


# Theological Lexicon of the New Testament



CESLAS SPICQ

*Translated and Edited by* JAMES D. ERNEST



## PREFACE

I have often been asked to bring together in one volume the NT word studies scattered throughout my previous works, especially in the commentaries. I could not simply collect them as they were, even filling in the references and bringing the bibliographies up to date. Still less could I think of producing an exhaustive work, a project so perfectly completed by the dictionaries of W. Bauer or Moulton-Milligan, not to mention the grammars, some of the articles in the *Theologisches Wörterbuch* of G. Kittel and G. Friedrich, and especially A. Deissmann's *Licht vom Osten* (Tübingen, 1923; ET *Light from the Ancient East*, New York, 1927), *Bibelstudien*, (Marburg, 1895) and *Neue Bibelstudien* (Marburg, 1897).

Not only do I study a restricted choice of words, but also *my intention is theological*. What interests me is not orthographic novelties, idioms, phonetics, or declensions, but the semantics and the religious and moral sense of the language of the NT. This language has its own rules and its own vocabulary. One cannot understand it except in light of the usages of the Greek language as it was spoken and written in the *oikoumene* of the first century, which is called "standard Koine," the popular language understood by the hearers and readers of the NT authors. That is why I have used many references—not only to the classical authors, but to the texts that are closest to the first century BC or AD. These references will undoubtedly be the most useful aspect of this work. Indeed, the many papyrological and epigraphical publications continually bring new findings. It is my goal to serve students of the Bible by placing conveniently at their disposal the fruit of my studies. "The person who knows the papyri a little meets at every turn in the NT, parallels of subject matter and form that allow him to gain a more vivid grasp of the words of Scripture."

# TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

In 1978 the original two volumes of Ceslas Spicq's *Notes de lexicographie néo-testamentaire* were published by Editions Universitaires of Fribourg, Switzerland (in the series *Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis*), and by Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht of Göttingen. These were followed four years later by a third volume, incorporating both newer material on some of the words covered in the original two volumes and also a large number of new entries. In 1991, Editions Universitaires collaborated with Cerf (Paris) in a single-volume reissue of the three-volume set. The reissue had a new title (*Lexique théologique du Nouveau Testament*) and merged the articles of the third volume into alphabetical order with the first two volumes but was otherwise unchanged. Meanwhile, an Italian translation had been published as a supplement to the Italian version of the Kittel-Friedrich *Theologisches Wörterbuch*.

For reasons evident from the foregoing, in a certain number of instances the same word is treated in more than one article. We have followed the lead of the French one-volume edition in declining to omit or rearrange any of the material. Readers may find all the places a particular word is discussed by using the index of Greek words provided for this edition and the cross-references supplied at the beginnings of some articles.

English-language versions of Père Spicq's three-volume *Agapè dans le Nouveau Testament* (though without the notes) and of a couple of smaller works have been published. His solid reputation among North American scholars, however, rests largely on his biblical commentaries, especially those on Hebrews and the Pastoral Epistles, which have not been translated into English. As the preface to the first French edition notes, it is from the commentaries that Père Spicq culled the material that makes up the *Theological Lexicon*; he had been asked to bring together his painstaking word studies in a single collection. When informed that an English translation would be made, he expressed satisfaction that his work would thus be made available to the English-speaking world. We regret that Père Spicq did not live to see the publication of this translation.

The usefulness of Père Spicq's work for New Testament scholars should be evident. Nowadays graduate students are much more likely to have seminars in more recent methodological subdisciplines—various forms of sociological, literary, or ideological criticism—than in epigraphy, papyrology, or lexicography. Practitioners of most of the newer methodologies, however, note the continuing fundamental importance of basic historical-critical work; in most cases, their intention is not to obviate it but rather to note its limitations and build upon it. They will not be spending their own time sorting through the

Fuad papyri or the Zeno archive, so they may be glad that Spicq and others have done it for them. This volume gives a summary of his findings plus references to hundreds of studies that today's biblical scholars might not easily find otherwise either because they were published in papyrological or epigraphical journals or *Festschriften* or else because they appeared too soon to be included in the computerized bibliographic databases upon which scholars increasingly rely.

Not only professional scholars in biblical studies and related fields, but also and especially pastors, teachers, and others interested in serious theological study of the Bible will profit from Spicq's work. In fact, Père Spicq's original preface points out that his primary interest was not in orthographical or grammatical details but in the religious or theological meaning of the words used in the biblical text. Obviously knowing some Greek is an advantage in using a work of this sort, but it is by no means an absolute requirement. For readers with little or no Greek, several conveniences have been supplied in the English version. In the main text, all of the Greek has been transliterated and where it seemed helpful translated as well. (The quotations in the footnotes, which are more likely to be helpful to scholars than to general readers, are printed in Greek characters.) Hebrew and Aramaic words are normally transliterated. The article titles are given in Greek characters, as in the original edition, but we have added transliterations; internal cross-references; cross-references to the Strong's word-numbering system used by Strong's *Concordance* and many other standard reference works; and English glosses.

It is important for readers to note that English glosses given with each article title are not original to Père Spicq; they have been added for the convenience of users of this work, especially those who do not know Greek. In a few odd cases a word or phrase has been lifted from Barclay Newman's *Concise Greek-English Dictionary of the New Testament* or from LSJ, but in general the glosses are extracted or otherwise derived from the articles themselves. (This procedure was necessary because sometimes Spicq disagrees with the commonly given definitions.) The glosses are intended to indicate concisely (not necessarily exhaustively) the range of meanings discussed within the article; thus they do not pretend to lexicographic rigor and should not be used as free-standing definitions. For words of special theological importance, no effort was made to represent in the gloss the semantic richness fully discussed in the article. The reader should consult the article to see which definitions Père Spicq applies to actual NT texts.

For the convenience of scholars, abbreviations for the papyri and inscriptions, as well as for classical works, have been standardized. The various bibliographies and tables of abbreviations are original to this edition. (The

completed tables were compared with those in the Italian edition as a way of checking for omissions.)

Readers who know some Greek should be aware that many irregular spellings—especially itacisms, but also others—will be encountered in quotations from the papyri and inscriptions. At times it was not obvious to me whether an odd spelling was original (and should thus be retained) or arose as a typographical error in the French edition. (Naturally, in a work of this complexity, especially since it was prepared in the days before personal computers made possible the elimination of human intervention between author's original notes and final published product, there were many typos, especially in the Greek and Hebrew fonts.) In a relatively small number of egregious cases, I checked the published edition of the papyrus or inscription in question, but time was not available to verify a significant percentage of the large numbers of such citations. When in doubt, I retained the spelling printed in the French edition. There are also dialectal spelling variations (most commonly, alpha instead of eta and xi instead of sigma) that will look like misspellings to readers unfamiliar with the main Greek dialects.

Spicq's studies draw on the whole classical and Hellenistic Greek literary corpus. He appears to have paid special attention to Jewish writers (Philo, Josephus) and later pagan writers (Plutarch). The special value of his work, however, is the extent to which it draws upon the nonliterary papyri and the inscriptions. Many readers will be to some extent familiar with the discovery of many new such sources over the past century and some of the lexicographic and grammatical work that has been done upon them (Deissmann, Moulton-Milligan, etc.). These papyri and inscriptions give us the language not as it was written by Plato five centuries before the birth of Christ but as it was used in everyday life by Greek and non-Greek peoples around the eastern Mediterranean during the early centuries of the spread of Christianity. Naturally, the language had changed. Readers of Spicq's articles will find many instances in which these nonliterary sources exemplify usages that make more sense of particular biblical passages than was possible before their discovery.

For readers who become interested in the social, economic, religious, and political institutions and circumstances constantly referred to in the papyri, various resources are available. Tarn and Griffith's *Hellenistic Civilization* is a recognized classic. An up-to-date and authoritative study of the Egyptian papyri from the third through the fifth centuries of the common era is Roger S. Bagnall's *Egypt in Late Antiquity*. Readers of Spicq may profitably consult Bagnall's appendices (on time, money and measures, and the nomes), brief glossary, and indexes for quick access to information on technical terms in the papyri. For the language of the papyri, readers may refer to the multivolume

grammatical work of Francis Gignac. A relatively recent work that demonstrates the way in which the nonliterary sources can illuminate and revise our understanding of the world in which ancient Christianity spread, especially with regard to popular religious life, is Robin Lane Fox's *Pagans and Christians*. This latter work is mentioned by way of noting that although the papyri and inscriptions do not now generate the same excitement among students of the Bible that they did not so many decades ago, neither are they yet "old hat"; in some ways they are still a largely unmined treasure for the study of early Christianity. Spicq's work is one of the best available entrees to this material for readers interested in exploring the theological meaning of the words used in the New Testament.

# α α

ἀγαθοποιέω, ἀγαθωσύνη

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*agathopoieō*, **to do good**; *agathōsynē*, **goodness**

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*agathopoieo*, S 15; TDNT 1.17–18; EDNT 1.4–5; NIDNTT 2.98, 100, 102; L&N 88.3; BAGD 2 | *agathosune*, S 19; TDNT 1.18; EDNT 1.7; NIDNTT 2.98, 100–101; MM 1; L&N 57.109, 88.1; BAGD 3

Classical Greek and Koine had different formulas for saying “do something good,” but it was the LXX – translating the hiphil of *yāṭaḥ* – then the *Letter of Aristeas* and the NT that were the first to use the combined form *agathopoieō*, unknown in the papyri.

In the OT, it refers to the performance of a good deed toward another, either by God or by a human. Thus Wis 1:12 juxtaposes “do good” and “do evil,” just as the Lord asks whether it is permitted on the Sabbath to do good or to do evil – *agathopoiēsai* or *kakopoiēsai* – to save a life or to take a life (Luke 6:9). In its first occurrence in the Sermon on the Mount, the verb, used with an object in the accusative, has the same sense: to render good in return for good. In Luke 6:35, however, it has a theological significance: “Love your enemies, do good,” because *agathopoieite* explicates *agapate* and shows that *agapē* love, when seen clearly and in action, manifests itself in doing good; the context proves that this type of love is proper to the sons of God.

On the other hand, if the four usages of *agathopoieō* in 1 Peter all have a religious meaning, since they refer the doing of good to the will of God and to God’s grace, the accent is not so much on the charity that gives and forgives, but on the virtue (cf. Gal 6:9–10), which is the virtue of servants who do well that which they ought to do or of wives who are faithful to the obligations attaching to their position (1 Pet 3:6). Doing good is opposed to doing evil (2:14; 3:17), transgressing (2:20).

In the same way, the noun *agathopoiia* refers to an upright moral life: “Let those who suffer according to the will of God entrust their souls to the faithful Creator in their doing of good.” Far from losing heart, or being paralyzed by panic, in these last days, Christians will occupy themselves with doing their best (cf. Eccl 9:10), seeking to fulfill the requirements of order and of justice: staying in their place, carrying out the responsibilities appropriate to their gender, their social status, and their function within the community (1 Pet 4:10; 5:2), having good morals, doing nothing blameworthy or mean. In short, their

manner of life, their conduct (*anastrophē*; 1:15, 18; 2:12; 3:1, 2, 16), should be commendable and appealing to pagans.

If Christians are marked by their good conduct, they will be known as an honest persons, *agathopoioi*: governors are appointed “to punish evildoers (*kakopoiōn*) and to praise doers of good” (1 Pet 2:14). This adjective, which places the beneficent or charming woman in contrast to the *ponēria* of the man in Sir 42:14, is attested only in three late papyri.

Closely related to *agathopoiia* is *agathōsynē*, a strictly biblical term, unknown in secular Greek and in the papyri. Its meaning is doubtful. Used more than a dozen times in the LXX (*tôb-tobah*), it refers to the beneficence that someone has shown (Judg 8:35; 2 Chr 24:16), to kind generosity (Neh 9:25, 35), to moral goodness, to well-being and happiness. It is used in the New Testament only by St. Paul, who sees it as a gift of God (2 Thess 1:11), a fruit of the Spirit (Gal 5:22) and of the light. This would be first of all goodwill or the intention to do that which is good, linked with the power of faith to accomplish it (2 Thess 1:11); then a right disposition of the soul, which we would call “kind feelings,” and which characterizes the person who is *agathos*, morally correct. This person’s excellence is seen in all areas: “in all goodness, justice, and truth” (Eph 5:9). But in the list of virtues in Gal 5:22, *agathōsynē* comes between *chrēstotēs* and faithfulness; it no longer means moral goodness so much as goodness of heart. St. Jerome made this excellent comment:

“Kindness or mellowness – the two senses of the Greek *chrēstotēs* – is a sweet, caressing, quiet virtue, disposed to sharing all of its goods; it invites familiarity; it is sweet in its words, steady in its ways. The Stoics briefly define it as a virtue naturally given to doing good. Goodness per se (*agathōsynē*) is not far removed from kindness, because it also is given to doing good. The difference is that goodness can be a bit somber and have knitted brows and an austere moral tone, doubtless doing good and giving what is asked of it, but without being mellow in its dealings or drawing everyone in with its sweetness.” Thus *agathōsynē* will always take care to obtain for others that which is useful or beneficial, but it can have a stern side and apply itself to correcting and punishing; kindness adds to this basic and active goodness a shading of cordiality and sweetness (cf. Eph 4:32; Col 3:12).

ἀγανακτέω, ἀγανάκτησις

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*aganakteō*, to be indignant; *aganaktēsis*, indignation

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*aganakteo*, S 23; EDNT 1.8; MM 1; L&N 88.187; BDF §229(2); BAGD 4 |  
*aganaktēsis*, S 24; EDNT 1.8; MM 1; L&N 88.186; BAGD 4



The etymology of these “emotional” terms has not been established. Common in the Hellenistic period, especially in literary Greek, they are rare in the classics, where they express the idea of bubbling and fermenting, first in the physical sense, then with respect to the soul that “is seething and irritated” like the gums of a person who is cutting teeth (Plato, *Phdr.* 251 c); “wailing with grief and roaring with anger”; “I am outraged at this encounter; my intestines are seething because I have to reply to this man” (Aristophanes, *Ran.* 1006; cf. *Vesp.* 287). Sometimes it is a case of mere discontent (Xenophon, *Hell.* 5.3.11), usually of indignation (Plato, *Ep.* 7.349d; Plutarch, *Cam.* 28.5; Diodorus Siculus 4.63.3), and especially anger.

The three occurrences of the verb in the LXX have a stronger meaning. Expressing God’s punishment of his enemies: “the waves of the sea rage (or boil) against them” (Wis 5:22); “in their suffering they became incensed at those whom they had taken for gods.” The connotations are quite varied in Philo and Josephus, first of all with respect to the subjects of the indignation: everyone, the people, even servants and slaves. But this emotion is often personalized: Laban is irritated (Philo, *Alleg. Interp.* 3.20), as are a seer (Josephus, *Ag. Apion* 1.204), the leading people of Daphne (*War* 1.245), members of the Sanhedrin (*Ant.* 14.179) and of the senate (*P.Oxy.* 1119, 8), the king (Philo, *Moses* 1.236, 292, 328; cf. *Rewards* 77; Josephus, *Ant.* 2.284; *War* 1.564), Tiberias (2.180), Titus (5.554; 6.352), Vespasian (4.189), etc. God himself is angry at the outrages committed by the Sodomites (*Ant.* 1.202) and “when people scorn the gifts that he gives them.” There is, after all, such a thing as legitimate indignation (Philo, *Decalogue* 112; *Moses* 1.244; *Spec. Laws* 3.42), as against an inhumane proceeding (Josephus, *War* 2.415), “violation of the holy places, pillage, and murder” (4.162), indignation “on behalf of the temple at Jerusalem” (*Ant.* 13.77), assaults (Philo, *Husbandry* 117) and murders (*Moses* 1.45), curses (*Decalogue* 75), defamation (*Flacc.* 35), and insulting behavior (*To Gaius* 361).

As the subject of and reason for the emotion varies, *aganakteō* and *aganaktēsis* take on varying connotations. An individual can be merely displeased or peeved (Josephus, *War* 1.564), but usually anger and rage are meant; indignation “that a person would claim for himself the honor due to God” (Philo, *Dreams* 2.99, 197), fury. Once a person’s emotions are stirred up (Josephus, *War* 1.471) and he is seething with indignation (1.438) or upset (6.203), he is unable to master his irritation (1.449), explodes (2.604), and – like Tiron “in his excessive fury” (1.544) – goes mad.

In the Gospels, *aganakteō* never means indignation or displeasure but anger. When the mother of Zebedee’s two sons asks that they be seated at Jesus’ left and right, “the ten, when they heard, were angry at the two brothers”

(Matt 20:24, *ēganaktēsan peri*; Mark 10:41). The leading priests and scribes, seeing the wonders worked by Jesus and the way in which the children were praising him, “became irritated” (Matt 21:15), as the ruler of the synagogue was angry at Jesus’ violation of the law of Sabbath rest (Luke 13:14, *aganaktōn hoti*) and as Jesus himself “became angry” when his disciples forbade parents to bring their children to him.

The substantive *aganaktēsis* appears only once in the NT, regarding the repentance of the Corinthians who had rebelled against the apostle’s authority but whose regret was reported by Titus. *Alla aganaktēsini* is usually translated “what indignation” (2 Cor 7:11), referring to their feeling about their offense; but we are to understand that they felt horror at what they had done. Today we would say “they were distraught” at their blindness.

ἀγάπη

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*agapē*, love

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*agape*, S 26; TDNT 1.21–55; EDNT 1.8–12; NIDNTT 2.538–551; MM 2; L&N 23.28, 25.43; BDF §163; BAGD 5–6; ND 4.258–259

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The etymology of *agapaō* is obscure. E. Boisacq and E. Stauffer offer no verdict, Blass and Debrunner say not a word, E. Risch and H. J. Mette admit their ignorance, as does P. Chantraine. A. Ceresa-Gastaldo suggests a link to the Sanskrit *pā* with the sense of shelter or protect, and an analogy with the Greek *posis*. A. Carnoy posits the primitive meaning “greet in a friendly manner” and goes back to the Indo-European *ghabh*, in Sanskrit *gabhasi*, “hand,” with reference to the Homeric Greeks, who took each other’s hand as a sign of friendship. I myself would be tempted to trace this verb to the root *aga*, “very”; we know that the Greek *agē* means “admiration, astonishment.” Hence, no doubt, the first usages of this term in the sense of welcome: the surprise of the host who receives a stranger. At any rate, the only adequate translation is “love in the sense of charity”; in Latin, *caritas* or *dilectio*.

The Greeks had four terms for expressing the major senses of love. First, *storgē* (*stergō*) refers either to the tender feelings that parents naturally feel toward their children or children toward their siblings and parents, or to the bond that unites husband and wife, and also takes in sympathy for friends and compatriots. *Erōs* (*eraō*), no doubt derived from an ancient neuter *\*eras*, is not found in the New Testament; it expresses above all unreasoning passion and desire (an *alogos orexis*), the desire of the wolf for the sheep. Although it is often used with no negative connotation, this word for a type of covetousness

can hardly express a love that is specifically divine, if only because it does not inspire respect.

Friendship or amity (*philia*, *phileō*) moves on an entirely different plane, even though it often refers to affection pure and simple, attachment, sympathy, always marked by a kindly attitude, and good will. But the Greek philosophers, especially Aristotle, turned it into a very elaborate concept. Strictly speaking, friendship wants reciprocity, does not take root except within a defined group of persons – thus we refer to “a pair of friends” – and above all between persons of the same standing: *amicitia pares aut invenit aut facit*. If, then, in certain usages *phileō* is very close to *agapaō*, the former verb was hardly appropriate for expressing a love that unites God and humans and extends even to enemies, especially since the noun *agapē* did not enter literary usage, except in the LXX, before the first century.

So what does *agapē* mean in the NT? It is the most rational kind of love, inasmuch as it involves recognition and judgment of value, whence its frequent nuance of “preference.” The verb *agapaō* most often means “value, set great store by, hold in high esteem”; it is a love with deep respect (1 Pet 2:17), which often goes along with admiration and can become adoration. This esteem and goodwill tend to be expressed in appropriate words and deeds. Unlike other loves, which can remain hidden in the heart, it is essential to charity to manifest itself, to demonstrate itself, to provide proofs, to put itself on display; so much so that in the NT it would almost always be necessary to translate *agapē* as “demonstration of love.” This affection – unlike *erōs*, which in the literature brings endless suffering and disaster – is accompanied by contentment, since the ordinary meaning of *agapaō* is to be happy, satisfied. But in Christian usage, since it is a divine love, coming from heaven (Rom 5:5), it will be joyful and already a foretaste of blessedness.

Finally, and perhaps above all, while friendship is properly used only of a relationship between equals, *agapē* links persons of different conditions: with rulers, benefactors, and fathers; it is a disinterested and generous love, full of thoughtfulness and concern. It is in this sense that God is *agapē* and loves the world. With those who are indebted, for inferiors, for subjects, this *agapē*, which is first of all consent, welcome, acceptance, is expressed in gratitude: it is the love inspired in turn by generous love – which is the meaning in 1 John 4:10 – and it is translated into acclaim, applause, tokens of respect, congratulations, praises, and even veneration, so that Christian *agapē* is expressed in liturgy and worship: “To the one who loves us ... to him be the glory and the power for ever and ever” (*Tō agapōnti hēmas ... autō hē doxa kai to kratos eis tous aiōnas tōn aiōnōn*, Rev 1:5–6).

The verb *agapaō* makes its first appearance in Homer, and *agapēsis* is used in the classical period, but the noun *agapē* is unknown before its usage in the LXX. When it is attested before the Christian era, it is almost exclusively in Hellenic Judaism, and in each case it has a religious meaning. One is inclined to think that it is not a biblical neologism but was borrowed by the inspired writers from the popular language of Egypt. In any case, contrary to what is often written, no certain attestation is available in any papyrus from the pre-Christian era.

*P.Berlin* 9869, an unintelligible fragment, has often been cited: *en tois malista agapēs*. But not only do the editors point the final sigma as doubtful, but they also put a question mark both after their restoration and after the word *agapē* in the index. Actually, the papyrus is mutilated; several letters have to be restored, and one could just as easily read the noun *agapēseōs*, the participle *agapēsas*, or the future *agapēseis*. These verbal forms seem all the more likely since this is a philosophical dialogue, and Aristotle frequently uses *mallon* or *malista agapaō*. Moreover, the date of this papyrus is unknown, and no positive data concerning its date are given.

To this text, which is doubtful, to say the least, E. Stauffer adds *P.Paris* 49, 3, dated by its editor W. Brunet de Presle to 164–58 BC. But this citation should be challenged, because after F. Blass aired his doubts on this reading, A. Deissmann consulted M. Pierret, conservator of Egyptian antiquities at the Louvre. The latter, after examining the papyrus, concluded, “One finds in papyrus no. 49 not a trace of the word *agapē*, but only on line 6 something that looks like it reads *tarachēn*.” On the authority of U. Wilcken, I shall adopt this reading: *dia te t[on] Sarapin kai tēn sēn eleuthe[ria]n kai pepeiramai*.

The other texts brought forward are either suspect or of unverifiable date, and E. Peterson has shown that none of them are admissible. An inscription from Tefeny in Pisidia, from the time of the empire, though the date can be narrowed down no further, reads: *penpsei d' eis aga[pē]n se philommeidēs Apphodeitē*, but A. Deissmann has proved that the word must be restored *ag[atho]n*, not *agapēn*. In *Lib.* 13a.3, Philodemus of Gadara (first century BC) wrote *philēsei kai di' a[g]apēs*; but W. Crönert, who had not cited the text without caution in his new edition of F. Passow's *Wörterbuch der griechischen Sprache* (2 d ed., 1912), finally rejects it in adopting the reading *di' agapēseōs*.

*P.Oxy.* XI, 1380, from the beginning of the second century AD, preserves a list of cultic names attributed in different places to the goddess Isis Polyōnymos. In the Egyptian villae of Thonis, she was invoked: *ēn Thōni agap[ēn ...]ō*. E. Peterson finds the conjecture unconvincing and reads *agap[ētēn]*. At line 109, the first editors, Grenfell-Hunt (1915) read A[...]THN AΘ-ΟΛΟΝ = *en Italia agapēn theōn*. But G. de Manteuffel, in making a more

attentive collation of this papyrus, which is conserved at the Bodleian, observed: “The epithet *agapē theōn* is very curious. The word *theōn* does not exist in the manuscript. τ instead of θ is a frequent enough mistake in the papyri. The greatest difficulty is in the division of the word *atholos*, but perhaps it can be explained in terms of the continuous script.” So the proper restoration is: *en Italia a[ga]thēn atholon*.

We must therefore conclude that the term *agapē*, derived from *agapaō* (and not from *agapēsis*) is proper to the Koine. If the LXX gave the word its theological density, it also existed in the pagan language, but it is not attested before the first century AD. It is nevertheless worth noting the names formed on this root, such as in the second century BC *Agapēnōr*, a name similar to that of the founder of the city of Paphos, *Agapōmenos* at Lindos, *Agapis* son of Annianos Neuthēnos, near the city of Carthage, and *Agapios*. Among women, we note *Agapēma* and of course *Agapē*, which is common but which seems to have been used especially among the higher social classes, as in the second century AD in Phrygia: *hē kratistē Domna Agapē*.

It is important to bring up to date H. Riesenfeld’s excellent bibliography on *agapē* and to complete the one that I myself began almost twenty years ago:

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ἀγαρεύω

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*angareuō*, to requisition

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*aggareuo*, S 29; *EDNT* 1.12; MM 2–3; L&N 37.34; BDF §§6, 42(2), 392(1e); BAGD 6; ND 2.77

This verb of oriental, probably Iranian, origin comes from *angaros*, which in Persian refers to the post riders who carried royal dispatches from relay post to relay post. As this official delivery service involved requiring people to provide services and enlisting people as well as provisions, draft animals, or lodging, it came to mean “to requisition” and in general to make someone do something against his will. This explains its pejorative flavor from Menander to modern times, and well attested in the NT: the soldiers requisition Simon of Cyrene to carry the cross of Jesus.

The Egyptian papyri give examples of the many requisitions that were made for pack animals and drivers, farm animals, wheat and the barges that carried it, work, and provisions. Normally, it was by public authority that individuals were coerced, but many requisitions were arbitrary or illegitimate. This accounts for the numerous claims of individuals who complained that they had been wronged, and hence the numerous interventions of sovereigns and prefects from the second century BC onward forbidding royal officers and soldiers to make requisitions for their personal interests. In 118, a decree (*prostagma*) of King Euergetes II and Queens Cleopatra II and Cleopatra III ordered: “Generals and other functionaries do not have the right to require the inhabitants of the country to work for their private interests, nor to use their beasts for their own purposes ... nor to make them supply geese, fowl, wine, or grain, whether for money as a bribe for the renewal of their appointment, nor in short to make them work for free on any pretext.”

These facts and the number of documents that exhibit them show how frequent and burdensome these *angareiai* were. They show precisely the significance of the precept of the Sermon of the Mount: “If anyone requisitions you for a mile, go with him two miles.”

The case is so classic that it had perhaps become a topic of popular philosophy and of diatribe. At any rate, Epictetus also takes it up; but he advises only to comply for fear of suffering greater evils: “If an unforeseen requisition arises and a soldier takes your young ass, let it go. Do not resist, do not murmur, lest you receive blows as well as lose the ass” (4.1.79). For the sake of love, our Lord says to acquiesce just as he said to bless persecutors. This attitude of acceptance toward impudent and vexatious people becomes a major theme of New Testament ethics: one must overcome evil with good. The paradox of going two miles when only one was demanded puts the emphasis on interior good will, on its promptness and sincerity – or rather on the authentic *agapē* that is manifested in deed and in truth (1 John 3:18), in the most costly fashion (John 15:13). According to the principle of John 3:21, “The one who does the truth comes to the light,” it was because Simon of Cyrene freely accepted his *angareia* that he and his children received the grace of faith.

ἀγοράζω

*agorazō*, to buy

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*agorazo*, S 59; TDNT 1.124–128; EDNT 1.23; NIDNTT 1.267–268; MM 6; L&N 37.131, 57.188; BDF §179(1); BAGD 12–13

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This utterly commonplace verb originally meant “to go to market,” then “to buy, make purchases,” the counterpart of “to sell.” The NT uses it to designate redemption, emphasizing that there has been a transfer of property (Rev 14:3–4) and noting that the price has been paid: “You are no longer your own, because you have been bought and paid for” (*ēgorasthēte gar timēs*, 1 Cor 6:20). This mention of payment is significant; for, in the Hellenistic era, the contract of sale is not completed by the mere exchange of agreements; the seller must have received the *timē*, at least the partial down payment that guarantees good faith and excludes the possibility of retraction. Only the payment of the price accomplishes the purchase of the property; so much so that the seller maintains his right to the item until he has received payment for it. This is why so many contracts mention that the payment has in fact been made. In accord with these usages, Rev 5:9 specifies that the purchase has been accomplished by the blood of Christ; 1 Pet 1:19 that the price of the ransom was the precious blood, and this – according to Eph 1:7 – was the means of redemption (*apolytrōsis*).

2 Pet 2:1 stigmatizes the false prophets who deny the Master (*despotēs* is the normal term for the owner of a slave, cf. 1 Tim 6:1–2) who purchased them, and 1 Cor 7:23 comments: “You have been bought and paid for! Do not become slaves of humans.” As a result, the purchase-redemption by Christ is a metaphor that evokes the freeing of slaves who gained their liberty through a fictive sale to the divinity, notably to the Pythian Apollo of Delphi; the owner, accompanied by his slave, whom he is leading to the god, presents himself at the sanctuary; the priest remits to the master the agreed price, which has been paid to him beforehand either by the slave himself or by his friends. The act of emancipation was inscribed on the walls of the temple: the master has sold his slave (*apedoto*) so that he is free; the god accepts the abandoned one, purchases him, and guarantees his protection. Henceforth the emancipated one is known as “sacred, slave of the goddess, being the god’s” (*hieros, doulētheas, tou theou ōn*) considering himself as consecrated to the service of the deity. That which was only a legal fiction in paganism is precisely the truth in Christianity. “Those who are in Christ” cannot revert to their former servitude. The one who has paid the price of their emancipation requires that they be faithful to his worship and his service.



ἀγωγή

*agōgē*, **conduct**

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*agoge*, S 72; *TDNT* 1.128–129; *EDNT* 1.25; *NIDNTT* 3.935; MM 8; L&N 41.3; BAGD 14–15

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St. Paul praises Timothy for having followed him “in teaching, *conduct*, purpose, faith, patience ...” (2 Tim 3:10). Clearly, the NT hapax *agōgē*, here used in a figurative sense, should be translated “conduct, manner of life.” It is sometimes used in a derogatory sense, for foul schemes, but for the most part it expresses either the culture or the conduct or manner of life peculiar to a given race or a given individual (Diodorus Siculus 5.26), such as Esther, who changed nothing of her ways (Esth 2:20), or the Jews who preferred their particular way of life, or Herod entreating, “Let everyone consider my age, the life that I lead (*tēn agōgēn tou biou*) and my piety” (Josephus, *War* 1.462).

Frequently – and this nuance is discernible in 2 Tim 3:10 – this conduct is adopted in imitation of a master, of a model, of ancestors. This is what St. Paul called “my ways in Christ” (*tas hodous mou tas en Christō*). The subject for imitation, then, is not the conduct of the person but the manner of life of the apostle. It has to do with conforming to the requirements of the faith that are transmitted in the *didaskalia* and bear upon customs and specific mores: practical, observable applications. In the Pastorals, which develop a theology of beauty, this *agōgē* of the apostle seems to involve a sense of the brilliance or splendor (cf. Phil 3:17; 4:9) that this term can connote in the first century, and which is at the same time a characteristic of virtue and a grace of the apostle (2 Cor 4:6).

ἀδιαλείπτως

*adialeiptōs*, **unceasingly**

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*adialeiptos*, S 88; *EDNT* 1.31; *NIDNTT* 3.229–230; L&N 68.55; BAGD 179

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This adverb, which means “without interruption, incessantly,” presents no difficulties. It is peculiar to the Koine and is not used in the Old Testament except in the books of the Maccabees. But twice it qualifies continual prayer, just as according to the *Letter of Aristeas* the priests maintain religious services without interruption. This is the only sense in which the word is used by St.

Paul, who is the only NT writer to use it; hence it has a theological value, but one that is hard to pin down precisely.

The expression “make mention” of someone in prayer is traditional. In general, people did one *proskynēma* each day; but it was not extraordinary for this remembering before the deity to be referred to as perpetual. Not only did St. Paul give thanks always (*pantote*) and on every occasion (*en panti kairō*), day and night, but he agreed to register in the order of widows only women who had persevered night and day in prayer (1 Tim 5:5), and he instructed all Christians to “pray continually.” How is this to be understood? This precept should be linked to that of the Master when he bade his disciples to “pray under all circumstances and never give up,” and understood in light of the tireless diligence of the primitive church in supplication.

But does the choice of the adverb *adialeiptōs* have some special significance? The papyri shed hardly any light, except that they corroborate the sense “continual, uninterrupted” and several times the nuance “without giving in to weakness.” A single pagan inscription mentions perseverance in prayer in this way: “I, Isio, son of Kallimachos, kinsman of the king, came and passed my time adoring our lady Isis.” Indeed, only the Christian religion gives this term for prayer its correct meaning. Certainly the point is not the counting of verbal invocations, which would run afoul of the prohibition against *battalogia*; and at any rate, even prayer day and night assumes some breaks. Taken therefore in a qualitative sense, *adialeiptōs* is hyperbolic. It expresses the positive aspect of the attitude of watchfulness that characterizes the servant of God in the end times, when it is necessary to go without sleep (Luke 21:36; Eph 6:18). It would not be adequate to make an equation with what we call today “the spirit of prayer,” a readiness to place oneself in the presence of God. It would be better to see it as “a spiritual life dominated by the presence of God” and as a perpetual communion with God, after the fashion of a shoot vitally connected to the vine stock. If it is true that, according to the NT, the Christian life consists in the living out of the theological virtues, then the believer’s connection with the three divine Persons is continual, first of all as a creature who is radically and permanently dependent on the Almighty and then as a child of God in a dynamic relationship of love with the One who has predestined him to “exist in love.” We may speak of prayer without ceasing when the heart does not cease to be oriented toward God, just as love never stops or slackens when one’s attention is temporarily diverted away from the beloved: everything is seen with reference to the beloved.

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*adunaton*, S 102; TDNT 2.284–317; EDNT 1.33–34; NIDNTT 2.601, 606; MM 10; L&N 71.3, 74.22; BDF §127(2); BAGD 19

The impossibility of the conversion of the apostate (Heb 6:4) is a difficult theological problem. What kind of *adynaton* is this? In the OT, the term sometimes points to an absolute impossibility, like that of escaping the hand of God (Wis 16:15), but usually it denotes a relative or conditional impossibility, like the possibility that Onias could achieve a peaceful settlement without the intervention of the king. In Jer 13:3, it is a rhetorical figure for expressing an absurd supposition, an event considered impossible because it is contrary to the laws of nature.

Clearly context is everything. In the NT, almost all the occurrences are religious, and we should compare our text closely with the response of Jesus to the problem of the salvation of the rich and of everyone: “with humans this is impossible, but with God all things are possible” (*para anthrōpois touto adynaton estin, para de theō panta dynata*). Or again: “It is impossible that the blood of bulls and goats should obliterate sins” (Heb 10:4) or that one could be pleasing to God without faith (11:6), because such is the providential disposition of the economy of salvation. In the case of apostates, it is not stated that they will not be pardoned, but they are denied the possibility of reforming themselves and repenting, given their spiritual bearing and the nature of their sin: having rejected God, after having seen the light of the faith, they are psychologically incapable of making another about-face; that would be contradictory to their apostate condition. The best parallel is perhaps Philo: “It is not easy, and perhaps even impossible, for a defiant spirit to be educated.”

Certainly, that which is impossible for humans is possible for God, and the whole gospel bears witness that divine initiative can change the spiritual condition of apostates, bring to them to a light and a power that will destroy the aforementioned impossibility. But on the one hand the context emphasizes the seriousness of the crime – “crucifying for themselves the Son of God and holding him up for public ridicule” – in order to conclude that such a soul is “rejected and close to destruction; its end is to be burned” (verse 8); on the other hand, it seems that this sin of apostasy can be assimilated to the sin against the light and the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, which is forgiven neither in this world nor in the one to come.

*atheteō*, to set aside, abrogate, reject; *athetēsis*, abrogation, rejection

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*atheteo*, S 114; TDNT 8.158–159; EDNT 1.35; NIDNTT 1.74; MM 12; L&N 31.100, 76.24; BAGD 21 | *athetesis*, S 115; TDNT 8.158–159; EDNT 1.35; MM 12; L&N 13.36, 76.24; BAGD 21; ND 2.77

The etymology of this verb (*tithēmi* with alpha-privative), literally “set aside,” hardly provides a precise statement of its meaning in the language of the New Testament, but its use is varied as well as precise. First, there is the legal sense, “to abrogate, abolish, declare invalid”; thus the institution of the Aaronic priesthood has been abolished (Heb 7:18) and Christ has been manifested to destroy the reign of sin by his own sacrifice (9:26). In both cases, *athetēsis* is chosen to express a judicial and official annulment; the hereditary priesthood is radically abolished; sin can never regain its power, since it has been conquered by the blood of Christ. *Athetēsis* is synonymous with *akyrōsis*, “annulment.”

In common usage, this “destruction” is only a repudiation, a refusal, or a withdrawal; one challenges an authority: “The one who rejects you rejects me, and the one who rejects me rejects the one who sent me”; one goes back on one’s word or perjures oneself. Hence, *athetēsis* smacks of perfidy. This sense is the one that attaches to *atheteō*, used sixty times in the LXX, where it translates seventeen Hebrew words, but most frequently *bāgaḏ*, “deceive, be unfaithful, betray,” and *pāša*’, “defect, revolt,” with the result that in biblical usage this verb almost always means “be unfaithful,” to revolt, or to betray, with the sense of “deceive” or “scorn.” Hence the comparison in Jer 3:20 – “As a woman betrays her lover, so have you betrayed me, house of Israel.” It is not just a matter of violating an agreement, or even of breaking with a person (cf. Polybius 11.36.10), but of going back on one’s decision and lying to most holy God.

It is in light of these texts that we must read 1 Tim 5:12, where the young widows, when their desires are stirred up against Christ, want to remarry, “having [their] condemnation, because they have rejected their former faith.” This *pistis* is not theological faith but the commitment of the widow to serve Christ and the poor, and doubtless also not to remarry. To revoke an agreement is to be unfaithful and to perjure oneself, to act toward God like a woman who betrays her lover.

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αἰδώς, ἀναιδέια

*aidōs*, modesty; *anaideia*, shamelessness

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*aidos*, S 127; TDNT 1.169–171; EDNT 1.37; NIDNTT 3.826–827, 829; MM 13; L&N 88.49; BDF §47(4), 126(1b); BAGD 22 | *anaideia*, S 335; EDNT 1.81; MM 33; L&N 66.12; BDF §23; BAGD 54

After the manner of the pagan cults, which often regulated the grooming of their participants – clothing, jewelry, hair – St. Paul instructs the Ephesian women, when they pray at church, to adorn themselves with decency and sobriety (*meta aidous kai sōphrosynēs kosmein heautas*, 1 Tim 2:9), because the right way for a woman to arrange or accouter herself is to observe the rules of modesty and decency.

*Aidōs* (from *aidomai*, to fear, respect) is a very old Greek concept expressing the respectful and secret fear that one feels toward oneself (Democritus, frag. 264, Diels). With the Stoics it became a leading virtue. Plutarch distinguishes *aidōs*, “which often allows itself to be led by reason and places itself under the same laws,” from an unhealthy shame whose hesitations and delays are contrary to reason. In the first century AD, this sentiment is sometimes that of shame, notably the shame of soldiers who are in flight and know that they are defeated, hence awareness of guilt; it is sometimes that of respect for others, the consideration owed others. It is then a restraint, a dignity, a modesty, or a discretion that keeps one from excess; thus a self-respect and a sense of honor that is often identified with modesty.

This virtue finds its highest expression in women. Philo explains why there was a wall of separation between Therapeutai and Therapeutrides, “to respect the modesty appropriate to the feminine nature,” and he personifies the virtue as a woman who has “colors which are those of modesty ... simple clothing, but more precious than gold, wisdom and virtue for her finery” (*Sacr. Abel and Cain* 26). This is the closest parallel to 1 Tim 2:9.

If *aidōs* is sometimes associated with the agreeable equilibrium that is *epieikeia*, it much more frequently connotes fear and even *eulabeia*, the feeling of reverence that one experiences in the presence of majesty, whether of the emperor or of God himself. It is in this sense that Christians offer worship to God (*latreuein meta aidous kai eulabeias*, cf. Heb 12:28).

If *aidōs* (Latin *verecundia*) keeps one from committing an act unworthy of oneself, makes one avoid that which is base, *anaideia* (NT hapax) is effrontery or impudence that shrinks from no means of achieving its goals. It is the *anaideia* of the importunate friend who gets the three loaves that he asks for in the middle of the night. This noun is rare in the papyri: it is found in a list of words (*P.Cair.Zen.* 59534, 21); in the complaint of Kronion, priest of Tebtunis in the second century, victim of the extreme insolence of Kronios; in the complaint of Aurelius, attacked in the third century by a basely impudent



woman; and finally in an elegiac poem on Meleager. If the Lord praises this boldness, it is because he has just instructed his disciples to pray to the heavenly Father and ask that his name be sanctified. But in accordance with *aidōs* – the religious fear that one experiences in the presence of the sacred – believers would be careful about being too free with their demands, would be hesitant to hail the holy God in an impetuous fashion, with too little concern for propriety. In truth, a child knows nothing of this timidity, but “pours out her heart” (1 Sam 1:15) before her Father, and the tradition of Israel validates this importunity. It is a form of *parrhēsia*.

### αἰσχροκερδής, ἀφιλάργυρος

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*aischrokerdēs*, **eager for shameful gain**; *aphilargyros*, **free of the love of money**

→see also ἀφιλάργυρος; φιλαργυρία, φιλάργυρος

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*aischrokerdes*, S 146; *EDNT* 1.41; *NIDNTT* 3.564; L&N 25.26; BAGD 25 | *aphilarguros*, S 866; *EDNT* 1.183; MM 98; L&N 25.109; BAGD 126

The Pharisees are stigmatized as “loving money,” and according to 2 Tim 3:2 people in the last days will be *philargyroi*; which can mean miserliness – often associated with meanness – as well as covetousness. This is a vice of priests (*Levi* 17.1), above all of sophists, “vendors of words” who shamefully hawk wisdom, and of false teachers (Titus 1:11). This *philargyria* is the “root of all evils.”

Thus we can see the message of Heb 13:5 to its readers as being “Let your ways, or conduct, be free of all greed (*aphilargyros ho tropos*); be content with what you have.” The Greek Fathers supposed that the Hebrews had suffered or been threatened with the loss of their goods (10:34) and must have been trying too eagerly to rebuild their resources or guarantee their material security. At any rate, trusting in Providence excludes any preoccupation with tomorrow, and one must be self-sufficient (*arkeō*, Matt 25:9; Luke 3:14; John 6:7; 1 Tim 6:8) with that which one currently has at one’s disposal. In moral theology, *aphilargyria* and *tharreō theō* are linked.

St. Paul requires that the candidate for overseer at Ephesus be *aphilargyros* (1 Tim 3:3), that the Cretan overseer not be eager for shameful gain, *mē aischrokerdē* (Titus 1:7), and similarly the deacons (1 Tim 3:8). St. Peter urges the presbyters to shepherd the flock of God “not for sordid gain (*aischrokerdōs*), but out of devotion.” The office of the presbyter is above all pastoral and is not a sinecure: watchfulness and continual care for the sheep,

providing food, guiding the movements of the flock (Num 27:17; Ps 80:2), leading them to pasture (2 Sam 5:2; Isa 40:11; Ezek 34:15; Ps 23; 95:7), keeping the sheep from dispersing and bringing back the strays (1 Kgs 22:17; Isa 53:6; Zech 11:16; 13:7; Ps 119:176), defending them against savage beasts (Exod 22:13; 1 Sam 17:34; Amos 3:12; Isa 31:4) and thieves (Gen 31:39; Job 1:17). Much courage and self-denial is therefore necessary in a “good shepherd” who seeks only the good of the flock and does not exploit them to his own profit. All shepherds are susceptible to the degeneration of the hireling who is transformed by the spirit of lucre into a shameless profiteer.

This probably explains why, in discussing ministers of the church, St. Paul and St. Peter substitute for the simple *aphilargyros* the highly pejorative *aischrokerdēs*. A “steward” in the household of God has a subordinate function. He will have to turn over his accounts to his *Kyrios* (Luke 12:42–48); his uprightness, which must be beyond suspicion, is an essential element of the “ethic of the *oikonomos*” prescribed by the Lord to his servants. This ethic opposes the service of mammon to the service of God (Luke 16:10–13). Xenophon had already defined it: “a good manager must not touch the goods of his master or steal them.” The Christian steward will be disinterested, no doubt in accord with *agapē* (1 Cor 13:5), but first of all in the name of honesty. His freedom from lust for money will guarantee not only his uprightness in the management of material goods but also his compassion toward all the miseries of his neighbors, because it is avarice that hardens the heart.

αἰφνίδιος, αἰφνιδίως, ἐξαίφνης

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*aiphnidios*, **sudden**; *aiphnidiōs*, *exaiphnēs*, **suddenly**

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*aiphnidios*, S 160; EDNT 1.44; MM 16; L&N 67.113; BAGD 26 | *exaiphnes*, S 1810; EDNT 2.1; MM 221; L&N 67.113; BDF §25; BAGD 272

Derived from *aiphnēs-aipsa*, the adjective *aiphnidios* (“sudden, unforeseeable”) is used for an unexpected arrival (Thucydides 8.14.1), but usually for a development that causes fear. The courage of the optimist is seen in his remaining “unruffled and imperturbable when some cause for fear unexpectedly appears” (Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 3.11.1117), such as an epidemic (“pride is overcome by the sudden and unexpected [*to aiphnidion kai aprosdokēton*], that which does not conform to expectations,” Thucydides 2.61.3) or especially death: “an unexpected death suddenly took his life” (Aeschylus, *PV* 680); “God who is responsible for sudden deaths”; especially in decrees of consolation, as at Cyzicus, at Sebaste in Phrygia (*SEG* VI, 189, 4), etc.

The LXX uses the adjective only twice: for a sudden and unexpected fear (*aipnidos kai aprosdokētos phobos*, Wis 17:14), and for the sudden and terrifying arrival of enemies. Philo uses it a few times in a positive sense (the sudden light of wisdom, *Sacr. Abel and Cain* 78; *Migr. Abr.* 156, 184; *Dreams* 2.137) or in the neutral sense of a sudden change (*Alleg. Interp.* 1.17; *Flacc.* 154), but the other occurrences are all pejorative: the wind and the storm that capsize ships (*Cherub.* 38; *Husbandry* 174–176; *Spec. Laws* 4.201), sudden floods (*Dreams* 2.125), the rising tide and waves that cause disasters (*Moses* 1.179; 2.254), a cloud of dust that causes a cruelly painful ulceration (*ibid.* 1.127), lightning that annihilates with one strike (*ibid.* 2.154, 283), the sudden collapse of a wall (*Etern. World* 129), the sudden attacks of criminals (*Spec. Laws* 1.75), the sudden death of animals as the prelude to pestilential epidemics (*Moses* 1.133). This suddenness is also a characteristic of evil: the sudden inability to grasp the idea of the good and keep it in oneself (*Giants* 20); errors attack the soul all at once and besmirch it (*Flight* 115); the sudden loss of moral precepts (*Unchang. God* 89; cf. 26); a sudden dissoluteness (*Spec. Laws* 3.126; *Rewards* 146); “a sudden and unexpected trouble seized them” (*aipnidos kai aprosdokētos tarachē*, *Joseph* 211); “a blind and sudden onset of folly and rage” (*Flacc.* 140).

In Josephus, reference is also made to disasters that strike terror (*War* 5.472), to shakings of the earth (*Ant.* 4.51), to sudden death and sickness (7.325; 12.413; *Life* 48), to sudden reversals of fortune (18.197), and thus sudden fear (9.199). Suddenness is often neutral, however: the wind changes suddenly (*War* 7.318), a cloud descends suddenly (*Ant.* 4.326), flame suddenly bursts out (3.207; *War* 4.180), someone shows up unexpectedly (*Life* 253), guards wake up suddenly (*War* 6.69), defenders suddenly open the gates (4.553; *Ant.* 7.139); but especially attacks by soldiers are so described.

In his warnings concerning the last days, the Lord urges vigilance, as at the prospect of a cataclysm. This is not the time for spiritual lethargy: “Watch yourselves, lest your hearts be weighed down with excessive eating and drinking and the preoccupation of life, lest that day come upon you unawares (*epistē eph’ hymas aipnidos hē hēmera ekeinē*) like a snare” (Luke 21:34). The unexpectedness of the coming of the divine Judge is supposed to inspire fear and thus wakefulness – a meaning of *aipnidos* that conforms completely with classical Greek, the LXX, and Philo and is comparable to *en tachei* in the parable of the Widow and the Judge. Thus the word here has a technical sense, almost equivalent to “formidable.” St. Paul retains it: “When they say, ‘Peace and security,’ then ruin will suddenly befall them (*tote aipnidos autois ephistatai olethros*), like the pains of a woman in labor” (1 Thess 5:3); the unforeseen character of the distress makes it all the harder to bear.

With the same meaning: “Watch, for you do not know when the master of the house is coming ... lest coming suddenly (*mē elthōn exaiphnēs*) he find you sleeping” (Mark 13:36). The compound form *exaiphnēs*, referring to an unforeseen arrival, one that is not announced, for which there was no warning, is almost synonymous with the simple *aiphnidios* and could be translated “instantaneously, all at once.” In the LXX, with a single exception, it is used only in the context of disaster (Prov 24:22; Isa 47:11 – *apōleia*); the desert wind striking the house, which collapses, burying the children (Job 1:19); suddenly falling prey to creditors (Hab 2:7); “in an instant, in a single day, the loss of children and widowhood” (Isa 47:9); “suddenly devastation comes to us” (Jer 6:26); “on the mother I have made sudden sleeplessness and terror to fall” (Jer 15:8). Philo, who gives this adverb the meaning “rapidly,” uses it sometimes in a positive, even a religious sense, or in a neutral context: to appear suddenly (*Sacr. Abel and Cain* 26), to burst in suddenly (*Flacc.* 113; *To Gaius* 217), a statue set up unexpectedly (*To Gaius* 337). By far the commonest use, however, is with woes: lightning that destroys everything (*Alleg. Interp.* 3.227), a torrent that overflows (*Post. Cain* 113), a ship that suddenly wrecks at port after a safe voyage (*Dreams* 2.143; cf. *Virtues* 49), bad weather and disasters (*Abraham* 138; *Moses* 1.118; *Etern. World* 141), human misery.

Like *aiphnidios*, the adverb *exaiphnēs* means “suddenly, all at once,” like the light that shone around Paul on the Damascus road (Acts 9:3; 22:6), as well as “immediately, immediately afterward, forthwith.” When the angel had announced the birth of a Savior to the shepherds of Bethlehem, “suddenly” there was with the angel “a large number of the host of heaven praising God” (Luke 2:13); “a spirit seizes him (the epileptic), and suddenly he screams” (Luke 9:39); this meaning is entirely classical: “as soon as he heard their sudden bitter cry, ... he said” (Sophocles, *OC* 1610); the judge sees each soul “immediately after death” (Plato, *Grg.* 523 *e*; cf. *Cra.* 396 *b*). The LXX has this usage: “these woes, from which you will not quickly extricate yourselves” (Mic 2:3), as do Philo (*Creation* 113) and Josephus (*Ant.* 7.225).

ἄκακος

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*akakos*, **good, beneficent, innocent**

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*akakos*, S 172; TDNT 3.482; EDNT 1.48; NIDNTT 1.561, 563; MM 17; L&N 31.34, 88.2; BAGD 29

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This adjective is used only twice in the NT (Rom 16:18; Heb 7:26) and is rather rare in classical Greek, where *kakos* (“bad, of bad quality”) is quite plentiful.

The alpha privative (“non-bad”) should not throw us off the track. The first meaning of *akakos* is “positively good”; Aeschylus, *Pers.* 662: “Come, beneficent father Darius”; but there is also Demosthenes, *C. Euerg.* 47.46: “his pretended innocence made an impression on the judges”; Plato, *Tim.* 91 d: “these men who are devoid of evil but light-minded, with their thoughts turned toward the heavens”; Polybius 3.98.5: the Carthaginian general Bostar “was a man without malice (*akakon onta ton andra*) and by nature mild,” like the Lacedaemonian general Callicratides, “of a mild character and a simple soul” (*akakos kai tēn psychēn haplous*, Diodorus Siculus 13.76); Menander, *Dysk.* 222: “you who leave an innocent young woman (*akakon korēn*) all alone, with no more precaution than if the house were empty.” Childlike innocence, meaning ignorance of error, of moral evil, of vice, is often mentioned in the funerary epigrams, as at Olympus: “Here lies Pisidis Hermaios, son of Hermas, an innocent child.”

This double meaning “perfect, whole,” and “innocent, without malice” is also found in the fifteen occurrences in the LXX. It means the former when it translates the Hebrew *tām*, *tāmīm*, “whole, without defect”: “Job was a perfect and upright man” (*anthrōpos akakos alēthinos amemptos*, Job 2:3, cf. 8:20; 36:5; Prov 2:21; 13:6). On the other hand, the meaning “simple, without malice” is clear in Jer 11:19 – “I, like an innocent lamb (*hōs arnion akakon*) that is led to the slaughter.” The Hebrew *’alūp*, “tame,” was understood to mean “without malice, naive,” not suspecting that it was being led to its death. *Akakos* is linked with uprightness (Ps 25:21). But the LXX created a new type of “simple” (Hebrew *pfī*), something like “ingenuous,” almost foolishly simple, as opposed to the crafty, the clever, the astute, the sly, the deceitful. The Book of Proverbs is addressed to those who are inexperienced and simple (*akakois*) to teach them discernment (Prov 1:4; 8:5); they need to be educated (15:10, *paideia akakou*) because they are ignorant and will only learn prudence little by little (21:11, *panourgotos ginetai ho akakos*); they are considered simpletons and derided (1:22). They believe everything that they are told (14:15), and their ignorance of all malice leaves them incapable of resisting the temptations of concupiscence, so they let themselves be perverted (Wis 4:12). They are a bit dim.

This candor is a function of age (“the perfect innocence of newborns”) and of virtue (Diodorus Siculus 5.66). The high priests must not keep company with any but “totally innocent and upright folk” (Philo, *Spec. Laws* 1.105), but this naiveté or simplemindedness is dangerous, because it makes a person credulous, and astute and hypocritical people take advantage. Charlatans link up with “simple and ingenuous souls (*aplastous kai akakōtatois ēthesi*) whom they lure and deceive.”



These are the credulous simpletons who are in view in Rom 16:18, which warns against “those people,” Judaizers or Gnostics who instigate dissension and scandal through their teaching (verse 17); “they seduce the hearts of the simple,” i.e., of naive people who are easily duped. In contrast, when Heb 7:26 writes of Christ the heavenly high priest, “Such is the high priest that we needed, holy, innocent, undefiled” (*hosios, akakos, amiantos*), this means absolute perfection in the sense of the Book of Job, with an extreme insistence on the absence of any stain, for in heaven he is even “separated from sinners.” Hence the redundancy of these adjectives, which amounts to a superlative. *Hosios* implies (1) consecrated to God as a priest; (2) holy in the cultic sense, possessing the qualities necessary for the accomplishment of the sacred functions; (3) holy in the moral sense, possessing a perfection that is lacking in nothing, carrying God’s will completely. *Akakos* means that like an innocent lamb (Jer 11:19), Christ is the spotless victim, acceptable to God (Job 8:20). *Amiantos* means without stain, pure, is the adjective used for the chaste (Heb 13:4), for a consecrated temple (2 Macc 14:36; 15:34), for authentically religious acts (Jas 1:27). The perfection of the Christ-Priest is thus consummate, absolute, religious, and moral.

## ἄκαρπος

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*akarpōs*, **fruitless, barren**

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*akarpōs*, S 175; TDNT 3.616; EDNT 2.251–252; NIDNTT 1.721, 723; MM 17; L&N 23.202, 65.34; BAGD 29

Sterility or barrenness – the incapacity for generation, the condition of that which does not produce anything – is a term that applies literally to unproductive land, of trees that bear no fruit, and of unmarried persons with no children. It is also used figuratively for a fruitless labor (Wis 15:4), a profitless work, such as the *erga akarpa* of darkness which produce nothing good or valuable (Eph 5:11), as opposed to the fruit of the light (verse 9); and above all it is used of the word of God smothered in the hearts of some by the cares of the world.

It is more difficult to say exactly what the meaning is in Titus 3:14 – “Our people must also learn to be first in good works ... so that they will not be without fruit” (*hina mē ōsin akarpoi*). It could refer to growth in virtue or to the gaining of a reward. Most likely, however, this is a reference to a law of fruitbearing, which is a major urgency of New Testament ethics. It appears in the Synoptics, from the Sermon on the Mount, where the plant is judged by its

fruit (Matt 7:16–20), and the parable of the Sower (13:3–8) to the incident involving the barren fig tree (Luke 13:6–9); in St. Paul (Rom 7:4; Eph 2:10), who prescribes the bearing of fruit; and in St. John, where the branch is judged by its productivity (John 15:2, 4–8; cf. 12:24). Hence *akarpōs* gains a theological significance in the language of the New Testament: if every Christian is supposed to engage in fruitful activity, the false teachers are without fruit (Jude 12), and the bad Christian is one who produces no fine and noble works. His barrenness is the proof that he is a counterfeit; he is not vitally connected to Christ.

### ἀκατάγνωστος

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*akatagnōstos*, **unobjectionable, irreproachable**

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*akatagnōstos*, S 176; *TDNT* 1.714–715; *EDNT* 1.48; MM 17; L&N 33.415; BAGD 29

In his preaching, Titus is to speak only “unattackable” words, so that the adversaries will be disarmed, finding nothing blameworthy or unseemly to denounce (Titus 2:8). That is to say, in the church, which is a column or buttress of the truth (1 Tim 3:15), one proclaims only the truth, that to which no one can raise any objection (cf. 2 Cor 13:8).

The NT hapax *akatagnōstos*, literally “nothing known against,” is a juridical term expressing the innocence of one acquitted in a trial. It does not appear in the papyri except in the Byzantine period, with respect to an unimpeachable contract or an irreproachable person. Thus it has a moral value, often associated with *amemptōs*, *deontōs*, and *spoudeōs*: the contractor agrees to work or to render his services, promising that he will be “without reproach” or irreproachable. Titus 2:8 is thus one of many cases where St. Paul seems to be ahead of his time with respect to linguistic usages.

### ἀκλινής

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*aklinēs*, **stable, unchanging, firm**

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*aklines*, S 186; *EDNT* 1.49; MM 18; L&N 31.80; BAGD 30

Unknown in Josephus, attested by one late occurrence in the papyri, *aklinēs*, literally “which does not bend, is straight,” signifies “stable, set,” then

“unmoving, at rest”; it is a synonym of *bebaios*. It is used of an enduring friendship (*Anth. Pal.* 12.158.4) and above all to unshakable reason or judgment. The emphasis is on immutability. It is Philo who gave this adjective its religious and moral sense by attributing stability on the one hand to God, as opposed to creatures, and on the other hand to the perfectly regenerated human. From that point one can see how the term made it into the vocabulary of the Epistle to the Hebrews, which exhorts us to hold fast the *homologia* of our hope (Heb 10:23). This hope, which is “firmly founded” on the promise of God, must be guarded without wavering. Note that the content of faith is identical to its hope (cf. Heb 11:1), just as in 1 Pet 3:15.

### ἀκρασία, ἐγκράτεια

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*akrasia*, **lack of self-control**; *enkrateia*, **self-control**

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*akrasia*, S 192; TDNT 2.339–342; EDNT 1.54; NIDNTT 1.494–496; L&N 88.91; BAGD 33 | *enkrateia*, S 1466; TDNT 2.339–342; EDNT 1.377–378; NIDNTT 1.494–496; MM 180; L&N 88.83; BAGD 216

Both of these terms derive from *kratos*, “force”; the *enkratēs* is the person who is master of himself; the *a-kratēs* is the one who cannot contain himself, who is lacking in power. From the time of Socrates, who made *enkrateia* the basis and foundation of all the virtues, and Aristotle, who distinguished between the perfectly chaste person who knows no impure desires (*sōphrōn*) and the continent person (*enkratēs*) who feels their power but resists them (*Eth. Nic.* 7.1–11; pp. 1145–1152), this control over impulses and this tempering of the passions are considered among the Greeks as an element of prudence-temperance (*sōphrosynē*), and consequently an essential virtue for the honest person.

In the OT, it appears only in the books influenced by Hellenism and has no distinctive meaning, as opposed to the *Letter of Aristeas*. In the NT, it is associated with righteousness, with gentleness (Gal 5:23), or inserted between *gnōsis* and *hypomonē* (2 Pet 1:6), receiving no particular emphasis in these “catalogs of virtues.” It seems that it is mentioned only because of the influence of Stoic ethics, which gave it its greatest prominence. The fact is that Philo considers conversion to be a passing “from incontinence to self-control” (*ex akrasias eis enkrateian*, *Rewards* 116), the latter being the most useful of virtues, allowing the courageous to triumph over the obstacles along the way and arrive at last in heaven (*Spec. Laws* 4.112); it is opposed to impure desire (1.149: *epithymia*), to the love of pleasure (*Abraham* 24: *philēdonia*), to

gastronomic and sexual delights, and even to intemperance in language. It is in this sense that 1 Cor 9:25 compares the Christian to an athlete, observing: “Whoever contends – *ho agōnizomenos* – submits to every kind of abstinence.” We know how rigorous the training of Greek athletes was, and the self-mastery cited here as an example applies to all arenas. The people of the end-times will not have it (2 Tim 3:3, *akrateis*); it is not so much that they lead a dissolute life, but rather that they cannot control themselves, and so they no longer act as human beings – they are amoral beings. In the first century AD, self-control is especially a virtue of the religious, who master their passions, and of the leader, who cannot direct others unless he is *sui compos*. According to Onasander 1.2–3, the first quality of a good general is to be *sōphrōn* (so as not to be distracted from duty by sensual pleasures) and *enkratēs*, because slavery to the passions would cause him to lose all authority. For Ecphantus, the king who would govern in accord with virtue will be *enkratēs*. The tradition lived on with Emperor Julian, who presented himself as an example to all his governors in that he administered the affairs of the empire “with such decorum and prudence and self-control” (*meta tosautes kosmiotētos kai sōphrosynēs kai enkrateias*). It is clear that we must interpret against this literary background the virtue demanded of candidates for overseer: that they be *enkratēs*, that is to say, self-controlled. But with Christians, this virtue is a gift of the Holy Spirit (Gal 5:23).

## ἄλαζονεία, ἄλαζών

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*alazoneia*, **boastful arrogance**; *alazōn*, **boaster**

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*alazoneia*, S 212; TDNT 1.226–227; EDNT 1.56; NIDNTT 3.28–32; MM 20; L&N 88.219; BAGD 34 | *alazon*, S 213; TDNT 1.226–227; EDNT 1.56; NIDNTT 2.435; L&N 88.219; BAGD 34

It is not easy to define precisely the nature of this vice. It is denounced in the pagan literature as well as in the Bible; but each author has his own conception of what it is. Sometimes it has to do with bombastic braggarts of the sort so thoroughly caricatured in Greco-Roman comedy, especially for the extravagance of their talk; sometimes it has to do with the boastful and presumptuous, whose chatter is tinged with insolence. *Alazoneia* is a vice of the rich and of those in the public eye (Wis 5:8; Philo, *Virtues* 162), of the man of politics (*T. Job* 21.3) and of the ruler (2 Macc 15:6; Philo, *Virtues* 161; *Spec. Laws* 4.170), of the orator, the philosopher, the poet, the magician, the doctor, that is, of all those who lay claim to intelligence (Wis 17:7), but also of superiors who abuse their authority vis-à-vis their inferiors. *Alazōn* is thus a

term of the wisdom vocabulary that associates arrogance, presumption, and above all pride. The *alazōn* takes himself for a god or boasts that God is his father (Wis 2:16). Thus he is an impostor and an ungodly person, after the fashion of Antiochus who “in his superhuman conceit thought that he could give orders to the waves of the sea” (2 Macc 9:8).

All of these nuances are found in the NT, especially the most ridiculous form of *alazoneia*: “Now you glory in your boastings; all vainglory of this sort is iniquitous” (Jas 4:16). At issue are presumptuous merchants and those “business travelers” who are puffed up in their imagination and in their speech, considering themselves rich in intelligence, ease, and savoir-faire, proud of the importance of their enterprise and their profits, multiplying fine projects for the future. All of this is inane, vain presumption, ignorance of creaturely limitations. To pride oneself on one’s own abilities is, religiously speaking, a sin.

This vice will be much more serious among the people of the end times, “impostors and arrogant,” who are simultaneously proud and blasphemers: *alazones*, *hyperēphanoi*, *blasphēmoi*, thus creatures in rebellion against divine authority who confine themselves to their own sufficiency, setting themselves up as their own standard for life. Henceforth, according to Rom 1:30, it is the province of the pagans to be “proud, blustery, inventors of evil.” These are not vain people who exalt themselves thoughtlessly, but people who go to the extreme excess of abolishing their Creator in their thoughts and in their lives. God abhors this conceit (Philo, *Spec. Laws* 1.265).

This nuance seems necessary in interpreting 1 John 2:16 – “All that is in the world – the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, *hē alazonia tou biou* – is not of the Father.” If St. John did not mention as a third *epithymia* “the lust for riches or money,” it is precisely because he had his sights set on a more serious vice than the ostentation of the wealthy or their arrogance toward the poor. He contrasts with God the creaturely pride, the mastery of one’s own existence, of the person who decides and directs the course of his life without taking God into account. This “sufficiency” is the exact opposite of the absolute duty of worshiping God and serving God devoutly; it follows that this is something altogether different from the classical and profane *alazoneia*.

ἀλήθεια, ἀληθεύω, ἀληθής, ἀληθινός, ἀληθῶς

*alētheia*, **truth**; *alētheuō*, **to speak the truth**; *alēthēs*, **true, truthful**; *alēthinos*, **authentic, genuine**; *alēthōs*, **truly**

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*aletheia*, S 225; TDNT 1.232–247; EDNT 1.57–60; NIDNTT 3.874–878, 882–893; MM 21; L&N 70.4, 72.2; BDF §§234(7), 397(3); BAGD 35–36 | *aletheuo*, S 226; TDNT 1.251; EDNT 1.57–60; NIDNTT 3.874, 877, 886–888; MM 21; L&N 33.251; BDF §101; BAGD 36 | *alethes*, S 227; TDNT 1.247–249; EDNT 1.57–60; NIDNTT 3.874–877, 882–884, 888–891, 893; MM 21; L&N 70.3, 72.1, 88.39; BAGD 36 | *alethinōs*, S 228; TDNT 1.249–250; EDNT 1.57–60; NIDNTT 3.874, 877, 883–884, 888–889, 891–893; MM 21–22; L&N 70.3, 72.1, 73.2; BDF §263(a); BAGD 37 | *alethos*, S 230; EDNT 1.57–60; NIDNTT 3.874, 877, 883, 888, 893; L&N 70.3; BDF §243; BAGD 37

All of these terms derive from *lanthanō*, “go unnoticed, be unknown,” and in the middle and passive, “forget.” These compound forms with the alpha prefix mean “not hidden.” *Alētheia* is that which is not concealed, a fact or a condition that can be seen or expressed as it really is. To speak the whole truth is to conceal nothing, and *alētheia* is the opposite of lying or forgetfulness. An event is true (*alēthēs*) when it is unveiled; a hidden reality becomes explicit. A person who is true or sincere is one who conceals nothing and does not try to deceive.

Greek philosophy and religious strivings were dominated by the search for truth (*hē zētēsis tēs alētheias*, Thucydides 1.20.3), as Plato explicates it: “By searching for truth I strive to make myself as perfect as possible in life and, when the time comes to die, in death.” The truth not only gives life; it gives the good life (Epictetus 1.4.31; 3.24.40), because it orients action: “If you knew the truth, you would necessarily act rightly.” It is a question of an ascent of the soul toward the “plane of truth” where it is possible to contemplate the Ideas, the veritable, authentic realities. Finally *alētheia* as a metaphysical concept refers to the nature or essence of things – Being insofar as it is intelligible – and is contrasted to the terrestrial world of sensible phenomena. Not only is the true identical to being, the real; but it is the divine reality as revealed to humans. Truth is God (especially in Gnosticism, cf. *Corp. Herm.*, chapters 7 and 13).

In the LXX, *alētheia* never expresses a metaphysical concept. It almost always translates *’emet*, from the root *’āman*, “be firm,” and thus refers to that which is solid, firm, valid, durable. A “true” path is one that ends where it is supposed to go (Gen 24:48; cf. Ps 25:10). The true is that which is real; “truly” relying on Yahweh means “actually” doing so (Isa 10:20). In a moral sense, truth is synonymous with sincerity and loyalty and the opposite of lying, falsehood, and counterfeiting (Prov 8:7; 22:21; 26:28). The Wisdom writings warn against hiding secrets (Wis 6:22) or speaking against the truth (Sir 4:25). Intentions are revealed (2 Macc 3:9 – *epynthaneto de ei tais alētheiais*); the exhortation is given to fight to the death for truth (Sir 4:28). This is in conformity with secular Greek, but, in accord with the underlying Hebrew,

*alētheia* in the LXX suggests consistency and solidity and therefore fidelity. Hence Yahweh is called “God of truth” on the basis of his unchangeableness, the solidity or stability of his works, the certainty that his promises will be fulfilled: what he says always comes to pass. His utterances and actual events coincide. God does not lie and never fails (Ps 132:11); the principle of his speech is truth (119:160). All his gifts are characterized by stability, fixity, perseverance, continuity; to say that he does the truth (*alētheian epoiēsas*, Neh 9:33; cf. Tob 4:6) is to say not only that his conduct is coherent but also that it corresponds to his prior declarations. Likewise, what is asked of the just is steadfast loyalty to the Lord: “If your sons watch their way, walking before me in truth with all their heart and all their soul.” Faithfulness and piety go together (Prov 14:22; 20:22). Not only is God near to all those who love truth-sincerity (Ps 145:18; Zech 8:19), he also showers blessings upon them.

The usages of *alētheia* in Philo derive more from the word’s etymology and the Greek tradition than from the Greek Bible, although a religious meaning is retained. The Alexandrian philosopher constantly contrasts authentic divine revelation (the truth) with philosophers and lawmakers who, “wrapping their thought in superfluous bombast, have deceived the masses with the smoke of illusion, masking the truth under mythic fictions.” He means the pure, naked, unadorned truth (*Creation* 45; *Drunkennes* 6, 34), unchanged, with nothing added and nothing taken away (*Creation* 170); thus a revealing, the light shed by revelation. “There is no light for actions more brilliant than the truth” (*Alleg. Interp.* 3.45; cf. *Unchang. God* 96), and “it is God’s will to reveal the secrets of things to those who wish to know the truth” (*Joseph* 90). “Truth” is associated with clarity (*saphēneia*, *Alleg. Interp.* 3.124, 128, 140), with revealing and light; it is “the knowledge of the true God” (*Rewards* 58; cf. *Contemp. Life* 89).

But Philo Platonizes by contrasting truth and appearance (*Migr. Abr.* 158; *Moses* 1.48); the study of intelligible essences, which yields truth, with the study of sensible objects, which yields opinion (*Rewards* 28). God is “Being, the one who is in truth,” “the one who is truth” (*Dreams* 1.60; *Abraham* 121), “truly existing” (*tou pros alētheian ontos theou*, *Decalogue* 81; *Spec. Laws* 1.313, 344). Truth basically means “reality”; “in truth” means “according to being” or “in reality”; true goods are real goods (*Creation* 21; *Sacr. Abel and Cain* 99; *Giants* 15; *Virtues* 17: *tou pros alētheian biou*; cf. *Ep. Arist.* 260, 306); “Do you believe that among mortal realities there is found one that has true being, true substance?” (*Unchang. God* 172). It is God alone who is “the sole Artisan of the true human being, that is, the spirit in all its purity” (*Flight* 71); “God placed the true human, that is, the Spirit, in us, among the most sacred shoots and plants of moral worth” (*Plant.* 42; *Dreams* 1.215; *Virtues* 20). Consequently, “true life is to walk according to the orders and commandments

of God” (*Prelim. Stud.* 87), “to grasp the truth” (*Sacr. Abel and Cain* 13), to be “well in tune with it” (*Post. Cain* 88), to revere it (*Spec. Laws* 4.33, 43). That is what is most honorable (*ibid.* 69, 71) and most profitable. In any event, Philo is far removed from the cult of truth in the Psalms and at Qumran.

On the grammatical level, note that apart from the plural, most of the occurrences of *alētheia* with the preposition *pros* (cf. *epi*, *ek*, *en*) conform to the language of the papyri. These provide no new data. They give this noun the meaning “sincerity, objectivity.” In his edict in AD 68, Tiberius Julius Alexander writes, “As for the most important questions, I will make them known to him in all truth” (*autō dēlōsō meta pasēs alētheias*, *BGU* 1563, 24 = *SB* 8444). One tells the truth, especially in judicial settings; it is revealed: “since the whole truth concerning the matters previously written about will hardly be made known” (*ex hou deēsei gnōsthēnai pasan tēn peri tōn proگرامmenōn alētheian*, *P.Oxy.* 283, 13); one is faithful to the facts (*C.P.Herm.* 18, 16). “That by all means the actual sum disbursed may be known” (*P.Panop.Beatty* 1, 17). *Alētheia* is the real (“Let them not address us as people who have really been wronged” – *entynchanousin kat’ alētheian plēm̄meloumenoi*, *C.Ord.Ptol.* 35, 9; second century BC) and is the opposite of falsehood and lying (“hating deviousness but honoring truth”).

This same meaning, truth-reality, appears in the Synoptic Gospels and in Acts, where *alētheia* never has a theological meaning. Sometimes it has to do with questions of noting or identifying facts, but usually *en* or *ep’ alētheias* is used with the verbs *didaskō*, *eipon*, *legō* to point to an utterance that is true, exactly correct, trustworthy – the opposite of false or ambiguous.

St. Paul uses the term *alētheia* in a way that agrees with its Greek etymology (that which may be seen in the open, as it is) but also takes account of OT usage; in various texts, one or the other element predominates. If people are lost, it is because “they did not accept the love of truth in order to be saved.... they did not believe the truth.” Salvation depends first of all on the adherence and submission of the heart to the objective truth; these responses make it possible to recognize and accept it when it is revealed in the preaching of the gospel (verse 13, *pistis alētheias*). By being resistant toward God’s commands (Rom 2:8), humans “held the truth captive through their unrighteousness” (Rom 1:18). In other words, when salvation and righteousness were revealed (1:16–17), humans refused to accept them; they shackled or gagged the revelation, as it were, through their impiety and their sins. This opposing force is next identified as the lie.

This “truth” of revelation is the correct knowledge of reality (Hebrew *’emet*). The Jews possess in the Torah the *morphōsis*, the form or expression of knowledge and truth (Rom 2:20); they are sure of the divine will respecting



them. It has to be obeyed, after the fashion of submitting to a rule (Gal 5:7), with nothing added and nothing taken away (Gal 2:5); we must walk straight or firmly, according to the solidity of the gospel. Preaching and teaching in the church are “conformable to the truth that is in Jesus” (Eph 4:21), and every baptized Christian puts on “the new humanity, created according to God in the righteousness and holiness of truth.” The Passover is to be celebrated “not with the old leaven, nor with the leaven of vice and perversity, but with the unleavened loaves of purity and truth” (*en azymois eilikrineias kai alētheias*, 1 Cor 1:8); here “truth” is sincerity, honesty, with a nuance of firmness as well (cf. Gal 5:7–9). This meaning, “truth-honesty,” is constant in the apostle.

The most numerous occurrences are those that give *alētheia* its Greek sense of true teaching, the expression or manifestation of the truth (and in a religious sense). “We have put aside the deceits of [false] shame (*ta krypta tēs aischynēs*), we who do not walk in shrewdness (*en panourgia*) or falsify the word of God (*mē dolountes ton logon tou theou*) but who, through the manifesting of the truth (*tē phanerōsei tēs alētheias*), commend ourselves to every human conscience” (2 Cor 4:2). This is the preaching-proclaiming of the unabridged kerygma, out in the light, under God’s watchful eye. Second Corinthians 6:4, 7: “recommending ourselves as ministers of God ... in the word of truth” (*en logō tēs alētheias*), which is the gospel (Col 1:5), the good news of salvation (Eph 1:13), the divine revelation that admits of no distortion or falsification. Ultimately, Christianity is “the truth”; a person accepts it and submits to it through the profession of faith and sets out to follow “the way of truth” (2 Pet 2:2). The church is a “pillar and supporting structure of the truth,” which is unchanging. The heterodox who deviate from the faith (1 Tim 2:4; 2 Tim 2:25; 3:7) are “without the truth” (1 Tim 6:5); heretics “turn their ears away from the truth” (2 Tim 4:4), turn their back on it (Titus 1:14, *apostrephomenōn tēn alētheian*), deviate or walk away from the truth (2 Tim 2:18, *ēstochēsan*), wander away from it and get lost (Jas 5:19) and end up opposing it. In a word, the Christian religion is a cult of the truth; to be converted is to “come to the knowledge of the truth” (*eis epignōsin alētheias elthein*, 1 Tim 2:4). This stereotyped formula, which appears in the later writings of the NT, refers to the correct knowledge of the true religion; the truth is the object of faith. The Christian profession is to adhere to it, to come to this knowledge, to receive it from God, and to keep it; this is salvation. *Epignōsis* is not a deepened knowledge, but a precise, determinate knowledge, built on revelation, the gospel discerned as being real and not a myth; hence it is an orthodox knowledge, received from God, opposed to heretical deviations.

In St. John, *alētheia* (twenty-five occurrences in the Fourth Gospel, twenty in the epistles) becomes a distinctively Christian term, belonging to the

vocabulary of the revelation of *epigeia* and *epourania* (earthly things and heavenly things). In the prologue, which summarizes the theology of his Gospel, John sets out to provide an unshakeable basis for the doctrine of the Revealer par excellence and presents him as “full of grace and truth.” This is the Word that was made flesh and dwelt among us. In this human condition, and on the level of history, *alētheia* is not the essential truth of the Logos but a divine gift: the knowledge of the truth communicated to human nature. Hence it is in the first place the beatific vision, then that quality which permits “bearing witness to the truth” (John 18:37), and finally the truth of the teachings of Jesus both regarding God (the Father) and regarding his own sonship and the salvation of humans. It is a truthful and sure teaching, worthy of trust. Jesus possesses this truth in its fullness and reveals, transmits, and explicates it. He is the supreme Revealer, unveiling and manifesting to the fullest the divine secrets.

He specifies that he alone gives access to God: “I am the way and the truth and the life.” The emphasis is on the way, an image explicated by the two ideas of truth and life. Jesus is the only way because he communicates the fullness of revelation and even the very life of God. He is the instrument of the truth that comes from God; it is inherent in him, and he affirms it unfailingly: “I, a man who spoke to you the truth that I heard from God.” After all, one testifies concerning that which one has seen and heard (3:11). The legal idea of testimony takes on a theological meaning (cf. Jer 42:5; Prov 14:25) when John the Baptist identifies Jesus as God’s Chosen One and reveals him as such (5:33; cf. 1:7, 15, 19, 31, 34) and when the incarnate Christ makes known what he has heard in heaven, whence he has come “to bear witness to the truth,” to manifest it. His life’s work is to make this revelation so as to inspire faith (1:7; 19:35; 1 John 5:6).

To accept this testimony means not only being teachable and sincere, but also being in spiritual relationship with the truth and the words of Jesus, like sheep that recognize the voice of their true shepherd (John 10:16, 27). Better yet, it is to be “of the truth” (*ho ōn ek tēs alētheias*): “Whoever is of the truth hears my voice.” The concrete meaning of the expression is to be originally from a certain place, to have been born there; but it is synonymous with “son of” and means “depend on, abide in.” Consequently, being “of the truth” means being permanently under God’s influence, being obedient to revelation. This is what explains the way of life and the bearing of the believer who abides in the radiance of the truth of Christ. Hence the biblicism “do the truth”; “the one who does the truth (*ho poiōn tēn alētheian*) comes from the light, so that his works are clearly seen (*hina phanerōthē*) as being done in God.” In the genesis of faith, orthopraxy makes it possible to attain to the knowledge of revealed truth;

it presupposes an interior choice – a right action and a true thought realized – that orients a person toward Christ. Thus a person becomes obedient to the Father’s drawing, unconsciously submits to his will, and thus proves to be in communion with him.

“If you abide in my word, you will truly be my disciples, and you will know the truth, and the truth will deliver you” (John 8:32). *Alētheia* is the content of Jesus’ utterance, the full revelation concerning God and humanity, concerning their relationship (verses 40, 44, 45). To know this truth, a person must abide faithfully in this word and adhere to it (10:38; 2 Tim 3:14) firmly (2 Pet 1:12; *T. Jos.* 1.3). Then come (a) progress in becoming a true disciple through a more intimate attachment to Christ; (b) deeper penetration into the truth that is revelation and the Christian mystery; (c) and finally liberation, because every sinner is considered a slave of error or vice; but here it is a question of enslavement to the devil and of the sin of unbelief (1 John 3:4). There is thus a change of masters; for the former tyranny is substituted by the Lord’s sovereignty (1 John 2:13–14; 5:18), then virtuous conduct characterized as service to God, and then finally and above all filiation takes the place of servitude. True liberty belongs to the one who lives in the household. It is a stable condition, characterized especially by a loving relationship with God; one is freed in order to be able to love. This is the noblest fruit of truth.

As of Christ’s advent, there are “true” worshipers (i.e., “real,” or better, “perfect” worshipers) who worship the Father *en pneumati kai alētheia* (“in spirit and in truth”). In spirit (the highest faculty of the human person), which allows being united with God, who is Spirit (John 4:24; no longer by material deeds or achievements). In truth means not as at Samaria and Jerusalem, but through the worship of the true God as revealed by Jesus, as children revering their heavenly Father. When Jesus prays to his father asking him to sanctify-consecrate the apostles *en tē alētheia*, as he himself is sanctified-consecrated *en alētheia*, we may understand him to mean “really, actually” (Theodore of Mopsuestia), but since through this consecration the subject is not only set apart for a sacred office but prepared and adapted for it, *en* can have an instrumental meaning. Thus truth would be the instrument of sanctification (cf. 2 Thess 2:13; John 16:13). The disciples are invaded by it and transformed within. Finally, this consecration is conformable to that of Jesus and derives from it; they are devoted and reserved for the exclusive service of God.

The Holy Spirit is described as the “Spirit of Truth.” He continues the presence and action of Jesus on earth. He indwells the apostles, to whom he reveals the work of the Father and the Son, provided that their love is authentic (John 14:17). This divine being proceeds from the Father; given to the disciples, he “will guide them into the entire truth ... he will repeat all that he

hears and will make future things known to you ... he takes what is mine and makes it known to you” (John 16:13–15). An infallible teacher and guide, worthy of trust, the Holy Spirit leads believers to understand better the truth that is Christ so that they may better fathom; he does not complete it, but on the one hand he makes an exhaustive inventory of the data of the gospel, and on the other hand he illuminates to provide better understanding (cf. the Fourth Gospel vis-à-vis the Synoptics). He unveils its riches, progressively explicates its content, and in this way proclaims (*anangelei*); in this sense he is a teacher. But like Jesus (John 12:49; 14:10), he invents nothing, does not speak on his own; he only repeats what he has heard from God (cf. 8:26) and, through prophetic charisms, also unveils future things (1 Cor 12:29–30; Rev 19:10) and thus strengthens faith. Thus the Spirit is indeed a revealer.

*Alētheuō*. – Incontestably, this verb has only one meaning in secular Greek, “speak the truth,” and that is its meaning in Gal 4:16 – “Have I become your enemy because I told you the truth?” Nevertheless, there are shades of meaning. In Plato, *Resp.* 3.413 *a* and *Tht.* 202 *c*, *alētheuein* means “being right.” Philo (*Etern. World* 48) contrasts the lover of truth (*alētheuontos*) to the concocter of paradoxes. The LXX puts these words in the mouth of Abimelech, addressing Sarah: “speak the truth in all things” (*panta alētheuson*, Gen 20:16; but the corresponding Hebrew verb is the niphal of *yākah*, meaning that Sarah will be entirely justified in the sight of everyone). The LXX also contrasts telling the truth with lying (Sir 34:4); but when Joseph explains to his brothers that he is putting them in prison “to find out whether the truth is with you” (*ei alētheuete ē ou*, Gen 42:16, Hebrew *’emet*), that is, whether they are spies or not, the verb has the sense “be sincere.” The meaning is “realize, carry out” in Prov 21:3 (the one who pleases God) and Isa 44:26 – “I carry out the words of my messengers” (Hebrew hiphil of *šālam*). These usages allow a somewhat original interpretation of Eph 4:15, *alētheuontes de en agapē*, which could be translated either “live by the truth and in love” (*NJB*) or, in line with the context, which denounces error and deceitfulness, “remaining in the truth, in love.” In any event, the emphasis is on remaining attached to the truth (of the gospel), holding fast to it, with the Johannine connotations of being of the truth, loving it, professing it, carrying it out; in other words, conforming one’s conduct to it.

*Alēthēs*. – This adjective, attested late, appears in the third century BC from the pen of Zeno: “if that is true (or correct)”; and it recurs in one form or another to modify something that has been said or written. It is the opposite of “false, lying”; this is in agreement with Wis 2:17 (“let us see if his words are true”) and with a goodly number of NT occurrences. In stating that she had no husband, the Samaritan woman spoke the truth, was correct and straightforward (John 4:18); John the Baptist and the evangelist spoke the truth (10:41; 19:35;

cf. 2 Pet 2:22). This formula is used when security is posted or an obligation is taken on: “The note concerning this is true.” This adjective constantly occurs in oaths and with testimony (John 5:31–32; 8:13, 14, 17; 21:24; Titus 1:13; 3 John 12; Josephus, *Ant.* 4.219). The nuance is then “authentic” or “sincere, truthful”; it is used to describe reliable men (Neh 7:2; Hebrew *’emeā*), for Jesus and his candor (Matt 22:16 = Mark 12:14; John 7:18), especially for the true God and his word. Finally, *alēthēs* often means “real” as opposed to imaginary or metaphorical, as in Acts 12:9 where Peter, once freed from prison, “did not know that this was real but thought that he was having a vision,” or in John 6:55 – Jesus’ flesh is truly (really) food and his blood is truly drink (the Textus Receptus substitutes the adverb *alēthōs*).

*Alēthinōs*. – Less common than *alēthēs*, but having pretty nearly the same meaning, this adjective is used relatively little in the papyri, where it is contrasted with lying; but its precise meaning is “authentic,” with respect to either things or persons: “true Egyptians (*hoi alēthinoi Aigyptioi*), easily recognizable by their speech” (*P.Giss.* 40, col. II, 27; edict of Caracalla). The LXX uses it with the nuance “perfect,” sometimes with respect to people, but with religious connotations. Usually it is applied to God (2 Chr 15:3; Isa 65:16; cf. *P.Oxy.* 925, 2; *BGU* 954, 28), his benevolence (Exod 34:6; Num 14:18; Ps 86:15; 103:8), his perfect works (Deut 32:4, Hebrew *tām*; Dan 3:27 [Theodotion]; 4:34), his words (2 Sam 7:28, Hebrew *’emet*; 1 Kgs 17:24), his commands and judgments (Ps 119:9; Tob 3:2, 5). Philo retained this meaning – “the one true God” (*Spec. Laws* 1.332; *To Gaius* 366) – but kept especially the nuance “authentic,” referring to the essence, the deep truth. For example, false money is contrasted with “true value, that which exists really” (*ontōs ontos*).

The NT is faithful to this semantic tradition. The true good (*to alēthinon*) is the authentic good, that of the soul (Luke 16:11). This adjective is applied almost exclusively to God and Christ, but the Fourth Gospel and the Epistle to the Hebrews give it a special meaning: “The Word was the true light” (*to phōs to alēthinon*, John 1:9; 1 John 2:8), meaning spiritual and divine, authentic or genuine. The opposite is not imperfect, veiled; *alēthinōs* implies the idea of an ideal or a perfect model, so that “the true” can properly mean only divine or heavenly realities; the earthly world is only a degraded participation in those realities. Hence Christ is not so much the “only and true” light as the “perfect” light, the source and model for all other light, the Revealer, the Illuminator par excellence. Likewise John 6:32 – “The Father gives you true bread from heaven” (*ton arton ton alēthinon*). This is not only “real” bread, bread of heavenly origin, but divine bread in its very essence. John 7:28 – “The One who sent me is true”; *alēthinōs* means neither “authentic” nor “real” but the only Sender worthy of the name, having the power to send. The relations

between the Father and Jesus are the ideal type for every human mission. John 15:1 – “I am the true vine” (*egō eimi hē ampelos hē alēthinē*), not only by comparison with the degenerate vine that is Israel, but the vine absolutely worthy of the name, the vine par excellence, doing in the highest degree “that which is proper to vines, bearing fruit that is very sweet and very wholesome” (M. J. Lagrange); the article before the adjective makes for a strong emphasis, a kind of superlative in apposition. Thus “true worshipers” (John 4:23) are authentic and perfect worshipers who actualize the precise concept of worship directed toward the true God. The tabernacle or sanctuary in which the high priest of the new covenant officiates in heaven (Heb 8:2; 9:24) is not “fabricated, an antitype of the true tabernacle,” imperfect and transitory, but is authentic and divine.

*Alēthōs*. – In secular Greek this adverb means sometimes “truly, sincerely” as opposed to “falsely,” sometimes “really” (Philo, *Alleg. Interp.* 1.17; *Post. Cain* 27; *Proceedings* XV, p. 94, line 16). Often the two meanings cannot be distinguished. The latter meaning surfaces in the LXX in questions: “Will I really give birth, now that I am old?” (Gen 18:13); “Will God really dwell on earth?” (1 Kgs 8:27 = 2 Chr 6:18; cf. Ps 58:1). But the adverb is used especially to give weight to an affirmation: “Truly, it is I who have sinned” (Josh 7:20; cf. 2 Macc 3:38). Hence its use in confessions of faith in the NT. It expresses certitude in knowledge (John 17:8; Acts 12:11; cf. Exod 33:16), the reality of a fact (Matt 26:73 = Mark 14:70; John 7:46; cf. Dan 3:24) or of a condition, its authenticity – “You are really my disciples” – and can be translated “actually.”

ἀμελέω, ἐπιμελέομαι

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*ameleō*, to not matter; *epimeleomai*, to busy oneself with, see to

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*ameleo*, S 272; *EDNT* 1.69; MM 26; L&N 30.50; BDF §176(2); BAGD 44–45 | *epimeleomai*, S 1959; *EDNT* 2.31; MM 242; L&N 30.40, 35.44; BDF §§101, 176(2); BAGD 296

The verb *melei* (construed with *moi tinos*, *peri tinos*, *hoti*) means: to care for someone with respect to something, to take an interest in or busy oneself with a matter; hence *meletaō* is not only “think about, meditate on” but also “to be busy about, to exert oneself” and even “to practice.” More frequent is *ameleō*, “to be careless, negligent, not put oneself out.” This indifference is that of the ones first invited to the marriage feast of the kingdom of God (Matt 22:5); it is cursed by Jer 48:10 and receives almost the same treatment in Heb 2:3 – “How shall we escape if we neglect so great a salvation?” – and Heb 8:9 – “Since they

have not remained in my covenant, I myself have also lost interest in them, says the Lord.” After asking Timothy to apply himself (*proseche*) to reading, to exhortation, and the like, St. Paul instructs him: “Do not neglect the spiritual gift that is in you.” The litotes *mē amelei* occurs frequently in the papyrological literature to express a psychological orientation of zeal and urgency or application to a task; *mē amelēsēs*, synonymous with *mē oknēsēs* (*P.Harr.* 107, 15; *P.Mich.* III, 221, 12, 13); and opposed to *spoudason* (*SB* 9754, 3–4 = *P.Mil. Vogl.* 255), to *prothymōs* (cf. *PSI* 621, 7), and to *epimeleō* (cf. *P.Eleph.* 13, 7; *P.Hib.* 253, 3 and 8).

*Ameleō* is used in medicine for neglected patients, who are lost for lack of care, but especially for functionaries in the public administration who default on their obligations as *epimelētes* (*P.Panop.Beatty* 1, 215; 2, 6, 74; Plutarch, *Tim.* 18.3: *argōs* and *amelōs*). *Ameleia* is typical offense of a proxy or of one responsible for carrying out a function, but who shirks his obligations. It is obvious that we should understand 1 Tim 4:14 in this sense – Timothy should not lose sight of the fact that he was supernaturally equipped to carry out his duty, and he should take his stand on this divine gift in facing up to his responsibilities as model pastor and teacher.

In this pastoral context, it is natural that St. Paul uses *epimeleomai* with respect to the Ephesian overseers: “If anyone does not know how to rule his own household, how will he look after a church of God?” (*pōs ekklēsiās theou epimelēsetai*, 1 Tim 3:5). This compound verb, meaning “busy oneself, take care, direct,” suggestive of the public function carried out by the community minister and of the devotion that this function requires, is copiously attested in secular Greek, especially in epigraphy (see the index in Dittenberger, *Syl.* 4.345ff.), with respect to every occupation, and it could be used here of any job or position of oversight in the *ekklēsia*. But the emphasis is on morality, because the term is used of a task that requires personal devotion, of effective leadership, of diligent application. In this sense it has a role in the medical vocabulary from the classical period, where *epimelesthai epimeleian poieisthai* means “care for medically.” It is in this sense that, according to Doctor Luke, the good Samaritan, having taken the injured traveler to the inn “took care of him” (Luke 10:34) and instructed the innkeeper, *epimelēthēti autou*.

From Aristotle on, this verb has a political sense: to busy oneself with public affairs. *Epimelētēs* designated especially the high magistrates who governed the city and whose dedicatory inscriptions praise their merit and their justice, so much so that the holder of such a title was addressed in a letter as “Your Diligence” – *Epimeleia* (*P.Panop.Beatty* 1, 76, 85–86, 103). Clearly this political-moral sense applies well to the overseer called to guide a Christian community, but it works even better in light of the cultic usages of *epimeleia*,

*epimeleomai* in the first century. In Israel, the *epimeleia tou hierou* or *tōn hiereōn* is entrusted to the priests and to the king: they oversee the cultic celebrations, the organization of processions, the offering of sacrifices, and are responsible for the liturgy. In pagan cultic rules, the phrase *epimeleisthai tēs thysias* recurs frequently, and the inscriptions provide *epimelētai tōn mysteriōn*. In other words, the Christian minister does not necessarily have a financial role to play, as some have claimed, but is a leader who carries out a religious function and must apply himself to it with the greatest diligence.

## ἀμεταμέλητος

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*ametamelētos*, **leaving no room for regret, irrevocable**

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*ametameletos*, S 278; TDNT 4.626–629; EDNT 1.69; NIDNTT 1.356–357; L&N 25.271; BAGD 45

Unknown in the OT, this adjective is used only twice in the NT, notably in Rom 11:29, where it has a theological significance; with respect to the final salvation of Israel, the apostle affirms: “The gifts and the calling of God are irrevocable.” If we insist on an etymological definition (*a-meta-melomai*), we will see this as meaning that God does not change his mind; once God has chosen his people, he will not go back on the decision; God never breaks his word after making a promise (Ps 110:4 = Heb 7:21). Hence our adjective, a synonym of *ametanoētos*, will express simply the absence of variation in the divine will. God is *am atablētos* (Aristotle, *Cael.* 1.9.279).

But we must look at usage, which shows two partially overlapping semantics, one literary, the other legal. Following Socrates’ definition of happiness as “a pleasure that leaves no regret,” Plato (*Tim.* 59), Crates of Thebes, Plutarch (*De tu. san.* 26), Porphyry (VP 39; ed. A. Nauck, *Porphyrii opuscula*, Leipzig, 1886, p. 37), and the Neoplatonist Hierocles of Alexandria (ed. F. Jullach, *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum*, Paris, 1875, vol. 1, p. 453) frequently modify *hēdonē* with the epithet *ametamelētos*. It is a scholastic tradition. But these same authors add that these pleasures are not vain but profitable (*ōpheleiai*), are not diluted with any sorrow (*alypon*), that nothing disturbs or diminishes their charm (*hēdeia*), and finally that they are characterized by permanence or fixity (*monimos*). This ensemble of subsidiary qualifiers tends to give to *ametamelētos* the sense “absolute, whole, unobscured.”

Meanwhile, another series of texts gives this adjective the meaning “total” or “definitive,” whether with respect to feelings, decisions, or personal



resolutions. Here and there appears a psychological or moral nuance of simplicity, good faith, or candor, which is the sense of the adverb *ameletētōs*. This meaning is predominant around the time of Christ, being used precisely with respect to benefits, to devotion, and – for the first time – to gifts. An honorific decree of Priene expresses the recognition of the city for the good grace and indefectible devotion of Zosimus toward it (*I.Priene*, 114, 8; end of the first century BC). According to Diodorus Siculus, “every benevolent act, done without afterthought, bears the good fruit of praise from those who are its beneficiaries” (10.15.3). The sure and definitive character of a donation in the first century AD is seen in the *Tabula* of Ps.-Cebes of Thebes: When an old man exhorts his interlocutor not to trust goods given by Fortune, who takes back what she gives, the stranger asks what characterizes gifts given by *alēthinē Paideia*. The rejoinder: “True knowledge of useful things, a sure and stable gift.”

This sense of *ametamelētos* – “irrevocable” – is exactly its meaning in the few papyri that use the adjective. On 10 November 41, Emperor Claudius wrote to the Alexandrians: “I shall now address the disturbances and the anti-Jewish riots ... reserving the right to bring an inflexible anger to bear against any who would start up again (reading *arxomenōn* for *arxamenōn*). I flatly declare to you that if you do not put an end to this murderous reciprocal furor, I shall be forced to give you a harsh demonstration of what the righteous anger of a philanthropic prince is.” Three other attestations are of juridical actions: writers of wills or parties to contracts declaring their decisions unchangeable and irrevocable, such as Abraham, bishop of Hermonthis, at the end of the fourth century: *hothen eis tautēn hormēsa tēn engraphon ametamelēton eschatēn diathēkēmian asphaleian*. The sense “immutable, unalterable” is confirmed by *P.Lond.* V, 1660, 37 (c. 353), if the restitution of C. Wessely is accepted: *asaleuton kai ametamelēton kai ametanatrepton einai*; and by *P.Cair.Masp.* 314, 3, 11, from the sixth century. These are late documents, but they provide good parallels to Rom 11:29, which has the value of a legal axiom.

The revelation will thus be this: The conduct of the beneficiaries of the covenant will have led God to abrogate it. Now God’s faithfulness is not made false by the unfaithfulness of men (2 Tim 2:13); not only does God not repent of his generous gifts and his promises, but they are irremissible by their very nature (1 Thess 5:24; 1 Cor 1:9; 2 Cor 1:19–22, etc.). Consequently, God will never go back on his choice and his gifts of grace.

The church takes charge only of those widows who have no family to support them. The children and grandchildren of a widow should learn to “give back [that which they owe] to their parents” (*amoibas apodidonai tois protonois*). Solon imposed this obligation on sons on pain of dishonor. In Egypt, it was the daughters who were bound to provide for their parents, sons being dispensed, at least unless they had agreed by contract to do so. But in year 26 of Euergetes I and in the year 1 of Philopator, Pappos and Ctesicles, aged and infirm, complain that their son and daughter, respectively, have refused or ceased to pay a food pension (*P. Enteux*. 25 and 26); while the children and grandchildren of the general Diazelmis surround his old age with honor and care, in the second to third century BC.

It is a question of natural law and of filial devotion, because it is a repayment or a just compensation of the part of children who after a fashion return to their parents from all that they have received from them. To be precise, *amoibē* (a biblical hapax) expresses exchange or substitution (*P. Oxy*. 1930, 2 and 4), a return gift, a recompense; hence its constant usage as a sign of acknowledgement in expressions of gratitude. In 84 BC, Zosimus, having received the title of citizen, felt no sterile gratitude (*ouk akarpon tēn tēs timēs dedeichen amoibēn*), for he loved the city as his homeland and poured benefits upon it. Pagans and Christians often ask God to return benefit for benefit, like this black slave of the centurion Pallas at Antioch: “In return, my God give my master a long life to live, and with it glory.”

## ἀναγκαῖος

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*anankaaios*, **urgently necessary**

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*anankaaios*, S 316; TDNT 1.344–347; EDNT 1.77–79; NIDNTT 2.663; MM 31; L&N 34.14, 71.39; BAGD 52

The Epistle to Titus concludes with an exhortation to brotherly love: “Let our people also learn to be first in good works, in the face of the urgent needs” (*eis tas anankaiais chreias*, 3:14); which is parallel to Rom 12:13 on authentic *agapē*: “Take your part in the needs of the saints, practicing hospitality zealously.” In the NT, the necessities of daily life – food, drink, clothing, shelter – are expressed by *chreia*, which in the classical language often has the nuance of destitution, indigence, privation, distress.

But here these “needs” are accentuated with the adjective *anankaaios* – “pressing need” – in conformity with the usage of literature, epigraphy, and above all the papyri of the Hellenistic period. Reference is sometimes made to repayment of cash advances (*P.Oxy.* 1891, 6; 1970, 20; *PSI* 964, 6), sometimes to services (*UPZ* 106, 11; 107, 13; 108, 11; *chrias pleious kai anankaiais parechomenos*; October 99; cf. the “indispensable secretary” of Palmyra, in *IGLS*, 1859, 7), sometimes to necessary food supplies (*UPZ* 110, 104; 144, 33; *SB* 7758, 15; cf. 7205, 18; *P.Mert.* 91, 17). Thus St. Paul has in mind the several forms of aid that Christians should supply to those whom we still call “the needy.”

Curiously, *anankaaios*, “constraining, necessary, indispensable,” is used for blood relatives, literally the son or the daughter who cannot refuse the obligations of an inheritance; for friends (*P.Oxy.* 2407, 36): *anankaioi philoi* are the most intimate friends. In this sense, Cornelius, while awaiting the arrival of Peter from Caesarea, “had gathered his relatives and close friends.”

From Euripides on, the expression *philos anankaaios* is commonly used. In *Resp.* 9.574, Plato contrasts the mother (*philē anankaia*) with the courtesan that someone wants to marry (*philē ouk anankaia*); then the father, the closest relative and relative of longest standing (*philos anankaaios*) with the adolescent born yesterday (*philos ouk anankaaios*). Josephus mentions “intimate friends” about ten times, but he is almost always talking about confidants of the king. The son of Nebuchadnezzar, for example, releases Jechonias and retains him as one of his closest friends. In the letters among the papyri, the emphasis is always on confidence and affection, notably in letters of recommendation: “Ptolemaeus, the bearer of this letter, is my friend and an intimate” (*P.Cair.Zen.* 7, 3; from March 257 BC); “Dioscoros, bearer of the letter, is my very close friend” (*estin mou leian anankaaios philos*). Sometimes a writer amplifies the effect by using the superlative: *philos anankaiotatos*.

These examples, to which many more could be added, allow us to place the Lucan vocabulary against its background in the contemporary language. The “intimate friends” shared Cornelius’s frame of mind and probably awaited with the same fervor as he the joyful message that St. Peter would bring them. In pointing out their presence, St. Luke intends to express more fully the social importance of the centurion of Caesarea; not only does he worship God “with all his house” (Acts 10:2), have devout soldiers in his service (verse 7), and enjoy a perfect reputation among “the whole nation of the Jews” (verse 22) but also he has numerous associates of quality (verse 27), including first of all some very dear friends. This pagan is a grand personage whose conversion should receive as much fanfare as possible in the church.

## ἀνάγνωσις

*anagnōsis*, **reading (aloud, in public)**

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*anagnosis*, S 320; TDNT 1.343–344; EDNT 1.79; NIDNTT 1.245; MM 32; L&N 33.68; BAGD 52–53

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On the Sabbath day, the Jews congregate at the synagogue (*bêṭ sēper*) to hear the reading of and a commentary on a text from the Law and the Prophets. The Christian church took up this tradition and turned “readers” into liturgical ministers. But the reading of papyri and parchments was difficult, and it was necessary for the reader to know the text before reading it publicly. “When you say, ‘Come listen to a reading that I am going to do,’ make sure that you do not grope your way through.” This is the *anagnōsis* that St. Paul enjoins upon Timothy: “Apply yourself to *reading*, to exhorting, to teaching” (1 Tim 4:13).

Thus the letter to the Colossians would be read in the Laodicean community (*anaginōskō*, Col 4:16); public reading, which assured the maximum disclosure of the word of God, was used from the first days of the apostolic writings and the prophetic revelations (Rev 1:3). In the second century, the duty of the “lector” is entrusted to a competent minister, meaning on the one hand one who can produce an intelligible reading: *anagnōstēs kathistasthō euēkoos* (*Can. App.* 19; *Const. App.* 2.5: *polys en anagnōsmasin, hina tas graphas epimelōs hermēneuē* [“much given to reading, so that he may interpret the Scriptures carefully”]; cf. Ambrose, *Off.* 1.44.215); and on the other one who is intelligent: *ho anaginōskōn noeitō* (Mark 13:14; cf. Eph 3:4); since he must not only make an informed choice of the passages to read, but also comment on them. He does not have the right to be boring or esoteric (Ambrose, *Off.* 1.22.100–101; Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* 4.23.8).

## ἀνάδειξις

*anadeixis*, **distinct demonstration, revelation, proclamation**

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*anadeixis*, S 323; TDNT 2.31; EDNT 1.80; NIDNTT 3.569; L&N 28.54; BAGD 53

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This substantive makes a late appearance in the Koine and remains rather rare, unknown in the papyri, Philo, Josephus, etc. It retains the basic meaning of the verb *deiknymi* – “show something distinctly” – and especially the meaning of the compound *anadeiknymi*: “make something visible by lifting it up,” for

example on the point of a spear (Plutarch, *Crass.* 26.4; cf. *De def. or.* 14), and is used for a shield (Herodotus 7.128; cf. 6.121, 124; Dio Cassius 77.13.5) and for the door of a house or of a sanctuary that is opened. Hence the meaning “be revealed,” “be uncovered” (Plutarch, *Them.* 25.2), “make oneself known” (idem, *Caes.* 38.5), “appear” (*Conf. Tongues* 103; *Sacr. Abel and Cain* 30). On the religious level, *anadeiknymi* often has God as its subject and means “reveal”: “I have revealed initiations to men.” It is in this sense that the substantive *anadeixis* is used by Diodorus Siculus 1.85.4 regarding the cult of the Apis-bull: “When Osiris died, his soul passed into an animal of this species and ... every time this god makes an *appearance* on earth, this soul passes successively ... into the body of a bull.”

The verb *anadeiknymi* also means “proclaim” (Xenophon, *Cyr.* 8.7.23), “declare” (2 Macc 9:14); “the God of victories proclaimed Abraham master of trophies” (Philo, *Prelim. Stud.* 93). It is used especially for the designation of a sovereign through investiture (“I have designated my son to be king”) or of a high official in his office. It is in this sense that the substantive *anadeixis* is used for the first time by Polybius for “the coronations of the Lagids” (*kai tas anadeixeis tōn basileōn*, 15.25.11), then by Plutarch: the colleagues of Caius proclaim the results of his election to a third tribunate (Plutarch, *C. Gracch.* 12.7); “the day of the election” (of candidates to the magistracies, *hē kyria tēs anadeixeōs*, *Cat. Min.* 44.10); Metellus “did not let Marius leave until twelve days before the election of consuls” (*tēn tōn hypatōn anadeixin*).

Curiously, the two biblical occurrences of *anadeixis* suggest both nuances, “show” and “institute.” According to Sir 43:6, the moon is *anadeixin chronōn*, that is, it indicates feasts and determines months; hence in the calendar it has the double function of announcing and ruling. According to Luke 1:80, John the Baptist was in the desert until the day of his manifesting to Israel (*heōs hēmeras anadeixeōs autou*). The solemnity of this “appearing” of the precursor, inaugurating his ministry, is noteworthy. The evangelist contrasts John’s long, solitary, silent sojourn in the Judean desert east of Hebron to his official manifesting by God; it is like a revelation. The Vulgate translates well, “usque ad diem ostensionis.” We may interpret, “He appeared publicly.” But this is also the coming of a hero who heralds the king and prepares his way, his presentation before the whole nation. It was at this point that John, then about thirty years old, received his investiture as announcer of the messianic era.

ἀναδέχομαι

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*anadechomai*, to welcome, accept; to accept responsibility for

The four biblical occurrences of this verb are all of the first aorist middle participle *anadexamenos*. If the Bible gives it the well-attested sense of hospitality, “to welcome someone as a guest,” it shows no trace of the common sense of accepting or receiving an object or a sum of money or of being subjected to an action. At least in the case of Eleazer’s “accepting” a glorious death in preference to an infamous existence (2 Macc 6:19), a voluntary and fervent consent is involved.

This verb is therefore not synonymous with *lambanō*. It very often means “take upon oneself, take on a burden or obligation”; one answers to someone for something. This was the case with Nicanor, who undertook to gain tribute money for the Romans by taking hostages from Jerusalem; and it is said in Egypt concerning the son of Jason, who only lived five years, that he “accomplished all that he agreed to” (*SEG*, vol. 8, 799, 2). When one takes on a task, one agrees to carry it through to completion (*P.Cair.Isid.* 82, 5 and 8). Finally, *anadechomai* expresses someone’s standing surety, as attests the constant, albeit late, association *engyasthai kai anadechesthai*.

This verb consequently has a legal meaning – to take on a responsibility – which is almost certainly the sense in Heb 11:17 – “By faith Abraham, when put to the test, offered Isaac – truly it was his only son that he was offering – he who had received the responsibility for the promises.” The “temptation” of Abraham was a trial of his faith, his love, and his obedience. All the commentators mention the nuance of the tense: the perfect *prosenēnochen* points to the sacrifice as completely accepted and, as it were, already accomplished in the heart of Abraham, even as the imperfect *prosepheren* evokes the progressive realization of this offering without weakening throughout the preparations to the immolation on Moriah: “Having offered ... he was in the process of offering”; while – as the recipient and agent of the promises of a posterity – he appeared to be nullifying this promise forever.

## ἀναπέμω

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*anapempō*, **to send, conduct, bring back, send up**

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*anapempo*, S 375; EDNT 1.87; MM 37; L&N 15.70, 15.71; BAGD 59

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During the Hellenistic period, this compound verb, unknown in the LXX, often has the same meaning as the simple form *pempō*, “send, conduct.” “Herod sent

subsidies to Antony's partisans" (Josephus, *War* 1.358, cf. 2.605; *Ant.* 18.313); "She sent us our provisions at the city of Antinous" (*Pap.Lugd.Bat.* VI, 37, 8); "Accept all that I send you." It is used constantly in shipping orders: "Order from Ischyriion to Heroninos to load four camels with vetch (*orobos*) and send them into the city." Documents are sent, as are people. Prayers are sent up to heaven. Although there is this variety of connotations, the basic meaning is moving a person or thing from the place where it is to another place, as is clear from the numerous "summonses" preserved among the papyri: "Immediately send Emes ... who is accused by Aurelius Nilus...." The meaning "bring back, cause to return," is very common in literary Greek and in the papyri: "I sent you a bag of sesame ... send it back with Achilles" (*P.Oxy.* 3066, 4); a deceased woman's dowry was not restored to the heirs (*UPZ* 123, 22); "If there is some rupture between us, I agree to return the estate to Heracleia." It is in this sense that we should understand Phlm 12, where St. Paul sent the slave Onesimus back to his legal owner: "I am sending him back to you" (*hon anepempsa* [epistolary aorist] *soi*).

*Anapempō* often has a legal meaning: to send up an accused person or to refer a matter to the competent authorities. This is the case in Luke 23:7, 11, 15: Pilate "sent Jesus up to Herod (*anepempsen pros*) ... Herod sent him back to Pilate (*anepempsen tō*) ... Herod sent him up to us (*anepempsen auton pros hēmas*)." These variations of venue and jurisdiction are mentioned constantly. Sometimes plaintiffs who are up against a scheming adversary and are unable to obtain a judgment before an easily influenced jury, appeal to a higher authority; sometimes the highest authority decides on jurisdiction. Thus a *prostagma* of Cleopatra III and Ptolemy Soter II rules that only the *dioikētēs* Eirenaïos will have jurisdiction to judge state agents: "they shall refer (*anapempeîn*) complaints against agents and their trials to Eirenaïos the kinsman (of the king) and *dioikētēs*" (*P.Tebt.* 7, 7 = *C.Ord.Ptol.* 61; from 144 BC). According to an inscription from Metropolis, the legate P. Ranius Castus received from the governor the assignment of taking on a case that his predecessors could not bring to a conclusion: "Having read Sosthenes' petition ... which was sent (*anapemphthēnai*) to me by the proconsul Stertinus Quartus, I am quite amazed that after so many letters from governors ..."

Thus Festus's language is perfectly adequate when he presents to Agrippa the case of the prisoner Paul: "I asked him if he wished to go to Jerusalem to be judged there, but when Paul appealed for his case to be reserved for the judgment of Augustus (the emperor Nero), I ordered that he be kept until I could send him up to Caesar" (*anapempsō pros Kaisara*, aorist subjunctive, Acts 25:21). This referral to the highest jurisdiction has numerous parallels.

Herod had three Arabs arrested who “were yet examined by Saturninus, governor of Syria, and sent to Rome” (*anakrithentes ... anepemphthēsan eis Rhōmēn*, Josephus, *War* 1.577; cf. *Ant.* 14.97). Quadratus promises to examine in detail matters submitted to him (*diereunēsein hekasta*), hears the complaints of the Samaritans, and sends to Caesar (*anepempsen epi Kaisara*) two high priests, various eminent persons, and others (*War* 2.243; cf. 246, 253; 3.398; *Ant.* 20.131, 134). Felix rids Judea of brigands, arrests Eleazar, who pillaged the region for twenty years, and sends him to Rome in chains (*dēsas anepempsen eis Rhōmēn*, *Ant.* 20.161). According to an inscription from Priene, the *stratēgos* writes and defers to the Senate: “concerning whom the *stratēgos* Lucius Lucilius wrote and sent to the Senate” (*peri hōn ho stratēgos Leukios Leukilios egrapsen kai anepempsen pros tēn synklēton*, *I.Priene*, 111, 147; first century BC; cf. Josephus, *War* 2.207).

## ἀναστροφή

*anastrophē*, **conduct**

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***anastrophe***, S 391; *TDNT* 7.715–717; *EDNT* 1.93; *NIDNTT* 3.933, 935; MM 38; L&N 41.3; BAGD 61

The most banal sense of *anastrephō* – “return, come back from one place to another,” hence “retrace one’s steps” (1 Sam 25:12; 2 Sam 3:16; Jdt 1:13) – sometimes retains the etymological nuance “to return upside down,” like runaways thrown back on top of each other (1 Macc 7:46; cf. Jdt 1:11); sometimes it has the sense of coming and going, “living.” Hence its metaphorical usage: “walk in virtue.”

Only this moral nuance is retained in the noun *anastrophē*, designating a mode of existence, a way of behaving. This became a technical term in NT spirituality. Just as the way of life of the pagans is stigmatized, so also is “perfect conduct from childhood” praised (2 Macc 6:23, *kallistē*). When St. Paul testifies concerning his conscience (“It is with simplicity and the purity of God – not in fleshly wisdom, but in the grace of God – that we have conducted ourselves in the world, particularly in our dealings with you,” 2 Cor 1:12), he contrasts two modes of existence and already gives *anastrophē* the exemplary sense that will be required especially of ministers of the church; the model, who is particularly visible, ought to be inspiring. Life lived in the faith is a persuasive testimony.

It is above all St. Peter who demands of all Christians an unassailable comportment. Whether with respect to bearing, dress, or behavior in family and social relations, every action and reaction in the context of the community, that



is, the concrete life of the believer, should be noble and radiant: “Let your behavior among the nations be noble” (1 Pet 2:12; *kalē*), apt as a result to disarm criticisms (3:16), notably those of husbands won over by the chaste and quiet deportment of their wives (3:1–2).

It used to be claimed that these moral and religious meanings derived from the OT, but they are attested in the secular literature, in the papyri, and especially by epigraphy, notably in the honorific decrees that give particular honor to magistrates and functionaries whose conduct has been irreproachable: “Menander, in the magistracies to which he has elected, has shown himself irreproachable by his noble and splendid conduct.” “I respect this man, who conducts himself so generously in all things.” This *en hapasin anastrephomenon* is already attested in the first century AD in *I.Priene*, in *I.Car.*: “In all his embassies, he has conducted himself properly and managed affairs justly,” and in inscriptions from Pergamum. There is a wealth of parallels to the formula in Heb 13:18 (*en pasin kalōs telontes anastrephesthai*) and to 1 Pet 1:15 (*en pasē anastrophē*).

If the extension of “good conduct” to all areas is emphasized, its quality or distinguishing marks become even clearer. Just as the NT writers qualify conduct with noble, good, pure, holy, devout, the inscriptions praise it for its nobility, glory, and piety.

## ἀνατρέφω

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*anatrephō*, **to nurture, raise**

→see also τρέφω, ἀνατρέφω

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*anatrepho*, S 397; EDNT 1.94; MM 39; L&N 33.232, 35.51; BAGD 62

This verb, which means “nurture” a child so that it will grow, then “raise” it, is only used once in the OT, with respect to Solomon: “I was nurtured, surrounded with swaddling clothes and with care” (Wis 7:4). In the NT, it is perhaps used concerning Jesus, who “came to Nazareth, where he had been raised”; it is clearly used concerning Moses, “nurtured for three months in the house of his father,” and St. Paul, who received his rabbinic education at Jerusalem. Because of this range of uses, *anatrephō* encompasses the entire life of the child until his maturity, including feeding and physical care, the formation of the mind and character; in which case it is synonymous with *paideuō*.

We must note, however, that *anatrephō* designates by preference the education received at home, almost always in relation with family members – natural or adoptive – that is, with brothers and sisters. Specifically, L. Robert,

in his epigraphical studies, has noted that “the verb *anatrephesthai* denotes education by the foster father, and is an important term for anyone interested in studying family relations and, for example, the status of the *threptoi*.” He cites the tomb of Kladaios at Aphrodisias where *Aurēlia Glyptē hē anathrepsamenē auton* (“who raised him”) is also buried (*MAMA*, vol. 8, 560, 4), or in Caria the tomb of a certain Zeno, buried together with *M. Aur. Eutychos ho anathrepsamenos auton*. Soterichos gives some vines, etc., to a certain Lucius, his pupil (*Loukiō hō anethrepsamēn*).

## ἀναφέρω

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*anapherō*, to cause to ascend, offer up, remove

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***anaphero***, S 399; *TDNT* 9.60–61; *EDNT* 1.94; MM 39; L&N 15.176, 15.206, 53.17; BAGD 63

In the classical language, this verb means “to carry up” or “back” (*Ep. Arist.* 268; Josephus, *War* 4.404; *Ant.* 1.16; *Ag. Apion* 2.162). In biblical Greek, it is used for everything that ascends, physically or metaphorically, from the flower of the vine (Gen 40:10), incense (Exod 30:9), or smoke (Judg 20:38), to anger (1 Macc 2:24) and hymns (2 Macc 10:7). Hence: to ascend or to carry from one place to another. Thus before the transfiguration Jesus made Peter, James, and John ascend a high mountain (Matt 17:1; Mark 9:2); and after the resurrection he himself “ascended into the sky.”

A good many OT meanings are unknown in the NT: “raise a levy” (1 Kgs 5:27), “to dress up a garment with jewelry” (2 Sam 1:24), “to bring something,” “present” a matter to Moses (Deut 1:17) or to God. But in both testaments, *ascend* or cause to ascend has above all a sacrificial usage and figures in the cultic vocabulary. The priests carry and transport the victim, raise it to place it on the altar, and offer it as a sacrifice (1 Macc 4:53). In this sense, the high priest of the new covenant offered himself once to take away the sins of the many (Heb 9:28) and has no need to offer himself anew (Heb 7:27). Abraham offered his son Isaac on the altar (Jas 2:21), and Christians, “a holy company of priests,” offer spiritual sacrifices (1 Pet 2:5), their continual praise, to God (Heb 13:15); *anapherō* is in this sense synonymous with *prospherō*, meaning “to offer.”

There remains 1 Pet 2:24 – “He bore our sins in his body on the cross,” where most commentators see a reference to the LXX of Isa 53:12 and understand 1 Pet in the same sense: bear sins = undergo punishment for sins. But A. Deissmann objects that quotations do not often have the same sense in

their new context as in the original, and that to undergo punishment on the cross would have been expressed by *epi tō xylō* (the dative case), while the accusative in 1 Pet, *epi to xylon*, evokes the idea of removal. He cites *P.Petr.* I, 16, 2 (vol. 1, p. 47) from 230 BC, in which the litigant protests against the debts that have been transferred upon him and submits his case to Asclepiades. It is true that, in the papyri and the inscriptions, *anapherō* often signifies “transfer, pay money” and that one can here get some idea of substitution. But Moulton-Milligan (on this word) rightly observe that nothing turns our thoughts in this direction in 1 Pet 2:24, where the accusative that follows *epi* is a person, which weakens considerably the parallel cited by A. Deissmann.

ἀναψύχω

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*anapsychō*, to refresh

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*anapsucho*, S 404; TDNT 9.663–664; EDNT 1.95; NIDNTT 3.686; MM 40; L&N 25.149; BAGD 63

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St. Peter exhorts the Jerusalemites to be converted “so that the times of refreshing [or relief] may come.” These times are linked with the Parousia and coincide with the *apokatastasis*: the perfect restoring, the complete restoration of the creation. St. Paul for his part, while a prisoner at Rome, declares that Onesiphorus has often comforted him or relieved him by his visits (2 Tim 1:16).

The verb *anapsychō*, which suggests the idea of refreshing and thus of invigorating, is used first for physical health, then for spiritual fortification, the relieving of anxiety, then of well-being experienced after pain or exertion. This is the meaning of this verb that is found among the papyri only in private letters. In the second century AD, a child writes to his parents: “when I found out, I was delivered from my uneasiness” (*P.Osl.* 153, 10). Another, in the third century, assures his parents of his academic progress: “I worked very hard and am relaxing.” But the best parallel to 2 Tim 1:16, cited in a Christian letter from the time of Constantine (*SB* 7872, 12), is in the double appeal made to Hephaistios, who is cloistered in the Serapeum of Memphis (*en katochē en tō Sarapoeiō*) on the one hand from his wife Isias, presently very distressed and incapable of being comforted except by the return of her husband to the house, and on the other hand from Dionysius, brother of Hephaistios, who writes to him along the same lines. This calming or relieving can blossom into joy. It is in any case rest, relaxation, in which the soul expands (cf. *platynō*; 2 Cor 6:11; 4 QPs 8.14), is not constrained; it is like an enlarging, which – thanks to the

brotherly love shown by Onesiphorus – presents a fine contrast with the apostle's incarceration.

ἀνθ' ὧν

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*anth' hōn* (*anti* + *hōn*), **in place of, in exchange**

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***anth' hon***, S 475, 3739; TDNT 1.372; BDF §§17, 208(1), 294(4); MM 46, 47; EDNT 1.8, 109; BAGD 73, 74

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In the papyri, this expression, used very often in business documents, means above all “in place of,” “in return, in exchange, in compensation.” For example, the farmer Idomeneus complains to King Ptolemy that his field, already sown, was flooded by Petobastis and Horos. He asks that he be indemnified, that the guilty parties “be forced to buy back my land at their own expense and pay the fees arising from the transaction, and that I be given in place of the one that they flooded (*anth' hōn*) a spread equal to the land that they themselves cultivate.” The substitute (BGU 2128, 4) is the equivalent; in contracts for work and in transfers of land, the boss or the seller certifies that he has received such and such a sum of money from the buyer, or that he has undertaken certain obligations “in return” for the labor of the worker. There is an exact correspondence between the work and the salary (cf. SB 10526, 8).

Making compensation is the very basis of exchange, as Philo observes: “Those who give (*hoi didontes*) wish to receive honor in exchange, seeking a recompense in return for their favor (*antidosin*), and under the guise of flattering with a gift (*dōreas*), they in fact execute a sale; those who are in the habit of accepting something in exchange for (*anth' hōn*) that which they supply are in fact sellers.” From this developed a logical sense for *anth' hōn* – “because, consequently” – and a moral sense, emphasizing exact repayment. This double nuance is preponderant in the biblical texts.

Often enough, the expression *anth' hōn* is used in a legal sense, “in compensation.” A young girl who has been violated must become the wife of her seducer, “since he has violated her, and he cannot repudiate her as long as he lives” (Deut 22:29); “Joab and his brother Abishai killed Abner, because he had put their brother to death” (2 Sam 3:30); “He shall pay back the sheep fourfold, since he has committed this deed and has not shown pity.” There is a strict reciprocity: “I will do you no more evil, since my life has been precious in your eyes on this day” (1 Sam 26:21). Most frequently, this correspondence occurs in relations between God and humans. Sometimes, when people are faithful God rewards them and blesses them: “In your race (Abraham's) will all

the nations of the earth be blessed, because you have obeyed my voice” (Gen 22:18; cf. 26:5); “My covenant will be for Phineas and his descendants after him a covenant of eternal priesthood, because he has shown himself jealous for his God” (Num 25:13); “Since you have asked for yourself discernment for understanding justice, behold, I shall act according to your word; I give you a wise and intelligent heart” (1 Kgs 3:11; 2 Chr 1:11; 2 Kgs 10:30; 22:19; Jdt 13:20; Ezek 36:13; Zech 1:15).

Most of the biblical usages of *anth' hōn* underline the justice of punishments, the exact repayment by God for people's sins; the penalties are at the same time the necessary consequence of and the just payment for the fault: “The land will become desolate ... they will pay for their sin, since and because (double conjunction in Hebrew) they have despised by judgment” (Lev 26:43); “Because you have not served Yahweh your God with joy and gladness of heart when you had everything in abundance, you will serve in hunger, thirst, nudity, and privation the enemy that God will send against you.” It is worth noting that of the five occurrences of *anth' hōn* in the NT, four express a punishment, the sanction for a trespass; the archangel Gabriel punished the unbelief of Zacharias: “You will remain silent ... since you have not believed my words” (Luke 1:20). Jerusalem will be destroyed, “because you have not known the time or your visitation” (Luke 19:44); Herod Agrippa is struck dead “because he did not give the glory to God” (Acts 12:23). If certain people are given over to perdition, it is “because they have not accepted the love of the truth in order to be saved.”

In contrast, Philo and Josephus use *anth' hōn* most often in a favorable context. Not only do they evoke the equity of the recompense, but they emphasize that gratitude is a gift in return for benefits received. There is an exact correspondence between the action of thanksgiving and the divine favor, for example the celebration of the Passover in grateful tribute for deliverance from servitude in Egypt (Josephus, *Ant.* 11.110).

In Hellenistic piety, as expressed notably in dedications, the Greek is seen giving gifts to his god, whom he knows to be close and powerful and whose protection and benefits he expects in exchange (*anth' hōn*). The *dōron* is a “tribute of friendship” (*Anth. Pal.* 6.325), which counts on winning the favors of the divinity (6.340), because the person who needs protection thinks on the one hand of pleasing the god and on the other hand of receiving a benevolent reciprocity. It is an exchange of friendly services. For example, three brothers dedicate their nets to Pan, and ask “Send to them in return (*anth' hōn*) a good hunt” (Leonidas of Tarentum, in *Anth. Pal.* 6.13; cf. 154). Selene asks Cybele for her daughter that she may grow in beauty and find a husband, a just favor “in return (*anth' hōn*) for the child's having often let her hair hang down in

your *pronaos* and before your altar” (ibid., 281); some sailors call upon Phoebus, “Be favorable to us and send us a good wind.”

ἀντιβάλλω

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*antiballō*, **to exchange**

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*antiballo*, S 474; *EDNT* 1.109; MM 47; L&N 33.160; BAGD 74

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The primitive sense of this verb is “to retaliate, return fire.” It is used figuratively in 2 Macc 11:13, in the sense of “reflect upon”; this English expression translates well the nuance of the Greek, “a return of the mind upon itself so as to examine and deepen a spontaneous deliverance of consciousness”; the subject returns upon itself and after a fashion is refracted. Hence the sense “dispute” or simply “converse with each other,” like the pilgrims of Emmaus: “What then are these matters that you were discussing among yourselves along the way?”

Literary and papyrological attestations are rare; not one corroborates the meaning of the two biblical texts. The clearest meaning is the comparison of two exemplars, for example of a copy and its original (Strabo 13.609; 17. 790), as in the annotation to the will of Antonius Silvanus in AD 142: *Antōnis Silbanos ho progegrammenos antebalon tēn prokimenēn mou diathēkēn*.

ἀντιδιατίθημι, ἀντικαθίστημι

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*antidiatithēmi*, *antikathistēmi*, **to oppose, resist**

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*antidiatithemi*, S 475; *EDNT* 1.109; MM 47; L&N 39.1; BAGD 74 |

*antikathistemi*, S 478; *EDNT* 1.109; MM 47; L&N 39.18; BAGD 74

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The first of these verbs appears only in the Koine; but, unknown in the papyri, it is attested in good literature. Occurring in the Bible only in 2 Tim 2:25, the present middle participle *tous antidiatithemenous* refers to “those who oppose or resist” the preaching of the gospel.

*Antikathistēmi* can have the sense of “put in place of, exchange” (Josh 5:7; cf. *P.Cair.Zen.* 59278, 4: *antikatastēsōme eis ta nea*), “establish, position opposite” with a nuance of hostility (Mic 2:8) and usually against an adversary in justice (Deut 31:21) or in a plea to higher authorities. This is the constant and frequent meaning in the papyri. In observing that the Christians have not yet

“resisted to the point of shedding blood,” Heb 12:4 uses a sports metaphor, that of two boxers or pancratists facing each other; their blows were often lethal. There is also a judicial nuance, because the persecuted Christians have not given the supreme testimony, shed blood. This usage of *antikathistēmi*, which agrees well with the language of the period, confirms the culture of the author of Heb as well as his familiarity with the language of the LXX.

*Antikeimai*, “to be situated facing, confronted” (Josephus, *War* 4.454; 5.70; Strabo 2.5.15), usually – and always in the Bible – has the sense of “be against”: the flesh and the spirit are opposed to each other as two irreducible principles (Gal 5:17), as the sinful life on the one hand and the rectitude and integrity of the gospel on the other (1 Tim 1:10). It occurs mostly in the form of the present participle: *ho antikeimenos*, “the opponent, the enemy, the adversary,” sometimes without a complement (1 Cor 16:9; Phil 1:28), sometimes with the dative. The term is common and characteristic in Christian language, applied sometimes to the antichrist, the adversary par excellence, “the one who is opposed and set himself up against all that bears the name of God” (2 Thess 2:4), sometimes to the devil, *ho antidikos*, the one who attacks *kat’ exochēn* against the church (Matt 16:18), its ministers (1 Tim 3:6–7), and its faithful. His aggression is directed against the most vulnerable, for example young widows (1 Tim 5:14), who go astray by following him.

ἀντλέω, ἄντλημα

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*antleō*, to draw (water); *antlēma*, bucket

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*antleo*, S 501; *EDNT* 1.112; MM 49; BAGD 76 | *antlema*, S 502; *EDNT* 1.112; MM 49; BAGD 76

The verb *antleō* is derived from the noun *antlos*, “ship’s hold,” and literally refers to bilge water that is bailed out. Hence it means “to empty water from the hull” and, by extension, “to draw.” Cf. “empty the water that the sea casts on board” (Theognis 673); “you draw straight from the cask” (Theocritus 10.13); “to draw water with a sieve, or what is proverbially called a pierced cask” (Ps.-Aristotle, *Oec.* 1.6.1); “they draw the liquid off with a bascule to which is attached a half of a wineskin instead of a bucket.” Hence the figurative sense “to drain, exhaust”: a life of woe (Euripides, *Hipp.* 898), destiny (Aeschylus, *PV* 375).

In the papyri, the verb is used sometimes in accounts for the pay of workers who pump water (usually in a vineyard): *antlousan eis ampelon* (*Pap.Lugd.Bat.* XII, 20, 7); “for the pay of two water-drawers”; sometimes it is used for the

hydraulic irrigation machine: “so that the machine may draw” (*hopōs antlēse hē mēchanē*, SB 9654, b 9); a machine for drawing water for a vineyard.

In the LXX, water is drawn from a well (Gen 24:13, 20, 43; Hebrew *šā’ah*; Exod 2:16, 19; Hebrew *dālāh*), and Abraham’s servant asks Rebekah, “Please give me a little water from your jar”; but in a figurative sense: “You shall draw water with joy from the springs of salvation” (Isa 12:3).

The substantive *antlēma*, which is much rarer, is still represented by only three attestations in the papyri. In a petition (from the first century AD) to a police chief regarding the “irrigating machine” (*epantlion*, line 21) of a vineyard at Thegonis, irrigation became impossible “with the water-drawing machine.” In the second century AD, in an account of workers and pay, each worker receives a drachma a day: “two workers building the waterwheel, two drachmas.” In the fifth century, in a contract for a bath house, the text is less certain: *to on en [tō] [ant]lēmati tou autou loutrou mēchanostasion*.

This group of texts, in addition to the immediate context, leaves no room for doubt regarding the meaning of the biblical hapax *antlēma* in John 4:11, where the Samaritan woman says to Jesus, *oute antlēma echeis*, which has to mean, “Lord, you do not have a container for drawing water”; but since *antlēma* “actually serves as a name for an instrument” (P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique*), the correct English would be “You have nothing to draw water with,” no vessel of any sort, no rope, etc., and the well is deep.

### ἀνυπόκριτος, γνήσιος

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*anyrokritos*, **upright, unfeigned, authentic**; *gnēsios*, **authentic, dear, legitimate**

→see also ὑποκρίνομαι, ὑπόκρισις, ὑποκριτής, ἀνυπόκριτος

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*anurokritos*, S 505; TDNT 8.570–571; EDNT 1.112; MM 50; L&N 73.8; BAGD 76 | *gnēsios*, S 1103; TDNT 1.727; EDNT 1.255; MM 128–129; L&N 73.1; BAGD 162–163

Because it is unknown in the papyri and in the secular language prior to its NT occurrences, *anyrokritos* can be said to be a specifically biblical word. If it is used only twice in the OT, in the sense of “upright, straightforward” (Wis 5:18; 18:16), it is found six times in the epistolary corpus of the NT, qualifying wisdom (Jas 3:17), faith (1 Tim 1:5; 2 Tim 1:5), and brotherly love (Rom 12:9; 2 Cor 6:6; 1 Pet 1:22).

In accord with its etymology and with the synonyms offered by Hesychius – *adolos*, *aprosōpolēptos* – it is usually translated “without hypocrisy,” that is,



without sham or dissimulation. It is indeed true that this sense of sincerity or rectitude is implied in all these occurrences, especially in Jas 3:17, where wisdom is first of all qualified by pure (*hagnē*) and finally by *adiakritos* (without partiality) and *anyrokritos*, which forms an *inclusio* and expresses a purity without mixture, an absolute sincerity. But this text contrasts the wisdom that comes from above with wisdom that is terrestrial, animal, diabolical (verse 15), and the eight characteristics listed are intended to define the true *sophia* in terms of its essential components so that it can be distinguished from counterfeits. Similarly the “unfeigned faith” of 1 Tim 1:5 and 2 Tim 1:5 evokes the *pistis* whose exterior profession in words and deeds translates the allegiance of the heart and the convictions of the spirit; a “sincere” faith is faith that includes intellectual orthodoxy, pious conduct, faithfulness, and loyalty in keeping obligations. But this “truth” then amounts to conformity with the very nature of the virtue, and *anyrokritos* must be translated “authentic.”

This emerges more clearly with the expression *agapē* (*philadelphia*) *anyrokritos*, which is probably a “love without hypocrisy,” such that the manifestations of affection match the sincerity of the attachment: one does not play-act in brotherly relationships. But this meaning does not account for Rom 12:9, where this independent noun phrase governs the whole section on charity (verses 9–21) and serves as a kind of chapter title. St. Paul lists the specific characteristics of *agapē*, which is neither *erōs*, nor *philia*, nor *philostorgia*, although it takes on their values; it is a completely original, godly love, revealed by Jesus Christ, poured out in the heart by the Holy Spirit, a love of nobility and beauty whose first mark is a horror of evil. In other words, *agapē anyrokritos* is specifically Christian love, characteristic of the baptized. It is also the mark of the true apostle; St. Paul recommends himself as a minister of God *en agapēi anypokritōi* (2 Cor 6:6), not by a show of affection but by the authentic charity which is divine in origin and has all of the traits that can be pondered in the example in Jesus Christ. It is like a certificate of origin that proves that Paul is truly sent by God and is thus a qualified apostle whose authority cannot be contested, in contrast to the *pseudapostoloi* (2 Cor 11:13). This meaning is confirmed by 2 Cor 8:8, where the Corinthians are in a position to prove that their love is authentic (*to tēs hymeteras agapēs gnēsion dokimazōn*), in that their urgency to participate in the collection authenticates their invisible love for God. Similarly Marcus Aurelius writes that “goodwill is invincible, if it is candid, without a mocking smile, without hypocrisy” (*to eumenes anikēton ean gnēsion ē kai mē sesēros mēde hypokrisis*, 11.18.15).

The adjective *gnēsios*, distinctively Pauline in the NT, is applied to three persons: *Timotheō gnēsio teknō en pistei* (1 Tim 1:2), which must be translated “dear and authentic child in the faith”; to Titus (Titus 1:4); and to Syzygos, on

whose name Paul makes a pun, “dear and authentic companion.” In secular usage, it is used for a son, a wife, a brother and sister, a friend, and a citizen. These usages show that in the Hellenistic period *gnēsios* goes beyond the legal definition whereby it describes the legitimate son, as opposed to the bastard.

(a) It is an emotionally freighted term. Like Isaac, whom Abraham sired by his wife, *huios* ... *gnēsios, atapētos kai monos* (Philo, *Abraham* 168), or the decree of Cersonesos for a certain Heracleotes: “he shows authentic love” (*agapan gnasian endeiknytai*).

(b) It is used in the first century in a religious sense for those who pass on a revelation.

(c) In an even broader sense, for the authorized interpreters of a teaching, like Aristotle, “the most authentic disciple of Plato.” “Legitimate sons,” natural heirs of their father, are especially qualified to pass on his commandments (Philo, *Virtues* 59) and to be named sole governors of his empire (*To Gaius* 24). The additional observation that the adverb *gnēsiōs*, “sincerely,” is used in the sense of “efficaciously” will enhance by this density of usages the meaning of *gnēsios* as applied to Timothy and Titus in order to boost their credibility with the Ephesians and Cretans: true children of the apostle, they are his most authentic representatives, interpreters of his teachings, faithful echoes of his own voice. Furthermore, they should be treated with reverence, because they are not simple “brothers” (1 Thess 3:2) or collaborators (Rom 16:21), but men who have lived with Paul in a profound intimacy like that between sons and their father; thus they are very dear to him (2 Tim 2:1). These are credentials that will inspire Christians to obedience and filial piety toward them.

ἁπαξ, ἐφάπαξ

*hapax, ephapax, once*

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*apax*, S 530; *TDNT* 1.381–383; *EDNT* 1.115–116; *NIDNTT* 2.716–719, 725; MM 53; L&N 60.67, 60.68, 60.70; BAGD 80 | *ephapax*, S 2178; *TDNT* 1.383–384; *EDNT* 2.91–92; *NIDNTT* 2.716–718; MM 269; L&N 60.67, 60.68, 67.34; BDF §§12(3), 203; BAGD 330

In a listing, the adverb *hapax* has an arithmetic significance – *epirrhēma arithmētikon* (Hesychius) – the opposite of “several times.” Thus 2 Cor 11:25 – “once I was stoned, three times I was shipwrecked”; a constant usage in the literature. The literature often uses the formula *hapax kai dis*, “a first and a second time,” which can be translated “various times.” The same usage appears in St. Paul: “We have wanted to come to you a first time and a second time, but

Satan has hindered us” (1 Thess 2:18); “When I was at Thessalonica you sent what I needed a first time and a second time” (Phil 4:16). Needless to say, uniqueness is the opposite of multiplicity, “one time” of “often” and “another time,” but not of “once again,” which is a repetition, even with significant changes, and with the nuance of a first time which contrasts with the last time (Heb 12:26–27 = Hag 2:5; cf. Judg 16:20, 28; 20:30–31; 1 Sam 3:10; 20:25; 2 Macc 3:37; *T. Abr.* A 8, 9, 15).

Often *hapax* has the meaning “one single time, unique.” “Only (and without exception) man gives orders to all other living beings that are mortal” (Philo, *Husbandry* 8; *Moses* 2.65), “a single bite inevitably brings death” (*Dreams* 2.88; cf. *Spec. Laws* 1.59). This uniqueness can be periodic: “Once a year, propitiation is made”; thus the high priest only enters the holy of holies once a year. But many other texts emphasize that what is done is not repeatable, and these give *hapax* its definitive meaning: “Once for all Christ was manifested at the consummation of the ages” (Heb 9:26); “humans are destined to die only once” (Heb 9:27). “The faith is passed down to the saints once for all.”

This meaning occurs frequently in Philo and the papyri: “The parricide would not die at one stroke (*mē hapax*); he finished dying only with continual suffering, sorrow, and distress” (*Rewards* 72); “It would be better to take nothing away, to add nothing ... and to leave alone that which was done once for all (*hapax* = definitively) at the beginning” (*Etern. World* 42); “Leave all the rest aside once for all.” The expression *pros hapax* at the end of a receipt (*P.Oxy.* 1138, 13; *BGU* 1020, 15; *PSI* 1040, 26; *P.Erl.* 79, 4) or a dossier (*P.Bour.* 20, 14) seems to mean that the item in question is complete and thus valid and definitive (cf. *P.Lips.* 34, 20; 35, 19; 39, 6). This would correspond to the Hebrew *pa’am*, often translated by *hapax* in the LXX, which means “anvil, step or pace, time or occurrence”; cf. Abishai to David: “let me pin him to the ground with a single throw of the spear” (1 Sam 26:8; cf. 1 Chr 1:11; Judg 16:18); “May sinners perish far from the face of the Lord, all together.”

*Hapax* usually is given the sense of “once for all” in Heb 9:28; 1 Pet 3:18 – Christ offered himself and died one single time for sins, and it is indeed true that this oblation was perfect and unique, so that there is no need for it to be renewed. But if this translation suggests the definitive quality of Christ’s sacrifice, it does not sufficiently emphasize that it is absolute, complete; it takes *hapax* too exclusively as an adverb of quantity and inadequately reflects the word’s etymology. *Hapax* may be an old nominative whose root is found in *pēg-ny-mi*, “to fasten by driving well in, to drive into the ground, fasten by assembling, fix by compacting, solidifying, crystallizing, jelling, being congealed.” This quality of “compactness” seems to be retained in Josephus, *Ant.* 12.109: *hapax ... eis aei diamenē*; 18.172; and the papyri where an initial

act includes its effects. In AD 54, when the prefect of Egypt, L. Lucius Geta, wrote that his orders and decisions had been formulated “once,” he means that they always remain binding and must be applied by everyone everywhere just as on the first day. In a contract for a nurse, dating to 21 May 26: “When the year is up Paapis will pay her once for all 60 silver drachmas for the second year” (*P.Rein.* 103, 14; republished *SB* 7619). Here *eis hapax* means not just “one time only” but “entirely, completely”; the sum will be paid in full. On the theological plane, to say that the sacrifice of Christ is “compact” would mean that it includes all of its effects (and its commemorations?), like the spring which contains potentially the whole river.

As for *ephapax* = *ha-pax epi* [*pasin*], unknown in the LXX, in Philo, in Josephus, and in the papyri before the sixth century, it is used five times in the epistolary corpus. Four of these occurrences have the same meaning as *hapax* in the last sense discussed above. In Rom 6:10, the death of Christ was a unique event that objectively included the death of all. In Heb 7:27, *ephapax* is opposed to *kath’ hēmeran*: Christ does not have to renew his sacrifice daily; its value is absolute and definitive, complete; thus he enters the heavenly sanctuary and does not come out again; his one and only entrance is made in order to remain there forever (9:12). To say that we are sanctified by the sacrifice of the body of Jesus (*hēgiasmenoi esmen ... ephapax*) means that this sanctification is not only definitive (note the perfect participle) but collective, thanks to this unique offering which contains his body.

## ἀπαράβατος

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*aparabatos*, **inviolable, nontransferable**

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*aparabatos*, S 531; *TDNT* 5.742–743; *EDNT* 1.116; *NIDNTT* 3.583–585; *MM* 53; *L&N* 13.61; *BAGD* 80

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How should we translate this biblical hapax in Heb 7:24 – “Jesus, inasmuch as he remains for eternity, *aparabaton echei tēn hierōsynēn*”? This rather rare verb is only found in late Greek; it is used only once in Philo and twice in Josephus. Etymologically speaking, (*parabainō*: pass along or pass beyond, violate) a *parabatēs* is a transgressor, a violator, or a denigrator, so *aparabatos* should be that which ought not be transgressed, “inviolable,” and that is the meaning – usually in a legal context – that is well attested in the papyri and even in literary writings, notably with the verb *menō*. But this meaning does not fit in Heb 7:24.

One might be tempted to give our adjective the otherwise well-attested meaning of “permanent, perpetual,” “unchangeable” as the word was

understood by the Vulgate (*sempiternum*) and the Peshitta, and as it is most often used in literature. But this would produce a tautology with the first part of the verse, even a banality; and in any case this notion of a priesthood unchangeable in character or quality is not in evidence elsewhere in the epistle.

Alternatively, we can posit a derivative meaning, one for which no attestation has yet been found: “not passing from one to another” (= *mē parabainousan eis allon*). This was the interpretation of St. John Chrysostom (*adiadochon*) and Theodoret, followed by Bengel – “that cannot pass to successors” – and it is the meaning that flows out of the context. As opposed to the levitical priesthood, whose mortal ministers had to transmit their power to their descendants, an eternal priest remains unique and will never have to pass his priesthood on to any other minister (cf. the *hoi men ... ho de* antithesis in verses 23–24). The term was apparently chosen because of its legal connotations and to justify the priestly “institution” of the new covenant – which was identified with a single person! So we translate: “He possesses the priesthood which is nontransferable.”

ἀπαρχή

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*aparchē*, **firstfruit**

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***aparche***, S 536; TDNT 1.484–486; EDNT 1.116; NIDNTT 3.415–417; MM 54; L&N 53.23, 57.171, 61.8; BAGD 81

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Most of the peoples of antiquity had the custom of offering to the deity, the master of nature and source of fertility, the firstfruits of their fields and the firstborn of their domestic animals. This usage is well attested in Greece, not only by the first literary text to employ the term *aparchē*, but by many inscriptions in which it can be seen that the *aparchai* are not only levies but personal gifts, and more precisely offerings to the deity: “Firstfruits to the goddess Artemis.” An Athenian decree pertaining to the offering of the firstfruits of grain and to the Eleusinian feasts celebrated on this occasion modifies the payment of a certain otherwise unknown Chairemonid: *kata ton Chairēmonido nomon ton peri tēs aparchēs*. Similarly, a decree probably found on the two steles at Eleusis and at Athens calls upon the Athenians to pay the *aparchē* used for the sacrifices. This religious act takes quite different forms; it may be carried out at the beginning of a meal or before the departure of an army (Xenophon, *Cyr.* 7.1.1; *Hier.* 4.2); but it is always an opening ritual.

We know how insistent Moses was about making this custom obligatory, how one had to present the firstfruits at the sanctuary with a word of dedication

and a prayer (Deut 26:1–4) and the portion reserved for the priests (Num 5:9; 18:11; 31:29). The firstfruits are the levy (Hebrew *trûmāh*) assessed on the firstfruits of the soil, considered as the best. The consecration to God of the firstfruits that sanctifies the whole harvest is a “sacred levy” (Lev 22:12; Ezek 48:10; Sir 7:31). At the return from captivity, this levy, which is reserved either for the priests or for the prince as part of their emolument (Ezek 45:16; 48:12, 18, 20, 21; cf. Philo, *Spec. Laws* 1.151: *semnoteron phoron kai hagiōteron*; 2.120, 222), strongly resembles a tax; this meaning of *aparchē* becomes common in the papyri and the equivalent is found in Josephus. Dio Cassius tells of when Emperor Commodus “ordered for his birthday that he be paid two gold denarii as firstfruits”; the term is also used in the inscriptions.

Philo commented copiously on the texts of Scripture relative to the *aparchai*. He most often gives these latter the meaning “offering” (*Joseph* 194; *Spec. Laws* 2.167, 184, 186) and emphasizes their value as the first portion, an initial offering (*Heir* 253; *Abraham* 196; cf. *Prelim. Stud.* 89: *archas, tas aparchas* [that which is original, first]), but above all he insists on their religious meaning as an expression of gratitude toward God, a basic way of honoring him: “The *aparchai* are offerings of thanks (*charistērious*) to God” (*Spec. Laws* 1.152; cf. 1.138). The sacred obligation to offer the firstfruits (*Spec. Laws* 2.168; 4.99) is an act of religious virtue that honors the deity (*Virtues* 95; *Sacr. Abel and Cain* 74, 117); virtue “returns in thank offerings the firstfruits of goods received” (*Prelim. Stud.* 7). If it is necessary to consecrate to God the firstfruits of all plunder (*Moses* 1.316), it is because of the knowledge that the victory was given by God. These levies are so plentiful that they constitute a treasure in almost all the cities (*Spec. Laws* 1.77–78, 133, 153), as a benefice for the priests, for the priests’ servants, or for a priest’s daughter who has been widowed or divorced and is childless (*Spec. Laws* 1.117, 126, 128, 129); so much so that it is evaluated as a sum of money (*timatai tēn aparchēn argyriō rhētō*, *Spec. Laws* 1.139; cf. *m. Bek.* 8.7–8), and thus the Jews “gathered together the sacred funds (*chrēmata hiera*; cf. *Syl.* 416, 9), those of the firstfruits, which they sent to Jerusalem” (*To Gaius* 156, 157, 216, 291, 311, 312, 316).

In the usage of the papyri, *aparchē* hardly ever has the religious meaning, but it retains its basic meaning of “beginning, first, initial” and most often designates the birth certificate, the identification document for free men, corresponding to the *hypomnēma epigennēseōs*; and for Roman citizens it refers to the *professio liberorum natorum*. According to the *Gnomon of the Idios Logos*: “A female citizen (of Alexandria) who by mistake married an Egyptian man, thinking that he was of the same estate as herself, is not held responsible. If the two spouses together present the birth certificates of their

children (*hypo amphoterōn aparchē teknōn tethē*), these latter will retain the right of (Alexandrian) citizenship” (*tēreitai hē politeia*) from their mother (47, line 131). In a list of inscriptions of minors as new citizens in AD 133, the document itself is called the *aparchē*. It proves that the child of a citizen was inscribed for the first time on an official list of citizens, with sponsors (*gnōstēres*, line 8) guaranteeing not that the child was born but that he has the right to be called a citizen of Antinoöpolis (*Pap.Lugd.Bat.* VI, 30, 18). At the beginning of the third century, Ermias and his wife Helen address a petition to the senate of Antioch that their five-year-old son Castor be inscribed as a citizen (βουλόμενοι θέσθαι ἀπαρχὴν υἱοῦ Κάστορος ἐτῶν ε’ ... ἀξιούμεν συντάξαι τῷ γραμματεῖ θέσθαι τὴν τοῦ Καστορος ἀπαρχὴν ὡς καθήκει, *P.Stras.* 634, 9 and 14). The editor, J. Schwartz, explains the procedure followed: “The father first addresses a petition to the *boulē*; then he presents his child, probably accompanied by two sponsors (*gnōstēres*) and pays perhaps ... a tax (*aparchē*); then the child is inscribed in the register; and finally a certificate (likewise called an *aparchē*) is delivered to the father by the *prytaneis*.” Under Hadrian’s reign, the tutor of a certain child born to a soldier had to prove that this child was a citizen by producing his birth certificate, but he seems to have been unable to do so: “that which is sought concerning the child’s *aparchē* ... to seek out the birth *aparchē*.” In the third century, *PSI* 1067, 11 contains the request for a child’s birth certificate: “desiring the *aparchē* that we had from our mutual daughter Eudaimonis.”

Requests for enrollment as an ephebe are rather common, and as with the birth certificate *aparchai*, the payment of a monetary tax is mentioned (*omnyō tassesthai aparchēn*), and the *aparchē* can mean a sum of money, notably that put up as a guarantee or the tax on Jews.

These usages, which despite their diversity retain the same fundamental meaning, help us better understand the NT usages of *aparchē*, which are almost all metaphorical. Most of these point to some beginning, a newness or even a birth. First of all, Jas 1:18 – “He begot us by the word of truth so that we might be as it were the firstfruits of his creatures.” Christians are the new Israel, constituting the “assembly of the firstborn” (*ekklēsia prōtotokōn*, Heb 12:23). Newly born, they are like the firstfruits of the harvest and belong to God, and are described in terms of their precedence in regard to generations to follow. The best parallel is Philo: Israel, an orphan-people that stirs God’s compassion, is “like a sort of firstfruits of the whole human race” (*Spec. Laws* 4.180). In the same sense, Christ resurrects the dead, “the firstfruits of those who sleep” (1 Cor 15:20); this is put in necessary relation with the mass of the other dead, who cannot *not* be “awakened” in their turn by God. Jesus is “at the avant-garde of those who have passed on,” part of the same company; his own resurrection

cannot be an isolated event but precedes and guarantees the resurrection of the other deceased.

If Epenetus is greeted as “firstfruits of Asia [offered] to Christ” (Rom 16:5) and “the household of Stephanas, firstfruits of Achaia” (1 Cor 16:15), this is a title of honor or dignity attributed to an elite, to the “firstfruits” of those who consecrated themselves to Christ in a certain region, the “firstborn” begotten to the divine life, but constituting a unity with those who will be converted in the future and stirred up by their example. The “firstfruits,” in accord with the usage of the LXX, are always the best. If the virgins “follow the Lamb wherever he goes, they have been redeemed (and separated) from humankind as a firstfruits for God and for the Lamb” (Rev 14:4); there has been a transfer of ownership. The reference is to the redemption of slaves (*agorazō*), who have a new standing and become the property of the deity. In the case at hand, it is the best part of redeemed humanity, that which is specially consecrated to God and to God’s service, but they are “firstfruits” with regard to the universal harvest of the elect. If all Christians have the firstfruits of the Spirit (*tēn aparchēn tou pneumatos echontes*), groaning inwardly and longing for adoption, the deliverance of the body (Rom 8:23), this *aparchē* is not a first participation as compared to a second that would be more abundant; it is an anticipation. The Holy Spirit is the pledge of the gift of glory. By his very presence he guarantees that the condition of the sons of God in this world will not remain precarious, imperfect, and threatened, or merely inchoative. They aspire intensely, for their standing as adoptive children should not only be recognized, but should also bring along all its rights and results, notable among which is the transformation of the physical body into a body that is spiritual and glorious. The Holy Spirit in the heart of the believer gives much greater certitude than any *prytaneis* of their birthright in the heavenly world. This integral fullness of adoption is a marvelous *novum*.

More delicate is the interpretation of Rom 11:16, where St. Paul wishes to prove by a reference to Num 15:20–21 that the Jews are a people consecrated to God: “If the firstfruits are holy, the rest of the dough is also, and if the root is holy, the branches are as well.” It matters little here whether the *aparchai* are the first Jewish converts or rather the patriarchs, notably Abraham (11:25), who constitutes “the holy root.” On first reading, one understands that the consecration of the firstfruits profits the ensemble, that it has the effect of consecrating the rest. But Fr. Lagrange observes that this theology is not found in the Bible, nor in Philo, nor in Josephus; the goal of the firstfruits is “rather to give the people free usage of the whole after a small part has been set aside for Yahweh (Lev 23:14).... This offering thus has as its result that it confers [on plants and fruits] a sort of legal purity,” making the loaf edible for the people of



God; its initial “impurity” is removed. In the case at hand, the descendants of Israel, though unbelievers at present, still benefit from the blessing granted their ancestors; they remain called to salvation by virtue of the very firstfruits: “the root is holy.” Now, the first NT meaning of the word is “non-impure” and it is thus in a marriage between a Christian husband and a pagan wife, or conversely “the unbelieving husband is found sanctified in the wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified in the brother; since otherwise we would have to conclude that your children are impure, whereas in fact they are holy” (1 Cor 7:14). This latter case is explained by the “incorporating personality” of the Christian parent, who passes on qualities and privileges to his descendant. But for the firstfruits, it seems that rabbinic theology granted it a value analogous to “sanctification” with regard to the whole harvest: the best part served for the whole (cf. 1 Cor 15:20, 23). The first includes the aggregate, and that is why the offering of the former is beneficial for the latter. This is the teaching of R. Josue ben Kabsai: “All my life I read this verse (Num 19:19), ‘The pure man sprinkles the impure’ and I believed that an individual could only annul the impurity of one person, until I learned that a sprinkling suffices for many” (*b. Dem.* 3.4); “The Mishna (*m. Šabb.* 21.2) permits the transporting of a pure oblation together with a part that is profane. If it is allowed to take away what is impure, it is thanks to the pure part which is the majority” (*b. Dem.* 7.2).

Thus all the NT usages of *aparchē*, while referring to OT texts and theology, apply only to humans. Under the influence of Philo, and, it would seem, the rabbis, they emphasize less the offering to God than the link between the firstfruits and the whole of the harvest; the former represent the latter and in some way contain it. Conformably to contemporary papyrological usage, the sense of newness, beginning, and birth is strongly emphasized; but according to the Pauline parallels, the nuance of “pledge, guarantee” comes to the surface. If the OT insists on the setting apart of the firstfruits, the NT makes the most of their unity with the rest of the harvest: “the branches are also holy.”

ἀπάτη

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*apatē*, **deception, trickery, pleasure**

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*apate*, S 539; TDNT 1.385; EDNT 1.117; NIDNTT 2.457–459; MM 54; L&N 31.12; BAGD 82

The classical meaning “deception, seduction, trickery” is the meaning in the LXX, which has only four occurrences, all in Jdt. It is the only meaning in St. Paul, and in the papyri, from the law of Cyrene in the second-third century BC

and an imperial rescript of the second century to the quasi-stereotyped formula reproduced in various forms in the sixth and seventh centuries: “I confess without any guile or fear or force or deceit or compulsion” (*homologō dichadoulou kai phobou kai bias kai apatēs kai anankēs pasēs*).

But in 1903, A. Deissmann announced another meaning of the term: “pleasure, delight.” In 1911, J. Rouffiac mentioned that several Italia manuscripts (codd. Corbeiensis, Bobbiensis) translate *apatē* with *delectationes*, *voluptas*, *delectamentum*, and he located this sense in *I.Priene* 113, 64 (84 BC): Euergetes Zosimus gave a banquet for the city, hired artists, “did not only that which was pleasant, but desiring moreover to delight the spectators, (he hired [a flute-player?] and a pantomime).” Finally, with immense epigraphical erudition, L. Robert showed that in the popular Hellenistic language *apatē* was often synonymous with *hēdonē*, *tryphē*, *terpsis* (a species of sensual pleasure, pleasure in spectacles). Apart from the Latin-Greek glossaries of the third century, he cites the *Lexeis Attikōn kai Hellēnōn kata stoicheion* of the lexicographer Moeris in the second century: “*apatē*: deceit among the Attics; pleasure among the Greeks.” The examples are numerous, from Polybius 2.56.12: tragedy is modeled on reality “for the pleasure of the spectators”; to 4.20.5: music was not brought to humans as a charlatan’s pleasure (or illusion?); to Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.4–5: spectacles are a delight for the city (cf. 4.114). According to Artemidorus of Ephesus, dreaming about peaches, apricots, plums, and cherries “signifies pleasures and sensual delights if these are seasonable.”

These attestations provide a framework for translating *hē apatē tou ploutou* in the explanation of the parable of the sower (Matt 13:22; Mark 4:19). Commentators usually say “the seductions of wealth stifle the word.” But we should probably follow M. J. Lagrange, who in his commentary on St. Mark relies on A. Deissmann and translates “the pleasures of wealth.” The parallel in Luke 8:14 is almost conclusive: *hēdonai tou biou*.

The two meanings are brought together in Strabo 11.2.10, which explains the epithet *Apatouros* given to the Aphrodite of Phanagoria: Attacked by giants, “she called on Heracles for help and hid him in a cave, then, receiving each of the giants in turn in her home, she turned them over one at a time to Heracles to be killed, thanks to this ruse whereby she served as bait, *ex apatēs*.”

ἀπελπίζω

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*apelpizō*, to hope for something in return

In the Sermon on the Mount, the Lord, wishing to emphasize the disinterested quality of *agapē*, commanded “Love your enemies, do good, and lend *mēden apelpizontes*.” If this were a matter of making interest-free loans, it would be an illustration of the gratuitousness of benevolence (*agathopoieō*), not as a profitable financial operation for the lender, even at the lowest rates, but as a brotherly service. But if the righteous person lent money to his countrymen without charging interest, debtors often abused his generosity (cf. Sir 29:1–7), so that the lender, defrauded of his capital, was tempted to refuse to make new advances. Hence the exhortation in Matt 5:42 – “Do not turn away from one who wants to borrow”; note the continued action implied by the present imperative *danizete* – “lend habitually” (Luke 6:35) – and the clear instruction *mēden apelpizontes* – “without expecting anything in return.” Lend with the willingness never to be repaid.

But this translation, which is an interpretation – the difficulty is well known – does not match the unique and well-attested meaning of *apelpizō*: not to hope that something will happen, to despair. Furthermore, it seems to contradict the motive given later in the verse for heeding the exhortation: “and your recompense will be great.” Some have suggested a mistake in the text, or else exploited the reading of certain manuscripts (Ⲭ, Ⲱ, Π\* 489) supported by the Syriac versions (*mēdena apelpizontes*) taking the neuter plural *mēdena* as referring to rebuffed would-be borrowers, “not forcing anyone to despair.” But this reading is clearly a dittography (*mēden a-apelpizontes*). Finally, one could follow the Old Latin, *nihil desperantes*, not despairing of someday recovering your capital or of being repaid a hundredfold by God (cf. the thought in Eccl 11:1 – the sea returns that which is given it). But M. J. Lagrange rightly rebels against the meaning, which he says is “absolutely repugnant in this heroic context” (*RB*, 1895, p. 196).

So we must follow the Clementine Vulgate (*nihil inde sperantes*), which takes the verb in the sense clearly demanded by the context, specifying the practical consequences of *agapē* in the abrupt manner of Semitic formulations. Jesus is not entering the spheres of business or of the virtues of prudence or justice. He is pointing out the nature of Christian love: complete forgetfulness of oneself and absolute gratuitousness. “Lend without expecting anything in return.”

## ἀπέραντος

*aperantos*, **endless, interminable, vain**

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*aperantos*, S 562; *EDNT* 1.120; L&N 61.19; BAGD 84

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The heterodox Ephesians are fond of “fables and endless genealogies,” i.e., never completed and inconsequential (1 Tim 1:4). The adjective *aperantos* (NT hapax), unknown in the papyri (cf. *P.Tebt.* 847, 21, *apēramenou*) has these two connotations. But in the first century it took on a technical rhetorical significance in the Stoic vocabulary, qualifying “reasonings that do not result in proof, arguments that do not conclude,” sterile conversations (Josephus, *Ant.* 17.131). Cicero complains to the son of Amyntas, an intolerable babbler (*aperantologias aēdous*, *Att.* 12.9; cf. Strabo 13.1.41). One of the best parallels is in the satirical poet Timon of Phlius: the philosophers “dispute endlessly [and vainly] (*apeirita dērioōntes*) in the aviary of the muses [meaning the Museum of Alexandria] ... until these table speakers are unburdened of their flow of words [literally, *logodiarrheō*]” (Athenaeus 1.22*d*). The other is in Philo: the happiness of the skeptics rides entirely upon the endless and fruitless (*aperantō kai anēnytō*) criticism of names and words (*Prelim. Stud.* 53). Minds of this sort know neither measure nor limit in their discourse, they speak indiscriminately, bringing chaos and confusion in all matters, mixing the true and the false, the sacred and the profane. Prattlers of this type, already exposed at Alexandria, have taken up exegesis and theology at Ephesus and pose a threat to the faith (cf. Titus 3:9).

## ἀπερισπάστως

*aperispastōs*, **without hindrance or distraction**

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*aperispastos*, S 563; *EDNT* 1.120; MM 57; L&N 30.33; BAGD 84

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The Corinthians are exhorted to virginity, which would firmly position them near the Lord, without distraction (*euparedron tō Kyriō aperispastōs*, 1 Cor 7:35). This adverb is a biblical hapax and is relatively rare in the Hellenistic period. Apart from errors, it is found only twice in the papyri, but its meaning is clear. Derived from *perispaō*, “pull from another direction, pull against,” *aperispastōs* means “without hindrance, without distraction”; which agrees with the meaning of the adjective *aperispastos*, “not drawn hither and thither,” known in the OT and very common in our papyri. The oldest attestation is from

the third century BC, and it is multiplied in the first and second centuries AD, so that it could be said that the word becomes common coinage. Now a general orders, “see to it that he is left in peace until he has finished his sowing” (*P.Rein.* 18, 40; 12 October 108 BC); now the weavers of Philadelphia remark that they “have until now been left in peace to practice our trade” and ask not to be disturbed and to remain exempt from other public services (*P.Phil.* 10, 16; from AD 139); or someone requires “that the carrier not be bothered” (*ho diagōn aperispastos estai*, *UPZ* 226, 6). In AD 46, 48, and 52 the *homologia aperispastou* is a guarantee of immunity to any constraint, penalty, or disagreement that a contracting party might incur.

In all these occurrences, the adjective emphasized the absence of troubles, bothers, inconveniences, freedom from worries; in other literary texts, the focus is on steadiness, attention, and refusal of any digression. All of these nuances converge perfectly in the *aperispastōs* of the virgins in 1 Cor 7:15, who are spared the *perispasmoi* of the married life. With good reason, the exegetes bring in Luke 10:38–42, where Mary of Bethany is seated, at rest, at the feet of the Lord, all her attention focused on him; while Martha busies herself here and there (*periespato*), pulled between divergent concerns. Thus virginity allows exclusive concentration on God.

## ἀπέχω

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*apechō*, to hold, collect, acknowledge receipt of payment in full; remain distant; abstain

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*apecho*, S 568; *TDNT* 2.828; *EDNT* 1.120–121; MM 57–58; L&N 57.137, 59.47, 85.16, 90.67; BDF §§ 129, 180(3), 180(5), 308, 322; BAGD 84–85; ND 6.3

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This verb, which has several very different meanings, is a compound of *echō*, “to have,” which expresses a relationship of possession: “to hold, keep,” hence “collect.” Thus after Asclepius has healed Demodike, Akesson’s wife, Akesson writes on a tablet, “You have received the debt of Akesson.” According to Marcus Aurelius 9.42.12–13, when a person does something good, it is enough to have acted in accord with nature; no reward is to be sought (*misthon zēteis*) any more than that the eye should receive a reward (*apechei to idion*) for seeing. In fulfilling its role, it possesses that which belongs to it (*echei to heautou*).

Hence the commercial meaning of *apechō*, “acknowledge receipt of payment in full,” which is copiously attested in the papyri and is highlighted by

A. Deissmann: to have something from someone's hand is to receive one's due. There are two types of receipts: some note the act of a person who has paid, with the verb in the perfect (for the abiding result of the action); others express the acknowledgment of the one who receives, with the verb in the present (*echō*, "I have"; *apechō*, "I have my due"). The oldest papyrological attestation of the verb is from 276 BC: *homologeîn apechein K ...* (*P.Hib.* 97, 5; republished as *P.Yale* 27; cf. *P.Alex.* 9, 10). Usually it is specified that the "price" (*tēn timēn*) of some land, a house, an ass, etc., has been received: "C. Anthistius Valens has received the price of these lands (*to autōn teimas apeschēkenai*) as stipulated in the papers" (*P.Phil.* 11, 13); "Sarapion acknowledges having received from the buyer the full price agreed upon, amounting to fifty-four thousand drachmas." Also quite often, however, only the sum of money is mentioned: "I have received the prescribed drachmas of silver"; "I acknowledge (having from you) twelve staters and two denarii which I received (*apeschon*) and which were charged to my account, and which I will repay" (*P.Mur.* 114, 12); sometimes obols (*P.Genova* 88, 2), as with this new officer (*principalis*) who has drawn some money (*chalkon apeschon*) and would have liked to send a gift to his mother (*P.Mich.* 465, 7). Sometimes a dowry is in question (*phernē*, *P.Fam.Tebt.* 13, 38; *P.Mil.Vogl.* 185, 21, 36), sometimes expenditures (*dapanēmata*, *P.Fouad* 64, 5; *P.Hamb.* 69, 6), *artabai* of grain, of straw (*SB* 9782, 3), a cargo or load, food and fruit (*karpōn*, *BGU* 1587, 7); on occasion, "what is due to me." A rental or lease that is paid in kind (*to ekphorion*) and a lease paid in cash (*phoros*) are mentioned either together or separately; but for the latter it is often specified that it is a loan or rent (*misthōsis*). In contracts for service, receipt of the agreed-upon wage is acknowledged (*apeschēkenai ... to symphōnēthen salarion*, *P.Harr.* 64, 25; *SB* 10205, 16). In AD 24, "He acknowledges ... receiving from him the price and the wages" (*homologeî ... apeschēkenai par' autou tēn timēn kai tous misthous*, *P.Mich.* 337, 7); in the second century, "I have received the wage from Phaophi" (*apechō de ton tou Phaōphi misthon*, *BGU* 1647, 13; cf. 1663, 1, 16; *P.Oxy.* 1992, 19).

These usages shed light on Matt 6:2, 5, 16, where – with respect of almsgiving, prayer, and fasting – the Lord denounces the ostentation of the hypocrites who seek to be seen and praised by other people. He repeats three times, "Truly, I tell you, they have received their reward" (*apechousin ton misthon autōn*). The verb in the present indicative means that these apparently pious people have nothing more to expect in the beyond. They already have now that which is due them. They have in hand the receipt for what they have supplied ... so much wind! The irony is plain. In the same sense, the rich are told in Luke 6:24, *apechete tēn paraklēsin hymōn*; they have had their portion

of joy on earth and must not expect “consolation” in heaven! In contrast, Philemon, whose runaway slave was temporarily separated from him (*echōristhē*), will recover him (*apechēs*) for good in heaven as a brother for eternity (Phlm 15). The same bookkeeping nuance appears in Phil 4:18, in a section where the apostle uses several expressions borrowed from the language of business. He acknowledges receiving the help sent by the Philippians: “I have received everything and more than enough” (*apechō de panta kai perisseuō*); “through Epaphroditus, I received what you sent” (*dexamenos ... ta par’ hymōn*). We could translate, “I give a receipt for everything, and I have plenty.”

The verbal prefix *ap-* retains its full force when *apechō* means “be distant,” first of all in a geographical sense: “Jesus was not far from the house” (Luke 7:6); the prodigal son was still far from his father (15:20); Emmaus is “a town about sixty stadia away from Jerusalem” (*apechousan stadious hexēkonta*, 24:13). The usage is classical and is particularly common in the LXX: Joseph’s brothers, having left the city, “had not gone far” (Hebrew *hiphil of rāḥaq*, Gen 44:4); “They were far from the Sidonians.” It is common even in the papyri. From this spatial meaning comes the definition “remain apart, stay distant,” especially in a figurative and psychological sense: “You are much farther than we from saying things worthy to be believed.” This meaning is common in the LXX, where Job begs God to remove his hand (Job 13:21) and Yahweh is far from the wicked (Prov 15:29); as a reproach, “He has removed his heart far from me” (*apechei ap’ emou*, Isa 29:13; the opposite of *engizeī*, draw near). It is commanded to “stay away from a man who has the power to put to death” (Sir 9:13), from quarreling (28:8), from violence (Isa 54:14), from the snares that lie in the path of the perverse (Prov 22:5; cf. Wis 2:16). Matt 15:8 quotes Isa 29:13 – “This people honors me with their lips, but their heart is far from me” (*apechei ap’ emou*, cf. Mark 7:6).

To keep one’s distance can be a sign of respect: “When the Lacedaemonians ravaged the rest of Attica, they respected Decelea” (Herodotus 9.13; cf. Thucydides 4.97.3); “certain people do not even respect corpses.” To be far from means to be unable to touch, a negative connotation that can be translated either “hinder” (“In all of these parts [thorax, the head, the back], with their numerous clefts, nothing hinders [*ouden apechei*] the vessels from carrying various materials”) or “spare.” Aristobulus gives the order to “spare Antigonus if he is unarmed.”

In the language of NT ethics, *apechō* (in the middle voice), as in classical Greek, always has the nuance of prohibition: “to abstain.” At the Jerusalem Council, St. James proposes, “Let us write to the Gentiles to abstain from the pollution of idols and fornication.” St. Paul gives this definition: “This is the

will of God, namely, your sanctification, abstaining (*apechesthai hymas*) from sexual immorality” (1 Thess 4:3), from every kind of evil. St. Peter writes, “I exhort you to abstain from fleshly desires that make war on the soul.” This means not just keeping one’s distance, but refusing to have even the slightest contact; at least this is the ethical nuance given this verb by the LXX and especially by Philo: “It is commanded to abstain from wickedness” (Philo, *Alleg. Interp.* 1.102; cf. 3.104), from injustice (*Husbandry* 113), offenses (*tōn hamartēmātōn apechou*, *Change of Names* 47; *Virtues* 163), from doing evil (*Spec. Laws* 2.15), “from returning to each other the wrongs that are done us” (*Virtues* 140; cf. *Moses* 1.308). Likewise, in Josephus God commands Adam and Eve to abstain from the tree of knowledge (*Ant.* 1.40), and commands Noah to abstain from shedding blood.

There remains the difficult task of translating Mark 14:41 – “Sleep now and rest. It’s all up (*apechei*)! The hour has come; the Son of Man will be handed over.” The Vulgate translates “sufficit,” but what does “it is enough” mean? F. Field noted that apart from the [pseudo-] attestation in Hesychius, the translation “sufficit” can be supported only with a text of Ps.-Anacreon (*Od.* 28.23): the poet, having given his instructions to the painter for a portrait of his mistress, concludes, “Enough! For now I see the young woman herself” (*apechei. blepō gar autēn*). This would perhaps be a sufficient attestation, but it can be corroborated by *P.Stras.* 4, 19, from the sixth century, and by the chorus in Aeschylus, *PV* 687 – “Oh! Oh! Far from me! Enough!” (*ea, ea, apeche, pheu*) – and probably by other equivalent usages. We have to remember that a word may commonly have a meaning in the spoken language that is not attested in written documents. In any event, this meaning is in harmony with “abstain” and “be distant.” We may imagine that the apostles, already asleep, have risen, and that after a few minutes Jesus, referring to all that has happened at Gethsemane, utters the word *apechei* either meaning “You’ve had it” or pointing out that the time has come: “The hour is now.” They would have to leave the garden and prepare to go.

ἀπλότης, ἀπλοῦς

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*haplotēs*, **simplicity, singleness, sincerity**; *haplous*, **morally whole, faithful**

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*aplotēs*, S 572; TDNT 1.386–387; EDNT 1.123–124; NIDNTT 3.571–572; MM 58; L&N 57.106, 88.44; BAGD 85–86 | *aplous*, S 573; TDNT 1.386; EDNT 1.123–124; NIDNTT 3.571; MM 58; L&N 23.132, 57.107; BDF §§45, 60(1), 61(2); BAGD 86



These are two terms that cannot be well understood in the NT except in light of the LXX. In classical Greek, “*haplous* is the opposite of *diplous*, meaning simple or single rather than double ... sometimes in the moral sense of straight, without turning aside.” But in the OT, this adjective translates the Hebrew *tām*, signifying all that is whole (hence upright [French *intègre* – Tr.], perfect); then well made; and finally peaceful, and hence innocent. *Tāmīm* refers to all that is complete, finished, done; hence intact or undefiled, without fault; and finally irreproachable, exemplary, impeccable. This perfection, which the Vulgate calls *simplicitas*, is frequently associated with *yāsār*, expressing rectitude: that which corresponds to an objective norm; thus, in a physical sense, that which is straight, direct, unified; and in a moral sense that which is loyal, just, right. This union (Ps 25:21; 37:37) points out that the perfection-integrity of the just is characterized by an absolute rectitude of conscience and life. Furthermore, the models of the pious person, like Noah and Job (Gen 5:9; Job 1:1, 8) are presented as “perfect and upright,” they are seasoned, lacking in nothing, innocent and irreproachable.

This is not just a dictionary entry but an entire spirituality. This faultless innocence, this uncompromising rectitude, is blessed by God (Prov 2:7; 10:29; 11:20; 28:10) and is the way of salvation (Prov 28:18). It is the virtue of the servants of God (Deut 18:13; Ps 19:24; 25:21; Prov 13:6), or better, a deep-seated purpose, a condition of the soul. As opposed to duplicitous people, those with divided hearts, those who are simple have no other concern than to do the will of God, to observe his precepts; their whole existence is an expression of this disposition of heart, this rectitude: “Let us all die in our simplicity” (1 Macc 2:37). In the first century BC, *haplotēs*, so exalted in the Wisdom writings, is considered the supreme virtue of the patriarchs.

It is not easy to define precisely the meaning of *haplous* in the outline of the logion of the two lights, which calls for checking the condition of this “lamp of the body,” the eye, because if it is “evil” (dark) it is unable to make out the exterior light of Christ; this would be blindness indeed, like that of a blind person facing the sun. If we take *haplous* and *ponēros* in a physical sense, they would mean respectively “healthy or normal” and “sick.” Thus Socrates called myopia a “defect of the eyes, *ponēria ophthalmōn*” (Plato, *Hp. Mi.* 374d), but this meaning is not biblical, and in secular Greek a healthy eye is normally called *ophthalmos agathos*; consequently, what we are dealing with is a Septuagintism. It is best to take the logion as a whole in a moral sense – the “darkened eye” in the sense of *T. Issach.* 4.6 (cf. *T. Benj.* 4.2), a clouded eye or depraved will. The eye is the organ for recognizing divinity: *ho ophthalmos sou = to phōs to en soi* (cf. Prov 20:27) = *tous ophthalmous tēs kardias* (Eph 1:18). The point here is probably unclouded loyalty, in the sense in which pure hearts

will see God (Matt 5:8), but the deepest meaning is that of a simple soul, not parceled out, like that of a small child, oriented exclusively toward God. This integrity, this rigorousness of basic purpose, introduces one to the light, the world of God. The light is total and perfect; but if one's outlook is evil, deficient because the heart is pulled in different directions (cf. Matt 6:21), the whole person abides in darkness (the world of Satan?). Simplicity is thus total involvement and the unreserved giving of the self.

These same connotations of generosity or liberality are to be understood in the verses about the gifts of the Macedonians and the Corinthians to the community at Jerusalem (2 Cor 8:2; 11:11, 13), and about gifts given by the charismatic, who gives not grudgingly but generously (*ho metadidous en haplotēti*, Rom 12:8). On the other hand, the nuance of integrity and uprightness come to the fore in 2 Cor 11:3 – “I fear that just as the serpent lured Eve through his wiliness (*en tē panourgia*; cf. Gen 3:1) your thoughts might be corrupted (and abased) from the simplicity and purity that are fitting with respect to Christ.” But if slaves must obey their masters “in simplicity of heart” (Col 3:22; Eph 6:5), purity of intention and wholehearted devotion cannot be separated in their service. The Christian slave will want to obey orders faithfully and not balk at his duties. He works as a person in a position of trust and with real nobility.

The meaning of the adverb *haplōs* (NT hapax) in Jas 1:5 cannot be determined with certainty: “God gives to all *haplōs* and does not reproach.” Given the last part of the sentence, it is tempting to translate *haplōs* “sincerely, without reservation or restriction.” But the meaning of the Vulgate, supported by the Peshitta, agrees better with the language of the LXX: God gives perfectly, i.e., with abandon. The papyri shed hardly any light, or rather they most often use *haplōs*, especially in the first century, to affirm a statement: “absolutely, quite plainly.” Contracting parties agree not to file any complaints whatsoever concerning debts, payments, stipulations, or “anything else at all.” Thus, in an act establishing ownership, “the declarer and his successors will not initiate any legal proceedings concerning the above-mentioned goods, nor for anything else, *absolutely*, in any manner.... For his part, Anthistia Cronous will not start legal proceedings against the declarer concerning any of the above stipulations (*peri mēdenos haplōs pragmatos*) ... in any fashion (*tropō mēdeni*)” (*P.Phil.* 11.16, 21). In AD 38, *emou mēthen haplōs lambanontos* means “without receiving absolutely anything.” Consequently, the best translation of Jas 1:5 would appear to be “purely and simply,” without emphasizing one nuance or another, except that of pure gift.

## ἀποβλέπω

*apoblepō*, **to look, observe, pay close attention**

→see also ἀφοράω

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*apoblepo*, S 578; *EDNT* 1.125; MM 59; L&N 30.31; BAGD 89

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To describe the character of the faith whereby Moses, in the midst of his trials, took the promised reward into account, Heb 11:26 uses the verb *apoblepō*, “look, observe, pay attention.” Faith “looks from a distance,” or better, “considers steadfastly” and as it were exclusively. In the OT, *apoblepō* sometimes connotes lying in wait or scrutinizing (Ps 10:8; 11:5), or making a profitable observation (Prov 24:32); but when it translates the verb *pānāh* (Hos 3:1; Cant 6:1), which means turn to look (Exod 2:12) or to leave (Isa 13:14), it takes on the sense of turning away, of detaching oneself from other concerns to devote one’s attention to one thing only. This meaning, which is the one that applies in Heb 11:26, is confirmed by Philo, *Spec. Laws* 1.293; Moses keeps his eyes fixed on the greatness of God. Cf. *P.Stras.* 305, 6: *apoblepōn kai eis ta mellonta*; *PSI* 414, 9, a letter from the vine-grower Meno claiming his pay from Zeno: *eis to opsōnion apoblepō*.

In secular Greek, *apoblepō* expresses the activity of the astronomer who “observes the heavenly motions,” or that of a painter who fixes his gaze on a model, constantly checking in order to take in every detail. The use of the word is extended from simple eyesight to a “become aware of” (Epictetus 1.6.37) and especially to “take into consideration, take into account” in order to pattern one’s conduct accordingly. This is exactly what Moses did in reckoning that there was no comparison between the treasures of Egypt and the divine “recompense.”

## ἀποδοχή

*apodochē*, **acceptance, enthusiastic reception, respect**

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*apodochē*, S 594; *TDNT* 2.55–56; *EDNT* 1.129; *NIDNTT* 3.744, 746; MM 62; L&N 31.52; BAGD 91

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“This saying is sure and worthy of all approbation” (*pasēs apodochēs axios*, 1 Tim 1:15; 4:9). This kerygma formula, influenced by Hellenism, and abundantly commented upon by exegetes, can be clarified when *apodochē* is given its proper value. This noun, which only appears in late Koine (except for

Thucydides 4.81.2), normally means “a good welcome, favorable reception,” and it is thus that it is attested in *Ep. Arist.* 257: “How can one find a good welcome among strangers?” and in Josephus, *Ant.* 18.274: “their insuperable objection to receiving the statue” of the emperor.

But already in the last century F. Field pointed out that the connotation of approval and admiration stood out in numerous texts, and in 1911 J. Rouffiac tracked it down in two inscriptions of Priene. We could add *Ep. Aristides* 308 – when Demetrius undertook a reading and a translation in the presence of the translators, “these were received with enthusiasm by the crowd” – and Diodorus Siculus 1.69; 9.40; 15.35.

What is more, the expression *axios apodochēs*, already used by Philo (“He alone is worthy of approval who has placed his hope in God,” Philo, *Rewards* 13; likewise *Flight* 129), is current in the literature: “Strato himself was a man worthy of much acceptance” (*autos de ho Stratōn anēr gegone pollēs tēs apodochēs axios*, Diogenes Laertius 5.64); “If the starting point is unknown ... all that follows can in no way deserve assent and confidence” (Polybius 1.5.5); with respect to the tomb of the king Osymandyas, “not only was this work praiseworthy on account of its immense size (*to megethos apodochēs axios*), but it was also admirable from an artistic point of view” (Diodorus Siculus 1.47.4; cf. 5.31: *apodochēs megalēs axiountes autous*; 12.15: this law is “perfectly just and worthy of the greatest praise”); *andros ergon kai pollēs axion apodochēs* (Hierocles, in Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.27.20; vol. 4, p. 662, 2). It is especially with respect to people that the meaning “consideration, high esteem” predominates in the inscriptions; for example in honorific decrees. One of these from the village of Odessa, around 45 BC, in honor of Menogenes, a *kaloskagathos* who had bestowed many benefits on the city and its region: “with the king he was reckoned worthy of great esteem” (*para tō basilei megalēs apodochēs axioutai*, *I.Bulg.*, 43, 13); another honors Menas of Sestos: “being considered worthy of the noblest esteem” (*tēs kallistēs apodochēs axioumenos par’ autō*, Dittenberger, *Or.* 339, 13–14). Similarly, a second-century inscription from Ephesus honoring the *agōnothētēs* Priscus: “a most respected man and worthy of all honor and esteem” (*andros dokimōtatou kai pasēs teimēs kai apodochēs axiou*, Dittenberger, *Syl.* 867, 20).

Consequently, the apostolic preaching not only deserves to be accepted by all but also deserves the highest credit (*pas* is intensive; cf. 1 Tim 6:1). It is worthy of devout respect, the respect that everyone owes to the Truth.

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*apokueo*, S 616; EDNT 1.134; MM 65; L&N 13.12, 13.87; BDF §101; BAGD 94

“Desire, when it has conceived (*syllambanō*), gives birth to sin (*tiktō*), and sin, when it has come to term, gives birth to death (*apokyō*).” The Father of lights “by his own will gave birth to us (*apekyēsen*) by a word of truth, so that we should be something of a firstfruits of his creatures.” The verb *apokyeō* (biblical hapax), unknown even in Josephus, belongs to cultivated Hellenistic Greek. It is much used by Philo, who gives it its precise, objective meaning as the last stage of begetting – “deliver” or “give birth” – even when the usage is metaphorical. After the conception (*syllambanō*) and the gestation (*en gastri echō*, *kyō*), the woman brings her child into the world; the prefix *apo-* precisely emphasizes the “delivery.” Although the compound verb under discussion sometimes includes the two preceding phases, it must normally be distinguished from the simple *kyō* (“carry in the womb, be or become pregnant,” the opposite of *tiktō*, Isa 61:4) and even more from the very general *gennaō*, because it refers to the moment when the mother, at the end of the period of gestation, brings forth into the world a fully formed child now capable of an independent existence. The *genuit* of the Vulgate must therefore be eliminated in favor of the *peperit* of the Old Latin (ed. Beuron, vol. 26, p. 17). In choosing this verb, St. James wanted to point out the efficaciousness of the divine action and the reality of baptismal generation. Christians had taken on a spiritual mode of existence by virtue of which they were capable of leading a really new life.

## ἀπόλαυσις

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*apolausis*, enjoyment, happiness

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*apolausis*, S 619; EDNT 1.135; MM 65–66; L&N 25.115; BAGD 94

This noun, unknown in the papyri before the sixth century (cf. *P.Flor.* 296, 11), is only used twice in the NT, and in accord with the double meaning that it has in the secular language. God provides us with “all things richly for our enjoyment, *eis apolausin*” (1 Tim 6:17). As opposed to the ascetic Manichaeism of the heterodox teachers, St. Paul affirms the optimism of revelation with respect to the earthly goods that divine providence obtains for us. The end purpose *eis apolausin* had already been expressed by Philo and Josephus in reference to food, subsistence, and everyday necessities of life. In

68, the prefect of Egypt, Tiberius Julius Alexander, promulgated an edict to the effect that his subjects should wait upon the “safety and material happiness” of the benevolent emperor Galba. The meaning is “to derive benefit, to enjoy personally, to make the most of a possession.”

This enjoyment, well-being, and pleasure is extended to happiness in all its forms, whether culinary delights (Josephus, *Ant.* 12.98), marital *koinōnia* (2.52), the love of a woman, the joys of youth (*I.Thas.* 334, 18), the diversion of activities, the satisfaction of ownership, or the present and lasting enjoyment of good things. It is in light of these usages that we must understand Heb 11:25 – Moses chose to be “mistreated with the people of God rather than to enjoy for a time the pleasure of sin.”

ἀπολείπω

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*apoleipō*, to leave behind

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*apoleipo*, S 620; *EDNT* 1.135; MM 66; L&N 13.140, 15.59, 85.65; BDF §393(6); BAGD 94

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After a quick visit to Crete, St. Paul left Titus there, and when he reached Rome as a prisoner, he had left Trophimus behind sick at Miletus (2 Tim 4:20). As parallels to this meaning of *apoleipō* (“leave behind”) one could cite 1 Macc 9:65, “Jonathan left his brother Simon in the city”; 2 Macc 4:29, “Menelaus left his own brother Lysimachus to replace him as high priest.” Not only people are left behind but also objects, just as the apostle left behind his cloak at the home of Carpos at Troas.

This nuance of losing and missing, an extremely frequent usage, is pejorative; it refers to any sort of failure or deficiency, from lateness or absence to renunciation and abandonment, with connotations of disorder and betrayal. It is certainly with this connotation of “desertion” that the angels, whose natural habitation is heaven, are said to have “left their proper abode.”

The idea of leaving and perhaps the use of *apoleipō* to communicate that a deceased person leaves surviving progeny or leaves possessions behind coincide with the technical usage of this verb in wills, as is attested in the papyri and the inscriptions: the testator “leaves” his goods to his heirs. Thus, around 200 BC, Epicteta: “I leave as follows (*apoleipō kata tan gegenēmenan*) in accord with the recommendation of my husband Phoenix”; in the second century AD, the will of Taptollion (*P.Wisc.* 13, 6, 7, 11, 13) or *P.Oxy.* 105, 3–4: “If I die with this will unchanged, I leave as heir my daughter Ammonous ... objects, furnishings, buildings, and all other property that I leave.”

This meaning of “survival” or of “things left,” of definitive acquisition, is the meaning in Heb 4:6, 9, where participation in God’s rest is still bestowed upon or granted to believers, because God’s promise is as unalterable as a *diathēkē*; it does not expire. But, on the other hand, “there remains no further sacrifice for the sins” of the apostates (10:26), because the divine economy has made no provision for their pardon.

## ἀπόστολος

*apostolos*, **apostle**

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*apostolos*, S 652; TDNT 1.407–445; EDNT 1.142; NIDNTT 1.126–130, 133–134, 136; MM 70; L&N 33.194, 53.74; BAGD 99–100

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This adjective (Plato, *Ep.* 7.346 *a*) and noun derives from the verb *apostellō*, “send, dispatch,” and like this verb it has a large variety of nuances that flow from the context.

From Herodotus on, *apostolos* refers to the bearer of a message, such as the herald sent by Alyattes to Miletus (1.21). Varus authorizes a “delegation” (*ton apostolon*) of Jews to Rome (Josephus, *Ant.* 17.300, the only occurrence; 1.146 is very poorly attested). The word means someone sent on a mission out of the country, or an “expedition,” or a group of colonists (Dionysius of Halicarnassus 9.5). Beginning in the fourth century, however, *apostolos* almost always refers to a naval expedition, a fleet, a transport ship (*P.Oxy.* 522, 1; *P.Tebt.* 486: *logos apostolou Triadelphou*; *PSI* 1229, 13). In the papyri, it is a technical term for the *naulōtikai syngraphai*, the official papers ordering the shipment of grain by boat on the Nile from the public granaries to Alexandria. The *apostolos* is a passport, a safe-conduct, or, if the bearer wished to leave, an exit authorization (*prostagma*, *P.Oxy.* 1271; cf. Strabo 2.3.5), an export license. *Gnomon of the Idios Logos* 162 prescribes: “Legal proceeding against persons who have embarked (at Alexandria) without a passport (*chōris apostolou*) now fall under the jurisdiction of the prefects.”

None of these meanings from everyday or legal parlance, except for the basic meaning “envoy, emissary,” can explain the extreme theological density of this term in the NT, especially in St. Paul. Paul’s usage presupposes a Semitic substrate, namely that of the *šaliaḥ*, an institution apparently going back to Jehoshaphat. This person is not a mere envoy but a chargé d’affaires, a person’s authorized representative; his acts are binding upon the “sender.” At this point the principal and the proxy are equivalent: “A person’s *šaliaḥ* is as the person himself.” This rule carries over into the religious sphere: when the *šaliaḥ* acts

on God's orders, it is God himself who acts (*b. B. Meṣ. 86b*), as in the case of Abraham, Elijah, or Elisha (*Midr. Ps. 78 5; 173b*). The rabbis considered the priest who offered the sacrifice to be God's *šaliaḥ*, "doing more than we can do" (*b. Qidd. 23b*; cf. Rengstorf, "ἀπόστολος," in *TDNT*, vol. 1, pp. 407, 419, 424), and on the Day of Atonement they called the high priest "the people's representative before God" (*m. Yoma 1.5; m. Giṭ. 3.6*). On the other hand, in the Mishnah and the Talmud, the *šaliaḥ* represents the community (*m. Roš Haš. 4.9*), invested with the power given him by his constituents. These data were little by little transposed into the Christian tradition.

"Jesus spent the night praying to God. When it was day he called his disciples, and having chosen twelve from among them, he named them apostles" (*kai apostolous ὀnomasen*). Among the *mathētai* who followed him, shared his life, and belonged to him (cf. *talmîdîm*, students of a master), Christ marked out twelve who would represent him in a special way, would be more closely associated with him, and would therefore have special authority. For the moment nothing is said concerning their function, except that the word *šaliaḥ* in itself indicates that they would be envoys and proxies with appropriate powers. This is what Mark 6:7 says on the occasion of the temporary mission in Galilee: "He called the Twelve to himself and began to send them (*apostellein*) two by two, giving them power over unclean spirits" (cf. Matt 10:1–2). With Jesus' *exousia* at their disposal, the apostles are prepared to carry out their mission. Here we already see the essential character of Christian apostleship.

1. – The apostle is a religious person, one set apart, *chosen* from among others and *called* by Christ; which implies that the apostle will share Christ's condition, abandon his property, his trade, his family, will drink his cup (Matt 20:23), receiving the baptism with which the Master was baptized (Mark 10:39). St. Luke insists, "Jesus, having through the Holy Spirit given his orders to the apostles whom he had chosen (*hous exelexato*), he was taken away" (Acts 1:2; cf. John 15:16, 19). St. Paul always justifies his authority as a proxy: *klētos apostolos*, apostle by (God's) call (Rom 1:1), i.e., by virtue of a vocation. The recurrent formula is "apostle of Christ Jesus by God's will" (1 Cor 1:1; 2 Cor 1:1; Col 1:1; Eph 1:1). The genitive *Christou Iēsou* (1 Pet 1:1) is a genitive of possession and of origin (cf. Rom 1:5), as clarified by the reference to the appearance of the resurrected Christ (1 Cor 9:1; 15:3–9) and reinforced by the divine will (*thelēma*). No surer basis can be given for the legitimacy of the apostolic mission: the mandate comes from God. "An apostle not in the name of humans, nor [appointed] by a human, but by Jesus Christ and God the Father" (Gal 1:1). This investiture is official and stable.

2. – The apostle is essentially a person *sent* by someone to someone else. The purpose can be more or less secular; as a delegate or representative, this



“*apostolos* is not greater than the one who sent him” (John 13:16); nevertheless, “whoever receives the one whom I have sent receives me, and whoever receives me receives the one who sent me.” The attitude that a person takes toward the *šaliah* is in reality directed toward the person of the sender. The apostle’s mission is first of all that of preaching, but also founding churches (1 Cor 9:2), forgiving sins (John 20:23), passing on the Holy Spirit (Acts 8:18), ordaining deacons (Acts 6:6), instituting presbyters (Titus 1:5). If need be, different audiences are specified: Peter is sent to the circumcised (Gal 2:7), Paul to the pagans (Rom 11:13; cf. 2 Cor 10:13–16).

3. – Such a role in God’s plan of salvation requires that the apostle be invested with *power* and authority (Luke 24:49; 1 Thess 1:5). The Lord gave them the Holy Spirit and *exousia* over the demons. As heirs or proxies of Christ, the apostles live not only as itinerant missionaries but as heads of communities, repositories of Jesus’ authority: “many wonders and signs were done by the apostles,” or more precisely, “by the power of God” (2 Cor 6:7). This is what gives so much credibility to the teaching and the promises of the apostles (2 Pet 3:2; Jude 17), since in reality they only pass on the word that they have received from their Master (1 Thess 2:13 – “The word that you heard from us is not the word of men but the word of God”). They are aware of this (Paul’s message was with “a demonstration of the Spirit’s power”) and conduct themselves as befits leaders, even if they are considered the *peripsēma* (“offscouring”) of the universe (1 Cor 4:13). They do not claim special privileges; they are servants (John 13:12–17; Luke 22:25–27), but they are at the top of the hierarchy of the kingdom of God. *Apostolos* is a title of honor (“I do not deserve to be called an apostle, because I persecuted the church of God” [1 Cor 15:9]; “As apostles of Christ, we could have looked down on you” [1 Thess 2:7]), because the “holy apostles” (Eph 3:5; Rev 18:20) are entirely consecrated to God (John 17:19).

4. – Since the Bible is neither a law code nor a theological handbook, words gain richer theological meaning from day to day and do not have a definite meaning that is fixed once and for all. In the NT, there are the high apostles, and there are second-order apostles. St. Luke knows only the Twelve as apostles: *hoi dōdeka*. Matt 10:2 specifies *hoi dōdeka apostoloi*. The Semitism *epoiēsen tous dōdeka* (literally, “he made the twelve”) in Mark 3:13–19 confirms that Jesus did indeed himself establish the college of the Twelve to govern the new Israel. These *šlûhîm* are proxies, representatives, plenipotentiaries, granted his own powers: “The one who listens to you listens to me, and the one who rejects you rejects me; but the one who rejects me rejects the One who sent me” (Luke 10:16; cf. Matt 10:14). In governing the church (cf. Matt 19:28; Luke 22:28–30), better than the “twelve men and three priests” who presided over the

Qumran community, these apostles are “pillars” (Gal 2:9), “VIPs” (Gal 2:2, 6), judges and guarantors of orthodoxy, established to abide forever, forever united with Christ. They are the “twelve apostles of the Lamb” (Rev 21:14).

In a text whose importance cannot be overestimated, the resurrected Lord is said to have appeared first of all to Cephas, then to the Twelve, and then to “all the apostles, and after all them to me (Paul)” (1 Cor 15:5–8). These *apostoloi* named after the twelve could be divinely appointed missionary preachers, charismatics who are listed first among the official ministers of the church (1 Cor 12:28–31; Eph 4:11), which shows that there is no conflict between institutions and charisms. Their anonymity is like that of the “apostles and presbyters” who are associated in an indeterminate group in Acts 15:4, 6, 22, 23; 16:4. Nevertheless, we know of Barnabas, Paul’s collaborator (Acts 14:4, 14; 2 Cor 12:7) and of particularly zealous missionaries like Andronicus and Junias, “outstanding among the apostles.” Just as there are always unfaithful stewards, there were Jewish-Christian missionaries, hardened in their prejudices, who took pride in the title of apostle and played up their prestige, *hoi hyperlian apostoloi* (2 Cor 12:11); these “super-apostles” (2 Cor 11:5) are “false apostles.” The church at Ephesus is congratulated for having identified them: “You have tested those who call themselves apostles but are not, and you have found them to be liars” (Rev 2:2).

5. – “Consider the apostle (Peshitta: *šliho*) and high priest of our faith, Jesus” (Heb 3:1). This is the only time that Christ is described as *apostolos* (before Justin, *I Apol.* 1.12). Perhaps there is a reference to the angel of Yahweh (Hebrew *mal’āk*), messenger and guide who led Israel during their wanderings in the wilderness (Exod 14:19; 23:20, 23; 32:34; 33:2; Num 20:16), God’s help personified for his people. We might also think of a contrast with Moses, chosen from among the Israelites to lead them, but not coming from heaven like the Son; more likely, however, the author of Hebrews is showing the influence of the Johannine tradition, in which Christ is first and foremost the one “sent” from God. Note John 9:7 – “Siloam, which is translated Sent” (*Silōam, ho hermēneuetai Apestalmenos*). The Evangelist treats the substantive *Šilōah*, referring to a canal leading or “sending” water, as a passive participle and considers it a proper name (cf. Isa 8:6 ff.; Gen 49:10, Hebrew *šilōh*; given a messianic interpretation at *Gen. Rab.* 98.13; 99.10; *Tg. Onq.*), which he applies to Jesus, “the Sent One,” by antonomasia (John 3:17, 34; 5:36; 7:29). Moreover, in Heb 3:1 the connection of “apostle” and “high priest” indicates that Jesus’ divine mission is to “represent” humankind before God, to be the *šaliah*, the one delegated by believers to plead their cause, a paraclete (1 John 2:1), interceding unceasingly on their behalf in the heavenly sanctuary (John 14:13–14). His “apostolate” is his permanent priestly office.

*argos*, S 692; *TDNT* 1.452; *EDNT* 1.150; MM 74; L&N 30.44, 42.46, 65.36, 72.21, 88.248; BDF §59(1); BAGD 104

A contracted form of *aergos*, the adjective *argos* is the opposite of *energos*, “active, effective” (cf. *synergos*: one who helps; *euergetēs*, benefactor), and means “inactive, idle, not working” when it is used to describe people (cf. Diodorus Siculus 17.79.3) and “ineffectual, incapable of doing something, sterile, inoperative, ineffective, unfruitful” when it is used to describe things. These meanings occur constantly throughout classical Greek and in the Koine. Menander: “He will call you a pest, a loafer” (*Dysk.* 366); “they reduce me to inaction”; Plutarch: “Marius did not spend this period in idleness” (*Cor.* 31.4); “a lazy and idle crowd” (*argon de kai scholastēn ochlon*, *Sol.* 22.3; cf. 31.5, Pisistratus promulgates the law on idleness, *ton tēs argias nomon*; cf. *Ti. Gracch.* 1.3). In Philo, the dozen occurrences of *argos* refer to a lazy and indolent life (Philo, *Conf. Tongues* 43; Philo, *Spec. Laws* 2.101), “the idlest (*argotatē*) and least formed soul has been allotted to the fish” (*Creation* 65; *Alleg. Interp.* 1.32), brute, unformed matter (*Flacc.* 148; *Moses* 2.136; *Spec. Laws* 1.21), idle land, meaning land lying fallow (*Spec. Laws* 2.86, 2.88). Likewise in Josephus: at the time for sowing “the people spent fifty days doing nothing” (*War* 2.200); David decided to march against the Philistines “being neither idle nor slack in his conduct of affairs” (*mēden argon mēde rhathymon en tois pragmasin*).

In the vocabulary of the papyri, *argos* almost always means “not busy, unused,” whether describing persons or things: a house or a place (*P.Mil.* 67, col. 1.7: *oikos prōtos argos*; *P.Mich.* 620, 58, 60, 73, 83, 90, 107, 108, *argē kella*), a chest that is empty or out of service (*P.Oxy.* 1269, 22), land that has not been sown (*P.Stras.* 144, 5; cf. *PSI* 837, 7; Dittenberger, *Syl.* 884, 23), an oil press that is not in working order, unproductive money: “they say that their gold is sitting idle and that they are greatly wronged” (*P.Cair.Zen.* 59021, 25: *SB* 6711; cf. 10257, 18). Finally, the *onos argos* is a beast that is good for nothing, as opposed to others that carry loads (*P.Lond.* 1170 verso, 474, 483; *SB* 9150, 38).

The three occurrences of *argos* in the OT are rather in the sense of “inert, unproductive.” God does not want for the works of wisdom to be ineffectual, *erga arga*, i.e., created in vain, remaining sterile, unexploited, unproductive (Wis 14:5); the feet of the idols are useless for walking (Wis 15:15); the idle or

lazy servant is not consulted concerning a great labor (Sir 37:11), he must be put to work lest he remain idle (Sir 33:28, *hina mē argē*).

At least seven of the eight NT occurrences retain the meaning “not busy, idle, inactive.” In the parable of the workers sent to the vineyard, certain ones have not yet been hired and wait around “not doing anything” (Matt 20:3, 6). Young widows who no longer have a household to manage, have no child to raise, and do not devote their time to prayer become idle (*argai manthanousin*), and not only idle but gossips and busybodies (1 Tim 5:13). Epimenides of Cnossos, in calling the Cretans “do-nothing bellies,” means that they are gluttons who get fat doing nothing. According to Jas 2:20 “faith without works is sterile,” i.e., useless for salvation; but 2 Pet 1:8 recognizes “you are not inactive and without fruit (*ouk argous oude akarpous*) toward the exact knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ.”

On Matt 12:36 all the commentators take different tacks: “For every idle word that one speaks one will give account on the day of judgment.” How should we take *pan rhēma argon*? As E. Stauffer has pointed out, it seems to be true that this warning must be assessed alongside the *paideai stomatos* of Sir 23 and the *disciplina oris* of Qumran, where there was a cult of silence. In fact, the expression *logon argon* is found in Josephus, *Ant.* 15.224, where it refers to an inconsequential utterance or bit of advice, one that is not taken into account, that has no effect. In Philo, *Dreams* 1.29, sound issues from thought, and “it is in the mouth that it is articulated”; the tongue serves as the herald and interpreter of the intelligence and “does not produce a sound that is not just that, that is ineffectual (*argēn*)”; cf. the ban on hasty speech (*Spec. Laws* 1.53); *Sent. Sextus* 154: “words without thought are mere noise” (*rhēmata aneu nou psophos*). Pythagoras had instructed “It is better to throw a stone with no goal than to utter an idle word” (*ē logon argon*, in Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 3.34.11; vol. 3, p. 684); cf. Pindar, frag. 58: “Take care not to utter useless words (*ton achreion logon*) in front of everyone.” Finally, this expression was used for the fatalistic argument posed by Chrysippus, the conclusion of which was the rejection of any initiative at all, which is the *argos logos* theorem taken up by Plutarch (*De fato* 11) and Cicero. Thus, not only is *argos* commonly linked with *logos* in the first century, but it always has the meaning “ineffective, inactive.” Therefore this meaning must be applied in Matt 12:36, where it fits the meaning of the context (bearing good or bad fruit, verse 33) and of all the other biblical occurrences, especially since it accords with the theology of the word in the Old and New Testaments: the word of God is never ineffectual (Isa 55:11), because it is by definition *energēs* (Heb 4:12). Similarly the word of the Christian must issue in *ergon* (1 John 3:18; cf. Phlm 6); it would be out of line with its dynamism for it to be inoperative, without effect. Thus it seems to have been

understood by *Did.* 2.5: “Your word shall not be empty (*ou kenos logos*), but fulfilled in action.”

ἀρνέομαι, ἀπαρνέομαι

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*arneomai*, *aparneomai*, **to say no, deny, repudiate**

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*arneomai*, S 720; *TDNT* 1.469–471; *EDNT* 1.153–155; *NIDNTT* 1.454–56; MM 78; L&N 30.52, 31.25, 33.277, 34.48, 36.43, 88.231; BDF §§78, 311(2), 392(1a), 397(3), 420(2), 429; BAGD 107–108 | *aparneomai*, S 533; *TDNT* 1.471; *EDNT* 1.153–155; *NIDNTT* 1.454–455; MM 53; L&N 30.52, 33.277, 34.49; BAGD 81

The grammarians point out that the Koine prefers the aorist middle of *arneomai* to the aorist passive form of the classical period; furthermore, verbs expressing will, desire, or hindrance are rather commonly construed with the infinitive (without an article) or with the conjunctions *hina*, *hōste*, *hoti*. In the NT, however, only the infinitive follows *arneomai*. Moreover, after “negative” verbs like *arneomai* (“deny”), *antilegō* (“object”), and *amphisbēteō* (“question”), the complementary clause takes the negative *ou* with *hoti* (1 John 2:22) and the negative *mē* with infinitive (Luke 22:34; cf. F. M. Abel, *Grammaire*, 75 i). Finally, of the *arneomai* compounds with the verbal prefixes *ap-*, *ex-*, *kat-*, the NT has only *aparneomai* and uses it with exactly the same meaning as the simple form, as is proved by the use of these two verbs in strictly parallel texts in the Synoptic Gospels.

The simplest meaning of *arneomai* is “say no,” in an oral context: “Sara denied it, saying, ‘I did not laugh’ ” (Gen 18:15; cf. Philo, *Abraham* 112, 206; *Spec. Laws* 2.54); Leah is “the one refused by every madman and sent back with a denial.” Petronius vacillates between two options: “to the crowd he said neither yes nor no.” Thus when Jesus asked who had touched him “they all denied it” (*arnoumenōn de pantōn*, Luke 8:45); Moses “refused to be called (*ērnēsato legesthai*) son of Pharaoh’s daughter.” This meaning – spoken denial – is the commonest meaning in the papyri. Just as today we say, “The accused denied that he was guilty” or “The accused denied everything,” *arneomai* is in a way a legal or judicial verb. It shows up in petitions and in transcripts of trials, where it often has connotations of lying, as it does also at 1 John 2:22. For example, on July 18, 142, the prefect of Egypt, Valerius Eudaemon, reacting against blackmail by debtors and denouncing their fraudulent maneuvering (*panourgia*), sets forth the legal means whereby they can resist: “If someone is being pursued for a debt and does not immediately state that he does not owe it

(*mē parautika arnēsamenos opheilein*), that is, if he does not try to prove – by saying that the documents are falsified and filing charges – the falsification of the documents or fraud or inveigling, then either such a maneuver will be pointless for him ... or he will not be shielded from punishment but will be liable for the statutory fines.” In 6 BC, Asinius Gallus, governor of the province of Asia, questioned some slaves who had been implicated in a murder during the course of a nocturnal row. Here is what happened: Philinus came three nights in a row, hurling insults, to besiege, as it were, the house of Eubulus and Tryphera. The third time he brought with him his brother Eubulus. So the masters of the house “ordered a slave not to kill him ... but to chase him off by throwing their waste on him. But in pouring it out, the slave, whether intentionally or not – for he persists in denying it (*autos men gar enemeinen arnoumenos*) – let the vase fall on Eubulus, who was killed.”

To say no is to deny consent, to refuse, to protest, sometimes to revolt. The nuances are numerous. One can simply refuse to take a meal (Homer, *Il.* 19.304) or to sing (Polybius 4.20.11), decline an invitation to dinner (Josephus, *Life* 222), or a favor, or honors. Or one can refuse to admit something: the healing of the lame man at Jerusalem was so obvious that “we can not deny it.” There are friendly refusals, sometimes mere omissions (Wis 18:9), or the results of ignorance (Philo, *Sacr. Abel and Cain* 23: *mē agnoun arnē*; cf. 79); usually, however, a resolute refusal is meant. According to St. Stephen, the Israelites rebuffed Moses, “saying, ‘Who set you up as a leader and judge?’ ” (Acts 7:35). Pilate refused to remove the standards from Jerusalem (Josephus, *War* 2.171); when Vespasian declines imperial honors, his officers become more insistent. *Arneomai* can also mean “renounce,” that is, to desist, detach oneself, and voluntarily forsake a person to whom one has been attached. Aseneth states, “My father and my mother have forsaken me, because I destroyed and shattered their gods.”

These usages are secular. It is the Wisdom of Solomon that gives this verb a religious meaning, with respect to the impious: refusing to know God. Philo uses it to mean “repudiate, apostasize”: “Whoever renounces the truly real God (*ho ton ontōs onta theon arnoumenos*) – what punishment does such a person deserve!” (*Spec. Laws* 2.255). These texts are few and late. Perhaps it could be suggested that it was the Lord who coined the idea of “repudiation” that would be preserved and exploited in the NT. The most important statement is, “Whoever confesses (*homologēsei*) me before men, him will I also confess (*homologēsō*) before my Father who is in heaven; but whoever denies me (*arnēsetai me*) before men, him will I also deny (*arnēsoomai*) before my Father who is in heaven.” A strong contrast is made between confessing the faith and repudiating it; the content, the object, and the publicness are the same. The

reference is to a disciple who publicly professes that he knows Jesus as Savior and God, adheres to his teaching, and submits his life to his Master's will. If this "Christian" later says *no* to this *Amen*, that is, if he officially renounces Jesus, declaring before other people that he is freeing himself from his dependence on the Lord, then the Lord in turn will abandon him and will not exercise his role as advocate and paraclete on his behalf (1 John 2:1). In other words, the baptized person, and especially the apostle, must bear witness publicly to Jesus; their renunciation of Jesus would prompt his official renunciation of them.

Seven times the Gospels use the verb *arneomai* for Peter's "denial" in the courtyard of the high priest. The apostle actually denies knowing Jesus (Luke 22:57) and being one of his disciples (John 18:25), and this renunciation takes place "in front of everyone" (Matt 26:70). This abandonment seems to fulfill perfectly the prediction recorded in Matt 10:32–33, at least in terms of the apparent events; but Peter wept bitterly after his sin, and the Lord, who had predicted it (John 13:38), had also prayed for him that his faith would not fail (Luke 22:32), and afterward he rehabilitated him, giving him the charge to feed his sheep (John 21:15–17). In other words, Peter denied Jesus with his lips, but in his heart he remained constantly faithful to his Lord and Master. The use of the word "denial" for this charade intended to get people to leave him alone is thus problematic. Theodoret commented well: Peter denied Jesus through weakness, but "was held fast by the bonds of love" (*tois tou philtrou desmois katechomenos*, Theodoret, *Car.* 31.10). On the other hand, when the members of the chosen people cry, "We recognize no king but Caesar" (John 19:15), they hand over and "deny Jesus ... the holy and just one" before Pilate, denying his messianic identity. Through their perjury (their violation of sworn loyalty) they exclude themselves from the covenant and abdicate their privileges along with their obligation to be in submission. This about-face is the same as that of the false teachers and heretics who "in denying the Master who redeemed them bring swift perdition upon themselves." They refuse to submit their thought to the only teacher of truth, Christ (John 14:6; 2 Cor 10:5), to whom they have promised unconditional obedience (1 Pet 1:2, 18, 22). They are like slaves whose master has paid the price for their emancipation but who respond with insolence and ingratitude. Their perdition is sure.

Another series of texts gives *arneomai* the meaning "to renounce," referring to self-sacrifice, the giving up of one's own stake: "Anyone who wishes to come after me must deny himself (aorist imperative, *arnēsasthō*), take up his cross each day, and follow me." To say no to oneself firmly and radically is to treat oneself as a negligible quantity that should never enter into consideration, to suppress oneself, in a way; a meaning reinforced by the image of bearing the

cross, which leads to death. Conversion to Christianity is a categorical refusal to be in servitude to worldly desires, the goal being to live freely, “with self-control and piety.” Faith implies faithfulness, a living adherence to Christ; it requires living in conformity to his teachings. Heretics profess (*homologousin*) to know God, but through their deeds they deny him (*tois de ergois arnountai*). This is repudiation in the most serious sense of the word: “If anyone does not care for his own people, and especially the members of his own household, he has denied the faith (*tēn pistin ērnētai*) and is worse than an infidel” (1 Tim 5:8). This violation of sworn loyalty means breaking the initial baptismal commitment to live a life of the brotherly love that characterizes the disciple (John 13:35). To fail here is worse than being an unbeliever, who at least is not breaking a promise. Without brotherly *agapē*, the Christian is not only failing to keep his word to the Lord Christ but also stooping beneath common morality. “Melior est canis vivus leone mortuo (Eccl 9:4), id est paganus christiano impio” (“Better a living dog than a dead lion, i.e., better a pagan than an impious Christian,” Hugh of St.-Cher).

## ἀρχιποίμην

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*archipoimēn*, **chief shepherd**

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***archipoimen***, S 750; TDNT 6.485–499; EDNT 1.165; NIDNTT 3.564, 568; MM 82; L&N 44.5; BDF §118(2); BAGD 113

“The shepherd’s mission is so lofty that it is rightly attributed not only to kings, sages, and souls of perfect purity, but even to the Lord God.” In the East, “pastor” is actually used to describe the function and the office of a sovereign; it is also used for Moses, who led Israel in its wanderings; for David; and above all for God. Jesus claimed the designation, and the faith of the disciple recognized him as the *archēgos* of the new People of God: “the God of peace who brought again from the dead the Shepherd of the sheep, the great one.”

If the salvation of all Christians lies in following the “guardian Shepherd” of their souls, the presbyters of the churches of Asia Minor are motivated to behave as models by the thought that “when the Chief Shepherd appears you will receive an unfading crown of glory” (1 Pet 2:4). The term *archipoimēn* is not a Christian coinage, even though it is unknown in the OT (cf. nevertheless its use by Symmachus to translate *noqēd* in 2 Kgs 3:4). It appears for the first time in *T. Jud.* 8.1 – “I had many cattle, and my chief herdsman was Hiram and Adullamite” (*ēsan de moi ktēne polla, kai eichon archipoimena Hieram ton Odolomētēn*). It is found again in an inscription of the imperial era on an



Egyptian mummy – “Plenis the younger, chief shepherd’s, lived ... years,” – and rather often in rent receipts and transfer orders. Around AD 270: “Aurelius Abous, son of Asemis, of the village of Philadelphia, chief shepherd of Antonius Philoxenos, the most powerful former procurator ... to Aurelius Kalamos.... I have received from you, from those that you hold that belong to the noteworthy (Antonius Philoxenos), twelve goats that I will record among those entered in my accounts”; “Aurelius Abous ... chief shepherd of the livestock of Antonius Philoxenos ... to Aurelius Neliammon ... I have received from you from the livestock that you have on location for the account of the noteworthy (Antonius Philoxenos) twenty-eight goats that I will record among the entries of the account of the noteworthy (Antonius Philoxenos) as having been handed over by you.” On 21 May 270, Dionysius writes to Neilammon, small livestock tenant: “Hand over to Pekysis, the chief shepherd, the small livestock in your keeping that formerly belonged to Kyrilla – fifty sheep, males and females in equal numbers, and five goats – and get an acknowledgement of receipt from him.”

The point of these texts is to underline the authority, the competence, and the responsibility of the chief shepherd. He exercises a high level of oversight over the shepherds and the flocks. It is up to him to see to it that the flocks are grazed in the best pastures, that the shepherds are remunerated, that the rent is paid, that the animals entrusted to his care are returned. Thus St. Peter, addressing presbyter-shepherds, suggests that they are only vicars, that they must carry out their duty in union with Christ, the “chief of pastors,” in conformity with his instructions and his example.

ἀρχιτέκτων

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*architektōn*, **master builder**

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*architekton*, S 753; EDNT 1.165; NIDNTT 1.279; MM 82; L&N 45.10; BDF §118(2); BAGD 113

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St. Paul, having laid the foundation of the church at Corinth, compares himself to a master architect who is within his rights in requiring his successors to adapt their labors to his own structure. There is nothing to say philologically about the NT hapax *architektōn*, except that its English transliteration is hardly to be defined in terms of our contemporary architects. This is already suggested here by the *architektōn*’s job of laying the foundation; and it is confirmed by Sir 38:27 – “Every craftsman and every master worker who works day and night” – and by the papyri and inscriptions.

At the beginning of the second century AD, Tesenouphos is an engineer or mechanic who complains about the lack of maintenance of the machines (*P.Tebt.* 725, 1, 12, 25). Some hundred years later, Apollonius is a naval engineer; Onasander uses this term for builders of siege engines (42.3). In the second century AD, the declaration of an “architect” who is in charge on the building site is registered (*P.Tebt.* 286, 19). But there are also architects in the literal sense of the word who are summoned when someone wants to build a house (*P.Cair.Zen.* 59233, 2, 7; 59302, 3), who propose changes in the plan that has been proposed to them (59193, 3, 8), and who take care that the dwelling is well outfitted (59200, 3, *kataskeuazētai*). Not only do the Greeks vote them honorific decrees, but they also endlessly praise their concern and devotion.

The architect proper has both speculative and practical capabilities. He works together with the commission set up by the city and he serves as the technical adviser. He establishes the estimates. He goes to the quarries to select the materials, oversees the manner in which they are rough-hewn and prepared for installation, according to the models or mock-ups (*typoi*) that he has prepared. He is in charge at the work site and manages the execution of all of the jobs, even the lowliest of them. He recruits, gives instructions to, and oversees a multitude of specialized workers: quarriers, masons, inscribers, marble masons, smiths, carpenters, joiners, marqueteurs, etc., whose salaries he pays (cf. *I.Lind.*, 419, 141); and as he is often in charge of the ongoing maintenance of the edifices, he remains on the job for years.

This description allows us to understand better how the apostle can compare himself to an *architektōn*, which should probably be translated “builder”: being in charge of *ergōn*, he is within his rights to require of preachers who come to labor on his work site and “add to his construction” that they be strictly faithful to the “canon” that he has determined once for all. “The architect (*ho oikodemos*) ... the painter ... the shipbuilder ... allocate all their materials such that when they are arranged and connected they give the whole work solidity, beauty, and utility” (Plutarch, *Quaest. conv.* 1.2.5).

ἀσφάλεια, ἀσφαλής, ἀσφαλίζομαι, ἀσφαλῶς

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*asphaleia*, **stability, safety, assurance, guarantee**; *asphalēs*, **safe, sure**; *asphalizomai*, **to secure, make sure**; *asphalōs*, **without slipping, securely, safely**

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*asphaleia*, S 803; TDNT 1.506; EDNT 1.175–176; NIDNTT 1.663–664; MM 88; L&N 21.9, 31.41; BAGD 118 | *asphales*, S 804; TDNT 1.506; EDNT 1.175–176; NIDNTT 1.663; MM 88; L&N 21.10, 31.42; BAGD 119 |

*asphalizomai*, S 805; *TDNT* 1.506; *EDNT* 1.175–176; *NIDNTT* 1.663; MM 88; L&N 18.12, 21.11; BDF §126; BAGD 119 | *asphalos*, S 806; *TDNT* 1.506; *EDNT* 1.175–176; *NIDNTT* 1.663; L&N 21.10, 31.42; BAGD 119; ND 3.9

These words are formed from the alpha-privative and *sphallō*, which means “stumble, fall,” and by extension “fail, be foiled.” They are particularly common in the literary (Philo, Josephus) and popular (the papyri) Koine. In the fifteen NT occurrences, St. Luke (eight occurrences) alone uses the substantive, the adjective, the verb, and the adverb; this is probably because these terms belonged to the medical vocabulary, but their use is so widespread that their meanings are considerably nuanced, both in classical Greek and in Hellenistic Greek.

*Asphaleia* – the condition of not slipping, a firm step – means first of all stability, and then especially security and safety, certainty or assurance: “by far the most surely true answer” (*makrō pros alētheian asphalestaton*, Plato, *Tim.* 50 b). Finally, it is a legal term, meaning security in the sense of a guarantee: “Otherwise he does not affix his seal on an act or sign a guarantee” (*ē asphaleian graphei*, Epictetus 2.13.7; cf. 2 Macc 3:22 – keeping deposits safe; Prov 11:15; *BGU* 1149, 24); Polybius 2.11.5: a guarantee against Illyrian violations. The LXX retains especially the meaning security and solidity, as does the *Letter of Aristeas*, which also notes that the translation of the Law had to be done *meta asphaleias*, meaning with care and precision (45; cf. 28; Josephus, *Ant.* 12.56). Philo mentions the security of persons, of property, and of places, notably of the altar and of places of refuge, but also in the intellectual order: stability and balance (*asphaleian kai eukosmian*) in the refutation of sophistry (*Heir* 125; cf. *Spec. Laws* 4.21; *To Gaius* 42); the reasoning faculty with its “sureness and good order” (*asphaleian kai kosmon*, *Change of Names* 111). The meaning personal or military security is predominant in Josephus, who also knows the meanings “holding someone under tight guard,” “assurance, certitude,” “victory” (*War* 1.375), “hope” (*Ant.* 15.166), “safety” (17.3). “He reckoned that God would certainly make sure that nothing that he had uttered would prove false” (*Ant.* 2.220; cf. 2.280; 4.31; 6.157). Also present is the legal meaning, a guarantee, security (*Ant.* 17.346): “the principal guarantee of secure peace (*pros asphaleian eirēnēs*) is the legitimate succession of princes” (*War* 4.596).

The adjective *asphalēs*, “not slipping, not falling,” means first of all “firm, solid,” whether with respect to things (Homer, *Od.* 6.42: Olympus) or persons; then “safe” or “making safe.” God has firmly fixed the clouds above (Prov 8:28) and opened a sure path through the sea (Wis 14:3); the ungodly do not lay solid foundations (4:3). But immutable Wisdom never changes in her designs,

is of firm, sure, and tranquil mind (*bebaion, asphales, amerimnon*, 7:23). For Philo, “safety lies in staying at home” (*Husbandry* 162); “the safest option is to remain calm.” If the adjective usually modifies a route or a journey, it is also used to define knowledge: “a comprehensive, firm, and solid grasp that reason cannot shake” (*Prelim. Stud.* 141); “to speak more truly (or precisely)” (*to ge asphalesteron eipein, Etern. World* 74); “the sustenance, the support, the strength, the firmness (*bebaiotēs*) of all is the immutable God” (*ho asphalēs theos, Dreams* 1.158). Most of the occurrences in Josephus have to do with security, sometimes in the legal sense; some have to do with prudence, which is very close to the idea of certitude (*Ant.* 1.106; cf. 15.67: uncertain hopes).

The verb *asphalizō*, “to secure, fortify,” is used for the solidity of a building (Neh 3:15; hiphil of Hebrew *ḥāzaq*, “make firm”), for the fastening of an image with iron (Wis 13:15), for putting something in a safe or sheltered place (10:12; cf. 4:17), for supporting with might (Isa 41:10, Hebrew *tāmāk*). In Josephus, it means especially to secure the defense of a country or a city, to take measures to ensure its security, especially with a nuance of prudence: the Tiberians “took the precaution (*asphalisthēnai*) of fortifying their walls” (*Life* 317); “being on guard against the appearing of enemies” (*asphalisamenoi periemenon autous, Ant.* 4.160). Josephus also uses the word, however, to describe how he safeguarded himself against those who might criticize his narrative (*Ant.* 10.218), and in a legal sense: “those who read these letters, which are guaranteed by the royal seal – *tas hypo tou basilikou sēmantēros ēsphalismenas epistolās* – shall not oppose what is written herein” (11.271).

The adverb *asphalōs*, “without slipping, solidly, firmly,” takes on all of the meanings of the adjective. In the LXX, it always translates the Hebrew *beṭaḥ*, referring to a safe place (Tob 6:4), a journey made in safety, but we may understand *asphalōs eidotes* to mean knowledge free of any doubt: “knowing with certitude what oaths they trusted in” (Wis 18:6).

All of this would be superfluous except that it helps determine the significance of *asphaleia* at the end of the prologue to the Third Gospel, which is written in purest Greek style, and in which Luke sets out to specify the goal of his work: *heōs an epignōs peri hōn katēchēthēs logōn tēn asphaleian* (Luke 1:4). First of all, we must point out the emphatic position of the last term which is thus spotlighted: *epignōs ... tēn asphaleian*. Thus we should not hesitate to translate, along with most moderns, “absolute certainty” – the Philonian definition – but at the same time recognizing that it means not just intellectual conviction but also safety, firmness, and stability. Xenophon had already used the word with respect to the certainty of an argument (Xenophon, *Mem.* 4.6.15, *asphaleia logou*); the meaning is identical in the synonym *to asphales*, in *P.Amh.* 131, 3: “until he has certain knowledge of the matter” (*hina to asphales*

*epignō tou pragmatos*, second century); 132, 5; *P.Giss.* 27, 8: “so that I may know with certainty” (*hina to asphales epignō kai stephanēphorian axō*). Finally, we should note the custom of supplying a guarantee or a written assurance.

On the other hand, in 1 Thess 5:3 it is a question of stability and safety, which is one of the most common meanings in the papyri: “When they say, ‘Peace and safety’ (*eirēnē kai asphaleia*), then sudden destruction will fall upon them.” When the officers from the Sanhedrin go to find the imprisoned apostles, they find the prison “locked and secure (*en pasē asphaleia*) and the guards standing before the gates.”

The adjective *asphalēs* is used three times by St. Luke in the sense of certain, precise, or exact knowledge (Acts 21:34; 22:30; 25:26), for which there is no parallel in the papyri (except for *P.Lond.* 1916, 26, from the fourth century AD, *hina to asphales methōmen kai pisthōmen*; *SB* 11017, 5: *tēn asphalēn phasin gnous*), which use it only with the meaning “sure,” which corresponds better to Phil 3:1 – “It does not hurt me to write the same things to you, and for you it is a guarantee” (*hymīn de asphales*, it is safer for you); and especially to Heb 6:19 – “We have a soul’s anchor that is sure and firm” (*asphalē te kai bebaian*). These metaphors of land or sea routes and anchors were traditional, like the union of the two adjectives.

The four occurrences of the verb *asphalizō* in the NT are all in the middle voice and have to do either with the guard at Jesus’ tomb or the Philippian jailer, who “secured the feet (*tous podas ēsphalisato*) of Paul and Silas in stocks” (Acts 16:24; cf. Wis 13:15; *P.Tebt.* 283, 19). This latter meaning is the most common in the papyri where a suspect is captured or secured or where the body of a deceased person is guarded (*P.Princ.* 166, 5), but in addition products are seized (*P.Tebt.* 53, 29) and property is secured (407, 4).

The adverb *asphalōs* has the same meaning in Mark 14:44, where Judas asks the soldiers to hold Jesus securely when leading him away, and in Acts 16:23, where the Philippian jailer is ordered to guard Paul and Silas closely (*asphalōs tērein autous*). Similarly *P.Giss.* 19, 14, “so I enjoin you to (guard) yourself closely” (*parakalō se oun asphalōs seauton [tērein]*); and *P.Oxy.* 742, 5: “put them in a secure place” (*thes autas eis topon asphalōs*). But at Pentecost Peter affirms, “Let the whole house of Israel know with certainty (*asphalōs oun ginōsketō hoti*) that God made this Jesus Lord and Christ ...”; a meaning that accords well with Luke 1:4.

ἄσωτία, ἄσώτως

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*asōtia*, incurable dissoluteness; *asōtōs*, prodigally

Made up of the alpha-privative and *soō*, *asōtos* normally means “incapable of being saved,” and thus “incurable,” and the adverb *asōtōs* “in a hopeless state.” With the philosophers and in usage, *asōtia*, literally “lost life,” can have two meanings, which are so closely linked that it is not easy to distinguish them: sometimes it means prodigality, sometimes a dissolute life. The transition from the one to the other is explained perfectly by Aristotle: “We label as prodigal those who are incontinent and those who become spendthrifts to satisfy their intemperance. That is why prodigals have such a bad reputation: they have several vices all at once.... Properly speaking, the word *prodigal* refers to the one who has only the sole vicious tendency to destroy his means of subsistence.”

*Asōtia*, dissipation of wealth and debauchery, is very often associated with drinking binges during festivals: “the temple was filled with debaucheries and orgies by dissolute Gentiles and prostitutes” (2 Macc 6:4); “Do not be drunk with wine, which only amounts to licentiousness.” Athenaeus (4.59–67) showed by many examples that the *asōtos* not only wastes his goods, but loses his time, degrades his faculties and abilities, and consumes him. So much did *asōtia* become synonymous with dissoluteness and immorality, and opposed to virtue (*aretē*), that it became a literary topos and is even found in symbolic monuments. It is in this general sense that *asōtia* designates the pagan lifestyle in 1 Pet 4:4 – the pagans often find it strange that Christian converts “no longer run with them to the same torrent of licentiousness.”

The prodigal spending, these dissolute ways, this flashy existence is often denounced as the vice of the sons of the family, of the younger set, starting with Prov 28:7 – “The one whose companions are the debauched (Hebrew *zalal*) brings dishonor to his father.” It is in this sense that admission to the presbyterate is allowed only for the father of a family in which the children “are not accused of bad conduct or undisciplined.”

We should hesitate to be specific about the conduct of the young man in Luke 15:13 – “he wasted all his substance by living *asōtōs*” (*dieskorpisen tēn ousian autou zōn asōtōs*). Because the older brother maligns the younger in verse 30 – “this son of yours has consumed your wealth with prostitutes” – we get the idea that the prodigal has lived lasciviously. But our Lord is much more delicate and discreet, and we must translate, with Fr. Lagrange: “He wasted all his substance through a life of foolish spending.” The tradition has precisely designated him as “the prodigal son.”

ἀτακτέω, ἄτακτος, ἀτάκτως

*atakteō*, **to be disorderly**; *ataktos*, **undisciplined, disorderly, rebellious**;  
*ataktōs*, **in disorder**

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*atakteo*, S 812; *TDNT* 8.47–48; *EDNT* 1.176; MM 89; L&N 88.246; BAGD 119 | *ataktos*, S 813; *TDNT* 8.47–48; *EDNT* 1.176; MM 89; L&N 88.247; BAGD 119 | *ataktos*, S 814; *TDNT* 8.47–78; *EDNT* 1.177; L&N 88.247; BAGD 119

In 1 Thess 5:14, St. Paul asks the community to take back the brothers who are living in a dissolute manner (*noutheteite tous ataktous*). In his second letter, he more severely prescribes keeping away every brother who is leading a dissolute life (*ataktōs peripatountos*, 2 Thess 3:6, 11), giving himself as an example: “We ourselves did not lead a disorderly life in your midst.” It would not be necessary to insist on the meaning of *ataktos* – “not remaining in his/her/its place, out of order, undisciplined” – if a certain number of exegetes did not suggest translating it “idle, lazy.” But the usage of the verb, the adjective, and the adverb in the Koine, notably in the first century AD, confirms that the word covers any breach of obligation or convention, disorders of life in general; and the usage is decisive.

On the cosmic level, matter was “disorderly and confused,” then God takes it from disorder to order. In military parlance especially, the word is used with respect to negligent officers (*P.Hib.* 198, 149; from the third century BC), an army in disarray, undisciplined or insubordinate soldiers. In addition, “disorderly” modifies “multitude, crowd.” In a political context, Josephus compares people who live unencumbered by laws and rules (“those who live in a lawless and disorderly fashion,” *tōn anomōs kai ataktōs biountōn*) to those who observe order and common law. In the social realm, if sons do not meet the financial needs of their parents when necessity arises, they become subject to a penalty of a thousand drachmas, according to testamentary convention. In apprenticeship agreements, it is provided that if the apprentice is guilty of misconduct or has been absent for one reason or another, he must work additional makeup days.

The moral sense is constant from *T. Naph.* 2.9, which prescribes doing everything “in order and with good intentions, in the fear of God, doing nothing disorderly (*mēden atakton poiēsēte*), out of due season,” to Iamblichus, who calls passion “disorderly, culpable, unstable” (*Myst.* 1.10 = 1.36.13). Morality lies in not letting reason follow its course with disorderly haste. *Ataktoi andres* (Philodemus of Gadara, *D.* 1.7.6) are *apaideutoi*. Diodorus Siculus goes so far as to equate the life unshackled by moral norms to the life of wild beasts:

“settling down into an *ataktos* and beastlike life and go out to various pastures at random” (*en ataktō kai thēriōdei biō kathestōtas sporadēn epī tas nomas exienai* 1.8.1). Finally, the *ataktōi* are rebels, the disobedient, or insurgents, even impious troublemakers; a regulation from Delos covers the possibility that pilgrims may conduct themselves improperly in the sacred places.

In sum, the *ataktos* is the who is defective in action, irregular, against the rule; and since in the Christian life the “order” is established by God or the leaders of the church, disorder can mean sometimes a shortcoming or a discordant note, sometimes law-breaking and moral dissoluteness. The *ataktōi* Thessalonians free themselves from the rule of community life. One thinks of sins against brotherly love, a propensity to favor discord, a refusal to accept the customs or discipline of the church. Certain “troubled” ones seem particularly stormy, befuddled types who disturb the peace (1 Thess 4:11–12). At any rate, “their walk is not in line” (Gal 2:14). They are “culpable” and probably stubborn.

ἀτενίζω

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*atenizō*, to look attentively, stare

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*atenizo*, S 816; *EDNT* 1.177; *NIDNTT* 3.520; MM 89; L&N 24.49; BAGD 119

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Among the numerous verbs of seeing in the NT (*blepō*, *theōreō*, *eidon*, *horaō*, etc.), the denominative verb *atenizō* merits special attention. It refers to “attentive and prolonged visual observation of an object,” an insistent fixing of the attention. Thus certain fixed stars “take on a tail ... in fact, one of the stars, in the constellation of the Dog, had a tail, though a dim one; those who looked at it intently (*atenizousin*) saw only a faint glow” (Aristotle, *Mete.* 343 b 9); “Why do we feel ill at ease when we fix our gaze on other objects (*ta all’ atenizontes*), but very comfortable when we look at objects that have the green color of grass, cabbage and other plants? It is because we cannot fix our gaze for long (*atenizein*) on white and black.” In the medical writers, the verb is used especially with *omma* for a particularly fixed gaze. Moulton-Milligan cite only one papyrus, to which we can add only *BGU* 1816, 25 (*axiō atenisai eis to megethos tōn proexērithmēmenōn*, a letter from 60/59 BC) and *Pap.Graec.Mag.* 4, 556 (“You will see the gods staring at you and rushing upon you,” *opsē de atenizontas soi tous theous kai epī se hormōmemous*) and 711 (with eyes fixed on God, not giving in to any distraction).

This verb is used twelve times by St. Luke (in Luke and in Acts) and twice by St. Paul. In Luke 4:20, it expresses curiosity and extreme attentiveness: in



the synagogue at Nazareth, “all eyes were riveted on Jesus.” The high priest’s servant saw Peter (*idousa*) sitting near the fire, and “after examining him closely (*kai atenisasa autō*) she said, ‘This person also was with him’ ” (Luke 22:56). It was with intensity and a certain amount of anxiety that the apostles, on the day of the ascension, as Jesus disappeared behind a cloud, continued to stare into the sky. When Peter stopped and fixed his gaze on the paralytic who was asking for alms, and when St. Paul looked piercingly at Elymas, this look was both an examination and the point of departure for mental reflection. Several times it connotes an emotional reaction. Thus it is possible to stare in a way that conveys awe, as when the Jews gazed at St. Peter, stupefied that he could perform a miracle (Acts 3:12) and when Cornelius beheld the angel and trembled (10:4). When Herod Agrippa, at the theater of Caesarea, appeared in his luxurious finery, glimmering in the early rays of sunlight, the spectators were seized with holy fright and could not take their eyes off of him (Josephus, *Ant.* 19.344). During the siege of Jerusalem, the Jews, agonizing under the cruelty of the brigands, “breathed their last with their gaze fixed determinedly on the temple” (*War* 5.517). Thecla was not only attentive to Paul’s teaching but beside herself with joy (*atenizousa hōs pros euphrasian*, *Acts Paul Thec.* 8).

## αὐθάδης

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*authadēs*, **presumptuous, arrogant, ill-bred**

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*authades*, S 829; *TDNT* 1.508–509; *EDNT* 1.178; MM 91; L&N 88.206; BAGD 120–121

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The first quality required in a candidate for the *episkopē* is that he be *mē authadē* (Titus 1:7). False teachers, on the other hand, come across as *tolmētai authadeis*. It is quite difficult to specify the meaning of a word that is not illuminated by its context, especially since English happens not to have a term that corresponds exactly to *authadēs*. Etymologically (*autos* + *handanō*) the word would refer to the person who delights in himself (cf. Josephus, *Ant.* 5.39) and is thus self-sufficient and presumptuous. This infatuation and self-centeredness lead to arrogance and even insolence. The *authadēs* is constantly characterized as hard (*sklēros*, Gen 49:3, 7; Polybius 4.21.3; Plutarch, *Lyc.* 11.6) and violent.

Thus it is not simply a matter of self-satisfaction, but of prickly pride, a haughty character who, refusing to hear what is said to him, persists stubbornly in his own opinion; such as Pharaoh and Herod, inflexible and mulish (Philo, *Moses* 1.139; *To Gaius* 301). Not only does this *authadēs* do only what he

wants but he is unfriendly, he is brutal and aggressive, at the least a quarreler and quibbler; in sum, ill-bred. In addition, in the catalog of vices in *Sacr. Abel and Cain* 32, Philo places *authadēs* between vainglorious and vulgar. In fact, Josephus attributes this sort of behavior to prisoners (*War* 4.96), the young (*Ant.* 4.263; 16.399), and slaves (*War* 2.356), for example, to Hagar, expecting a child and showing arrogant and insolent pride toward Sarah (*Ant.* 1.189). In Lucian and in the literature, it is a constant trait of the “misanthrope,” who is strictly insufferable.

So it is evident that “presumptuous” and “arrogant” do not convey the depth of meaning of *authadēs*, but it is clear that “God’s steward” cannot have this sufficiency, this infatuation, this bad character, these base sentiments, which would confine him to a conspicuous isolation. Someone so unsociable would not be able to carry out the responsibilities of a pastor.

## αὐτόματος

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*automatos*, **spontaneous, self-moving**

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*automatos*, S 844; EDNT 1.179; MM 93; L&N 89.21; BDF §§59(1), 117(2), 243; BAGD 122

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In writing that the iron door of the prison at Jerusalem “opened itself” for the angel and Peter, not only does St. Luke show his Hellenistic culture once again – the expression being a common one – but he also points to the miraculous character of the event.

More delicate is the exegesis of *automatos* – spontaneous, moving of its own accord – in the parable of the grain that comes up without any tending, without the help of the sower. The earth acts alone: the man sleeps night and day “and the seed sprouts and grows, he knows not how.” By itself (*automatē*), the ground produces first the stalk, then the ear, then the full grain in the ear” (Mark 4:27–28). The Lord did not give an explanation of this parable, and the interpretations that have been suggested are widely divergent, but the emphatic position of *automatē* (not translated by the Peshitta) at the beginning of the sentence indicates that it is the most important word and that the interpretation of this teaching depends on understanding it. So what does it mean? That the earth produces, on its own, independently of the activity of the farmer, without any human cooperation? Or that it produces without visible cause, in an undiscernible fashion?

We should recall first of all the belief that in the golden age “the soil would produce on its own (*automatē*) an abundant and generous crop,” then the

constant use of *automatos* to describe the spontaneous production of uncultivated land, the natural growth of seed, its own energy. Thus this word describes the second crop in Lev 25:5, 11 (*spīah*); and Josephus, comparing the sacrifices of Abel and Cain, observes: “God is honored by things that grow spontaneously and according to nature” (*tois automatois kai kata physin*) and not by products fashioned by human ingenuity (*Ant.* 1.54). This word is used when Judas Maccabeus finds the temple at Jerusalem wasted and “plants growing on their own in the sanctuary” (*Ant.* 12.317). Philo similarly contrasts spontaneous growth and the art of agriculture. Given this commonplace, contemporary agricultural usage, it indeed seems that in the Markan parable Jesus is insisting on the wonder of a grain that grows without anyone’s tending it; being alive, it accomplishes on its own its germination, growth, and fruit-bearing through mysterious exchanges between itself and the soil that has received it: they are linked – “it is the earth alone that produces.” Just so the kingdom of God on earth has its own dynamism, an immanent energy, a vital force. Since humans have nothing to do with it, we can conclude that this innate vitality comes from God. In fact this is what is indicated by the fact that the vitality is not easily perceptible; but this invisibility is not mentioned for its own sake; it is a secondary trait.

## αὐτόπτης

*autoptēs*, **eyewitness**

→see also μάρτυς

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*autoptes*, S 845; *TDNT* 5.373; *EDNT* 1.179; MM 93–94; L&N 24.46; BAGD 122

Luke the historian calls upon the authority of eyewitnesses of the gospel message preached by Jesus from the beginning of his ministry: *hoi ap’ archēs autoptai kai hypēretai genomenoi tou logou*. The noun *autoptēs* (a biblical hapax, unknown in Philo), formed from *opsis* (J. Pollux, *Onom.* 2.57–58), often has the banal meaning of a spectator who sees with his own eyes, as opposed to the “hearer” of a reputation or a bit of news. In the magical papyri, it designates the immediate vision of the divinity. It is often used by medical writers and can have a juridical meaning after the fashion of *autopsia*, personal inspection.

In Luke 1:2, the *autoptēs*, as opposed to a simple informer who mediates between the sender of a message and its recipient, is a qualified witness who personally affirms both that which he has seen and his conviction, thus making certainty possible. He himself guarantees the truth of the gospel. This term must

therefore be understood in its technical sense as a major component in the documentation or factual report that the historian sets out to describe. The eyewitness, who has participated in the events, provides an account that is in accord with reality. From Herodotus on, Greek historians make a distinction in their sources of information between that which they have heard and that which they have seen personally. Only their presence in the theater of action makes their account believable: “As for the history of the war, I wrote it after having been a participant in many of the events (*pollōn autourgōs praxeōn*), a witness of a large number of them (*pleistōn d’ autoptēs genomenos*); in short, without being unaware of anything that was said or done.” The Jewish historian is here plagiarizing Polybius: “On account of the fact that I was not only the witness of the events (*mē monon autoptēs*) but in some a collaborator (*synergōs*), in others the architect (*cheiristēs*), I have undertaken to write so to speak a new history from a new point of departure (*archēn allēn*).” According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the value of Theopompus of Chios, author of historical works, lay in his having been “eyewitness of most of the events, *pollōn men autoptēs gegenēmenos*.” Finally, in the first century, Diodorus Siculus, in describing the Arabian Gulf, distinguishes between the two categories of sources: that which he derived from the Royal Annals kept at Alexandria, and observations that were communicated to him by eyewitnesses, *ta de para tōn autoptōn pepōsmenoi*. Luke 1:2 clearly is in line with this historiographical hermeneutic. Its *autoptai* have all the trustworthiness of persons who have been present at occurrences, of witnesses who merit belief.

## ἄφεσις

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*aphesis*, **a sending out, point of departure, discharge, settlement, forgiveness, dispensation, acquittal, liberation**

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*aphesis*, S 859; TDNT 1.509–512; EDNT 1.181–183; NIDNTT 1.697, 700–703; MM 96; L&N 37.132, 40.8; BAGD 125

This noun, derived from the verb *aphiēmi*, “send out, let go” (Matt 8:22; *P.Amh.* 37, 10), has multiple shades of meaning, some of them quite everyday, like the sending out of ships (Demosthenes, *Corona* 18.77–78); but there are also technical applications, for example in architecture, and in sports, where it refers to the starting line for the athletes in the *diaulos*; in astrology, it refers to the point of departure, the beginning. In Aristotle, it refers to the emission or expulsion of fish roe, and in Hippocrates it becomes a medical term, the emission of gas being a symptom of illness.

*Aphesis* is used especially for persons, usually as a legal term for a layoff, for the release of slaves or prisoners (Polybius 1.79.12; Plato, *Plt.* 273c), the repudiation of a spouse, an exemption from military service (Plutarch, *Ages.* 24.3), a dispensation from an obligation: “A councillor who does not come to the meeting chamber at the appointed time shall pay one drachma for each day’s absence unless the council grants him a dispensation” (*ean mē heuriskomenos aphessin tēs boulēs apē*, Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 30.6). In Demosthenes, *aphesis* is usually a “discharge” in the technical sense of freeing someone from an obligation, but also a “settlement” (“My father was able to recover the debt after the settlement,” *C. Naus.* 38.14) and a “remission” (“This remission of interest did not wrong the creditors”). On rare occasions it refers to the forgiveness of an offense: “What we have said concerning forgiveness of a parricide by a father shall be valid for similar cases” (Plato, *Leg.* 9.869 d). The term does not seem to have been used by the moralists, however.

In the papyri, *aphesis* refers especially to the draining of water from pools (*P.Oxy.* 3167, 10; *P.Petr.* II, 13, 2: *aphesis tou hydatos*; *P.Flor.* 388, 44) and especially to sluice gates (“the sluice gates at Phoboou,” *P.Oxy.* 3268, 11; 918, verso 20; *P.Ryl.* 583, 16, 63) or the conduits from which water flows out into the fields. It is difficult to determine the meaning of *gē en aphesei*; scholars disagree. Indeed, it seems that the expression had several meanings, but the very word *aphesis* suggests land “in remission,” recalling the *fundi derelecti* of the empire, i.e., either uncultivated land, fallow land (*P.Got.* 20, col. II, 2, 6, 7, 8; *P.Yale* 1674, 57); or land exempted from certain taxes. It seems that *aphesis* also had the meaning “expense” or “disbursement,” for example, in the phrase *logos apheseōs statērōn*, expenses of 130 staters (*P.Tebt.* 404, 1); *apheseōs chōmatos* (*O.Bodl.* 1827: an accounting for the repair of a dike; *P.Tebt.* 706, 11); payment for a route (*P.Tebt.* 815, col. IV, 26); or expenses for the considerable work projects throughout a *nomarchia* (*SB* 8243, 9, *tas apheseis*).

“Dispensations” from *leitourgiai* are well attested. According to a transcript of an audience before a *stratēgos*, a weaver wrongly chosen for a *leitourgia* asks for an exemption (*tēs leitourgias aphessin*, *P.Phil.* 3, 5; second century AD). In the third century, this exemption is a privilege of the artists of Dionysus (*P.Oxy.Hels.* 25, 17). An imperial prescript provides that the prefect of the province shall be able to release a petitioner from a legal obligation (*P.Oxy.* 1020, 6). *Aphesis* is also debt remission: according to a judgment at Cnidos in the second century BC on behalf of Calymna, “a deduction made from the talent that the Calumnians claim was forgiven them by Pausimachus and Cleumedes.” Finally, *aphesis* refers to the liberation of a prisoner: *homologia apheseōs* (*SB* 9463, 12–13). A decree at Athens, for the poet Philippides, who used his influence on behalf of his compatriots after the battle of Ipsos, “for all those

who were prisoners, after making his case to the king and obtaining their liberation ... he sent them on their way to their chosen destinations” (Dittenberger, *Syl.* 374, 21). An Iranian act emancipating slaves by consecrating them to the god Sarapis uses the words *tēn aphesin autou*. In a dream in the Serapeum, a vision gives Ptolemy confidence that he will be delivered soon (*aphesis moi ginetai tachy*, *UPZ* 78, 39).

Apart from several occurrences with no original meaning, the LXX gives *aphesis* at least two special meanings. First, the sabbatical “remission”: “You shall give the earth release and let it lie fallow” (*aphesin poiēseis*, Hebrew *šāmam*, Exod 23:11; Lev 25:2–7). This sabbatical year is also the occasion of the liberation of Israelite slaves and the return of security held for debts: “At the end of seven years, you shall make a remission ... a remission of what he has loaned to his neighbor” (*šmiṭâh*, Deut 15:1, 9; 31:10). Similarly, the jubilee every fiftieth year is the occasion for the freeing (Hebrew *drôr*) of all the inhabitants of the land; and the ground lies fallow. Elsewhere, *aphesis* takes on a metaphorical meaning – and for the first time, a religious, messianic meaning – in Isa 58:6 – “to send back free (*en aphesei*, Hebrew *hāpšîm*) those who have been mistreated.” It enters into the vocabulary of instruction in Jer 34:15 – “You were converted today ... and each of you proclaimed freedom to his neighbor” (cf. verse 17).

It is in Jewish literature that *aphesis* receives its full, if not definitive, meaning. For Philo, the term is constantly associated with *eleutheria* and understood to mean complete liberty. Allegorical exegesis takes the sabbatical years and jubilees as referring to “the emancipation and liberation of souls that call upon God” (*Heir* 273) and reject their former errors (*Prelim. Stud.* 108). When Abraham pleads for Sodom, “at first he sets forth the number of the liberation (*tēs apheseōs*) at fifty (righteous), but he stops at ten, the limit of redemption (*tēn apolytrōsin*)” (ibid. 109), i.e., liberation in exchange for ransom (cf. *Spec. Laws* 2.121). Moses offers a goat “as a sacrifice for the remission of our sins” (*thysē peri apheseōs hamartēmatōn*, *Moses* 2.147; *Spec. Laws* 1.190; cf. 215, 237).

Josephus, who usually uses *aphesis* in its secular literary meaning, also recognizes the meaning “acquittal” and even pardon: Herod “promised to pardon past offenses” (*War* 1.481). *Didous aphesin* could be translated “give absolution.”

It is remarkable that the NT writers use *aphesis* thirty-six times, always meaning pardon for sins; there is never a secular meaning, as if this were a technical term reserved for religious use. Its first occurrence is on the lips of Zechariah in his description of the goal of John the Baptist’s ministry: namely, to prepare the Messiah’s ways “so as to give to his people the knowledge of

salvation through the forgiveness of their sins” (*en aphesei hamartiōn autōn*) on account of God’s tender mercy (verse 78). The remark that salvation consists of forgiveness of sins shows that the messianic *sōtēria* is spiritual and will not be a political liberation. In effect, Mark 1:4 and Luke 3:3 characterize the ministry of the precursor in the region of the Jordan as a bath of conversion “for the forgiveness of sins” (*eis aphesin hamartiōn*) so as to prepare sinners for the coming of the Messiah. This involves sorrow for offenses committed, penitence, upright intentions; without these things God could not grant pardon. Water baptism is a means of realizing this conversion, and its goal – something altogether new – is a washing, “the remission of sins.” In the blood covenant sealed by Jesus with the institution of the Eucharist, the blood is not poured out on the people but drunk by the participants: “This is my blood, the new covenant, shed for the many for the remission of sins.” Henceforth it is clear that *aphesis* is the basic element of the redemptive work accomplished on the cross; it is connected with pardon, sanctification, and salvation. Speaking to the disciples at Emmaus, Jesus reminded them of “what was written ... that in his name repentance for the forgiveness of sins (*eis aphesin hamartiōn*) should be preached to all nations,” but he specified that first the Christ had to suffer, die, and be resurrected (Luke 24:47). This point is of the highest importance, because it implies that forgiveness of sins is due to the sufferings of Jesus.

This is what St. Peter keeps teaching to the crowd at Pentecost (Acts 2:38), to the Sanhedrin, and to the centurion Cornelius: concerning Christ, “all the prophets bear witness that whoever believes in him receives remission of sins through his Name” (Acts 10:43). This forgiveness depends on faith in the person and the power of Jesus; it is universal, so that everyone can benefit from it. St. Paul said the same thing at Pisidian Antioch, before King Agrippa, and to the Colossians (Col 1:14; *aphesis tōn hamartiōn* is linked with *apolytrōsis*, “redemption”).

There remain five texts where *aphesis* is used without a complement or in the variant expression *aphesis tōn paraptōmatōn*, “the remission of trespasses,” associated with redemption (*apolytrōsis*, Eph 1:7), the two terms being almost equivalent. In Mark 3:29 the Lord states, “Whoever blasphemes the Holy Spirit will never have forgiveness” (*ouk echei aphesin eis to aiōna*; the last three words are omitted in D and in numerous Latin manuscripts). This unpardonable blasphemy is a willful blindness and hardening. At Nazareth, identifying himself as the Messiah, Jesus cites Isa 58:6, which announces the deliverance (*en aphesei*) of the chosen people (Luke 4:18). The Epistle to the Hebrews uses *aphesis* without a complement for forgiveness, declaring that the absolution of offenses depends on the sacrificial efficacy of the blood: “Without the shedding of blood there is no remission” (*ou ginetai aphesis*). Glossing Jer 31:34 (“I will

remember their sins and iniquities no longer”), Hebrews adds, “Now, where there is remission of these (*hopou de aphasis toutōn*), there is no more offering for sin” (Heb 10:18). In fact, since sin has been “remitted” because of the sacrifice on the cross, we could say that when Jesus died sin died as well, so that a new offering in the future would be nonsensical; “fieret enim injuria hostiae Christi.” All these NT usages, which are so perfectly homogeneous, presuppose a catechesis – whose scope and evolution are unknown to us – that added the term *aphesis* to the Christian vocabulary with a precise and exclusive theological meaning.

### ἀφιλάργυρος

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*aphilargyros*, **free of the love of money**

→see also αἰσχροκερδής, ἀφιλάργυρος; φιλαργυρία, φιλάργυρος

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*aphilargyros*, S 866; EDNT 1.183; MM 98; L&N 25.109; BAGD 126

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Since the love of money is one of the signs of belonging to the world, Heb 13:5 addresses to persecuted Christians the charge “that your way of life be *aphilargyros*.” This is an echo of Matt 6:24: “You cannot serve God and money.” The same virtue is among the qualities required of the candidate for the *episkopē* (1 Tim 3:3). There is not much of significance to add to the citations of this term supplied by T. Nägeli and A. Deissmann unless perhaps from the honorific decrees and in speeches in praise of virtue. The first mention is an honorific decree of Priene, from the second century BC. Unfortunately it is mutilated, but J. Rouffiac finds reason to classify it among “expressions of piety and of the moral ideal” which are common to the vocabulary of the inscriptions and of the NT. More developed is the inscription of the Egyptian delta of 3 May 5 BC, “let *aretē* and *philagathia* and *aphilargyria* be manifest” (*aretē te kai philagathia kai aphilargyria prodēlos geinētai*, SB 8267, 44).

That this absence of avarice was a highly prized virtue is already known from Diodorus Siculus, who emphasizes that Bias never used his oratorical prowess to gain wealth (9.11, *aphilargyria*), but especially from the listing of the qualities of Antoninus Pius: “Hear! In the first place, he had a love of wisdom; in the second place, he did not love money, and in the third place, he loved virtue.” But the best parallel to 1 Tim 3:3 is in Onasander (1.8), in a list of qualities required in a general: he must be *aphilargyros* because *aphilargyria* guarantees that the leader will be incorruptible in his management of affairs. After all, many who demonstrate courage are blinded by money. The conclusion is that detachment from money will guarantee the probity of the



bishop in the administration of material goods and probably also in the handling of spiritual things. One cannot be too strict (*dokimasthēsetai kai prōtē*, Onasander, loc. cit.); hence, similarly, *mē aischrokerdē* (Titus 1:7). It is enough to recall that Judas loved money (John 12:6) as did the Pharisees (Luke 16:14, *philargyroi*) and that Simon Magus expected “to gain the gift of God by paying money” (Acts 8:20).

ἀφοράω

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*aphoraō*, to look from a distance, gaze fixedly

→see also ἀποβλέπω

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*aphorao*, S 872; EDNT 1.183; MM 98; L&N 27.6, 30.31; BDF §74(1); BAGD 127

Christians are like athletes who compete together in the arena, where all the believers of the OT cheer them on like “supporters” (Heb 11–12:1). Once the race is begun, the athlete must not allow himself to be distracted by anything. Not only so, but he does not look back (Luke 9:62), nor to left or right, but keeps his attention fixed on the goal, concentrating only on it; and this exclusive attachment is the secret of his endurance and perseverance. Thus Heb 12:2 asks the disciples to “fix their gaze” on Jesus (*aphorōntes eis*).

It does not do justice to this biblical hapax to translate it simply “look at,” especially in a letter where the verbs of seeing and considering are so numerous, so varied, and used with careful attention to their particular nuance. The first meaning of *aphoraō* is “look at from a distance,” so it is very close to *apoblepō* (Heb 11:26): just as Moses fixed his eyes on his reward, the believer under the New Covenant thinks only of the heavenly high priest (3:1, *katanoēō*), to whom every step here below in some way brings him closer (12:22–24, *proselēlythate*). But with the particle *eis*, this verb signals the turning of eyes from different points on the same object, in which one faces it and finally fixes one’s attention on it. Thus people look at a model, a guide or leader, and above all God himself. The multitude of citations having to do with looking to God show that a spiritual attitude is intended – whether in a Jewish or a pagan context – the attitude of every human creature face to face with their Creator and Lord.

This attitude entails first and foremost a selectivity, even exclusivity, in attention, as when, for example, the priests refuse to hear the high priests and prominent persons urging them to offer sacrifices for the emperors. They rely on the large numbers and the assistance of the revolutionaries; above all they

look to the authority of Eleazar. When Josephus says that “each of the victims died gazing resolutely toward the temple” (*War* 5.517; cf. 6.123) or that “the army had its eyes on Titus” (7.67, *eis auton apheōra*), or that “when he had to render judgment, he considered only the truth” (*Ant.* 7.110), it is understood that these contemplatives have turned away from other considerations and focused only on one thing. It is precisely in this sense that believers turn and keep their gaze fixed on their *archēgos*, who “in place of the joy that lay before him endured a cross, despising the shame thereof” (Heb 12:2).

In addition, *aphoraō* means “consider, reflect,” because faith, the evidence of things invisible (Heb 11:1), is a faculty of perception – it “takes in” (verse 3, *noeō*) – but this “observing” is not here purely speculative; *aphoraō* is used for a spectacle that affects the feelings and gives rise to a practical response, notably in the papyri where in its rare occurrences it has the sense of “take into account”: “but if you take into account that they are slandering you” (*ean de aphidēs hoti diaballousi se*, *P.Fouad* 54, 29, from the second century; *P.Oxy.* 1682, 14 from the fourth century); “considering the absolute necessity of this task (= in taking into consideration, *aphorōn to aparaitēton tēs chreias*), bring your zeal to bear ...” (*P.Panop.Beatty* 2, 46; third century). Such is the point of the exhortation in Heb 12:2 – believers, in meditating on the passion of Jesus, find the model for their own conduct, the source of their *hypomonē* (endurance). They have only to follow the *archēgos*. The best parallel is Plutarch’s: “Cato says that in critical circumstances, the senators would turn their eyes toward him (*aphoran ... pros auton*), as the passengers on a ship turn toward the pilot” (*Cat. Mai.* 19.7).

Formed from *bainō*, “stand or lean on,” the NT hapax *bathmos* is an architectural technical term meaning a (raised) threshold of a door or of a temple, a stair step; hence “degree” or “step,” whether of the zodiac or a sundial, of a genealogy (*P.Cair.Masp.* 169, 10, from the sixth century; Dio Chrysostom, 41.6), or of time: “Nature has produced stages of life, like steps, as it were, by which people ascend and descend” (Philo, *Etern. World* 58). Hence, in a metaphorical sense, *bathmos* refers to any step of progress toward a goal, levels of vice or of virtue, a stage along the soul’s journey.

Thus we may approach 1 Tim 3:13, where deacons “who serve well gain an excellent rank, *bathmon heautois kalon*,” a sentence that is something of a *crux interpretum*. It can be understood as saying that deacons, after the fashion of candidates for the *episkopē* (3:1), will not have to be embarrassed at their duties, that they will serve without an inferiority complex; but also that they are in a position to be promoted to a higher level. T. Nägeli, (*Wortschatz*, p. 26) cites an inscription from Mitylene: “kept up to the degrees (*basmoi*) of his rank” (*tois tas axias basmois anelogeise*, *IG*, vol. 2, 243, 16); P. N. Harrison cites the *Sententiae* of Hadrian, where the emperor asks a soldier who wants to join the praetorian guard first of all to prove himself “in political service, and if you become a good soldier, you will be able to pass on to the praetorium as a third *bathmos*.” In any event, the term is used in honorific designations, as seen in the formula used in inscriptions at Sardis and at Side: “*ho lamprotatos komes prōtou bathmou*, vir clarissimus, comes primi ordinis.”

The best context is probably Qumran, where the stages of approach to the various offices and the rules determining precedence and hierarchical order (*sereq*) are so detailed: “the priests shall go first, in order according to their spirit, one after the other. The Levites shall go behind them, and all the people third, in order.” “In accord with his intelligence and the perfection of his conduct, each one shall keep to his place to carry out the service with which he is charged with respect to a more or less extended group of his brothers. Thus shall be recognized in some *a higher dignity than in others*.”

The diaconal *bathmos kalos* seems to derive from the Lord's teaching on the steward faithful in small things, who carries out a lower duty conscientiously and will also be faithful in higher functions. The Master will place him over his whole household and all his goods, and he will entrust to him the government of ten cities, the managing or dispensation of spiritual riches (Luke 7:44f.; 16:10ff.; 19:17). It is at least with this meaning that our text is understood when it is cited by the first Roman ordination ritual (Hippolytus, *Trad. ap.*) and by the ordination ritual of the patriarchate of Antioch (*Const. App.*).

## βαρύς

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**barys, important, serious, burdensome, grave, dangerous**

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**barus**, S 926; TDNT 1.556–558; EDNT 1.199; NIDNTT 1.260–262; MM 104; L&N 22.4, 65.56, 78.23; BAGD 133

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The meaning of this adjective varies according to context and may be either favorable or pejorative. Sometimes it means “worthy, important,” like certain commandments of the law, as opposed to those which are “secondary”; or the letters of Paul, serious, powerful, impressive; sometimes – most often, in fact – the connotations are negative, as with “heavy burdens,” burdensome responsibilities, difficult undertakings, even “grave accusations” (Acts 25:7).

It is in this sense that the scribes and the Pharisees place heavy burdens on people's shoulders (Matt 23:4, *phortia barea*), burdens that are crushing and literally unbearable, after the fashion of sins that weigh on the conscience more than a heavy burden (*hōsei phortion bary ebarynthēsan ep' eme*, Ps 38:4), or of a tax collector who oppresses the taxpayers (*P.Mich.* 529, 28, 35–36; *P.Ant.* 100, 11, *enochlein hymin eti peri toutou moi bary*), or of the “unjust” person who carries very heavy burdens, *pherousa barytata* (Philo, *Husbandry* 20). This constraint is so linked to the person that at times it becomes one with him, as in the case of this man of the second-third century who “wears the yoke of Judaism” (*houtos pherōn Ioudaikōn phortion*, *C.Pap.Jud.* 519, 18; cf. *t. Ber.* 2.7).

Jesus stated that his yoke is easy and his burden light (Matt 11:30), and 1 John 5:3 repeats: “his commands are not *bareiai* (*hai entolai autou bareiai ouk eisin*).” This can be understood as meaning that his precepts are not crushing or oppressive, or that they are not difficult to carry out. The best commentary is Philo's: “God doesn't ask anything burdensome, complicated, or difficult, but something that is simple and easy: to love him as benefactor, or at least fear

him as master and lord.” It seems that this is a traditional description of laws or commands: “the precepts are neither excessive nor too burdensome (*ou hyperonkoi kai baryterai*) for the abilities of those who conform to them” (Philo, *Rewards* 80). More precisely, it is the ideal voiced by Israelite and pagan rulers, but too often contradicted by actual deeds. The assembly of Israel at Shechem stated to Rehoboam: “Your father made our yoke heavy (*ebarynen*); but now you should lighten the harsh servitude of your father and the heavy yoke that he placed on us.” The Gadarenes denounced Herod, whose orders were too severe and tyrannical. Pharaoh published ordinances that made demands beyond the abilities of the Jews (Philo, *Moses* 1.37), just as Tarquin had “become hateful and unbearable to the people.” But Vespasian forbids burdening the provinces (*IGLS*, 1998, 12, *barynesthai*), and Tiberius Julius Alexander refuses to “weigh down Egypt with new and unjust burdens” (*SB* 8444, 5, *barynomenēn kainais kai adikois eispraxesi*). If the “weight of business” rests on rulers, they acquit themselves honorably when they do not impose overly heavy burdens on their subjects (Acts 15:28; 1 Thess 2:7; Rev 2:24).

When St. Paul preaches to the Ephesian elders, “Grievous wolves (*lykoi bareis*, literally heavy wolves) will enter in among you and will not spare the flock,” he depicts the heretic as a fierce and ravenous animal, a type of the tyrants who exploit the people in Ezek 22:27; Wis 3:3; Prov 28:15 (bear in the Hebrew). Jesus had called them *lykoi harpages* (Matt 7:15; cf. John 10:12) that ravage the flock; the same modifier is used of the wolves in Gen 49:27, Ezek 22:27, corresponding to the Hebrew *tārap*, “tear to pieces”: Benjamin is a wolf who tears up his prey, but no parallel is known to the “heavy wolf,” which evokes the ideas of violence and of irritation, and which could just as well be translated “dangerous, formidable, voracious, ferocious, rapacious, or cruel.”

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βασιλεία, βασιλείος, βασιλεύς, βασιλεύω, βασιλικός, βασίλισσα  
*basileia*, **kingdom, reign**; *basileios*, **royal**; *basileus*, **king**; *basileuō*, **to be king, rule, reign**; *basilikos*, **royal**; *basilissa*, **queen**

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*basileia*, S 932; *TDNT* 1.564–593; *EDNT* 1.201–205; *NIDNTT* 2.372–382, 386–388; MM 104; L&N 1.82, 11.13, 37.64, 37.65, 37.105; BDF §163; BAGD 134–135 | *basileios*, S 934; *TDNT* 1.564–593; *EDNT* 1.205; *NIDNTT* 2.372–373; MM 104; L&N 37.69; BDF §50; BAGD 136 | *basileus*, S 935; *TDNT* 1.564–593; *EDNT* 1.205–208; *NIDNTT* 1.372–373, 377–378, 389; MM 104–105; L&N 37.67; BDF §§46(2), 146(3), 147(3); BAGD 136 | *basileuo*, S 936; *TDNT* 1.564–593; *EDNT* 1.207–208; *NIDNTT* 2.372–373, 377–378, 380–381;

MM 105; L&N 37.22, 37.64; BDF §§177, 234(5), 309(1); BAGD 136 | *basilikos*, S 937; TDNT 1.564–593; EDNT 1.208; NIDNTT 3.372–373; MM 105; L&N 37.69; BAGD 136 | *basilissa*, S 938; TDNT 1.564–593; EDNT 1.208; NIDNTT 2.372–373, 381; MM 105; L&N 37.68; BDF §§34(1), 111(1); BAGD 137

In every language, a “king” is a head of state, a sovereign, a monarch; by extension, a head or representative of a group, one who reigns or presides at an event. A “kingdom” is the land or state governed by a king, and by extension a collective or persons or things ruled by a common principle (cf. the animal kingdom, the plant kingdom). “Reign” is the exercise of royal power, domination, either absolute personal power or dominating influence.

From Homer on, the ideal king fears the gods and lives justly (Homer, *Od.* 19.109); his power and honor come from Zeus, who is kindly disposed toward him (*Il.* 2.196; cf. Hesiod, *Th.* 80–101; 886; Dittenberger, *Syl.* 1014, 110: *Dios basileōs*). In the classical period, Aristotle distinguishes five types of government (*archē*, *Pol.* 3.14.1284.): (1) Spartan monarchy, law-based (Plato, *Leg.* 3.691 d–692 b) but not entirely sovereign (*ouk esti de kyria pantōn*). (2) Barbarian monarchy, especially in Asia Minor, is law-based and hereditary, and thus stable, but despotic and quite close to tyranny, because it favors the sovereign and does not have the consent of the subjects, as with Hieron of Syracuse (Pindar, *Ol.* 1.23; *Pyth.* 3.70, 85); it is a perversion of monarchy (Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 8.12.1160). (3) Elective tyranny, as it existed among the ancient Greeks, was called *aisymnēteia*; *aisymnētai* were lawmakers chosen (for a given term or for life) to put an end to civil discord and given extensive powers; such was Pittacus, one of the Seven Sages (Plato, *Hp. Ma.* 281 c; *Prt.* 343 a; *Resp.* 1.335 e; *P.Oxy.* 2506, frag 77). (4) The monarchy of the heroic age, the period of Heracles and Priam, was based on general consent and heredity but regulated by law. The founders of the dynasty were benefactors of the people; their descendants inherited their power, led military operations, judged lawsuits, and presided over sacrifices that were not reserved for the priests. (5) Finally, there was absolute monarchy, under which “one person has authority over everything,” as in the domestic government, which is a kind of household monarchy (cf. *Rh.* 1.8.1365.). But it is more advantageous to be governed by the best laws than by the best person (cf. democracy).

During the Hellenistic period, Xenophon mentions the identification of the good shepherd and the good king (*Cyr.* 8.2.14), which is emphasized by Philo and many others. They are only repeating the image of the shepherd-king from the Code of Hammurabi and the designation of the sovereign as shepherd in Akkadian (*ré'u*) and in Sumerian (*sipa*), a royal and divine title in Egypt and in

the Mediterranean world. Hence the abundant literature on the good king, beginning with the edicts of Asoka in third-century BC India (“king, friend of the gods, with a friendly look”), the Stoics Zeno, Cleanthes, Sphaerus, and Perseus, who wrote treatises *Peri basileias*, and also Diotogenes, Ecphantus, and Sthenidas, whose fragments are preserved in the *Florilegium* of Stobaeus. Two main themes are expounded: monarchy is an institution of divine law, and the king is an image of God’s rule over the world. The king conforms to God, and the subjects imitate the king.

The papyri and the inscriptions exalt the title of *basileus* adopted around 334 by Alexander the Great (*I.Priene* I, 1) and preserved in the Antiochian and Egyptian monarchies. Antiochus I of Commagene was called “great king Antiochus the just god” (*basileos megas Antiochos theos dikaios*, *IGLS* I, 1–2) and even “king of kings” (*basileus basileōn* III, 12–13; cf. A. Deissmann, *Light*, pp. 356, 363ff.). Not only is a king called “great” (*P.Oxy.* 2554, col. I, 13: *ho basileus megas*) but also “very great” (*P.Fouad* 16, 10: *hyper tou megistou basileōs*; *BGU* 1816, 23), “eternal” (*PSI* 1314, 17), “most pious” (*P.Oxy.* 2267, 9), the “divinized”; oaths are sworn by him (*BGU* 1735–1740); furthermore, Zeus is venerated as *basileus*. So the friendship of kings is a grounds for pride, and those who seek justice resort to them (*P.Yale* 46, col. I, 19; *P.Mert.* 5, 4; *P.Sorb.* 13, 1). It is the king who hears suits (*P.Yale* 42, 30) and gives verdicts (*C.Ord.Ptol.* 21, 14). He commands, and his *prostagma*ta are “edicts.” If he is enriched by the collection of taxes, he is also a benefactor who gives generously. In return, places of prayer, an altar, a front hall in a temple, etc. are dedicated to him.

*Basilissa* is a title of the goddess Isis (E. Bernand, *Fayoum*, n. 167, 3; 169, 6), but it is the ordinary term for the wife of a reigning sovereign. She is described as *kyria* (*SB* 7746, 33: *hyper tēs kyrias basilissēs*; 7944, 3), as a priestess (ibid. 8035 a 5–6: *hiereias basilissēs Kleopatras theas*; 10763, 3; *hierateuousēs basilissēs*), and as a goddess (*tē thea basilissē*, ibid. 6033, 2; 6156, 3; 6157, 1). Oaths are sworn by her as by the king (ibid. 6261, 13, *P.Sorb.* 32, 6; *P.Eleph.* 23, 10), and Antiochus III orders that worship be offered to “our sister, Queen Laodice.”

It is common practice for a document to be dated by the year of the reign of the sovereign or “under the reign of” (*C.Ord.Ptol.* 9, 1), usually with the present participle of the verb *basileuō*, for example: “the twentieth year of Ptolemy’s reign.” But there is also the figurative statement that Nemesis became queen or began to reign over the world (*basileuousa tou kosmou*).

*Basileia* is sometimes “kingdom,” sometimes “reign,” “government” (“having received from his father the rule over Egypt and Libya,” *paralabōn para tou patros tēn basileian Aigyptou kai Libyēs*, *SB* 8545, A 6; cf. 6003, 14;

8232, 3; 8858, 6; *P.Oxy.* 2899, 3; 2903, 7), sometimes described as “very happy.” Βασιλεία (as our word is accented, with an acute on the penult) should not be confused with βασιλεια (accent on the antepenult).

The adjective *basileios*, “royal” (Wis 5:16), is rather rare, *basilikos* on the other hand is extremely common, used especially with reference to the land belonging to the Lagids (*basilikē gē*), leased out to renters (*P.Rev.*, col. 26, 13; 33, 9–18), cultivated by royal farmers (*basilikos geōrgos*); hence the “royal grain” (*P.Sorb.* 17 a 7, b 8) and the royal linens (*P.Rein.* 120, 3; 121, 3); *othonia* were a royal monopoly. Everything pertaining to the sovereign was modified by this adjective, notably the royal clerk or scribe (*basilikos grammateus*), who collaborated with the *stratēgos* and was an important official in the financial administration; the royal law (*nomos basilikos*, Jas 2:8), enacted by the sovereign; the oath by the king (*basilikos horkos*, *P.Ryl.* 572, 55; 585, 43; *P.Lond.* 2188, 145; *C.Ord.Ptol.* 21, 23); the royal treasury (*to basilikon*, *P.Yale* 57, 13; *P.Lille* 14, 6–7; *C.Ord.Ptol.* 71, 10), made up of the revenues of the royal domains and taxes; or the royal stores, a grain warehouse (*P.Cair.Zen.* 59015); the royal bank or banker (*trapeza, trapezitēs basilikē*) that receives all the money due the treasury. Finally, there is the praise implied in the designation of a person as *basilikōtatos*.

The OT uses *melek* for king. The primitive meaning of this root is “to deliberate,” then “to decide”: the king is the one who governs, who wields supreme power. The first mention of a king is religious: “Yahweh is King.” After the crossing of the Red Sea, Moses and the Israelites sing a victory chant: “He is King, Lord forever and ever.” This is not a reference to some monarchical government, but rather to the exercise of absolute power to protect and guide the chosen people (Mic 2:13; Ps 74:12); thus Yahweh is King of Israel. Gideon proclaimed “It is the Lord that should be your sovereign” (Judg 8:23), meaning that Israel is the domain or kingdom over which God reigns and in the midst of which he resides (Ps 59:14), Zion being the “city of the great King” (Ps 48:3). As the object of the psalmists’ faith, adoration, and supplication, God is called “my King and my God” (Ps 5:2; 44:5; 68:25; 84:4; 145:1), “my Lord, our King” (Add Esth 14:3). The transcendence of this royalty is elaborated over the centuries. Yahweh is an *eternal* king, “for ever and ever,” whose universal reign will have no end (Ps 66:7; 102:13; Dan 6:27). God is also called King of heaven and of ages (Deut 9:26, LXX; Tob 13:7; 14:15). He is clothed in majesty (Ps 93:1), the King of glory (Ps 24:7, 10; 1 Chr 29:11), sitting enthroned amid a court (Ps 29:10; 93:2; 103:19); so he alone is king (2 Macc 1:24–25), King of kings (Dan 4:34), above all the gods (Ps 95:3–4) and king of the nations, which he rules (Jer 10:7; Ps 22:29; Pss 96 – 98). He directs the history of the world (Ps 33:13) because “all things are in his power” (Add



Esth 13:9, 15; Ps 48:3 ff.). As Lord of heaven and earth, he is “King of all things” (Tob 10:13, **8**). In his special role as King of the chosen people, whom he rewards for their faithfulness, Yahweh has an eschatological kingdom: “The Lord will reign over them forever and ever” (Wis 3:8); “the King of the world will resurrect us to a new life.” We can see how the proclamation of this reign would cause the earth to rejoice (Ps 97:1) and how Rabbi Yochanan said “any blessing that is not contained in the kingdom is no real blessing” (*b. Ber.* 12a).

As for human royalty in Israel, certain texts that present it as the product of agitation by the people are unfavorable toward it (1 Sam 8:1–22; 10:18–25; 12:15); but others that attribute the initiative to God are favorable. In any event, this monarchy has a religious character. First of all, the king is enthroned in the sanctuary, where he is anointed (Ps 89:21, 39, 40); this anointing is the essential rite of coronation. Next, at the royal palace, where he is given the kingly insignia, he is acclaimed and the ranking officials pay him homage. From there the messengers depart, the “evangelists of joy” who carry the news of the investiture into the countryside, where “the earth resounds with their shouts” (1 Kgs 1:40). The Israelite king is essentially a proxy and representative of God, chosen by God to be his people’s leader and his own earthly assistant, the mediator of his gifts (2 Sam 16:18; 2 Chr 13:8). Obviously, the king must remain dependent on and obedient to God, not becoming puffed up with pride over his brothers (Deut 17:20). He carries out justice (Jer 22:16). He needs his subjects’ prayers (Ps 72:15), but he puts all his trust in Yahweh, who grants him his favor (Ps 21:8).

The NT mentions “the kings of the earth” (*hoi basileis tēs gēs*) and “kings of the nations” (*hoi basileis tōn ethnōn*, Luke 22:25), who hold sway over their peoples and govern them. It is commanded to honor them (1 Pet 2:17), to obey them as sovereigns (2:13), and to pray for them and for all who hold authority, for this authority is from God (John 19:11; Rom 13:1). The only true God is acclaimed late as “King of the ages, incorruptible, invisible,” and in a doxology as “the blessed God ... King of those who reign and Lord of those who have sovereignty.” On the other hand, Jesus at his birth is described by the magi as “King of the Jews” (Matt 2:2; cf. 27:11), that is, as Messiah. Nathaniel confesses him as “King of Israel” (John 1:49). After the miracle of the multiplication of the loaves, the crowd wanted “to take him and make him king” (John 6:15), and he was acclaimed as such on the occasion of his messianic entry at Jerusalem: “Your king comes to you” (Matt 21:5; Luke 19:38; John 12:13 = Zech 9:9). In the course of his trial before Pilate, Christ, accused of being King of the Jews, admits “I am a king” (John 18:37), but he adds that his kingdom is not of this world. In fact, he will appear as a glorious king at his Parousia (Matt 25:34), “Lord of lords and King of kings” (Rev

17:14; 19:16). This is the belief of the primitive church, since at Thessalonica the Jews accuse the Christians of contravening “Caesar’s edicts by saying that there is another king, Jesus” (Acts 17:7).

The expression “kingdom of God” (*basileia tou theou*) appears more than 130 times in the NT, and in a new way, especially in Matthew (50 times), whose theology as a whole is summed up by the phrase. It is relatively rare in the Pauline epistles, where it is very close to the concept of justification; this evolution already suggests the variety of meaning of the formula. Jesus begins his preaching with these words: “The time is fulfilled (*plēroō*) and the reign of God has drawn near (*ēngiken*); repent and believe the gospel” (Mark 1:15). As the first phrase of this saying indicates, the proximity is temporal; but inasmuch as this reign comes in the person and the ministry of Jesus, the proximity is also spatial (cf. *P.Oxy.* 1202, 8; *P.Gen* 74, 17; *P.Thead.* 17, 12) and we may also translate it as “is coming.” Since the verb is in the perfect indicative, it means an extreme closeness, immediate imminence (J. Schlosser), even a presence (“It is here”), because the moment of this coming as at the actual beginning of the ministry of Jesus. The reign of God has thus indeed come at this point. This is confirmed by Luke 11:20; Matt 12:28, where the Lord concludes, “If I cast out demons by the finger of God, then the reign of God has come” (*ephthasen*). The verb *phthanō*, which means “come before, precede” in classical Greek (cf. again 1 Thess 4:15), in the Koine has the sense “arrive, come upon”; here, given the aorist tense and the context, it can mean only the actualization of a past fact whose consequences may be observed; “it expresses not proximity, however great, but effective contact, a presence that has become a reality,” or better, a continued present. This curious link between coming, being close, and being present occurs in John 4:23; 5:25 – “The hour is coming and now is.” Finally, the *basileia entos hymōn estin* (Luke 17:20–21), which can be taken either as “among you, in your midst,” meaning that the reign of God is present in Israel; or “in you,” meaning in each person who acts spiritually.

In any event, the reign is progressive and dynamic, like seed sown and growing on its own (Mark 4:26), or a mustard seed that becomes a large tree (Mark 4:30–32; Matt 13:31–32; Luke 13:18–19), or again leavening whose action is mysterious and independent of human action (Matt 13:33). It is given as a demonstration of the Father’s love (*eudokēsen*); and Jesus’ disciples are taught to pray that this reign, already inaugurated by him, might “come” to its full, universal blossoming; it then becomes the kingdom of God on earth, a place that one *enters* to take possession of it (*eiserchesthai*, Matt 5:20; 7:21; 18:3; 19:23; 23:13). It is prepared from the creation (25:34), people are called to it (22:10), as to a wedding feast.

It is each person's responsibility to respond to the invitation, to prepare, like the wise virgins (Matt 25:1–13); for “not everyone who says ‘Lord, Lord’ will enter into the kingdom of heaven” (Matt 7:21; Luke 6:46). A person does not enter the kingdom, does not receive the gospel, without having a little child's qualities of openness and receptivity, without being poor in spirit, that is, aware of one's poverty. These requirements are otherwise expressed as not looking back (Luke 9:62), as renunciation (Mark 9:43–47; Luke 18:29) – just as a person sells everything in order to purchase a pearl or gain possession of a treasure (Matt 13:44–46) – as becoming a eunuch if need be, as doing oneself violence and forcing one's way (Luke 16:16; Matt 11:12–13). In essence, this amounts to being converted and believing (Mark 1:15), possessing a higher righteousness than that of the Pharisees (Matt 5:20; 6:25–33), that is, practicing brotherly love (Matt 18:23–25; cf. Jas 2:5) and being born from above (John 3:3, 5). In a word, it is not enough to wait expectantly for the reign or the kingdom; a total giving of oneself to the divine sovereign is required.

As a wheat field also has tares, so the kingdom of God on earth is composed of good and bad persons (Matt 13:24–30, 36–43, 47–50) and there is a hierarchy in its membership. Because of the excellence of the new dispensation, “the one who is least in the kingdom of God is greater than John the Baptist” (Luke 7:28; Matt 11:11). Publicans and prostitutes precede, enter ahead of (*proagousin*) the heirs of the old covenant. There are the small and the great (Matt 5:19–20). The keys of the kingdom are entrusted to Peter (Matt 16:17), the apostles are taught the mysteries of the *basileia* that they must proclaim to all the world (Matt 10:6–8; 24:14), but the scribes and Pharisees shut up the way into these mysteries (Luke 11:52; Matt 23:13).

This reign of God, this kingdom of Christ, a place of blessedness (Luke 14:15), is also eschatological and will have no end (Luke 1:33), is an unshakable kingdom (Heb 12:28), paradise (Luke 23:42), or heavenly glory (Matt 20:21; Mark 10:37). Inaugurated by the resurrection of Jesus, this life in the kingdom is comparable to an eternal banquet where guests beyond number from East and West (Matt 13:11) celebrate at Christ's table.

According to Acts 1:3 (cf. 1:6) Jesus discussed the reign of God with his apostles between the resurrection and the ascension, and this kingdom is also the theme of Philip's preaching (8:12) and of Paul's (19:8; 20:25; 28:23, 31). The latter points out that “it is through many tribulations that we must enter the kingdom of God.” His epistles add nothing to the Synoptic theology, but they insist forcefully on the holiness of the members of the *basileia*, which cannot be inherited by the unjust. A person must be worthy of this reward (2 Thess 1:5), even though it is absolutely certain (2 Pet 1:11). The emphasis is on the eschatological royalty of Christ (1 Cor 15:24–25; 1 Tim 4:1) as well as on the

power of the reign of God. Hence the acclamations in Revelation. Not only is Christ the “ruler of the kings of the earth” (Rev 1:5), and not only is he thanked for becoming king (11:17), but “he has made of us a kingdom, priests for God his Father” (1:6; 5:10), and his own “will reign as kings forever” (22:5; cf. 1:9). “The reign of our Lord and of his Christ has been established over the world, and he will reign forever and ever.”

*Basileuō, basileios.* – The verb *basileuō*, “be king, reign” (Matt 2:22) has no special meaning in the NT, but it can have the nuance “become king, begin to reign” and is used especially for Christ (Luke 1:33; 14:14, 27) and his victorious domination over his enemies (1 Cor 15:25); for God (Rev 11:15); and for Christians (Rev 5:10; 20:4, 6).

As an adjective in the singular, *basileios* describes the “royal priesthood,” but used as a substantive in the plural, it refers to a royal palace (Luke 7:25), beginning in Herodotus: Croesus lodges Solon *en toisi basilēioisi*. The adjective *basilikos*, much commoner in secular Greek, is applied to an official in the court of Antipas. The description “royal officer” (John 4:46, 49; D and several manuscripts have *basiliskos*) suggests that this is a ranking dignitary (cf. Plutarch, *Sol.* 27.3; Josephus, *Life* 149), as the Old Latin and the Vulgate interpret it (*regulus*, a king of a small country or person of royal blood). In Acts 12:20 – “the land drew its subsistence from the king’s land” (*apo tēs basilikēs*). An interesting usage is in Jas 2:8, which describes the precept concerning loving one’s neighbor as the “royal law”; Jesus had called this the “great commandment” (*entolē megalē*, Matt 22:36). The expression is already used in Xenophon, *Oec.* 14.7 (*basilikoi nomoi* = laws enacted by the king) and Ps.-Plato, *Min.* 317 (*nomos esti basilikos* = all that is correct is royal law, i.e., is worthy of a statesman), but Philo is the one who gives it its theological elaboration: “the king is a living law” (*ton basilea nomon empsychon*, *Moses* 2.4); “piety is the queen of virtues” (*tē basilidi tōn aretōn*, *Spec. Laws* 4.147); “the sky is the king of the sensible realm ... astronomy is the queen of the sciences” (*Prelim. Stud.* 50); the “royal road” is the way of perfection, of the word of God (*Post. Cain* 101–102; *Giants* 64; *Unchang. God* 144–145; 159–160; cf. Num 20:17), leading to the truth (*Migr. Abr.* 146). Consequently, if *basilikē* refers to all that comes from the king (Josephus, *Ant.* 9.25), belongs to him, and concerns him (Philo, *Flight* 95, 100, 103; *Dreams* 1.163; *Moses* 2.99), then the “royal law” in Jas 2:8 will mean a precept enunciated by God (Josephus, *Ant.* 11.130) and imposing an absolute obligation. But we might also interpret it as prescribing the highest virtue, *agapē*, the queen of all the others, or even as being addressed to the members, the heirs, of the kingdom of God. Finally, we cannot rule out a connotation of excellence; “royal,” a synonym of “august,” is an excellent description of the king of commandments!

## βασκαίνω

*baskainō*, to bewitch, cast a spell, regard enviously

→see also φθόνος

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*baskaino*, S 940; TDNT 1.594–595; EDNT 1.208; NIDNTT 2.552, 559; MM 106; L&N 53.98, 88.159; BDF §§72, 152(1); BAGD 137

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Paul's exclamation to the Galatians is not easy to translate: "O foolish Galatians! Who has bewitched you (*tis hymas ebaskanen*), before whose eyes Jesus Christ was portrayed crucified?" An NT hapax, the verb *baskainō* is a denominative formed from *baskanos*, "one who casts a spell"; a *baskania* is an evil spell, and the verb, meaning "cast a spell, wish evil, speak ill of," "emphasizes the magical value of the group, which relates properly to an evil spell." Hence the modern translations: "Who has bewitched you, cast a spell on you?" But doesn't this notion of a verbal incantation overplay the metaphorical sense of the word? – for surely the sense is metaphorical here. The best approach is to take into account the actual usage of this verb, which is unknown in the papyri.

*Baskainō* (and related words) is constantly associated with *phthoneō*, "to envy" (cf. Gal 5:26). Callimachus wrote this as his own epitaph: "He sang louder songs than Envy" (*Epigr.* 21), and Stobaeus collected fifty-nine sayings *peri phthonou*, of which the fifty-second goes "They were exceeding *baskanos* and *phthoneros*." In the LXX, in times of famine, "a man will have an evil eye toward (that is, will look askance at, will envy, *sphodra baskanei*, Hebrew *rā' a*) his brother, the wife of his bosom, his children" (Deut 28:54), and even his wife will jealously spy on her husband and her children (28:56). Moreover, if the miser does not profit from his property, the envious person never has enough and is consumed with the desire to have more, "is grudging to himself" (Sir 14:6). In his insatiability, he commits the grossest injustices to increase his wealth: "The person with the jealous eye is evil" (*ponēros ho baskainōn ophthalmō*, Sir 14:8). This same psychology is evoked by Philo: adversaries, who ought naturally to be jealous of the conqueror, feel no envy toward him" (*baskainein, mē phthoneisthai*, *Husbandry* 112); "he always looks at happy people with an evil eye (*baskainōn*)." This is also in the vocabulary of Josephus: "Daniel was envied (*ephtonēthē*) because people are jealous (*baskainousi*) of those who are more honored than they themselves by the king" (*Ant.* 10.250; 257); "people made jealous by my fortune invented accusations against me" (*Life* 425); "to remove from those envious of us the last pretext for chicanery" (*Ag. Apion* 1.72). This meaning of *baskainō*, "look at with an evil eye, be envious of," fits with Demosthenes, *C. Lept.* 20.24: "If the possessor of

a great fortune did not acquire it at your expense, then there is no room for regarding him with hostility (*baskainein*).”

This envious regard is often considered harmful and injurious; it is described as “the evil eye” and is connected with the magical notion of the casting of an evil spell: “I do not wish to seem to cast an evil spell on (*baskainein en*) the general prosperity” (Lucian, *Nav.* 17; cf. *Philops.* 35). A lead bracelet bears the inscription “Spell-caster begone” (*exō baskanos*); “May Envy and the Evil Eye be far from this happy art.” The influence of this *oculus invidiosus*, the symbol of *baskania*, was even attributed to demons, for example, to the she-devil *Baskosyne*. Plutarch, in *Quaestionum convivialum*, tries to explain how “a look can do harm, even though the causal link is difficult to grasp” (680 f); he uses the terms “effluence,” “emanation,” “current,” “fascination.” Heliodorus draws on this: in the course of a procession, Charicleia “attracted the evil eye (*ophthalmon tina baskanon*). ‘You also, like the rabble, believe in the bewitching power of the eyes (*baskanian*).’ ‘Yes; I say nothing is more real’ ” (*Aeth.* 3.7.2); “the sickness comes from envy (*ho phthonos*), which is properly called bewitchment (*baskanian*)” (3.7.3; cf. 3.19.2; 4.5.4).

It was difficult to escape the evil eye (Stobaeus 3.38.10), especially when its fascination was worked on the eye of the person to whom harm was wished. Magicians, however, used incantations, talismans, and especially amulets for protection against this sort of influence; “their strange appearance distracts the gaze of the *baskanos* and thus keeps him from fixating on his victim.” The epistolary papyri constantly use *abaskantos* with respect to the health of humans, especially children, and even of horses (*O.Florida* 15, 2; 17, 4; *SB* 1022, 6). The writer prays for the health of the recipient and for his preservation from the evil eye.

In view of these data, it seems best to translate *tis hymas ebaskanen* “Who put a spell on you?” meaning “Who beclouded your mind?” The Galatians have lost their minds (*anoētoi*); it is not as if they had made some easily explainable mistake in a secular matter, but rather as if their freedom has been put in bondage by the mysterious maneuverings of parties unknown (*tis?*) – *baskania* is often personified (*SEG* XV, 853, 6) – behind whom the working of the devil may be detected; by the jealousy (*phthonō diabolou*) whereby death entered into the world. This would mean Paul’s enemies in Galatia, moved by envy, like those Roman preachers who sought to ruin the apostle’s authority and prestige by taking advantage of the powerlessness to which he was reduced by his captivity. They acted *dia phthonon kai erin*, through envious, partisan malice. These jealous folk must have somehow cast an evil eye on Christians, even though they had the wherewithal to conjure against this seduction: “You,

before whose eyes Jesus Christ was portrayed crucified.” Keeping the eyes fixed on the Crucified One would have been the antidote par excellence.

## βατταλογέω

*battalogeō*, **to babble**

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*battalogo*, S 945; TDNT 1.597; EDNT 1.209; MM 107; L&N 33.88, 33.89; BDF §40; BAGD 137

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Before teaching his disciples the Our Father, our Lord instructed them: “In your prayers, do not babble as the gentiles do, for they think that by using many words they will make themselves heard.” This advice seems to recall Eccl 5:1, “Do not be hasty to speak in God’s presence ... let your words be few,” and Sir 7:14 – “do not repeat words in your prayer”; but no sure etymology can be given for *battalogeō*. A. Schlatter, pointing out that *legō* can mean “gather, collect” (cf. *poēlogeō*, *blastologeō*, *botanologeō*, *krithologeō*) and that *batos* (Syriac *bata*) means “bramble,” relies on Philo (*Alleg. Interp.* 3.253; *Dreams* 2.161; cf. *Moses* 1.65) to arrive at the forced sense of “give oneself over to painful and sterile work.” Furthermore, most modern scholars see in this verb a hybrid of the Aramaic *battalta* and the Greek *logos* (in a pejorative sense, cf. *spermologos*, *koprologos*, *sykologeō*) and draw support from the Palestinian Syriac and Sinaitic Syriac versions, “do not be saying (mouthing) *battalata* = vain things.” So what is in view is verbiage or constant repetition, as verse 8 specifies – “They think that their prayer will be answered thanks to their torrent of words.” Quality matters more than quantity; but above all verbosity and prattling are here denounced. Moulton-Milligan (on this word) cite the nickname given Demosthenes (*battalos*, pouring out torrents of words). *Battalogia* would then be “logorrhea, an endless torrent of prayers and litanies,” which reminds us of the *prophasei makra proseuchomenoi* (making long prayers for show) of the scribes (Mark 12:40). It is not the length of the prayer in terms of time that is denounced, because Jesus spent whole nights in prayer and tarried in prayer (Luke 6:12; 22:14) and his church persevered in prayer (Acts 1:14; 12:5; 1 Tim 5:5; etc.), but abuse and redundancy and canned formulas, in which the cry of the heart becomes mere words.

Liddell-Scott-Jones (*Lexicon*) and M. J. Lagrange (*Evangelie selon saint Matthieu*, 3 d ed., Paris, 1927) prefer to see this word as onomatopoeic, like *battarizō* (stammer); which should be compared to the “muddling up” of tongues at Babel (Gen 11:7–9), the “babbling” of Isaiah, and the “gurgling” water of Ezek 47:2. By way of an example of the meaningless litanies, cf. the

magical incantation of the third century, to which we might compare our *abracadabra*: “Demon, whoever you are, I adjure you by the god Sabarbarbathioth, Sabarbarbathiouth, Sabarbarbathioneth, Sabarbarbaphai ...,” or “the secret name Thoathoethathoouthaethousthioaithithethointho.” Whether we are talking about unintelligible muttering and stammering or of prattling on unreflectively, the play on words and the results are similar (cf. Herodotus 7.35: “to speak *barbara* and recklessly,” *legein barbara te kai atasthala*). “We should see this as a useless spate of words such as that produced by uncultivated people telling their business to lawyers ... a reference to the eloquence expended by the pagans to persuade the gods” (M. J. Lagrange) and to “tire them out,” as the Latins said.

The followers of Jesus Christ have only to say “Our Father” to be heard.

βέβαιος, βεβαιόω, βεβαίωσις

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*bebaios*, **solid, durable, sure, valid, guaranteed**; *bebaioō*, **to make sure, confirm, authenticate, guarantee, carry out**; *bebaiōsis*, **firmness, juridical definiteness**

→see also ἀσφάλεια

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*bebaios*, S 949; TDNT 1.600–603; EDNT 1.210–211; NIDNTT 1.658–660; MM 107; L&N 28.43, 31.90, 71.15; BDF §59(2); BAGD 138 | *bebaioo*, S 950; TDNT 1.600–603; EDNT 1.210–211; NIDNTT 1.658–659; MM 108; L&N 28.44, 31.91; BAGD 138 | *bebaiosis*, S 951; TDNT 1.600–603; EDNT 1.210–211; NIDNTT 1.658–659; MM 108; L&N 28.44; BAGD 138

*Bebaios* – “that on which one can walk,” hence “solid, firm, durable” and finally “sure, certain” – often modifies *logos*: an utterance that is well-founded, authorized, and thus convincing. This firmness-solidity implies immutability when the topic is a promise, an institution, or the word of God. Thus we arrive at the legal meaning, “valid” and even “guaranteed,” copiously attested in the papyri and the inscriptions for *bebaios*, the denominative verb *bebaioō*, and *bebaiōsis*. It is in this strong sense that we should understand Rom 4:16: *bebaian tēn epangelian*; the divine promise is not only firm and immutable, not only assured for all posterity, but it is guaranteed to them. Similarly, in Mark 16:20 – *ton logon bebaiontos* – the Lord does more than confirm the word of the apostles by the miracles that accompany him; he also authenticates and guarantees it. Inasmuch as the law of Moses was promulgated by angels, this “word” is valid and authentically divine (*logos bebaios*, Heb 2:2). At the transfiguration, the appearance of Moses and Elijah evokes the messianic



prophecies of the OT; these prophecies become more sure, their veracity is guaranteed by the transfiguration of Jesus (*bebaioterōn ... logon*, 2 Pet 1:19).

It is indeed legal language that is used in Heb 9:17, an exceptional scriptural use of the word *diathēkē* in the sense of a will, in order to express our ability to inherit these heavenly goods: it was necessary for Christ, the only Son and heir of God, to die so that we might gain possession of his inheritance; *diathēkē epi nekrois bebaia*, a provision of a will is not valid, has no legal force (*ischuei*) and cannot become operative, until after the demise of the testator.

As for the verb *bebaioō*, it can mean “carry out, realize,” and it is in this sense that we should take Rom 15:8, *eis to bebaiōsai tas epangelias*: Christ “demonstrated God’s truthfulness by carrying out the promises made to the fathers”; Heb 2:3 – “The salvation that was announced by the Lord ... was confirmed to us by those who heard him.”

When Heb 6:16 appeals to the oath as the juridical proof that nullifies any dispute between adversaries – *eis bebaiōsin ho horkos* – the sense of *eis bebaiōsin* is “definitive, without opposition, with no reconsideration or challenge possible,” recalling Lev 25:23, where once Yahweh has affirmed that the Holy Land belongs to him “the land shall not be sold *eis bebaiōsin*” (Hebrew *lišmitut*); God remains the owner, so the ceding of absolute ownership is forbidden.

Finally, the moral applications of the words of this group are frequent, usually in the sense of firmness, fixity, solidity (1 Cor 1:8; 2 Cor 1:21; Heb 3:14; 13:9; 2 Pet 1:10), notably with respect to faith or hope that is well founded and solidly attached, like an anchor in the heavenly holy of holies: *asphalē te kai bebaian*.

## βέβηλος, βεβηλόω

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*bebēlos*, accessible, profane, impure, impious; *bebēloō*, to profane, besmirch

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*bebelos*, S 952; TDNT 1.604–605; EDNT 1.211; MM 108; L&N 88.115; BAGD 138 | *bebeloo*, S 953; TDNT 1.605; EDNT 1.21; L&N 53.33; BAGD 138

Derived from *bainō*, “go, come,” the adjective *bebēlos*, “accessible, profane,” unknown in the papyri, is the opposite of *abatos*, *hieros*, *hagnos*, “inaccessible, sacred,” and is used for places that are not consecrated, where it is permitted to set foot; hence, accessible to everybody (cf. Philo, *Alleg. Interp.* 1.62; Josephus, *Ant.* 3.181; *War* 4.182; Thucydides 4.97.3). The exact equivalent would be “profane” (*pro-fano*): that which is opposite or outside of the sacred. When

used of persons it means “uninitiated, profane, impure” and takes on a moral value (Philo, *Sacr. Abel and Cain* 138).

In the language of the Bible, it is highly pejorative (Ezek 21:30 – *bebēle anome!*, profane and lawless one); and it is often associated with *anosios* (unholy, 1 Tim 1:9; 3 Macc 2:2), with  *pornos* (sexually impure, Heb 12:6), *anieros* (unholy, Philo, *Sacr. Abel and Cain* 138; *Spec. Laws* 4.40); *akathartos* (unclean, *Spec. Laws* 1.150), *amyētos* (uninitiated, Plutarch, *De def. or.* 16). It takes on a technical meaning: the profane is opposed to the sacred as the impure to the pure. The verb *bebēloō*, translating the Hebrew piel *hilel*, in the sense of “profane, besmirsch,” speaks of a sort of sacrilege. In fact, the profaner is an impious person, after the manner of Esau, who renounced the sacred prerogatives which were his as the firstborn and which made him the fully entitled heir of the messianic promises; thus he was faithless.

In the Pastorals, *bebēlos* is an adjective for heterodox and heretical teaching: “impious fables, old wives’ tales.” So myth is gratuitous invention (2 Pet 1:16), opposed to true history, against which so many first-century authors protest: Moses urges “putting away the fiction of myths ... which provoke endless errors” (Philo, *Virtues* 178); “the sophists of Egypt give myths ... more attention than the evidence for the truth” (*Migr. Abr.* 76); “The ones who spread this idea sacrificed to mythological invention more than to history.” When St. Paul calls myth profane, he denounces its incompatibility with the sacred; it is a profanation and an impiety to introduce into gospel teaching these human, fictive elements, which do not mix with religion (cf. Heb 13:9 – *didachais xenais*), and which do not encourage true *eusebeia*.

This inanity is again expressed in the prohibition against crude and profane chatter – *tas bebēlous kenophōnias* (1 Tim 6:20; 2 Tim 2:16) – which, under the guise of doctrine, secularize and besmirsch the divine truth entrusted to the church. Literally, *kenophōnia* (attested by the best manuscripts instead of *kainophōnia*, empty chatter rather than novel chatter) means: “sounds with no meaning” (cf. 1 Cor 14:7–11), unintelligible words, like those of a baby; hence hazy and vain discourse, inane and empty; called *mataiologia* (1 Tim 1:6; Titus 1:10), they are stigmatized by Plutarch as vain rantings against all that one says (*De tranq. anim.* 468a; *De aud. poet.* 39c). Similarly, Archimedes protests, “I wanted to avoid appearing to some people to have set forth vain words (*kenēn phōnēn*)” (Archimedes, *Eratosth.*, intro.).

This is how the first Christians assessed the “profane” in religious instruction.

## *biazomai*, to use violence or force

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*biazomai*, S 971; TDNT 1.609–613; EDNT 1.216–217; NIDNTT 3.712; MM 109–110; L&N 20.9, 20.10; BDF §311(1); BAGD 140; ND 6.98–99

Matt 11:12 – *hē basileia tōn ouranōn biazetai, kai biastai harpazousin autēn*;  
Luke 16:16 – *hē basileia tou theou euangelizetai kai pas eis autēn biazetai*.  
These verses are among the most enigmatic of the NT, and any proposed interpretation can be only a hypothesis. Neither the rabbinic texts nor the papyri provide direction for exegesis. The exegesis depends on whether *biazetai* is passive or middle voice and whether it should be taken in a favorable or an unfavorable sense; but these decisions are determined by the interpretation that one chooses.

We must emphasize that these two texts are not real parallels; each evangelist has not only inserted this logion in a different context but has understood it in a particular way. Matthew seems more primitive and Palestinian; Luke fits with a later stage in the propagation of the gospel. So we cannot use one text to explain the other; each has its own particular significance.

Predominant in Matt 11:12 is the idea of violence against the reign and of effort or aggression on the part of people. All the old versions took *biazetai* as a passive; but is it transitive or intransitive? In the papyri of the third-fourth century BC, it is used for the violation of a law, as with this woman, who is seeking to have construction banned: “The above-named person coming upon this land in violation of my rights brought in bricks and dug a foundation to build” (*P.Enteux.* 69, 4; *P.Tebt.* 779, 5). It is also used when an orphan complains about the encroachments of a neighbor who despises him (*P.Enteux.* 68, 11). Sometimes what is at issue is the right of the stronger, the compelling of an adversary in spite of himself, without his permission; hence an abuse of power that gives rise to a tort. Sometimes it is a matter of violence as such and a stroke of force; the owner who calls upon a centurion in AD 31 because he has suffered great violence at the hands of his aggressors (*epei de kata polla biazontai me*) explains: *katabiazomenos de kai synarpozomenos* (*P.Oxy.* 2234, 8, 19; cf. *P.Fouad* 26, 33). In several papyri, and constantly in literary texts, the verb is used for forced entry into a house (*P.Tebt.* 804, 9), a route, or a city.

In view of these usages, we may understand Matt 11:12 as follows. From the time of John the Baptist to the present, the reign of God has been the object of violence, and violent or fanatical people assault it or attempt to take it by force. The logion would be about violence that is detrimental to the reign on the part of the Pharisees, the Zealots, members of the Sanhedrin, demonic powers,

any Jewish or pagan adversary whatsoever, all persecutors (Acts 5:26; 21:35, *bia*; cf. Gal 1:13). Christ is a “sign spoken against” (Luke 2:34); John the Baptist is in prison (Matt 11:2), and it is a characteristic of the kingdom of God on earth to be oppressed by the violent, just as the church is attacked violently by the gates of hell. It would be just as possible to take the passive *biazetai* in a favorable sense as an allusion to the power inherent in the reign of God, which “forces a way for itself” and deploys itself in force, but this interpretation loses sight of the meaning of “violent people,” who would then appear to be opponents of this power and would “seize” the reign rather than “receive” it (cf. nevertheless Josephus, *Ant.* 4.121: do violence to the divine will; *War* 6.108: “I strive to save people condemned by God”).

The Lucan recension is altogether different. Not only have the *biastai* disappeared, so that it is no longer a question of seizing or ravishing the kingdom in order to plunder it (*harpazō*), but the main clause is controlled by the verb *euangelizetai*, which has its technical biblical sense, “announce glad tidings, good news”; for example, the granting of a favor, or a victory. The Hebrew *bāšar* (piel *biššar*) carries the idea of joy; here, it is the joy of deliverance and salvation, which John the Baptist was the first to announce (Luke 3:18). The Acts of the Apostles will then show that when the preaching of the gospel opens the gates of the kingdom, believers receive the good news with joy. So then, how should we take the second part of the verse – *pas eis autēn biazetai*? It is difficult to think of a person entering the kingdom of God as being under compulsion or suffering violence. Commentators just as easily take *biazetai* as a middle, as is often the case in the papyri, either in a positive sense (“everyone strives to get in”) or in a negative sense (“everyone uses violence in his own interest”); this last meaning does not yield any sense, because it is too universal.

P. H. Menoud considers the verb to be a passive and suggests translating “each one is expressly invited to enter.” He justifies this sense, which harmonizes perfectly with the preceding clause, on the basis of the weakened meaning that *biazomai* has taken on over the centuries. Actually, *biazomai* in the LXX often translates the Hebrew *pašar*, “urge someone through words or prayers” and has the sense of “insist,” with the interlocutor “accepting” the demand made of him of his own free will, having the freedom to refuse (Gen 33:11; Judg 19:7; 2 Sam 13:25, 27; 2 Kgs 5:23); a meaning well attested in the literature and confirmed by a papyrus from AD 22, in which Serapion confesses that he is the object of friendly persuasion by friends: “I was pressed by my friends to enter the service of Apollonios” (*egō de biazomai hypo philōn genesthai oikakos tou archistatoros Apollōniou*). This weakened sense seems to apply also in a rule relating to the Lycian sanctuary of Men Tyrannos in the

second century AD, where *biazomai* has an absolute and reflexive meaning: having detailed the preliminary purification rituals (garlic, pork, sexual abstinence), the founder forbids the offering of any sacrifice out of his presence or without his permission (*aneu tou katheidrysamenou to hieron*), immediately adding: *ean de tis biasētai* (and if anyone violates), his offering will not be pleasing to the god. There is no question of a violator's forcing entrance into the temple, but simply of his transgressing the rule and sacrificing anyway.

If we add that *biazomai* expresses not only obstinate determination (Judg 13:15–16) but the firmness of a decision and zeal in carrying it out, we can understand Luke 16:16 in terms of the *dynamis* inherent in the apostolic preaching: the reign of God is announced with power and absolutely every person – with no categories whatsoever – is in a hurry to follow the way and enter in; “each one forces his entrance.”

## βλαβερός

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*blaberos*, **harmful**

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***blaberos***, S 983; *EDNT* 1.219; MM 112; L&N 20.13; BAGD 142

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Derived from *blabē*, “damage, harmfulness” (Wis 11:19), the adjective *blaberos* describes that which does harm, like vinegar to the teeth or smoke to the eyes (Prov 10:26). People who seek to get rich fall prey to “senseless and baneful desires” (*epithymias pollas anoētous kai blaberas*, 1 Tim 6:9). In various contexts, *blaberos* can refer to simple inconveniences, that which is injurious, and even that which is disastrous (Aristotle, *Pol.* 3.15.13; 1286b). Rare in the papyri, it is used for the deterioration of a machine or a person's health.

In 1 Tim 6:9, the strong sense of the word is to be understood, because “terror and violence will lay riches waste” (Sir 21:4): instead of the expected multiplication of profits, covetousness that is never satisfied hastens losses that lead to ruin. Otherwise, the adjective has the judicial and penal sense so often attached to the noun *blabē*: penalty, pecuniary compensation. Eternal perdition (cf. *eis olethron kai apōleian*) would be the compensation, as it were, for the greedy person who prospered here below; that at least is Abraham's verdict (Luke 16:25).

γαστήρ

*gastēr*, **belly, womb**

*gaster*, S 1064; *EDNT* 1.239; MM 121; L&N 8.68, 23.19, 23.50; BAGD 152

The “belly” is an organ of the body distinct from the stomach (*stomachos*) and the intestines (*koilia*), making up one of its internal parts. “The great blood vessels pass above the belly” (Hippocrates, *Nat. Hom.* 11; 196.4). Its functions, changes, and diseases are described. In the OT, the Hebrew *beṭen*, related to the Akkadian *bāntu*, “eminence, prominent part,” can refer to a protuberance in a pillar; but usually it refers to the inside of a person, especially in contradistinction to the lips, the organ of externalization. If the seat of wisdom is in the belly (Job 32:18–19; Prov 20:27), it is because certain words, spoken of as if they were delicacies, descend “into the chambers of the belly,” to the depths (Prov 18:8; 26:22).

“Belly” is substituted for the mother’s womb. The expression “to have in the belly” (*echein en gastri*) as a way of saying that a woman is pregnant is first attested in Herodotus 3.32 with respect to the wife of Cambyzes; the LXX uses this expression to translate the Hebrew *hārāh*. It is used almost constantly in the NT, notably for the Virgin Mary (*heurethē en gastri echousa*, Matt 1:18), fulfilling the prophecy of Isa 7:14.

But “to conceive” was also expressed *syllambanein en gastri* (Gen 25:21), especially in the medical writings. It is therefore not surprising that Doctor Luke put the angel’s announcement to Mary this way: *kai idou syllēpsē en gastri kai texē huion*.

*Gastēr* is often used with a pejorative nuance, for example in Philo, who denounces its desires (*Creation* 158; *Alleg. Interp.* 3.149; *Spec. Laws* 1.192; 4.96) and its pleasures. It is insatiable (*Dreams* 2.147, 208) and must be mastered (*Prelim. Stud.* 80; *Spec. Laws* 2.195; 4.127). It is with this meaning that Titus 1:12 cites Epimenides of Cnossos, who calls the Cretans “idle bellies” (*gasteres argai*). Already in Homer, Melantheus insults the swineherd by saying that he would rather “fill his belly” than work. The insult became traditional; cf. the disdain of the Muses: “Shepherds ... who are nothing but bellies” (Hesiod, *Th.* 26). At Rome, L. Veturius was drummed out of the equestrian order because “from neck to groin he was nothing but a belly” (Plutarch, *Cat. Mai.* 9.6); the materialistic turncoats of Alexandria apostasized

“for the love of their belly” (3 Macc 7:11; cf. Phil 3:19); “rebels against the divine law, incapable of restraint ... in the quest for pleasures of the belly and the entrails” (Philo, *Virtues* 182); whereas Socrates considered humans as related to the gods, “we, on the other hand, regard them as bellies, as guts, as sexual organs” (Epictetus 1.9.26). J. M. Edmonds quotes an anonymous writer: “the whole body is a belly.”

## γνήσιος

*gnēsios*, **authentic, dear, legitimate**

→see also ἀνυπόκριτος, γνήσιος; ὑποκρίνομαι, ὑπόκρισις, ὑποκριτής

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*gnesios*, S 1103; *TDNT* 1.727; *EDNT* 1.225; MM 128–129; L&N 73.1; BAGD 162–163

As opposed to the adopted son or to the illegitimate child (*nothos*, Heb 12:8; Menander, *Sam.* 236–237; Philo, *Dreams* 2.47), *gnēsios* modifies the child born of a legitimate marriage: “the title of legitimate child belongs to the one who is a son by blood.” In practice, this juridical meaning becomes synonymous with “authentic, true, real,” and it is with this meaning that Paul addresses Timothy as “*gnēsios* child in (the) faith” (*gnēsio teknō en pistei*, 1 Tim 1:2) and Titus as “*gnēsios* child according to a common faith” (*gnēsio teknō kata koinēn pistin*). In the Hellenistic period, this term takes on an emotional density attested notably in the papyri and the inscriptions, where it means “dear” or “much beloved.”

I. – It is used for children, with a very affectionate nuance; Isaac is “son ... *gnēsios*, beloved, and only” (*huios ... gnēsios, agapētos, kai monos*); Meltinianos reserves a place in his tomb for “my dear children” (*ta gnēsia mou paidia*, *MAMA*, VIII, 595; *CII* 739). It is used for women – mothers or wives – with a clear nuance of love: “in memory of my dear wife Agelais” (*Agelaïdi gynaiki gnēsia mneias heneken*); for parents, “my sweetest and most *gnēsios* father” (*ton glykytaton kai gnēsion patera*, *BCH*, 1883, p. 274, n. 15; cf. Philo, *To Gaius* 62, 71; *MAMA*, I, 361, 365); for brothers and sisters: “do not trade a true brother for gold from Ophir”; and finally for friends, compatriots, companions, and “dear colleagues”: *gnēsios erastēs*; “let them not forget their true friends.” This is the meaning when St. Paul writes, “For your part, Syzygos, true yokefellow, I ask you to come to the aid” of Euodia and Syntyche. In addition to the word-play, the designation is affectionate. To convey this nuance, 1 Tim 1:2 and Titus 1:4 should be translated “dear and true child.”

II. – In addition, *gnēsios* is used in a religious sense for the transmitters of revelation. Isis to Horus: “He made me swear not to pass on the revelation, except only to my child and dear friend” (*ei mē monon teknō kai philō gnēsio*). More generally, it modifies the authorized interpreter of a teaching: Aristotle is “the most authentic disciple of Plato”; in a more specialized sense, it refers to the legitimate heir to whom a father passes on his authority and command (Philo, *Virtues* 59; *To Gaius* 24; cf. *Spec. Laws* 4.184; Josephus, *Ant.* 17.45). It may stand comparison to the position at court of the “king’s friend”; for Eleazer, for example, King Ptolemy is a sincere friend. These latter nuances fit well with the case of the apostle’s representatives at Ephesus and Crete. Not only does their spiritual father show tender affection for them that will gain honor for them among Christians, but they are representatives vested with a legitimate authority that cannot rightly be contested; they are, in the final analysis, authentic interpreters of his doctrine, the faithful echo, as it were, of Paul’s voice (cf. Philo, *Contemp. Life* 72, and 2 Tim 3:10).

III. – When modifying things, *gnēsios* refers to those which are appropriate, well suited for their purpose; with respect to a service, rendering a service sincerely means rendering it effectively; thus should be understood the exhortation to the Corinthians to be generous toward the saints at Jerusalem (*to tēs hymeteras agapēs gnēsion dokimazōn*, 2 Cor 8:8; cf. *P.Ant.* 188, 16: *to gnēsion endeixesthai*; *P.Lond.* 1041, 2: *gnēsion agapēn*). They must prove the authenticity of their love, to be sure; but their alms are “normal.” The external, material gesture only gives “proper” expression to the internal urgency of love. But there is beauty and honor in showing oneself “true” (cf. Philo, *Post. Cain* 102), in demonstrating one’s intimate feelings: *gnēsios kai endoxōs*.



δειλία, δειλιάω, δειλός

*deilia*, **faintheartedness, cowardice, fear**; *deiliaō*, **to be fearful**; *deilos*, **fearful**

*deilia*, S 1167; *EDNT* 1.281; MM 138; L&N 25.266; BAGD 173 | *deiliaō*, S 1168; *EDNT* 1.281; MM 138; L&N 25.267; BAGD 173 | *deilos*, S 1169; *EDNT* 1.281; MM 138; L&N 25.268; BAGD 173

Associated with *phobos* (Wis 4:17), *eklysis* (2 Macc 3:24), *anandria* (cf. 4 Macc 6:20), *atolmia* (Philo, *Virtues* 25; Josephus, *Ant.* 4.298; 15.142; Aeneas Tacticus, *Polior.* 16.20), faintheartedness or cowardice can be defined as “a failure of spirit caused by fear.” Rarely mentioned in the papyri, it is used for mere reserve or abstention, a lack of courage and of reaction, a sort of torpor, and finally fright (*tarassō*, Ps 55:4; John 14:27; Josephus, *Ant.* 5.216) which can become panic and terror in the face of extreme danger.

I. – Jesus reproaches the apostles for this psychological fear when they are terrified by the storm (Matt 8:26; Mark 4:40), because it involves a moral deficiency: they no longer have faith, or they have but little faith in the presence of the Savior, who has to reassure them. Reference is made to the wisdom literature: when one relies on God, there is nothing to fear.

II. – When Rev 21:8 places the fainthearted and the unbelieving in the lake of fire, it has in view Christians during times of persecution who, out of a fear of suffering, renounce their faith. It is a commonplace that human courage and cowardice are revealed in the face of death; the latter is expressed in flight before danger, but it also lays hold of the lazy farmer (Josephus, *War* 3.42; *P.Tebt.* 58, 27) and the athlete and every human heart that weakens (literally “melts,” Isa 13:7, Hebrew *māsas*), even the hearts of apostles facing eschatological trials (John 14:27). Cowardice can then be defined as “a more serious disease than those which afflict the body, because it destroys the faculties of the soul” (Philo, *Virtues* 26) and seen as a major vice, characteristic of base souls.

III. – “God has given us a spirit not of faintheartedness but of strength and love” (2 Tim 1:7). St. Paul encourages his young and timid disciple not to be frightened at the difficulties of his post; more precisely, he stirs up “the good soldier of Jesus Christ” (2 Tim 2:3) to undertake and pursue combat (1 Tim 1:18) according to the traditional military maxim, dating back to Deuteronomy:

“Conquer ... fear not and be not disheartened.” The fainthearted are excluded from the army; cravenness was the vice most opposed to courage in combat (Sir 37:11; Philo, *Moses* 1.233; 1.235). It goes without saying that strength and hardiness are required above all in a leader: “faintheartedness and cravenness in private life bring dishonor to those afflicted by them, but in a general charged with responsibilities, they become a public calamity and a great disaster” (Polybius 3.81.7).

δειπνέω

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*deipneō*, to dine

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*deipneo*, S 1172; TDNT 2.34–35; EDNT 1.281–282; NIDNTT 2.520–521, 536; MM 138; L&N 23.20; BAGD 173

In instituting the Eucharist, the Lord blessed the cup *meta to deipnēsai* (Luke 22:20; 1 Cor 11:25), and he promised the church at Laodicea, “If anyone hears my voice and opens the door, I will come in with him and dine with him (*deipnēsō*) and he with me” (Rev 3:20).

Among the papyri are preserved a certain number of invitations to dinner either in a private home, or in a temple, or above all at the *klinē* of Sarapis, to which have been compared the NT texts cited above and participation “at the Lord’s table” (1 Cor 10:21). In effect, the pagan sacrifice was a meal offered to the god; sometimes the god was received at table, sometimes the god invited people to table in the *Hēraion* to rejoice in the divine presence. For example, at the mystery of Panamara, the priest of Zeus writes to the Rhodians: “Although the god invites all men to his feast and to all he offers a common table and equally honorable roles, nevertheless, as he considers your city worthy of special honors ... and on account of our having shared together in the same holy things, I invite you to come to the god, I urge all citizens of your city to take part in the joy that he offers you.” It is the god who offers the meal and presides; one responds to his call; the believer is closely united to his god.

These parallels are interesting from the point of view of linguistics and the history of religions, but the Pauline formulation may be more directly inspired by Mal 1:7, 12; Ezek 39:20; 44:16.

δεισιδαίμων, δεισιδαιμονία

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*deisidaimōn*, **superstitious, religious**; *deisidaimonia*, **superstition, religion, reverence**

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*deisidaimon*, TDNT 2.20; EDNT 1.282–283; NIDNTT 1.450, 453; MM 139; L&N 53.3; BDF § 244(2); BAGD 173 | *deisidaimonia*, S 1175; EDNT 1.282–283; NIDNTT 1.450, 453; MM 139; L&N 53.2; BAGD 173

This adjective and this substantive, unknown in the LXX and the papyri, are among the numerous compounds featuring *daimōn* as the second component. Both have favorable and pejorative usages. Religious fear is always involved; Theophrastus gives the best definition: “Superstition would seem to be a feeling of fear (*deilia*) toward the divine power (*pros to daimonion*)” (*Char.* 16.1).

The favorable meaning – religion and reverence toward the deity – is well attested: “The sovereign will be very zealous toward the gods, because the citizens are less likely to fear that they will suffer from illegal acts when they perceive that the one in authority is religious (*deisidaimona*) and solicitous toward the gods” (Aristotle, *Pol.* 5.11.25.1315); “Those who fear the gods (*hoi deisidaimones*) are less afraid of men.” In the first century, calling punishment down on the guilty inspired “in the king a religious fear and a respect for the deity” (Diodorus Siculus 1.70.8). The repentant Manasseh wanted to show the utmost reverence toward God (*peri auton deisidaimonia*, Josephus, *Ant.* 10.42); when the Jews were not able to tolerate the emperor’s ensigns in the temple, Pilate was astonished at such zeal (*to tēs deisidaimonias akraton*). *Deisidaimonia* refers to the Jewish religion. In 49 BC, the consul Lentulus Crus exempted Jewish Roman citizens from military service “on account of their religion.”

The pejorative meaning – superstitious and punctilious – is much more commonly attested. It can be seen in Menander’s *Deisidaimōn* (The Bigot), in Theophrastus’ *Deisidaimōn* (*Char.* 16), and Plutarch’s *Peri deisidaimonias* (On superstition). Theophrastus portrays the *deisidaimōn* as very attentive to omens and dreams, careful to avoid defilement, carrying out multiple purifications, reciting prayers suited for the given circumstances, going overboard with the worship of images. Plutarch denounces superstition as an excessive fear of divine signs: “just as unbelief (*apistia*) and disdain of divine signs is a terrible evil, so also is superstition, which, like water, always filters down to the lower levels” (*Alex.* 75.3). “Thanks to Anaxagoras, Pericles raised himself above superstition. Superstition is inspired by celestial phenomena in people who do not know their causes and because of their ignorance are disturbed and frightened regarding religion. Natural science, which banishes this ignorance, replaces timid and feverish superstition with solid piety” (*Per.* 6.1). This terror,

which is passed on in traditions and stirred up by accidents (*Marc.* 6.11), bad omens (*Tim.* 26.1), wonders (*Cleom.* 39.3; *Sol.* 12.5), an eclipse, etc., is a product of human weakness (*Cam.* 6.6); it is a characteristic of barbarians (*Sert.* 11.6), women, and children. So superstition must be driven out from piety and from philosophy, which “Pythagoras (who attached great importance to divination through dreams) and his disciples filled with phantoms, fables, and superstitions” (*De gen.* 9). Upon the death of one of his daughters, Plutarch exhorts his wife to avoid exaggerated mourning and not to have recourse to superstition (*Cons. ux.* 1).

Philo sees “the crushing burden of superstition” (*Giants* 16) as a deviation that mars healthy piety (*Rewards* 40), “the queen of virtues ...; adding to it, or on the other hand taking from it, in any way ... deforms and distorts its appearance ... because additions breed superstition, and suppression breeds impiety” (*Spec. Laws* 4.147). *Eusebeia* occupies an intermediate position between superstition and impiety (*Unchang. God* 164); *deisidaimonia* is a false respect for God (*ibid.* 103), an evil parasite that grafts itself onto worship and sacrifice (*Plant.* 107); it spreads in waves and “has submerged souls lacking in virility and nobility” (*Change of Names* 138). It is “a sister of impiety” (*asebeia*, *Sacr. Abel and Cain* 15).

With these two series of texts fresh in our minds, it is easy to see a favorable sense in *deisidaimōn* in Acts 17:22, the praise with which St. Paul begins his discourse on the Areopagus: “O Athenians, I see that in all things you are very religious” (*kata panta hōs deisidaimonesterous hymas theōrō*). No judgment for good or for ill is made of this piety; “the fear of the deity can according to its nature be either piety or superstition; this term – a *vox anceps* – ... is quite fitting for a sentiment that is praiseworthy but directed toward an object that one does not approve.” The “very” alludes not only to the altar erected “to an unknown god” (Acts 17:25) but to all the representations of deities that abounded in this city (Acts 17:16), where Plautus’s *bon mot* is especially applicable: “It is easier to meet a god there than a mortal” (Plautus, *Satir.* 17). Besides, it was a commonplace to praise the Athenians as surpassing all other nations in the honors they rendered to the gods.

*Deisidaimonia* has almost the same meaning when Festus uses it in his explanation to King Agrippa of Paul’s situation: “His accusers were disputing with him regarding their religion and on the subject of a certain Jesus, who had died but whom Paul affirmed to be alive” (*zētēmata ... peri tēs idias deisidaimonias eichon*, Acts 25:19). The word could not have meant “superstition,” for that would have been an affront to the Jewish king; coming from the Roman prefect, however, it seems to have some pejorative nuance, either like our word “sect” or like the Greek *thrēskeia*, which is used for

aberrant cults as well as for worship of the true God (Jas 1:26–27). This ambiguous meaning (suggested by *ideas deisidaimonias*) is common.

## διαλάσσω

*dialassō*, **to reconcile**

→see also καταλλαγή, καταλλάσσω

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*dialasso*, S 1259; TDNT 1.253–254; EDNT 1.307; MM 151; L&N 40.2; BDF §193(4); BAGD 186

“If you are presenting your offering (*to dōron*) at the altar and you remember that your brother has something against you (*echei ti kata sou*), leave your offering there and go first to be reconciled with your brother” (*hypage prōton diallagēthi tō adelphō sou*, Matt 5:23–24). Even though the verb is an imperative (aorist passive, with dative of accompaniment), this is not a cultic rule or a liturgical law but a moral obligation incumbent on a person appearing before God to offer a sacrifice. Apparently, a person who is the object of a brother or sister’s animosity must take the initiative in reconciliation; the offended party takes the first step. But J. Jeremias notes that “has something against you” (*echei ti kata sou*) corresponds to the Aramaic adjective *’aketânâ* (= the Greek *mnēsikakos*) and refers to a brother who holds on to the memory of an offense of which he has been the victim. Thus it is not surprising that the true offender should go to him and ask him not to hold a grudge and “gain reconciliation” (*diallagēthi*).

Beginning with Moulton-Milligan, two papyri have been cited that use this verb with the same meaning. In the second century, a prodigal son writes to his mother, “I have written to thee that I am naked (*hoti gymnos eimei* = that I have nothing to wear). I beseech thee, mother, be reconciled to me (*dialagēthi moi*).... I know that I have sinned.” A runaway slave begs his owner to be reconciled (*hōste diallagēthi hēmein*). We may add *P.Mich.* 502, 8, a letter from Valerius Gemellus, a soldier stationed at Coptus who seeks to end his quarrel with his brother: “I urge you to be reconciled to me, brother (*paraklētheis, adelphe, diallagēthi moi*), so that I may have your confidence while I am in the army.” Then there is the case of the concubine of the Levite from Ephraim, who had run away from him and been gone four months. Her husband “went to speak to her and persuade her to be reconciled.”

The verb *diallattō* was used often in private law for the reconciliation of persons; *diallaktai* had the job of bringing about *diallagai*. Augustus urged Herod to be reconciled with his children (Josephus, *Ant.* 16.125; cf. 16.267,

269; 7.192); the reconciliation of Hyrcanus and Aristobulus took place in the temple (*War* 1.122). Conciliation also played a role in ending civil wars but was particularly common in international life between cities and warring states: the four hundred send heralds to Agis, king of Sparta, “to say that they wished to come to terms with him” (*legontes diallagēnai boulesthai*). Titus said concerning the Jews, “Let us not wait for agreement to be re-established between our enemies; necessity will reconcile them all too quickly” (Josephus, *War* 3.496). Herod states, “We have learned from messengers of God to reconcile enemies to each other” (*Ant.* 15.136), which entails changing feelings and attitudes (11.54). It is thus that God takes pity on David and is reconciled with him (7.153); so reconciliation is then pardon (6.151).

διερμηνεύω, ἐρμηνεία, ἐρμηνεύω

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*diermēneuō*, **to translate, interpret, explain**; *hermēneia*, **interpretation**;  
*hermēneuō*, **to translate, interpret**

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***diermeneuo***, S 1329; *TDNT* 2.661–666; *EDNT* 2.53–55; *NIDNTT* 1.579–581; MM 160; L&N 33.145, 33.148; BAGD 194 | ***ermeneia***, S 2058; *TDNT* 2.661–666; *EDNT* 2.53–55; *NIDNTT* 1.579–582; MM 254; L&N 11.147; BAGD 310 | ***ermeneuo***, S 2059; *TDNT* 2.661–666; *EDNT* 2.53–55; *NIDNTT* 1.579–581; MM 254; L&N 33.145; BAGD 310

According to Luke 24:27, Christ “explained [to the disciples of Emmaus], in all the Scriptures, that which concerned him.” This is the only use of the verb *diermēneuō* in the Gospels. In earlier secular texts, it normally has the sense of “translate” from one language to another, but Luke clearly intends it to mean “interpret,” as in 1 Macc 1:36 – “Nehemiah called the liquid *nephtar*, which is interpreted as purification (*ho diermēneuetai katharismos*), but most call it naphtha.” This usage is clearly attested by Philo, who knows the strict sense “translation,” but more often gives the word a broader meaning: “He will translate your thoughts” (*Migr. Abr.* 81); “that which language expresses” (*Conf. Tongues* 53; cf. *Migr. Abr.* 12). So *diermēneuō* means “express one’s thought in words.” Thus it is not permitted to express the name of God in literal terms (Philo, *To Gaius* 353; cf. *m. Meg.* 3.41); the precision of thought of a person well-versed in doctrine is expressed in his explications (Philo, *Contemp. Life* 31). To explain the genesis of light is to give its intelligence or to discover the unknown (Philo, *Creation* 31). Finally, for Philo, as for St. Luke, this verb means “interpret,” and thus it is that Jesus, like Moses, is an interpreter of the holy books.

In Acts 9:36 we have “a disciple named Tabitha, which translated (*hē diermēneuomenē*) means Dorcas.” In other NT texts, this idea – which could be put “that is” or “which means” – is expressed by the simple verb *hermēneuō*, which Philo uses extensively for the transcribing into Greek of the meaning of a Hebrew word.

In the papyri, *hermēneuō* usually means the translation of an original text into another language. Thus the will of C. Longinus Castor, written in Latin, was translated into Greek: “I translated the preceding copy” (*hērmēneusa to prokeimenon antigraphon*, BGU 326, col. II, 22 = SB 9298, 26); “copy translated into Greek” (*antigraphon hermēneuthen Ellēnikois grammasi*, P.Oxy. 2231, 26–27); “to translate the letter you sent to me” (*ta hermēneuthēnai to grammation ho diepempsante moi*, P.Stras. 260, 1); “I translated from Latin” (*hermēneusa apo Rhōmaikōn*, P.Ryl. 62, 30); which presupposes a strict correspondence between the two texts. But the correspondence is broader when an attorney pleads for his client through an interpreter (*di’ Anoubiōnos hermēneuontos eipen*, SB 8246, 38, 46), and especially in the case of an explanation, as with Isidorus: “Having been given firm information by men who summed up what they knew, and having myself transcribed all these events, I explained to the Greeks the power of the god and of the prince.” Finally, to translate feelings is to express them.

So there are translators. Joseph’s brother “did not know that Joseph understood, because they were speaking through an interpreter.” In a country like Egypt, where many races met, the *hermēneis* (cf. *Ep. Arist.* 310, 318) were not merely multilingual, but seem to have been charged with official duties, such as a certain Apollonius, interpreter for the Ethiopians in Egypt. They could be appointed either by private individuals (SB 10743, from the first century) or by the state, because in the first century interpretation was a public function. Furthermore, the papyri often attest to the presence and activity of a *hermēneus tēs kōmēs*. They are employed by individuals – not only a general (SB 9046, 308) but also private persons. They write (*Stud.Pal.* XXII, 101, 11), are associated with notaries (P.Oslo 183, 6, 8), translate from Greek to Latin or from Latin to Greek (BGU 140, 326; P.Stras. 253, 4; P.Ryl. 62, 30; P.Harr. 67, col. II, 11), and later from Coptic to Greek (P.Lond. 77, 69; vol. 1, p. 235; eighth century). They seem to be entrusted with fairly extensive authority, because they serve as intermediaries: “and we have written also to Apollonius the *hermēneus* concerning these things” (*gegraphamen de kai Apollōniō tō hermēnei peri toutōn*, SB 7647, 7; cf. P.Ryl. 563, 7; P.Cair.Zen. 59065, 2; PSI 409, 15). They become parties to lawsuits. For example, to learn if a woman has the right to remain with her husband against the will of her father, the judge prescribes: *ekeleusen di’ hermēneōs autēn* (the Egyptian woman) *enechthēnai ti*

*bouletai, eipousēs para tō andri menein ... (P.Oxy. 237, col. VII, 37).* In another case, the judge prescribes that the testimony of Ammonios, Antoninos, and the priest of Sarapis shall be examined *di' hermēneōs*. Thus interpreters are numerous, influential, competent, having certain prerogatives, and indispensable in a cosmopolitan and multilingual society.

The special duty of the *hermēneus* is *hermēneia*. If the latter has an almost sacred character in Jewish writings when it designates the Greek version of the Scriptures (the Septuagint, cf. Josephus, *Ant.* 12.39, 87, 104, 106, 107, 108), it also suggests the “explications” supplied by the translator, who thus becomes an interpreter. It is not that he could express his own thoughts: “the soothsayer said nothing personal, he only interpreted someone else’s words, when the divine presence seized him” (Philo, *Moses* 1.286); “interpreters of dreams are obligated to tell the truth, because they explain and proclaim divine oracles” (*Joseph* 95). Philo elaborated a theology of the *hermēneus* who carries out a religious function related to prophecy: “The prophets are God’s interpreters.” In fact, God equips “the perfect interpreter by making the springs of language gush forth for him and by revealing them to him” (*Worse Attacks Better* 44; cf. 68). “The wicked are not permitted to be God’s interpreters, so that any evil man is not inspired by God.” Only the virtuous “are able to interpret the meaning of the Holy Scriptures” (Josephus, *Ant.* 20.264).

In summary, then, “interpreters” were numerous and important in the secular world of the first century, and they were especially so in Jewish theology. Signal honor was given to the translators of the Hebrew Bible, which had become unintelligible for their contemporaries, and Moses was seen as the outstanding interpreter of the divine revelation. Indeed, prophecy and interpretation were closely associated. With all this in mind, we can better understand 1 Cor 12:30, where St. Paul makes the interpreter a charismatic, and 14:5, 13, 27, where he requires that speech in incomprehensible tongues be translated for the hearers and clearly explained by an interpreter, who transposes the divine revelation into accessible language. If there is no *di hermēneutēs* (verse 28) in the assembly, the one speaking in tongues must be silent or pray for the ability to interpret (verse 13) – which presupposes that the ecstatic discourse has an internal meaning. In any event, it is the Holy Spirit who gives the gift of interpretation of tongues (1 Cor 12:10, *hermēneia glōssōn*), and very likely the *di hermēneutēs*, did not stop at giving a pure and simple translation of that which was spoken by the glossalaliac; if necessary, he added explanations and timely clarifications so that the charism might bear all of its fruit for edification (1 Cor 14:26).



δίκαιος, δικαιοσύνη, δικαίω, δικαίωμα, δικαίωσις, δικαστής, δίκη  
*dikaios*, **conforming to law or custom, right, virtuous**; *dikaiosynē*, **justice, righteousness**; *dikaioō*, **to justify, pronounce just**; *dikaiōma*, **justification, righteousness, righteous decree, just requirement**; *dikaiōsis*, **justification**; *dikastēs*, **judge**; *dikē*, **custom, justice, punishment**

→see also λάθρα

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*dikaios*, S 1342; TDNT 2.174–178, 224–225; EDNT 1.324–325; NIDNTT 3.352–355, 358, 360–363, 365–370; MM 162; L&N 34.47, 66.5, 88.12; BDF §263(a, b); BAGD 195–196 | *dikaiosune*, S 1343; TDNT 2.174–178, 192–210; EDNT 1.325–330; NIDNTT 3.352–354, 358, 360–365, 369–372; MM 162; L&N 34.46, 53.4, 57.111, 88.13; BDF §§163, 219(4), 275(3); BAGD 196–197 | *dikaioo*, S 1344; TDNT 2.174–178, 211–219; EDNT 1.330–334; NIDNTT 3.352, 354–355, 358, 360–363, 365, 369–370, 372; MM 162–163; L&N 34.46, 36.22, 37.138, 56.34, 88.16; BDF §§148(4), 195(1e); BAGD 197–198 | *dikaioima*, S 1345; TDNT 2.174–178, 219–223; EDNT 1.334–335; NIDNTT 3.352, 354, 361–363, 365, 371–372; MM 163; L&N 33.334, 56.34, 88.14; BAGD 198 | *dikaiosis*, S 1347; TDNT 2.174–178, 223–224; EDNT 1.335; NIDNTT 3.352, 354, 363, 371–372; L&N 34.46, 56.34; BAGD 198 | *dikastes*, S 1348; EDNT 1.336; MM 163; L&N 56.28; BAGD 198 | *dike*, S 1349; TDNT 2.174–182; EDNT 1.336; NIDNTT 3.92–93, 96; MM 163; L&N 12.27, 38.8; BAGD 198; ND 6.90

I. *Dikē*. – It is generally agreed that *dikē*, the basic term in this group, is related to *deiknymi*, “show, indicate.” Thus its root meaning would be “that which is indicated, is in usage, is customary,” and it is from this starting point that it ends up meaning “justice.” The first appearance of this meaning is as a mythical divine being: “There is a virgin, Dike, daughter of Zeus, honored and revered by the gods, inhabitants of Olympia,” who denounces the unjust deeds of humans before her father and calls for their punishment. But already in Homer, *dikē* refers to a person’s due or share, what he has a right to (*Il.* 19.180; *Od.* 24.255) and also to just actions toward someone else (*Od.* 14.84), giving another person his due (*Il.* 23.542; *Od.* 9.215). Aristotle emphasizes mutuality and reciprocity (*Eth. Nic.* 5.7.1131).

Meaning “right” (Homer, *Il.* 16.388; Hesiod, *Op.* 219) and “justice” (Josephus, *War* 5.2), *dikē* is introduced in legal language, where it refers sometimes to a trial, a legal decision, sometimes to the result of a trial, namely, the execution of sentence, the penalty or punishment: “pursued by your justice” (Wis 11:20); “the slave and the master were stricken with the same punishment” (Wis 18:11). This latter meaning predominates in the LXX: “the

avenging sword of vengeance” (Lev 26:25; cf. Exod 21:20); “punishment by fire” (Amos 7:14; cf. 2 Macc 8:11, 13); “the punishment reserved for sinners.” The NT knows only this meaning: when St. Paul was bitten by the snake after escaping the shipwreck, the Maltese concluded, “Surely this man is a murderer, since after he has been saved from the sea, Dike (the avenging goddess) does not allow him to live” (Acts 28:4); those who do not obey the gospel “will in punishment suffer eternal loss” (2 Thess 1:9); Sodom and Gomorrah have “suffered the punishment (the consequence of just judgment) of eternal fire” (Jude 7).

II. *Dikaïos*. – This adjective modifies persons who conform to custom or law (Homer, *Od.* 6.120) and things that are “normal,” i.e., that are as they ought to be (a just judgment, Deut 16:18; John 5:30; Josephus, *Ant.* 9.4; just ways arrive at their goal, Rev 15:3; Josephus, *Ant.* 13.290). Aristotle defines the *dikaïos* as “one who conforms to the law (*nomimos*) and is equal (*isos*).” But all of Greek literature includes in the obligations of the just not only their responsibilities toward humans but also toward the gods; the just are so only if they are pious. So if the just person has a political “virtue,” it is conceived as the virtue of establishing order and harmony among men (Plato, *Resp.* 4.443 c–e). *To dikaion* is an innate idea that belongs to human nature, like the beautiful, the good, and the fitting. Under Stoic influence, Philo makes it a cardinal virtue, but one whose role goes far beyond the legal realm. Depending on the LXX, Josephus has a religious concept of the just person, who is not only faithful to divine commands, but a person of honesty, rectitude, keeping to his place and acting according to the divine will. Thus it is the faithful Jew who is just (*Ant.* 9.33), “all the Jews among the Hebrews” (10.38; cf. 14.172). They illustrate the conception of Theognis (“All the virtues are included in justice. If you are just, you are a good person” (1.147–148) or of Isocrates (the best person is the just person, *Nic.* 20; cf. *Hel.* 1). “No sin is the result of justice” (Philo, *Quest. Gen.* 4.64); “Just ways do not know how to do wrong” (*dikaïos adikein ouk epistatai trophos*, Menander, in Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 9.8, vol. 3, p. 438; *T. Gad* 5.3).

The LXX affirms and reaffirms that God is “just and upright” (Deut 32:4; Ps 11:7); a “just judge” (Jer 12:1; Ps 7:12; Tob 3:2), acting justly (Gen 18:25; Judg 5:11; Ps 145:17), rewarding or punishing with justice (Ps 62:13); but this justice is linked with goodness: “Yahweh is merciful and just; our God is compassionate” (Ps 116:5). The Messiah is described as just, not only because he carries out God’s will, but because he possesses this attribute, which is proper to good sovereigns, and because he establishes justice on earth: “I will raise up from David a just seed.... He will practice judgment and justice in the land.... He will be called ‘Yahweh-our-Justice.’” As for the just person in the OT, he is first of all innocent, in contrast to the impious transgressor (Exod

23:6–8; Ezek 23:45); he is “the one who does the will of the Lord” (Sir 16:3). So he is essentially a religious and perfect person (Gen 6:9), especially impartial (Deut 16:19) and generous (2 Kgs 10:9; 1 Sam 24:18). Not only is he “just before God” (Gen 7:1), he is also a “son of God” (Wis 2:18), and “the souls of the just are in God’s hands” (Wis 3:1; 5:1, 15). Even when persecuted (Wis 2:10–18), the just are beloved of God (Ps 146:7) and living (Isa 26:2), and they will be exalted: “Glory to the just!”

In the NT, several usages of *dikaïos* match secular usage, especially the neuter *to dikaion*. The master of the vineyard promises the workers that he will give “whatever is just” (*ho ean ē dikaion*) after the work is done (Matt 20:4). Each one can judge what is right (*krinein to dikaion*, Luke 12:57). Masters must give their slaves what is just and equitable (*to dikaion kai tēn isotēta*, Col 4:1), and St. Peter considers it his responsibility (literally, considers it just, *dikaion hēgeomai*) to keep Christians watchful. But our authors sometimes feel the need to Christianize this obligation, which has its source in God; Peter and John ask their judges “if it is just in God’s sight (*ei dikaion estin enōpion tou theou*) to obey you rather than God.” Nevertheless, in the great majority of cases, *dikaïos* retains its LXX meaning. First of all, in describing God as just in carrying out his promises of salvation, “God shows his justice ... so that he may be just himself (*eis to einai auton dikaion*) and also make just those who have believed in Jesus.” God is always just in his judgments, punishing the godless and rewarding the faithful. It follows that the law, which comes from God, expresses his will, and binds people to God and their neighbor, “is holy, and the commandment is holy, just, and good” (*hagia kai dikaia kai agathē*, Rom 7:12). This justice clearly goes beyond the realm of the legal or even the equitable; it is almost synonymous with perfection or integrity! Taking up the messianic designation in Isa 53:11; Jer 23:5, St. Peter says to the Sanhedrin, “You disowned the Holy and Just One” (*ton hagion kai dikaion*). Again, the modifier *dikaïos* is used for a person of perfect rectitude, one who carries out the will of God; a person set apart, contrasted with the breaker of the law. This person is promised the highest reward: the resurrection of the just (*anastasis tōn dikaion*, Luke 14:14; cf. Acts 24:15). *Dikaïos* became a term for a Christian, first of all because Christians are purified from sin (Matt 13:43, 49) and acceptable to God (Jas 5:6); they are irreproachable, and their prayers are very powerful (Jas 5:16; 1 Pet 3:12); they are also merciful (Matt 25:37, 46). If they are “saved with difficulty” (1 Pet 4:18; a quotation from Prov 11:31) through many trials, they are sure of receiving “the recompense of the just” (Matt 10:41) and reaching God (Heb 12:23).

St. Paul enriched this OT idea of justice/righteousness. Whereas Ps 14:1 says, “There is no just person, not even one” (quoted Rom 3:10; cf. Eccl 7:20), the

apostle adds on the one hand that it is not mere knowledge of the law that makes a person just, but putting it into practice, actualizing it in works. And on the other hand he declares that a new form of justice/righteousness has appeared, no longer a legal or sacrificial justice, nor even moral, but a religious and internal righteousness. Whereas Adam's transgression brought a death sentence for all humans (Rom 5:18), Christ instituted (*kathistēmi*) a dispensation of justifying, life-giving grace: "Through one person's obedience, all will be constituted just" (*dikaioi katastathēsontai hoi polloi*, Rom 5:19); it is no longer Adam's sin that is inherited, but Christ's righteousness. Thus Christ establishes a new humanity of just people, antithetical to sinful humanity. To be clothed with this righteousness, it is enough to believe: "The just will live by faith." It is the gift or the sharing of God's justice/righteousness that makes the believer just, not so much on the moral plane of virtues as in the theological order: the *dikaioi* is a new creation (2 Cor 5:17), enters into communion with God, is a new being. So it is indeed faith that is the principle of the religious life (Rom 3:26; Gal 3:7–9) and justification that gives life (*dikaiōsis zōēs*, Rom 5:18; *to pneuma zōē dia dikaiosynēn*, 8:10). This dynamic and life-giving principle indwells the Christian, who, led by the Holy Spirit (Gal 5:18) – whose role is to lead the children of God (Rom 8:14) – and by faith (Gal 3:11), knows how to discern between good and evil and wants what God wants, just as a child instinctively knows its father's desires and seeks to please him. The law, on the other hand, was established to set rules for sinners and to punish them. Thus "the law was instituted not for the just (those justified by Christ) but for the lawless and rebellious, the godless and sinful."

III. *Dikaiosynē*. – This substantive, unknown in Homer and Hesiod, first appears in Herodotus (1.96), and in the Koine it substituted more and more for *dikē*. Certainly it retains a legal sense, but its meaning is considerably broadened. Not only is it a virtue, notably in sovereigns, lawmakers, and leaders, that sums up all other virtues; it seems to consist most of all in properly fulfilling one's role in society, at least beginning with Plato (*Phd.* 82 a: *demotikē kai politikē aretē*). Little by little, it becomes a synonym of perfection and an attribute of every honest person, of good comportment (Josephus, *Ant.* 3.67; 4.223; 19.154). Hence its association with *semnos* (Isocrates, *Panath.* 249; Josephus, *War* 4.319), referring to a sort of nobility or at least dignity (Josephus, *Ant.* 11.217; 12.160). *Dikaiosynē*, which implies measure and moderation, goes along with leniency (*praos*, Dio Cassius 49.20) and *epieikeia* (Josephus, *Ant.* 14.13); so it is inclined to forgive (3 Macc 7:6–7; *I.Sard.* 20.1–6). In addition, it is with increasing frequency characterized as being ready to serve and dedicated to serving everyone; doctors who devote them-selves to the service of all are praised for their *dikaiosynē*. Finally, *dikaiosynē* is linked with

beneficence and philanthropy. In the second century BC, Theodorus is praised “for his beneficence and his justice toward all” (*euergesias heneken kai dikaiosynēs tēs pros hapantas*, SB 9974, 7), as is Callicles, and Musonius defines virtue thus: “Virtue (*aretē*) is brotherly love and goodness and *dikaiosynē* and beneficence” (frag. 14, ed. C. E. Lutz, p. 92, 32; frag. 16, p. 104, 33; frag. 17, p. 108, 2; frag. 38, p. 136, 3; cf. frag. 11, p. 82, 33; frag. 13 b, p. 90, 13; cf. Philo, *Quest. Gen.* 4.66). *Dikaiosynē* had all of these characteristics when personified, honored, and even divinied, worshiped, given altars.

In the LXX, *dikaiosynē* translates the Hebrew *šdāqāh*, the exact meaning of which is not discoverable but which seems to express fullness and abundance. The justice/righteousness of God, which in itself is indefinable, is always expressed in his relations with the world; it is a relational concept, one that has to do with activities. The believer confesses that on Yahweh’s side, all is perfect: “his work is perfect, all his ways are justice” (Deut 32:4); “Justice belongs to the Lord our God” (Bar 1:15; 2:6; Ezra 9:15); “You are just with regard to all that has happened to us.” On rare occasions this legislative and retributive divine justice is purely judicial; it is the attribute of an all-powerful sovereign: “You sit enthroned as a just judge” (Ps 9:5; 51:16; 96:13; 111:3; 129:3). He brings to pass exactly what he has announced, but above all, his actions, which are so perfectly just, are always accompanied by goodness and mercy: “Yahweh will do justice to his people and will take pity on his servants” (Deut 32:36; Ps 88:13; 103:17; 116:5; Jer 9:23). He betroths himself to his people in justice, grace, and affection (Hos 2:21); “your great goodness will be remembered and your justice will be proclaimed” (Ps 145:7, 17). The “justices” of Yahweh are his divine favors (Judg 5:11; 1 Sam 12:6 ff.; Mic 6:3), a fullness of gifts (Deut 33:21; Amos 5:24), help (Isa 41:10 – “I have upheld you by the right hand of my justice”; 42:6), and above all, salvation (“a righteous God and Savior; there is none but me,” Isa 45:21; 46:13); “my salvation will soon come, and my justice will appear”; “In your justice deliver me, free me, ... save me” (Ps 71:2). Thus the Messiah, raised up by God’s justice and under his protection (Zech 9:9), will execute righteousness and justice (Isa 9:6; 11:4 ff.; 32:1). He is the “Just One” who is to come (Jer 23:5) and will be called “Yahweh our Justice” (Jer 32:15).

Human justice/righteousness, which is contrasted with iniquity (*anomia*, Isa 5:7), is defined in relation to God (Zech 8:8, cf. Wis 5:6) and concretely as faithfulness to the law, the proof of total dependence on and submission to the Lord, guaranteeing innocence (Ps 18:21, 25) and perfection (Ps 15:1 ff.; 24:3). It is also a cardinal virtue, however (Wis 8:7) and a correct attitude in all human relationships, including, for example, the giving of alms. There are constant appeals to seek (1 Macc 7:12), pursue (Prov 15:9; 21:21; Sir 27:8), practice

righteousness and justice (Hos 10:12; Jer 22:3; Ezek 45:9 ff.; 2 Sam 8:15). Also quite common are the mentions of the fruits of this justice: pardon for sins (Tob 12:8; 14:9), the way of life (Prov 12:28), and promises of reward: “The one who sows justice will have a guaranteed reward,” for “when one lives with justice, one finds grace with God” (Philo, *Alleg. Interp.* 3.77).

In the NT, we must immediately distinguish between the *dikaiosynē* taught by St. Paul and that of the evangelists and the non-Pauline epistles. In this last category of writings, all the occurrences are conformable to the LXX, always with a nuance befitting the “ethics” of the new covenant. When John the Baptist objected to baptizing Jesus with a baptism of repentance, the Master replied, “It is appropriate for us to fulfill all righteousness,” that is, to conform to God’s plan, what God has decided, what is pleasing to God. The beatitude of those who hunger after righteousness is the blessedness of moral integrity, the desire for spiritual goods; it is analogous to the beatitude of those “persecuted for the sake of righteousness” (Matt 5:10; 1 Pet 3:14), religious persecution of the disciples, whose moral conduct condemned pagan depravity. But there are different righteousnesses: “If your righteousness does not go beyond that of the scribes and Pharisees you will not enter the kingdom of heaven.” For them, righteousness was embodied in spectacular displays; but in the new covenant, it is the heart that counts: right intentions, and especially love. So there is a qualitative change. Justice/righteousness in the new kingdom means fulfilling God’s will freely and joyfully, which goes beyond (*perisseuō*) material obedience. This is even clearer in Matt 21:32 – “John came to you in the way of righteousness and you did not believe in him,” whereas the publicans and the prostitutes came to be purified. Great sinners were made righteous by believing in the message of the prophet sent by God.

To say that “human wrath does not accomplish the justice/righteousness of God” (Jas 1:20, *dikaiosynē theou*; cf. Rom 10:3) means that it is foreign to the divine will and hence cannot be justice. The quotation of Gen 15:6 – “Abraham believed God and this was imputed to him as righteousness” – remains on the Jewish plane: the patriarch is judged by God as being holy in his conduct, so that a nuance of reward is conveyed. Likewise Heb 11:7 – Noah “became an heir of righteousness according to faith” (cf. Rom 4:11, 13) and not according to works or through a legal system. Similarly, training through correction (*paideia*), which procures the “peaceable fruit of righteousness,” seems to internalize *dikaiosynē*; the “trainee” acquires this or that virtue as evidence of eternal salvation. This original nuance in the new covenant is found also at 1 Pet 2:24 – Christ was crucified “so that we might live for righteousness/justice.” Life is transformed by faith and baptism, which make the Christian ready to do God’s will, able to serve him, and thus to be genuinely

just/righteous, for “whoever fulfills righteousness is born of him” (1 John 2:29). In the new heavens and new earth “the justice/righteousness will dwell for which we wait as the fulfillment of his promise” (2 Pet 3:13). This eschatological righteousness is a perfection in which nothing is lacking; here it is almost synonymous with glory, God’s gift if not God himself.

There remain the Johannine usages of *dikaiosynē*, first in the sense of “trial”: the Paraclete “will convict the world of guilt with respect to righteousness/justice.” Like an advocate in an appeals court, the Holy Spirit will ask each person to make an individual assessment of the original judgment against Jesus: was he guilty or innocent? Everyone must take sides. The Paraclete will convict the original judges of injustice and will exalt the innocence of their convict. As for 1 John 2:29, this verse presupposes the Pauline theology: “Since you know that God is just/righteous, you know also that whoever practices justice/righteousness is born of him.” This practice is the whole of Christian ethics (cf. Rev 22:11) and means above all the exercise of brotherly love (1 John 3:10). But the way in which God’s righteousness is related to that of his children is remarkable: it is as divinely born ones that Christians resemble their Father. Those who are born of a righteous/just God cannot be other than truly righteous/just (cf. 1 John 3:7).

For St. Paul, *dikaiosynē* is a new and crucial chapter in soteriology. The former Pharisee eliminates the self-proclaimed righteousness obtained through observance of the law (*dikaiosynē ek nomou*), by the “works” that it prescribes (Gal 2:16; Rom 3:20; 4:2; Titus 3:5). This righteousness, after all, would be purely legal, a personal victory and the rightful property of the obedient person; but this *dikaiosynē* cannot give life (Gal 3:21) and is therefore worthless, no longer valid, because in the divine plan the law was intended to be no more than a pedagogue, a transitory institution (Gal 3:15–26). Otherwise “Christ died in vain” (Gal 2:21). But in fact Christ is “the end of the law (*telos nomou*) that righteousness might be given to whoever believes” (Rom 10:4). So a new dispensation is substituted, that of a life-giving justice/righteousness, a participation in God’s righteousness (the antithesis of personal human righteousness, Rom 10:3; 2 Cor 5:21). This righteousness is based on faith and is valid for all humanity (Rom 9:30ff.). In its very essence, therefore, this is no longer a human way of justification but justification through divine intervention. What then is this *dikaiosynē theou*? It is known by its manifestations, because it is essentially active, dynamic, communicating benefits proper to God, making, as it were, a new creation (2 Cor 5:17); and its goal is the justification of humans (Rom 3:25–26). This “righteousness/justice of God” is first of all a divine attribute (Rom 8:33, “it is God who justifies,” *theos ho dikaiōn*), notably with respect to his role in retributive justice; but it is

seen especially as a merciful will that is gracious and forgiving (Titus 3:5). It is revealed in the cross of Christ, the source of salvation for all who believe: “Christ has become our righteousness” (*Christos egenēthē dikaiosynē*, 1 Cor 1:30; Rom 10:4). Sin is abolished (Gal 2:17; Rom 4:7). This is not a simple acquittal, a verdict of justification (Rom 8:33); this is the merciful justice of God, “who gives life to the dead and calls the nonexistent into existence” (Rom 4:17) and transforms the one who participates in Christ’s death and resurrection. He infuses the believer with a *dikaiōsis zōēs* (Rom 5:18), the infusion of a *pneuma zōē dia dikaiosynēn* (Rom 8:10; Gal 3:2, 5). It is consequently a gift received (*dōrea*, Rom 5:17), a real justice] righteousness (4:4–5) that a person possesses beginning in the present, thanks to Christ. “God made him who knew no sin to be sin for us, so that we might become the righteousness of God in him” (2 Cor 5:21).

Saving faith is precisely this acceptance and this confidence in God acting in the mystery of Christ, in whom the future of salvation is summed up (Rom 3:22). Justice/righteousness and faith are not identical; for it is not faith that justifies, but God who justifies through faith (cf. Lagrange, “La Justification selon saint Paul,” p. 140). In faith, a person appropriates Christ’s righteousness (Gal 2:17, the efficient cause of our own righteousness, thus becoming the “righteousness of God,” 2 Cor 5:21). Righteousness proceeds from faith, which is like a title for obtaining this gift from God. To talk about this relationship between faith and justice/righteousness, St. Paul uses the phrase *ek pisteōs* (“from or of faith,” Rom 5:1; Gal 3:24; this is man’s part; cf. Gal 3:8); *dia pisteōs* (“through faith,” Rom 3:30; with the genitive, *dia* refers to the active role of faith as used by God, Rom 3:22; 9:30; cf. Lagrange, *ibid.*); finally, the instrumental dative *pistei* (Rom 3:28; 5:2; cf. 5:20; Phil 1:27): a person is justified by means of faith, but the principal agent is God.

Understood thus, justice/righteousness by faith cannot be forensic. The sinner is transformed within, is prepared to life with God, prepared for eternal life (Rom 5:21; 8:10), granted a power (5:17) that allows him to triumph over sin (6:18ff.; 2 Cor 6:4), outfitted with the “weapons of justice/righteousness” (Rom 6:13; 2 Cor 6:7; Eph 6:14). Since the object of this initial justification is a living being, it must continue as an unending process; so in concrete terms it is identified with the Christian life (1 Pet 2:24; 1 John 3:10) and with sanctification.

IV. *Dikaioō*. – The occurrences of this (relatively rare) verb in the secular literature shed no light on the biblical texts. In the literary documents, the predominant meaning is “judge to be good, appreciate, reckon to be just” and hence “pronounce personal judgment.” The ten or so occurrences in the papyri



have the same meaning, but almost all have a legal sense: “the court’s verdict was that we should reimburse the capital.”

In the LXX, the passive of *dikaioō*, translating the qal stem of the Hebrew verb *šādaq*, almost always means “be just,” as at Gen 38:26 – “Tamar has been more in the right than I.” Good judges “pronounce the just just” and do not justify the guilty (Exod 23:7). This justice/righteousness consists in being in order, as by carrying out a vow (Sir 18:22); in being within one’s right (niph'al of the Hebrew verb *šāpaq*, Tob 6:12, 14; cf. Add Esth 10:9); and especially in being “innocent, beyond reproach.” It is a gift given by God. Often *dikaioō* means “defend, excuse,” but this declaratory sense (2 Sam 15:4) – which is rather often legal – is purely literary, because it presupposes that no one can effectively justify the sinner – except the Messiah: “My servant, the Just One, will justify the many (hiphil of *šādaq*); he will take on their iniquities” (Isa 53:11). Here the death of the servant expiates the sins of the people; to justify means to destroy sin, so that sinners recover a real innocence of soul. This heralds Pauline justification.

The Gospels use the aorist passive *edikaiōthē* in the same meaning as the LXX. In the parable about the recalcitrant children – representing people who refused to believe God’s message as communicated either by Jesus or John the Baptist – the Master concludes: “Wisdom has been justified by her works” (Matt 11:19) or “by all her children” (Luke 7:35). Far from blaming the precursor for his austerity or Jesus for his open-mindedness, the people and the publicans showed themselves to be teachable and conformed to the dispositions of divine wisdom. Thus they avenged and “justified” this wisdom, proclaiming the excellence and the authenticity of its providential interventions. The “children of wisdom,” truly wise people, prove through their adherence that the means used by God to carry out his merciful plan of salvation were effective, well adapted to their goal. The justification in Matt 12:37, which is declaratory (but with cause), is perfectly traditional, as is Matt 16:15, which denounces “those who pass themselves off as just before people” (*hoi dikaiountes heautous*) but whose assessment is at variance with God’s.

The conclusion of the parable of the Pharisee and the Tax Collector, addressed to certain people who thought of themselves as just (*hoti eisin dikaioi*, Luke 18:9), uses the perfect passive participle *dedikaiōmenos* to express that the tax collector “went down to his house justified rather than the other (the Pharisee)” (verse 14) upon his return from the temple, thanks to his prayer and his humility. Here it is a question of interior justification, which is much more than a verdict of acquittal: God grants that this “sinner” becomes just, he makes him just. This is already the Pauline sense attested in the discourse at Pisidian Antioch: “Through him (Jesus), everyone who believes is

justified (*en toutō pas ho pisteuōn dikaioutai*) from everything that you could not be justified from (aorist passive, *dikaiōthēnai*) by the law of Moses.”

Several times St. Paul uses *dikaioō* in its forensic OT sense, “declare or acknowledge to be just,” especially when he is quoting the OT, but it would be wrong to extend this meaning to all the texts. In the first place, this would be to forget that “verbs in *-oō* mean to make whatever the root indicates. Thus *dikaioō* should properly mean ‘make just.’ This meaning is not found in secular Greek for rather natural reasons.” In the second place, it would overlook the fact that St. Paul, as a converted Pharisee, perceived as no one else did the opposition between the new covenant and the old covenant, law and grace, circumcision and baptism, and perhaps especially the inefficacy of the old legal dispensation compared to the efficacy and realism of the dispensation of salvation centered on the cross of Jesus. The consequence is a radical change in ideas concerning righteousness/justification, as is seen in the frequent linking of the verb “justify” with faith in Christ and in the explicit contrast between justification and works of the law; there is a different scheme or process for attributing justice/righteousness in the new covenant than in the old covenant. The apostle gives *dikaioō* a causative sense, as appears from Rom 3:24 – “All have sinned and come short of the glory of God (cf. Rom 8:30; 2 Cor 3:18; 5:21); (henceforth) they are justified (present passive participle, *dikaioumenoi*) freely by his grace, through the redemption (*apolytrōsis*) that is in Jesus Christ.” God has shown his mercy, but not by pronouncing acquittal pure and simple; through Christ a price was paid, a ransom (*lytron*) with expiatory value (cf. verse 25: *hilastērion*), so that “sinners” have become just, have been made truly righteous. Another clear text is Rom 3:26 – “to show his justice/righteousness (his salvific action), so that (it might be established that) he himself is just and that he justifies (present active participle, *dikaionta*) the one who has faith in Jesus”: the just God communicates his justice/righteousness and makes just. Again: “We hold that a person is justified (present passive infinitive, *dikaiousthai*) by faith without works of the law”; “There is only one God, who will justify (future active indicative, *dikaiōsei* = will make just) the circumcised on the basis of faith and the uncircumcised by means of that same faith” (Rom 3:30).

The realism in this Christian justification is made explicit at Rom 5:1 – “Having therefore been justified by faith (aorist passive participle, *dikaiōthentes*), let us maintain peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ.” Whereas sinners were enemies of God, they have now “become righteous/just,” i.e., reconciled with God (5:10) in an enduring way (5:2) and have a loving relationship with a holy God in the peace of a purified heart. Such is the standing of the present Christian life. Believers are made so thoroughly just that

they are sure of their future glorification: “Those whom God has called he has also justified (aorist active indicative, *edikaiōsen*), those whom he has justified he has also glorified (aorist, anticipating something that is certain, according to Lagrange)” (Rom 8:30). All these verbs are causative; all these acts of God connect to each other and are called by each other’s names. Justification is as real and as personal a gift as the gift of faith; the present state is as certain as the future glory. Finally, 1 Cor 6:11 is decisive: “You have been washed (at baptism), you have been sanctified, you have been justified (aorist passive indicative, *edikaiōthēte*) in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of our God.” The three aorist verbs show that the events coincide; the two latter verbs in the passive express the reality of the interior change. E. B. Allo notes, “This is a classic passage against imputed righteousness.”

V. *Dikaiōma*. – Schrenk (*TDNT*, vol. 2, p. 219) correctly observes that the ending *-ma* indicates the result of an action, in this case the action expressed by *dikaioō*, “to justify.” Thus *dikaiōma* will mean “justification” in Rom 5:16, 18, where St. Paul contrasts the death sentence (*katakrima*) that followed Adam’s transgression (*di’ henos paraptōmatos*) with justification through Christ (*di’ henos dikaiōmatos*), justification that gives life (*eis dikaiōsin zōēs*) and is valid for all humankind. Humankind takes on a new religious “status,” not simply on the basis of God’s declaration, but because this justice/righteousness has become the property of former sinners who can take advantage of it.

On the other hand, “God’s righteous decree” (*to dikaiōma tou theou*, Rom 1:32), “the requirements of the law” (*ta dikaiōmata tou nomou*, Rom 2:26, cf. 8:4), and “worship regulations” (*dikaiōmata latreias*, Heb 9:1, 10) have the common OT meaning “ordinance, regulation.” In accord with the ideal of Jewish piety, Zechariah and Elizabeth, “both just (*dikaioi*) before God, walked in all the commandments and regulations of the Lord” (Luke 1:6). It is more difficult to understand Rev 15:4 – “All the people will see and bow down before you, because your justifications are manifest” (*hoti ta dikaiōmata sou ephanerōthēsan*). This could refer to the punishment of the ungodly, but more likely it refers to brilliant manifestations of divine sovereignty (cf. Bar 2:17 – in Hades the dead do not return “glory and justice to the Lord”; verse 19).

VI. *Dikaiōsis*. – This rather rare substantive (unknown in Philo, Epictetus, and the papyri) normally means “that which is in accord with the right, the act of establishing justice,” but none of the secular usages shed light on “conferring of justice, act of justification” in Rom 4:25 and 5:18. In the first text: “Jesus our Lord was delivered because of our sins (to do away with them) and raised because of our justification (to obtain it for us, *dia tēn dikaiōsin hēmōn*)”; *dia* indicates the goal, the instrumental cause, “with a view to our salvation”; Christ’s resurrection is the efficient cause of our justification, for if at baptism

the Christian dies with Christ on the cross (Rom 6:4), he enters the new life with Christ emerging from the tomb. Our life is a participation in his, the “life-giving spirit.” In Rom 5:18 – “As through the trespass of one, condemnation fell on all people, so also the righteousness worked by one man (*di’ henos dikaiōmatos*, the state or work of righteousness) procures for all people (in solidarity with him) the justification that gives life (*eis dikaiōsin zōēs*).” This can be understood either as participation in the very life of God or as the existence that concretely carries out justice but necessarily depends on the infusion of grace; justification already means life, as with a fruit seed.

VII. *Dikastēs*. – This substantive is used only by St. Stephen in the NT (Acts 7:27, 35), and it is a quotation from Exod 2:14 – “Who set you up as a chief and judge over us?” (*archonta kai dikastēn*, Hebrew *šōpēṭ*). This association suggests that *dikastēs* is not exactly synonymous with *kritēs*: there are different kinds of judges. *Dikastēs* may refer to a magistrate who sits at a tribunal to pass judgment, but also to “elected judges” (Philo, *Unchang. God* 112; *Husbandry* 116), delegates, arbiters chosen to settle disputes, such as priests, whose duties include settling contested matters; and finally the conscience, and God, the heavenly judge.

The office of judge is treated with the highest consideration. There are “royal judges,” like Dionysius, “king’s friend become *politikon stratēgon*” (*SEG XXIII*, 617, 4; cf. *P.Dura* 18, 10, 31; 19, 18; from AD 87/88). There are above all those eminent persons who have a top-level role in the city administration, who are members of a board or of commissions of the assembly charged with preparing for a festival or managing funds. Cities invite foreign judges to “settle disputed contracts” and honor them not only for the fairness of their decisions but also for their behavior. Here we may mention the biblical use of *dikastēs* for a person of high rank, a ruler, a leader of Israel (1 Sam 7:1–2), having official authority and the required powers. Artisans are incapable of these functions (Sir 38:33).

δίστομος

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*distomos*, **having two mouths or two edges**

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*distomos*, S 1366; *EDNT* 1.337; MM 165; L&N 79.94; BAGD 200

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This adjective, which literally means “with two mouths” or “with two openings,” is applied to a cave with two entries (*distomos petra*, a rock pierced right through, Sophocles, *Phil.* 16), a road that splits (*distoi hodoi*, the point where two travelers’ routes meet, Sophocles, *OC* 900), the post of a door with

two entries, a river or canal with a “double mouth” (Polybius 34.10.5); “so that the canal also has two mouths” (*hōste kai distomon einai tēn diōryga*, Strabo 17.4.35). In a letter of September 19, 251, the *dioikētēs* Apollonius asks his steward Zeno to have four hundred birds sent to him to fatten, and one hundred chickens to Ptolemais, “which is on the double mouth.”

Euripides speaks of thrusting in a “two-edged sword.” The OT uses *distomos* with either the *machaira* or the *rhomphaia* as a way of emphasizing its penetrating force. The NT uses the term only metaphorically: the word of God is “sharper than any two-edged sword” (*tomōteros hyper pasan machairan distomon*, Heb 4:12). The comparison is self-evident in Hebrew, first of all because a “word” is “what comes out of the mouth”; and secondly because the word is an offensive weapon, and God’s is irresistible. The qualification “two-edged,” meaning “sharpened on both sides,” emphasizes its piercing quality.

Rev 1:16; 2:12; 19:15, in order to symbolize the power of the divine word, have a sword coming out of Christ’s mouth and add that this *rhomphaia* is *oxeia*, that is, “sharp, penetrating.” No clearer expression for its force could be devised.

## διχοτομέω

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*dichotomeō*, to cut in two

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*dichotomeo*, S 1371; TDNT 2.225–226; EDNT 1.337; MM 165; L&N 19.19, 37.12; BAGD 200

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In a collection of “parables of the Parousia,” the responsible parties – who have the keys to the kingdom of heaven – are warned that they will be judged with particular rigor. Actually, the steward or servant who mistreats the household staff and carouses with his master’s property will be severely punished by the master when he returns: *dichotomēsei auton*. Must we translate literally (“He will cut him in two”) or figuratively (“He will remove him” from his service, will show him the door)?

Derived from *temnō*, “to cut, cleave, slice,” and hence “smite,” the compound *dichotomeō* (unknown in the papyri and in Philo) literally means “cut or divide in two.” It is used for the moon (*hē selēnē dichotomousa*), which divides the months into two equal parts. In geometry, it means “to bisect a figure into equal parts by bisecting lines, medians.” But the meaning “to separate, to remove from a group or a person” is attested in the fourth century AD in a tomb inscription, probably Christian, at Lycaonia, in which Gordian is separated from his eldest son, Ambrose: “to my firstborn son Ambrose, who

has cut me off from long life” (*tō hueiō mou tō prōtotokō Ambrosiō tō dichotomēsanti me tou poloetion zēn*, MAMA VIII, 252).

These usages hardly correspond to the usage in the two Synoptics. On the other hand, Josephus, commenting on the judgment of Solomon (1 Kgs 3:25), has the king say *amphotera dichotomēsai ta paidia* (“cut both children in two,” *Ant.* 8.31). The only occurrence of the verb in the OT has to do with sacrificial victims: “You shall cut the ram in pieces”; and in 3 *Apoc. Bar.* 16.3, the Lord commands, “and you shall cut them off with the sword and with death, and their children with demons” (*kai dichotomēsate autous en machaira kai en thanatō, kai ta tekna autōn en daimoniois*). This is the best parallel to the NT texts.

This form of torture is already mentioned by Odysseus to Melantho: “I will tell Telemachus, so that he will carve you (*tamēsin*) limb from limb” (Homer, *Od.* 18.339). According to Herodotus 2.139.2, an Ethiopian received in a vision the advice that he should “cut in two (*diatamein*) across the middle of the body all the priests of Egypt.” The prophet Daniel threatens, “The angel of God will cleave you down the middle” (Sus 55, *schisei sou*, LXX). “When the master of the house comes and sees the steward insolently handing out orders, he drags him outside and cuts him” (*helkysas etemen*, Epictetus 3.22.3); Pyrrhus, with his sword, “cleaved the body of the barbarian in two parts that fell simultaneously on each side.”

Such a punishment for the servant in the Gospels is extremely severe, and already St. Jerome explained, “This does not mean that he will cut him in two with the sword, but only that he will cut him off from the society of the saints and will consign him with the hypocrites.” So it is possible to treat the text in a more or less softened manner, theologically and morally speaking. But this is not a place for sensitivity. Cut off from the household of God, the unworthy one can only be in Gehenna, as Matt 24:51 notes: “where there is wailing and grinding of teeth” (cf. 8:12; 13:42, 50; 22:13; 25:30). This is the punishment reserved for the “worthless servant” in the parable of the Talents (Matt 25:30; cf. the parable of the Minas: “As for my enemies ... slaughter them before me,” Luke 19:27) and is analogous to the fate of the sterile fig tree (Luke 13:9, *ekkopseis autēn*). The verb *dichotomeō* seems to suggest God’s absolute rights and the requirements attached to his gifts.

O. Betz has shown a correspondence to the disciplinary formulations at Qumran, especially 1 QS 2.16–17, which formulates a twofold curse: “God will separate him for evil and he will be cut off from the midst of all the sons of light ... the error that led him astray will win him a place in the midst of those eternally accursed.” The dramatic death of Judas (“his body burst open,” *elakēsen mesos*, Acts 1:18) could well be a reference to the punishment in Matt

24:51. Finally, the deaths of Ananias and Sapphira, hypocrites who lied to the Holy Spirit (Acts 5:1–11), show that the punishments of unworthy believers are not purely metaphorical.

δοκιμάζω, δοκιμασία, δοκιμή, δοκίμιον, δόκιμος, ἀδόκιμος  
*dokimazō*, **to prove, test, verify, examine prior to approval, judge, evaluate, discern**; *dokimasia*, **verification, testing, authenticity**; *dokimē*, **proof, trial**; *dokimion*, **testing, proven worth**; *dokimos*, **proved, acceptable**; *adokimos*, **worthless**

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*dokimazo*, S 1381; TDNT 2.255–260; EDNT 1.341–343; NIDNTT 3.808–810; MM 167; L&N 27.45, 30.98, 30.114; BDF §§392(3), 405(2), 416(2); BAGD 202 | *dokimasia*, TDNT 2.255–260; EDNT 1.343; NIDNTT 3.808; MM 167; L&N 27.45; BAGD 202 | *dokime*, S 1382; TDNT 2.255–260; EDNT 1.341–343; NIDNTT 3.808–809; MM 167; L&N 27.45, 65.12, 72.7; BDF §110(2); BAGD 202 | *dokimion*, S 1383; TDNT 2.255–260; EDNT 1.343; NIDNTT 3.808–809; MM 167–168; L&N 27.45, 73.3; BDF §§23, 263(2); BAGD 203 | *dokimos*, S 1384; TDNT 2.255–260; EDNT 1.341–343; NIDNTT 3.808; MM 168; L&N 30.115, 73.4, 87.7; BDF §§23, 263(2); BAGD 203 | *adokimos*, S 96; TDNT 2.255–260; EDNT 1.33; NIDNTT 3.808–810; L&N 65.13, 88.111; BAGD 18

The exact meaning of these terms is subject to dispute because they are used in so many ways in literary, epigraphic, and papyrological texts. Even their etymology is unsure, although derivation from *dokeō* (*dokaō* is not attested) is the best option and accounts for the intellectual value of the verb *dokimazō*: “put to the proof, test, discern, verify, examine before giving approval.”

In the inscriptions and the papyri, beginning with the third century BC, the verb’s first meaning is “examine, verify.” In a Samian law concerning the distribution of grain: “Let the *chiliasteis* examine mortgage guarantees and the personalities of the guarantors”; a *nomarchos* is to examine a petition (*P.Fam.Tebt.* 43, 52; *P.Ryl.* 114, 35; *P.Gen* 32, 8); an architect “shall visit the site, make an estimate (*dokimasanta*), and set the amount of the rent” (*P.Bour.* 20, 9). Similarly, private individuals estimate prices (*P.Hib.* 207, 8), verify the value of staters (*P.Yale* 79, 10), or evaluate an opportunity (*P.Oxy.* 2760, 17; Philo, *Moses* 1.263, 306; 2.177). Someone makes an examination in order to be able to judge and decide. This is why the formula “if your majesty approves him” (*ean to megaleion sou dokimasē touton*) comes up so often in petitions to the prefect of Egypt; thus this mother from Theadelphia writes: “I take refuge at

your feet, beseeching you on behalf of my minor children to order ... either the *stratēgos* or whomever your majesty shall decide to force Annous to pay regular rent on the land” (*P.Thead.* 18, 17). When someone submits a case to an authority for examination, it is in order that the authority may evaluate it, decide, and finally approve (*ean dokimazēs*). In a Macedonian law concerning the use of public land, “the councillors approved (*edokimasan*) that those who did the planting ... should have a share in the harvest.” The verb has a religious meaning when a divinity tests, sanctions, and guarantees the virtue of a king and thus qualifies him in his functioning.

In the LXX, the nuance of approbation is attested only once, as is the nuance “discern” (Job 34:3); but “put to the proof, examine” is quite common, especially with respect to metals, and is used for God’s examining, sounding, scrutinizing, and testing human hearts, which are purified by “testing” – as silver is purified (Ps 66:10) – and emerge perfect (Sir 31:10). The meaning “verify” (Wis 2:19; 2 Macc 1:34) is also a component of the meaning “test God” (Ps 95:9; Wis 1:3). Philo retains for this verb the meaning “put to the test,” an examining whose goal is to judge and verify; but he especially emphasizes “evaluate” and “discern values.” Josephus was apparently the first to give the word a moral meaning: the character of an Essene novice is put to the test (*to ēthos dokimazetai*) for two years, and only then is he received into the community. God put Abraham’s attitude to the test (*Ant.* 1.233) and approved just laws (4.295; cf. 8.380; 14.195); virtue is tested (3.15); the correctness of the lawmaker’s conceptions is verified (1.15; 11.94); tribal chiefs are approved by the people as honest and just (3.71; cf. 13.183); Alexander “put to the test the virtue and faithfulness of all the peoples” (*Ag. Apion* 2.42). The meaning “judge, esteem” is also well attested.

The first NT use of *dokimazō* is meteorological. With respect to the impending crisis, Jesus says to his contemporaries, “Hypocrites, you know how to evaluate (*oidate dokimazein*) the appearance of the earth and of the sky; how is it that you do not evaluate this present time?” (Luke 12:56). *Kairos* is the time when a decision is to be made, ought to be made. The Israelites do not “discern” the times and the person of the Messiah; the Master invites them to “verify” his coming and draw out its meaning. When 1 Pet 1:7 specifies that faith is more precious “than perishable gold, which is nevertheless tried by fire” (*dia pyros de dikomazomenou*), not only does this mean that the fire selects, purifies, refines the material and gives the metal greater value; the text also uses the verb *dokimazō* in the sense that *dokimasia* is constantly given in the papyri (cf. below, *dokimos*), where gold, silver, or pewter is tested by fire to prove its authenticity and to remove impurities. This meaning – “verify, test” – also appears in 1 Cor 3:13, where each apostle’s work “will be made manifest by



fire” (at the Last Judgment) and “the fire will prove its value (quality).” Fire is the means of verification and control, as with precious metals: that which is worthless is destroyed, but that which is solid and eternal remains. It is through their generosity – and thus by concrete acts, by their behavior – that the Corinthians will verify, test, and prove their love to be genuine, of good alloy (2 Cor 8:8).

*Dokimazō* means “discern” what it is important to do, the best course to follow, the decision to make, and especially to discern what is pleasing to the Lord (Eph 5:10), which presupposes spiritual renewal and the possession of love, which consequently gives a religious sense, a kind of spiritual instinct that allows a person to recognize true values (Rom 12:2). The Pauline innovation is to apply this verb, with a moral and religious meaning, to Christians themselves: “Examine yourselves.” The authenticity of charismatic manifestations must be tested, put to the proof, verified: “Prove all things, hold fast that which is good” (*panta de dokimazete, to kalon katechete*), and thus reject whatever is suspect. St. Paul valued the zeal of the brother (St. Luke?) who accompanied the bearers of the collection; he has had many proofs of his zeal (2 Cor 8:22, *hon edokimasamen*), just as the Corinthians have judged these bearers qualified (*hous ean dokimasēte*, 1 Cor 16:3). God himself had examined the apostle, tested his heart, and pronounced him qualified to preach the gospel (1 Thess 2:4). Finally, candidates for the diaconate are to be examined before being installed in their function: “Let them be tested first (*houtoi dikomazesthōsan prōton*); then, if they are without reproach, let them carry out their office” (1 Tim 3:10). If this *dokimasia* is not explicitly demanded for *episkopoi*, the criteria of discernment are enumerated at length (1 Tim 3:1–7). The “proving” mentioned in these texts is in absolute conformity to Greek custom, whereby before entering upon the duties of public service (a magistrate, a *stratēgos*, a senator), a person was subjected to an examination (inquest, proof, trial period?) to determine if he met the conditions required for the office in question.

*Dokimasia*. – This word occurs only once in the NT (Heb 3:9), and there it is a quotation from Ps 95:7–11, where the Israelites are so bold as to put Yahweh to the test, and it is also a hapax in the LXX. In Philo, the word means verification, control (*Spec. Laws* 4.106, 157), a testing (*Flight* 155), experience (149; *Flacc.* 130), criterion (Philo, *Virtues* 68: *logia tēs dokimasias*, ritual formulas for testing); “the test of the soul is that of trouble and bitterness” (*Prelim. Stud.* 164). In the papyri, “six guaranteed gold *solidi*” (*P.Ness.* 18, 14), testing of gold to see if it is pure (*P.Leid.* X, 42–43) testing of bullion for fraud (*ibid.* X, 62), testing and approval for an office (*P.Mert.* 26, 11; cf.

Dittenberger, *Syl.* 972, 29), judged and examined by a common arbiter (*P.Mil.* 659, 55; *PSI* 1105, 20; *SB* 7201, 11).

*Dokimos*. – This adjective, “proved, acceptable, tried,” is abundant in the papyri, but is used almost exclusively for silver, gold, or coins; often there occurs the phrase “three gold *solidi* of imperial coinage, checked for good minting” (*P.Rein.* 105, 1; *SB* 7996, 12, 22, 26; 9193, 18; 11239, 7) or “of imperial minting, authentic and legal.” Similarly, in the LXX, it is almost always a question of refined or purified gold or silver (1 Kgs 10:18 = 2 Chr 9:17; 1 Chr 28:18; 29:4; cf. Zech 11:13); but also “four hundred silver shekels of merchants’ currency” (Gen 23:16).

Philo was familiar with the use of the word for coinage of good alloy, pure and tested metal (*Sacr. Abel and Cain* 137), but he uses this adjective so frequently that it is often impossible to specify its meaning. Often it is a case of something that after examination has been proven, recognized as authentic, and thus acceptable; sometimes it is objects that are of good quality (*Heir* 180), well-reputed islands (*To Gaius*), a well-bred flock (*Dreams* 1.255), but especially souls that live according to the laws of nature and are accepted into God’s circle of friends. With regard to people, *dokimos* means qualified or competent: *en pasi dokimon* (*Joseph* 114), physicians (*Unchang. God* 65; *Spec. Laws* 3.117), scholars (*Creation* 128), artisans (*Heir* 158), priests who are particularly expert at examining animals (*Spec. Laws* 1.166), hence the best (*Plant.* 81) and the noteworthy (*Spec. Laws* 1.78). We could translate “distinguished,” with the additional connotation “deserving the respect and esteem of all,” with a nuance of honorableness and celebrity. So Philo considerably enriched the idea of the *dokimos*, and these nuances are found also in Josephus: “the most eminent ones (*hoi dokimōtatoi*) were slaughtered” (*War* 1.35); “the most eminent citizens by birth and intelligence” (2.482; 4.160); the most eminent Jews of Alexandria and of Rome (7.447; *Ant.* 14.21, 43; *Life* 55); Tiberius Alexander, “the most respected of the friends of Titus.”

The nuances of honor and celebrity are also found in St. Paul: “Greet Apelles, *ton dokimon en Christō*” (Rom 16:10), which is correctly translated “who has proved himself as a Christian” but must also be understood as praise for an illustrious believer, one of good repute. Likewise 2 Tim 2:15 – “Work to present yourself to God as an approved person (*seauton dokimon*), a worker who does not need to be ashamed” (cf. G. Therrien, *Le Discernement dans les écrits pauliniens*, pp. 218–259), tested by his excellent achievements in the gospel ministry but as a result excellent and recognized as such by all. For a Christian who serves Christ in righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Spirit is not only pleasing to God but “approved of men,” recognized by other people as a true or valuable disciple (Rom 14:18). Obviously these praises presuppose

preliminary testing: *hoi dokimoi* are “qualified” Christians, not through their words, but demonstrably, through their deeds (2 Cor 10:18; 2 Cor 13:7). Thus tested, they receive the crown of life.

*Dokimē*. – “Proof, trial” appears only in the Hellenistic period (Symmachus, Ps 68:11; Dioscorides 4.184 [but LSJ says the word is interpolated here – Tr.]) and is used only by St. Paul in the NT. In an active sense, the testing of the Macedonian churches through multiple afflictions gives them abundant joy (2 Cor 8:2). The Corinthians seek proof that Christ is speaking through St. Paul (13:3); they could verify his apostolic authenticity by the manifestations of power in their community, a proof that the Lord would approve. The other texts have a passive sense: “proven character” (Rom 5:4), a quality of one who has been put to the test (2 Cor 2:9; Phil 2:22), proof (2 Cor 9:13).

*Dokimion, dokimios*. – In the papyri, the adjective is only used to describe refined gold or silver: “six minas of pure gold according to the Alexandrian standard.” Similarly the four occurrences in the LXX: “the words of Yahweh are pure words of refined gold”; but in Jas 1:3 – “the testing (*to dokimion*) of your faith produces endurance”; faith that has been put to the test is purified, strengthened, verified, and on this account has become precious. In 1 Pet 1:7, the neuter adjective used as a noun also shows the proven character of faith; when it has proved itself, it is worthy of praise; its worth is recognized after examination.

*Adokimos*. – This word, which means “worthless,” seems to have only one occurrence in the papyri, this in the Zeno correspondence: *kai adokimou* in an account of receipts and disbursements seems to mean “not taken into account, not included in the sum total” (*P.Cair.Zen.* 59176, 64). The LXX has only two usages: “dross” (Hebrew *sîg*) to be purged from silver (Prov 25:4); which in Isa 1:22 means “worthless” (“your silver has become dross”). This is the predominant meaning in Philo: the worthless words, desires, and deeds of the fool (*Conf. Tongues* 198); it could even be translated “void, of no account.” This nuance is to be retained in many NT texts. In contrast to a fertile field, one that bears “thorns and thistles is worthless (*adokimos*) and in danger of being cursed” (Heb 6:8). Since it is void as far as fertility is concerned, it is not fit for the intended use; it is rejected, abandoned, since one is judged by one’s works. After asking “Test yourselves ... examine yourselves,” St. Paul adds “at least unless you should be void” (*ei mēti adokimoi este*, 2 Cor 13:5), meaning that there would be no good to verify. This “incapacity” is that of the mind (*adokimon noun*) of the pagan philosophers, who cannot discern truth and virtue (Rom 1:28) or of latter-day heretics robbed by their corrupt intelligence of the capacity for sound judgment in anything concerning the faith and moral values (2 Tim 3:8). Warped and disordered minds are radically incapable of any

good work (Titus 1:16), whereas the apostle is not incapable of proving himself (2 Cor 13:7). In the athletic context of 1 Cor 9:27, the nuance is more precise: St. Paul beats his body and trains it as a slave “for fear lest after preaching to others I myself should be disqualified.” He is alluding to the preliminary test at athletic competitions, where the judge, after an examination, “eliminated” certain contestants who were “not acceptable,” or in the case of defeat, refused to award them a prize.

δόξα, δοξάζω, συνδοξάζω

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***doxa*, expectation, opinion, reputation, honor, glory; *doxazō*, to think, hold an opinion, imagine, praise, glorify; *syndoxazō*, to sanction, agree to, glorify with**

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*doxa*, S 1391; *TDNT* 2.233–253; *EDNT* 1.344–348; *NIDNTT* 2.44–52; MM 168–169; L&N 1.15, 12.49, 14.49, 25.205, 33.357, 76.13, 79.18, 87.4, 87.23; BAGD 203–204 | *doxazo*, S 1392; *TDNT* 2.253–254; *EDNT* 1.348–349; *NIDNTT* 2.44–45, 874; MM 169; L&N 33.357, 87.8, 87.24; BDF §§235(2), 392(3); BAGD 204 | *sundoxazo*, S 4888; *TDNT* 2.253–254, 7.766–797; *EDNT* 3.299; *NIDNTT* 2.44; L&N 87.10; BAGD 785

The noun *doxa* derives from *dokeō* (future *doxō*, aorist *edoxa*), “think, admit, claim.” It means a subjective appraisal, an internal mental judgment, made by an individual or an assembly. But, beginning with its first usages, *doxa* means “expectation, what is thought possible”; “In accord with our expectation, she goes straight to the mark”; hence by far the most widespread meaning in secular Greek, “opinion, thought, sentiment,” as distinct from *noēsis* (Plato, *Resp.* 7.534.a) and *epistēmē*. There are both true and false opinions, especially among the *axiōmata*, the maxims of the philosophers (*Resp.* 3.413 a), the *kyriai doxai*, and also illusions produced by the imagination or a miscalculation.

This “opinion” can also be that held by others concerning a person; so *doxa* is renown, reputation. Usually this is favorable: “Philip is in love with fame, he has a passion for it.” Hence in the Koine, especially in the inscriptions and the papyri, the meaning “esteem, honor” (expressed by the Latin *gloria* and our word *glory*), is often linked with *timē* (*Pap.Graec.Mag.* 4, 1616), *aretē*, *epainos*. In an honorific decree of Ptolemy IV for the Cretan auxiliaries (around 150 BC), Aglaos of Cos, through his deeds and his excellent counsel, showed himself “worthy of his country and of the glory (good reputation) that he enjoys.” Around the same period, in a decree at Miletus, “Eirenias has shown the finest zeal for the interests of the city and gives his cooperation to all that

pertains to the renown and the glory of our country.” According to his epitaph, the officer Apollonius received from the benefactors “the garland, the sacred allotment of the glory that belongs to the king’s ‘kinsmen.’ ” A *prytanis* is acclaimed as “glory of the city” (*doxa poleōs*, *P.Oxy.* 41, 4).

The semantic evolution of *doxa* is probably the most extraordinary in the Bible. Not once in the LXX (except for Eccl 10:1) or the NT does this noun mean “opinion.” It translates most often the Hebrew *kāhōd*, but also *hōd*, *p’ēr*, *tip’eret*. *Kāhōd*, from the root *kbd*, “be heavy,” evokes the idea of weight or that which confers weightiness (cf. 2 Cor 4:17, an eternal weight of glory) and hence esteem or respect, especially power and wealth. In this secular meaning, *doxa* can be translated sometimes “majesty” (2 Macc 15:13) or “dignity,” sometimes “renown.”

Because Yahweh is the supreme sovereign, he is described as the “king of glory.” The whole universe is full of his *doxa*, that is, the splendor of his majesty. We should understand this to mean his mighty deeds, his glorious interventions (Exod 14:18; 16:7) both in overturning his adversaries (Exod 15:7) and in saving his people. In fact, more than once it is said that “the glory of Yahweh appeared,” conceived sometimes as a manifestation of the deity (Isa 40:5), sometimes as an image of Yahweh; it is visible. “The spirit of the glory of Yahweh was like a raging fire on the peak of the mountain in the eyes of the children of Israel” (Exod 24:17; Deut 5:24), a sparking of light (Ezek 1) that flames out (Isa 60:1–3). This is how biblical *doxa*, the manifestation of the presence and activity of the invisible and transcendent God answers to sense experience: even though its brilliance cannot be perceived by the eyes of the flesh (Ezek 33:22; Acts 22:11; *Asc. Isa.* 9.37), it is contemplated by the spirit. Biblical *doxa* therefore has a touch of luminescence.

It is worth noting that Hellenistic Jewish writers know nothing of the religious meaning of *doxa*. Nevertheless, the *Letter of Aristeeas* has the word in the sense of splendor and brilliance. Philo (in 180 occurrences) has only the meaning “opinion,” in accord with the classical tradition, whether true or false opinion (Philo, *Sacr. Abel and Cain* 2–3; *Worse Attacks Better* 32). This latter is described as vicious (*Sacr. Abel and Cain* 5), atheistic (*Alleg. Interp.* 23; *Post. Cain* 42), and especially as vain or empty; it is over against the truth. *Doxa* (often synonymous with *dogma*) refers also to philosophical opinions and especially to wealth, power, honor, and pleasure. These are images and shifting shadows (*Spec. Laws* 1.28), they are uncertain (*Rewards* 29), intoxicating vapors and lies (*Rewards* 21).

For Josephus, *doxa* is opinion, conception, judgment, but especially reputation, renown. In contrast to Philo, he almost always uses *doxa* in a

favorable sense (“esteem”), linking it to piety and virtue; but neither of them seem to have been influenced by the LXX.

The NT writers are familiar with almost all of the above-mentioned secular and religious meanings. The Synoptics already attest the meaning “honor, distinction, reputation” for the guest placed by the host in the best place, resulting in “honor before all” (*doxa enōpion pantōn*, Luke 14:10). The devil promises the Messiah royal glory – that attaching to domination, magnificence, splendor (Matt 4:8; Luke 4:6). This was the kind of glory Solomon had (Matt 6:29; Luke 12:27). This glory is luminous, like that of Moses and Elijah at Tabor, signaling a heavenly appearance, a divine manifestation. Peter and his companions, awakened by the dazzling light, “saw his (Christ’s) glory” (Luke 9:32). This is a divine state, a condition of honor, of preeminent dignity, of splendor; it belongs especially to Jesus (Mark 10:37), and contrasts with his earthly *morphē* and his passion (Luke 24:26). When the Son of Man appears at the end time as judge and sovereign, his glory will fill the heavens from one end to the other, instantaneously, like lightning. Finally, God’s glory (*kāhōd*) manifests his presence and his intervention, bathing the shepherds of Bethlehem in light. Also, the angels who praise God (Luke 2:13) acclaim the intervention of God’s mercy and might to save humans: “Glory in the highest to God” (*doxa in hypsistois theō*).

St. Paul is the writer who uses the word *glory* most often. As a part of his largely Septuagint-based vocabulary, *doxa* has a depth of meaning that cannot be expressed by a simple translation. Certainly there is the quite basic sense of honor and repute, even beauty and splendor: “If a woman wears her hair long, it is a glory for her”; but there is also a religious nuance with those who “seek glory, honor (*doxan kai timēn*) and immortality.” To the Israelites “belong the adoption and the glory and the alliances and the temple worship and the promises” (Rom 9:4). There is the light of this *doxa*, like the shining forth of luminous rays, like the stars, which each have their brilliance and thus a variety of beauty. Thus Moses’ face, when he returned from speaking with God, shone brilliantly, even though the light was dissipating (Exod 34:29–35); but the administration of the new covenant according to the Spirit prevails with a preeminent and definitive glory (*tēs hyperballousēs doxēs*), because its light comes from “the knowledge of God’s glory (shining) on the face of Christ.” The two splendors are not comparable. There is so much variety in luminousness: “man is the image and glory of God, but woman is the glory of man.” If Adam and Eve are both the image of God, then the man manifests the royal authority of his Creator and the honor of God (cf. *Num. Rab.* 3.15 – “the honor [*kāhōd*] of God ascends from men”) and the woman “procures honor [i.e., for her husband]” (Prov 11:17). These latter texts can be understood well

only as a function of OT *kāhōd*. “All have sinned and are deprived of the glory of God” (Rom 3:23) cannot refer to the good opinion that God would have of the righteous (Cajetan), nor to the grace that would be inaugurated glory (a later theological distinction), but to the splendor and beauty that shine out from the divine splendor and holiness. The idolatrous pagans “exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images representing a mortal man.”

This glory is God in the splendor of his majesty and the omnipotence of his interventions, “the Father of glory” (*ho patēr tēs doxēs*). But this predicate *doxa*, which is peculiar to God, is attributed also to Christ, the “Lord of glory.” Heb 1:3 adds the description: “the Son (of God), the effulgence of his (the Father’s) glory (*apaugasma tēs doxēs autou*) and the image of his substance.” If Christ is the refulgence of God’s *doxa*, it is because his origin is divine; he has the same nature as the Father while having his personal independence. The Council of Nicea would give the definition “light from light” (*phōs ek phōtos*). In proclaiming Jesus as his Son at Tabor, God conferred honor and glory upon him (2 Pet 1:17, *timēn kai doxan*); but as a human, Jesus – after the shame of his passion – was glorified by his resurrection, and at the end of time he will appear as an almighty sovereign and in blinding light. His disciples await “the appearing of the glory of our great God and Savior Jesus Christ,” for they will participate in it (2 Thess 2:14).

Actually, the great innovation of the new covenant is that it calls all believers to share the “eternal glory (of God) in Christ” (1 Pet 5:10). The economy of salvation is order “for our glory” (*eis doxan hēmōn*, 1 Cor 2:7). God calls us “to his kingdom and his glory” (1 Thess 2:12; Rom 5:2; 8:18, 21), and the goal of Jesus’ advent on earth was “to lead many sons to glory” (Heb 2:10). Beginning in the present, these contemplate Christ’s glory and are metamorphosed in his image “from glory to glory,” the objects of increasing illumination. The life-giving glory of Christ becomes ours and emphasizes our spiritual likeness to the Lord; through this refraction we resemble his image more and more “with unveiled faces.” Furthermore, “when Christ, our life, is manifested, then you will be manifested with him *en doxē*,” that is, in splendor and in the greatest dignity (2 Cor 4:17), symbolized as an incorruptible crown. If *doxa* became almost synonymous with the heavenly state, the emphasis is on the nobility of this state and the light received from God. This insistence on dignity and eternity – whereas we think especially of “beatitude” – contrasts with the imperfections of earthly, mortal existence but also refers to the glorious condition of the first human being, clothed with God’s glory. Finally, it is part of the light mysticism characteristic of inhabitants of the Orient and the Mediterranean.

There is nothing to do but give glory to God, after the fashion of Abraham (Rom 4:20), do everything for God's glory (1 Cor 10:31; 2 Cor 8:19), as an expression of our gratitude and adoration, homage to the almighty and faithful God (2 Cor 1:20; Phil 1:11; 2:11). The fact is that the whole economy of salvation in God's intention has as its goal to draw from the saved a hymn "to the praise of the glory of his grace." Hence more or less developed doxologies acclaim either God's excellence, nature, and activity, or Christ as king, heavenly priest, *archēgos*, shepherd: "Jesus Christ, to whom be the glory for ever and ever."

In the Fourth Gospel, the term *doxa* is almost always placed in the mouth of Jesus, notably in the sense of honor, praise, repute, and to contrast honors given by humans with those that come from God. But St. John worked out a theological concept of glory, Christianized it, attributing it to Jesus Christ, while setting it in relation to the glory of God. It was actually in order to reveal his *doxa* that God sent his Son here below, and because Jesus never failed to glorify God, God in turn glorifies him (8:50, 54; 17:5). In the "Prologue," which sketches a portrait of the person of Christ and the character of his mission, the evangelist first states that "the Word was God" (verse 1); then he was "the true light that illuminates every man, coming into the world" (verse 9); "he sojourned among us." All of this leads up to "We beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son of his Father." Just as in the LXX, the apostles *saw* the *doxa*, the luminous manifestation of the Word incarnate, that is, his divine stature, for this glory is precisely that of the Father. Jesus possesses it by right in his capacity as only Son, that is, by virtue of his eternal filiation (cf. 2 Pet 1:16–17).

This divine glory or power in Jesus was manifested perceptibly in the miracles and first of all in the one at Cana: "He manifested his glory and his disciples believed in him" (*ephanērōsen tēn doxan autou kai episteusan eis auton hoi mathētai autou*, John 2:11). This *doxa* comprises three elements: (a) a manifestation (*phanerōsis*), a light (*phōs*); (b) the seeing (*theōria*) of this manifestation; (c) the faith and praise (*timē*) of the witnesses. *Doxa* is the outcome for Jesus of the faith of the disciples, who recognize him as Messiah or Son of God. Through the miracle, Jesus accomplished a self-revelation; in this sign, the disciples discerned his very nature, his "glory," namely, that he was the Messiah (the Word incarnate).

For St. John, it is especially in his passion that Jesus is glorified, because his death is not only that of a martyr showing his patience, faith, and confidence in God, but is also the manifestation of God present and acting in him to save the world (2 Cor 5:19) and ratifying the accomplishment of his mission: "Father, the hour is come; glorify your Son so that your Son may glorify you" through



the redemption of humanity, a common labor manifesting the love of the Father and of the Son. In carrying out the Father's *thelēma*, Jesus glorifies him through his obedience and his love (John 17:4). Jesus wants his disciples to behold this heavenly glory openly, to see (*theōrōsin*, present subjunctive) the brilliance and splendor of his divine nature (John 17:24; Heb 12:14). Christ's last will is that his own may see and hence share his *doxa*, which he possesses in common with the Father; for in this order of reality, it is not possible to behold without in some way becoming a participant (2 Cor 3:18). So Jesus asks that his disciples be made capable of receiving this vision face to face with his divinity, "as he is" (1 John 3:2), which they have not seen here below except through the veil of his flesh (1:14). As St. Augustine says concerning spiritual realities, "to see them is to have them" ("videre est ea habere").

Jesus makes believers sharers in precisely this divine *doxa*, which in the OT was incommunicable: "I have given (*dedōka*) to them the glory that you gave me, so that they may be one as we are one" (John 17:22, both verbs in the perfect). This is a reference to divine filiation (1:2), high nobility. This participation in the divine nature (1 Pet 1:23; 2:2; 2 Pet 1:4) and thus in eternal life, this communion in Christ, imparts to all members the same life that belongs to him; obtained through Christ's passion and his Eucharist, it is the principle that unites all Christians with each other and with the three divine persons. Believers are ushered into the presence of the Holy Trinity, receive its splendor, and share in its glory.

So we understand that Jesus continues in heaven the ministry that he carried out on earth; he "finds himself glorified by his disciples" (John 17:10; *dedoxasmai*, perfect passive), as much through their faith as through their fruitful ministry (verse 8; 1 Thess 2:20; Phil 4:1). Similarly, the Father is glorified by their spiritual fruit (John 15:8), after the fashion of a proud vineyard owner who derives honor from the fruitfulness of his vines. Moreover, in the time of the church, the Paraclete, the Spirit of Truth, will glorify Christ (John 16:14) by making his teachings ever better known, by illuminating them. He never stops re-announcing them, re-proclaiming them (*anangellō*). This manifestation will be simultaneously an interior light and a power of visible radiance. Finally, so that the Father may be glorified in the Son, Jesus promises to do whatever his own ask in his name (14:13). Thus the heavenly Christ continues to act as he did on earth, for the glory of his Father.

*Doxazō*. – In classical Greek this denominative verb expresses both meanings of *doxa*: "think, hold an opinion, imagine," and "honor, exalt, praise, celebrate." This latter meaning is the only one in the LXX: human honors are offered to the king of Israel (2 Sam 6:20; 10:3; 1 Chr 17:18; 19:3) as well as to a slave (Jdt 12:13), to a father, a mother, a priest, a judge, the rich, etc. But in

the song of Moses after the crossing of the Red Sea, Yahweh is said to be clothed in glory (Hebrew *gā'āh*) and is exalted (hiphil of *nāwāh*); he wins fame and demonstrates his magnificence by his might (niph'al of *'āḏar*). “Who is like him, majestic in holiness?” (Exod 15:1, 2, 6, 11; cf. 1 Macc 3:14). Since God manifests his glory in Israel and glorifies his own, it follows that his people will exalt and praise him. This gratitude is the elect people’s *raison d’être*.

In the NT, *doxazō* sometimes retains its secular meaning, “praise, acclaim,” while here and there a shade of OT *doxa* is present. But the meaning of “glorifying God” is exactly as in the LXX: like lights that shine and give forth light, the good works of the disciples “glorify the Father who is in heaven” (Matt 5:16). God is exalted and praised in view of the manifestations of his sovereignty and power, especially in the miracles whose brilliance draws adoration and thankfulness. If Christians are commanded to “glorify God in your bodies” (1 Cor 6:20; imperative, *doxasate*), it is because the body is the temple of God; not only must it be preserved pure and holy, it is also the locus of sacred acts, of worship that praises and glorifies God (cf. Rom 12:1). All the faithful are joined together in this thanksgiving liturgy. “In everything let God be glorified (acclaimed) through Jesus Christ” (1 Pet 4:11; a doxology follows).

As for St. John, he uses *doxazō* almost exclusively for Christ’s glory and his relationship with the Father, exactly as with *doxa*. If “the Spirit was not yet, because Jesus had not yet been glorified” (7:39, passive of *doxazō*, as at 12:16, 23), this must be understood as a reference to the reintegration into eternal glory after the passion and the resurrection, i.e., in the splendor of his majesty and sovereign omnipotence.

*Syndoxazō*. – This extremely rare verb, a biblical hapax, is only attested three or four times and in each case in a different meaning. Aristotle understands it to mean common approbation: “No profit will be had from the most beneficent laws, even if they are sanctioned by the unanimity of the citizens (*syndedoxasmenōn hypo pantōn tōn politeuomenōn*), if these latter ...” (*Pol.* 5.9.12). In Porphyry, it means “agree, consent to.” According to Rom 8:17, it is a matter of being “glorified with,” together in heaven: “we will suffer with him (Christ) so that we may be glorified with him,” united to him, eternally in his presence, participants in his honor, his joy, and the riches of his kingdom.

δοῦλος, οἰκέτης, οἰκεῖος, μίσθιος, μισθωτός

*doulos*, **slave**; *oiketēs*, **slave or domestic servant**; *oikeios*, **family member**; *misthios*, **salaried domestic servant**; *misthōtos*, **day laborer**

→see also ὑπηρέτης, μισθός, μισθόομαι, μίσθωμα

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*doulos*, S 1401; *TDNT* 2.261–279; *EDNT* 1.349–352; *NIDNTT* 3.592–597; MM 170; L&N 37.3, 87.76; BDF §162(5); BAGD 205 | *oiketes*, S 3610; *EDNT* 2.495; MM 440; L&N 46.5; BAGD 557 | *oikeios*, S 3609; *TDNT* 5.134–135; *EDNT* 2.494; *NIDNTT* 2.247, 251; MM 440; L&N 10.11; BAGD 556 | *misthios*, S 3407; *TDNT* 4.695–728; *EDNT* 1.432; *NIDNTT* 3.138–139; MM 413; L&N 57.174; BAGD 523 | *misthotos*, S 3411; *TDNT* 4.695–728; *EDNT* 1.433; *NIDNTT* 3.138–139; MM 414; L&N 57.174; BAGD 523

It is wrong to translate *doulos* as “servant,” so obscuring its precise signification in the language of the first century. In the beginning, before it came to be used for slaves, *doulos* was an adjective meaning “unfree,” as opposed to *eleutheros*, and this dichotomy remained basic in the first century: *eite douloi, eite eleutheroi*. Gaius defines: “The principal legal distinction between persons is that of free and slave. Further, among free men, some are *ingenuus*, other are manumitted. The *ingenii* are those who are born free; the manumitted are those who are freed from servitude by a legal proceeding.”

The word *slave* refers above all to a legal status, that of an object of property (Latin *res Mancipi*). To be a slave is to be attached to a master (Greek *despotēs*; Matt 13:27; Luke 14:21; 1 Tim 6:1; Titus 2:9) by a link of subjection – you are the slave of that which dominates you (2 Pet 2:19; cf. Rom 9:12). A slave is an article of personal property that one buys, sells, leases, gives, or bequeaths, that one can possess jointly; a slave can serve as a pledge or mortgage; is a *res* or a *sōma* (male or female; Rev 18:13), is grouped with the animals as among those *hypo zygon* (under the yoke, 1 Tim 6:1; cf. Gen 27:40; Lev 26:13; Deut 28:48; etc.); and this nuance of abjection is evoked by the *morphē doulou* of the Son of God Incarnate (Phil 2:7; cf. Matt 20:27). Given that Christians are bought and paid for by the Lord, St. Paul, the former rabbi, i.e., theologian-jurist or jurist-theologian, transposes this notion of servitude into the supernatural order, accentuating above all the nuance of the Lord’s radical seizure of the believer; the latter, being in submission to the discretionary will of his Master, becomes essentially a dependent individual. Furthermore, while only freemen and freedmen enjoy the right to *tria nomina*, the slave bears only a *cognomen* and is specified by the use of the genitive of his owner’s name, to which is often joined a title designating the job that he does for his master (*oikonomos*, *dispensator*, *medicus*, *balnearius*, etc.). So when St. Paul officially presents himself as “apostle, slave of Jesus Christ,” he proclaims that he belongs exclusively and totally not to any emperor here below but to the Lord of heaven and earth, who owns all rights to him; more precisely, he defines himself, his existence, his mission, all his activities, in terms of Christ, his master. In fact, if the slave is the object of a real right, the *dominica*

*potestas*, then he himself has no legal status as a person, is entitled to no rights: “servile caput nullum jus habet” (Diogenes Laertius 17.32); it is the owner of the slaves who profits from their activity, who has the right to the fruit of their labor; their *opera* are his, just as the fruit of a tree belongs to the owner of the tree. Thus the master will gather the increase on his goods due to the industry of his *douloi* (Matt 25:14; cf. Luke 19:13), the apostle carrying out his ministry expects no salary (1 Cor 9:16–17), and the *douloi archeioi* recognize that they are only slaves, whose only purpose in life is to carry out that which they are commanded to do; *doulos eis hypokoēn* (Rom 6:16).

If it is true that “slavery is an institution which has as its essential goal to make available to one person the activities of other persons,” a link attaches the *doulos* to his function; the slave is a “worker” or a living tool (*organon*), and his most important role is carrying out his task to the profit of his master. This nuance can be seen in the declaration of the Virgin Mary – “behold the handmaid of the Lord” (*idou hē doulē Kyriou*); in the expression “his *douloi* the prophets” (Rev 10:7; 11:18; cf. 1:1; Acts 4:29; 16:17); in the texts in the Synoptics that evoke the deeds of slaves (Matt 13:28; 21:34; 22:3–4; 24:46; Luke 15:22; 17:7), “to each his own work” (*hekastō to ergon autou*, Matt 13:34); in the Pauline meaning of the verb *douleuō* – “complete a task, consecrate oneself to a work, devote oneself to a master” (Acts 20:19; Rom 6:6; 7:6, 25; 12:11; 14:18; 16:18; Gal 5:13; Col 3:24; Titus 3:2); and finally, in the ethic of servitude, urging Christian slaves not only to obey their master (Eph 6:5; Col 3:22; Titus 2:9), but to “serve” willingly (Eph 6:7; 1 Tim 6:2).

Slaves are a very diverse lot, from laborers to philosophers, from farmers to physicians. In the imperial administration, the most capable could advance. The job of *praegustator* led to the post of *tricliniarcha* (*CIL*, XI, 3612, n. 10, 68), that of *vestitor* to *procurator*, etc. Even at the heart of the domestic setting there is a hierarchy: the master sets the faithful and prudent *doulos* over all his household (Matt 24:45, 47; Luke 12:41); this slave directs and oversees the subordinate personnel and can come to occupy the highest posts (Matt 25:23ff.). The ideal is liberation, and it is Christ who liberates slaves from sin, making each son of God an *apeleutheros Kyriou* (1 Cor 7:22; cf. Jas 1:25; 2:12).

An *oiketēs* is most often a slave as well, although in many texts it is not possible to say with certainty (Acts 10:7; *P.Lund* IV, 13, 4), and this term is sometimes substituted for *doulos* as being less dishonorable, as in this epitaph for an Ethiopian slave: “It is to the decurion Pallas, works superintendent of Antinoe, that the god led me as servant (*oiketēs*) from the land of Ethiopia.” From its etymology (*oikia*), *oiketēs* would be a “domestic” in the old sense of the word: one who tends to the house and is a part of the family (*famulus*),

according to Philo's definition – "the domestics (*hoi oiketai*) ... are always with us and share our life; they prepare the bread, the drinks, and the dishes for their masters (*tois despotaïs*), they serve at table" (*Spec. Laws* 1.127). *Oiketai* are "people in service" (1 Pet 2:18; cf. the collective *oiketeia*, Matt 24:45) including all the servants, male and female, free and slaves born in the household, in the service of the master of the house, from cooks and porters to stewards and tutors, but not directly agricultural or industrial workers.

The adjective *oikeios* used as a noun, however, only designates members of the same family: parents and close relatives. Eph 2:19 opposes this word to foreigners and aliens; 1 Tim 5:8 places *oikeioi* among *hoi idioi* – "those of the household" are a closer group within "his own." Gal 6:10 uses this term for participants in the same faith; the papyri associate it with brother (*BGU* 1871, 4), son (*SB* 8416, 5), with friends; as the object of *philostorgia* (*P.Ant.* 100, 2; cf. *SB* 7558, 35) and of "recommendation" to influential personages.

Among the domestics attached to a household, some are salaried (*misthios*, Sir 37:11); these workers, hired when there is work and discharged when they are no longer needed, are treated without consideration (Luke 15:17, 19); these are workers for hire whose existence is tantamount to servitude (Job 7:1); but they can no more properly be called servants than can day workers who hire themselves out to some concern (Mark 1:20, *misthōtos*), to tend a flock (John 10:12) or to till a field. The emphasis is always on their compensation, and they accordingly have nothing in common with *douloi*. "The *ergatēs* (worker) *has a right* to his food" (Matt 10:10; 1 Tim 5:18; cf. Jas 5:4).

## δύσκολος, σκολιός

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*dyskolos*, **difficult, causing frustration or unhappiness, disagreeable**;  
*skolios*, **crooked, difficult, perverse**

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*duskolos*, S 1422; *EDNT* 1.361; MM 173; L&N 22.32; BAGD 209 | *skolios*, S 4646; *TDNT* 7.403–408; *EDNT* 3.255; MM 578; L&N 79.90, 88.268; BAGD 756

The adjective *dyskolos* and the adverb *dyskolōs* are used in the NT only with respect to the rich, for whom access to the kingdom of God is difficult (Mark 10:24) or who enter it with difficulty (Matt 19:23; Mark 10:23; Luke 18:24). In contemporary literary texts, "the climbing of a wall is difficult" (Josephus, *War* 6.36); "it is difficult (*dyskolos*) and even impossible (*adynaton*) for the defiant mind to receive an education" (Philo, *Rewards* 49); "It is a difficult and hard cure (*dyskolon kai chalepon*) that philosophy undertakes for garrulousness"

(Plutarch, *De garr.* 1). Inscriptions evoke difficult or troubled times (Dittenberger, *Syl.* 409, 33; *Or.* 339, 54) and how difficult, almost impossible, it is to express gratitude to match benefits received: “since it is difficult to give thanks to match such good deeds of his” (*epeidē dyskolon men estin tois tosoutois autou euergetēmasin kat’ ison eucharistein*, *Or.* 458.18). In the phrase *ei dynaton ē dyskolon* (“whether possible or difficult,” Josephus, *Ant.* 6.203), the difficult has the sense of the impossible (cf. 2.98; 3.72); but God’s help is sought in surmounting the difficulty (5.94; 11.134), and a noble soul succeeds in so doing (2.40).

In the papyri, the word is also used for a difficult approach to a city (*dyskolōs anerchometha eis polein*, *P.Princ.* 102, 9, from the fourth century), for an action that eventually becomes impossible without help from others (“if you cannot open the box yourself, because it opens with difficulty, give it to the locksmith and he will open it for you,” *P.Oxy.* 1294, 10); but it is also used with the connotation of “frustrating, disheartening, causing unhappiness”: a son writing to this father and giving him the news of the household tells him, “there is nothing *dyskolos* at your house” (*ouden dyskolon eni epi tēs oikias sou*).

With reference to persons, *dyskolos* describes a man who cannot be satisfied, who has a bad character or gloomy disposition: the “awkward customer” (Xenophon, *Cyr.* 2.2.2). Philo evokes the “farmhand, struggling under a grumpy and disagreeable boss – *dyskolos* and *dystropos* – who often makes him do things that he does not want to do, which he carries out only painfully and unwillingly.” So *dyskolos* can be compared to *skolios*. St. Peter bids household servants: “be submitted to your master with profound reverence, not only to the good and indulgent (*tois agathois kai epieikesin*), but also to the difficult (*kai tois skoliois*)” (1 Pet 2:18). Since *skolios* literally means “twisting, oblique,” we should take this to mean masters who are bizarre, capricious, even wildly eccentric. *Skolia* is the opposite of rectitude (*eutheia*) and could be translated: all speech or action that is wrong and perverse (cf. Prov 23:33), contrary to good sense. This might be the term for what we call impossible bosses – never content, always surly, and also, at that period of history, brutal. “Not a single servant stayed; because, already a hard person by nature, he had become even more difficult (*dyskolōteron*) because of his illness” (Isocrates, *Aeginet.* 19.26).

The ethical connotation is often more pejorative. Beginning with Deut 32:5 (commented on by Philo, *Sobr.* 10–11) and Ps 78:8, *skolios* refers to a generation that is wayward, perverse, rebellious (Acts 2:40; Phil 2:15), from whom spotless children of God separate themselves.

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*egguos*, S 1450; *TDNT* 2.329; *EDNT* 1.371; *NIDNTT* 1.372–373; MM 179; L&N 70.8

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Derived from *gyē*, “curve, hollow,” *engyē* (with the prefix) means “a pledge put in someone’s hand,” and its first occurrences refer to divinities. When Poseidon declares to Hephaestus, “He (Ares) will pay all the expenses, I give myself as surety before the immortals” (Homer, *Od.* 8.348), Hephaestus answers, “For a poor payer, a poor guarantee” (8.351). At Aeschylus, *Eum.* 898, the Erinyes ask Athena to guarantee their cult in the city of Athens and to guarantee the people her protection: “This surety (*engyēn*) is valid forever.” Theognis 286: “take the gods as guarantors of good faith.” “From the idea ‘palm or hollow of the hand’ there developed an original legal group of meanings that were applied to the idea of a security deposit.” A person stands surety for another by committing himself to a creditor to supply a guarantee for the execution of an obligation in the event that the debtor defaults. A guarantor is thus one who is responsible for another person’s debt; his responsibility becomes operative when the debtor declares himself insolvent with regard to the terms of the contract.

The guarantor (a relative, a friend; cf. Josephus, *War* 1.460; Plutarch, *Alc.* 5.4: “He is my friend; I stand surety for him”) is normally an honorable person who has a fortune at his disposal; being an honest person, he sees to it that the contract is carried out and justice respected. Thus he is above all a person who may be trusted. Ben Sirach, who places standing surety between almsgiving and hospitality, sees it as a brotherly service: “Do not forget the kindness of your surety, for he has given his life for you. It is the deed of a sinner to waste the goods of his surety” (Sir 29:15–16). So there are swindlers and sharpers, or simply unfavorable turns of events, that make the surety’s job extremely burdensome: “Surety (*engyē*) has ruined many upright people; it has tossed them like a wave of the sea.”

The fact is that those who stood surety risked ruin and imprisonment, and even reduction to slavery, because they were “subject to the same penalties as those for whom they offered themselves as guarantees.” According to Philostratus, they could even incur the death penalty: “Among the Egyptians there was a law whereby one who was defeated after being the victor had to be

publicly punished by death; actually, he was held in advance for death, or else he had to provide guarantors for his person (*engyētas tou sōmatos*). Since no one was willing to undertake such a guarantee for Attalus, the *gymnastēs* himself fulfilled the legal condition [by standing surety]" (*Gym.* 24; cf. 8). In any event, we can understand the proverb "Surety calls ruin" (*to engyē para d' atē*) and the comment of Theophrastus: "The untimely person goes seeking surety for himself to an unfortunate soul who has just been condemned as surety for someone else (*engyēs*)" (*Char.* 12.4).

The inscriptions confirm these responsibilities of sureties. In a registry of real estate sales at Tenos, "the aforementioned sellers obligate themselves as a body and each for all." On Crete, "if a son stands surety during the lifetime of his father, he will answer with his person and with all the property that he possesses." In an Athenian rental contract: "Exechias of Aphidna stands surety for the execution of the contract within the set time frame; for their part the administrators of the Kytherians guarantee the lease to Eucrates and his descendants; failing which, they undertake to pay him a thousand drachmas." An inscription at Delos (*I.Delos* 502) mentions an *engyos tou pseudous*, a conditional surety that only protects the authorities against the risk of exorbitant bids. At Pergamum, "clients of the dormitory shall supply to the god guarantees for the salaries of the physicians to be paid during the year."

In the papyri, the correspondence of Zeno in the third century BC (*P.Cair.Zen.* 59001, 43; 59173, 32; 59340, col. II, 17–18; *SB* 7450, 23; 7532, 19), and especially in the first century AD, the formula *engyoi allēlōn eis ekteisin* recurs constantly; it means that the guarantors are jointly responsible for the payment or settlement of a debt. Most often it is a matter of a monetary loan, but it can also be land leases, contracts for service (*paramonē*, *P.Mich.* 70, 6; *P.Oxy.* 10, 11, 34; 13, 5), even the hiring of a nurse or the payment of a pension (*P.Enteux.* 25, 12). Sometimes it is recalled "that Pythocles has the right of execution on all the property belonging to Spokes and on the property of his surety for debts to the royal treasury" (*P.Sorb.* 17 a 17; cf. 10, 3); or that "this man has no right of execution against me ... let him be barred from bringing any suit against me or molesting either my own person or the above-named sureties, and let him put up security against the possibility of legal damages" (*P.Rein.* 7, 35; second century BC). Sometimes, on the other hand, the surety protests his good faith and obligates himself for the future.

It follows from these texts that in the first century a guarantee was supplied most frequently (1) by a relative or friend of sufficient means; (2) it was always cited by name; (3) it was for the security of the debtor; (4) the surety is often the deity himself or one of his representatives (Moses, the prophets); (5) it



expresses his solidarity – his guarantee is an act of benevolence, a *charis* (Sir 19:15); (6) *engyos* in literary texts sometimes has a metaphorical meaning.

Having thus given a certain density and vitality to the term *engyos*, we can understand its usage in Heb 7:22 (NT hapax), where the author, by assessing the quality of a *diathēkē* as a function of the quality of its mediator, proves the superiority of the priesthood of the order of Melchizedek over the Levitical priesthood by the unchangeableness of its founding: “It is established forever.” Hence “Jesus has become the surety of a better covenant” (*kreittonos diathēkēs gegonen engyos Iēsous*). God has sworn (Ps 110:4), his decision is immutable (Heb 6:17); the new covenant will be eternal (Heb 13:20) and the new high priest permanent. Consequently, it is characteristic of Jesus to be an indefectible surety for the future, for he remains the same “yesterday and today and forever” (13:8).

The choice of the word *engyos* as much as the connected mention of the name of “Jesus” signals that the author is evoking the legal meaning of this term: if Jesus is given by God as a pledge of his eternal covenant, then he must take on himself all the obligations of a contract of guarantee and is possibly even called upon to give his life. Is he not in solidarity with the parties to the contract – *ex henos pantes* (2:11ff.) and the *archēgos* of salvation (verse 10)? Moreover, Christianity is a hope (7:19; 1 Pet 3:15), and salvation will be completed in its fullness only in the future; so it is to be expected that guarantees and sureties will be supplied for the obtaining of the covenant’s goods, the realization of the divine promises. The fact that it is Christ who is this living and permanent guarantee, the surety provided by God, who has literally put our salvation “in his hand” (*en-gys*), means that from here on the salvation of each believer is his responsibility (2:10). He has paid our debts. He has freed us from sin. Through his “precious blood” he has bought and paid for our emancipation. Our confidence, the best guarantee there is, must be absolute.

ἐγκαίνιζω

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*enkainizō*, to renew, inaugurate

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*enkainizo*, S 1457; TDNT 3.453–454; EDNT 1.377; NIDNTT 3.670, 673; MM 215; L&N 13.84; BAGD 215

This verb, which literally means “renew,” rarely used in secular Greek, is a good instance of a Septuagintism in the NT, where it is only used twice in a religious sense. In Heb 9:18, the first covenant “was not inaugurated without

blood”; in Heb 10:20, Christ “has inaugurated for us a new and living way through the veil.”

In the LXX, it translated either the piel of the Hebrew verb *hādaš* or the verb *hānak*. The former, “produce something anew, redo,” is often used with the moral or psychological connotation of a new beginning; hence, “to install royalty” (1 Sam 11:14), “renew the altar of Yahweh” (2 Chr 15:8); “restore the house of Yahweh” (2 Chr 24:4, 12). It is in this sense, it would seem, that the shedding of blood gives validity to the old covenant (Exod 24) and inaugurates it (Heb 9:18).

As for the verb *hānak*, it describes the earliest education of a child; one sets the child on the right path in life (Prov 22:6); hence, “begin to put into use.” The word is used for the dedication of the house of God (1 Kgs 8:63; 2 Chr 7:5), and in 1 Macc, *enkainizō* is used for restoration of the altar (4:54), the repair of the entrances and chambers of the temple (4:57), and the restoration of the sanctuary to its former condition (5:1). Hence, the *Enkainia*, the Feast of Dedication (John 10:22) that Judas Maccabeus ordered celebrated from the 25th of the month of Kislev.

So, since Christ the *prodromos* (Heb 6:20) himself opened a new route of access from earth to heaven and was the first to traverse this “new route,” his own can undertake to follow in his steps. So it can be said that he “inaugurated” it, because he opened it for traffic; but since this route leads to the heavenly sanctuary and is a “sacred way” that cannot be traversed except by believing souls purified from sin, *enkainizō* also signifies that Christ “consecrated” this route, which will be that of the liturgical pilgrimage to the heavenly Jerusalem.

ἐγκακέω

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*enkakeō*, to conduct oneself badly, become weary, lose heart

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*enkakeo*, S 1573; TDNT 3.486; EDNT 1.377; NIDNTT 1.561, 563; MM 215; L&N 25.288; BDF §§123(2), 414(2); BAGD 215

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This verb is peculiar to the Koine, where, moreover, it appears only rarely. It can be transitive or intransitive. Its exact meaning (“conduct oneself badly”) derives from its etymology, but the nuance varies according to context. The first usage is in Polybius in the sense of doing ill, being at fault, committing culpable negligence: “The Macedonians neglected to send the prescribed help” (*to pempein tas boētheias ... enekakēsen*). In the second century AD, Didymarion writes to Paniskos that his brother was not the object of any reproach, and he draws the conclusion that he did not conduct himself amiss

(*legō mē enkakēsē*, *P.Petaus* 29, 12). But with respect to Gen 27:46, where Rebekah declares, “I am tired of living (*prosochthizō*) because of these Hittite women,” Symmachus uses the verb *enkakeō* to mean “lose heart.”

The first NT attestation is in St. Luke’s introduction of the parable of the Widow and the Judge, which says that the lesson is “that they should always pray *kai mē enkakein*” (present infinitive); that is, that in the most desperate circumstances, they must continue to ask doggedly and intensely and never desist. But how should the verb be translated? The best equivalent is “non segnescere” (Bengel), and better yet “not to slacken.” It is not so much a matter of omission as of relaxing one’s efforts, losing heart in the midst of difficulties, letting go, interrupting one’s perseverance before attaining one’s goal; giving up rather than continuing the fight. Hence, on the moral level, the exhortation is to overcome lethargy, boredom, duration, even distress in tribulation; one must not give in to the apparent uselessness of appeals to God and succumb to exhaustion, but on the contrary overcome fatigue and continue without yielding or softening.

The five other occurrences are in St. Paul and have the same basic meaning: “Brothers, do not slacken in doing well” (aorist subjunctive, *mē enkakēsēte*, 2 Thess 3:13), do not tire of doing what is good. “Having undertaken a good work, let us not slacken (present subjunctive, *mē enkakōmen*); at the desired time we shall reap, if we do not give up (*mē eklyomenoi*; cf. Matt 15:32; Heb 12:3, 5)” (Gal 6:9). One’s perseverance must not weaken in service to one’s neighbor, since the harvest will result from our doggedness; a relaxation of effort would be disastrous. “Since we have this ministry, according to the mercy that was shown to us, we do not lose heart” (*ouk enkakoumen*, present indicative, 2 Cor 4:1, 16), or “we do not weaken,” “we do not give in”; this is the refusal of all negligence and all laxness. Finally, Eph 3:13 – “Do not give in (*mē enkakein*, present infinitive) to the trials (captivity) that I am enduring for you,” which might scandalize (in the full sense of the word) believers who see their apostle reduced to inactivity and impotence, apparently abandoned by God. Are there not grounds for discouragement? Hence the exhortation not to lose heart: hold fast, without letting up; always be ardent.

In conclusion, the verb *enkakeō* in the NT is (a) found exclusively in the writings of Luke and Paul; (b) both made it a Christian technical term to express the unflagging pursuit of the goal of service to neighbor or of apostolic ministry as well as the “tautness” of the determined heart that does not let up, does not lose courage; (c) this absence of letting up is a precept of the new morality, a catechetical rule that each Christian must apply in his or her personal life; (d) in almost all of these contexts, notably Luke 18:1; Gal 6:9, this moral obligation is expressed as a function of eschatological *peirasmōs* and

of the Parousia. During the wait for deliverance, judgment, and glory, letting up and weakening are not permitted.

ἐγκαταλείπω

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*enkataleipō*, **to leave, forsake, abandon**

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*enkataleipo*, S 1459; EDNT 1.377; MM 179; L&N 13.92, 35.54, 68.36; BAGD 215

Of the ten occurrences of this verb in the NT, half are in quotations from the OT; consequently, its meaning must be understood in terms of the language of the LXX. First of all, Heb 13:5 – “He himself has said, I will never leave you nor forsake you.” Exegetes rightly attempt to identify the citation, which is very close to Josh 1:5 and Deut 31:6, 8; 1 Chr 28:20; but neither the tenses nor the moods of the verbs are exactly the same. Moreover, our text is exactly identical to that of Philo (*Conf. Tongues* 166), which cites Josh 1:5. The inevitable conclusion is that either Philo or the author of Hebrews had read a recension of the LXX different from that which we possess.

On the literary level, we may note the fivefold pleonastic repetition of the negation, which reinforces the absoluteness of the thought and thus the certainty of divine help: never, never, never, in any circumstance whatsoever, God will not fail. On the theological level, it is impossible to state too emphatically that this OT assertion, in one form or another, is a statement of the unchangeableness of providence, one of the most essential items of Israel’s faith. Citing Ps 16:10, St. Peter therefore affirms concerning the Messiah: “You will not abandon my soul in Hades” (Acts 2:27, 31), because being abandoned by God would mean rejection (1 Kgs 8:57; 2 Chr 15:2; Prov 4:6), a sort of desertion (Job 20:13) of which it is unthinkable that the Son of God could become the victim.

Nevertheless, on the cross, citing Ps 22:2, Jesus cried out: “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” This cry expresses the completeness of his dereliction at the point where his resistance was lowest (Ps 38:10; 71:9; *Gos. Pet.* 19: “My strength, my strength, you have forsaken me”) and death was imminent; but this is not despair: the Messiah was “abandoned to his enemies” (Ps 22:13ff.) and thus he can say that God “remained far off” (verses 12, 20), but his confidence remains complete (verses 21ff.). His trial is analogous to that of Hezekiah, whom “God abandoned to prove him, to learn all that was in his heart” (2 Chr 32:31); and we know that the love and the power of God are sometimes expressed in the *peirasmōs* of the just.

Otherwise, *enkataleipō*, which usually translates the Hebrew *ʿāzab*, often has, like that Hebrew verb, a toned down meaning: to loosen ties, to give out; in the passive: be left defenseless in the hands of an enemy. Expressing the contrast between the power of God and human weakness by four antitheses, St. Paul writes that he is pursued, harassed, pressed, and hunted down, as it were, by his adversaries (*diōkomenoi*, *all' ouk enkataleipomenoi*, 2 Cor 4:9). If we take this as a metaphor for a race or a manhunt, we will translate “pursued but not overtaken”; but if the reference is to combat, the apostle is not so roughly handled that he gives in (cf. 1 Macc 1:42), that he is put out of commission and abandoned, and in this sense “eliminated.”

If you forsake a person, you also leave a place, notably when fleeing; the place is abandoned, and property is often left in disarray; the two go together. It even happens that people forsake worship. This is what happened with certain “Hebrews” who got into the habit of excusing themselves from the meetings of the community, through egotism (refusing to “give themselves” to the common life), through haughtiness (scorning the society of their brothers, cf. 1 Cor 11:18–22; Jude 19, *apodiorizontes*), or perhaps for fear of advertising their faith in a time of persecution, fearing reprisals by the pagan authorities (Heb 10:32), and thus leaving the community to its risks and dangers without giving it the support of their numbers and their courage.

It is probably this same refusal to compromise themselves that accounts for the abstention of the Roman Christians from St. Paul’s first hearing: “At my first defense, no one came to my aid, but all forsook me” (2 Tim 4:16). This must have been a grave sin, since St. Paul immediately adds, “May they not be held accountable for this!” In fact, the five occurrences of *enkataleipō* in Malachi translate the Hebrew *bāḡad*, “betray, deceive, break faith” (2:10–16), and the OT always forbade forsaking a dear or honored person.

No doubt it is with this moral flavor that we should understand 2 Tim 4:10 – “Demas has forsaken me, having preferred this present age.” My coworker walked out on me!

ἐγκομβόομαι

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*enkomboomai*, **to attach, fasten**

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*enkomboomai*, S 1463; TDNT 2.339; EDNT 1.377; MM 180; L&N 49.9; BAGD 216

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A denominative verb formed from *kombos*, “knot, buckle,” this biblical hapax means “attach, fasten.” It evokes the large apron that workers or slaves fitted or

fastened to their tunics to protect them. 1 Pet prescribes buttoning or fastening to oneself (the verb in the middle voice) humility in mutual relations. There is possibly a reminiscence of the symbolic gesture of Jesus in girding himself with a towel, in the manner of a slave, to wash the feet of his apostles. We might also remember the sash that slaves wore on their shoulder to distinguish them from freemen. In any event any Christian should present himself before his neighbor in an attitude of modesty, reserve, and self-renunciation, thanks to a humility that is solidly fitted and manifest.

ἔθος, εἰθισμένος (ἐθίζω)

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*ethos*, **custom**; *eithismenos* (*ethizō*), **accustomed**

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***ethos***, S 1485; TDNT 2.372–373; EDNT 1.384; NIDNTT 2.436–438, 455; MM 181; L&N 41.25; BAGD 218–219 | ***eithismenos*** (*ethizo*), EDNT 1.381; MM 181; L&N 41.26; BAGD 2

The substantive *ethos* has at least four meanings in the NT.

I. – Personal custom. – On Thursday of the last week at Jerusalem, Jesus “went according to his custom (*kata to ethos*) to the Mount of Olives” (Luke 22:39; cf. 21:37; John 18:2). This meaning is common in the papyri: “as is your habit (*hōs ethos esti soi*), use your influence” (*P.Fay.* 125, 5); “it is our custom”; “even though it is not his custom” (*P.Brem.* 54, 8). Heb 10:25 denounces “the habit of some (*ethos tisin*)” of forsaking church meetings (*tēn episynagōgēn*); many times they excuse themselves individually. Doing so has become a custom, inspired by various motives, all worthy of censure.

II. – Social, religious, traditional custom. – Propriety requires conforming to the uses and customs sanctioned by the usage of honest folk in certain circles and practiced since a certain time: that which is done in the usual manner. King Alexander sent to Jonathan “a gold buckle such as it is customary to give to the king’s relatives.” Banking transactions are carried out *kata to ethos* (according to custom); prices are established in advance by usage (*ex ethous*, *P.Grenf.* I, 48, 15). Rites and liturgical prescriptions set particular behavior of observant folk. It was custom that fixed the drawing of lots to determine which priest would offer the incense. When Joseph of Arimathea and Nicodemus took Jesus’ body, wrapped it with bandages and aromatic herbs, and John 19:40 specifies “as is the burial custom of the Jews” (*kathōs ethos estin tois Ioudaiois entaphiazein*), we must translate “regularly,” just as circumcision is carried out *kata to ethos* (SB 15, 30; 16, 18; 9027, 21; BGU 2216, 28).

III. – Common usage and legal rule. – If there is a “force of habit” (Epictetus 3.12.6: *to ethos ischyron proēgētai*; Philo, *Joseph* 83; *Decalogue* 137; *Abraham* 185; *Spec. Laws* 2.109) and if there is a moral obligation to conform to good usages, a custom that is universal and has long been traditional tends to take on more and more of the force of law. Denouncing the divinization of a dead child, Wis 14:16 notes, “This impious custom (*to asebes ethos*) was kept as a law (*hōs nomos ephylachthē*).” *Ethos* is as obligatory as *nomos*. Moreover, “law did not exist in the time of Homer ... peoples continued to follow unwritten customs.” The idea has been defended that in the papyri *ethos* has no normative value and usually expresses only a state of affairs with no constraining force; but in Egypt it has the value of customary law, because judicial sanction raises usages based on practice alone to the rank of positive law. Philo observed that “a custom introduced different legal principles from city to city, not the same principles for all” (*Husbandry* 43; cf. *Migr. Abr.* 90); “customs are unwritten laws, decrees taken by men of former times and inscribed ... in the souls of those who belong to the same commonwealth” (*Spec. Laws* 4.149; cf. 150; *To Gaius* 115). Thus in AD 68, the prefect of Egypt, Tiberius Julius Alexander, prescribes that “no one shall be compelled to tax farming or to other leasing of inherited property against the general usage of the provinces” (*para to koinon ethos tōn eparchōn* – BGU 1563, 30; cf. *P.Princ.* 119, 52; Philo, *To Gaius* 161). In the second century, the edict of the prefect T. Haterius Nepos commands of priests in charge of temples: “They shall avoid infringing customs, in keeping with [the dignity of the sanctuaries].” Contracts stipulate obligations in conformity with custom (*P.Brem.* 36, 17; *P.Oxy.* 1887, 11; *P.Ross.Georg.* III, 32, 10).

It is in this sense of Roman *consuetudo* (“repeated usage of a traditional juridical rule”) that we must understand Luke 2:42 – when Jesus was twelve years old, his parents went up to Jerusalem “as was the custom for the feast (of Passover)”; *kata to ethos tēs heortēs* is, in fact, a legal obligation (Deut 16:16; cf. Exod 23:17; 34:23; *m. Hag.* 1.1), imposed only on men but extended by tradition to pious women. With the same meaning: “We must sacrifice today, in the customary fashion (*kata to ethos*) in this feast called Pascha” (Josephus, *Ant.* 2.313; *P.Oxy.* 1464, 4), again with Joseph and Mary taking the child Jesus to the temple “to accomplish the customary requirements of the law regarding him” (Luke 2:27); *kata to eithismenon*, literally, “according to the custom of the law” is the constant way of referring to a legal requirement.

IV. – Roman law. – Festus, in explaining to King Agrippa the matter concerning Paul, says, “It is not the custom of the Romans (*ouk estin ethos Rhōmaiois*) to hand over an accused person before he has, in the presence of his accusers, been given the opportunity to respond to the charge.” The formula

*kata Rhōmaiois ethos* or *kata ta Rhōmaiōn ethē* is copiously used by Josephus and in the papyri, sometimes in the sense of a habitual way of acting, constant usage, sometimes – usually – in the technical sense for Roman law. Here we have a clear reference to normative and obligatory usage: that of Roman trial law. The *juris studiosus* that St. Luke was, according to the Muratorian Canon, would admire the equity of the imperial official, because not to take account of the custom would be to scorn *aequitas*. Given respect for legal form, it was absolutely necessary to have witnesses appear and give the accused the chance to defend himself. In this case, *ethos* refers to an inexorable obligation.

V. – The “customs of Moses” and the “customs of our fathers.” – In Acts 6:14; 15:1, the *ethē* that Moses passed on to his people are in view. These became the “customs of the Jews” (Acts 26:23; Josephus, *War* 7.50), venerable because they were ancestral and national (Acts 16:21). Not to “walk according to these customs” (*mēde tois ethesin peripatein*) is apostasy against Moses (Acts 21:21; Philo, *Dreams* 2.123). The constantly used plural could allude to religious or liturgical usages like the Sabbath (Josephus, *Ant.* 12.259; 14.245, 246, 258, 263), circumcision (*BGU* 82, 12: *peritmēthēnai kata to ethos*; Josephus, *Ant.* 1.214), ablutions and purifications (Josephus, *Ant.* 6.235), sacrifices (9.262, 263; 16.35), the distinction between clean and unclean animals, fasting (*Ag. Apion* 2.282), etc. In reality, it is a question of the fundamental institutions that the chosen people received from God, namely, the law and the traditional observances necessary for “being saved” (Acts 15:1), that is, for entering the messianic kingdom. These separate Israel from the whole sinful gentile world (Philo, *Moses* 2.193; *Spec. Laws* 3.29; Josephus, *Ant.* 4.137; 16.42). “The customs of the Jews” (*P.Lond.* 1912, 86) can, to be sure, point to a certain way of life, customs proper, and even certain legal provisions, but in actual usage it is a technical term for Israelite religion as practiced by its faithful, opposed as such to the “customs of the Romans.”

εἰκών

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*eikōn*, **image, representation**

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*eikon*, S 1504; *TDNT* 2.381–397; *EDNT* 1.388–391; *NIDNTT* 2.286–288, 292–293; *MM* 183; *L&N* 6.96, 58.35, 58.61; *BAGD* 222

The noun “image” is the first word uttered by God in his relations with humans (Gen 1:26–27). It is not said that it was uttered in Hebrew. If its original meaning is difficult to determine, its doctrinal density in the NT is considerable



as well, since it is essential to biblical anthropology, to Christology, to soteriology, and to eschatology.

I. – The first meaning of *eikōn* is “image, effigy, representation,” whether a painting, a statue, or a figure stamped on a coin (Herodotus 2.130; Philo, *Change of Names* 93; *Virtues* 4; Matt 22:20). “Before a shining mirror, Glauke arranged her hair, smiling at the lifeless image of her person.” For Plato, those who observe an eclipse of the sun must look at the image of the star in water or some other substance of this type (*Phd.* 99 d). That is to say, the image is very different from the likeness, because it is very close to the shadow: “What I call image is first of all shadows (*tas skias*), then appearances that show themselves in the water and those that form on surfaces that are dense, attractive, and shiny, and every other representation of this sort” (*Resp.* 6.509 e; 510 e: *skiai kai eikones*; Philo, *Alleg. Interp.* 3.96: “God is the image of his shadow, called shadow” – *skia*; cf. Heb 10:1).

In the LXX, *eikōn*’s dominant nuance is “representation, reproduction, figure” (1 Sam 6:11 – “the images [Hebrew *selem*] of the tumors” and is sometimes used in an artistic sense: an artisan casts a statue – Isa 40:19, Hebrew *pesel*; Ezek 16:17; Dan 2:31–35; 3:1–18); the images of the Chaldeans (Hebrew *selem*) drawn on the wall in vermilion (Ezek 23:14); the father “makes an image of his child who was too soon snatched away from him” (Wis 14:15). Sometimes it is synonymous with *eidōlon*. In the Hellenistic period, in literary texts, the papyri, and especially the inscriptions, *eikōn* refers to all kinds of art (*P.Oxy.* 3094, 44), painting or statuary, in the sense of “portrait.” Apion, a young recruit in the navy of Misenum in the second century BC: “I gave my little portrait to Euctemon to take to you” (*epempsa soi eikonin mou dia Euktēmonos*, BGU 423, 21).

These portraits and statues are ordered out of filial devotion and usually with a religious intention, as is attested by acts of endowment, as in the third century BC Agasicratis established an endowment at Calauria in the Argolid: one adult victim was to be sacrificed to Poseidon and another to Zeus Soter, and “the altar shall be prepared near the statue of Sophanes, the husband of the testatrix.” “We have set up this portrait of Neiloussa, wife of Parthenopaios, our mother, in a sanctuary.”

Honorific decrees ordering the erection of statues in honor of famous or important people are numerous. Athens ordered “a bronze statue” of the poet Philippides set up at the theater; the priests of Thebes ordered one for the general Callimachus; Miletus ordered one for Eirenias (“let a golden portrait of him be set up at the place designated by the people”); the confederation of the Magnesians ordered one in honor of Demetrias, secretary of the federal council (“let his portrait be set up at a place that he shall choose”).

Given that the sovereign, such as Ptolemy Epiphanes, is the “living image of Zeus, son of Helios,” numerous statues are raised (*tas tōn basileōn eikonas*). They are placed in the temples where they function in the cult. At Athens, during the imperial period, there was a *zakoros*, a religious official, a kind of sacristan, in charge of the “images” of the emperors (*tōn theiōn eikonōn*), that is, their portraits, or more precisely, busts, which were venerated. At Pergamum, *hymnōdoi* are linked to the celebration of the imperial cult (*hymnōdoi eis eikonas tōn Sebastōn*, *I.Perg.*, 374). In 193 BC, Antiochus III instituted “high priestesses who shall wear gold crowns that shall have her portrait” for the cult of Laodice; that is, they bear the queen’s bust. It is easy to understand the indignation of the Jews when the Roman officials presume to set up imperial statues in the synagogues, as well as the denunciation in Rev 13:14–15 of the superstition regarding talking statues and images of the emperors: “all those who bow down before the image of the Beast shall be killed.”

II. – Because an image not only implies the likeness of a copy to a model, but derives from an earlier reality, it implies a relation of dependency and of origination; and possessing to some extent the same “form,” it resembles its precursor. It is in this sense that God decides, “Let us make man in our image (Hebrew *dmût*) and according to our likeness (*šelem*),” (Gen 1:26). He has a nature akin to God’s (Gen 9:6), like a son begotten by his father. This is clearly a term of honor: man is crowned with glory (Ps 8:5; Sir 17:3 ff.). He is sharply distinguished from the animals created before him; he rules the earth, probably because of his faculties of intelligence and volition. In any event, “God made man the image of his own eternity” (Wis 2:23), so that we must at least conclude that “to be the image” means “to participate in the being” (Plato, *Prm.* 132 d) and the life; here, that of the “living God.”

III. – There are many degrees in representation. There is only one adequate image of God, his Son. Here *eikōn* means not so much resemblance as derivation and participation; it is not so much the likeness of a copy to its model, but the revelation and, as it were, emanation of the prototype. The image of something is its expression, the thing itself expressed. Here, by the incarnation, Christ manifests the Father (cf. Col 2:9 – “in him dwells bodily [by the incarnation] all the fullness of the godhead”). In and by his image, God becomes visible. The emphasis falls simultaneously on the equality, if not identity (*consubstantial* will be the word) of the *eikōn* with the original, and on the authentic representativeness of Jesus, for the one who was *en morphē theou* (in the form of God) and *einai isa theō* (equal with God, Phil 2:6) could say “the one who has seen me has seen the Father.”

IV. – In the NT, a new anthropology is superimposed on the old; the elect are predestined to be conformed to the image of the Son of God, associated with his glory (cf. Phil 3:21). On the model of the first creation, the “image” of the baptized is “conformed” to the prototype of the *archēgos*, because it depends on him and reproduces him, and thus represents or manifests him, because it has the same “form” (cf. Gal 4:19), that is, a new existential condition. The *eikōn* takes on ontological meaning, because the person-image achieves a new spiritual state, we might even say a transformation of his being, which – as a living portrait – will share the glorious condition of the resurrected Son.

This eschatological reproduction will not be consummated until the resurrection; it is realized here below through a progressive assimilation to the one first glorified: “As we have borne the resemblance (*tēn eikona*) of the one who was of the dust, so shall we bear the image of the one who is heavenly” (1 Cor 15:49). The continuous process is evoked in 2 Cor 3:18 – “All reflecting on unveiled faces the glory of the Lord, we are metamorphosed into the same resemblance (*tēn autēn eikona metamorphoumetha*) from glory to glory, as by the action of the Lord, [who is] spirit.” Glory (*doxa*) is participation in the divine nature (cf. 2 Pet 1:4; Heb 1:3) and puts the emphasis on a luminous manifestation, analogous to that of the transfiguration (cf. Matt 17:2; Mark 9:2). This change or growth in quality is a spiritualization that transfigures Christians to resemble their Lord; they change in form (*morphē*), putting on that of Christ: “The one who cleaves to the Lord is one spirit with him” (*ho kollōmenos tō Kyriō hen pneuma estin*, 1 Cor 6:17).

This conformity to Christ, by grace and by glory, cannot but fulfill the divine plan for the resemblance of man to God (Gen 1:26), according to Col 3:10 – “You have put on the new man, that which is directed toward true knowledge in being renewed according to the image of its creator” (*anakainoumenon ... kat’ eikona tou ktisantos auton*). The newness has to do with belonging to the Lord, which implies a vital participation and allows the believer to become an image/reproduction, in the following manner: the Son of God, the firstborn of a multitude of brethren, having assimilated himself to the likeness of our human nature, passes on to us the conformity to his own “exemplary” filiation, by means of which we are authentic sons of God (John 1:12), “of his race” (Acts 17:28), and his heirs. This forms the basis of an entire ethic, that of purification, imitation, and progress.

*eilikrineia*, **purity, unmixed quality**; *eilikrinēs*, **without mixture, sincere, candid**

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*eilikrineia*, S 1505; TDNT 2.397–398; EDNT 1.391; MM 183–184; L&N 88.42; BDF §119(4); BAGD 222 | *eilikrines*, S 1506; TDNT 2.397–398; EDNT 1.391; MM 184; L&N 88.41; BDF §119(4); BAGD 222

The first element of the compound *eilikrinēs* is obscure. It has often been derived from *eilē* (*halea*, *hēlios*), “distinguished from the sun” (?), suspended in its rays, purified by them; hence, “pure, without spot, immaculate.” But P. Chantraine notes that *eilē* literally means “heat of the sun” and prefers to link the adjective to *eilō*, “cause to turn”; the metaphor would be that of grain or wheat, sorted and purified by rolling or bouncing in a screen.

What is certain is that its basic meaning is “without mixture,” hence “pure, distinct,” as is attested by its association with *amigēs* (“without mixture”), *amiktos* (“unmixed”), and constantly with *katharos*: “a pure and clear air” (*katharon kai eilikrinea*, Hippocrates, *Vict.* 2.38.5); “If we should bring back the other stars and the whole of heaven to a nature that is pure and without mixture (*eis tina physin katharan kai eilikrinē*), delivered from change.... A mixture is an alteration; the primitive substance loses its purity (*to eilikrines*)” (Plutarch, *De fac.* 16); “that which is one is undefiled and pure (*to hen eilikrines kai katharon*); it is by the mixture of one substance with another that defilement (*ho miasmos*) comes about.”

The classical texts are clear: “Steadiness, purity (*to katharon*), truth, and, as we say, integrity (*eilikrines*) in those things that abide always in the same state, in the same manner, free of all mixture (*ameiktotata*)”; “by means of thought in itself and by itself and without mixture (*eilikrines*, of the senses and the body), one pursues realities in order to gain the truth”; each element of the army “had its distinct place” (*to eilikrinē*, separate).

In the Koine, the meaning has evolved; *eilikrinēs* is used with people and means “sincere, of good faith, candid,” especially in the inscriptions and the papyri. Moulton-Milligan cite inscriptions from Didyma in the third century BC (*eilikrinē kai bebaia poioumenous hymas pros tous philous apodexin*, Dittenberger, *Or.* 227, 12) and from Miletus in the second century BC (*exēgoumenoi sympantos tou plēthous pros hēmas ektenestatēn te kai elikrinē tēn eunoian*). The adjective appears in the papyri only from Christian pens of the Byzantine era: prayers are addressed to the Lord from a sincere heart (*en ilikrinei dianoia*).

*Eilikrinēs* is a hapax in the LXX: wisdom is a completely pure, unadulterated exhalation or emanation from the Almighty. Nothing unclean gets into it (Wis

7:25). Philo used this adjective for “the Being purer than the one, more primordial than the monad” (*Contemp. Life* 2), mind, clear light without shadows (*Heir* 308; *Joseph* 145), truths (*Dreams* 2.74), piety (*therapeia*) that is sincere and entirely pure (*Abraham* 129). Josephus has only two occurrences: the most honest and sincere part of the people (*War* 2.345); Agrippa waits for his anger to abate so that he may give a dispassionate judgment (*logismois eilikrinesi*, *Ant.* 19.321).

When the author of 2 Pet 3:1 gives the purpose of his letter as awakening the sincere mind of its recipients (*tēn eilikrinē dianoian*), he seems to be giving the adjective its Philonian meaning; but NT *dianoia* is the religious faculty of perceiving and understanding. Here this faculty has to be healthy, without shadow or stain; it is more than faithfulness – perfect transparency of the spiritual mind, comparable to the candor of doves (Matt 10:16; cf. Luke 11:34). In Phil 1:10, the emphasis is especially on absence of sin: “so that, discerning true values, you may be pure and without reproach on the day of Christ” (*hina ēte eilikrineis kai aproskopoi*). *Eilikrinēs* is here introduced into the vocabulary of salvation and a meaning that is both moral and religious; doing no wrong means not only not sinning but being in conformity to what God expects of the children of light, without participating in the least in the world of darkness. It is an entire spirituality (Rom 12:2).

As for the noun *elikrineia*, derived from the preceding adjective and much rarer, its two papyrological meanings, from third-century petitions, give it the sense “probity.” In its three Pauline occurrences, it means especially sincerity: the Corinthians are invited to celebrate the Pascha not “with the leaven of vice and perversity, but with the unleavened bread of *elikrineia* and truth.” The apostle presents himself thus: “Our pride is in this: the testimony of our conscience, that it is with God’s simplicity and purity (*hoti en haplotēti kai eilikrineia tou theou*) that we have conducted ourselves in the world, particularly with regard to you.” Frankness and faithfulness are essential to the character of Paul and his apostolic ministry; each term reinforces the other: biblical *haplotēs*, characteristic of the righteous, is always associated with uprightness; here it is reinforced by the transparency and candor of *eilikrineia* and finally confirmed by the superlative “of God” – a sincerity coming from God, derived from his own, given by him! This rectitude is referred to again in 2 Cor 2:17 – “We are not like many, who hawk about the word of God, but with God’s commission, in God’s presence, in Christ do we speak to you.” There is no higher way of describing the apostolic faithfulness, which can be referred to Matt 5:37 (“Let your yes be yes, your no, no”); but more precisely, the contrast with falsifications indicates that Paul neither adds to nor subtracts from the message received from the Lord. He transmits it whole, without adding

heterogeneous elements, without mixing in his own personal ideas. He only gives voice to what he has heard from the Master and his first apostles. That is why he is trustworthy.

NT *eilikrineia* is “perfect purity” and describes the mind, the heart, one’s conduct. Better yet, it describes Christian existence in its relation to God and to people. It is not so much the absence of duplicity or hypocrisy as a fundamental integrity and transparency; it can be compared to innocence, the candor of children, to whom the kingdom of heaven belongs (Mark 10:14).

εἰρηνεύω, εἰρήνη, εἰρηνικός, εἰρηνοποιέω, εἰρηνοποιός

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*eirēneuō*, **to be at peace, live in peace**; *eirēnē*, **peace**; *eirēnikos*, **peaceful**;  
*eirēnopoieō*, **to make peace**; *eirēnopoios*, **making peace; a peacemaker**

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*eireneuo*, S 1514; TDNT 2.417–418; EDNT 1.394; NIDNTT 2.776, 780; MM 185; L&N 88.102; BDF §§227(2), 309(1); BAGD 227 | *eirene*, S 1515; TDNT 2.400–417; EDNT 1.394–397; NIDNTT 2.776–783; MM 185–186; L&N 22.42, 25.248; BDF §128(5); BAGD 227–228 | *eirenikos*, S 1516; TDNT 2.418–419; EDNT 1.397; NIDNTT 3.776, 780, 782; MM 186; L&N 25.249; BAGD 228 | *eirenopoieo*, S 1517; TDNT 2.419–420; EDNT 1.397; NIDNTT 2.776, 782; L&N 40.4; BAGD 228 | *eirenopoios*, S 1518; TDNT 2.419; EDNT 1.397; NIDNTT 2.776, 780, 782; L&N 40.5; BAGD 228

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In secular Greek – classical and Hellenistic – *eirēnē* designates a political and social phenomenon, and first of all the state of a nation that is not at war. It is contrasted with *polemos*. War is enmity (Plato, *Resp.* 5.470 c) and peace is harmonization (Plutarch, *De Alex. fort.* 1.6.329 a–c). Treaties of alliance and of peace almost always link *eirēnē* and *philia*. In other words, peace is not only the elimination of war, but an organization of the future, because it guarantees tranquility (*hēsychia*, Plato, *Resp.* 575 b), wealth (Homer, *Od.* 24.486), the cessation of banditry (Epictetus 3.13.9), an opportunity for all sorts of happiness and prosperity, at least if the peace is general: *he koinē eirēnē*. It goes without saying that the king who is “philanthropic” will be interested in restoring order and guaranteeing the peace, because it is recognized that peace is better than war.

If peace is the situation of a nation that is not at war, it also defines the public order, relations between citizens, and social peace, as opposed to discord, trouble, and sedition: “*eirēnē tēs staseōs*, the end of civil war.” This is the most common usage in the papyri: the *stratēgos* must take measures to guarantee peace and order (*P.Petaus* 53, 17; cf. *P.Stras.* 5, 8). An arrest warrant

is addressed “to the *epistatēs* of the peace of the town of Teos” (*epistatē eirēnēs kōmēs Tēēōs*, *P.Oxy.* 64, 2; cf. *P.Cair.Isid.* 130; *P.Oxy.* 2714, 11; 3035, 2; 3184 *a* 17; *b* 14). So there were guardians of the peace, for example in a list of police officers including *eirēnophylakes* (*SB* 4636), whose responsibility it was to see to it that no one disturbed the course of public services; they may be compared to the municipal functionaries *epi tēs eirēnēs*. *Eirēnē*, finally, refers to the state of a person who is not troubled or disturbed, who is tranquil: “There is nothing to keep you from speaking in peace (without opposition)” (Plato, *Symp.* 189 *b*). But it is quite remarkable that there are no texts evoking the state of soul of a person not troubled by any care, any disquiet, having blessed tranquility – what we call “peace within.”

In reading the OT, one has the impression of entering another world, first of all because of the frequency with which peace is mentioned (about 280 times), then because of the new content of this idea, though it is always synonymous with tranquility. *Eirēnē* almost always translates the Hebrew *šālôm*; the sense of the root is “be well, complete, safe and sound,” and *šālôm* expresses “the state of a being who lacks nothing and has no fear of being troubled in its quietude; it is euphoria with security. Nothing better can be desired for oneself and for others.” There is also a nuance of plenty and prosperity (cf. 1 Macc 14:8); this is how the good health and joyfulness of the woman in Cant 8:10 appears in the eyes of her fiancé (cf. the strong woman who finishes her years in peace, Sir 26:2). Furthermore, the Israelite greeting is a wish for peace, that is, for well-being and happiness. But the great innovation of the OT is to make peace a religious idea: it is a gift of God. “Gideon built an altar to Yahweh and called it Yahweh-Peace” (*eirēnē Kyriou*, Judg 6:24); “I am Yahweh – I bring peace” (Isa 45:7); “Great is Yahweh, who wishes peace for his servant” (Ps 35:27). If it is commanded to seek peace (Ps 34:14), much more often it is stated that it is God who secures peace (Isa 26:12; 57:19; 66:12) and that there is no peace for people except for that granted by God when they are in conformity with his will. There can be no peace for the ungodly, but it is granted to those “who walk with God in peace and uprightness.” That is to say that Israel will be the people of peace. Not only did God give Moses this formula of blessing: “May Yahweh lift his countenance upon you and give you peace” (Num 6:26); he gives it to the devotees of his temple: “Great will be the glory of this house ... in this place will I put peace,” and the faithful will implore “Peace upon Israel!” (Ps 125:5; 128:6; cf. Sir 30:23).

It is difficult to specify the content of Israelite *eirēnē*, but it is certain that without excluding the possession of human goods (Ps 4:8), it is in the first instance the fruit of trusting and loving relations with God, who comes to the aid of his own (1 Chr 12:18), hence a characteristic of Israelite religion, a

completely original quality of soul of its faithful. With “messengers of peace,” bearers of “good news,” peace is synonymous with salvation and victory. A number of these announcements are eschatological, linking justice, peace, and salvation; a certain number are clearly messianic in character: “The government will rest upon his shoulders; his name will be called ... Prince of Peace. For the growth of his government and peace will be without end.” The death of the Messiah/liberator will be expiatory: “The punishment that earned our peace (salvation) has fallen upon him (the Servant of Yahweh)” (Isa 53:5). The NT writers would recognize that this religious peace was accomplished by the Savior Jesus.

The Synoptic Gospels retain the OT meaning of *eirēnē* – “security” (Isa 59:8), but they apply it to Jesus, who guides us “into the way of *eirēnē*” (Luke 1:79), that is, who introduces us to the messianic salvation. Simeon, having beheld the Savior, asks God – as a *doulos* asking his *despotēs* – “Let your servant depart in peace.” At Bethlehem, the angels sang, “Glory to God in the highest and peace on earth to people upon whom his favor rests.” The Messiah henceforth present brings peace, the gift of God to all people. When Jesus makes his entry into Jerusalem, his disciples sing Ps 118:26 and acclaim the Messiah-king who “comes in the name of the Lord, peace in heaven and glory in the highest places” (Luke 19:38). Jesus, sent by God, carried out the mission that was entrusted to him; salvation is certain, and its author is glorified. Clearly the point is the reconciliation of humans with God, on the spiritual level.

We know that the Israelite greeting was expressed in a wish for peace. Jesus prescribes this greeting to his apostles, but in so doing gives it a religious meaning, namely, benediction: “When you enter into the house, greet it; and if the house is worthy, let your peace come upon it.” People also wished each other peace upon parting (1 Sam 1:17; 20:42; 29:7), and there again this commonplace manner of taking one’s leave can express not only brotherly love but also the salvation of the soul, the forgiveness of sins; Jesus says to the forgiven sinner, “Go in peace.”

In the Fourth Gospel, peace appears only in the “farewell discourse,” at precisely at the moment when Jesus is leaving his own, who will be so sorely tested and even terrorized by the passion of their Master. He does not wish them peace; he gives them peace, and not just any peace, but his very own peace, which spreads among them like the sap of the vine to the branches by virtue of their ontological union (*en emoi eirēnē*). It is a legacy that is the fruit of his sacrifice, by which he is victorious over death and Satan; a legacy that will permit his own to know nothing of fright and panic even in the midst of the worst catastrophes. When the resurrected Christ came upon his apostles, his



greeting was not the ordinary wish, “Shalom,” nor even a benediction, but the confirmation of his gift: “*Eirēnē hymīn*” (“Peace to you”).

The Acts of the Apostles mentions civil and political peace, like the unity following hostility within a group; but it also mentions the religious, brotherly harmony in the Christian communities; finally, and above all, it defines this peace in terms of Christ. St. Peter says to the centurion Cornelius: “God has sent the word to the sons of Israel, announcing peace by Jesus Christ. He is the Lord of all” (Acts 10:36); *euangelizomenos eirēnēn* evokes the OT messengers of peace, but this has to do with the gospel message, which is the salvation granted by God to all people. This reconciliation translates for them into peace of the soul, thanks to forgiveness of sins. This is already the teaching of St. Paul.

We might almost say that the apostle created a new concept of *eirēnē*, an altogether internal and very spiritual peace, since he locates it at the heart of the Christian life and connects it to each of the persons of the Holy Trinity. The most important text is Rom 5:1–2: “Being therefore justified by faith, let us keep peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ, to whom we owe our access by faith to this grace in which we stand and our glorying in the hope of the glory of God.” The first result of justification was obtaining peace, not only reconciliation with God, the end of a breach and a disorder, but the inauguration of new relations that promise future blessedness: “May the God of hope fill you with all joy and peace, so that you may abound in hope, by the power of the Holy Spirit” (Rom 15:13). This Christian peace, which comes with the call to salvation and endures until the point of entering heaven, is the consequence of all the gifts of a God whom St. Paul describes as “the God of peace,” because he alone creates peace.

This peace, almost synonymous with salvation, is obtained thanks to Christ, who by his cross reconciled all humans with God. He announces it, and his gospel would be described as the “gospel of peace” (Eph 6:15; cf. Isa 52:7). He effects peace: his own peace (John 14:27; 16:33) is a spiritual reality that rules the minds and hearts of his disciples, making harmony among them, as with the members of a single body: “May the peace of Christ rule in your hearts: this is indeed the goal of the call that has gathered you into one body (the church)” (Col 3:15). What is more, he is himself our peace, because he has not only reconciled us with God but also established peace between Jews and Gentiles, dissolving their indissoluble opposition (there is no longer Jew, nor Greek; they are one in him – Gal 3:28; Col 3:11). He has eliminated the partition (*phragmos*) or the fence (of the Mosaic law and of enmity) or the wall that separated them. This is the teaching of Eph 2:13–17: “You who once were far off have now drawn near, thanks to the blood of Christ. For he himself is our

peace, who from the two has made one people ... breaking down the enmity in his flesh.... to create in his person the two in one new man, he who makes peace (*poiōn eirēnēn*), and to reconcile them with God, both in one body, by the cross: in his person he has put the enmity to death. Having thus come he proclaimed peace (*euēngelisato eirēnēn*) to you who were far off and to those who were near.”

This altogether spiritual peace resides in hearts and thus points to the Holy Spirit, who infuses it in the form of mutual love, harmony, and brotherly unity: “To set the mind on the Spirit is life and peace” (Rom 8:6); “the reign of God is righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit.” So we understand not only that “the peace of God passes all understanding” (Phil 4:7), but that the apostles ceaselessly exhort believers to seek and find peace between themselves, because peace is a distinguishing mark of their religion. This is what gives the *eirēnē* of the apostolic salutations its density of meaning; it includes peace with God, the benefits of salvation, harmony with all people, Christian blessedness, that is, peace of heart or calm in the soul which is purified from its sins; an interior well-being that follows justification by faith and is the work of the Holy Spirit.

In the secular literature, the denominative verb *eirēneuō*, “be or live in peace,” is always used in contrast to a state of war, meaning that a kingdom (Josephus, *Ant.* 11.214; 20.49, 133) a city (*War* 6.100), a region is at peace, or that two sovereigns are reconciled (Dio Cassius 77.12; *Dittenberger, Or.* 199, 1; 613, 4). The same meaning occurs sometimes in the LXX, but the verb is most often applied to individuals and means being tranquil, having a human happiness. The NT Christianizes this verb, giving it only a moral and individual meaning, always in parenesis. In its four occurrences, three are in the present imperative and all command keeping harmony and unity. Without a direct object, *eirēneuete* (“live in peace”) means “have only one heart and one soul” (2 Cor 13:11); with *en allēlois* (Mark 9:50) or *en heautois* (1 Thess 5:13) it has to do with preserving good brotherly relations; Rom 12:18 – “If possible, as much as lies within you, be at peace with all people” – extends the effort to live peaceably to every neighbor. In the context, it is a matter of not returning evil for evil, not getting revenge, suppressing the causes of discord, and especially overcoming evil with good; all requirements of authentic charity.

The adjective *eirēnikos* takes on rather varied nuances: (a) an objective meaning: that which has to do with peace (“a man engaged in a peaceful action, not a violent one”); (b) disposed to peace, opposed to bellicosity, used of relations between peoples or between parties in a city; (c) that which is calm and peaceable, whether a city or individuals; (d) in Philo, a personal moral

quality: serenity, or an inclination to peace, loved for itself – “virtue is of a particularly peaceable nature.”

In the LXX, the “man of peace” (Hebrew *šālēm*) is a person who is benevolent and of a friendly disposition, is sincere (Hebrew *kēn*; Gen 42:11, 19, 31, 33, 34) not only in speech but also in conduct; he concludes “peaceful accords” (Zech 6:13; 8:16; 1 Macc 5:25). The peace offering (Hebrew *šelem*) was translated *eirēnikos*, probably because of the idea of salvation, “safe and sound, well-being,” with all the semantic richness of the Hebrew *šālôm*: desiring peace and appealing to God to obtain it.

This nuance is not to be excluded at Heb 12:11, where the rigorous discipline of Israelite education leads finally to the peaceable fruit of righteousness (*karpon eirēnikon dikaiosynēs*). The adjective *eirēnikos* refers to the *agōn*, to the rest of the victorious athlete after the competition (12:1) and to safety after the bloody combat (12:4). It retains the double meaning of biblical *šālôm*: interior peace with God, and (this-worldly) salvation. Jas 3:17 is in line with LXX usage: Wisdom is first of all pure (*hagnē*, not stained, because it comes from God), very peaceful (*eirēnikē*), that is, judging from verse 16, opposed to disorder and intrigues (cf. Prov 3:17; Mal 2:6; Rom 8:6).

Unknown in the papyri, Philo, and Josephus, the verb *eirēnopoieō* is the equivalent of *poieō eirēnēn*: “make peace, pacify, conciliate.” An OT hapax, “The one who criticizes boldly makes peace” (Prov 10:10), it is also found in the NT. Col 1:20 places this verb in parallel with *apokatallassō*: God was pleased to reconcile all creatures with himself, “making peace by the blood of his cross.” Christ is the instrument and the goal of reconciliation.

The adjective *eirēnopoios*, which appears for the first time in Xenophon, is a Koine term, synonymous with *eirēnikos*, but with an emphasis on nobility. Not only did Philo ask that thanks be given to “God who makes peace (*tou eirēnopoiou theou*) and preserves peace (*eirēnophylakos*)” (*Spec. Laws* 2.192); in addition, “peacemaker” was an attribute of the prince. Antony conferred it upon Caesar (*ho eirēnopoios*, Dio Cassius 44.49), and Commodus applied it to himself (*eirēnopoios tēs oikoumenēs*).

Certainly we cannot see this sovereign, political sense in the seventh beatitude of the Sermon on the Mount (*makarioi hoi eirēnopoioi*, Matt 5:9); still less can we see the *pacifici* of the Vulgate. Rather, it is *pacificatori*, that is, persons whose action or influence pacifies or restores peace, favors good understanding, settles quarrels, annuls conflicts, reconciles, and calms minds. The right translation is literal – “peacemakers” – those who pursue it and spread it, establishing it around themselves (the Peshitta translates *ab day šlāmâ*, those who make peace), hence “artisans of peace.” At the same time, however, it has to be understood in terms of the function of the messianic messenger who

establishes peace (Isa 9:6; Ezek 34:25, 29) and of charity-love, which always tends to come to expression, to act. Peacemakers show themselves to be children of God – of the God of peace (1 Thess 5:23; Phil 4:9; cf. Sir 4:10; *Jub.* 1.24–25).

εἰσακούω, ἐπακούω, ὑπακούω, ὑπακοή

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*eisakouō, epakouō, to hear, listen to, heed; hypakouō, to heed, obey; hypakoē, obedience*

→see also παρακοή; πειθαρχέω

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*eisakouo*, S 1522; *TDNT* 1.222; *EDNT* 1.400; *NIDNTT* 2.172–173, 175, 177; MM 188; L&N 24.60, 36.15; BDF §173(3); BAGD 232 | *epakouo*, S 1873; *TDNT* 1.222; *EDNT* 2.17; *NIDNTT* 2.172–173, 175, 178; MM 228; L&N 24.60; BDF §173(3); BAGD 282 | *upakouo*, S 5219; *TDNT* 1.223–224; *EDNT* 3.394–395; *NIDNTT* 2.179; MM 650; L&N 36.15, 46.11; BDF §§163, 173(3), 187(6), 202, 392(3); BAGD 837 | *upakoe*, S 5218; *TDNT* 1.224–225; *EDNT* 3.394–395; *NIDNTT* 2.179; MM 650; L&N 35.15; BDF §163; BAGD 837

The verb *akouō*, “hear, understand,” occurs in combination with a number of prefixes (*eis-*, *ep-*, *pro-*, *hyp-*, etc.). *Eisakouō*, used without an object, expresses the idea “listen, heed”; with an accusative or genitive of the thing, it emphasizes the attention or the results of the hearing; with the genitive of the person, it means the communication, the passing of information from one person to another (one hears and so understands). Cf. the chorus to Tecmessa: “Listen to this man; he comes to tell us of the fate of Ajax” (Sophocles, *Aj.* 789). With the nuance of a favorable hearing: the ambassadors give a good reception to what Alcibiades has to say (Thucydides 5.45.4). Finally, the verb expresses the idea of taking heed of claims (*idem* I.126) and submitting to them: Olynthus had obtained the obedience of the closest neighboring cities.

These meanings are also found in the papyri of the third century BC, especially sympathetic hearing and taking heed. In a letter addressed to a *dioikētēs*: “We ask, if it seems good to you, that you summon certain ones of us and hear what they wish to tell you” (*P.Lond.* 1954, 8). Techesteus writes to Zeno, “Summon me and hear what I have to say; I have a proposal concerning how the water should be brought.” The usage is elevated in a hymn to Isis: “As for me, I heard from others of an extraordinary wonder”; and the goddess herself is the subject in the fourth century AD: “Do not let the gods sleep; Osiris will hear you, because you died prematurely, without child, without wife.”

The translators of the LXX obviously knew these secular meanings, but they considered the ear to be the organ of understanding and a channel of teaching; they gave hearing a pedagogical meaning: “The wise listen to advice” (Jer 37:14; Prov 12:15; Hebrew *šōmē‘a*). Not only does the LXX call for paying heed to teaching, it attributes blessedness to the one who hears well (Prov 8:34). This hearing well involves having a positive moral disposition, paying heed, and being teachable. *Eisakouō* is thus in effect synonymous with believing, acquiescing, and complying. To hear is to accept a proposition or to pay heed to what has been said, and so to obey.

The great innovation of the OT is to consider revelation as the word of God to humans and to require that people give it a good reception and submit to it. The verb *eisakouō* (more than 280 occurrences in the LXX) becomes for this reason one of the most important in OT theology when God is its subject. First of all, it is said repeatedly that God hears someone’s voice and pays heed, because he is merciful (Exod 22:26). He hears sighs (Exod 2:24; 6:15) as well as murmuring (16:7–9, 12), the cry of the poor (Job 34:28; Ps 34:6; 69:33), of the oppressed (Sir 35:13), of the widow (Jdt 9:4, 12), and the desire of the lowly (Ps 10:17). The faith of Israel is that “my God will hear me” (Mic 7:7), “his ear is not too heavy to hear” (Isa 59:1). It is precisely prayer that has this access to God, and *eisakouein* then means “grant an answer”: “God hears the prayer of his servant in the temple”; “You will call upon him and he will answer you” (Job 22:27); “Have pity on me – hear my prayer”; “You will pray to me and I will answer you” (Jer 29:12). God shows himself propitious (Isa 19:22).

There are nevertheless cases in which God does not hear, refuses to pay heed (Deut 1:45; 3:26), for example when “your hands are bloody”; likewise, the great sin of Israel is refusal “to observe (Hebrew *šāmar*) my commandments and my laws” (*eisakouein tas entolas mou*, Exod 16:28), to hear his voice. This religious hearing is obedience to the divine precepts, the carrying out of God’s will; better yet, it is loving God, becoming attached to him; “that is life for you” (Deut 30:20).

Given the importance of this theology, it is remarkable that Philo’s eight occurrences of this verb are all quotations on the OT and the single occurrence in Josephus (*Ant.* 1.190) is likewise a quotation of Gen 16:11 – Ishmael was so named “because God heard his supplication.”

Of the five NT occurrences of *eisakouō*, four (in the passive) mean to have one’s petition granted and, in accord with LXX usage, have to do with prayers addressed to God. The first regards the “Gentiles,” who think “that they will be heard (passive indicative future *eisakousthēsontai*) thanks to their many words,” their verbiage (*polylogia*). This refers particularly to the multiplicity of

titles attributed to the many-named divinity in attempts to win favor. In the new religion, it is enough to call upon God as Father; this name alone already constitutes a prayer.

The angel said to Zechariah, “Fear not, Zechariah, for your prayer (the coming of the Messiah) has been heard” (aorist passive indicative *eisēkousthē*, Luke 1:13), as to the centurion Cornelius: “Your prayer has been heard” (*eisēkousthē sou hē proseuchē*, Acts 10:31). According to Heb 5:7, Christ in the garden of agony, having offered prayers and supplications to God with loud cries and tears, was heard because of his piety (*eisakoustheis* [aorist passive participle] *apo tēs eulabeias*). *Eulabeia* here is filial devotion, well translated by the Vulgate: “exauditus est pro sua reverentia.” It is often said that suppliants are saved thanks to their piety (*dia tēn pros theous eusebeian*, Diodorus Siculus 12.57.4; cf. 11.12), that a miracle is obtained because of the piety of the sacrificing priest, that an act of adoration is done *eusebias charin*; but here (*apo tēs eulabeias*) we have to take *apo* as indicating consequence (“because of”; cf. Exod 3:7; 6:9; Matt 18:7; Luke 19:3; etc.). It was because Christ’s piety was outstanding, because he submitted himself wholly to his Father’s will, that his prayer was heard with favor and answered.

1 Cor 14:21 is a very free quotation of Isa 28:12 – “The Lord will speak to this people through people that babble and in a foreign tongue ... and they would not hear.” St. Paul applies this text to glossalalia: “By people of a foreign land and by the lips of foreigners I will speak to this people, and even then they will not listen to me” (*kai oud’ houtōs eisakousontai mou*, future middle indicative). Speaking in tongues is not a sign of divine blessing upon a community, not a “sign for believers”; this obscure, even unintelligible mode of expression is above all intended for pagans who will see in it divine revelation! What is clear is that this “hearing” of the glossalalia in the Christian community is to be understood according to its LXX meaning (Hebrew *ʾānâh* = respond): accepting the divine message, submitting one’s life to it, obeying.

*Epakouō*. – In classical Greek, this verb is in many cases synonymous with the preceding one and means simply “hear,” but its particular nuance is rather that of paying heed, paying attention. “Men of Ionia, as much as you are able to hear me (*epakountes*), pay heed to what I say” (Herodotus 9.98); “Pay attention to the moment when you hear the voice of the crane call.” Hence: “take account, obey an order”; “Histiaeus, obeying the first order” (*epakousas tō prōtō keleusmati*, Herodotus 4.141); “Listen to justice, forget violence” (Hesiod, *Op.* 274). In Homer, however, the verb has a religious meaning and is used for the deity: “Father Zeus, you who see all and hear all” (*pant’ epakoueis*, *Il.* 3.277). When used regarding prayer, it means “hear and answer”: “Hear my prayer, accept my offering” (Aristophanes, *Nub.* 274; cf. Aeschylus, *Cho.* 725).

This meaning is well attested in the inscriptions and the papyri. At Iasos, an altar is dedicated to Aphrodite: Aphroditēs epakouousēs kai epēkoou. At Laodicea on the sea, a dedication reads “Karpeina, who was heard (*epakousthisa*) following a vow, has consecrated (this) to the propitious goddesses (*theais epēkoois*).” Invocation to Isis in the second century BC: “Come to me, god of gods, show yourself merciful; hear me; take pity on the Twins.” This hearing and answering is also found in secular materials. After King Attalus II of Pergamum made a donation, the city of Delphi acknowledged it thus: “He gave an eager welcome to our requests” (*epakousas prothymōs*, Dittenberger, *Syl.* 672, 6). In a letter to Zeno, the following occurs: “Write me concerning whatever you wish; I will be happy to carry it out” (*hēdeōs epakousomenou*, *P.Mich.* 103, 15; cf. *P.Cair.Zen.* 59080, 3). The meaning “listen attentively” is common: “Remain and listen for a while to one deceased.”

The translators of the LXX (Hebrew *šāmā* ‘ and *ānāh*) knew this secular meaning, but they almost always used the word for God’s hearing with favor and granting an answer: “Isaac prayed to God ... and God heard him.” Beginning with Jacob this granting of an answer is expressed as a response: “I made an altar to God who responded to me in my day of distress” (Gen 35:3); “Samuel cried to God for Israel, and God responded to him.” In a corresponding fashion the pious hear the words of the Lord and obey what he commands (“I heard the voice of the Lord” [Deut 26:14; 2 Chr 11:4]) in all that he commands.

Philo knew this religious meaning of the word: “God hears suppliants” (*Worse Attacks Better* 93) and “heeds the prayers of Moses”; but most of his occurrences mean simply to hear: “The governor of the land ... pretended not to hear what he heard.” The same commonplace meaning occurs in Josephus: “They were afraid of being heard by the enemy” (*War* 4.331); “Titus heard quietly what was said to him.”

The verb is not only a hapax in the NT but a quotation of Isa 49:8 (LXX): “At the favorable time I answered you” (*kairō dektō epēkousa sou*, 2 Cor 6:2). The prophet envisioned the return from exile; St. Paul understands a reference to the messianic age and the apostolic preaching: a favorable time for action, since it is God’s “accepted” (*dektos*) time for help – hence an opportune time.

*Hypakouō*. – In classical and Hellenistic Greek, this verb is often synonymous with the preceding forms (“pay heed, listen”), with the emphasis on the attention given. “I awakened Ulysses, I spoke to him, and he paid me heed at once” (Homer, *Od.* 14.485); “Pay heed, hear, O mother, I beg you.” The prefix has its force, however, both in Aristophanes, where one seems to bend the head down to listen (“At least listen to the little child,” *Lys.* 878) and also in

the meaning “listen at a door, answer”; which today is the job of a concierge or porter: “Upon our arrival, the porter (*ho thyrōros*) came out to meet us – he was the one who used to answer (*eiōthei hypakouein*) – and told us to stay there and wait for him” (Plato, *Phd.* 59 e); “Philip, the fool, knocked at the door and told the porter (*tō hypakousanti*) to announce him” (Xenophon, *Symp.* 1.11); “If it is an aged man who answers the door (*tē thyra hypakēko*) I say at once, ‘My father, my dear father.’” Thus when St. Peter knocked on the door, “a young servant-girl named Rhoda went to answer” (Acts 12:13).

The dictionaries give another meaning, “obey,” and it is indeed true that this meaning is clearly attested, especially in the political arena; but the shades of meaning – difficult as they are to distinguish – are many. For example, it is obvious that the Samaritans did not “obey” the kings of Syria (Josephus, *Ant.* 13.275) but conformed to their commands (cf. 3.207), because hearing often means “answering an invitation” and “taking into account” what is asked (Herodotus 3.148). Sometimes it is done willingly, one complies easily (Xenophon, *Cyr.* 2.2.3), and this is the case with the wife who owes obedience to her husband. Sometimes you turn a deaf ear to appeals that are directed to you (Xenophon, *An.* 4.1.9) because to submit to someone else is to compromise your freedom, so one obeys with difficulty; hence the frequent meaning “yield” in Thucydides.

The verb is often used in the papyri, meaning either strict obedience to an order or a law, or an agreement to carry out one’s responsibility; or even the spontaneous and loving submission of a wife to her husband (*hypakouousēs moi kai phylattousēs moi pasan eunoian*, *P.Lond.* 1711, 35; 1727, 12). The commonest meaning, however, is “respond” and “correspond”: “I have sworn that I will respond to all questions concerning the vessel” (*P.Oxy.* 87, 19). In the considerations listed in an honorific decree of Athens for the poet Philippides: “He willingly responded to the desires of the people (*hypēkousen tō dēmō ethelontēs*) and celebrated the traditional sacrifices at his own expense” (Dittenberger, *Syl.* 374, 39; third century BC; *Ep. Arist.* 44). In the judicial sphere, it has to do with answering an authoritative summons: “Since Cathytes, summoned before men, has not responded (*ouch’ hypēkousen*), I have decided that for his disobedience (*apeithias*) he shall pay 250 denarii.” In the third century AD, the verb is used for the identification of a person in court: “This is the person who answered when his name was called.”

The LXX gives no special meaning to this verb, treating it as a synonym of *eisakouō* and *epakouō*, in the sense of either hearing or especially of obeying. On the one hand, paying heed already means taking into account (Gen 27:13; Dan [Theodotion] 3:12; cf. Philo, *Flight* 21; *Cherub.* 9) and obeying (“When their ear hears, they obey me,” Ps 18:44). On the other hand, most of the usages



are religious: hearing God's voice means putting his commandments into practice. Otherwise, *hypakouō* translates the Hebrew *ʾānāh* in the sense of "respond": "I called and you did not answer me." Philo gives this verb especially the sense of "obey," but he distinguishes between constrained, forced obedience (*Creation* 142; *Moses* 1.156) and voluntary obedience (*Joseph* 269), the latter being the obedience of children who accept being in submission to their parents' orders (*Spec. Laws* 2.236). He recognizes that "it is very onerous to be compelled to obey a large number of commandments" (*Husbandry* 49) and that the subject (*to hypakouon*) always fears the power of the one who commands even delicately (*Virtues* 114), although people do not obey the commands of the first one to come along (*Good Man Free* 25). But obedience is learned (*hypakouein mathontōn*, *Conf. Tongues* 55; *Migr. Abr.* 8; cf. Heb 5:8); it is the work of education (*Drunkenness* 198). Obeying someone else does not destroy freedom, as can be seen from the submission of children to parents or that of students to their teacher (*Good Man Free* 36, 156).

In conformity to this evolution, *hypakouō* in the NT always means "obey" (and takes the genitive or the dative) except at Acts 12:13 (cf. above). Unknown in St. John, it is found in the Synoptics only for the winds and the sea (Luke 8:25; Matt 8:27; Mark 4:41) and for unclean spirits constrained and forced to submit to Christ's orders; also for the sycamore in Luke 17:6 that would not be able to resist the apostles' faith.

The theological meaning appears in Acts 6:7 – at Jerusalem, a great multitude of Jewish priests obey the faith (*hypēkouon tē pistei*); this imperfect of repetition and duration suggests the continuity of the conversions of those who paid heed to the preaching of the apostles and committed themselves to it, that is, who submitted heart and spirit to what they heard: the doctrine and requirements of the Christian faith (cf. Rom 1:5; 16:26). This would again be called "obedience to the gospel" (2 Thess 1:8; Rom 10:16). The gospel preached and transmitted took form in a "type of teaching" to which people became obedient from the bottom of their hearts, that is to say, with all their being – understanding, will, conduct. In effect, one is the slave of whomever one obeys (*douloi este hō hypakouete*, Rom 6:16). Whether the master be God or sin, one receives the master's orders and carries them out; serving two masters simultaneously is impossible. If sin is the reigning prince, then one's desires are conformed to it; one consents or yields to it (Rom 6:12). Believers, however, are defined as "those who obey" Christ, the bringer of eternal salvation (Heb 5:9). Thus they correspond to the obedience of the one who submitted to the Father even to the point of death (5:8). In all cases, it is clear that Christian "obedience" is the strictest obedience there is. More than a de facto submission, it is free, complete, and definitive commitment to the one

recognized and confessed as a master with full prerogatives. As a subject, the believer is not only dependent upon the Lord's wishes but consecrated to him in life and in death. To have faith is to profess and to make real this "obedience." A fine example of this faith is that of Abraham who "when called, obeyed" God's command right away (Heb 11:12); the juxtaposition *kaloumenos hypēkousen* evokes more than consent. According to the usage of the papyri (cf. above) it expresses the exactitude of the human response to the divine will, whatever that will may be.

This religious obedience "in the Lord" is commanded to children with respect to their parents (Eph 6:1; Col 3:1; we can also take *hypakouete* in the sense of "pay heed") and to slaves with respect to their masters ... as to Christ (Eph 6:5; Col 3:22), desiring to please them. Sarah, a model for Christians, obeyed Abraham, whom she recognized as her lord and master (1 Pet 3:6). Envisioning the public reading of his epistles, St. Paul, after condemning the lazy who will not work, commands, "If anyone will not obey our word (expressed) in this letter ... no longer have anything to do with him" (2 Thess 3:14). Thanks to God, whether the apostle was present or absent the community at Philippi always obeyed him (Phil 2:12); we could almost translate that they always heard him.

*Hypakoē*. – This noun, unknown in classical Greek, seems to appear for the first time as a hapax in the LXX, where it translates the Hebrew *'nāwāh* ("humility," cf. Ps 18:36; Prov 15:23). In *Gos. Pet.* 42, it means "response." We could say that it was St. Paul who introduced *hypakoē* into the Greek language and gave it its meaning of strict obedience, first of all with regard to the submission of every person to God, and then of the obedience of Christ as contrasted with Adam, the first disobedient man: "By the obedience of one, all will be constituted righteous" (Rom 5:19). This obedience refers to the mission on which Christ was sent into the world, and especially the crucifixion (*genomenos hypēkoos mechri thanatou*). Heb 5:8 specifies: "Even though he was a Son, he learned obedience by the things that he suffered" (*emathen ... tēn hypakoēn*). Just as the Savior's whole life was characterized by his submission to God's will, the Christian life is defined by the initial undertaking of baptism, the obedience of the faith (*eis hypakoēn pisteōs*). We recognize and profess that Christ is the only master and Lord of our life; we submit to him our thoughts, will, and conduct better than prisoners of war bound hand and foot and turned over to a new authority: "We take every thought captive to the obedience of Christ (*eis tēn hypakoēn tou Christou*), and we are ready to punish all disobedience, when your obedience shall be complete."

St. Peter's three uses of this term are remarkable. First of all in the primitive definition of baptism: "Having perfectly sanctified your souls by obedience to

the truth” (1 Pet 1:22), the heart commitment and public proclamation of this commitment to the divine revelation, which brings definitive belonging to God (perfect participle). The letter is addressed “to the elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, in the sanctification of the Spirit, for obedience and the sprinkling of the blood of Christ” (*eis hypakoēn kai rhantismōn haimatos Iēsou Christou*, 1:2). By the obedience of the faith, the baptized are placed under the lordship of Christ and promise to submit their lives to his precepts. Just as blood seals the *diathēkē* (Matt 26:28; Heb 10:19), the union of obedience and blood refers to the ratification of the old covenant (Exod 24:7–8); the consecration by faith of the person and of all existence is definitive. That is why 1 Pet 1:14 calls Christians “children of disobedience that you were (*hōs tekna hypakoēs*), no longer be conformed to the former covetousnesses.”

The frequency and the absoluteness of these NT expressions shows that primitive catechesis was designed to teach believers the idea, the meaning, and the fullness of Christian obedience. Philology alone cannot suffice to fill these out (even with the help of the synonyms *peithō*, *hypatassō*, etc.). In biblical theology, we would have to begin with Matt 11:29–30: the taking of the yoke of Christ and of the baptism in which the disciple recognizes Christ as *Kyrios*. But this submission must be put into context with the love that is the royal law (Jas 2:8), at the same time strictly required and a law of liberty (1:25; cf. 1 Cor 10:23), and which thus governs not slaves but children. Obedience, then, will not consist in material conformity to precepts but in taking heed and being teachable, letting oneself be persuaded, in having a well-disposed heart, and from that point submitting to a rule of life and complying with what is asked. The example of Christ proves that this obedience is the freest and the most spontaneous that there is.

ἐκδημέω

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*ekdēmeō*, to leave, be in exile

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*ekdemeo*, S 1553; TDNT 2.63–64; EDNT 1.408; NIDNTT 2.788–790; MM 192; L&N 23.111, 85.21; BAGD 238

“Being at home (*endēmountes*) in the body, we are in exile (*ekdēmoumen*) from the Lord.... We prefer to be in exile (*ekdēmēsai*) from the body and be at home (*endēmēsai*) with the Lord. That is why whether we are at home in this body or away from it (*eite endēmountes eite ekdēmountes*) it is our desire to be pleasing to him” (2 Cor 5:6, 8, 9). These three occurrences of *ekdēmeō*, the only

occurrences in the whole Bible, are rather difficult to translate, because this compound of *dēmos* (“land, territory”) is relatively uncommon and has varied meanings.

The first meaning is “leave” (with an accusative of the place or person): “Solon left the country and went to Egypt” (Herodotus 1.30); “Laius had left to consult the oracle.” Next, it can mean “go away”: “The one who has killed will go away into some other country and to some other place, and he will stay there in exile.” It can also mean “travel” and becomes synonymous with *apodēmeō* (“leave on a journey,” Matt 25:14; Mark 12:1; Luke 20:9): “These are the conditions imposed on a trip abroad” (Plato, *Leg.* 12.1952 d); “The soul completed the journey, because it found a path” (Ps.-Aristotle, *Mund.* 1.391). In *T. Abr.*, the verb is used for death, as in 2 Cor: leaving the body to go to God.

In the papyri, this verb is almost always used for changing one’s residence, going from one place to another, leaving one’s country or moving. In the first century AD, two ephebes state, “If we move or if we leave, we must notify the president.” “Ever since we left (*aph’ hou exedēmēsamen*) the monarchs have done nothing ...” (*P.Mich.* 43, 5; third century BC). The meaning “be absent” is well attested: “Be so good as to write Epharmostos to be there and not to be absent (*egdēmountos*) when the matter is judged.”

The Pauline use of moving as a metaphor for death, expressed as a play on words, is clear: it is a matter of moving from one country to another, that is, moving out of here in order to move in elsewhere, leaving the body behind to gain heaven and see Christ. Here below, Christians are in exile “apart from the Lord.” They live as exiles (*ekdēmeō*) so long as they dwell in this body, which is likened to a tent (*skēnos* – 2 Cor 5:1, 4 – a symbol of nomadic life) because their citizenship is heavenly (Phil 3:20). The idea could have been comprehensible to pagans: “A little earth envelops and hides his body; his soul, having escaped his members, is possessed by the vast *ouranos*.”

ἐκλύομαι

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*eklyomai*, to untie, dissolve, be physically or morally weak

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**eklyomai** S 1590; *EDNT* 1.419; *NIDNTT* 3.177–178; L&N 23.79, 25.288; BAGD 243

*Eklyō*, “untie, slacken, dissolve,” is used for spilling water (*P.Tebt.* 49, 6; 54, 16; second-first century) and in the context of bathing; in the second century BC, Asclepiades complains about a brawl in which he was victimized by the bath-house employees when, seriously ill, he emerged exhausted from the bath:

“and when I emerged *eklelymenos* from the bath” (*kamou anabantos eg balaneiou eglelymenou*, *P.Tebt.* 798, 7). Herod relaxed and finally fainted in a bath full of oil (Josephus, *War* 1.657).

In the passive, the verb is often used of people who are fasting and who faint from hunger. (It was his concern about this eventuality that prompted Jesus to multiply the loaves for the crowd that had followed him on the mountain.) It is also used for men worn out by a long march (1 Sam 30:21, Hebrew *pāgar*, in the piel, too weak) across a wilderness (2 Sam 16:2, Hebrew *yā‘ap*) or after battle (2 Sam 21:15, Hebrew *‘up*; 1 Macc 10:82); they arrive exhausted at their stopping place. This tiredness or physical weakness is expressed in the figure of speech “to have limp, soft, or lifeless hands.”

But it is also said that the heart weakens, and the present participle *eklyomenos* is used not only for physical weakness but also for moral laxity and thus signifies a lack of spiritual vigor, laxity provoked by weariness, lack of courage, giving up. Hence the expression “he relaxed his eagerness” (*exelyse to prothymon*). This is the meaning in NT exhortations: “Having undertaken to do good, let us not lose courage; at the desired time we shall reap a harvest, if we do not slacken (*mē eklyomenos*)” (Gal 6:9); “Consider [the sufferings of] the one who endured in his own person such contradiction by sinners, so that you may not weaken, your souls may not slacken.” Christians who have started out energetically but lack *hypomonē* see their courage fall off bit by bit and are incapable of carrying through. That which is most difficult in the Christian life is not the heroism of a single day, but perseverance in faithfulness to the loftiest ideal: the imitation of the crucified Christ. Hence the present imperative – *mēde eklyou*, quoted from Prov 3:11 – in Heb 12:5: “Do not slacken” when you undergo trials at God’s hand. Providential training through correction is designed for your good.

ἐκτένεια, ἐκτενήζεις, ἐκτενῶς

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*ekteneia*, **fervor, unfailing intensity**; *ektenēs, ektenōs*, **without ceasing, zealously, urgently**

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*ekteneia*, S 1616; TDNT 2.464; EDNT 1.422; MM 198; L&N 25.70; BAGD 245 | *ektenes*, S 1618; TDNT 2.463–464; EDNT 1.422; MM 198; L&N 25.71, 68.12; BAGD 245 | *ektenos*, S 1619; EDNT 1.422; MM 199; L&N 25.71, 68.12; BAGD 245

These terms express tautness and, in a moral sense, an effort that can be understood either as perseverance (“without respite, without letting up,

assiduously”) or as intensity (“with fervor, urgently”). The two meanings are often joined together in a context that makes it difficult to distinguish between them. In the OT, which does not use *ektenēs* (cf. 3 Macc 3:10; 5:29), their usages are religious, notably with respect to the great cries of prayer that Israel voices, forcefully and one might almost say violently, toward God.

Luke also uses *ektenōs* with respect to prayer: in the garden, Jesus prayed with more urgency, and when “Peter was being guarded in prison, the church urgently prayed to God for him.” As for 1 Peter, it bids the baptized “Love one another from the bottom of your hearts, intensely” and repeats, “Above all, have an intense love between yourselves,” meaning that this love should stretch and be as fervent as possible.

In contemporary usage, especially in the inscriptions, *ektenēs* and *ektenōs* refer to a constant concern to be of service, exacting and untiring zeal, urgent affection, and even lavish gift-giving; things that would be attributed today to “fervent love” (cf. Rom 12:11). As part of the official vocabulary of chancelleries, *ekteneia*, *ektenōs*, and *ektenēs* are in copious supply in honorific decrees, where they enjoy a privileged association with *prothymia*, *prothymos*, *prothymōs*, as Hesychius and the *Suda* note. In Thrace: “I have a fervent desire to benefit everyone” (*prothymian gar ektenestatēn echō tou poiein eu pantas*, *I.Thas.* 186, 10). A decree from Lampsacus sends to the magistrates of Thasos the list of honors conferred upon Dionysodoros, who “shows himself full of ardor and zeal for the interests of the people” (*ektenē kai prothymon heauton eis ta tou dēmou paraskeuazei pragmata*, *ibid.*, 171, 14 = *SEG XIII*, 458 and the commentary of J. Tréheux in *BCH*, 1953, pp. 426–433); “he showed himself full of ardor and zeal for all” (*pasi ektenē kai prothymon auton pareicheto*). Around 188, the Milesians honor the physician Apollonios, “he showed himself *ektenēs* and *prothymos* likewise according to his art,” (*ektenē kai prothymon homoiōs heauton pareicheto kata te tēn technēn*, Dittenberger, *Syl.* 620, 8, 13); the Erythreans fête their praetors, “they proved themselves *ektenēs* and *prothymos* toward the defense of the city” (*ekteneis kai prothymous autous pareschonto pros tēn tēs poleōs phylakēn*, *ibid.* 442, 9; cf. *SB* 8855, 10). Around 200: “showing himself *ektenēs* and *prothymos* in everything” (*ektenē kai prothymon em pasi paraskeuazomenos*, *I.Priene* 82, 10–11; cf. *ektenē kai prothymon heauton ... parechetai*, *I.Magn.*, 86, 12 and 20); a decree in honor of Boulagoras, “whereas having been chosen several times by the people as their representative during public proceedings, he was unflagging in his activity and zeal – *ektenē kai prothymōs* – and he has secured many advantages and profits for the city.” Around 130, an inscription of Pergamum, “so that ... now in a manner worthy of godlike honors he became most *ektenēs* in his zeal” (*hopōs ... nyn isotheōn ēxiōmenos timōn ektenesteros ginētai tē prothymia*).

The association of zeal and ardor is similar. Cf. a hydrophore of Artemis: *ektenōs kai philoteimōs* (I.Did., 375, 8); “fulfilling the duties of *hydrophoros* in a matter worthy of his race, *philoteimōs*, and performing the mysteries *ektenōs*” (*plērōsasa de kai tēn hydrophorian axiōs tou genous philoteimōs kai ta men mystēria ectenōs telesasa*, ibid. 381, 8). A decree of the Athenian association of soteriasts (worshippers of Artemis Soteira) sets out to reward a certain Diodorus: “the synod having received his *ekteneia* and *philotimia*.” The council and people of Sardis honor a priestess Claudia Polla Quintilla, who on the one hand had served the god and the community in an orderly and zealous fashion (*kosmiōs, philoteimōs*) and on the other hand had generously (or constantly) funded public sacrifices out of her own pocket. In 218 BC, a letter-decree from the *kosmoi* (rulers) and city of Gortyn expresses the gratitude of the city to the physician Hermias of Cos, who for five years worked for “citizens and all inhabitants with zeal and constancy – *philotimiōs* and *ekteniōs* – in everything pertaining to his profession and all other cares.”

From these usages it emerges that *ekteneia* in the NT is intensity without negligence or failing, whether in prayer or brotherly love. It would not seem that the accent falls on duration or persistence; it is rather fervor, authenticity, magnanimity, a certain lavishness of feeling that characterize Christian *agapē*, eager and generous. To better situate 1 Pet 1:22 and 4:8, we should note that in literary texts *ektenōs*, often in conjunction with *philophronōs* and *ektenēs*, often modifies friendship. In fact, *hoi ectenestatoi* is used for the most fervent friends (Polybius 21.22.4). In 182 BC, Eumenes II invites the city of Cos to celebrate games in honor of Athena Nikephora, “with all those who are most *ektenēs* to us among the Greeks.” Arcesilas informs his friend Thaumasis that he has drawn up a will in his favor, so greatly has the latter proven his zeal toward him (*ton eis em’ ectenōs houtō pephilotimēmenon*, Diogenes Laertius 4.6.44). Attalus II, writing around 160 to Attis, priest of the temple of Cybele at Pessinus, declares “Menodorus, whom you sent to me, gave me your fervent and friendly letter.” Arbaces “eagerly forged close relations with the leaders of troops from various nations and succeeded in gaining their friendship” (Diodorus Siculus 2.24.3).

But St. Peter’s vision of such generous and constant brotherly love is only possible as a function of the divine rebirth of the children of God. They share in a divine love and give expression to its spontaneity and fervor.

ἐκτρέπομαι

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*ektrepomai*, to change direction, deviate, go astray

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*ektrepomai*, S 1624; EDNT 1.423; NIDNTT 3.902–903; MM 199; L&N 13.155, 31.65; BAGD 246

Very rare in the papyri, the verb *ektrepō* is used only in the middle or passive voice in the NT. It expresses a change of state or direction and seems to have in the first century connotations that vary according to context. Used notably in the moral or religious sphere, it means that one withdraws, deviates, turns aside from one way to go astray, get lost, flee down another. It is in this sense that the word is used four times in the Pastorals, where it seems to have become a technical term of parenesis: the heterodox turn away to wander in empty verbiage, *exetrapēsan eis mataiologian* (1 Tim 1:6; second aorist passive); heretics turn their ears away from the truth, turning instead to fables, *epi de tous mythous ektrapēsontas* (2 Tim 4:4, future passive indicative); Timothy must flee this profane chatter; young widows go astray after Satan (1 Tim 5:15, *exetrapēsan*).

The first-century parallels, Jewish and pagan, have this ethical significance: the nouveaux riches do not see the route before them and go astray in areas in which no paths have been cleared, *eis anodias ektrepontai* (Philo, *Spec. Laws* 2.23); “Turn aside from eunuchs (*gallous ektrepesthai*) and flee the company of those who have deprived themselves of their virility” (Josephus, *Ant.* 4.290). The young “turn aside from the ways of their fathers, they take the opposite path” (ibid. 6.34). “Rehoboam went astray in unjust and impious actions, *eis adikous kai asebeis exetrapē praxeis*” (ibid. 8.251); *eis* indicates the direction toward which one turns; cf. 5.98 – “If you turn aside to imitate other nations.” Hyrcanus, a disciple of the Pharisees, bade them take notice if he committed any fault or turned aside from the way of justice (*tēs hodou tēs dikaias ektrepomenon*) and correct him (ibid. 13.290). In his chapter on training, Musonius says to “do anything to avoid things that are truly evil.” T. Nägeli cites an inscription of Oenoanda in Lycia that is very close to the wording of 1 Tim 1:6 and 6:20 – *ektrepesthai dei tous sophistikous logous*.

*Ektrepomai* is also used in medical and surgical contexts – “leave its place, disconnect, dislocate, separate,” – and it is in this sense that we should understand Heb 12:13 – “Let the lame person not deviate; let him be healed.”

ἑκτρομα

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*ektrōma*, stillborn child, child born abnormally before term

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*ektroma*, S 1626; TDNT 2.465–467; EDNT 1.423; NIDNTT 1.182–183; MM 200; L&N 23.55; BAGD 246



After listing the appearances of the risen Christ to the apostles, St. Paul concludes: “And finally, as to a prematurely born child, he appeared even to me; for I am the least of the apostles” (1 Cor 15:8–9). A NT hapax, *ektrōma* is used three times in the LXX, and always in a comparison. Aaron pleads with Moses on behalf of Miriam when she is stricken with leprosy: “Let her not be like a stillborn child (*hōsei ektrōma*, Hebrew *mût*), that emerges from its mother’s womb with half its body eaten away” (Num 12:12). “Why was I not like a stillborn child (*hōsper ektrōma*), hidden in its mother’s womb, like the little ones who have not seen the light of day?” The rich man, who has fathered a hundred sons and lived a long life, but whose soul is not satisfied and who does not receive a proper burial, is worse off than “the stillborn child, because in vanity it came and in obscurity it went, and in obscurity will its name be hidden; it has not even seen the sun and has not known it” (Eccl 6:3). In all three cases, the *ektrōma* is a stillborn child, a physiological definition that sheds no light on the Pauline metaphor.

There is a single occurrence in the papyri, dating from 142 BC. A pregnant Jewish woman complains that she was attacked by another woman, perhaps in a village of Samaria, and is in danger of having a miscarriage. In the secular literature, the term is not used by gynecologists and can be cited only in one text from Aristotle and in the definition of Hesychius: “a child born dead, untimely, something cast out of the woman” (*ektrōma: paidion nekron aōron, ekbolē gynaikos*).

Since the documentation is poor and worthless for shedding light in 1 Cor 15:8, exegetes make the most of a notation by the twelfth-century polygraph J. Tzetzes, who saw the term *ektrōma* as a derogatory label and understood the apostle to be taking up an insult used against him by his adversaries, like “ordure” (*peripsēma*) in 1 Cor 4:13. But J. Schneider (*TDNT*, vol. 2, pp. 465–467) has demonstrated that this polemical interpretation does not square with the kerygmatic material that precedes. Thus it seems preferable to see in this word an expression of humility, as it was understood by Ignatius of Antioch, the Greek Fathers, and a number of moderns.

T. Boman points out the triply depreciative expression: the last of the series – like a stillborn child – the lowliest or most minuscule of the apostles (*elachistos*, imperceptible); and he cites the Latin *abortivus* (dwarfish, infantile, falling short in maturity) which was not unknown to Paul. In effect, St. Irenaeus knew an analogous meaning: “shapeless and formless, like an *ektrōma*.” So *ektrōma*, derived from *ektitrōskō* (pierce, tear), literally means a fetus born before its time and violently; metaphorically, the Pauline image would be that of a body ripped by force from a woman’s womb (the synagogue). The reference would be to the abnormal and sudden character of Paul’s birth to the

Christian faith and the apostolic ministry. His case is indeed different from that of the Twelve. He, Saul, was in a way a “premature birth,” in an immature stage of his gestation in grace, “only a spiritual embryo” (T. Boman, p. 49). He immediately explains: “since I had persecuted the church of God” (verse 9). Moreover, in the occurrences of *ektrōma*, the emphasis is always placed in the abnormal birth, before term, whether the baby is dead or living (Schneider). It required an omnipotent intervention by Christ to give this persecutor, in one stroke, both faith and the apostolic calling.

ἐκψύχω

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*ekpsychō*, **to be short of breath, expire**

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*ekpsucho*, S 1634; EDNT 1.424; MM 200; L&N 23.99; BAGD 247

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Instead of the classical *apopsychō*, the Koine uses – though rarely – the verb *ekpsychō*, which has quite variable meanings. It appears for the first time in Epicharmus in the sense “dry out,” but in Ps.-Aristotle it means “be short of breath” (Ps.-Aristotle, *Pr.* 882; 886). In Plutarch: “Cooling off (*to ekpsychesthai*) not only hardens bodies but also causes them to melt” (*Quaest. conv.* 6.8.6; 695 D).

In Judg 4:21, Alexandrinus translates the Hebrew *’ûp* as *exepsyxen* (Sisera “fell motionless and died”), whereas the piel of *kāhāh* in Ezek 21:12 has to be translated *ekpsyxei pasa sarx kai pan pneuma* (“all flesh and every spirit will weaken”). The only three occurrences of the verb (in the aorist indicative) in the NT are in St. Luke, and they all mean “give up the ghost.” Ananias “fell down and expired” (Acts 5:5); so also Sapphira (5:10) and Herod Agrippa I (“he was eaten by worms and expired,” 12:23). Perhaps this was the medical meaning in the first century, but its usages in Hippocrates (quoted by Hesychius) refer to “a patient who blacks out” (*Aff.* 1.5, 1.18).

ἐλαττον (ἐλάσσων), ἐλαττονέω, ἐλαττώω

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*elatton* (*elassōn*), **smaller, lesser; elattonēō, to have less, have too little; elattoō, to diminish**

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*elatton* (*elasson*), S 1640: TDNT 4.648–659; EDNT 1.426; NIDNTT 2.427–428; MM 201; L&N 59.3, 67.116, 87.67; BDF §§34(1), 47(2), 61(1), 185(4), 263(3);

BAGD 248 | *elattoneo*, S 1641; *EDNT* 1.426; MM 201; L&N 57.41; BAGD 248 | *elattoo*, S 1642; *EDNT* 1.426; MM 201; L&N 87.68; BAGD 248

If it is true that in the Hellenistic era the double consonant *ss* replaced the Attic *tt*, this is not a general rule. It applies most of the time in the LXX, but *elatton* is much more common than *elassōn* in the papyri. The NT confirms this variety of usage, with *elassōn* twice (John 2:10; Rom 9:12) and *elatton* twice (1 Tim 5:9; Heb 7:7).

*Elassōn*, very common in comparisons of size, functions as the comparative of *mikros*, “smaller, lesser,” and the opposite of *meizōn* (to designate a younger sibling), of *kreittōn* (“the lesser is blessed by the greater”), of *kalon* (the wine that is less good is served at the end of the meal), or of *pleiōn* (Exod 16:17; Num 26:54; 33:54; *P.Mich.* 636, 8); thus the neuter *mē elatton* is used in 1 Tim 5:9 – a woman is not to be enrolled with the widows until she is “at least sixty years old.”

The denominative verb *elattoneō*, “have less or too little, lack,” a NT hapax (2 Cor 8:15) is a citation of Exod 16:18 – “the one who had less manna did not go wanting.” It is rare in the papyri, but attested in 217 BC: a defrauder in a wine delivery will be required “to restore to us the difference, fourteen missing jugs” (to *diaphoron tōn elattonountōn* ὁ *keramiōn*, *P.Magd.* 26, 12). In 11 BC, the word is used for the lack of the price of 230 *kotylai* of oil (*BGU* 1195, 19); and in the third century AD: “it is my joy and my glory to produce more and lose nothing” (*pleon exeurein kai mē elattonin*, *P.Oxy.* 2407, 54).

*Elattoō* also has the meaning “lack, be deprived of,” as well as “decrease,” like the present passive infinitive in John 3:30 – “he must become greater, but I must decrease.” The decreasing can be monetary or solar (Dio Cassius 45.17: “the light of the sun seems to diminish and go out”) or physical (Philo, *Virtues* 46; *Etern. World* 65); but also psychological or social. In 180 BC, Orthagoras of Araxa is the object of an honorific decree because “sent on a mission to the confederation, he so conducted the debates with words and with deeds that he gained advantages for our people and we avoided suffering the least diminution, *kai en mēdeni elattōthēnai*.” It can refer to a decrease in quality (Sir 16:23; Philo, *Giants* 27); “the science of gymnastics is not inferior to any other art” (Philostratus, *Gym.* 1). It is in this sense that God made man slightly, hardly (*ēlattōsas brachy*) lower than the angels (Heb 2:7, citing Ps 8:5).

ἐλεέω, ἔλεος

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*eleeō*, to have compassion, show favor or mercy; *eleos*, compassion, mercy

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*eleo*, S 1653; *TDNT* 2.477–485; *EDNT* 1.429–431; *NIDNTT* 2.594; MM 202; L&N 88.76; BDF ββ90, 148(2), 176(1); BAGD 249 | *eleos*, S 1656; *TDNT* 2.477–485; *EDNT* 1.429–431; *NIDNTT* 2.593–597, 600; MM 203; L&N 88.76; BDF β51(2); BAGD 250

*Eleos* is an irregular noun. Normally masculine, it is most commonly neuter in the Hellenistic period. It refers to a “feeling,” namely, the feeling of one who is moved by the sight of another’s suffering and in a way shares in it: compassion. Such a sensitivity to misery is unacceptable without controls or objective motives. Furthermore, Aristotle specifies that “pity has as its object a being that does not deserve its misfortune” (Aristotle, *Poet.* 13.1453) and defines *eleos* as “a pain following upon the sight of a destructive or painful evil that strikes a person who does not deserve it and that one might expect to suffer oneself or see one’s own dear ones suffer.... To feel pity, one must obviously be able to think that one is exposed” (*Rh.* 2.8.1385–14). One must be moved only at the sight or the thought of someone suffering wrongly. This idea was taken up by the whole Greek tradition, notably by Polybius, and became even more categorical with the Cynics: “The Cynic must feel neither envy nor pity.” Of course, even philosophers sometimes show themselves more favorable to altruistic feelings, but even so, pity remains suspect, even a weakness.

R. Bultmann (“ἔλεος,” in *TDNT*, vol. 2, p. 478) mentions the large role played by pity in the administration of justice. The litigant or the accused always seeks to gain the judge’s *eleos*; they bring before the court “pity, excuses, humanity, but no human law, no divine law, allows the accrual of profit from this unclean wretch.” “He begged and supplicated the judges with many tears ... to stir their compassion.” In the third century BC, an old man, victim of the theft of grain, asks for the king’s help and concludes, “Thus, thanks to you, O king, I will enjoy the effects of justice and mercy for the rest of my days.”

With the LXX, we enter an entirely new world, in the first place because pity is exalted with considerable frequency, and secondly because it becomes a religious virtue and especially a divine attribute, so much so that Israel’s religion appears to be the cult of a God of mercy, which is an innovation – despite the altar raised by the Athenians to *Eleos* (Pausanias 1.17.1; Diodorus Siculus 13.22.7) and the Epidaurian belief (*Eleos epieikēs theos*, *IG* IV, 1282). After all, *eleeō* and *eleos* are translation Greek; all, *eleeō* and *eleos* are translation Greek; they reflect the content of the Hebrew original. Most commonly the verb *eleeō* translates the Hebrew *hānan*, “show favor or grace,” with the nuance of a freely given favor, a generous gift. Thus the usages of the verb connote preferential love for a certain person that is shown in the

generosity with which favors are granted. Fairly often *eleeō* translates the piel of the Hebrew *rāham*, “have pity, show mercy,” but also “love tenderly.” On the other hand, there are 172 instances in which the LXX uses *eleos* to translate *hesed*, a word whose significance is varied and disputed but whose basic meaning is “goodness, benevolence, favorable disposition,” covering the spectrum from plain sympathy and goodness to mercy and clemency. It is fundamentally a species of love (and is often linked with love – “love *hesed*” [Amos 5:5] means to love tenderly); and most of its occurrences have to do with God’s mercy or lovingkindness. The description of God as *rāh-hesed*, literally “great in favor,” is to be understood as meaning “abundant in mercy” (*polyeleos*, Num 14:18; Joel 2:13; Ps 86:5, 15). Translators of the NT must keep these nuances in mind wherever they must render the rich meaning of formally biblical *eleos*.

The NT takes up Israel’s faith in God’s mercy in exactly the same form and continues it. It gives much greater emphasis, however, to the precept of brotherly mercy, which it makes into an active, internal virtue, an indispensable condition of eternal blessedness and an imitation of the heavenly Father. In the parable of the Unmerciful Servant, Jesus first contrasts two debts – one enormous (ten thousand talents), the other miniscule (a hundred denarii) – then the two creditors. The king is moved by a visceral compassion (*splanchnistheis*, Matt 18:27) when he hears his debtor’s supplications and forgives the whole debt; but the latter shuts out all feelings of pity and not only refuses to forgive the debt owed him but throws the debtor into prison. So this is the motivation for the king’s (God’s) judgment: “Contemptible servant, ought you not also to have had pity on your fellow-servant, since I took pity on you?” (*ouk edei kai se eleēsai ton syndoulon sou, hōs kagō se ēleēsa*, 18:33). And he hands him over to the torturers. Jesus explains the teaching of the parable: “So also will my heavenly Father do to you, if each of you does not forgive (*mē aphēte*) his brother from the heart” (18:35). On the one hand, “from the heart” contrasts with forgiveness merely spoken with the lips; it is a matter of not only overlooking the offenses of which one has been victim, but of loving one’s neighbor, that is, of wishing and doing him well in every circumstance (Matt 5:44). On the other hand, God will treat us according to the way we treat our brethren. The motivation for brotherly compassion is imitation of God; which puts the emphasis on the interiority and sincerity of the forgiveness. The one who shows compassion has a good heart.

The good Samaritan is a model, because he was moved by compassion at the sight of the wounded stranger (*idōn esplanchnisthē*, Luke 10:33) and helped him, showing himself to be the “neighbor” of the man who fell into the hands of the brigands. Just the opposite of the priest and the Levite, who passed by the

wounded man, remaining indifferent strangers and even turning aside for fear of contracting a legal defilement, the Samaritan was completely spontaneous, quick to act, disinterested, and efficient in his generosity simply because he was good-hearted and was moved (*ho poiēsas to eleos met' autou*, 10:37), because he knew himself and showed himself to be the brother of the stranger.

The apostles praise this virtue: “The wisdom from on high is ... full of mercy and good fruit” (*mestē eleous kai karpōn agathōn*, Jas 3:17); a love that originates with God reflects the very wisdom of God and is made manifest in “good works.” It is beneficent, especially toward the unfortunate. The one who carries out such a ministry in the church will radiate goodness: “Let the one who practices mercy (do so) with joy” (*ho eleōn en hilarotēti*, Rom 12:8; cf. Prov 22:8 a, LXX), not only because God loves a cheerful giver (2 Cor 9:7) or to build up the unfortunate with a smile but because “there is greater happiness in giving than in receiving” (Acts 20:35). Jude (21–22) addresses all Christians: “Keep yourselves in the love of God, awaiting the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ for life everlasting (*prosdechomenoi to eleos tou kyriou hēmōn*). Have pity on those who are deciding” (or “disputing,” *kai hous men eleate diakrinomenous* – the textual variants are numerous). This whole catechesis was already contained in the promise of divine mercy to those who pardon their neighbor: “Blessed are the merciful, for they themselves shall be shown mercy.”

As for God, his mercy is revealed in the coming of the messianic salvation and is sung by the Virgin Mary and the priest Zechariah in terms borrowed from the OT. It is a gratuitous favor, a grace that presupposes God’s love and the intervention of his omnipotence. In addition, it is manifested in Elizabeth’s motherhood (Luke 1:58), as it is shown to the Gerasene demoniac (Mark 5:19), to St. Paul (1 Cor 7:25; 2 Cor 4:1; 1 Tim 1:13, 16), to Epaphroditus (Phil 2:27), to the house of Onesiphorus (2 Tim 1:16; cf. *SB* 1872). It extends to all believers (Gal 6:16) and together with Christ’s mercy becomes the content of the apostle’s wish for a whole church: “Grace, mercy, and peace from God the Father and Christ our Savior” (1 Tim 1:2; 2 Tim 1:2; Jude 2; 2 John 3). Thus it is God’s mercy that accounts for the conversion of a persecutor and his sending as an apostle, for the healing of a sick person, for the casting out of a demon, for purification from sin and a life united to God. Blind, epileptic, and leprous folk all appeal to Jesus’ compassion, always with success, and it is thanks to his intercession that believers can “approach the throne of grace to receive mercy and find grace to help in time of need” (Heb 4:16).

Certainly God is free to grant or deny his favors and his forgiveness (Rom 9:15–18; cf. Exod 33:19); but those who yesterday were “Not pitied” are today “Pitied” (1 Pet 2:10; cf. Hos 1:6–9). St. Paul’s innovation in the biblical

theology of *eleos* is to locate God's mercy at the beginning and at the end of the plan of salvation: "Formerly you were disobedient to God; now you have obtained mercy.... God has consigned all people to disobedience so as to show mercy to all" (Rom 11:30–32). Universal mercy extends to Gentiles as well as Jews (Rom 15:9) and consists in the forgiveness of sins. It is made effective for each one in baptism ("He has saved us according to his mercy through a bath of regeneration and renewal in the Holy Spirit" (Titus 3:5), and it has an eschatological bearing ("God wished to make known the wealth of his glory in vessels of mercy that he has prepared for glory"). The whole Christian life here below consists in "waiting for the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ for life everlasting" (Jude 21).

ἐλπίζω, ἐλπίς

*elpizō*, **to hope**; *elpis*, **hope**

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*elpizo*, S 1679; TDNT 2.517–533; EDNT 1.437–441; NIDNTT 2.238–246; MM 204; L&N 25.59, 30.54; BDF §§14, 74(1), 187(6), 233(2), 235(2), 337(2), 338(3), 341, 350, 397(2); BAGD 252 | *elpis*, S 1680; TDNT 2.517–533; EDNT 1.437–441; NIDNTT 2.238–246; MM 204–205; L&N 25.59, 25.61, 25.62; BDF §§14, 235(2), 400(1); BAGD 252–253; ND 2.77

We note that the noun *elpis* is absent from the four Gospels and thus that the Lord did not use the word *hope*. The verb *elpizō* is used only twice in its secular sense ("If you lend to those from whom you hope to receive ..." [Luke 6:34; cf. *elpizōn* ... *apodōsei*, L. Robert, *Gladiateurs*, n. 55]; "Herod hoped to see Jesus perform some miracle" [Luke 23:8]) and three times in its religious sense, all in accord with the OT meaning. The more the proclamation of the gospel of salvation advanced in Asia Minor and in Europe, the more the apostles, especially St. Paul, came in contact with pagans, whom they defined as "those who have no hope." These pagans are amazed by the unique *elpis* (Eph 4:4; Heb 3:6; cf. *P.Brem.* 1, 1: *mia ēn elpis kai loipē prosdokia*; UPZ 42, 39; *C.P.Herm.* 116; Josephus, *War* 5.64; 6.160) that animates all the members of the new religion. They cry for help (Acts 16:9 – *boēthēson hēmin*), so that the preaching of the faith is oriented more and more toward a preaching of hope (cf. Heb 11:1), and the confession of faith becomes a *homologia tēs elpidos aklinē* ("unwavering confession of hope," Heb 10:23).

I. – Secular objects of hope. – If hope is defined as "expectation of something good," then there are many good things (Sir 2:9): returning to one's country (Jer 44:14; Philo, *Spec. Laws* 4.17; Polybius 3.63.7), freedom (Isa 25:9;

cf. Jdt 6:9; Ps 112:7), receiving a teaching (Isa 42:4; cf. Philo, *Change of Names* 8), help (2 Macc 3:29), a wage (Wis 2:22, *misthon*), money, a harvest (Philo, *Virtues* 159; *Rewards* 129; 1 Cor 9:10); escaping an illness (2 Macc 3:29; Philo, *Sacr. Abel and Cain* 123; Josephus, *War* 1.657; *Ant.* 17.172), a shipwreck (Acts 27:20), a disaster (Job 2:9); what in Greek is called salvation (Philo, *Flacc.* 11; *To Gaius* 151, 329; 4 Macc 11:7). Philo specifies that people hope for useful goods, like wealth, health, reputation (*Alleg. Interp.* 3.86; *Decalogue* 91; *To Gaius* 11), pleasures (*Dreams* 2.209), favors and compliments (*Abraham* 128; *To Gaius* 137), a calm and tranquil life (*Moses* 1.214), a contemplative life (*Migr. Abr.* 70), wellbeing (*Joseph* 162), freedom (*Alleg. Interp.* 3.194; *Moses* 1.171, 193; *Virtues* 123), fatherhood (*Alleg. Interp.* 3.85; *Spec. Laws* 1.138; 4.203; *Decalogue* 126; *Virtues* 207), motherhood (*Spec. Laws* 3.62), marriage (*Husbandry* 158; *Prelim. Stud.* 5; Aristaenetus 1.21.14: *elpizomenos estin ho gamos hēdys*), victory (*Spec. Laws* 4.28; *Good Man Free* 111; *To Gaius* 356; *Husbandry* 162; *Joseph* 138), booty (*Cherub.* 75), happiness (*Flight* 145; *Abraham* 7; *To Gaius* 82), perfection (*Heir* 311; *Decalogue* 113). St. Paul and St. John express several times their desire to visit a community, to prolong a visit, to be free to meet a disciple. This meaning is in conformity with common usage as expressed in the papyri: “Tell Longinus that I hope to meet him again.” The desire is expressed that a certain order will be carried out (*P.Ant.* 188, 10), that a guilty person will be imprisoned (*SB* 9616, 28), that a certain person will make an effort (*P.Brem.* 5, 8: *dōsein ergasian*; a Latinism, cf. Luke 12:58), that someone will carry out our business (*P.Oxy.* 3147, 8, *hoti poiei to pragma hēmōn*), that a field will be sown (*P.Ryl.* 243, 8), that certain things will be pleasing (*PSI* 1242, 3: *auta hēdistā*; first century; cf. *SB* 9528). Someone counts on receiving money (*P.Mich.* 480, 15; *Pap.Lugd.Bat.* XI, 28, 10; *P.Oslo* 50, 7; *P.Laur.* 39, 8) or help. Soldiers hope for promotion. In the midst of trials, the danger is that one will lose all hope. Is a happy life not sustained by hope? In contracts for divorce by mutual consent, the spouses recognize that they were united in a legal marriage and in a common life “for the procreation of children, according to the human custom, with good hopes” (*epi chrēstais elpisin*, *C.P.Herm.* 29, 10 = *SB* 9278; *C.Pap.Jud.* 513). In all these texts, we can conclude on the one hand that human hope is the expectation – uncertain, confident, or anguished – of a desired good; it glimpses as possible or probable the realization of that which it counts on. On the other hand, the birthright of every human being, man or woman, but above all of the poor and unfortunate, is to retain hope. “Thales, when asked what the commonest thing was, answered, ‘Hope – for even those who have nothing else still have this.’ ”



Otherwise, in biblical as in secular Greek, *elpizō* (*en*) means to hope in someone, to place one's confidence in people or in earthly realities: the people of Shechem put their hope in Gaal (Judg 9:26; cf. 20:36), Hezekiah put his in Egypt and his horsemen (2 Kgs 18:24), the Assyrians put theirs in their shields and spears; Israel in Bethel (Jer 48:13) and Egypt (Ezek 29:16); but Jer 17:5 curses the person who trusts in a human (Philo, *Flacc.* 22). This same meaning, "placing one's confidence," is found in the papyri: "For we would not have expected him to perish (future infinitive of *diapiptō*) in so short a time" (*ou gar an ēlpiamen en houtō brachei chronō diapesein auton*, SB 6787, 39; third century BC); "but I hope that I shall be saved through your prayers" (*elpizō de diasōthēsesthai me dia tōn euchōn sou*, ibid. 7872, col. II, 10; *C.P.Herm.* 5, 11). It is attested especially in Jewish and Christian tomb inscriptions: "I expect a good hope of mercy"; but then the verb has a religious meaning.

II. – Religious objects of hope. – Pagans placed their confidence in God to obtain earthly goods. In the first century AD, according to Orphic and mystery traditions, souls aspire to immortality, to a blessed survival after death, and it was thought that Dionysus would protect his faithful ones after death. But this hope was never named as such, and it is only Plutarch who states that the initiates into the mysteries undergo "a sudden thrill mixed with hope" (*met' elpidos idias echousi*, *De fac.* 28; 943 c), when they are in the act of clinging to the moon.

A veritable semantic revolution is effected by the LXX, which gives *elpis* and *elpizō* a strictly religious meaning. Hope, which is always directed toward God, is no longer any expectation whatsoever, but a sure and certain confidence in Yahweh. It is not only the virtue of certain individuals but also the faith, piety, and spirituality of Israel, as these are expressed by the psalmists and the sages: "The hope of the righteous is full of immortality" (Wis 3:4). "The hope of those who fear God is placed in the one who saves them." No object is given to *elpis*. It is only a matter of finding one's refuge in Yahweh and having full and complete confidence in him. The twelve prophets have throughout history strengthened the chosen people "by certitude and constancy of hope" (*en pistei elpidos*, Sir 49:10). Just as pagans denounce the vain and deceptive hope that animates humans without God – for destiny laughs at hopes (Josephus, *War* 1.233) – so does Israel affirm the blessedness of *elpis* based on the true God: "Happy is the one whose hope is in Yahweh, his God" (Ps 146:5; cf. Sir 14:2); "Yahweh of Hosts, blessed is the person who hopes in you" (Ps 84:12). "Blessed is the person who trusts in Yahweh; the Lord is his hope" (Jer 17:7); "The hope of the righteous is joy, but the hope of the wicked will perish."

St. Paul – who would be imprisoned "because of the hope of Israel" (Acts 28:20) – is the faithful heir of this language, this lexicon, and this faith: "God,

in whom we have placed our hope (*eis hon ēlpikamen*) ... will deliver us, with you helping us through prayer.” “It is for this reason that we toil and strive, that we have placed our hope in the living God (*ēlpikamen epi theō zōnti*), who is the Savior of all people, especially of believers” (1 Tim 4:10). The verb in the perfect emphasizes that the hope is immutable and is the source of all the efforts, like that of the widow who “has placed her hope in God” (*ēlpiken epi theon*, 1 Tim 5:5) and whose prayer is almost constant, because God is her only help. This is the example given by the holy women of Israel who “placed their hope in God” (*gynaikes hai elpizousai eis theon*, 1 Pet 3:5). This is still the traditional contrast: expecting the pleasures that this world can offer or expecting from God alone the regard and recompense of virtuous conduct.

The object of this hope is rarely specified and never defined. 2 Thess 2:16 is content to say that Christ and God our Father have given us “a good hope graciously” (*elpida agathēn en chariti*), but Heb 7:19 states that the new covenant introduced “a better hope (*kreittonos elpidos*) whereby we draw near to God”; not only is the certitude complete, but the things hoped for are far superior. We may distinguish hope in the realization of the promises of the Messiah and his kingdom, the fervent expectation of salvation, eternal life, glory, (Rom 5:2; 8:21; Eph 1:18; Col 1:27), resurrection, the appearing-epiphany of Christ and of all the good things implied in the concept of the heavenly inheritance (Rom 8:17; 1 Cor 15:50; Eph 1:18; Titus 3:7) or kingdom (2 Thess 1:5; 2 Tim 4:18), notably the vision of God (1 Cor 13:12; 1 John 3:2), which is presently impossible (2 Cor 4:18). The specific character of the Christian *elpis* is to expect not only a future good but “what we do not see” (*ou blepomen elpizomen*, Rom 8:25; cf. 2 Cor 4:18).

Whatever the diversity of these objects of hope, they are all summed up in Christ “our hope” (*elpis hēmōn*, 1 Tim 1:1), not only because his disciples await the coming (1 Thess 1:10; Phil 3:8–13, 20; 1 Tim 6:14; 2 Tim 4:8) of the victorious one (Rev 2:21; 5:5; 6:2; 17:14), who will lead to glory the multitude of the children of God (Heb 2:10; 10:22; 12:22–24; “to be with him,” Phil 1:22–23), but especially because it is through him alone – and no longer through Moses (John 5:45) – that they may obtain the future glory (Col 1:27). They are “those who have placed their hope in Christ” (1 Cor 15:19; cf. Rom 5:1) or in the grace that he has brought (1 Pet 1:13). He is the “pioneer of salvation” (*archēgos tēs sōtērias*, Heb 2:10). Their religious life is summed up in the person of the one who is the “living hope” (Heb 10:23).

So NT hope is not only a personal feeling (*peri tēs en hymin elpidos*, 1 Pet 3:15), nor even the thing awaited (1 Thess 2:19; Eph 2:12), but the whole economy of the new covenant, the dispensation under which all believers live, the goal and the meaning of their calling (Eph 4:4), whose full actualization

they await (Gal 5:5). They are exhorted to “hold fast to the hope set forth” (Heb 6:18), to “keep their confession of hope unshakable” (*tēn homologian tēs elpidos*, Heb 10:23), that is, their profession of faith.

III. – Hope as a virtue. – A feeling of confidence, hope resides in the heart (Jdt 6:9; Ps 28:7); it is a virtue infused by “the God of hope” (Rom 15:13) or the Holy Spirit (Rom 15:13; cf. 5:5) – the pledge of the world to come (2 Cor 1:22; 5:5) – and by means of the Scriptures (Rom 15:4). It is associated with faith and charity. Being confident of the future (*chrēstas peri tōn mellontōn echein elpidas*, Josephus, *Ant.* 6.275), it is a source of optimism: “charity hopes all things” (1 Cor 13:7), sure of the triumph of the good. This hope is always joyful, since it already possessed the pledge of the promised blessedness (Rom 14:17; Gal 5:22). It eliminates timidity and hesitation and gives the hopeful person “great boldness,” made up of assurance and pride, letting one keep the “head high” (cf. Lev 26:13) and remain unshakable before criticisms and even fearless before God’s judgment (1 John 2:28; 3:21; 4:17). This certitude and confidence which belong to “sharers in a heavenly calling” (Heb 3:1) are for them a *kauchēma*, a subject of pride and honor, a claim to glory, attributed again by Heb 3:6 to hope. But this essentially dynamic virtue demands the sanctification and purification of the Christian, because the end demands the use of means to attain it: “Whoever has such a hope in God purifies himself, as he himself is pure” (1 John 3:3). Only the pure, after all, will see God (Matt 5:8; Heb 12:14), and nothing impure will ever enter into the heavenly city (Rev 21:27; 22:11). So those whose entire hope is to draw near to God, and to see God, purify themselves from every evil (Acts 24:15–16; 2 Cor 5:9).

IV. – The certitude of the Christian hope. – Unlike human hope, whose props are often weak, whose goals are often bad, whose expectations are often disappointed, NT *elpis* is sure and certain first of all by virtue of its semantic origin in the LXX (Hebrew *bāṭaḥ*), where it means essentially having confidence, being assured. Then, by virtue of its object and its own nature, it is solid (*bebaia*, 2 Cor 1:7; Heb 6:19), indefectible (*aklinēs*, Heb 10:23); since it places its confidence in God it cannot be disappointed. What is more, it is sure because it is based on many statements in inspired Scripture. Finally, it is sure because St. Paul expressly states it and justifies it: “Hope does not disappoint, because the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit that has been given to us.” Hope’s certitude is the certitude of God’s unchanging and efficacious love and of his infinite mercy, in which he has willed that none should perish and set in motion the whole economy of forgiveness and salvation. Now this divine *agapē* comes to indwell the souls of the faithful – justification is already present, actual – because the Holy Spirit has poured it out in them, so that it becomes their possession. They abide in God (1 John 2:5–

6). So there is no break between earth and heaven (cf. the metaphor of the anchor, Heb 6:19). Divine love is like a spring that wells up to eternal life (John 4:14; 7:38).

Thus it is certain that hope placed in God will not be disappointed. The verb *kataischynō*, used almost eighty times in the LXX, expresses the idea of disappointment in a context of confidence (Luke 13:17). The wicked person who plots evil but cannot actualize his plans is embarrassed by his failure, but the faithful person who waits on God for salvation will not be confounded – a *litotes* – will not regret having entrusted his whole life to God. A “dis-grace” means being rejected by one’s Lord – this would be opprobrium, shame (cf. *aischynomai*; Phil 1:20); it would mean becoming the object of mocking by unbelievers who would laugh at the unfortunate, disappointed righteous person. It is as with the man who wanted to build a tower and had laid the foundation, but was unable to complete the project: “everyone ridiculed him” (Luke 14:29, *empaizō*). For a member of the new and eternal covenant in Jesus Christ, such an emptying out of hope is unthinkable (cf. Rom 8:32), since it is God himself who has given us this “good hope.”

## ἐμπίπτω

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*emiptō*, **to fall into, run into, encounter**

→see also περιπίπτω; πίπτω

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*emipto*, S 1706; EDNT 1.445; MM 207; L&N 15.121, 90.71; BAGD 256

In the NT, people fall physically into a pit and metaphorically into snares, notably the net of the devil (1 Tim 3:7), that is, his power. Because the devil slanders the elect and claims the role of their torturer (Rev 12:10; 1 Cor 5:5), it can be said that the proud “fall into the condemnation of the devil,” the latter being the one who carries out the punishment. At the same time, people fall into temptations or shame; so *emiptō* means “encounter” or “appear, show up” whether with respect to things or persons. The French still say “I fell upon such and such” (“je suis tombé sur ...,” the English expression being “I ran into ...”), whether the encounter was favorable or not.

“Fall into the hands of ...” in the sense of being left at the mercy of, is a biblicism, from Samson dreading to fall into the hands of the uncircumcised (Judg 15:18) to the traveler who was helped by the Samaritan after falling into the hands of thieves (Luke 10:36). It is always preferable to fall into the hands of the Lord, who is merciful, rather than into the cruel hands of men. The cry of

terror at the thought of the condemnation of the apostate in Heb 10:31 is exceptional: “It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God.”

ἐνέχω

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*enechō*, **to hold a grudge, be unhappy, irritated, resentful; to be liable (to prosecution), be subject**

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*enecho*, S 1758; TDNT 2.828; EDNT 1.454; NIDNTT 2.142; MM 214; L&N 39.4, 88.169; BDF §308; BAGD 265

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It is not easy to translate this compound verb in its two Gospel occurrences. To explain that Herodias was intent on killing John the Baptist, Mark 6:19 notes, “*eneichen autō*,” that is, she held a grudge against him, harbored ill feelings against him, or better yet, had it in for him. In effect, we understand the object *cholon* (“bile, choler, resentment, hatred”). On the one hand, however, *enechō* has softened and even positive meanings; and on the other hand, in Gen 49:23 it translates the Hebrew *śāṭam* (“they harassed him by shooting arrows at him”). This could be the nuance in Luke 11:53 – “The scribes and the Pharisees began to be terribly unhappy (*deinōs enechein*) and to provoke him to speak on many topics, setting traps for him.” Osty’s translation, which harmonizes with Mark 6:19, is preferable: “they began to be very resentful” (“se mirent à en avoir assez”).

This verb, whether transitive or intransitive, expresses a certain fixity in a place or in feelings, especially in the passive: “sink into, be put or held in, keep oneself in,” hence “be bound by oaths” (Pausanias 3.24.7), “be subject to” (Aeschylus, *Suppl.* 169); and hence its legal usage: be subject to the law, be liable to prosecution, incur punishments. This meaning of being charged, the object of prosecution or sanctions, is the most common meaning in the papyri, especially in decrees of amnesty. For example, in 163 or 186 BC, there is this decree of Ptolemy VI Philometor (or of Ptolemy V Epiphanes): “charged with brigandage or other grounds for prosecution”; one from Ptolemy Euergetes II in 145/144: “those who fled ... because they were objects of prosecution” (*C.Ord.Ptol.* 41, 4; cf. *SEG* IX, 5, 39; XVI, 784, 7); or this one from Ptolemy Euergetes II and Cleopatra II (his sister) and III (his wife), in 118: “except for those guilty of murder or sacrilege.” According to another formulation: “Whoever denounces before the *stratēgoi* of the nome those who contravene these arrangements shall obtain a third of the property of the one charged.”

There is no analogous usage of the verb *enechō* in the NT, but the legal-social meaning of the present passive imperative, “be engaged in,” is well

attested in Gal 5:1 – “Do not submit again to the yoke of servitude” (*mē palin zygō douleias enechesthe*). The best parallels are: *Ep. Arist.* 16 – the king “frees those held in servitude” (*tōn enechomenōn*); *P.Flor.* 382, 31 – the one who is compelled to undertake *leitourgiai* (*enechesthai tais leitourgiais*); Josephus, *Ant.* 18.179 – “he was bound with chains” (*desmois eneicheto*); cf. *BGU* 473, 7.

ἐντευξίς, ἐντυγχάνω

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*enteuxis*, **audience, meeting, prayer, supplication, petition; entynchanō, to meet, address, converse with, lodge a complaint, make a request**

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*enteuxis*, S 1783; *TDNT* 7.244–445; *EDNT* 1.458; *NIDNTT* 2.860–861; MM 218; L&N 33.347; BAGD 268 | *entugchano*, S 1793; *TDNT* 8.242–244; *EDNT* 1.461–462; *NIDNTT* 2.882; MM 219; L&N 33.169, 33.347; BDF §202; BAGD 270

The first meaning of *entynchanō* is “meet, reach, appear before someone”; hence, “address someone, have a conversation with someone on this or that subject” (Polybius 4.30.1; 4.36.9; Plutarch, *Fab.* 20.2). Thus, “Conformably to what you wrote about Zeno, I interviewed Aphthometos” the *stratēgos* (the latter being the military and civil governor of the nome, or province – *P.Ryl.* 568, 4 = *SB* 7651); “Someone wants to approach you ... to ask for my daughter” (Menander, *Dysk.* 751; cf. 73); “He met [and asked a favor of] King Eumenes” (*NCIG*, vol. 7, 1, 4); the assembly of the Jews addresses Festus concerning Paul; and before putting a prayer into words one puts oneself in the presence of God and addresses oneself to him. This interview, when it makes reference to a third party (notably in the course of an audience) most usually has the goal of complaining and accusing; *ho enteteuchōs* is the complainant (*UPZ* 118, 23; cf. 1 Macc 10:64 – *hoi entynchanontes*; *P.Oxy.* 2281, 3; *entychontos kai eipontos*; 2340, 3; 2576, 3; 2730, 10; *Dittenberger, Or.* 664, 10), one who takes action against someone; we could translate “the accuser.” This person sometimes proceeds with a modicum of discretion, but usually with violence and the intention to cause harm (*P.Ryl.* 563, 5).

Coming before someone to speak with him can be motivated by a more precise intention, namely to express a request. Thus *entynchanō* can mean “pray, ask, beseech”: “Moses met with God in an invisible fashion to ask him to save them ...” (Philo, *Moses* 1.173); “I greet you, brother, and I ask ...” (*se, adelphe, aspazomai kai entynchanō*, *P.Brem.* 10, 5; second century AD); “We have besought your virtue before, Lord” (*P.Thead.* 20, 3); “night and day I plead with God on your behalf” (*nyktos kai hēmeras entynchanō tō theō hyper*

*hymōn*, BGU 246, 12). It is with this connotation of intercession that Rom 8:27, 34 and Heb 7:25 say that the Holy Spirit and Christ as priest intervene on behalf of Christians (*hyper hēmōn, autōn, hagiōn*). We can understand this to mean that they are personages who are particularly qualified to appeal for divine mercy; but given the semantics of *enteuxis*, and especially in Hebrews, the emphasis is on the audience that the Second and the Third Persons of the Trinity obtain with the First (cf. Rom 8:26 – *hyperentynchanō*). It is more than a meeting: it is a presence, an intervention with the maximum possible influence (asking can be synonymous with ordaining, *P.Mich.* 522, 4). It is precisely the eternal priest-king after the order of Melchizedek who has the credence with God to take in hand the cause of his disciples and solicit for them the gift of grace; the mere presence of his humanity in heaven is in itself a perpetual *enteuxis*.

The noun *enteuxis* also has the sense of a meeting or interview (2 Macc 4:8; an OT hapax; cf. Diodorus Siculus 17.76.3; 17.114.2), but its two occurrences in the NT have the sense of “prayer, supplication.” 1 Tim 2:1 – “I ask in the first place that supplications (*deēseis*), prayers (*proseuchas*), intercessions (*enteuxeis*), and thanksgivings (*eucharistias*) be made for all people, for kings ...” (cf. 1 Tim 4:5). This relationship of prayer-*enteuxis* and gratitude agrees with the formula in the papyri. The official request, according to O. Guéraud (*P.Enteux.*, pp. xxii ff.), would be in three parts: (a) a summary of the facts that motivate the petition, the applicant being the victim of an injustice: *adikoumai hypo ...*, I have been wronged by ... (*P.Enteux.* 1, 1; 2, 2; 3, 1; etc.); (b) the petition per se: *deomai oun sou*, I therefore request of you; (c) a kind of thanks in advance, because in giving satisfaction to the applicant, the sovereign will be doing a deed of justice, benevolence, or “philanthropy.”

This petition was normally presented in writing by the plaintiff, who delivered it in person to the office of the *stratēgos*. The latter sent it with his instructions to the competent authorities (*P.Sorb.* 11, 1: “We have sent you the *enteuxis* that Kalippos delivered to us.... Look into the matter”), who follow the instructions given. Sometimes the *epistatēs* did what was necessary to obtain justice for the plaintiff, sometimes he attempted to reconcile the two parties. In case of a deadlock, he sent the matter back to the *stratēgos*, who could have the case heard by a tribunal; but in some cases the originator of the complaint did not show up when called (*P.Mich.* 534, 8, 10). All this took time, especially since petitions flooded in, sometimes being repeated by impatient applicants. We get the idea that the officials were negligent. But when they did take action, they had to take counter-complaints into account (*P.Oxy.* 2597; *P.Mert.* 59, 19), and even when they were condemned, the guilty often took no notice.

These misadventures of human justice would be out of place in the petitions of Christians to God. When they pray, it is not to complain about a third party, but to plead for personal help. In their request, they can already express their gratitude for the expected answer. Thus their supplication is itself a form of worship. They are no longer asking favors of earthly “kings.” Rather, they are praying for them to the Lord of heaven! This is one of the greatest points of difference with *enteuxeis* here below.

ἐντολή

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*entolē*, **commandment, precept, instruction**

→see also παραγγελία, παραγγέλλω

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*entole*, S 1785; TDNT 2.545–556; EDNT 1.459–460; NIDNTT 1.330–337; MM 218; L&N 33.330; BAGD 269

The imperative force of *entolē*, “commandment, precept,” inherited from the OT (cf. Gen 26:5; Deut 8:1), is still present in the NT (John 11:57), even though “order” is better conveyed by *epitagē* (Rom 16:16; 1 Cor 7:6, 25; Titus 2:15). Still, in numerous Johannine texts, notable in the “farewell discourses,” where the commandment to love is given (John 13:34; 14:21, 23; 15:10, 14), it is tempting to weaken the word’s legal connotations.

The tension is mitigated by the observation that in literary texts *entolē* sometimes means a pedagogical precept and that in the Koine the term can mean “mandate.” In public law, it is applied to constitutions, laws, decrees, edicts, rules of the public administration, royal and imperial orders; sometimes it can mean a simple recommendation, like that of Cyrus to Chrysentas when he sends him on a mission (Xenophon, *Cyr.* 2.4.30) or like that which Ausonios received concerning the piety of his father Papnuthios (*P.Lond.* 1924, 3; cf. *P.Sarap.* 92, 14; *SB* 6823, 18; 7987, 9; 9156, 4). Sometimes it corresponds to the *mandata principis* of the Romans. *Entolai* are the instructions given by a city or a person to representatives, or communicated by a prince to his officers, either to delineate their responsibilities or to inform their subalterns and the populace, “to be carried out.”

Clearly a number of the Johannine “commandments” (several times *logos* is substituted for *entolē*, 1 John 2:4–5; Rev 3:8, 10; 12:17; etc.) must be understood according to these meanings. Jesus received them from the Father, and he passes them on to his apostles, whom he installs in their office. These are precepts, to be sure, but they have as much to do with doctrine (1 John 3:23) as with morality, and they are intended for publication among all believers so as



to ground their thoughts and their conduct. Finally, since Christ has suppressed the “law of commandments” (Eph 2:15), the *entolē* of *agapē* epitomizes the institution of the new covenant, “the law of Christ.”

ἐξαιρέω, ἐξαιρέομαι

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*exaireō*, to extract, cut out, destroy, exclude, set aside; *exaireomai*, to remove, take away

→see also περιαιρέω

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*exaireō*, S 1807; *EDNT* 2.1; MM 221; L&N 85.43; BDF §81(3); BAGD 271 | *exaireomai*, L&N 21.17, 30.90

Formed from the simple verb *aireō*, “take, remove, seize,” the verb *exaireō* is used five times in the NT. Only one of these occurrences is in the active voice, a second aorist imperative: “If your right eye offends you, pluck it out (*exele auton*) and cast it away” (Matt 5:29). The right eye was presumed to be more precious, so it was the one to go after in an enemy: “that I gouge out the right eyes of all of you” (1 Sam 11:2); “May the sword strike his arm and his right eye” (Zech 11:17); “to gouge out their right eyes” (*dexious autōn ophthalmous exoryxai*, Josephus, *Ant.* 6.71; cf. Plutarch, *De Is. et Os.* 55.372e: Typhon gouges out Horus’s eye). The best parallel is from the dream of Charicleia in the third century: “With a sword stroke, a man plucked out his right eye.”

This usage of *exaireō* with the meaning “extract, cut out” agrees with its classical meaning; but in classical usage there is also the nuance “destroy, devastate” a city or a people, and finally “exclude, set aside,” which is the meaning in Matt 5:29. Cf. Herodotus 3.150: “They excluded their mothers and in addition one other woman from each household”; Plato, *Phdr.* 242 b: “I make an exception for Simmias of Thebes”; Menander, *Dysk.* 578: “pull the bucket back out from the well”; 626: “fish out the hoe and the bucket”; Josephus, *War* 2.293: “Florus sent to the temple treasury and removed seventeen talents”; *Ant.* 11.41: extirpate the memory of friends; Plutarch, *De sera* 26.565 b.

In the Koine, the middle *exaireomai* retains the classical sense “remove, take away,” often with an idea of violence, and especially the meaning “deliver.” That is the meaning of the aorist middle in Acts 7:10, 34, where God delivers his people from all their trials, and in Gal 1:4, where Jesus Christ “gave himself for our sins, in order to free us (*hopōs exelētai hēmas*) from the present evil age,” to liberate us from bondage. This idea of extracting or removing is indicated by the reflexive meaning of the middle voice, which places the

beneficiaries of the act of deliverance in the hands of the agent of deliverance; at least this is the theological meaning that the LXX gives the verb *exaireomai* (Hebrew *nāṣal*) – often synonymous with *sōzō* and *rhyomai* – when God is the subject.

After all, it is for the purpose of constituting a people of his own that God “descends” and frees them from Egyptian (Exod 3:8; 18:4, 8–10; Jer 34:13) or Babylonian servitude (Isa 31:5; 48:10; Jer 42:10). The God who delivers is a Savior from all trials, from distress (1 Sam 26:24), from calamities (Job 5:19), and especially from sin (Wis 10:13), which is the obstacle to reconciliation: “It is he who will deliver Israel from all its sins” (Ps 130:8). This is the central object of Israel’s faith: “The salvation of the righteous comes from Yahweh.... Yahweh helps them and delivers them.” If God in his righteousness sometimes refuses to deliver from the hand of their enemies (Zech 11:6), it is because this salvation presupposes a good moral disposition. Hence prayers for divine mercy and thanksgivings for liberation, for the believer knows that all deliverance is a free gift from God: “The sons of Israel say to Yahweh, ‘We have sinned.... Only deign to deliver us this day.’ ”

Since God delivers those whom he loves (2 Sam 22:20), *exaireomai*, “place in reserve” (Homer, *Il.* 2.690), finally means “choose for oneself” (ibid. 9.129; Xenophon, *An.* 2.5.20); “they chose a leader among the former priests of Heliopolis” (Josephus, *Ag. Apion* 1.261), hence separate, set apart from others (*Ant.* 15.164). Thus we should understand the present middle participle: “I drew you out (chose you, *exairoumenos se*) from the midst of the people and from the Gentiles, to whom I send you to open their eyes” (Acts 26:17).

ἐξαρτίζω, καταρτίζω

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*exartizō*, **to complete, suit to a goal; katartizō**, **to set in place, organize, dispose of, restore, mend**

→see also καταρτίζω

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*exartizo*, S 1822; TDNT 1.475–476; EDNT 2.3; NIDNTT 3.349–351; MM 222; L&N 67.71, 75.5; BAGD 273 | *katartizo*, S 2675; TDNT 1.475–476; EDNT 2.268; NIDNTT 3.349–350; MM 332; L&N 13.130, 42.36, 75.5; BDF §§74(1), 126(1a); BAGD 417–418

Training in the Scriptures allows the person of God to become accomplished, equipped for every good work, *hina artios ... pros pan ergon agathon exērtismenos* (2 Tim 3:17).

(a) The biblical hapax *artios*, rather rare in the Koine and unknown in the papyri, literally means “adapted” or “well equipped, in proportion, fitting together perfectly.” It is also used for intact faculties as well as for speech that is appropriate for a given situation. In medicine, it is used for the newborn whose whole body is well put-together and for vertebrae that are well aligned. Ambidextrous athletes have equal force and aptitude to strike with each arm (Philostratus, *Gym.* 41). This adjective is also known to signify “even” (Epictetus 1.28.3); as Philo comments, “four is a number that is even, complete, full.” The ensemble of external goods, body, and soul constitutes “a good that is balanced and truly complete” (Philo, *Worse Attacks Better* 7; cf. Marcus Aurelius 1.16.31: *artion kai aētētēton psychēn*). So *artios* in 2 Tim 3:17 means that the minister of the gospel has “all that is necessary,” an adequate equipping, after digesting the word of God – as the end of the verse makes clear.

(b) “Being completely equipped (perfect passive participle) for every good work.” The compound form *exartizō* has two meanings: “to finish, complete”; and “to connect perfectly, fit to perfection, adapt to a physical or moral goal.” This purpose is constantly underlined in the papyri: for example, a machine is sold in good condition, i.e., capable of performing the service expected of it (*P.Athen.* 17, 9: *syn tē ousi mēchanēn exērtismenēn pasi tois skeuesi*). Thus the person of God/biblicist is not only perfect, accomplished, but suited for all the tasks of ministry.

(c) Thus *exartizō* is stronger than *katartizō*, even though the two are sometimes synonymous. The first meaning of the latter verb is “put into order, arrange an object so that it can do its work”; thus the worlds were set in place, organized, and adorned by God’s utterance. Secondly, “put in order, dispose of,” like the vessels of wrath for perdition, i.e., ripe or completely ready for *apōleia* (Rom 9:22). Finally, “restore, mend” nets (Matt 4:21; Mark 1:19) or rebuild walls lying in ruins (2 Esdr 4:12–13); that which is lacking is supplied, for example deficiencies of faith (1 Thess 3:10), a Christian who is at fault is straightened out, corrected (Gal 6:1). If *katartizesthe* in 2 Cor 13:11 is taken as an imperative passive, the verse will mean “let yourself be led to a spiritual condition in which nothing is lacking” or “accept correction.” If it is taken as a middle, “work at your restoration, cooperate in your remaking...” The root nuance of *artios* – ordering, adapting, adjusting – is preserved in 1 Cor 1:10, where the Corinthians, divided among themselves, are exhorted to agree, to be in harmony, as persons well fitted together in the same intelligence and the same way of feeling (*ēte de katērtismenoi*).

Thus the verb became a technical term in early parenesis. The Lord had said that “every disciple who is well formed (*katērtismenos*) will be like his master”

(Luke 6:40). Heb 13:21 asks “May the God of peace make you fit for every good work to do his will” and 1 Pet 5:10 assures, “The God of all grace ... will himself equip you,” will arrange everything for the best (cf. Ps 58:9; 80:16). The semantic evolution is perfectly homogeneous.

ἐξηγέομαι

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*exēgeomai*, **to recount, narrate, explain, interpret**

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*exegeomai*, S 1834; TDNT 2.908; EDNT 2.6; NIDNTT 1.573–576; MM 223; L&N 28.41, 33.201; BDF §396; BAGD 275

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In the Bible this verb, which usually translates the piel of the Hebrew *sāpar*, clearly means “recount, narrate.” It is used for telling a dream to a companion (Judg 7:13), for telling how Elisha resurrected someone who had died (2 Kgs 8:5); the voice of nature tells about the glory of God (1 Chr 16:24; Job 12:8; cf. 28:27); “the story was told in these writings and in the Memoirs of Nehemiah” (2 Macc 2:13); “every nation talked about the battles of Judas.” In his five uses of the word, Luke knows no other meaning. There is therefore no reason to substitute another meaning in John 1:18 – “An Only Son, God, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has told about him.” This is the culmination of the prologue: the Gospel can be opened, it is the *exēgēsis*, the laying open, the narration of the word of God by Christ for the world. The evangelist is probably thinking of Sir 43:31 – “Who then has seen the Lord and can tell about him (*ekdiēgēsetai*)?”

Nevertheless, this is a religious teaching, and the verb has no object. Furthermore, *exēgeomai* is used thus constantly for interpreting an oracle or a dream: “Asking the god about the right way of burying the brave [war dead] and the particular honors involved, we will bury them in whatever manner the god explains” (*kai thēsomen hē an exēgētai*, Plato, *Resp.* 5.469). *Exēgētai* are those who interpret things that the divinity has communicated obscurely or without explaining. The Apollo of Delphi is “this god, the traditional interpreter (*patrios exēgētēs*) for everyone in these matters (religion).... He gives his explications on the *omphalos*” (*epi tou omphalou exēgeitai*, *ibid.*, 4.427.). “Theseus instructed the nobles to get to know divine things ... to interpret secular and religious customs (*hosiōn kai hierōn exēgētas*)” (Plutarch, *Thes.* 25.2). J. Pollux gives this definition: “Exegetes was the term for those who teach about omens and other religious matters” (*exēgētai de ekalounto hoi ta peri tōn diosēmeiōn kai ta tōn allōn hierōn didaskontes*, *Onom.* 8.124); and Philo already says “Another suggestion has been made by the interpreters of

Holy Scripture” (*tois exēgētais tōn hierōn grammatōn*, *Spec. Laws* 2.159). He defines further: “The explications (*hai exēgēseis*) of the Holy Scriptures are made according to allegorical meanings.” Similarly, in Josephus *exēgeomai* is a “technical term for the interpretation of the law as practiced by the rabbinate.”

Literary texts and the papyri associate the functions of the *hiereus* and the *exēgētēs*; “the *pontifex maximus* has the duties of exegete and interpreter, or rather of hierophant.” Appius Gemellus is city priest and exegete. The *exēgētēs* has been called “a jurisconsult in sacred law.” In Egypt the exegete was high in the ranks of the *archai*, a veritable executive of the municipality. Nowhere does *exēgeomai* mean “give a revelation,” but rather “narrate, lay open, describe” (A. J. Festugière, *Observations stylistiques sur l’Evangile de S. Jean*). Thus this verse means that the Son, by his person and his teaching, presented, expressed, and gave a human translation to the divine mystery.

### ἐξίστημι (ἐξιστάνω)

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*existēmi* (*existanō*), **to displace, cause to go out, relinquish, derange; move away, depart; to tremble, be stupefied or flabbergasted, be beside oneself, be out of one’s mind**

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*existemi* (*existano*), S 1839; TDNT 2.459–460; EDNT 2.7–8; MM 224; L&N 25.220; BDF §§342(1), 198(6); BAGD 276

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The semantic interest of this verb lies in its multiple meanings in various authors, times, and cultural settings – a variety to which the prefix lends itself. Transitive *existēmi* has the etymological meaning “displace, cause to go out”: “setting aside those acts” (Demosthenes, *Embassy* 21.72); in style, “facts and persons that are most removed from the common life” (Aristotle, *Rh.* 3.2.3; cf. 3.8.1, divert the attention). In Euripides, it has a psychological meaning (“First derange his mind with a sudden madness”) that is found also in Plutarch: Solon “placed on the same level deception and constraint, pleasure and suffering, as being equally capable of disturbing human reason.” When intransitive, the verb means “move away, part from.” “They left the route” (Herodotus 3.76), leave the field free (Xenophon, *An.* 1.5.14), give place, abandon a country (Plutarch, *Sull.* 22.9; *Pomp.* 10.2), give up the burdens of empire (Thucydides 2.63.2), but also lose one’s mind (“I feel my reason take flight”).

The LXX, which uses this verb to translate twenty-nine different Hebrew words, gives it the basic meaning “tremble” (Hebrew *hārad*) but with very diverse nuances which can be specified only according to the context and the underlying Hebrew verb. Sometimes it is a simple rustling (Ruth 3:8), as the

trees of the forest sway and shake in the wind (Isa 7:2, Hebrew *nū 'a*); it can denote astonishment (Gen 43:33; Job 26:11, Hebrew *tāmah*), awe – that of Athenobius before Simon’s opulence (1 Macc 15:32), identical to that of the comedian Philippides (*egō men exestēn idōn*, frag. 27, ed., J. M. Edmonds, *Attic Comedy*, vol. 3 A, p. 178) – or wonder, as at the falling of the snow (Sir 43:18), and even the opening up of the heart in joy (Exod 18:9, Hebrew *ḥādāh*; Isa 60:5, Hebrew *rāhaḥ*). Trembling is synonymous with stupefaction (Jer 2:12; 4:9; 1 Kgs 9:8; 2 Chr 7:21, Hebrew *šāmēm*), but usually this “stupor” is agitation resulting from concern, disquiet, and anxiety; so the disturbance is profound, and *existēmi* means “tremble with fear” (Gen 27:33) to the point of fainting (Gen 42:28); but here again the nuances are numerous. A person can be simply “alarmed” (1 Sam 13:7) at the news of a catastrophe (Isa 32:11), be horrified (52:14), tremble greatly as at a volcanic eruption (Exod 19:18), be dazed and lose consciousness, experience all the varieties of fear: dread (Ezek 2:6; Hebrew *yārē*), horror (27:35; Hebrew *šā 'ar*), terror (26:16; Hebrew *lābaš*), panic (Josh 10:10; Hebrew *hāmam*; Judg 4:15), to the point of fainting (Ezek 31:15; Hebrew *'ulpeh*) or being routed.

If the LXX specifies rather frequently that it is the heart or the spirit that is moved and pants (Isa 42:14) or is overwhelmed, it also gives this verb a suggestive religious meaning: when the divine fire consumed the whole burnt offering, the people trembled with dread (Hebrew *rānan*, cry out with joy), they fell on their faces (Lev 9:24); this is holy dread, where reverential fear reigns. Rahab, having heard what Yahweh has done on Israel’s behalf, confesses “Our hearts have been terrified (niphāl of the Hebrew *māsas*, dissolve, weaken); no one has any more courage before you” (Josh 2:11). When the Israelites shall return to God with respect and joy, “they will reverence the Lord and his benefits” (Hos 3:5; Hebrew *pāḥad*: shudder, tremble with fear or joy; 11:10; Mic 7:17). After the death of Holophernes, they are stupefied and worship God (Jdt 13:17); “I have revered your work, O Yahweh” (Hab 3:2). This psychological and religious meaning is found also in Philo. On Gen 2:21 – “God provoked an ecstasy in Adam” – he comments “the intelligence is in ecstasy (a going outside of oneself) when it no longer busies itself with intelligible things ... it is in ecstasy when it is diverted by God” (*Alleg. Interp.* 2.31; cf. *Conf. Tongues* 142; *Heir* 251); “the soul filled with grace, transported with enthusiasm, appears to be outside itself.”

In the papyri, *existēmi*, attested especially in the first century, almost always has a legal meaning; such as the *cessio bonorum*, i.e., the relinquishment of property by a debtor to compensate his creditors in order to avoid execution of debt on his person. In AD 36, a widow of Tebtunis, acting as guardian for her three minor sons: “we relinquish all” (*ekstēnai hēmas pantas*, *P.Mich.* 232, 20 =

SB 7568); in AD 37: “I acknowledge the relinquishment to my parents, named above, of everything that they have” (*homologō existasthai tois proگرامmenois mou goneusi ... pantōn hōn echousi*, 350, 22; cf. line 7); in AD 44, Taorseus acknowledges that she has ceded all the parts of the old house at Tebtunis (351, 8 and 21); in AD 46: “we have ceded to our sister Soeris the whole house, the furnishings, and implements” (352, 3); in AD 58, Ophelous cedes to Antiphanes his share of all the property left by his deceased father Heraclas (*P.Oxy.* 268, 11). In AD 62, some farmers are forced to give up the farming of their five *arourai* (*P.Oxy.* 2873, 12 and 25); in AD 67, Thommous cedes to his brother Sambas all future rights in succession of their father, who is still living (*P.Tebt.* 380, 19). In 82, the use of a weaving shop is ceded by debtors in lieu of an interest payment (*P.Oxy.* 2773, 10). In AD 87, an act of donation between two citizens of Europus: “to cede to him according to the deed.”

The NT uses *existēmi* (and *existanō*) in the strong sense of “be stupefied,” but there are many shades of meaning, first of all on the secular level: Simon Magus, seeing the great wonders worked by Philip, “was flabbergasted” (*existato*, Acts 8:13); he himself had “astounded the people of Samaria” (*existanōn to ethnos*) through his magic (8:9). With almost the same meaning, when the child Jesus heard and answered the doctors of the law in the temple, they “were stupefied (and admiring) at his intelligence and his answers” (Luke 2:47 – *existanto pantes*; cf. 2:48, his parents were disconcerted, stunned, *exeplagēsan*). The astonishment arises from an inability to understand or justify something that is abnormal. At the end of Peter’s Pentecost speech, the Jerusalemites “were stupefied and astonished (*existanto*) and said, ‘Are not all those who speak Galileans? How is it that we all hear them in our own languages?’ ” (Acts 2:7). And again: “Then they were stupefied and were at a loss (*existanto de pantes kai diēporounto*), saying to each other, ‘What can this mean?’ ” (2:12). Similarly, when St. Paul, right after his conversion, proclaimed at Damascus that Jesus was Son of God, “All those who heard were stupefied and said, ‘Is this not the person who was persecuting at Jerusalem those who called upon his name?’ ” (Acts 9:21). A person is troubled, even disturbed, absolutely disconcerted; such as “the believers of the circumcision” at Caesarea who witnessed the conversion of the centurion Cornelius: “they were stupefied to see that the gift of the Holy Spirit was also poured out on the Gentiles” (10:45); but here already there is a certain religious fear provoked by the manifestation of the divine. The “stupor” is not simply surprise, but incomprehension in the face of mystery, a sort of daze that engulfs the mind and leaves it stunned before the facts.

This psychology is that of witnesses to a miracle: after the healing of a blind and dumb demoniac, “the multitudes were stupefied (*existanto*) and said, ‘Could this be the son of David?’ ” (Matt 12:23). This astonishment before this manifestation of the Messiah is admiring and religious. Likewise after the healing of Jairus’s daughter: “immediately they were taken by a great stupor” (Mark 5:42); the parents’ terror was such that it did not even occur to them to give the daughter something to eat (Luke 8:56). God has intervened; fear does not rule out joy and gratitude. After the healing of the paralytic, “all were stupefied (*existasthai*) and gave glory to God” (Mark 2:12); the enthusiasm was general.

In cases where the disciples notice the power or the transcendence of Jesus, *existēmi* is no longer simply religious terror, but retains its classical meaning: “to be beside oneself.” When Jesus walks on the water to rejoin his apostles, “they were beside themselves” (*ek perissou en heautois existanto*, Mark 6:51), just as on Easter morning, after hearing the holy women tell that the tomb was empty, that angels had appeared, etc. (Luke 24:22); and when Peter, miraculously delivered from prison, shows up at the home of Mary, John Mark’s mother: *existēsan* (Acts 12:16).

The verb is pejorative in Mark 3:21, where “his own” – probably meaning his relatives – at Capernaum wish “to seize him, because they (probably meaning the crowd) said, ‘He is beside himself’ ”; *exestē* could be translated, “he has gone mad, he has lost his mind,” but even better, “he is a fanatic, he has lost his grasp on himself and concrete reality.” In something of the same meaning, there is the Pauline hapax: “If we are out of our minds, it is for God; if we are reasonable (*sōphronoumen*, composed, sober), it is for you” (2 Cor 5:13). Divine love is “ecstatic”; the lover no longer lives his own life but is beside himself, living the life of his Beloved (5:14). But with regard to the believers, Paul restrains himself and acts with prudence. He is of sound mind and adapts himself to the needs and circumstances of each one.

## ἐπανόρθωσις

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*epanorthōsis*, **correction**

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*epanorthosis*, S 1882; TDNT 5.450–451; EDNT 2.18; NIDNTT 3.351–352; MM 229; L&N 72.16; BAGD 283; ND 2.84

Among the benefits that accrue to the careful student of Scripture, one is *epanorthōsis* (2 Tim 3:16). The term is frequent in the inscriptions, with respect to the repair of a statue, the restoration of a sanctuary (cf. 2 Macc 5:20), the



rebuilding of a city. In the papyri, it is used for the correcting of a work, the rectification of an error in a document. This sense of redressing errors or ignorance is well attested in literature.

But it seems that this word has the meanings of both the English word *correction* (change to make better, remove and punish errors) and the word *correctness* (conformity to a rule, rightness or exactness, even perfection, in conduct). Thus Philo defines ethics: “ethics studies the *epanorthōsis* of human morals” (*Drunkennes* 91). The *epanorthōsis biou* or *ēthōn* is nothing other than the discipline of morals or the right conduct of life, or even that which is normally necessary for human subsistence and life.

## ἐπερώτημα

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*eperōtēma*, **declaration of commitment, pledge**

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*eperotema*, S 1906; TDNT 2.688–689; EDNT 2.21; NIDNTT 2.879–881; MM 231–232; L&N 33.162; BAGD 285

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According to 1 Pet 3:21, baptism is not the washing away of a physical defilement but the “*eperōtēma* of a good conscience to God” (*syneidēseōs agathēs eperōtēma eis theon*). All the commentators try to specify the meaning of the biblical hapax *eperōtēma* and end up with quite varied definitions. Many of them connect this noun to the verb *eperōtaō* (Ps 137:3, Hebrew *šā`al*) and translate “a request addressed to God,” and it is true that this accords with the word’s meaning in literary Greek: “ask a question.”

But, on the one hand, it is hardly possible to imagine where this “prayer” would fit in the baptismal ceremony; and on the other hand this interpretation does not agree with the indicators supplied by the OT and the inscriptions. Theodotion’s version of Dan 4:17 – *rhēma hagiōn to eperōtēma* (Aramaic *še`alta`*) – suggests that the word should have the sense of “decision,

resolution.” Manuscript **Ⲭ** of Sir 36:3 has the variant *eperōtēma* for *erōtēma*:

“The law is as worthy of confidence as the response of the oracle.” This is not a “request” but a “declaration,” above all an “oracular response,” which is the meaning of *eperōtasis* in *P.Oxy.* 1205, 9 ff., *P.Lond.* 1660, 42; Dittenberger, *Syl.* 977, 1. In addition, most modern scholars understand *eperōtēma* in the legal sense of commitment, stipulation, corresponding to the agreement formula in contracts, *eperōtheis hōmologēsa*; this would be the equivalent of the *homologia* of baptism (Rom 10:10; 1 Tim 6:12; Heb 4:14; 10:23), the commitment of the believer to the stipulations of the covenant, i.e., to

submitting his whole life to God (cf. 1 Pet 1:22 – *hypakoē tēs alētheias*; Heb 10:22). This oath of allegiance is antithetical to the disobedience of Noah’s contemporaries; it is the pledge of a person regenerated by the power of Christ’s resurrection, in which the believer shares through the baptismal rite (1 Pet 1:3; Rom 6:4; Col 2:12).

## ἐπιείκεια, ἐπιεικής

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*epieikeia*, **clemency, moderation, generosity**; *epieikēs*, **clement, reasonable, accommodating, generous**

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*epieikeia*, S 1932; TDNT 2.588–590; EDNT 2.26; NIDNTT 2.256–259; MM 238; L&N 88.62; BDF §31(2); BAGD 292 | *epieikes*, S 1933; TDNT 2.588–590; EDNT 2.26; NIDNTT 2.256–259; MM 238; L&N 88.63; BDF §31(2); BAGD 292

The dictionaries give this definition: clemency, benevolence, moderation, fairness, mildness; and Bible translators most often use leniency, clemency, indulgence. In one sense, everything depends on context; but the usage of these terms in the Koine, where they are favorites, allows us to fathom their basic signification.

I. – In the OT, *epieikeia* is above all a quality of justice (Wis 12:18) and of God’s governing (2 Macc 2:22; 10:4), which treats people with mercy (Ps 86:5; Bar 2:27; Dan 3:42); and St. Paul exhorts the Corinthians “through the *praytēs* and *epieikeia* of Christ.” In other words, justice goes hand-in-hand with clemency, a quality of judges, a virtue of legislators (Philo, *Virtues* 148; *Spec. Laws* 4.23; *To Gaius* 119) and of kings (Josephus, *Ant.* 15.14, 15.177); so much so that Aeneas Tacticus says to choose as leader the one who is most *epieikēs* and most *phronimos* (*Polior.* 3.4). For those in positions of superiority, *epieikeia* is an easy-going quality that moderates the inflexible severity of wrath, a fairness that corrects anything that might be odious or unjust in the strict application of the letter of the law. Lawyers appeal to it, and in the third century *clementissime* became a term for the *stratēgos*.

II. – This clemency, which mitigates sanctions, corresponds in part to Roman *indulgentia* and *benignitas*; but Hellenistic *epieikeia* emphasizes first of all moderation and just measure or, as we say today, “equilibrium.” This is why *epieikēs* and *metrios* are so often linked, and why in Greece *anēr epieikēs* has always meant “honest man” or “virtuous man”; he possesses the *tropōn epieikeia*. It seem likely that this basic value is that required in the candidate for the episcopate: he must be balanced in his mentality and his behavior; he

radiates serenity (1 Tim 3:3). It is also the quality of those who share in the wisdom from on high (Jas 3:17). Here again, usage allows us to flesh out this idea.

III. – The person characterized by *epieikeia* is reasonable, a respector of social norms. Sometimes the emphasis is on exactitude, loyalty, and fidelity in the accomplishment of a task; much more often on mildness; hence its connection with goodness (1 Pet 2:18), peace (Jas 3:17; *1 Enoch* 6.5, Greek frag.), and mildness-leniency (*praytēs*). So it becomes apparent that Hellenistic *epieikeia* is first and foremost a virtue of the heart – open, conciliatory, and trusting toward one’s neighbor (Strabo 6.3.9). Not only is it opposed to wickedness (Josephus, *Ant.* 10.83) and to violence (Philo, *Cherub.* 37), but being thoroughly mild and kind (cf. Philo, *Virtues* 81, 125, *hēmeros*), it can be persuaded, and bends and even resigns itself when wronged. Positively, it is hard to distinguish from *chrēstotēs*, from an accommodating attitude, and from “philanthropy,” the “habitual inclination of character in the direction of friendliness toward people” (Ps.-Plato, *Def.* 412 e).

IV. – Finally, NT *epieikeia* is not only moderation and measure, but goodness, courtesy, generosity. Furthermore, it suggests a certain amiability, good grace. Frag. 427 of Sophocles places *epieikēs* and *charis* in parallel. According to Origen, if Mary, greater in grace than Elizabeth, took the initiative to visit her, and when they met was the first to utter a greeting, the reason is that the Virgin Mary was “full of thoughtfulness (*epieikēs*) toward others.”

So I suggest translating the neuter adjective *epieikes* used substantively as “friendly equilibrium” in Phil 4:5, where the Vulgate uses the word *modestia*: “Let your friendly, well-balanced character be known to all.” This favorable reputation and especially this attractiveness are self-evident. They remind us of the possession of the earth by the *praeis* (Matt 5:4).

## ἐπιθεσις

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*epithesis*, the action of placing something on someone or something, application, laying on of hands, assault

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*epithesis*, S 1936; TDNT 8.159–161; EDNT 2.27; MM 239; L&N 85.51; BAGD 293

The semantics of *epithesis* – explained by Hesychius as “among the Pythagoreans, the number two” (*ho tōn dyo arithmos para tois Pythagorikois*) – is quite curious. The literal meaning of the word is “the action of placing on”; hence (a) application (of a coating), or laying on of hands; (b) the action of

placing on, applying, attributing to, for example an epithet (cf. Aristotle, *Rh.* 3.2.1405); (c) the action of laying hands on or attacking someone (cf. the effort to seize tyrannical power, Diodorus Siculus 13.92); hence assault, aggression.

This latter, pejorative meaning is almost the only one known in the OT. A conspiracy (Hebrew *qešer*, conspiracy, treason) is organized against Amaziah (2 Chr 25:27); “when they perceived that the attack came from Lysimachus ... they all resisted in a wild tumult” (2 Macc 4:41); Jason leads a surprise attack against the city. This is the constant meaning of the word in the papyri, where it is not used very often, beginning with a letter from 14 BC that tells about an attack by two people against the *epistatēs*. In the first century AD, it is almost always a case of an official complaint, for example against the slave Euporos, who violently attacked and beat his victim in the year 45 (*P.Oxy.* 283, 15), or against slanders and violent attacks in 47–48 (*P.Mich.* V, 231, 7). Later, a woman denounces two hoarders who have outrageously attacked and despoiled her (*P.Oxy.* 1121, 7; in AD 295), and a victim of abuse of power protests before the *ekdikos* (*PSI* 872, 4; sixth century).

The four occurrences of *epithesis* in the NT have nothing to do with the above meanings. They all have a religious meaning and all are instances of the phrase *hē epithesis tōn cheirōn*. By the “laying on of hands,” Jesus restored health to the sick, blessed children (Matt 19:13) or his disciples (Luke 24:50), as did patriarchs with their children and the high priest with the people (Gen 48:14; Lev 9:22; Sir 50:20). In the early church, this gesture became the rite for passing on the Holy Spirit (Acts 8:17–18; Heb 6:2) or a spiritual gift (1 Tim 4:14; 2 Tim 1:6), that of “ordination” of deacons and presbyters (Acts 6:6). Since it communicates to the subject something possessed by the donor, it is not only a protocol for legal installation to positions in the church hierarchy (1 Tim 5:22) but a sacrament that guarantees the uninterrupted succession of ministers: the beneficiary receives the same power as the one who lays hands on him.

## ἐπικαλέω

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*epikaleō*, to give a name or surname, call, designate, invite; to appeal to, call upon, invoke

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*epikaleo*, S 1941; *TDNT* 3.496–500; *EDNT* 2.28–29; *NIDNTT* 2.874; MM 239; L&N 33.131; BDF §§157(2), 202, 268(1), 392(3,4), 397(3), 406(2), 412(2); BAGD 294

This compound verb, in the active and the passive, means “to name, to nickname (surname), to give the name, to invite,” but in the first century it quite

often has the same meaning as the simple form *kaleō*, “call, designate,” and has no distinctive meaning of its own. It is used only once in the Synoptics, with regard to the derisive label applied to Jesus: “If they have called the master of the household Beelzebul, how much more the members of the household.”

I. – In Acts, St. Luke conformed to the style of surnames, inherited from the OT, which spread throughout the Roman Empire during the Hellenistic period, especially in Egypt, but also in Babylonia and Syria-Palestine, especially among the Jews, as well as in Greece and in Asia Minor. Hence the double name of the apostle, *Saulos ho kai Paulos*. These surnames were often chosen on the basis of a distinguishing physical, moral, or religious characteristic of a person, to specify his origin (Josephus, *Ant.* 14.4: Quintus Metellus the Cretan) or to distinguish him from others of the same name (Acts 10:5, Simon Peter and Simon the tanner at Joppa), sometimes as a nickname chosen by fellow members of a club or fellow players of a game (*IG XIV*, 1517, Geminas becomes *Petrokorax*). Nicknames were often chosen simply because they sounded like the original name and made it easier for a foreigner to fit into a new culture. In any case, surnames were used by princes and slaves alike and by all decent folk.

To unite these two names (X is also called Y), first of all the stereotyped formula *hos kai* or *hos ē* (third century BC) was used, then *ho kai*. With increasing frequency, a verb was added (*hos kai kaleitai*, *ho kai legetai*), and, beginning with the end of the second century AD, the present passive or middle participle (*ho epikaloumenos*, *ho epikeklēmenos*, *ho legomenos*). These references allow us to locate St. Luke’s usage in the language of the time. In four cases, the name and the surname are Semitic (Acts 1:23; 4:36; 15:22; 13:8 – Bar-Jesus/Elymas); in other cases, the surname is Latin or Greek (10:5, 18, 32; 11:13; 13:1); this is the case with Tabitha, translated into Latin as Dorcas, which means gazelle (9:36), and with John, who is surnamed Mark (12:21, 25). The participle is always between the article and the name.

II. – In the active or middle voice, *epikaloumai* often means “reproach, blame, make a claim, accuse.” This is the case with Potiphar’s wife: “I cried out to call those in the household to help”; with some Carians who appeal to Cyrus (Xenophon, *Cyr.* 7.4.1); and with the gymnasiarch Marcus Aurelius Nepotianus, who appeals to the prefect (*epikaloumenos ton lamprotaton hēgemonā Aideinion Ioulianon*, *P.Oxy.* 3286, 11). Hence we arrive at the legal sense of the Latin *provocare*, “appeal” to a provincial official or a higher jurisdiction, like that of the emperor. Thus St. Paul appealed to Caesar.

Our verb also means “take someone as witness,” notably God, as a guarantor of affirmations or of personal justification. This is an oath formula: May God punish me, cause me to die, if I am lying. In a letter to Yesu ben

Galgola, Simon bar Kochba writes, “I call heaven to witness against me that ... I shall put fetters on your feet.” Abraham and Eliezer call God as witness for their future conduct. Thus St. Paul protests his devotion: “As for me, I take God as my witness (*egō de martyra ton theon epikaloumai*) that it was to spare you that I did not come again to Corinth” (2 Cor 1:23).

III. – *Epikaleō* in the sense of “invoke, call upon” always has a religious meaning in the LXX, and a technical value in the formula “invoke the name of God,” which goes back to Enoch. It is first of all a profession of faith, because to utter the divine name over someone or something (Bar 2:15, 26; 1 Macc 7:37) is to make it God’s property and place it under God’s protection. It is to set apart a people, a city, or a sanctuary to worship and serve God, on account of which God protects them. At the Jerusalem Council (Acts 15:17), James quotes Amos 9:12, where “all the nations upon whom my name is invoked” are called to the messianic kingdom, but the pagans are precisely those “who do not invoke his name” (Jer 10:25).

In the NT, the name is that of Jesus Christ, recognized as Lord and God, such that the formula “invoke the name” is probably linked to baptism, where it is professed that “whoever calls upon the name of the Lord will be saved” and where a person is purified of sins by “calling upon his name” (Acts 22:16). This is the designation of Christians according to Acts 9:14, where Saul has the power to “bind all those who call upon your name.”

This invocation becomes ecclesial and ecumenical in the epistles of St. Paul. First Corinthians is addressed to “those who call upon the name of our Lord Jesus Christ in any place” (1 Cor 1:2), the church being the gathering of those who adore Christ, who celebrate his worship (cf. Ps 145:18) and pray to him from a pure heart. Over against the religious individualism of the Greek cities, all believers are united in their adoration of Christ as Lord and God; their common “invocation” is the expression of their unity. “He is the same Lord for all (Jews and Gentiles), rich toward all who call upon him, for whoever calls upon the name of the Lord will be saved” (Rom 10:12–13; cf. Heb 11:16). If the invocation of the name is always salvific and implies worship in the NT, the call for help in the OT is less accentuated, with divine protection and generosity being more emphasized.

IV. – In the magical papyri, *he epikaloumenē* is a technical term designating the woman who has made a charm, a “spell-caster,” invoking Thoth-Hermes, who presides over funerals, and urging him to conquer the heart (the *enkephalon*) of the one whom she loves, precisely by means of this charm which she has executed. The one invoked can be either a demon (the *nekydaimōn*) who is asked to intervene, or the spirit of the person for whom the action is done. Cf. *Pap.Graec.Mag.* 4, 1749: “Say this: I invoke you, the ruler

of all becoming” (*lege ton logon touton: epikaloumai se, ton archēgetēn pasēs geneseōs*, vol. I, p. 128); 1812: “I have called upon your great name” (*epikeklēmai to mega sou onoma*); 1822: “give me the submission of every soul that I shall invoke” (*dos de moi pasēs psychēs hypotagēn, hēs an epikalesōmai*, vol. I, p. 218); V, 470: “I call upon you, the ruler of the gods ... it is I who call upon you” (*epikaloumai se, ton dynastēn tōn theōn ... egō eimi ho epikaloumenos se*, vol. I, p. 196); *P.Leid.* W, 9, 35: “call upon the god of the hour and the god of the day” (*epikalou ton tēs hōras kai ton tēs hēmeras theon*); *P.Oxy.* 886, 10, an appeal to the sun and all the gods concerning things with respect to which one wishes to receive an omen (third century AD).

ἐπιμέλεια, ἐπιμελέομαι, ἐπιμελῶς

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*epimeleia*, **care, solicitude, attention**; *epimeleomai*, **to take care of, attend to**; *epimelōs*, **attentively, diligently**

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*epimeleia*, S 1958; *EDNT* 2.31; MM 241–242; L&N 35.44; BAGD 296 | *epimeleomai*, S 1959; *EDNT* 2.31; MM 242; L&N 30.40, 35.44; BDF §§101, 176(2); BAGD 296 | *epimelos*, S 1960; *EDNT* 2.31; MM 242; L&N 30.41; BAGD 296

These terms present no difficulty with regard to meaning and are abundantly used in the Koine, notably in the papyri and the inscriptions; at least the first two terms are. On the other hand, they are rare in the NT (which does not use *epimelētēs*). Hence the need to bring them to life, as it were, by providing parallels from pagan sources.

I. – At the stopover at Sidon, “Julius treated Paul with courtesy (or amicably, literally with humanity) and allowed him to visit his friends and receive their care, *epimeleias tychein*.” The commentators observe that this latter expression is excellent Greek, but should it be translated “care, treatment” or “good offices, solicitude”? The two meanings are equally attested. From Plato on, *epimeleia* is used for the attention and care given a sick or disabled person, and this meaning is retained by the medical writers, notably Hippocrates and Galen. In the third century BC, a decree of Cos honors a physician: “he performed *epimeleian* for the citizens according to the healing art” (*epimeleian epoieito tōn politan kata tan technan tan iatrikan*). It goes on to praise him for his goodwill and *epimeleia*. At Gortyn, the physician Hermias for five years cared for the citizens, the metics, and the allies; “he performed *epimeleia* and saved them from great danger” (*epimeleian epoiēsato kai esōse es megalōn kindynōn*, *I.Cret.* IV, n. 168, 15; p. 231). Care can be provided for a

patient not only by a physician but any devoted person in his entourage: “since you provided all *epimeleia* and refreshment for me in my illness and old age” (*epeidēper pasan anapausin kai epimeleian epoiēsas moi en tō emō nosō kai gērō*, a will, *P.Cair.Masp.* 67154, B 19ff.) and so is used for all the kinds of devotion lavished on an aged or disabled person.

By extension, *epimeleia* is used for the effort and care expended on any task whatsoever: the librarian who completes his collection of books and repairs those that are in poor condition (*Ep. Arist.* 29, 317); the maintenance of canals and banks (*P.Panop.Beatty* 2, 223) and lands (1, 403), of vineyards (*Pap.Lugd.Bat.* XIII, 16, 8), of palm groves (*ibid.* VIII, 21); vegetable farming (*P.Panop.Beatty* 1, 249–250), all agricultural labors (*Ep. Arist.* 107; *P.Mert.* X, 17: “let the entire remaining agricultural *epimeleia* be completed,” *tēn allēn geōrgikēn epimeleian pasan epiteleitō*, from 28 July AD 21; *P.Tebt.* 703, 66; from 260 BC), irrigation (*P.Oxy.* 2767, 10); the raising of horses (*P.Oxy.* 2480, 97: *eis epimeleian tōn hippōn*; cf. *P.Alex.* 12, 20), of cattle (*Philo, Prov.* 2.27); the setting up of a statue by the *agōnothetai* (*I.Car.* 79, 11, *tēn epimeleian tēs anastaseōs poiēsamenōn*; cf. *I.Lind.* 472, 10; 474, 8); any “business” whatsoever, whether concerning the duties of the king (*Ep. Arist.* 245; *Dittenberger, Or.* 383, 49: *emais epimeleiais*) or of statesmen (Aristotle, *Pol.* 3.5.10); or toward a deceased person (from a will: “for the *epimeleia* of my body,” *pros tēn epimeleian tou sōmatos mou*; *Pap.Lugd.Bat.* XIII, 14, 28; *P.Oxy.* 2857, 19, from May 17, 134); to occupy one’s leisure time (*Wis* 13:13), “to preside at the service of the gods” (Demosthenes, *C. Andr.* 78: *pros tous theous epimeleias*), to keep a sanctuary in decent condition, to serve the ibis shelters (*P.Fouad* XVI, 5 = *SB* 9628, 1), to oversee functionaries, etc.

In a special sense, *epimeleia* is used for a public duty or function (Dinarchus, *C. Phil.* 3.15–16; 1 Macc 16:14 – “Simon, taking care of matters related to the administration of their cities”; *P.Fouad* 20, 5; *P.Cair.Isid.* 79, 8). It is not rare for those who are responsible to justify their inspection rounds on the grounds that it is their duty – “for this is my *epimeleia*” (*touto gar hē epimeleia mou*, *P.Oxf.* III, 3; AD 142; *P.Oxy.* 2560, 11: “according to his *epimeleia*” (*kata tēn autou epimeleian*) – and they are not free to neglect their responsibilities (*P.Oxy.* 2228, 43). For example, the *epimeleia* of the ephebes and the obligation of officers to carry out their duties are known, but in their honorific decrees the cities praise functionaries who have demonstrated diligence, like Agathocles at Istrus around AD 200, who proved himself “full of ardor in the exercise of magistracies, in *public services*, and in councils.” If this “care in well-doing” (*Ep. Arist.* 18) is praised, it is because it implies a favorable disposition (*ibid.* 282), great carefulness, effort (Menander, *Dysk.*



862), solicitude (Philo, *Prov.* 2.99; *P.Princ.* 151, 18; *SB* 8858, 10), and zeal (Xenophon, *Cyn.* 1.17; *P.Tebt.* 769, 5).

This term was used especially for the care and devotion shown by parents or nurses to children. For example, Termouthis raised little Moses *pollēs epimeleias* (Josephus, *Ant.* 2.236); 21 May AD 26, in a nurse's contract, "the declarer undertakes to give complete care and help to the infant, as is her duty" (*P.Rein.* 103, 17; cf. *BGU* 1106, 28, from 13 BC; *SB* 9534, 17: *ta tekna hēmōn epimeleias tynchaneto*, the conclusion of a letter of the third century AD). This Christian letter from the third-fourth century says it all; Thonis assures her dear Heracleus: "I will care for him as if he were my own son." This reminder of the scope of the task, of the absolute devotion and self-giving required, should never be forgotten with reference to the charge to the Ephesian overseer (1 Tim 3:5.)

II. – The verb *epimeleomai* also has a medical definition, attested only by St. Luke in the NT: the good Samaritan, after dressing the victim's wounds, takes him to the hostelry where he takes care of him (*kai epemelēthē autou*), probably by watching over him through the night; and when he leaves, he tells the innkeeper "take care of him, *epimelēthēti autou*" (Luke 10:34–35). Here the reference would seem to be not to remedies or medical treatment per se but rather to watchfulness, devotion, or health-care in the broad sense of the term. At least it is in this sense that the word is copiously attested in papyrological letters, in a quasi-stereotyped form: "take care of yourself so that you may be healthy" (*epimelou seautou hin' hygiainēs*). Sometimes the health of children is specified.

One watches over persons, just as one "busies oneself" with this or that undertaking, whether it is someone copying a letter (1 Macc 11:37); or God, who "busies himself with human affairs"; or Abel, who has a concern for justice (Josephus, *Ant.* 1.53); or subjects, who must observe the laws (ibid. 8.297: *tōn nomimōn epimelēsomenous*). In the vocabulary of the inscriptions, this nuance of completing a task predominates. In 287 BC, an Athenian decree honors the poet Philippides, who "has busied himself (*epimelēthē*) with all the other games and sacrifices in the name of the city ... drawing on his own personal revenues" (Dittenberger, *Syl.* 374, 45); "let the magistrates charged with administration busy themselves (*epimelēthēnai*) with the crown and the proclamation" (ibid. 374, 67). In 271/270, the taxiarchs are honored because "they all busied themselves with their own tribes" (*SEG* XIV, 64, 13). In AD 158, a regulation from Gazorus in Macedonia for the use of public properties notes: "There are people willing to do the work and receive a share of the harvest."

Thus we can understand how Paul could write “If someone cannot govern his own household how can he look after a church of God?” (1 Tim 3:5), because on the one hand *episkopos* – for that is the function he is discussing – is a title given to governors (in colonies), to certain magistrates (in autonomous cities), and to high-ranking functionaries of associations, such as the *episkopos*-administrator of the association of *Ameinicheitai* at Delos; and on the other hand *episkopou* means “take care” (*P.Oxy.* 2838, 9; from 4 February 62). This term probably says nothing about the object of stewardship and oversight, but it suggests the diligence and prudence of an official of the household of God and its worship. Not only does the *episkopos* watch over and busy himself with the community, but he also sees to its spiritual needs and devotes all his energy to it.

III. – This is confirmed by the adverb *epimelōs* in the Koine, which emphasizes the attentiveness (of a hearer, *Ep. Arist.* 81), the diligence exercised in worship (Menander, *Dysk.* 37), efforts expended in a conversion (stele of Moschion, *SB* 8026, 16 = *SEG* VIII, 464), the care taken in raising children (Prov 13:24, piel of the Hebrew verb *šāḥar*: *epimelōs paideuei*; Josephus, *Ant.* 17.12; cf. *PSI* 405, 20), in purifying a temple (*ibid.* 12.318), for a neighbor (*P.Oxy.* 1581, 14), to fatten cattle (*P.Fay.* 121, 7), the exact placement of a torture victim on the wheel so as to break his back (4 Macc 11:18). In this last case, the term corresponds to the Aramaic *’āšparnā* of Ezra 6:8, 12, 13: “strictly.” This application (*P.Oxy.* 1675, 15), diligence, and zeal are exclusive; thus the object of the thoughts of man was only evil, in Gen 6:5, where *epimelōs* translates the Hebrew restrictive adverb *raq*. This is how we should understand Luke 15:8; the woman who had lost a drachma “searched diligently (*epimelōs*) until she found it” (*zētei epimelōs heōs hou heurē*); she did only that, ceasing her other occupations – like the shepherd who left the ninety-nine faithful sheep – and gave total and exclusive attention to this search, until it was complete....

### ἐπιούσιος

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*epiousios*, coming next, for tomorrow; for subsistence, necessary

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*epiousios*, S 1967; TDNT 2.590–599; EDNT 2.31–32; NIDNTT 1.251; MM 242–243; L&N 67.183, 67.206; BDF §§123(1), 124; BAGD 296–297

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The fourth petition of the Lord’s Prayer is formulated thus in Matt 6:11 – *ton arton hēmon ton epiousion dos hēmin sēmeron*; in Luke 11:3 – *ton arton hēmōn ton epiousion didou hēmin to kath’ hēmeran*. In the first text, the aorist

imperative *dos* denotes punctiliar action and envisions only the present day; in the second, the present imperative *didou* has a nuance of continuity: do not cease to give us (daily) that which is necessary to us.

The difficulty lies in the translation of *epiousios*, the only adjective in this prayer, which is not only a biblical hapax but, according to Origen, “is not used by any of the sages among the Greeks, and is no longer used in current language; it seems to have been invented by the evangelists.” Some have claimed to find the word in a Fayum papyrus from the fifth century AD; but one consideration is that the papyrus is very mutilated and our word is followed by a lacuna, then “a half-obol”; and another very important consideration is that the papyrus reads *epiousi*, *-ōn* being a gratuitous addition. Since therefore usage is of no help, all that remains is recourse to etymology. Everything has been suggested.

*Epiousios* can derive from (1) *epiēmi*, “take place, arrive,” yielding “the arriving day,” or daily (Chrysostom, Severus of Antioch); (2) *epi*, “upon,” plus *ousia*, “nature, substance,” either supersubstantial (St. Jerome, on Matt 6:11 – “which is beyond all substances and surpasses all created things”; likewise P. Joüon, in *RSR*, 1927, p. 221), or “befitting our nature, sufficient to maintain us, required, necessary” (Cyril of Jerusalem, *Mystagogical Catecheses* 5.15; Theodore of Mopsuestia, Cyril of Alexandria); (3) *epi*, “to, on,” plus *eimi*, “be”; but the prefix *epi* should lose its iota when compounded with this verb, so that we would have *epousios*, not *epiousios*; nevertheless, there are exceptions to this rule in the Koine (J. Carmignac cites twenty-six exceptions; *P.Oxy.* 924, 2: *tou epiēmerinou*; fourth century); (4) *ep* plus *eimi*, “go,” either from the participle *epiōn*, “coming,” hence, the bread that comes next, in the future; or from the feminine form *epiousa*, which is used precisely to mean “the next day, the coming day” (Acts 16:11; 20:15; 21:18), as the Coptic versions interpreted (Bohairic, *crastinum*; Sahidic, *venientem*). Asking for tomorrow’s bread would seem to contradict the ban on taking thought for the *aurion*; but in the near east the day begins in the evening, and furthermore *hē epiouse hēmera* can mean the same day; hence “daily bread” (Tertullian, Cyprian, Augustine). Thus J. Carmignac, referring to St. Jerome, who read *māhār*, “tomorrow,” in the Gospel of the Hebrews, suggests translating Matt 6:11, “Give us day by day our bread until the next day.” This would be a reference to the daily manna.

This evocation of manna (Exod 16:4) is mentioned also by J. Starcky, who understands *epiousios* bread to mean “the daily ration” from day to day. Thus he agrees with the meaning of W. Foerster (*TDNT*, vol. 2, pp. 590–599), “the measure necessary for each one,” citing Prov 30:8 – “give me my daily bread” (*lehem huqi*). This is also the meaning accepted by J. A. de Foucault, who, after the fashion of Origen, connects *epiousios* and *periousios* (Exod 19:6; *periousia*

is contrasted with *anankaia*, Polybius 4.21.1; 4.38.4; Isocrates, *Bus.* 11.15) and, taking account of the definition given by Hesychius (*periousios*: more than enough), concludes that *epiousios* could mean “for our subsistence.” This is what the exegesis of F. M. Braun finally amounts to. He adopts the Peshitta version, “bread of our necessity,” the food that is necessary for us for a day.

In the last analysis, two translations are possible: “bread for tomorrow” or “the bread that is necessary.” E. Delebecque expresses amazement that commentators overlook the repetition of the article (*ton arton ... ton epiousion*), which makes the adjective not predicative but attributive, emphasizing the meaning of the antecedent noun, and therefore necessarily nontrivial. He cites Plato, *Resp.* 7.525 c: “to facilitate the passage of the soul from the sensible world to truth and reality” (*ep’ alētheian te kai ousian*) and asks whether we should not read *ton arton ... ton epi ousian* (two words); the first translators of the original semitic of a catechism (Jerusalemite? Antiochene?) would have taken *epiousian* as a feminine adjective, and surprised at the form after the masculine *ton*, would have corrected it to *epiousion*. There is nothing more attractive than this hypothesis, which explains the neologism and shows that it means “essential”: the bread that leads to life!

H. Bourgoïn ends up with the same meaning, taking as his point of departure the grammatical phenomenon that he calls the “empty prefix,” which “having been emptied of all semantic content does not change the meaning of the root with which it agrees.” Thus in Greek *epiphlegō* and the simple *phlegō* have the same meaning: “consume with flames, burn.” Examples can also be found in French: *chercher* and *rechercher*, or the action of *partir* and *départ*. Hence, in *epiousios*, the prefix *epi*, expressing the idea of contact, can be rendered “touching” or “concerning”; the adjective amounts to the same thing as *ousios*, that which concerns the essence, is essential. Once the prefix is empty, the meaning is clear: “give us our essential bread today” (Matt), “each day” (Luke). Bread of life would be a possible equivalent; divine bread for eternal life. In any event, this is the petition of one who is poor, or better, of a child addressing the heavenly Father.

## ἐπιποθέω

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*epipotheō*, to long for, desire intensely

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*epipotheo*, S 1971; *EDNT* 2.33; L&N 25.18, 25.47; BDF §§70(1), 171(1), 392(1a); BAGD 297–298

The verb *potheō* is unknown in the NT. The Koine is well-known for its love of compound forms because of their supposedly greater “expressiveness,” even sonority, but scholars disagree concerning the nuance conveyed by the preposition *epi-*, which signifies intensity or direction. Moreover, if the meaning “sigh, languish after someone or something” is well attested by the LXX, the shades of meaning vary, as with the corresponding Hebrew terms. It is nevertheless noteworthy that this verb connotes not only eagerness, but anxiety and sometimes fear, and in any case the dissatisfaction proper to desire, which aims at acquiring that which it does not yet possess, the lack of which causes it to suffer.

The variety or imprecision of the meanings of *epipotheō* in the NT is even greater than in the LXX. The meaning of the word depends on its context, but also on the individual personality of each writer. The meaning “desire intensely” is in evidence from the earliest NT writing: “God jealously desires this spirit that he has made to dwell in us.” He reclaims that which is his own, but his *phthonos* expresses the exclusivity of his love. On the human level, infants are eager for their mother’s milk (1 Pet 2:2), just as the hart’s instincts draw it to fresh water. The seven other NT usages are Pauline, of which five express ardent desire, whether to see loved ones (1 Thess 3:6; Rom 1:11; Phil 2:26; 2 Tim 1:4; cf. *epipothia*, Rom 15:23) or to put on the glorious body without getting rid of the fleshly body.

On this other hand, this meaning (“desire”) cannot be maintained in 2 Cor 9:14, where the nuance is surely tender affection: the prayers of the saints of Jerusalem, who will be thankful for the collection from the Corinthians, will “manifest their tender affection for you (*epipothountōn hymas*).” Even clearer is Phil 1:8, “God is my witness that I cherish you in the bowels of Christ Jesus” (*martys gar mou ho theos, hōs epipothō pantas hymas en splachnois Christou Iēsou*). Hence, there is a good chance that in the complicated blend of feelings that animate the repentant Corinthians (fear, zeal, desire to punish the offender) their *epipothēsis* may be not an ardent desire but rather a sincere or solid attachment to the apostle, with the nuance of anxiety or pain that the verb conveys in the LXX.

Thus St. Paul marked *epipotheō* and its derivatives with his personality, imbuing them with a lively sensibility. Sometimes they suggest an urge, an inclination; sometimes a fervent tenderness, an emotion that grips the heart; always love, always a favorable sense. These nuances are, moreover, those of *potheō* and *pothos*.

*epistomizō*, to muzzle, close someone's mouth

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*epistomizo*, S 1993; EDNT 2.40; MM 246; L&N 33.124; BAGD 301

Titus is to “shut the mouths” of those who are insubordinate, vain speechifiers, and deceivers of minds (Titus 1:11). The biblical hapax *epistomizō*, literally “put something on the mouth,” means “put the bit in a horse's mouth,” but it is used for people as well as for animals, like our verbs *muzzle* and *gag*. Metaphorically, to close a person's mouth is to make him be quiet, impose silence on him.

This verb, unknown in the papyri, belongs to cultivated Greek. It has first of all a rhetorical meaning. In a discussion, the adversary is not allowed to defend himself, he is unable to respond: “ ‘While he should,’ he said, ‘close the mouths of us who were speaking against him’ ” (Demosthenes, *Halon.* 33); “He allowed himself to be so tangled up by your speech that he was silenced, for he dared not say what he thought” (Plato, *Grg.* 482 e); “I have to my credit a deed capable ... of closing the mouth of my enemies.”

The moral meaning of the word is that of Philo: “reason will bridle (*epistomie*) and restrain the impetuosity and the flow of passion” (*Alleg. Interp.* 3.155); “extreme joys, like great sorrows, leave us speechless” (*Heir* 3); moral sensibility “condemns us to the interior of ourselves, without letting us even open our mouths; holding and bridling the tongue (*epistomizōn*) with the help of the reins of the conscience, it restrains its presumptuous and unbraked course” (*Worse Attacks Better* 23). Plutarch expresses a similar thought: “the bond is like a bit imposed on the irrational part of the soul.... When the Genius pulls back on the reins, he causes what we call repentance ...; the soul, feeling the pain of the blow, feels restrained from within by its lord; then, thus punished, it becomes docile and manageable, like a tamed animal” (*De gen.* 22; cf. *Arat.* 1).

In Titus 1:11, it is not just a matter of silencing the heterodox but also of reducing the “insubordinate” to obedience; so that the best parallel would be that of restraining a rebellion, in Josephus, *Ant.* 17.252, where Varus takes a legion to Jerusalem to stop the revolutionary agitation of the Jews, *tēn Ioudaiōn neōteropoian epistomiountas*.

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ἐπισυναγωγή

*episynagōgē*, meeting

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*episunagoge*, S 1997; TDNT 7.841–843; EDNT 3.293–296; NIDNTT 2.33; MM 247; L&N 15.126, 15.128; BAGD 301

“With respect to the Parousia of our Lord Jesus Christ and our reunion with him” (*hēmōn episynagōgēs ep’ auton*, 2 Thess 2:1), St. Paul calls upon the Thessalonians not to be shaken or alarmed. Heb 10:25 urges its readers not to forsake their meetings, “especially as you see the day approaching.” In both cases, the text or the context is eschatological, as in the case of the OT hapax: “the place (where the ark is hidden) will be unknown until God has accomplished the reassembling of his people” (*heōs an synagagē ho theos episynagōgēn tou laou ... genētai*, 2 Macc 2:7), the restoration of Israel after the Diaspora.

*Episynagōgē* is only attested once BC in secular language and hardly seems to differ from *synagōgē*, which, after the fashion of *oikos* (1 Tim 3:15), designates sometimes the community assembly, sometimes the place where this meeting is held. Christians sometimes used the word in this sense to designate their church; but in Heb 10:25, *episynagōgē* is a religious term, designating not a “grouping together” or a society of any sort, but a meeting for worship, at more or less regular intervals, of Hebrew Christians in a set place, in a certain “house” in an unknown city; in 2 Thess 2:1, the meeting with Christ will take place in heaven.

ἐπιφαίνω, ἐπιφάνεια, ἐπιφανής

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*epiphainō*, **to shine, light up, appear**; *epiphaneia*, **an appearing**; *epiphanēs*, **manifest, glorious**

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*epiphainō*, S 2014; TDNT 9.7–10; EDNT 2.44–45; NIDNTT 3.317–319; MM 249–250; L&N 14.39; BDF §§72, 309(2) | *epiphaneia*, S 2015; TDNT 9.7–10; EDNT 2.44–45; NIDNTT 3.317–319; MM 250; L&N 24.21 | *epiphanēs*, S 2016; TDNT 9.7–10; EDNT 2.45; NIDNTT 3.317–319; MM 250; L&N 79.22; ND 4.148

Apart from rare secular uses (Ezek 17:6; 2 Macc 12:22; 15:13), the verb *epiphainō* in the LXX has God as its subject. With the exception of Zeph 2:11, where this manifestation involves vengeance (Hebrew *yārēʿ*, niphal), the divine interventions are beneficent and inspire gladness and rejoicing (2 Macc 3:30; Philo, *Dreams* 1.71). Sometimes the appearance is a vision (Gen 35:7; Ezek 39:28; Hebrew *gālāh*, hiphil), sometimes a brilliant light (Deut 33:2, Hebrew

*zeraḥ*; Philo, *Change of Names* 6, 15), most often a shining (Ps 118:27, Hebrew *’ôr*, hiphil), and the prayer of the psalmists is that God will make his face to shine on his servants (Ps 67:1; 80:4, 6, 8; 119:135; Dan 9:17; Num 6:25).

I. – In the NT, this meaning (“shine, light up”), which is the meaning in secular Greek, is attested by Acts 27:20, where during the storm neither the sun nor the stars appeared for several days; and the same meaning is present in the first of three other occurrences which are religious: Zechariah announces the appearance of the Messiah to “shine on (Ambrosiaster: *illuxit gratia Dei*) those who are in the darkness” of sin; salvation is an illumination.

This nuance cannot be ruled out in Titus 2:11 – “the saving grace of God has shined upon all people” (*epephanē hē charis tou theou hē sōtērios pasin anthrōpois*) – which sums up the gospel and attests to the realization of the prophecy of the Benedictus. Grace – merciful favor (Hebrew *hesed*), gratuitous goodwill, active beneficence (1 Cor 15:10; 2 Cor 6:1) – is almost personalized in the saving intervention of Christ. The generous goodness of God, by nature invisible, appeared before the eyes of all humankind in palpable form (1 John 1:1–2), was suddenly manifested at a precise historical moment. The second aorist passive *epephanē* (cf. Titus 3:4), prominently placed in the sentence, suggests the suddenness of the appearing and the surprise it produced, like a light that all at once pierces the darkness. But since soteriological epiphany was understood in the Hellenistic era as the beneficent intervention of the king or of the gods, this nuance of gratuitous and gracious generosity may be suggested by the adjective *sōtērios*; it is surely evoked in Titus 3:4.

II. – The substantive *epiphaneia* in the first century simultaneously suggests light or splendor and effective help. In 2 Macc it refers to heavenly manifestations (2:21; 14:15; 15:27), which augur well for the people of God (5:4) but are fearsome to their enemies (3:24; 12:22). Thus “the Lord Jesus will destroy the lawless one with the *epiphaneia* of his *Parousia*” (2 Thess 2:8): his visible presence or second coming will be victorious, like that of an emperor who is visiting or making a joyous entry into a city, granting favors (*philanthrōpa*) to his subjects but also punishing his adversaries. This condemnation of the unfaithful is also included in 1 Tim 6:14; 2 Tim 4:1. But the courtly meaning is emphasized in the Pastorals: the essentially glorious (Titus 2:13), and thus shining, epiphany is that of the *Kyrios*, the *Sōtēr*, the *Megas* and *Monos Theos* and his *basileia*. The Christian life consists of waiting for this manifestation (Titus 2:13), like preparing for a visit and awaiting punishment; but in this case the outlook is supremely joyful, because this coming of the Lord will mean sharing in his blessedness.

III. – The OT had already described Yahweh as truly *epiphanēs* in a manner illustrated by the defense of his people. The adjective *epiphanēs* occurs only



twice in the NT, with respect to the “Day of the Lord” (Acts 2:20); it retains the sense of the niphal of *yārē*’ (Joel 2:11; 3:4; Mal 3:22) – awesome manifestation! – but also with the nuance of indisputable.

ἐρεθίζω, ἐρίζω, ἐριθεία, ἔρις

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*erethizō*, to stimulate, excite, exasperate; *erizō*, to fight, contend; *eritheia*, paid work, intrigue or dispute aiming at gain, selfish ambition; *eris*, emulation, dispute, discord

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*erethizo*, S 2042; *EDNT* 2.51; MM 253; L&N 88.168, 90.55; BAGD 308 | *erizo*, S 2051; *EDNT* 2.52; MM 254; L&N 33.447; BAGD 309 | *eritheia*, S 2052; *TDNT* 2.660–661; *EDNT* 2.52; MM 254; L&N 39.7, 88.167; BAGD 309 | *eris*, S 2054; *EDNT* 2.52–53; MM 254; L&N 33.447, 39.22; BDF §§47(3), 142; BAGD 309

These terms, rare or unattested in the papyri, belong to cultivated Greek; their frequency is noteworthy in the Bible, where they often take on a religious meaning, either favorable or unfavorable.

I. – *Erithizō* (“set in movement, provoke, excite”) has as its subject the *zēlos* of the Corinthians’ love, which has “stimulated” the generosity of their brothers: “your zeal has *stirred up* most of them” (*ho hymōn zēlos ērethisen tous pleionas*, 2 Cor 9:2); but in a pejorative sense, overly finicky or irritating use of parental authority can *exasperate* children.

II. – The denominative verb *erizō* (“fight against, to quarrel, vie with”) is used only once in the NT, with respect to the Messiah: in his great discretion and mildness, he refuses to provoke disputes and quarrels, *ouk erisei oude kraugasei*. In Sir 8:2; 11:9, the wise are told *mē erize*; here, the sense is that of debates between schools, disputes between rabbis, personal rivalries.

III. – Unknown in the LXX and the Greek language before the NT, *eritheia* is used seven times in the NT, including twice in the sin lists (2 Cor 12:20; Gal 5:20) along with *eris*, which indicates that the former does not have the same meaning as the latter and is not derived from it. Like many abstract nouns in -*eia*, it was formed from a verb in -*euō*, in this case *eritheuomai*, “work for hire.” The *erithos* is a day laborer; the term is used especially for weavers and spinners. As a result, the term *eritheia* (“paid work”) originally had a positive sense; but it came to mean that which is done solely for interested motives (“What’s in it for me?”). Hence the meaning: contrive to gain a position or a magistracy not in order to serve the state but to gain honor and wealth. From

that developed two other meanings: dispute or intrigue to gain advantages; or personal ambition, the exclusive pursuit of one's own interests.

These connotations of intrigue, disputation, and chicanery appear in all the NT texts. In Rom 2:8 – wrath and anger “to all those who are of *eritheia* and disobedient to the truth.” In 2 Cor 12:20; Gal 5:20, *eritheiai* follows *zēlos*, *thymoi*, and is thus linked with animosity. At Philippi, the spirit of factionalism and rivalry motivates Paul's adversaries; their “apostolic zeal” is in fact a ploy aimed at displacing him and winning personal advantages. Jas 3:14 and 16 once again link *zēlos* and *eritheia*; the text stigmatizes this “bitter zeal” and this “spirit of intrigue,” which are “opposed to the truth” and which so often disturbed the life of the early communities, where the ideal is nevertheless “that we may lead a peaceful and quiet life” (1 Tim 2:2).

IV. – The Greeks divinized Dispute or Emulation, which they considered the energizing spirit of the world and one of the primordial forces. They had a cult of rivalry. But although in the secular language *eris* is sometimes positive (linked with *neikos*), sometimes pejorative (linked with *zēlos*), and can mean “wrath” (*Ep. Arist.* 250; *P.Grenf.* I, 1, 21: “know that I have invincible courage when wrath takes hold of me”), its nine occurrences in the NT are all pejorative. Quarreling or discord, the fruit of over-excitement (cf. Sir 28:11), of jealousy or anger, became a Christian sin. Actually, they were already mentioned in the sin lists in Sir 11:4 (after *thymos* and *zēlos*) and as punishment for sinners (40:9). The *zēlos-eris* connection is found again in the Pauline sin lists; both of these are the fruit of paganism, the deeds of people not yet spiritualized by grace.

These *ereis* are sometimes discussions that degenerate into quarrels (cf. Ps 139:20) and finally sects and schisms (Gal 5:20), sometimes discord that breaks out into opposition and open battle. In the Pastorals, it is the vice of false teachers; they are avid polemicists. Blinded by vanity, they are full of animosity and jealousy toward other teachers whom they consider to be rivals; hence the bitterness of their quarrels (1 Tim 6:4).

## ἑσοπτρον

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*esoptron*, **mirror**

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*esoptron*, S 2072; TDNT 1.178–180, 2.696; EDNT 2.60; MM 256; L&N 6.221; BDF §30(3); BAGD 313; ND 4.149–150

The most primitive mirror was a sheet of water in a bronze platter (cf. the Athens museum; *Jos. Asen.* 18.7; Iamblichus, *Myst.* 2.10). In the first century, the *esoptron* is a disk, round or slightly elliptical, polished, made of an alloy of

copper and tin (Exod 38:8; cf. Isa 3:23; Philo, *Migr. Abr.* 98; *Moses* 2.139), sometimes silver (*P.Oxy.* 1449, 19) and even gold, with a handle of metal, ivory, or enamel, and used to reflect the images of objects or persons.

In the Bible, *esoptron* is used only metaphorically: of wisdom, “the spotless mirror of God’s activity” (Wis 7:26) or of the wise person whose perspicacity succeeds in uncovering a neighbor’s true feelings in spite of false appearances, after the fashion of a “mirror polisher” who cleans the easily oxidizable metal, exposing the true nature hidden by the scaling or rust that hides it. On the same psychological level, Jas 1:23 compares the Christian who hears the word of God, but does not put it into practice, to “a man who considers in the mirror the face that he was born with (from his origin, meaning his true self, *to prosōpon tēs geneseōs autou*). He has seen himself, but he goes away and immediately forgets what he is like.” So the mirror is an instrument of knowledge; but for this information to be morally useful, it has to be allowed to correct faults, to remove blemishes.

1 Cor 13:12 contrasts our present (*arti*) knowledge of God “through a mirror” to the eternal vision after death, “then (*tote*) it will be face to face.” According to Kittel’s article (*TDNT*, vol. 2, pp. 696–697), the rabbis never mention the mirror as giving an indistinct image; for them it is the symbol of prophetic revelation, a spiritual vision; mirrors that are not defective give clear knowledge, and it is surely in this sense that the image is used in 2 Cor 3:18. But we cannot neglect the Hellenistic texts that point out that a mirror image can differ from the reflected object, especially if the mirror is concave or convex, or simply tarnished. At any rate, the contrast with contemplation *prosōpon pros prosōpon* shows that for Paul seeing through a mirror is imperfect. In fact, one does not get at the object itself, but its reflection; not reality, but an appearance, an image, a reproduction (*eidōlon*, Plutarch, *Ad princ. iner.* 5), a refraction (*anaklasis*, Plutarch, *Amat.* 20; *De fac.* 23) which may even be illusory. It is something quite different to see God “as he is” (1 John 3:2); in any event, the image is inferior to the object, because it appears only fleetingly (Philo, *Alleg. Interp.* 3.100–101); whereas to know God is to abide in him (1 John 4:11–12). We might even say, at least in terms of the love described in 1 Cor 13, that the mirror stands between the one who looks in it and effective capture by God, which is true biblical “knowledge.”

ἑταῖρος

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*hetairos*, associate, comrade, friend

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*etairos*, S 2083; TDNT 2.699–701; EDNT 1.65; NIDNTT 1.259–260; MM 256–257; L&N 34.16; BAGD 314

It is difficult to provide an exact translation for this term, which means “one who is associated with another,” because the nuance depends on the context: companion, comrade, friend, dear or good friend. These labels are not exactly synonymous, even though the LXX used *hetairos* to translate the Hebrew *rē‘a* (“neighbor”) and its derivatives, with the exception of Cant 1:7, where the *ḥḥērīm* are the companions or favorites of the king. There is a world of difference between the companion of the ostrich (Job 30:29), the confidants of Zimri (1 Kgs 16:11), and the fleeting friendship of the hot-tempered person (Prov 22:24), on the one hand; and on the other hand, comrades in labor (Eccl 4:4) who are true friends, who love to get together (Sir 40:23), share their joys and sorrows, vibrant in their perfect harmony.

In the NT, this word is used only by St. Matthew, always in the singular and in the vocative: *hetaire*. In the parable of the workers sent to work in the vineyard, where the owner responds to the complaint of one of the workers, we must translate “comrade” (Matt 20:13), because *hetairos* was the common term for agricultural workers (*P.Oxy.* 1859, 2; 1911, 157; 2195, 134; *PSI* 955, 17), and the relationship between the two men is not particularly cordial. On the other hand, in the parable of the royal wedding, the emotive tone is definite: “Friend, why did you come here without wedding attire?”

The Vulgate’s translation – “Amice, ad quid venisti?” – caught on, and practically speaking Jesus no doubt called Judas, in the Olivet garden, “My friend!” Nevertheless, *hetaire* should be nuanced a bit. First of all, we should remember that *hetairos* is used for the disciple of a teacher (Xenophon, *Mem.* 2.8.1) and the adherent to a party (Josephus, *Life* 124). It presupposes a strict solidarity, often deep bonds. In the Talmud, it corresponds to the Hebrew *ḥāḥēr* and qualifies a member of a group of scribes: an associate, an assistant, or a colleague. Thus the Lord was able to remind the traitor that he was a member of the apostolic college, and the nuance was closer to companion: “You kiss me, with what you have come to do!”

ἑτεροζυγέω

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*heterozygeō*, to mismate, be mismated

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*eterozugeo*, S 2086; TDNT 2.901; EDNT 2.65; NIDNTT 2.739, 741, 3.1160, 1164; MM 257; L&N 34.9; BDF §§119(1), 193(3); BAGD 314

To the Corinthians, who were getting used to debasing contact, or rather compromise, with their pagan surroundings (going to temples, entering mixed marriages?), St. Paul gives this charge: “Do not be unequally yoked with unbelievers.” The verb *heterozygeō* (literally, “pull the yoke in a different direction than one’s fellow”; figuratively, “make a mismatched covenant, mismatch”) is a biblical hapax, rarely used by ecclesiastical writers; it is the opposite of *syzygeō*. Its meaning is somewhat illuminated by the adjective *heterozygos*, attested once in the papyri: the property of Demetrius was confiscated, including “two unmatched vases” (*Antipatridia heterozyga dyo*, *P.Cair.Zen.* 59038, 12). As a grammatical term, *heterozygos* means “declined or conjugated irregularly.” There is another adjective *heterozyx*, “having lost its yoke-mate, unmatched”; Cimon urges the Athenians “not to allow Greece to become lame (*chōlēn*) or their city to be deprived of its rival” (*mēte tēn polin heterozyga periidein gegenēmenēn*, Plutarch, *Cim.* 16.10).

Just as in a yoked team the difference between two mismatched animals keeps them from pulling the yoke in the same way and with the same force, so also is an alliance between light and darkness unimaginable – between Christ and Belial, between pagans and believers in their practical living. This would be an incongruous collaboration, assuming that the *pistoi* are a “new creation” (2 Cor 5:17), and that the imbalance would tilt in favor of the pagan ways; so that to join with unbelievers is in reality to bear a yoke that belongs to another, *heterozygein*. Hence the refusal of any compromise.

εὐαγγελίζομαι, εὐαγγέλιον, εὐαγγελιστής

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*euangelizomai*, to announce good news; *euangelion*, good news; *euangelistēs*, bringer of good news, evangelist

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*euaggelizomai*, S 2097; TDNT 2.707–721; EDNT 1.69–70; NIDNTT 2.107–114; MM 259; L&N 33.215; BDF §§69(4), 119(1), 152(2), 163, 206(4), 309(1), 311(1), 392(3); BAGD 317 | *euangelion*, S 2098; TDNT 2.721–736; EDNT 2.70–74; NIDNTT 2.107–114; MM 259; L&N 33.217; BDF §§119(1), 163, 224(2); BAGD 317–318 | *euangelistes*, S 2099; TDNT 2.736–737; EDNT 2.74; NIDNTT 2.107, 114; MM 259; L&N 53.76; BAGD 318; ND 3.12–14; 5.73–74, 78

In secular Greek, *angelos* was “messenger” (especially of the gods) and *angelia* “message.” *Euangelos* referred to “one who bears good news,” a messenger of joy. When transmitting oracles, this sacred messenger could announce the future or bring salvation (*sōtēria*) and success (*eutychia*, *eutychēma*) and thus

was considered a divine being (*theios anthrōpos*) whose coming stirred joy; his announcements were full of promise.

The verb *euangelizomai*, “announce good news,” is construed with the accusative or the dative of the person. It is always used in a context of joy, at least from the point of view of the messenger: “I bring good words, happy news (*logous agathous pherōn euangelisasthai*) that I want to be the first to announce to you ... they wanted to crown me for the good news (*euangelia*)” (Aristophanes, *Eq.* 643); “I am not the one who was seen, rejoicing and laughing at the success of the alien ... announcing good news to others.” Usually, the announcement concerns victory and peace: the bringer of good news (*euangelos*) arrives from the battlefield, sometimes by ship, sometimes by horse or by letter, but also on foot, by a runner. Any political or private communication that is considered happy may be so designated. For example, tyranny is overthrown and liberty recovered (Lucian, *Tyr.* 9); two messengers announce to Marius his fifth election to the consulate and give him written notice thereof (Plutarch, *Mar.* 22.4); a wedding ceremony (Menander, *Georg.* 83; Longus, *Daph.* 3.33.1: *ton gamon euēngelizeto*); the birth of a child: “If someone brings the morose man the good news of the birth of a son (*pros ton euangelizomenon hoti*), he replies, ‘There goes half my property’ ” (Theophrastus, *Char.* 17.7); the midwife encourages the pregnant woman “by announcing to her (*euangelizomenē*) a lucky delivery” (Soranus, *Gyn.* 21); even an opportune death: “I begin by announcing this good news to you: Demaenetus is dead” (Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 2.10.1); finally, any kind of news at all, even false news.

The LXX always uses *euangelizomai* to translate the piel of the Hebrew verb *bāšar* (only once in the hithpael, 2 Sam 18:31); in all of the semitic languages, the root of this verb contains the idea of joy. Εὐαγγελιζόμενος in the LXX corresponds to the Hebrew *mbāššēr*, a bringer of good news. On a secular level, the good news announced is what makes one happy, for example, news of the birth of a son or of a victory. The messenger’s fervor is emphasized: he runs to make his announcement. But on a religious level, *euangelizō* becomes a religious, cultic, and messianic verb. The announcement, which is always oral (Ps 40:9 – “I have not sealed my lips”), takes on a solemn character to proclaim God’s interventions and benefits: “Climb up on a high mountain, messenger of Zion, raise your voice forcefully, messenger of Jerusalem.... Behold, the Lord God is coming in power” (Isa 40:9). The good news of salvation is sung (Ps 96:2); it is a victory: “The Lord utters a word, he announces the good news to the great host: they flee, the kings of the armies flee” (Ps 68:11–12). “How beautiful on the mountains are the feet of the messenger who proclaims peace, who announces good news, who proclaims salvation, who says to Zion, ‘Your

God reigns' ” (Isa 52:7; cf. 60:6; Nah 1:15). The Messiah is the one who will be the bearer of the message of salvation: “Yahweh has anointed me; he has sent me to bring good news to the humble” (Isa 61:1; *euangelizomai* and *kēryssō* are synonymous).

It is worth noting that Philo seems unaware of these texts. If on a rare occasion he gives a moral significance to *euangelizomai* (the happy messages for the soul in *Dreams* 2.281 are the destruction of Egyptian vices), he ignores the other terms from the same root, and he uses this verb especially in the sense of “promise” (a harvest, *Creation* 115; *Moses* 2.186), like the hope that “anticipates and announces the full joy that is coming”; but the messenger always hurries to announce favorable news (*Joseph* 245, 250; *To Gaius* 99). These same, exclusively secular, usages are found again in Josephus.

It is only in Palestinian Judaism that *bāšar* once again takes on the religious meaning that it has in the prophets and in the Psalms: “When the lips of the man at prayer begin to move on their own, let him then receive the good news that his prayer is answered” (*m. Ber.* 5.9d 25); “You have brought me good news: tomorrow I shall take part in these things in the world to come” (*Sipre Deut.* 307, on Deut 32:4); “Let the one who recites the Shema morning and evening receive the good news that he is a son of the world to come” (*m. Šeqal.* 3.47c 62); “Let them bring the good news that I have forgiven your sins.”

In the papyri, the verb *euangelizō* is rare in the active voice. In the middle: Apollonius and Sarapias express their joy at the announcement of a wedding (*charas hēmas eplērōsas euangelismenē ton gamon tou kratistou Sarapiōnos*, *P.Oxy.* 3313, 3; second century). A sixth-century Christian: “I announce once more to Your Honor that the blessed river that fertilizes Egypt has progressed (*prosbainein*) by the power of Christ.” It is the substantivized adjective *euangelion*, most commonly used in the plural form *euangelia* (εὐαγγέλια, but frequently written εὐαγγέλιον, εὐαγγέλια), which considerably enriches the idea of evangel and confirms its religious and cultural meaning. An Egyptian functionary in the third century writes to his subordinate: “Forasmuch as I have become aware of the tidings of joy (*epei genōstēs egnomēn tou euangeliou*) concerning the proclaiming as Emperor of Gaius Julius Verus Maximus Augustus, the son of our lord, most dear to the gods, the Emperor Gaius Julius Maximinus, pious, happy, and Augustus, it is necessary, O most honorable, that the goddesses be celebrated in festal procession.” In the introduction to the new calendar around the year 9 BC, *I.Priene* 105, 40 (= Dittenberger, *Syl.* 458) says, “The birthday of the god (Augustus) began for the world the good news that he brought” (*ērxen de tō kosmō tōn di’ auton euangelion he genethlios tou theou*). J. Rouffiac, who edited this text, comments: “That idea that an evangel began for the world with the birth of Augustus is one of the most remarkable points of

contact between our inscription and the NT, because no other word received the imprint of Christianity more profoundly than ‘evangel.’ ”

What is more, if Greek *euangelia* expressed the gratuitousness, the richness of the gifts and the joy that they stirred, they referred above all to the sacrifices celebrated when good news was announced: the phrase for these sacrifices was *euangelia thyein*. In the imperial period, instances multiply. On the occasion of the “salvation” of Thersippus, a three-day feast was celebrated, and the people “sacrificed evangels and salvations” (*euangelia kai sōtēria ethyse*, Dittenberger, *Or.*, IV, 42; fourth century BC; cf. VI, 32; *Syl.* 352, 5). Someone vows to sacrifice (*euangelia thysō*) to the goddesses of vengeance and to Hermes if delivered from a certain Manes. There are other examples. So the word “evangel” was perfectly suited to refer to the announcement of the birth of the Savior Jesus and of his death, just as much as the blessedness and thankfulness that were at the heart of the new religion, which was dedicated to the perpetuation of his memory. *Euangelion* was to become the ideal word in the Pauline kerygma for announcing salvation through Christ’s victory over Satan, sin, death, and superstition: the good news from God!

The verb *euangelizomai*, unknown in Mark, John, Jas, 2 Pet, and Jude, always in the NT expresses an oral announcement, but because it is the word of God and of the Spirit (1 Pet 1:12), it is accompanied by power and the working of miracles. It brings about new birth (1 Pet 1:23–25) and salvation (1 Cor 15:1–2; cf. Acts 16:17 according to D\*), stirring joy (Acts 8:8). If God is at the origin of the revelation of the plan of salvation (Acts 10:36; Rev 10:7), it is the angels who announce the births of the Messiah and of his precursor (Luke 1:19; 2:10; cf. Rev 14:6), who are sources of delight (Luke 1:14). John the Baptist, in promising the advent of the kingdom of God (Luke 16:16), “evangelized” by announcing this good news to the people (Luke 3:18); but it is Jesus himself who declares himself the messenger of blessedness of the last times. At Nazareth he applies Isa 61:1 to himself (“He has anointed me to announce good news to the poor,” Luke 4:18), and in reply to those sent by John the Baptist he affirms that “good news is preached to the poor” (*ptōchoi euangelizontai*, Matt 11:5; Luke 4:18, 43; referring to Isa 35:5; Isa 61:1; cf. Luke 16:16; Eph 2:17). Not only does he convey the joyous message, but he alone brings the content to fruition: salvation, as confirmed by his preaching among the dead in 1 Pet 4:6. After him, apostles and disciples are evangelists, fulfilling the prophecy of Isa 52:7 – “How beautiful are the feet of those who announce good news” (*tōn euangelizomenōn agatha*).

As for the good news itself (*euangelion*, 72 times in the NT, including 60 in St. Paul), it is mentioned eight times in St. Mark, including six times in quotations of Jesus; and there is no reason to suspect the authenticity of these



occurrences or see in them an anachronistic anticipation of Paul, even though this term already had its full meaning from the missionary kerygma: a message preached to all people concerning the person, the public life, and the teaching of Jesus, Son of God; i.e., a blessed event and a new doctrine concerning salvation, both expressed and realized in the advent of the Messiah-King. This evangel is the salvation of all people who believe (Mark 16:15–16).

St. Paul received as a revelation from God (Gal 1:11–12, 15; Rom 1:1) this *euangelion*, which must be made public and is the “word of truth” (Col 1:5), having Jesus Christ as its object and author (*euangelion tou Christou*), identical to the gospel of God (genitive of author, 1 Thess 2:2, 8, 9; Rom 1:1; 15:16; 2 Cor 11:7). The christological and soteriological content is never adequately spelled out, and if various elements successively come to the fore in Paul’s preaching, there is no “transforming” evolution of his gospel, even in his Pastoral Epistles. This “good news” is therefore a treasure from which one may draw infinitely and which is identical with its content (Phlm 13): the new religion, a “mystery” unveiled (Eph 6:19), of which Paul is priest (Rom 15:16); that is to say, “Christ died for our sins” (1 Cor 15:3; Rom 1:11), the *euangelion* produces *sōtēria* (Rom 1:16; 1 Cor 15:2; Eph 1:13; 3:6), is a force (Rom 1:1; 15:16; 2 Cor 11:7; 1 Thess 1:5; 2:8–9; 1 Pet 4:17) that bears fruit and makes progress (Col 1:6). It makes its course across the world (2 Thess 3:1; 2 Tim 2:9). It is personified, as it were (2 Cor 10:14), and its characteristics can be noted: (1) it is revealed by God to humankind (Gal 1:11–12; 1 Thess 2:2, 9; 2 Thess 2:14), so it is true (Gal 2:5, 14; Col 1:5); (2) one must believe it (Phil 1:27), obey it (Rom 10:16; 1 Cor 9:12; 2 Cor 9:13; 2 Thess 1:8; 1 Pet 4:17; cf. 1:2), base one’s hope on it (Col 2:23), taste its peace (Eph 6:15), because it is good news of immortality (2 Tim 1:10); (3) it must be proclaimed to others (Rom 15:9; 1 Cor 9:14, 18; 2 Cor 10:14; Gal 2:2; 1 Thess 2:8); (4) no matter the cost (Rom 1:16; 1 Cor 9:23; Phil 1:16; 2 Tim 1:8; 2:9; 1 Thess 2:2); (5) one serves it (Rom 1:1; 15:16; 1 Cor 9:23; Eph 3:7; Col 1:23; Phil 1:12; 2:22; 4:3; 1 Thess 3:2) and defends it by word, conduct, and action (Phil 1:7, 16, 27; 4:3; 1 Tim 1:11); (6) because it is also possible to stand in its way (1 Cor 9:12, *enkopēn*), disobey it and forget it (Rom 2:16; 10:16; 2 Thess 1:7–8; 1 Pet 4:17), even falsify and corrupt it; (7) but whoever holds fast to the gospel is begotten to eternal life (1 Cor 4:15; cf. Jas 1:18; 1 Pet 1:23) and shares in the sanctification of the Spirit (2 Thess 2:14).

Altogether out of the ordinary in the Bible is the angel of Rev 14:6 – “having an eternal gospel” (*echonta euangelion aiōnion* [hapax Rev]) to “evangelize those who are seated on the earth....” There have been many ways of interpreting this “eternal gospel,” to which Joachim of Fiore was to give such notoriety! “Eternal” would mean that it was predetermined by God *ab aeterno*,

or on the contrary that it has to do with the age to come, and thus means God's definitive triumph, the inauguration of the reign of the Lamb at the end of the world. L. Cerfaux's exegesis emphasizes the absence of the article before *euangelion* and refers to Isa 52:7–8 and to *Pesiq. R.* 35, where Elijah proclaims the salvation and blessedness brought by the coming of the Messiah. But one hardly sees why this good news is announced to all the nations of the earth, and also its content, which is an exhortation to fear God (cf. Mark 1:14ff.) and call upon the Creator (cf. Acts 14:15; 1 Thess 1:5, 9) does not deserve this description. Furthermore, it seems preferable to take *aiōnion* in the sense of "immutable" or "divine" and to follow E. B. Allo: "it is the gospel pure and simple, said to be eternal because it does not change, as opposed to the law of Moses," and proclaimed universally (Matt 24:14).

The last evolution of *euangelion*: the gospel, which was always an oral message, becomes a writing: "the memoirs of the apostles, which are called Gospels." As Eusebius would explain, missionaries "put their honor to preaching the word of faith to those who had heard nothing of it and transmitting to them the text of the divine Gospels" (*tōn theiōn euangeliōn*, *Hist. Eccl.* 3.37.2). This tetramorphic (in four forms) gospel (Irenaeus, *Haer.* 3.11.8; 4.20.6; Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* 6.24.6) is the four books of the Gospels which are the written form of the preaching of the gospel of Jesus Christ.

As for the term *euangelistēs* (evangelist), it is unknown before the Christian era; its mention in an inscription at Rhodes is so disputable that nothing certain can be drawn from it. Its uses in the papyri are all Christian and late, referring above all to the evangelist John (an amulet from the fifth century, *P.Oxy.* 1151, 45; sixth century, *PSI* 953, 82; *CPR* I, 30, 4), sometimes to Mark (*SB* 6087, 18, *Markou euangelistou*). The three NT mentions are hardly more explicit. The word is attributed as a title to the deacon Philip in Acts 21:8 ("having entered [at Caesarea] into the house of Philip the evangelist"). St. Paul uses it as a functional description of his co-worker Timothy, whom he has just exhorted to "preach the word" (2 Tim 4:2). He reiterates: "Do the work of an evangelist (*ergon poiēson euangelistou*), fulfill your ministry (*tēn diakonian*)" (4:5). Finally, in a list of charismatic gifts, evangelists are slipped in between apostles and prophets on the one hand and pastors and teachers on the other "for the work of ministry, for the edification of the body of Christ."

This office of evangelist has been understood in quite diverse fashions, but most often in an anachronistic fashion, with reference to later distinctions (Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* 3.37; 5.10.2), whereas in NT times this function did not as yet have a determinate character. All that we can say is that an evangelist is a messenger (cf. Isa 40:9; 52:7; 61:1) who preaches the gospel. He collaborates with the apostles and continues their mission, spreading their preaching without

having their authority, even though this office is put ahead of pastors and teachers. His ministry is especially itinerant, but can also be fixed, and the evangelist – like Timothy, bishop of Ephesus – is stationed, if we may so express it, in the community where he carries out other responsibilities; which is commonly the case with charismatic gifts.

## εὐγενής

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*eugenēs*, **noble, well-born**

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*eugenes*, S 2104; *EDNT* 2.74; *NIDNTT* 1.187–188; *MM* 259–260; *L&N* 27.48, 87.27; *BAGD* 319

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I. – In the parable of the minas, a man of noble birth (*anthrōpos tis eugenēs*) goes off to a distant country to receive a kingdom (Luke 19:12), after the fashion of Archelaus, the claimant to the throne, who went off to Rome but only brought back the title of ethnarch (Josephus, *Ant.* 17.299ff.). In the parable of the talents, the *anthrōpos* is not otherwise described (Matt 25:14), but he must be a very rich man, a big-time merchant, a major businessman, a banker or ship owner, who has considerable sums at his disposal. A comparison of the two texts suggests that we should not assign too much weight to the juridical value of *eugenēs*, which, for Palestinian hearers of that period, could equally well suggest grandeur (cf. Job 1:3, Hebrew *gāḏōl*), the nobility of a dignitary (2 Macc 10:13), and wealth (cf. Matt 25:14). Since Luke puts a claimant to a throne on the stage, *eugenēs* has to mean “noble, of royal descent.”

II. – In Hellenistic Greek, *eugenēs* is used not only for noble birth but also for noble sentiments, character, morals. Cnemon says: “Gorgias opened my eyes, his behavior was that of the noblest heart,” because he acted in a disinterested fashion and with sympathy. Among the Jewish people, those of noble soul despised the orders of Antiochus Epiphanes (Josephus, *Ant.* 12.255). There are obviously degrees in virtue and ability; hence the frequent use of the comparative and superlative forms. Thus the Jews of Berea “were more noble [in character] than those of Thessalonica” in their welcome and cordial treatment of the apostles.

III. – The community at Corinth was for the most part recruited from the poor and obscure social classes. In one of the most oratorical sections of his first letter, St. Paul emphasizes: “Look at your own call, brothers; not many wise according to the flesh (*dynatoi*), not many powerful (*dynatoi*), not many well-born (*genos*)” (1 Cor 1:26). The converts are for the most part not intellectuals, not in positions of authority, not descendants of the old families of

the city. To begin with, the nobles were identified with the *eupatrides*, the “well-born”; the *genos*, “sons of noble fathers,” for a group (*genos*), a sort of familial corporation – like the Bacchiades at Corinth, who made it a rule to marry among themselves – gifted with religious and even military privileges. Little by little, this class acquired power and wealth, especially in land (cf. the *geōmoroi*), although they did not consider it beneath their dignity to supplement their resources with income from maritime trade; their political influence grew. In the first century, the well-born comprise the urban bourgeoisie, a patrician nobility or aristocracy, who wield patronage and form the dominant, governing class of the city with all the accompanying social prestige. These are the “known” people (cf. *nobilis*) in a complimentary sense, “the good people, the best people” (*aristoi*), who take precedence over the others (*phronimoi*, *ischyroi*, *endoxoi*, 1 Cor 4:10).

*Eugenēs* and *eugeneia*, which recur abundantly in the inscriptions, refer not to a political quality but to a social standing. Aristotle had asked, “what are they that they should be called noble (*genos*)” – and what is the value of nobility? He cites the opinion of the sophist Lycophron: “there is no difference at all between those who are noble and those who are not”; then Socrates: “the noble are those whose parents are respectable people”; and finally Simonides: “the *genos* are the descendants of rich people of the past.” Finally, the Stagirite concludes: “nobility is excellence of lineage” (Stobaeus, *Flor.* 86.29 A 25; vol. 5, p. 712). More specifically, he continues: “Those who have a long line of virtuous or wealthy ancestors are considered to be of better birth (*eugenesteroi*) than those whose possession of these qualities is recent.... The noble can be the good man (*eugenēs ho agathos anēr*), but more precisely nobles are those who have a long line of rich ancestors or virtuous ancestors” (ibid., C 52; vol. 5, p. 723; cf. *Rh.* 2.15.1390.; *Pol.* 3.13.1283.). This moral sense alone is retained by Philo: nobility is the practice of virtue.

The rare Corinthian *genos* are then those who were called in turn-of-the-century France “les gens bien,” a class based on dignity and treated with consideration; the moral element is intimately interconnected with the social element.

εὐδία, χειμών

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*eudia*, **good weather**; *cheimōn*, **winter, bad weather**

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*eudia*, S 2105; *EDNT* 2.75; *NIDNTT* 3.1000, 1002; MM 260; L&N 14.1; BAGD 319 | *cheimon*, S 5494; *EDNT* 3.462; MM 686; L&N 14.2, 67.165; BDF §186(2); BAGD 879

“Good weather” is only mentioned once in the NT, and in contrast with “bad weather,” as is not rare in secular texts. “When evening comes, you say ‘Good weather (*eudia*), for the sky is red’; and in the morning, ‘Storm today (*cheimōn*), for the sky is red and threatening.’ ” *Eudia* refers to a calm sky and clear weather. Hence the derivative meaning, unknown in the Bible, “serenity of soul” (Epictetus 2.18.30), “the honey of blessedness” (Pindar, *Ol.* 1.98), the peace and tranquility of order in a city: “the multitudes seek to find calm, *zētountes eudian heurein*” (Philo, *Spec. Laws* 1.69).

As for *cheimōn* – it has a double meaning. First of all “winter,” the opposite of summer (*Enoch* 3.1), from Cant 2:11 – “Behold the winter (Hebrew *stāw*) is past” – to John 10:22, where the feast of Dedication is celebrated during the winter. It is the cold season, when bathrooms (*P.Flor.* 127, 7) and the *gymnasion* are heated daily (*I.Priene* 112, 98; from the first century BC), when stored provisions are used (*P.Alex.* 1.7). All moving is hard and dangerous, and the Lord bids Christians pray that their flight may not have to be in such times (Matt 24:20; Mark 13:18); crossing the sea, even the Adriatic, is especially dangerous, and St. Paul asks Timothy to come before winter, *pro cheimōnos elthein*.

*Cheimōn* also refers to bad weather in general (*P.Hib.* 198, 114): the cold rain that leaves you shaking (1 Esdr 9:6) and from which you seek shelter (2 Esdr 10:9, Hebrew *gešem*), rain showers (Job 37:6), the more or less violent storm, which became the symbol for human difficulties.

εὐδοκέω, εὐδοκία

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*eudokeō*, to approve, consent to, accept; *eudokia*, benevolence, favor, favorable disposition

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*eudokeo*, S 2106; *TDNT* 2.738–742; *EDNT* 2.75; *NIDNTT* 2.383, 780–781, 817–818, 820; MM 260; L&N 25.87, 25.113, 30.97; BDF §§67(1), 119(1), 148(2), 196, 206(2), 392(3); BAGD 319 | *eudokia*, S 2107; *TDNT* 2.742–751; *EDNT* 2.75–76; *NIDNTT* 2.817–820; MM 260; L&N 25.8, 25.88; BAGD 319

The semantic history of this verb is curious, as much from the point of view of orthography as from that of its varied, if not uncertain, signification. It appears not before the Hellenistic period and only in popular language (it remains unknown in Philo and Josephus), being attested for the first time in *P.Rev.*, from 259 BC. In this collection of administrative documents, in col. 29, 2–21, the issue is the fixing of the sum of taxes in kind on fruits and vegetables. The tax collector must verify the estimate given by the producer (*ean men eudokē*

*ho telōnēs*). The meaning is obvious: “If the tax collector approves.” It is in effect this meaning, “consent, accept,” that is constantly attested in the papyri, almost always in a legal or financial contract.

In the second century BC: “You have accepted the price for the mummy.” In a contract for a division of property in AD 10–11, previously formulated clauses are subscribed to (*eudokō tē progegrammenē diaresei*, or in an equivalent form, *eudokō pasi tois prokeimenois*). In AD 48: “Thaesis, present in person, gives his agreement to all the dispositions taken by her husband Ptollion, conformably to the proxy.” When the agreement is that of a collective, the consent of all the members is insisted upon: “They approved unanimously, voluntarily, and spontaneously, with an irrevocable decision” (*ēudokēsan ex homonoias hekousiōs kai authairetōs kai ametanoētō gnōmē*, *P.Lond.* 1913, 11; cf. Polybius 1.8.4: “The Syracusans accept Hieron as their general with unanimous enthusiasm” [*pantas homothymadon eudokēsai*]; Diodorus Siculus 14.110.4: “The Lacedaemonians were eager to give their consent”); but in private contracts people were content to write, “I accept these things” or “I accept everything.” In a single instance *eudokeō* has the sense of being content, taking pleasure: *eudokō zēlō douleuein* (*P.Grenf.* I, 1, 17; from the second century BC; cf. Polybius 1.78.8: “Hamilcar was content to associate with his [the Numidian Naravas’] operations”; 2.38.7: “they became reconciled to their position”; Philodemus of Gadara, *Mort.* 36.4: *hē eudokoumenē zōē*). In a negative sentence in a marriage contract, the verb is used in a phrase that means “without the consent of the young bride,” so that the act is fully voluntary; it is also used to express displeasure (*P.Tebt.* 591), even a refusal (*P.Mich.* 474, 14: “up to the present you have not been willing to come”) or anger.

The LXX uses this verb often. Despite a degree of uncertainty as to its meaning, as is shown by the nine different Hebrew verbs that it translates, there is an original theological sense. Of course, there is the common secular meaning “to accept” (Gen 33:10, Jacob to Esau, *eudokēseis me*; Tob 5:17; Judg 15:7), or “consent,” to which is added the meanings “to pay, discharge” (Lev 26:34, 41; 1 Esdr 1:58; Job 14:6) and “prosper, succeed.” But the meaning “to be willing” is well attested; and furthermore, from David on, the verb is constantly applied to God, to his “will” and its efficacious manifestations. It seems to be a matter of love in the proper sense of the word, with the nuance of “take pleasure in”; hence “show oneself favorable” and “accept” (Ps 51:16; 119:108; Eccl 9:7). In his relations with humans, God is the sovereign Lord, benevolent and beneficent, absolutely free to dispense his favor; it is emphasized that he takes pleasure in doing good and that he is quite willing to accept the worship of the just, even as he refuses that of the godless.

The same theology is found also at Qumran, while the verb *rāṣâh* is most often used with respect to humans. God is asked to grant “to the sons of your servant – as is your *will* for your chosen ones – that they may stand before you forever” (1 QS 11.16), and especially: God loved the spirit of light for all eternity “and in all its works he takes pleasure” (4.1).

So when after the baptism of Jesus and the descent of the Holy Spirit “a voice from heaven says, ‘This is my son, my beloved, *en hō eudokēsa*,’ ” we may translate “in whom I have delighted,” or better, “in whom I take pleasure”; but we must take account of the affective meaning of the verb in the first century, since it has to do with the personal relations between the Father and the Son: the Father’s “pleasure” is the joy of the love that he bears for the Son. The French *complaisance*, which expresses a disposition to be accommodating, to acquiesce to the tastes or feelings of another, is much too feeble. The text uses *eudokeō* to exegete the divine *agapē*; it has to do with delighting in someone, a form of beatitude. NT *agapē*, a heavenly love, is a blessed love.

In the epistles, *eudokeō* with humans as subject has the sense “be willing, accept willingly,” to express spontaneous initiative, undertaken gladly, or “take pleasure” in a bad sense, as in 2 Thess 2:12 – “so that they all may be condemned who did not believe the truth and took pleasure in iniquity”; but St. Paul’s love and hope is to “go and dwell with the Lord” (2 Cor 5:8). This is much more than a willingness to die; it is a positive desire, a joyful hope.

With regard to God, Jesus and Paul use the verb exactly according to its OT meaning: “It has pleased your Father to give you the kingdom” (Luke 12:32); or it has pleased God to save those who believe by the foolishness of preaching (1 Cor 1:21) – even if they are a small number (10:5); or to reveal his Son and make all the *plērōma* dwell in him (Col 1:19); it is always a matter of supreme, gratuitous initiative, of God’s benevolent and effective will. He is free not to accept animal sacrifices (Heb 10:6 = Ps 40:7) and not to show kindness to the believer who falls away or lacks *hypomonē* (endurance).

Eudokia. – This noun is not completely unknown in secular Greek (in addition, secular Greek uses *eudokēsis*, “consent, approval,” which is absolutely unknown in the Bible), but it is common in the LXX (where it almost always translates the Hebrew *rāṣôn*) and in the NT, where its meaning, corresponding to that of the verb *eudokeō*, is also uncertain and varied.

Up until the second century, with something like three exceptions, the LXX uses *eudokia* only with regard to God, to express his benevolence (Ps 51:18; 1 Chr 16:10; cf. 2 Chr 15:15), his approval (Ps 19:14), his favor (Ps 5:12; 79:17) for his people (106:4; cf. 69:13 – *kairos eudokias*, the favorable time). It is the same in Sirach, where the Lord’s kindness (*hē eudokia autou*) guarantees the prosperity of godly people (11:17), but *eudokia* is especially his good pleasure,

that which pleases him, is acceptable to him, emphasizing his free and sovereign will. With regard to humans, *eudokia* expresses contentment (Sir 29:23), consent (15:15), even in a bad sense: the good pleasure of the godless (9:12, *eudokia asebōn*), the satisfaction of covetousness (18:31, *eudokian epithymias*).

In his hymn of jubilation (Matt 11:26; Luke 10:21), which is certainly authentic, Jesus praises his Father for “hiding these things from the wise and learned and revealing them to little ones. Yes, Father, such was your good pleasure” (*nai, ho Patēr, hoti houtōs eudokia egeneto emprosthen sou*). The particle *nai* reaffirms the main verb, “I give thanks to you,” and accentuates God’s kindness and initiative, independent of any exterior circumstance: this is pleasing to him.

At Bethlehem, a large company of the heavenly host praised God, saying, “*Doxa en hypsistois theō kai epi gēs eirēne* (Glory to God in the highest and upon earth peace) *en anthrōpois eudokias*.” The sentence has only two parts, linked by *kai*, and corresponding to *doxa/eirēnē*; *en hypsistois epi gēs*; *theō/en anthrōpois eudokias*. If it is certain that *eudokias* is a genitive of quality, it is difficult to understand it as a reference to a human sentiment, and all the more difficult to translate it “good will,” in the sense that salvation is to be granted only to well-intentioned folk, thus limiting its range, whereas God “wishes to save all people.” Doubt is no longer possible after the discovery at Qumran of the expressions *bnê ršônô* (1 QH 4.32: “the multitude of his mercies toward the sons of his good pleasure”), *bnê ršōneykā* (1 QH 11.9: “In your goodness is much pardon, and your mercy is for the sons of your goodwill”), *bhūrē rāšôn* (“the chosen ones of goodwill”). According to the context, this would mean the members of the eschatological community are the object of divine favor. Other Aramaic parallels can be cited to prove that the locution was common. In Luke 2:14, the angels celebrate the peace granted to the whole earth, thanks to the saving reconciliation of all humankind by the God’s absolutely free favor. There is no restriction on the beneficiaries of this salvation. They are all sinners; God gives this gift to all. This paradox or scandal depends on the good pleasure and sovereign will of the Lord of heaven and earth and is explained by his infinite kindness.

In the epistolary corpus, only St. Paul uses this term. When applied to God, it is always with the meaning found in the OT and the Gospels. That is, God has determined ahead of time that we should be his adoptive sons by Jesus Christ: “such was the good pleasure of his will (*kata tēn eudokian tou thelēmatos autou*), to the praise of the glory of his grace, whereby he has gifted us in the Beloved.” The emphasis is not so much on love – although that is the supreme explanation – as on the absolute freedom of the divine decision. God’s will is a



mystery, and no one can question his rulings: God acts as seems best to him. With respect to humans, *eudokia* sometimes means a good desire or will, a good disposition to do God's will: "May our God fulfill (or accomplish) in you every good desire" (*plērōsē pasan eudokian agathōsynēs*, 2 Thess 1:11; a meaning analogous to that in *P.Grenf.* I, 17, have goodwill for something). When the apostle is imprisoned, "certain ones preached the word of God out of jealousy, in a spirit of rivalry (to supplant Paul), others out of favorable sentiments (or with good attitudes)" (Phil 1:15). Here *di' eudokia* expresses a right will, pure intentions, and benevolence toward Paul, whose work these preachers were continuing, but also a will to serve God and the gospel. It is more difficult to translate Rom 10:1, *hē men eudokia tēs emēs kardias*: "the wish (or intent) of my heart and my prayer to God is for their salvation." Here *eudokia* expresses a heartfelt, gracious inclination, very close to the "desire" that is well attested in the LXX, or better, a complete disposition to do. A comparison has been made to Mordecai: "I was completely willing to kiss the soles of his feet (Haman's) for the salvation of Israel" (*ēudokoun philein pelmata podōn autou pros sōtērian Israel*).

εὐεργεσία, εὐεργετέω, εὐεργέτης

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*euergesia*, **goodness, kindness, generosity**; *euergeteō*, **to do good**; *euergētēs*, **benefactor**

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*euergesia*, S 2108; TDNT 2.654–655; EDNT 2.76–77; NIDNTT 3.1152; MM 260; L&N 88.7; BDF §163; BAGD 319–320 | *euergeteo*, S 2109; EDNT 2.76–77; NIDNTT 3.1147, 1152; MM 260–261; L&N 88.7; BAGD 320 | *euergetes*, S 2110; TDNT 2.654–655; EDNT 2.76–77; NIDNTT 1147, 1152; MM 261; L&N 35.15; BAGD 320

I. – In the OT, *hē euergesia* is used for benefits conferred either by God (Wis 16:11; Ps 78:11, Hebrew *‘lîlâh* = great deeds) even upon sinners (2 Macc 6:13), or by the king. So it is not surprising that St. Peter uses this word for the "miracle" of the healing of the lame man at the Beautiful Gate.

But *euergesia* implies goodness, kindness, generosity, which can extend, with no distinction between persons, "to all people, *eis pantas anthrōpous*" (*P.Oslo* 127, 11; *BGU* 970, 8). It is thus that Christian slaves will serve with faithfulness and love their masters, who "benefit from their devotion" or "receive their good services." While in the secular world a slave was a *sōma* (body) or a *res* (thing), St. Paul makes Christian *douloi* capable of *euergesia* and transforms obedience from base servitude to noble deed. *Euergesia*, for that

period, suggests a gracious gift, royal, imperial, or divine (cf. Polybius 5.11.16), the generosity of a superior (*P.Fam.Tebt.* 15, 72; *P.Thead.* 20, 7) or a patron. Publishing on 28 September 68 the edict of the prefect T. Julius Alexander, the *stratēgos* of the oasis of the Thebaide prefaces these remarks: “I have sent along to you a copy of the edict ... so that by taking cognizance of it you may enjoy its benefits.” The prefect himself states that he is taking care that the city may continue to enjoy “the benefits that it gained from the augusti” (*apolauousan tōn euergesiōn*, line 4), and concludes by referring to “the beneficence and constant foresight (of the emperors), to which we all owe our safety.” According to 1 Tim 6:2, masters become obliged to their slaves!

II. – The verb *euergeteō*, used eight times in the LXX, has only God for its subject: the Lord does good. This should be remembered in the exegesis of Acts 10:38, where there is a septuagintism: Jesus of Nazareth “went from place to place doing good (*euergetōn*) and healing all those who were under the power of the devil.” The universality of this beneficence and this victory over evil are on another plane from those of the reigning emperor.

III. – In the Hellenistic period, *euergetēs* sometimes obviously retains its banal sense, “benefactor,” but it is becoming a technical term for the benefactor-protector of a city, of a people, of the whole human race (*P.Oxy.* 2342, 37; *P.Ryl.* 617, 6; *SB* 6674, 3). Thus it is attributed first of all to the gods and goddesses who are benefactors of their faithful (*I.Magn.* 62, 23; *P.Ross.Georg.* V, 6, 4), notably to Artemis, protector of the city (*ibid.* 31, 19, 23; 38, 35). A dedication of L. Ioulios Seoueros is consecrated “To Artemis and Apollo and Leto, *euergetai*.” In Egypt, in Syria, and at Rome, the title *Theoi Euergetai* is applied to kings. The decree of Canopus, 7 March 238: “May it please the priests of the land that the honors hitherto rendered in the sanctuary (of Osiris) to King Ptolemy and Queen Berenice, gods *euergetai*, and to the parents, gods *adelphoi*, and to their grandparents, godssōtēres, be increased.” Usually, the prince is acclaimed as *sōtēr* and *euergetēs*, for example Antiochus in Syria. In 334 BC, the Prienians confer this title on King Antigonos (*I.Priene* 2, 6). Caesar receives it from the inhabitants of Delos (*I.Delos* I, 1587), of Mytilene (*IG* XII, 2, 151), of Megara (*IG*, VII, 62), of Karthaia (*IG* XII, 5, 555; cf. Philo, *Good Man Free* 118); then Augustus, “the first, the greatest and universal benefactor” (Philo, *To Gaius* 149), at Thespieae in 30–27 (*IG* VII, 1836) and at Philae in 13–12 (*SB* 8897, 1); Claudius (*SEG* XIV, 703; *I.Perg.* 378); Nero; “the king of the Arsacid dynasty” in AD 87 (*P.Dura* 18, 1, 12; 19, 1; 20, 1; 22, 1; 24, 1, 21); Vespasian; Trajan: “savior and benefactor of the whole world” (*ton pantos kosmou sōtēra kai euergeta*, *IG* XII, 1, 978; *I.Cor.* n. 102, 7; cf. 503, 4. In *SB* 8438, 4, we must read *eusebeias* for *euergesias*; cf. *ChrEg*, 1967, p. 212).

The label becomes more democratic, closer to our modern “decorations.” At Tralles, the prefect Fl. Caesarius is honored as *sōtēr* and *euergetēs* “in all things” (*IGLAM*, n. 1652 d, 7–8); exactly like the prefect of Egypt in 55–60 (*SB* 7462, 16); Laodicea honors the “*legatus propraetor*, patron and benefactor of the city, in return and recognition for his continual benefits” (*IGLS* n. 1258; cf. 4010, 8). At Sardis, the governor T. Julius Celsus Pelemaeanus, governor of Cappadocia, *euergetēs* and *sōtēr* of the city (*I.Sard.* 41, 10); at Lindos, the priestess of Athena, *sōtēr* and *euergetis* (*I.Lind.*, 394, 11; in AD 10); at Athens, Demetrius of Phalerum (Plutarch, *Demetr.* 8.7; 9.1); in Cyprus, the *praetor* and high priest Polycrates (*SEG* XX, 196) and the *procurator* Flavios Boethos (*ZPE* 1976, p. 135, line 8); at Mytilene, Potamos: *euergetēs*, *sōtēr*, and *ktistēs* of his country (Dittenberger, *Syl.* 754; first century AD). A *prytanēs* (*P.Oxy.* 41, 23–24), a *harpistēs* (Dittenberger, *Syl.* 738, 14–15), and a donor who supplies oil to the gymnasium are graced with this designation (*I.Car.* n. 11, 7; 175 a 3; *MAMA* VI, 105, 165). Even so, the category of *euergetai* is the object of honors; sacrifices and public games are celebrated in their name to express gratitude for their devotion and generosity.

Obviously, flattery and adulation were not strangers to these proceedings. “The subordinates of Flaccus called him master, benefactor, savior, and other similar titles” (Philo, *Flacc.* 126; cf. *To Gaius* 22). The high priest Apollonios did not shrink from saying to the Greeks of Asia concerning Augustus, “Providence has produced an emperor and filled him with virtue, in order to make of him a benefactor of humanity; thus has been sent to us and our people a savior who has put an end to war.... Not only has he surpassed previous benefactors, but he leaves no room for future benefactors to hope to outdo him.” This *isotheism* or *theia euergesia* of the prince (*P.Hib.* 274, 7; *P.Stras.* 245, 17–18) can only shock an objective mind. Thus Germanicus says categorically: “I absolutely reject these odious acclamations which are addressed to a god. They are fitting only for the one who is the real savior and benefactor of the whole human race, my father (Augustus) and his mother.”

It is with this background that we must read Luke 22:25 – “The kings of the nations govern over them as masters (*kyrieuousin*), and those who wield power over them are called ‘benefactors’ (*euergetai*).” The absence of criticism in this saying and the light irony mark it as the Lord’s own. This discretion only heightens the absoluteness of the command that ministers of the church shall be lowly – like servants (verses 26–27).

*euthymeō*, **reassure, comfort**; *euthymos*, **reassured, comforted, in good spirits**; *euthymōs*, **willingly, gladly**

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*eutumeo*, S 2114; *EDNT* 2.77; MM 261; L&N 25.146; BAGD 320 | *eutumos*, S 2115; *EDNT* 2.77; MM 261; L&N 25.147; BAGD 320 | *eutumos*, *EDNT* 2.77; MM 261; L&N 25.147; BAGD 320

While it is true that *thymos* refers to the soul or the heart as the life-principle or the seat of the emotions, the compound forms with *eu-* take their precise nuance from their immediate context and from contemporary usage. But it is hard to see why modern translations prefer to translate “courage” in Acts 27:22, 36. In the midst of the storm, Paul invites his companions to be confident – *parainō hymas euthymein* – because “there will be no loss of life among you, but only of the vessel.” They are not asked to be valiant, only to recover their composure. A little later, the apostle asks each one to take some food. He himself takes some bread and gives thanks to God; “then all were reassured (not ‘encouraged’; *euthymoi de genomenoi pantes*) and also took food.” So *euthymeō* must be translated “reassure, comfort,” as the papyri indicate.

At the beginning of the second century, Eutychidis writes to his father: “With respect to the barley from Thallou, be reassured, for I have sold it” (*P.Amh.* 133, 4; republished in *P.Sarap.* 92). In the fourth century, Hermodoros writes to his brother: “Be reassured with respect to our children Anysios and Aphtonios, because they are in good health.” But in letters, *euthymeō* is very often associated with *hygiainō*, and it is common to wish correspondents both good health and “good morale.” If Serenos Antonia ends his letter to his mother in the third century with the simple *euthymeī kyria* (*P.Ross.Georg.* III, 2, 32; the editors translate “Sei gutes [sic] Mutes”; cf. *P.Oxy.* 2156, 24; *PSI* 1248, 2, 27), *euthymeī* at the end of the epitaph for Artemidora, who died at the age of forty-eight, is translated by its editor E. Bernand “Be consoled” (*Inscriptions métriques de l’Egypte*, n. 58, 9). Compare this with the funerary epigram “EUTH ...” (*I.Cret.* I, 292, n. 2), which should no doubt read *euthymeī* (cf. R. Merkelbach, in *ZPE*, vol. 12, 1973, p. 206). In the fourth century, “I pray that you are in good health and *euthymos*” (*euchomai hygiainonti soi kai euthymounti*, *C.P.Herm.* 5, 3; cf. 29; 4, 6; 14, 5; *P.Alex.* 30, 5); “above all, I pray to God most high concerning your health and complete soundness, that my little letter may find you in good health and *euthymos*” (*pro men pantōn euchomai tō hypsistō theō peri tēs sēs hygiās kai holoklērias, hina hygienonta se kai euthymounta apolabē ta par’ emou grammatidia*, *P.Lips.* 111, 5); “May my letter find you in good health and in good spirits” (*P.NYU* 25, 4; cf. *PSI* 825, 4); “praying divine providence that you are well and in good spirits”

(*euchomenos tē theia pronoia hygiainonti soi kai euthymounti*, *P.Lond.* 409, 6–7, republished in *P.Abinn.* 10, 7; cf. 36, 7, taken up from *P.Gen* 53); “healthy and in good spirits” (*hygiēna ta se kai euthymounta*, *P.Ross.Georg.* III, 9, 21; cf. 10, 5). From the Fayum, in the sixth century, “Above all I send up prayers and petitions to my God and our Savior Christ that they may preserve you in good health and good spirits like myself.” Not having had news from his mother and his brothers, the physician Eudaïmon writes them: “You have not consoled me by reassuring me concerning your health” (*P.Fouad* 80, 7). *Euthymia* is a medical term, used by physicians to encourage the sick person to recover strength and hope; it almost means “relaxation.”

Jas 5:13 should be translated with these nuances in mind: “Is someone among you suffering? Let him pray. Is someone in good spirits (*euthymeî*)? Let him sing hymns. Is someone sick? Let him call the elders of the church....” *Euthymia* is not joy, but serenity, that which Prov 15:15 refers to as “the contented heart,” hopeful feelings, energetic and lively, readily breaking into song; which Seneca calls “stable bearing of the soul”; and which is as such an ethical ideal. Thus the Christian’s good humor or good morale is not only the absence of suffering or anguish, but a serene and confident psychological balance.

The adverb *euthymōs*, unknown in the papyri, is used by St. Paul in his speech to Felix: “Knowing that for a number of years you have been judge of this nation, I make my defense with confidence” (Acts 24:10). The best parallel is that of the Persian Phaulas: “one thing above all inspires courage in me for this battle against the chief nobles, namely, that we shall be judged by Cyrus, an impartial judge” (Xenophon, *Cyr.* 2.3.12). Perhaps the tone of voice determined the precise nuance, which could equally well be “willingly” or “gladly.” In any event, it is a conventional *captatio benevolentiae*.

εὐκαιρέω, εὐκαιρία, εὕκαιρος, εὐκαίρως

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*eukaireō*, to find time, use one’s time; *eukairia*, right moment; *eukairos*, favorable, propitious; *eukairōs*, in season, at a favorable time

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*eukaireō*, S 2119; *EDNT* 2.78; *NIDNTT* 3.833, 837; MM 262; L&N 67.4, 67.80; BDF §392(3); BAGD 321 | *eukairia*, S 2120; *TDNT* 3.462; *EDNT* 2.78; *NIDNTT* 3.833, 837; MM 262; L&N 67.5; BDF §400(1); BAGD 321 | *eukairos*, S 2121; *TDNT* 3.462; *EDNT* 2.78; *NIDNTT* 3.833, 837; MM 262; L&N 67.6; BAGD 321 | *eukairos*, S 2122; *EDNT* 2.78; *NIDNTT* 3.833, 837–838; MM 262; L&N 67.6; BAGD 321

All these terms, which belong to Hellenistic Greek, are used abundantly in the papyri, almost exclusively in private letters; thus they were part of the popular language. In the NT, the verb *eukaireō*, “find time, use one’s time,” which does not occur in the LXX, is used for hearers of Jesus who do not have the time or the leisure to eat; of the Athenians, who pass their time talking or hearing about whatever is newest (Acts 17:21); and of Apollos, who refuses to go immediately to Corinth: “he will go [to see you] when he has time,” or “when he finds either the occasion or the opportunity.”

The substantive *eukairia* is used sometimes for the “right moment,” the propitious juncture, the favorable occasion – for example, Judas seeks a propitious moment for betraying Jesus. Sometimes it is used for the exact moment when help arrives (Ps 9:10; 10:1; Hebrew *‘ēl*). It is used for time spent advantageously: leisure time (Sir 38:24), sometimes for a life “happily spent” (Ps.-Plutarch, *Cons. ad Apoll.* 17); which would in Byzantine and modern Greek come to mean “holiday” (cf. *tēs eirēmenēs eukairias*, *P.Ant.* 94, 23).

The adjective *eukairos* is used in exactly the same sense, for the day that is propitious or on which aid and help are received, for a favorable position (2 Macc 14:29; cf. *Ep. Arist.* 115) and for appropriate circumstances for putting plans into effect; one takes advantage of an opportune moment. Thus the “propitious day, *genomenēs hēmeras eukairou*” of Mark 6:21 was the favorable day awaited by Herodias for carrying out her plan to get rid of John the Baptist.

The adverb *eukairōs* locates the action “at the desired time” (Sir 18:22), at the right moment (*SB* 6786, 28; *P.Cair.Zen.* 59498, 15; 59508, 5), when one has a chance of succeeding or being well received. When Timothy, who was timid, turned out to be too reserved in the exercise of his office, St. Paul told him to proclaim the word of God “in season, out of season,” or without taking account of the favorable or unfavorable response of his hearers, favorable or unfavorable circumstances, even though humanly speaking, on the level of prudence, there are times for speaking and other times for abstaining from speech.

εὐμετάδοτος

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*eumetadotos*, **generous in giving**

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*eumetadotos*, S 2130; *EDNT* 2.80; MM 263; L&N 57.97; BAGD 323

St. Paul requires the rich to “do good (*agathoergein*), be rich in good works (*ploutein en ergois kalois*), generous in giving (*eumetadotous*), socially minded

(*koinōnikous*)” (1 Tim 6:18); these four expressions sum up the meaning of virtue for rich: generosity. They should be open-handed.

*Metadidōmi* means to convey to someone else that which is one’s own (Rom 1:11; 1 Thess 2:8). Given the love of the Koine for compound forms, it is possible that the prefix in *eu-metadotos* (a biblical hapax, unknown in the papyri) adds no special element of meaning to the simple form; but it is more likely that it emphasizes the nuance either of liberality, or the ease, promptitude, and joy with which one makes one’s wealth useful to others (cf. Acts 20:35; Wis 7:13 – wisdom passes on without regret [*aphthonōs metadidōmi*] that which it has gained, without afterthought). If this is indeed the meaning of the prefix, then it transforms simple “sharing” into a full-fledged virtue.

The teaching is Christian: John the Baptist had instructed people to give spontaneously to the needy, and St. Paul had urged “working with one’s hands in order to be able to give to those in need” (Eph 4:28). But it corresponds with the ethic, as much Jewish as pagan, that distinguishes between blind wealth and clear-sighted or “clairvoyant” wealth. The latter goes along with wisdom and willingly shares of its goods (Philo, *Flight* 29). This ethic is that of a hero of Menander: “Money is a fragile thing. If you are sure that it will be at your disposal forever, then keep it and do not share with anyone (*mēdeni toutou metadidous*). But if you are not its master, and if you owe everything not to yourself but to *Tychē*, why should you be jealous of it? ... You should use it generously, help everyone, enrich as many people as you can with your own means. That is what is imperishable.... Give open-handedly, share (*metadidou*) ... willingly.”

εὐνοέω, εὔνοια

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*eunoeō*, to be benevolent, be accommodating, come to terms; *eunoia*, benevolence, goodwill, friendship, devotion

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*eunoeo*, S 2132; TDNT 4.971–973; EDNT 2.80; MM 263; L&N 30.23, 31.20, 56.3; BAGD 323 | *eunoia*, S 2133; TDNT 4.971–973; EDNT 2.80; MM 263; L&N 25.72; BAGD 323

Noos, “intelligence, mind,” designates from Homer on a thought that may be mixed with a feeling and emerges into an action. This meaning is found in more than a hundred compound forms, including *eunoeō* and *eunoia*. The verb is ordinarily translated “be well disposed toward, in agreement with,” and the

noun “good feelings, benevolence,” but the nuances are so numerous that it is difficult to specify exactly what is meant in each text.

In classical Greek, *eunoeō* expresses a disposition that is inclined to be favorable, to wish someone well. According to Cyrus, “It is difficult to show benevolence (*eunoein*) toward the malevolent (*kakonois*)” (Xenophon, *Cyr.* 8.2.1). A servant shows himself to be *devoted* toward his master (*to eunoein emoi*; Xenophon, *Oec.* 12.5). The affective sense is clear in the Delphic precept *philois eunoei* (Dittenberger, *Syl.* 1268, 15), but a specific nuance is apparent with regard to social and political relations, where especially official friendship and loyalty are in view. In the papyri, beginning in the first century AD, the verb refers to conjugal attachment: the wife promises to live with her husband as *gnēsia gametē* (true wife) and adds *kai eunoein soi* (*PSI* 64, 4). Testators recognize their wives’ virtue: “being kind to me and showing me full faithfulness” (*eunoousē moi kai pasan pistin moi ekdeiknymenē*, *P.Oxy.* 494, 9; 2474, 6; cf. *P.Tebt.* 326, 10). In business letters, the author supposes that his correspondent is well disposed toward him (*P.Brem.* 53, 18; *P.Mich.* 476, 14). *Eunoeō* is used only once in the NT. The Lord commands, “be accommodating toward your adversary (*isthi eunoōn tō antidikō*, where *antidikos* is a legal term; cf. *P.Wash.Univ.* I, 6, 20, 26) while you are on the way with him” (Matt 5:25). Here the idea is to “come to terms,” to settle upon concrete measures to take. The parallel, Luke 12:15, uses the perfect passive participle of *apallassō*: deliver oneself from, have done with one’s creditors, get out of difficulty.

The noun *eunoia* is used much more and has more diverse meanings. Certainly it expresses benevolence, or more precisely “a benevolent feeling” (*to tēs eunoias pathos*, Philo, *Abraham* 153, 168, 194) that does not exclude respect (*eunoia kai timē*, Josephus, *Ant.* 6.257; 7.51; 8.386; 20.205; *P.Princ.* 74, 6 and 9; *MAMA*, VI, 115, 9–10; 119, 19), but it is a matter first of all of good intentions or good feelings, goodwill. This is the constant meaning in the LXX. The reader of Sirach is invited to read with “goodwill and attention” (*met’ eunoias kai prosochēs*, Sir Prologue 15). King Demetrius writes to Jonathan: “We have decided to do good (to the Jewish nation) because of the goodwill that they have for us.” Likewise in Philo: among the wicked, “goodwill is nothing but hypocrisy” (Philo, *Conf. Tongues* 48); souls harmonize in good sentiments. It is fairly common in Josephus: it was with good intentions (*kai’ eunoian*) that Varus sent Philip (*War* 2.83); “those who are arriving were moved by goodwill and came as allies.” This goodwill or favor is sometimes attributed to the Deity: *eunoia theou* (*Ant.* 5.95; cf. 4.106, 190, 213; 7.385; 14.455); “the goodwill of Lord Sarapis” (*tas eunoias tou kyriou Sarapidos*).

As a virtue of the good citizen, *eunoia* balances life in community, causes one to share the joys and sorrows of others, and overcomes attachments; it is



the basis of good relations (Josephus, *Ant.* 14.154; 19.51, 211) and becomes faithfulness and loyalty when it is a matter of the attachment of inhabitants or an army to a general or emperor (*tē pros ton hēgoumenon eunoia*). Hence the language of treaties of alliance and friendship (*Ant.* 12.417; 13.37) and political friendship, like that of Hiram and Solomon (*Ant.* 8.57) or Antipater and Hyrcanus (14.8; cf. 16.10, 60; 17.37, 39, 43, 123, 353). If Aristotle refused to assimilate *eunoia* to *philia*, this distinction is obliterated in the first century: “you have *eunoian* and *philia* for me” (*P.Brem.* 49, 5; Philo, *Spec. Laws* 1.52; *Plant.* 90; *I.Priene* 47, 25). In a wedding contract, the wife promises to keep all her affection and tenderness for her husband (*P.Lond.* 1711, 34). In any event, the term is often linked with *storgē* (Josephus, *Ant.* 4.134; 15.84; *P.Stras.* 284, 13; *SB* 9622, 6) and *philostorgia* (4.273; 8.193; 15.68; 16.21; *P.Oxy.* 494, 6; *P.Mich.* 341, 9, from AD 47). It is used for the love of Pharaoh’s daughter for the child Moses (Philo, *Moses* 1.19, 33; *Virtues* 224) or of Sarah for the son of Hagar (Josephus, *Ant.* 1.215), of the love of husband and wife (*Ant.* 5.310; 17.49, 58, 85), the love of a father for his children and vice versa (1.222, 291, 297; 17.103), especially brotherly affection, that felt for a friend (*War* 1.416), even an affinity felt for other nations and for all people (Philo, *Spec. Laws* 2.167).

In every case, the feelings of benevolence imply fidelity (*eunoia kai pistis*) and are characterized by seriousness and ardor (*eunoia kai spoudē*) and even eagerness and zeal (*prothymia kai eunoia*, Josephus, *Ant.* 8.57; 19.51; *SEG* I, 363, 10). *Eunoia* is, in effect, a “will (*boulēsis*) to see good things happen to one’s neighbor for his own profit” (Philo, *Plant.* 106); it is a preoccupation, something that one attends to: “exhibiting the same benevolence and attention” (*tēn autēn eunoian kai epimeleian parechomenos*, Dittenberger, *Syl.* 390, 18); “to all beneficence and benevolence” (*pros pantas euergesia kai eunoia*, *P.Fam.Tebt.* 15, 72). Put plainly, *eunoia* entails devotion.

This meaning was not unknown in classical Greek, but it is common in the Hellenistic period and constant in the inscriptions praising magistrates, officials, physicians, officers, etc., for their virtue and devotion (*aretēs kai eunoias charin*); that is, for the loyalty, fidelity, and zeal that they showed in the exercise of their responsibilities or functions. In the second century BC, a *proxenia* decree for a Roman citizen: “It pleases the city to garland him ... for his merit and the devotion that he unfailingly shows toward our city” (*I.Gonn.*, n. XX, 7; cf. 109, 14: “devotion and philanthropy toward the people,” *tēn pros ton dēmon eunoian kai philanthrōpian*). In 46 BC, the dedication of a statue in honor of the *stratēgos* Ptolemaios, “for his merit and devotion.” More simply, an honorific decree at Athens: “Whereas in every circumstance Philippides has unfailingly showed his devotion to the people” (*apodeiknymenos tēn pros ton*

*dēmon eunoian*, Dittenberger, *Syl.* 374, 9). At Delos: “Whereas Aglaos has previously, in the most difficult circumstances, given numerous and brilliant proofs of his devotion to the king’s business.” Around 60 BC, “the horsemen among the colonists have observed the attitude adopted by their masters toward the power” (*BGU* 1185, 3).

Given the multiplicity of meanings, we may hesitate to offer a translation of Eph 6:7 – “*met’ eunoias* serving as for the Lord” – which is part of the parenesis addressed to slaves. But the apostle has already made appeal to their rectitude of heart (*en haplotēti kardias*, 6:5), with a nuance of liberality in self-giving; then to the spontaneity and energy exercised in work done “with feeling” (*ek psychēs*, 6:6). In 6:7, therefore, *eunoia* can no longer be simply “goodwill,” but indeed to serve masters “with devotion” and with respect. This is a call to faithfulness and loyalty in service – and these from the heart – because the word *eunoia* implies good intentions: the slave will therefore always be “well disposed” both in his relations with his owner and in regard to the orders that he receives. It is a wonderful thing that such interior perfection, which would be translated “devotion,” should be the virtue of slaves whom the pagans considered to be “things” or “bodies.” That is the perfection of Christian *eunoia*!

## εὐπειθής

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*eupeithēs*, **open to reason, willing to be persuaded**

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*eupeithes*, S 2138; *EDNT* 2.81; MM 263–264; L&N 33.305; BAGD 324; ND 4.152

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This biblical hapax occurs in a list of the attributes of true wisdom: “The wisdom from on high is first of all pure (*hagnē*), then peaceful (*eirēnikē*), moderate (*epieikēs*; cf. above, pp. 34–38), conciliatory (*eupeithēs*), full of mercy and good fruits” (Jas 3:17). The Vulgate translates *suadibilis*.

At first glance, it is the opposite of *apeithēs*, “recalcitrant,” and *dyspeithēs*, “difficult to persuade, undisciplined.” In Plato, it refers to the person who obeys the laws, and in Josephus, disciplined troops; but this obedience becomes more flexible in Philo and especially in Epictetus, where the wise person is open to reasonable persuasion (3.12.13: *eupeithēs tō logō*) and enters “into the role of brother, being deferent, characterized by complaisance (*eupeitheia*), benevolence in speech.” Thus *eupeitheia* in the first century implies goodwill and mutual understanding; it refers not to passive obedience but to an inclination to accept suggestions and conform to them willingly. In the papyri,

*eupeithēs* has the precise nuance of legal agreement or consent. In AD 44, Taorseus agrees to renounce in his half-sister's favor his share in an old building bequeathed by his mother; she will not file any complaint "because she is in agreement." In 58, a woman named Ammonarion and her daughter Ophelous, agreeing to accept from Antiphanus a certain sum of money as a dowry, stipulate: "We are in agreement with each other as to the following: A. and O. have given their consent and have received from Antiphanus ..."

The connection with *epieikēs* in Jas 3:17 suggests that *eupeithēs* should have a coordinate meaning; wisdom is open to reasons that are supplied; it is willing to be convinced, agrees to follow instructions, strives to be conciliatory. This is how Musonius conceived of it: the *eupeithēs* son listens to his parents' advice and follows it gladly (*hekousiōs*), when the advice is good and feasible. The papyri confirm this meaning: "to be in agreement, to be satisfied." In an inscription for the ephobia of Bacchias in the second century, "I will see that the gymnasiarch is satisfied when he returns from his voyage." In the third century, a secretary is hired after his responsibilities and compensation have been established: "Valerius is satisfied with the salary and with all the outlays (arrangements for covering his expenses)" (*P.Mich.* 604, 22). An agreement concerning a substitution in the public service connected with the grain collection: "Aurelius Sarapion ... is satisfied (*eupithēs*) by Philosarapis regarding all the costs of the grain collection (*seitologia*)" (*eupithēs genomenos hypo Philosarapidos peri tōn tēs seitologias analōmatōn pantōn*, *P.Oxy.* 2769, 26); "satisfied with everything done by Sarapion" (*eupeithēs kata pan gegonōs hypo tou Sarapiōnos*, *BGU* 1130, 5; from 4 BC).

## εὐπερίστατος

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*euperistatos*, **surrounding, besetting**

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*euperistatos*, S 2139; *EDNT* 2.81; MM 264; L&N 30.32; BDF §117(1); BAGD 324

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Compound forms with *euperi-* are frequent (*-blēptos*, *-graphos*, *-koptos*, *-noētos*, *-treptos*, etc.), but the only occurrence of *euperistatos* is that in Heb 12:1 – the Christian life is compared to an endurance course, and – like every athlete – the believer must cast off on the one hand every load or burden (*onkos*) that would break his momentum and on the other hand the obstacles that could trip him up, *tēn euperistaton hamartian*.

The many translations that have been proposed are all more or less glosses.

(a) The Peshitta (sin is always near us, *tajjeb*), Theophylact, Bengel, and Moulton-Milligan all see in the verbal adjective a derivative of *peristasis* in the sense of “regrettable circumstances,” and they give full force to the article, *tēn ... hamartian*. This sin which seduces would be the surprise-attack sin that is a constant threat; cf. Gen 4:7 – “Sin lurks at the door!”

(b) With good reason, following the Vulgate and Theodoret, moderns prefer to see in this adjective a derivative of *periüstēmi* (“surround”), not in the passive sense, “which we can easily get rid of, easy to avoid,” but in the active sense: the sin that encumbers us, that easily envelops us, that besieges or besets, that easily insinuates its way in through the eyes, the ears, touch, taste, thought.

## εὐποιΐα

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*eupoia*, **beneficence**

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*eupoia*, S 2140; EDNT 2.81; MM 264; L&N 88.7; BDF §119(1); BAGD 324; ND 3.68

Whether used for beneficence per se, in association with *koinōnia* (Heb 13:16; cf. Mark 14:7) or for the concrete gifts that beneficence produces, the word offers no difficulty. Julius Pollux, *Onom.* 5.32.140, offers as synonymns *euergeteō*, *eupoieō*, *charizomai*, *dōreomai*, *didōmi*; but apart from two decrees in honor of Zosimus (*I.Priene* 112, 19; 113, 76 [84 BC]), *eupoia* is unknown in the Christian era. As Julius Pollux observes: “For *eupoia* is not much used; nor have I yet found *philodōria* in the classical writings” (*to gar eupoia, ou lian kekritai; ou de philodōrian oupō heuron en tois kekrimenois*, *ibid.*). Philo (*Change of Names* 24) and Josephus (*Ant.* 2.261) connect *eupoia* with *euergesia*; and Josephus makes the former equivalent to our “charity” or “almsgiving” (*Ant.* 19.356; 20.52); while Epictetus associates it with justice (in Stobaeus, *Flor.* 46.5.80; vol. 4, p. 224).

It is attested in the papyri only from the third century, and then most notably in Christian letters.

## εὐπορέω, εὐπορία

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*euporeō*, **to have means; euporia, resources, wealth**

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*euporeo*, S 2141; EDNT 2.81; MM 264; L&N 57.27; BDF §101; BAGD 324 | *euporia*, S 2142; EDNT 2.81; MM 264; L&N 57.32, 57.201; BAGD 324

*Euporeō*, in biblical Greek, refers to that which is at one's disposal, to have the means or be in a position to do something (cf. Lev 25:26, 49; hiphil of the Hebrew *nāsag*, with "the hand"); and hence "achieve success, succeed" (Wis 10:10). According to Acts 11:29, the disciples at Antioch resolved (*hōrisan*) to come to the aid of the brothers in Jerusalem, "each according to his possessions, *euporeito tis*," meaning "each according to his means."

Such acting according to the possibilities, according to the resources that one possesses, is attested in late papyri; in the eighth century, "whoever detains a *kalaphatēs* (fugitive) or hides him will have to pay one thousand solidi, if he has the means" (*P.Apoll.* 9, 9; cf. *PSI* 1266, 8); in the sixth century, a mother who suffered and worked to support her daughter no longer has the wherewithal to provide for her (*P.Oxy.* 1895, 7). The word is used for supplies of food (*P.Lond.* 1674, 20; Josephus, *Ant.* 17.214), water (*P.Oxy.* 2410, 7, AD 120), belts (*P.Mich.* 464, 18; in AD 99), weapons (Josephus, *Life* 28), rights that one is able to exercise (*P.Ryl.* 162, 27; AD 159). In a general sense, *euporeō* means "be prosperous, rich," the nuance being that of our expression "to have means," an ease that allows the free use of one's possessions.

The substantive *euporia* has only this meaning of "resources, wealth." Demetrius notes in speaking to the silversmiths of Ephesus: "it is from this work that we derive our resources." In AD 185, the *cosmogrammateus* writes to the *stratēgos*: "I submit the following names to you as being financially capable of supporting public works." Nevertheless some of those subjected to such burdens protest, for example Orsenouphis, who protests that he does not have the requisite means: "my resources not having grown from that time until now."

## εὐπρέπεια

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*euprepeia*, **beauty**

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*euprepeia*, S 2143; *EDNT* 2.82; MM 264; L&N 79.13; BAGD 324

The fortune of the rich is just as uncertain as "the good looks of the face" of the flower that will be dried out by the searing wind: *hē euprepeia tou prosōpou* (Jas 1:11). This NT hapax is common in the LXX, where it expresses the majesty of God (Ps 93:1, Hebrew *gē'ūt*; 104:2, *hādār*), God's glory (Bar 5:1), the glory of God's dwelling (2 Sam 15:25, *nāweh*; Job 5:24; 36:11, *nā'im*; Ps 26:8, *mā'ōn*), of his festivals (Sir 47:10), of his warhorse (Zech 10:3, *hōd*). Yahweh makes his people to share in his *euprepeia* (Ezek 16:14; Ps 50:2), and his wisdom is more brilliant (*euprepesterā*) than the sun (Wis 7:29).

These usages emphasize the brilliance of royal nobility, the charm of beauty, the splendor of an opulent life.

εὐπρόδεκτος

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*euprosdektos*, **acceptable**

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***euprosdektos***, S 2144; TDNT 2.58–59; EDNT 2.82; NIDNTT 3.744, 746; MM 264; L&N 22.44, 25.86; BAGD 324

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St. Paul knew the adjective *dektos*, “accepted, allowed by someone,” used for example with respect to Epaphroditus, who brought him the offering of the Philippians, “a pleasant-smelling perfume, a sacrifice that God receives and finds pleasing.” It is used for a favorable or propitious time (Luke 4:19), and it is thus that the LXX translates by *kairō dektō* the time of God’s good pleasure, benevolence, favor (*b’ēl rāṣōn*) in Isa 49:8. But when the apostle cites precisely this text in 2 Cor 6:2 and comments “Behold, now is the *euprosdektos* time, now is the day of salvation” (*idou nyn kairos euprosdektos, idou nyn hēmera sōtērias*), the choice of the compound form is surely intentional, and it must be given an intensive value (*eu-prosdechomai*): “Now, at the present, is a very favorable time, the most acceptable time there is.”

*Euprosdektos* is used also for goodwill (*prothymia*), quickness to give, which is “quite well received” by God, whatever the size of the gift (2 Cor 8:12); or for the charitable gift (*diakonia*) of the gentile churches, which was “much appreciated” by the saints at Jerusalem (Rom 15:31; the simple *dektos* here would be almost nonsensical); but especially for the offering that the pagans constitute, a *prosphora* that is “very acceptable” to God (Rom 15:16). Spiritual sacrifices are particularly well received by the Lord, thanks to the mediation of Jesus Christ, who secures easy and sure access to God for them. The superlative nuance of *euprosdektos* in the NT is confirmed by its substitution for the simple *dektos* that qualifies the old sacrifices (Lev 1:3; Isa 56:7) and by the emphasis in 1 Tim 2:3 – “this is excellent and acceptable (*apodekton*) in the eyes of God our Savior” (*touto kalon kai apodekton enōpion tou sōtēros hēmōn theou*, verse 4). The essential thing is not the preparing and presenting of an offering, but that it pleases the One whom it is intended to honor, and that he accepts it.

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εὐσχημόνως, εὐσχημοσύνη, εὐσχήμων

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*euschēmonōs*, **honorably, respectably**; *euschēmosynē*, **propriety, modesty**;  
*euschēmōn*, **respectable, noble**

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*euschemonos*, S 2156; *EDNT* 2.86; MM 266; L&N 66.4, 88.50; BAGD 327 |  
*euschemosune*, S 2157; *EDNT* 2.86; MM 266; L&N 79.13; BAGD 327 |  
*euschemon*, S 2158; *TDNT* 2.770–772; *EDNT* 2.86; MM 266; L&N 79.15,  
87.33; BAGD 327

Having a good *schēma* could mean appearance, outward bearing, correct moral conduct, or high social class. The emphasis is sometimes on decent behavior, sometimes on order and beauty, sometimes on respectability and nobility.

St. Paul always insisted that Christians conduct themselves in a worthy and honorable manner, understanding *euschēmonōs* in a moral sense – which implies good behavior – whether in their private life; or publicly, so that pagans might be able to appreciate the quality and propriety of their conduct; or finally in their assemblies for worship, where everything must be done “decently and in order.” *Euschēmosynē* is a universally recognized value, at least according to Socrates, who sought only “that which it is honest to do” (*to euschēmon skopei*, Epictetus 4.1.163; cf. 4.12.6); and Hellenistic opuscula and inscriptions vie with each other in praising it. Ps.-Hippocrates wrote a *Peri euschēmosynēs* (ed. Littré, vol. 9, pp. 226–244) to demonstrate that this virtue seals the honor and good reputation of the physician. Clement of Alexandria expects it of women (*Paed.* 2.31.1.; 2.33.1), with whom it becomes a sort of elegance. “And they made even the residence beautiful and *euschēmōn* and worthy of both cities” (*epoiēsanto de kai tēn parepidēmian kalēn kai euschēmōna kai axian amphoterōn tōn poleōn*, *I.Magn.* 101, 15; second century BC); the virgins of Athens, in 98–97: “to parade according to the orders in the finest and most *euschēmōn* manner.” So the apostle can justify to the Corinthians his praise of virginity thus and need no further commentary or explanation: “I say this ... for the sake of propriety, *pros to euschēmon*” (1 Cor 7:35). To his mind, it is less a matter of honesty than of dignity and honorableness, almost adornment; or, in any event, of an inclination to be steadily and unremittingly close to the Lord.

Actually, the adjective *euschēmōn* is used very frequently in the papyri for a special class of citizens, the most well-thought-of and well-to-do in a town or city. The *euschemones* are the prominent people who are liable to support public works (*leitourgiai*); then the term becomes something of a title of nobility and finally of mere politeness: “I want to lease from you the property of the noble lady.” A *neōkoros* (temple warden) of Sarapis, a former *stratēgos* and senator from Alexandria, is described as *euschēmōn*.

It is in this sense that Mark 15:43 describes Joseph of Arimathea as a “distinguished member of the council,” and that the distinguished women of Pisidian Antioch and Berea are mentioned in Acts 13:15; 17:12.

εὐτραπελία

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*eutrapelia*, **lively humor, wittiness, mocking derision**

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*eutrapelia*, S 2160; EDNT 2.86; MM 266; L&N 33.34; BAGD 327

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Eph 5:4 – “Obscenity (*aischrotēs*), foolish talk (*mōrologia*), and *eutrapelia* ... are improper (*ouk anēken*).” Thanksgiving (*eucharistia*) is to be preferred. All the commentators understand the apostle to be forbidding buffoonery and nonsense in conversation, but what exactly is *eutrapelia* (Old Latin and Vulgate: *scurrilitas*)? This NT hapax is unknown in the LXX and the papyri and is sometimes used in secular texts in a positive sense, sometimes negative.

Derived from *trepomai*, the adjective *eutrapelos* means literally “turning easily,” hence “supple, agile; versatile, treacherous” and “supple of mind, quick with a comeback,” which may mean either “of lively humor” or “mocking, derisive.” The first occurrences are pejorative: “Do not be duped, friend, by treacherous gain” (*mē dolōthēs, ō philei, kerdesin eutrapelois*, Pindar, *Pyth.* 1.92); “I am twenty years old and have never spoken a word or done a deed that was improper” (*oute ergon out’ epos eutrapelon*, *Pyth.* 4.105; textual variant, *entrapelon*). Likewise Aristophanes: “Without pretext or specious reason (*oute tin’ echōn prophasin oute logon eutrapelon*) you claim to rule alone” (*Vesp.* 469); and Isocrates: “They worked at being serious and not playing the buffoon (*semnynesthai ... ou boumolocheuesthai*). Jokers and those who know how to mock (*tous eutrapelous de kai tous skōptein dynamenous*), who are now described as gifted (*euphyeis*), were regarded at that time as victims of fate” (*Areop.* 7.49). But this same Isocrates makes *eutrapelia* a spiritual and literary quality “that contributes not a little to education in speech” (*Antid.* 15.296).

Hippocrates recommends that physicians try wittiness (*echein tina eutrapeliēn*), because severity (*to austēron*) disheartens healthy folk and sick folk alike (*Decent.* 7). Plato observes that “the old, to try to please the young, make themselves light-hearted and funny (*eutrapelias te kai charientismou empimplantai*), and imitate them in order not to seem dour and authoritarian (*aēdeis einai mēde despotikoi*).”

Aristotle, in defining the object of wittiness (namely, pleasure in moments of distraction), showed that there is *eutrapelia* and *eutrapelia* in the course of



making this quality a virtue of the golden mean that cannot exist without tact and perspicacity:

Since life includes rest as well as activity, and in this is included leisure and amusement, there seems here also to be a kind of intercourse which is tasteful; there is such a thing as saying – and again listening to – what one should and as one should. The kind of people one is speaking or listening to will also make a difference. Evidently here also there is both an excess and a deficiency as compared with the mean. Those who carry humour to excess are thought to be vulgar buffoons (*bōmolochoi kai phortikoi*), striving after humour at all costs, and aiming rather at raising a laugh than at saying what is becoming and at avoiding pain to the object of their fun; while those who can neither make a joke themselves nor put up with those who do are thought to be boorish and unpolished (*agroikoi kai sklēroi*). But those who joke in a tasteful way are called ready-witted, which implies a sort of readiness to turn this way and that (*hoi d' emmelōs paizontes eutrapeloi prosagoreuontai, hoion eutropoi*); for such sallies are thought to be movements of the character, and as bodies are discriminated by their movements, so too are characters. The ridiculous side of things is not far to seek, however, and most people delight more than they should in amusement and in jesting, and so even buffoons are called ready-witted because they are found attractive (*kai hoi bōmolochoi eutrapeloi prosagoreuontai hōs charientes*); but that they differ from the ready-witted man, and to no small extent, is clear from what has been said.

To the middle state belongs also tact (*epidexiotēs*); it is the mark of a tactful man to say and listen to such things as befit a good and well-bred man; for there are some things that it befits such a man to say and to hear by way of jest, and the well-bred man's jesting differs from that of a vulgar man, and the joking of an educated man from that of an uneducated. One may see this even from the old and the new comedies; to the authors of the former indecency of language (*aichrologia*) was amusing, to those of the latter innuendo is more so; and these differ in no small degree in respect of propriety. Now should we define the man who jokes well (*ton eu skōptonta*) by his saying what is not unbecoming to a well-bred man, or by his not giving pain, or even giving delight, to the hearer? Or is the latter definition, at any rate, itself indefinite, since different things are hateful or pleasant to different people? The kind of jokes he will listen to will be the same; for the kind he can put up with are also the kind he seems to make. There are, then, jokes he will not make; for the jest is a sort of abuse (*to gar skōmma*

*loidorēma ti estin*), and there are things that lawgivers forbid us to abuse; and they should, perhaps, have forbidden us even to make a jest of such. The refined and well-bred man, therefore, will be as we have described, being as it were a law to himself.

Such, then is the man who observes the mean, whether he be called tactful or ready-witted (*eit' epidexios eit' eutrapelos legetai*). The buffoon (*bōmolochos*), on the other hand, is the slave of his sense of humour, and spares neither himself nor others if he can raise a laugh, and says things none of which a man of refinement would say, and to some of which he would not even listen. The boor (*agroikos*), again, is useless for such social intercourse; for he contributes nothing and finds fault with everything. But relaxation and amusement are thought to be a necessary element in life.

In *Rh.* 2.12.1389–12, Aristotle gives this definition: “The young love laughter and so are also witty (*philogelōtes, dio kai eutrapeloi*); wit is insolence tempered by education” (*hē gar eutrapelia pepaideumenē hybris estin*).

Then *eutrapelia* becomes a mental refinement and a character trait commonly attributed by historians to their heroes. At Sparta, Cleomenes was *eutrapelōtatos* in his private relations. The tyrant Dionysius of Syracuse could not help smiling at a funny remark (*dia tēn eutrapelian*) by Philoxenus (Diodorus Siculus 15.6.4); Agathocles was a naturally witty character (20.3.3); Sulla said jokingly (*eutrapeleuomenos*) that he was always sure of winning the war (38–39.7). Plutarch recalls the charm of Antony’s humor (*hē peri tēs paidias kai tas homilias eutrapelia*, *Ant.* 48.5) and recalls in *De virt. mor.* 2.441 *b* that Chrysippus made a virtue of wittiness (*eutrapelias aretas*), alongside affability (*euapantēsias*). “The Persians joked with each other on matters about which it was more agreeable to be teased than not.... How not to admire the refinement and wit of these men whose very mockeries pleased and charmed those to whom they were addressed” (*agasthai tēn eutrapelian*, *Quaest. conv.* 2.1.1692 *e-f*). Similarly, Philo reports that at Gaius’s question, “Why do you abstain from pork? there was a great burst of laughter from his adversaries: Some laughed because they were truly amused, while others, with calculating flattery, pretended to find that he had spoken with wit and grace” (*syn eutrapelia kai chariti*).

From this collection of texts – there are hardly any others before the Christian era – we can see that *eutrapelia* took on a more and more favorable sense, apparently the opposite of its Pauline meaning, but we must not forget the primitive pejorative sense of the word, and especially Aristotle’s observations: *eutrapelia* is a form of *hybris* and cannot be virtuous except among people who have tact and are well-bred; otherwise, it is unwholesome

and tends to vulgarity, even obscenity. This distinction was noted in the first century in Plutarch's words about Cicero: "His facility for sarcasm and *eutrapelia* was seen as a virtue and an attractive feature of his court speeches, but he used it to excess, thus injuring a number of people and gaining a reputation for meanness" (*Cic.* 5.6). There can be no doubt that the apostle – God knows he had a sense of humor, and he had told the Colossians that their language should be "seasoned with salt" (Col 4:6) – intended to debar God's children from this habitual lack of brotherly love and decency. Certainly his correspondents understood him.

## εὐχομαι, εὐχή

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*euchomai*, **to affirm, vow; pray; *euchē*, vow, votive offering, wish, prayer**

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*euchomai*, S 2172; TDNT 2.775–806; EDNT 2.88–89; NIDNTT 2.861–862, 867, 873; MM 268; L&N 25.6, 33.178; BDF §§67(1), 180(4), 187(4), 359(2), 392(1c); BAGD 329 | *euche*, S 2171; TDNT 2.775–806; EDNT 2.88–89; NIDNTT 2.861, 867; MM 268; L&N 33.178, 33.469; BAGD 329; ND 3.65

There may be diverse uses of *euchomai*, relating to vows, promises, wishes, or prayers, but the basic meaning is to affirm out loud, to make a solemn declaration. It appears for the first time, with one legal exception, in the Mycenaean form *e-u-ke-to* in a Pylos Linear B tablet: "Eritha the priestess has and protests that she has a frank fee in the name of her god." This is a claiming of property rights.

In a secular context, the nuances are multiple. The most common construction (*euchomai* followed by the infinitive) means (a) to affirm boldly and proudly: "We affirm proudly (we flatter ourselves) that we are more valorous than our fathers" (Homer, *Il.* 4.405); Athena to Ares: "I boldly affirm (I flatter myself) that I am stronger than you"; (b) to make oneself known: "Behold my race, the blood of which I boast to be an offspring" (*Il.* 6.211; 20.424); "I have the honor of being the son of wise Antiochus"; (c) to boast and glorify oneself: "None of the Danaeans can boast to have held his horses ahead ..." (*Il.* 8.253–254); "no one dares boast to contend with you."

In a religious context, the meanings of *euchomai* are just as nuanced: (a) make a vow or promise (in order to obtain a favor): "Make a vow (to Lycian Apollo) to sacrifice a hecatomb of first-born lambs" (*Il.* 4.101; *Od.* 17.49); "Anacharsis vowed to the mother (of the gods) to offer her a sacrifice"; (b) express a vow as a prayer: the priestess Theano, "addressed this prayer as a suppliant to the daughter of great Zeus" (*Il.* 6.304; 311–312); "Pallas Athena

heard their prayer” (10.295); “Thus he prayed, and Athena heard him” (*Od.* 3.385); (c) prayer of request: “to pray is to address requests to the gods” (*to d’euchesthai aitein tous theous*); “Poseidon, when I pray you do not refuse to carry out what we want”; (d) wish: “A man wishes that someone close to him will remain in his house to protect it against misfortune”; (e) give thanks: when the divinity has acted, thanksgiving is expressed in prayer; “Let us go offer thanksgiving in the assembly of the gods” (*euchomenai theion*, Homer, *Il.* 7.298); the Greeks, learning of the enemy’s shipwreck, address prayers to Poseidon Soter; (f) finally, to invoke, pray (with no further specifics): “when the king had prayed” (*Il.* 19.257); “the prayer to Father Zeus was completed.” If sometimes prayer is silent, it is normally spoken aloud and is heard (*Il.* 16.236; Aeschylus, *Cho.* 720), because it rises to the level of a cry and is even accompanied by tears (*Il.* 8.364; *Od.* 9.294).

In the Hellenistic period, the polyvalence of *euchomai* is reduced, but its religious use is accentuated and even becomes “canonical” in the inscriptions, and above all in cultic rules, where prayers are made, for example, for the senate, the people of Rome and of Ephesus, and sometimes with a nuance of thanksgiving (*euxacharistōn*: “following his vow and giving thanks,” *IGLS* 2744; cf. *I.Bulg.* 1184, 1476); but by far the most common sense is “vow”: “by carrying out our vows for the salvation of all of them” (*IGLS* 1322–1328, 1337, 1336); “Asianus completed this edifice according to the vow that he had made” (2006; cf. 2039); “Valerianus ... following his vow, raised this column at his own expense.” The formula *euxamenos anethēken* (having vowed, he offered) is used in dedications.

In the papyri, our verb is used only in official or private correspondence, first of all at the beginning of the letter, where the author prays for the recipient: *euchomai tō theō* (*P.NYU* 25, 2; *P.Oxy.* 3314, 3), *tē theia* (*Pap.BruX.* XVII, p. 94). Often, the prayer is linked with an act of worship (*proskynēma*, *P.Oxy.* 2598 a 2–4; b 2–3; *P.Genova* 49, 3); its object is almost always the good health of the recipient: “I pray that you are well.” Christians took over this usage as a matter of politeness, and *euchomai* often retains the sense “wish.” This latter meaning seems to be that of the formula *errōsthai se (hymas) euchomai*, which recurs endlessly in the letters; it is no longer a prayer (at least not usually) but a wish: “I wish you good health.”

The LXX uses the verb often, but knows barely two meanings for it: either “pray,” in the sense of implore, supplicate, or intercede; or “utter a vow.” The same meanings occur in Philo, though the uttering of vows is rarer, while “pray and supplicate” recur frequently with respect to God, together with sacrifice (*Unchang. God* 8; *Plant.* 161–162; *Decalogue* 72) and the blessing of the people (*Change of Names* 127), sometimes with a nuance of thanksgiving. The

emphasis is on the “request” in prayer. But while the LXX does not use *euchomai* in the sense of “wish,” Philo does so often: “Joseph wished to raise his subordinates to the level of blameless folk.”

The six occurrences of the verb in the NT confirm its decline; it is unknown in the Gospels. In 3 John 2 (“I hope that you are prospering in every way and are well”), the present *euchomai* and its object are in complete conformity with the epistolary papyri (cf. above). Its banal (if we may put it so) meaning of “prayer” or “request” is only found twice in the NT. The three other texts express a desire or wish: during the storm, the sailors wished or were calling out their desire (durative imperfect *ēuchonto*) that the day would come (Acts 27:29). During his appearance before King Agrippa, St. Paul cries out, “Would God (*euxaimēn an tō theō*) that you might become as I am, except for these chains” (Acts 26:29). The verb here is an aorist optative middle. We know that the optative is a potential mood for the uncertain future and for wishes, here an optative of courtesy (*euxaimēn an* = “I would like to pray God”). After the fashion of Moses’ pleading for Israel (Exod 32:32), St. Paul does not hesitate to sacrifice all for his compatriots: “I would wish to be anathema myself for my brothers, for my kinsmen according to the flesh” (Rom 9:3). Here, the imperfect has the value of an optative: “I would wish, if it were possible....”

*Euchē*. – This abstract noun (naming an action expressed by *euchomai*) occurs only once in Homer (*Od.* 10.525), but it is common in classical Greek in its first meaning, “vow” and “votive offering”; this is the predominant meaning in the LXX, which uses the word for religious obligations, a votive offering (Deut 12:17), sacrifices (Lev 22:21, 23, 29; Num 15:3, 8; 29:39; Jer 11:15; Mal 1:14), and Nazirite consecration to God. This is the vow made by St. Paul (*eichen euchēn*, Acts 18:18) and four other men (Acts 21:23).

*Euchē* often means “wish”: “For young people action, for adults deliberation, for old men wishes” (Hesiod, frag. 220); “Such are my wishes for us.” This is the commonest meaning in the papyri: “so strong is my desire to greet you” (*P.Mich.* 494, 6); “My wish, master, is to carry out my service at your feet” (*P.Rein.* 113, 5; *BGU* 531, 5), “the desire of the debtors is to supply wine” (*P.Michael.* 29, 18). Then *euchē* is used for a prayer of entreaty. A usage that is found only rarely in the LXX, but commonly in Philo: *euchē* is defined as “a prayer (*aitēsis*) addressed to God in order to obtain goods” (*Unchang. God* 87; cf. *Sacr. Abel and Cain* 53). Thus “wish-prayers” were made for others, notably for the emperor. One of the duties of priests of Dionysus in the second century BC consisted of praying: “and he shall pray prayers for the city of the Prienians” (*kai tas euchas euxetai hyper tēs poleōs tēs Priēneōn*). According to Jas 5:15, the prayer of faith (*hē euchē tēs pisteōs*), made by the elders of the church, will save the sick person.

St. Paul sends Timothy to the Philippians “in order to be encouraged in turn by the news that I will receive from you” (Phil 2:19). That is the usual translation of the biblical hapax *eupsycheō*, which is rare in classical and Hellenistic literature, where it refers to bravery in battle, comfort in trials (Josephus, *Ant.* 11.241: the king comforts Esther after she faints). It occurs in great abundance in epitaphs, like that of Serapias: “You have left behind an inscription and a marker to commemorate your virtue as you ascend to the country of the blessed. Good courage, Serapias!” Most often, it is a simple utterance connected with the name of the deceased or ending the inscription, for example *Euthenia eupsychi*. It is sometimes used in letters of condolence: “Take heart!” Even the Jews at Rome follow this usage: “To Eutychedianos, *archōn*, his worthy spouse. Good courage! May your sleep be with the just” (*CII* 110); “Here lies Junia, daughter of Antipas, two years, four months, and [ – ] days old. Good courage, be joyful – *euphychei euphronei*” (ibid. 303).

This nuance of joy, or as we would say, good spirits, is attested at the time of Claudius or of Nero in a letter from a woman to her husband: “For I am not troubled, but I remain *eupsychousa*” (*egō gar ouch oligōrō, alla eupsychousa paramenō*, *BGU* 1097, 15); or in this assurance, carved on a stone of a newly constructed edifice: “I am placed for the joy (*pros eupsychian*) of those who dwell here” (*IGLS*, 1653, 3). This nuance is not excluded in Phil 2:19, which can be compared to the letter of Heraklammon to his son Kallistos in the second century: “Write to me soon so that I may rejoice” (*tacheōs oun moi grapson hina eupsychō*, *P.Oxy.* 2860, 17); the father’s heart will be comforted, refreshed, and joyful to hear from his child, from whom he has hitherto had no response to his letters.

L. Robert, commenting on *IGRom.* IV, 860, 12, which praises a police superintendent for his “magnanimous generosity in the ‘good news’ festivals” (*epididonta en euangeliois eupsychōs*) illustrates the psychological and moral connotations of this adverb:

From Liddell-Scott-Jones, one would think that this word was a hapax from Xenophon, *Eq. Mag.* 8.21; from the Thesaurus it is evident that the adverb is well attested in Polybius and Diodorus; there it has the connotation “courageously,” which it also has in the decree of Lete on the military

successes of a *quaestor* (Dittenberger, *Syl.* 700), like *eupsychia* in a decree of Elea for a pankratist (*Syl.* 1073, 30–31), like *eupsychotatos* for a young Spartan winner in the endurance contest beneath the whip at the altar of Artemis Orthia, like (again at Sparta) *eupsychia kai peitharchia en tois patriois Lykourgeiois ethesin*, “enduring courage and obedience” (*IG V*, 1, 549). The adverb in the inscription under discussion may have the sense of “magnanimity and generosity.” I compare it to a decree of Acraiphia under Claudius, which I published in *BCH*, 1935, pp. 338–340; the preamble of this second decree begins with this rhetoric: *tēs ophilomenēs hapasi timēs tois eis tēn patrida eupsychōs diatēthisin ... axious ontas metalambanein* (lines 37–40), “being worthy to receive their share of the honor that is due to those who administrated in a manner honorable to their country”; the decree has to do with three citizens who when the land was in very difficult circumstances (*en tē tēs chōras apōleia*) agreed to assume the military command, the superintendence of the marketplace, and the supplying of oil, and who made numerous generous gifts of grain, money, and oil to grocers, cooks, butchers, and others. The meaning is the same in 3 Macc 7:18 – “the king having gladly (*eupsychōs*) supplied them everything needed for each of them to arrive at his own house.

ζημία, ζημιόω, κέρδος, κερδαίνω

*zēmia*, fine, penalty, contribution, harm, loss, disadvantage; *zēmioō*, to lose, suffer loss, be punished; *kerdos*, gain, profit; *kerdainō*, to gain, profit

*zemia*, S 2209; TDNT 2.888–892; EDNT 2.101–102; NIDNTT 3.136–137; MM 273; L&N 57.69; BAGD 338 | *zemioo*, S 2210; TDNT 2.888–892; EDNT 2.102; MM 273; L&N 38.7, 57.69; BDF §159(2); BAGD 338 | *kerdos*, S 2771; TDNT 3.672–673; EDNT 2.284; NIDNTT 3.136–137; MM 341; L&N 57.192; BAGD 429 | *kerdaino*, S 2770; TDNT 3.672–673; EDNT 2.283–284; NIDNTT 3.136–137; MM 341; L&N 13.137, 57.189; BDF §§28, 101; BAGD 429

In the OT, *zēmia* (Hebrew *‘ōneš*) and *zēmioō* (*‘ānaš*) always have the sense “fine, contribution,” “impose a fine, punish”; a meaning that is frequent in the papyri, but unknown in the NT apart from Luke 9:25 – “What good will it do a person to gain the whole world, if he himself is lost or condemned, *heauton de apolesas ē zēmiōtheis*?” *Apōleia* is the technical term for eternal damnation (cf. John 12:25); if Luke, unlike the parallels (Matt 16:26; Mark 8:36), adds *zēmiōtheis*, the point is that this is not a question of a simple loss, but of a penalty, or positive punishment.

In the literary and popular Koine, *zēmia* and *zēmioō* refer to a very wide range of “harm.” *P.Tebt.* 420, 4: “You know that I am above reproach (*apo zēmias*)”; the prostitute is a bane (Philo, *Spec. Laws* 3.51); pederasty wrongs the lovers (*Contemp. Life* 61, *ezēmiōse*; *P.Tebt.* 947, 2; second century BC); associating with the wicked becomes “the worst calamity” (*Migr. Abr.* 61, *megistē zēmia*); “those who rebel against divine law come into grave danger for the body and the soul” (*Virtues* 182); “the person who kills a domestic ... slashes his own fortune by the price of this man” (*Spec. Laws* 3.143; cf. Josephus, *Ant.* 11.214); “they consider an expensive coat to be a great waste” (Philo, *Dreams* 1.124); sometimes it is a matter of wrong (*Giants* 43; *Post. Cain* 184), of detriment (*Virtues* 169), of a deficit (*P.Oxy.* 2023, 4, 9); sometimes ruin (*Moses* 2.53; *Migr. Abr.* 172), of dire consequences (*Unchang. God* 113). “When he was about to be sentenced to death (*thanatōi zēmiousthai*), Hyrcanus had saved him from danger and punishment” (Josephus, *Ant.* 15.16). It is in this sense that St. Paul connects *hybris* and *zēmia* to suggest the anger and the loss of the cargo and the ship in the course of the storm (Acts 27:10, 21) – which he considers as totally null and worthless in comparison with having



Christ (Phil 3:8) – did not wrong the Corinthians, whose sorrow bore such auspicious fruit (2 Cor 7:9). But the bad preacher whose work will be consumed by fire will suffer a loss or harm (1 Cor 3:15), namely, the fruitlessness of his work, which will not be rewarded; he will lose his pay.

In the language of business and *diatribē*, *zēmia-zēmioō* are normally opposed to gain and profit, *kerdō-kerdainō*. So the Lord used this ruinous accounting to teach that gaining the universe would be empty if one lost oneself; St. Paul, alluding to the Damascus road, applied it to himself: the advantages that he had in Judaism (*kerdē*) he considered disadvantageous (*zēmian*) for the sake of Christ; “I consider it all a liability next to the outstanding profit of knowing Jesus Christ. For him, I have accepted the loss of everything ... in order to gain Christ, *hina Christon kerdēsō*” (Phil 3:8).

The goal of the merchant is to make money, to generate profits: “We shall trade and make profits.” But *kerdos* is used for all sorts of advantages and acquisitions. If there are base profits or sordid gains, there is also the gaining of souls, and *kerdainō* became a religious term, or rather an apostolic and missionary term, from the brotherly correction whereby one “gains one’s brother” (Matt 18:15) and from Paul’s adapting himself to every type of person “in order to gain the largest number” (1 Cor 9:20–22) to the husbands whose minds are closed to the word of God but who will be won without a word by the behavior of their Christian wives (1 Pet 3:1). Such texts obviously have no pagan parallels.

## ζωγρέω

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*zōgreō*, to capture alive, spare the life of

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*zogreo*, S 2221; EDNT 2.109; MM 274; L&N 37.1; BAGD 340

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Formed from *zōon-agreō*, this verb is defined by the *Suda*: *zōgrei – zōntas lambanei*. It means “capture alive, spare the life of” and belongs to the vocabulary of hunting and war. Its eight occurrences in the OT all have military meanings, while the two NT occurrences are metaphorical, suggesting a fish or a small animal caught in a net.

After the miraculous catch of fish, “Jesus said to Simon, ‘Fear not; from now on you will catch men.’ ” This is not so much an order as a prophecy announcing the apostolic task to which the disciple will be exclusively dedicated (cf. Luke 18:28–29). He will no longer catch dead fish, in order to eat them; rather, he will catch living people, not to reduce them to servitude, after the fashion of prisoners, but to give them liberty and true life.

In Greek literature, *zōgreō* is most often opposed to verbs meaning kill, massacre, annihilate: “The Persians massacred a large number of the Massagetae and made the others prisoners” (Herodotus 1.211); “The Syracusans had either captured a large number of men or killed them” (Thucydides 7.41.4); “Such was the anger of the Crotoniates that they took no prisoners but killed all who fled.” The fate of these captives is often dire: weighed down with fetters (Herodotus 1.66; Polybius 5.77), it was not rare for them to be executed in the end: “Seven hundred men of the popular party, taken alive (*zōgrēsantes*), were put to death; only one escaped, and he was mutilated” (ibid. 6.91); “Of all the enemies that the Scythians capture alive, they sacrifice one out of a hundred.” But to be “taken alive” means not simply escaping immediate massacre and “being spared,” but also retaining hope of liberation (Herodotus 5.77). That is why vanquished people plead with their conquerors to spare their lives. That is in fact the nuance in Luke 5:10 – keep a captive alive, be gracious and merciful to him, even restore him to life.

The secular texts cited display especially the cruelty of victors toward their prisoners, whom they torture and reduce to slavery, when they do not simply execute them. Thus it is that the devil casts his net over sinners, takes them prisoner (*ezōgrēmenoi*), subjects them to his will (2 Tim 2:26).

## ζωογονέω

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*zōogoneō*, to leave alive, produce a living thing, make alive

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*zoogoneo*, S 2225; TDNT 2.873–874; EDNT 2.109; NIDNTT 2.476; MM 275; L&N 23.89, 23.92; BAGD 341

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This verb has two meanings, which are not always separable. The first, attested by the LXX, is “leave alive,” as opposed to “kill”: Pharaoh “mistreated our fathers, even forcing them to expose their infants so that they would not live, *eis to mē zōogoneisthai*” (Acts 7:19) is a reference to Exod 1:17, 18, 22. “David left alive (*ezōogonei*) neither man nor woman” (1 Sam 27:9, 11; cf. Judg 8:19; 1 Kgs 20:31; 2 Kgs 7:4; always translating the Hebrew *ḥāyāh* in the piel or the hiphil).

With this meaning, *zōogoneō* is a technical term in botany (Theophrastus, *Caus. Pl.* 3.22.3; 4.15.4; *Hist. Pl.* 8.11.2), attested in the papyri, beginning with AD 13, and in the third-fourth centuries it is almost always associated with *euthaleō*, meaning good growth, fine vegetation. On 29 March 323, Origenes and his companions swear to the *logistēs* Dioscurides that they have regularly

watered the tree *pros to zōogonein kai euthalein dia pantos*, which seems to be a stereotyped formula.

But literally, *zōogoneō* means “produce or beget a living thing, make alive,” and with this meaning, God is almost always the subject, as in 1 Tim 6:13 – “I adjure you before God, who gives life to all things, *tou theou tou zōogonountos*.” This divine attribute is referred to in 1 Sam 2:6 (“the Lord causes to die and makes alive, *Kyrios thanatoi kai zōogonei*”) and in the secular literature: god is the engenderer, *ho zōogonōn*.

These usages may help clarify the paradox in Luke 17:33 – *ean apolesei zōogonēsei autēn (psychēn)*; whoever consents to the loss or destruction of his life will save it, preserve it. That is how modern exegetes take it; but for the sentence to mean anything, it seems that we should not exclude the nuance “will bring it back to life,” referring to the saving or originating of a new life. For the living – *ta zōogonounta* – can have several ways of existing or disappearing (Lev 11:47).

ἡγούμενος

*hēgoumenos*, **leader**

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*egoumenos*, S 2233; *TDNT* 2.907–908; *EDNT* 2.113; MM 277; L&N 31.1, 36.1, 37.58; BDF §§264(6), 341, 413(1); BAGD 343

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Derived from *hēgeomai*, this present participle would normally mean “leader, guide, commander,” but the variety in its usage gives it a broader meaning. In Matt 2:6, it refers to the Messiah, “the leader who will shepherd my sheep” (= Mic 5:2 – *archontos*; cf. Gen 49:10); in Acts 15:22, Judas Barsabbas and Silas are “leading men among the brethren” (*andras hēgoumenous en tois adelphois*), an expression that could be compared to the three high officials in Dan 6:2 (cf. 2 Chr 7:18), the chosen and outstanding men of 1 Chr 7:40; especially that category of glorious men in Israel, “leaders of the people by their counsel”; their prudence qualifies them as messengers in delicate matters (2 Chr 17:7; 1 Macc 9:35; 13:8).

*Ho hēgoumenos* is the top man, like Joseph in Egypt, one who is in some way superior (Luke 22:26; Phil 2:3). In the OT, it refers to men who are wise, intelligent, learned (Deut 1:13; Sir 9:17), powerful (Sir 41:17), from whom the chiefs of the tribes are chosen, and initially the king and the general (Judg 11:6, where B reads *archēgos*; 1 Kgs 16:16; 1 Macc 13:53), or *stratēgos* (1 Macc 13:42; 14:35, 41). But *hēgoumenos* can refer to quite diverse levels: prince (Josh 13:21; 2 Sam 3:38; 2 Chr 19:11; Ezek 44:3), governor and magistrate (Ezek 23:6, 12; Dan 2:48; 3:3; Mic 3:9; Mal 1:8), prefect (2 Chr 17:2), “official in charge of the house of God” (1 Chr 9:11, 20), superintendent (1 Chr 26:24; 27:4, 16; 2 Chr 31:13), chief officer (Jer 20:1). In the army, distinctions are made between commander in chief (Jdt 5:5, 7:8; 2 Chr 20:27), commander of a thousand (1 Chr 12:21), commander of fifty (1 Kgs 1:9, 13), commander of couriers (1 Kgs 14:27; cf. the quarrymen under the orders of a *hēgoumenos*, *I.Did.* II, 39, 51). The term always designates one who has authority and takes the initiative, the leader who has responsibility for a common undertaking, notably the head of the city (Sir 10:2) and of the nation, whom God himself prepares for this post.

These usages help clarify the function of the *hēgoumenoi* in Hebrews, who are in charge of the community. They are obviously analogous to the *proistamenoι* (1 Thess 5:12; 1 Tim 3:4–5), who have gifts for administration

(*kybernēseis*, 1 Cor 12:28; Rom 12:8), and who care for the believers as shepherds care for their sheep (*epimeleomai*, 1 Tim 3:5), or as *oikonomoi* of the house of God. The author of Hebrews greets them, because they are worthy of respect (Heb 13:17, 24; cf. *1 Clem.* 21.6 – “let us honor those who preside over us,” *tous proēgoumenous hēmōn aidesthōmen*; Josephus, *War* 1.271: “He died as a hero by an end that matched the conduct of his whole life”). He asks that they be remembered (verse 7) and obeyed. The Vulgate translates *praepositi*. We must recall that in the Hellenistic era, in the Lagid and Seleucid kingdoms, *hēgoumenos* is a technical term for the person in charge of a city, is responsible for its defense or protection; or again, the president of an assembly, esteemed by all.

Since there is no other NT parallel than Luke 22:26 (parallel to *ho meizōn*), the best thing would be to transliterate *hēgoumenos*, which became the traditional title of superiors of monasteries (*P.Rein.* 107, 1; *P.Ness.* 45, 1; 46, 3; etc.). If we translate, it is difficult to choose between “leader,” which preserves the etymological sense, and “president,” which reflects the use of the term in the papyri to designate the head or person in charge of various associations, an office also referred to as *epimelētēs*. For example, there is the *hēgoumenos* of the weavers of a village (*hēgoumenos gerdiōn tēs kōmēs*, *P.Grenf.* II, 43, 9, in the first century; *P.Bon.* 20, 21, from 69–70); the *hēgoumenos* of a town assembly, Onnopheros – these presidents were linked and sometimes identified with the *presbyteroi*; and the *hēgoumenoi* of religious bodies: “Athenodorus, to the *hēgoumenos* of the priests of Soknopaiou Nesos.”

From all these texts the conclusion emerges that the post of *hēgoumenos* was not a sinecure. The person in question was appointed because of his great competence. He had responsibility for the overall administration of the association and wielded authority, called and presided over meetings, supplied the drinks for the monthly dinner, managed finances (*PSI* 1265), gave orders (2 Macc 14:16, 20), and was owed obedience; he took coercive measures against delinquents and meted out penalties. It is not surprising that in 24 BC the “*spoudē* (zeal, pains) *tōn hēgoumenōn*” should be mentioned (*P.Tebt.* 700, 30), or that in the second century AD a certain Dios, who awaits the arrival of the *hēgoumenos* to solve his problems, should at the same time expect “the help of the gods” (*P.Alex.* 25, 15). These data supply something of an analogy with the office of the leaders of the Christian community in the first century: they “take pains,” and St. Paul asks that they be “thought of with infinite (*hyperekperissou*) respect” (1 Thess 5:13; cf. *Did.* 4.1).

***hēdeōs*, gladly; *hēdion*, more gladly, quite gladly; *hēdista*, most gladly, very gladly; *hēdys*, pleasant, sweet**

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***edeos***, S 2234; *EDNT* 2.113; MM 277–278; L&N 25.129; BAGD 343–344 | ***edion***, BAGD 343–344 | ***edista***, S 2236; MM 278; L&N 25.129; BDF §§60(2), 246; BAGD 343–344 | ***edus***, BAGD 344

*Hēdys*, which is used to describe wine (Esth 1:7; *P.Cair.Zen.* 59110, 29; *P.Lond.* 2056, 4), an offering that is acceptable to God (Josephus, *Ant.* 12.47), a sweet child (*CII* 126), a person who is pleasant to be with (*C.P.Herm.* 3, 5; cf. *P.Brem.* 55, 9; *P.Ryl.* 706, 14), and of “the sweet life.” As a parallel for the comparative *hēdion*, which is found only in Sir 22:11, which bids the reader “cry more sweetly (or less sadly) over a deceased person, because he is at rest” (*hēdion klauson epi nekrō*), the letter of the proconsul Paulus Fabius Maximus in 9 BC has been cited. This letter proposes to the Greeks of Asia Minor the introduction of a new anniversary for Augustus, “the same for all; it would be more satisfying for humankind (*hēdion d’an anthrōpois*) if everyone joined with it the pleasure of their own inauguration.”

As for the adverb *hēdeōs*, it refers to the sort of friendly indifference with which an audience may listen to this or that speaker (2 Cor 11:19; Polybius 5.36.6; 5.37.12) and the real pleasure that they may derive from so doing (Mark 6:20; 12:37). Menander uses it often, as do the papyri, from which Moulton-Milligan give numerous examples. It is common for the author of a letter to ask his correspondent exactly what he wants, saying that he will do it willingly. In 250 BC: “Write if you need anything from us, for we will do it *hēdeōs*” (*graphe de kai, ean tinos tōn par’ hēmin chreian echēs, hoti gar hēdeōs poiēsomen*, *SB* 7648, 8); in the second century AD: “But you also must make clear to me what you want; they will do it *hēdeōs*.” Pleasure is or is not derived from someone’s company (*SB* 4317, 10; 7572, 20; *P.Oxy.* 298, 33; 1218, 12). The word is also used in formulas of greeting, and takes on the nuances of willingly, gladly (*Pap.Lugd.Bat.* XVI, 31, 4), pleasantly, with pleasure, as in this epitaph for a black slave: “Learn, stranger, that I am Fortunatus, because I obtained from Fortune that which is pleasant for mortals” (*SB* 8071, 18; cf. *SEG* VIII, 464, 22).

The adverb *hēdista*, which St. Paul uses in the sense of “most gladly” (2 Cor 12:9, 15), takes on all the preceding meanings. “King Agrippa to Joseph his very dear friend, greetings. It was with much pleasure that I read your letter” (Josephus, *Life* 365); “Write me what you want, and I will be very happy to do it” (*P.Oxy.* 1061, 21; from 22 BC); “I greet you most gladly” (*P.Oxy.* 933, 5);

something is received with great pleasure (*P.Lond.* 897, 8; vol. 3, p. 207; in AD 84); to dilute in very sweet wine (*P.Oxy.* 234, 39).

ἑπιος

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*ēpios*, **congenial, kind**

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*ēpios*, S 2261; *EDNT* 2.122; MM 281; L&N 88.61; BAGD 348

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Unknown in the OT, rare in the papyri, *ēpios* is used only twice in the NT, both times by St. Paul. Writing to the Thessalonians, he reminds them that as an apostle of Christ he could have been a burden on them (*en barei*) but rather was entirely congenial toward them, after the fashion of a mother who nurses her children and pampers them. To Timothy, he writes: “A servant of God must not be combative, but very congenial toward all.” In both cases, *ēpios* refers to a style of teaching and of apostolic authority, without sharpness or bitterness arising from overzealousness: St. Paul shows a motherly goodness; the bishop of Ephesus will make no use of hurtful or sarcastic speech, or a rigid attitude; nor will he be intolerant in his relations with others; he will be “kind toward all,” even adversaries and opponents.

This means that in the NT *ēpiotēs* is not so much a virtue of personal and family life – much less of child-rearing – as the attitude required in the leader of the community. Toward adversaries who are determined to discuss and quarrel, the good shepherd keeps a courteous and calm attitude, an attitude well suited to pacifying the hot-tempered and aggressive, a disarming gentleness. In paganism and in Judaism, it is above all a divine attribute: “the most *ēpios* god toward humans” (*theos ... anthrōpoisi d’ ēpioutatos*, Euripides, *Bacch.* 861); the Pythagorean Sthenidas of Locri: “It is natural that the first god was considered father of the gods and father of men, especially because he is *ēpios* toward all whom he has brought into being (*hoti ēpios pros panta ta hyp’ autō genomena esti*) and because for all of them alike he is the nurse and teacher – *tropheus, didaskalos* – who teaches them all good things” (in Stobaeus, 7.63; vol. 4, p. 271). Philo attributes these words to Yahweh: “I am by nature *ēpios* and favorable to true suppliants” (*Moses* 1.72). Zeus, who is “*ēpios* toward humans (*ho d’ ēpios anthrōpoisi*), sends them unfailing signs” (Aratus, *Phaen.* 5); Leto, “endlessly mild, *ēpios* toward humans and toward the immortal gods, mild from her first day, merciful among all the Olympians.” In an invocation to Isis, from the second century, this tenderness is parallel to *philostorgia*, the virtue of rulers: *en Kalamisi ēpian, en tē Karēnē philostorgon*. This modifier goes particularly well with divinities who save: Apollo, Asclepius, Hygieia.

It is likewise a royal virtue, one that Ahasuerus made good on. It is incumbent upon masters to show “congeniality and mildness” (Philo, *Decalogue* 167). Philodemus of Gadara agrees: “let him appear *praos* (mild) because of his judgment, let him be loved for his *ēpiotēs*” (*Good King* 7.13–14; cf. 6.24). According to Hecataeus, “after the battle of Pharsalus, Ptolemy became master of Syria, and many of the inhabitants, when they learned of his cordiality and humaneness – *tēn ēpiotēta kai philanthrōpian* – wanted to leave with him for Egypt” (Josephus, *Ag. Apion* 1.186). When Augustus gave way to wrath, Maecenas always calmed him: “for he set him free from wrath and restored him to a more *ēpios* frame of mind.” In the fifth century, Leontios, prefect of the pretorium of Illyria, staked his claim to glory on having been mild and benevolent toward upright judges and dreadful to the unjust. In his chapter on descriptions of royalty, Julius Pollux lists: “Concerning the praises of a king, say – *Peri basileōs epainōn, lege: patēr, ēpios, praios, hēmeros, pronoētikos, epieikēs, philanthrōpos, megalophrōn*” (*Onom.* 1.2.40). The first sequence probably comes from Homer. It goes without saying that *ēpiotēs* can be practiced by private individuals. Moulton-Milligan cite this tomb inscription: “kind and *ēpios* to all people.” In fact, it is most often associated with *hilaos* and *meilichos*. Philo inserts it between *hēmerotēs* and *philanthrōpia* (*Sacr. Abel and Cain* 27). Finally, while *nēpios* is the underaged child, or minor, subject to someone’s authority or in need of someone’s protection, the person who is *ēpios* plays a parental and civic role, is a person of responsible age who is gifted with beneficent power and with wisdom.

ἡσυχάζω, ἡσυχία, ἡσύχιος

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*hēsychazō, to be silent; to be calm, tranquil; hēsychia, silence, tranquility, rest; hēsychios, tranquil, quiet, peaceful*

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*esuchazo*, S 2270; *EDNT* 2.125; *NIDNTT* 3.111–112; MM 281; L&N 23.82, 33.119, 88.103; BDF §420(2); BAGD 349 | *esuchia*, S 2271; *EDNT* 2.125; *NIDNTT* 3.111–112; MM 281; L&N 22.43, 33.119, 88.103; BAGD 349 | *esuchios*, S 2272; *EDNT* 2.125; *NIDNTT* 3.111–112; MM 281–282; L&N 88.104; BAGD 349

Before taking on moral value, these terms – etymology unknown – meant either silence or tranquility, and it is not always impossible to unravel this double connotation.

I. – When the Jews heard Paul speaking in Hebrew they “kept all the more quiet” (Acts 22:2). Doctors of the law and Pharisees were reduced to silence by



the wisdom of Jesus and “held their peace.” But if Peter’s audience, after hearing him tell about the conversion of the centurion Cornelius, “kept silence” (Acts 11:18, *hēsychasan*), keeping their objections quiet, we would do better to translate “fell silent,” because it is said immediately thereafter “and they glorified God,” apparently aloud. Similarly, when St. Paul would not let himself be persuaded to give up his plans to go to Jerusalem, the brothers are silent, meaning that they no longer insisted, but more accurately, “We remained quiet, saying ‘God’s will be done’ ” (Acts 21:14). In other words, “silence” means not the absence of noise or speech but quiet and tranquility. So it is that a woman – like a disciple in the school of a teacher – should receive “instruction in silence (*en hēsychia*), in all submissiveness (*en pasē hypotagē*).” This mandate is more psychological and religious than physical: it calls for an attitude of attentiveness and receptiveness.

II. – In the LXX and the papyri, the most common meaning of *hēsychia-hēsychazō* is remain calm, tranquil; repose is contrasted with agitation, war, or danger. It is commonly said that the land, the city, or the populace was tranquil for so many years, meaning that they enjoyed peace for that length of time: peaceful people live in security and at rest (Ezek 38:11; Hebrew *šāqat*). The meaning is classical, since Thucydides uses *hēsychia-hēsychazō* for inaction, times of peace, as opposed to combat (3.6.1; 3.12.1; 3.66.21; 3.71.1; 3.106.3); this is the meaning in 2 Macc 14:4 (“That day Alcimus did nothing more, *tēn hēmeran ekeinēn hēsychian esche*”) and in Luke 23:56 (“on the Sabbath, the women rested, according to the commandment”). The definition of the word is then extended to cover interior calm, as opposed to anxiety or fear. The one who listens to talebearers will never have peace (Sir 28:16; cf. *BGU* 1764, 11), but the good will remain in tranquility (Prov 15:15). Yahweh watches over them (Isa 66:2) and gives them *hēsychia* (1 Chr 22:9). “The children of the great God will live in tranquility (*hēsychiōs*) around the temple” (*Sib. Or.* 3.702).

III. – There are different levels of rest. Just as *hēsychia* does not mean absolute muteness, neither does it imply the cessation of all activity. St. Paul exhorts the Thessalonians to work *meta hēsychias*, so that they may eat their own bread (2 Thess 3:12), to “live in quietness (*hēsychazein*), look after your own business, work with your hands” (1 Thess 4:11), meaning without agitation, dispute, or vain curiosity, without poking into things that are not their concern. The meaning is clearly moral. The best parallel is Philo’s contrast between the respectable man and the “vulgar man, who spends his days meddling, running around in public, in theaters, tribunals, councils, and assemblies, meetings and consultations of all sorts; he prattles on without moderation, fruitlessly, to no end; he confuses and stirs up everything, mingling

truth with falsehood, the spoken with the unspoken, the private with the public, the sacred with the profane, the serious with the ridiculous, not having learned to remain quiet (*hēsychian*), which is the ideal when the situation calls for it; and he pricks up his ears in an excess of bustling busyness.”

IV. – Finally, the whole of the Christian life should unfold in a climate of peace and security that is favorable to the birth and development of virtue. Believers should pray for the powers that be, “so that we may lead a peaceful and *hēsychios* life.” Like *hopōs, hina* introduces a result: that the Christian community, free from trials, may develop in calm and tranquility. The adjective *hēsychios* reinforces the idea of peace (*ēremon*) and accentuates the importance of unfettered external freedom and of serenity of heart. An untroubled political and social context is favorable for the life of the soul. Christian women, according to 1 Pet 3:4, have the charm of quietness and peacefulness (*tou praeōs kai hēsychiou pneumatos*), the opposite of agitation, impatience, annoyance, notably of compulsive discussion. Discretion and tranquility go together. Thanks to this peaceful, religious calm, the spouse can hope to win her husband who does not believe in the word of God even without speaking a word (1 Pet 3:1).

V. – Hellenistic *hēsychia* then has a broad range of meaning: (a) repose in a bed (*Jos. Asen.* 10.8; 25.3), in the grave (Job 3:13 – *nyn an koimētheis hēsychasa*), days of relaxation (Add Esth 14:17w – I do not wear the diadem “on days when I am resting”), especially during retirement, like the secretary Pamouthis, who expressed the desire to terminate his functions, to withdraw from business (*tōn pragmatōn*) because of his poor health, and to rest: *kai hēsychasai*. (b) This tranquility of mind and of heart, this calm existence, sheltered from trouble and danger, is the hope of all citizens (Dio Chrysostom 6.34: *mēdepote de hēsychian dynamenous agein*; Thucydides 1.71.3; 5.26.5; Philo, *Rewards* 128; *T. Asher* 6.6), of spouses (*P. Oxy.* 129, 8), of every wise person (*PSI* 41, 23), like Sertorius (Plutarch, *Eum.* 21.1). (c) If Epictetus addresses “those who seek tranquility and leisure, *en hēsychia diagein*” (4.4; cf. 1.10.2: *en hēsychia kai ataraxia*), he sees in this desire an occasion for mutual interdependence, which is contrary to *ataraxia* (cf. Plato, *Resp.* 6.496 d; Epicurus, according to Plutarch, *Mor.* 465 f). But the Latins raised *otium cum dignitate* to the level of an ideal. (d) This repose is even a religious virtue, because it is proper to God, who is the model for the wise person. Through its detachment from created goods, it becomes in Philo a characteristic of the contemplative life, practiced by the silent Essenes (Josephus, *War* 2.130), and a monastic spirituality: “If you see a monk walking along alone, with a demeanor that bespeaks humility, modesty, quietude, and tranquility – *tapeinon kai praon kai hēsychion kai ēremon* – envy the happiness of that man.”

# θ th

## θάλλω

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*thalpō*, **to warm up, keep warm, care for, nurture**

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*thalpo*, S 2282; EDNT 2.128; MM 283; L&N 35.36; BAGD 350

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This verb may be said to have four meanings: (a) In its literal meaning, “reheat, keep hot,” it is applied to things, to an animal that is brooding, keeping its eggs warm (Deut 22:6), and to people: “Was I made just to stay in bed and keep warm under the covers?” (Marcus Aurelius 5.1.1). (b) In a metaphorical sense, to keep warm by showing affection, meaning to comfort or restore the strength of (cf. *thalpōrē*, comfort), which does not exclude the first meaning: Abishag the Shunammite warms and strengthens David (1 Kgs 1:2, 4; cited by Josephus, *Ant.* 7.343); the deceased are kept warm by a mound that lightly covers them. (c) Translating love, burning passion, or signifying a tender attachment, like Herodes Atticus erecting a statue to his cousin and disciple Polydeukion: “the one who nurtured him and loved him as a son” (*ho threpsas kai philēsas hōs huion*). That is the meaning of the two NT occurrences, where St. Paul cherishes the Thessalonians as a mother does her children (1 Thess 2:7) and declares: “No one ever hated his own flesh, but rather nurtures it and cares tenderly for it. That is just what Christ does for the church” (Eph 5:29). That is the late meaning in the Byzantine papyri; in marriage contracts, the fiancé undertakes “to care for and nurture and clothe (his wife)” (*thalpein kai trephein kai himatizein autēn*, *P.Cair.Masp.* 6 B, 132), “to love and care for and attend to” (*agapan kai thalpein kai therapeuein*). (d) Among these usages, one last meaning must be included: “tend, care for,” used of persons as well as of things. The *stratēgos* Callimachus “cared for the city” (*tēn polin ethalpse*) as a good father for his family and like the *dux* of *P.Lond.* 1674, 100 (cf. 1727, 11; 1729, 16).

## θανάσιμος

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*thanasimos*, **mortal, causing death, relating to death**

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*thanasimos*, S 2286; EDNT 2.129; MM 283; L&N 23.115; BAGD 350

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This biblical hapax, which can be either noun or adjective (like the English “mortal”), is as common in classical Greek as in Koine. It is noteworthy both that its meaning never varied and also that something that is by nature *thanasimos* can be rendered harmless by some external intervention. The resurrected Christ, appearing to the Eleven, promises them the gift of miracles on various occasions: “They will take serpents in their hands, and if they drink any deadly poison, it will do them no harm” (*kan thanasimon ti piōsin ou mē autous blapsē*).

(a) In classical Greek, *thanasimos* (“causing or leading to death”) is used to describe an act of aggression (Sophocles, *OT* 560), a fall, a deadly wound or illness, especially poisonous animals (*thansimōn thēriōn*, Polybius 1.56.4) whose bite causes death (Diodorus Siculus 1.87). Hence, the meaning “poison” or “poisoning,” which predominates almost to the point of being a technical term in the Hellenistic period. This is the only meaning known by Philo and the commonest meaning in Josephus. According to Plutarch, when Domitius had asked his physician for poison (*pharamakon*), he gave him a narcotic to drink, not a lethal drug (*ou thanasimon*, *Caes.* 34.8); Aratus received from his son Philip “a poison which, without being lethal, drove him mad.” In a *tabella defictionis* of Cnidos in the second century BC: “I consign to Demeter and to Kore the one who said against me that I compound deadly poisons for my husband.”

(b) *Thanasimos* is also “relating to death.” “Hecuba, learning the deadly fate of the child” (*thanasimon moron*, Euripides, *Hec.* 1145); “the prophet himself led me to this destiny of death” (*thanasimous tychas*). Antipater had prepared a deadly plan (Josephus, *Ant.* 17.74, *thanasimon gnōmēn*); “he himself was more deadly a menace for his father than all the others” (*pantōn autō thanasimōtatōn*, *Ant.* 17.120).

(c) “Near death, moribund, dying.” Sophocles, *Phil.* 819: “O earth, receive me quickly, I am going to die” (*dexai thanasimon*); Plato, *Resp.* 3.408c: “to heal for money a rich man who was dying” (*thanasimon ... iasasthai*); 10.610 e: “injustice is far from being a cause of death.”

θαρσέω (θαρρέω), θάρσος

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*tharseō (tharreō)*, **to have confidence, courage; tharsos, courage**

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*tharseo (tharreo)*, S 2293; TDNT 3.25–27; EDNT 2.134; NIDNTT 1.327–329; MM 284; L&N 25.156; BDF §§34(2), 148(2), 206(2), 407; BAGD 352 | *tharsos*, S 2294; EDNT 2.134; L&N 25.157; BAGD 352

The denominative verb *tharseō* (Ionian; the Attic form is *tharreō*) is always used in the imperative in the NT, in conformity with most of its occurrences in the LXX. It means, in effect, “have confidence, courage, be unafraid,” with the nuance determined by the context. It is a common stylistic element in accounts of miracles, as in that of the paralytic: “Take heart, my child, your sins are forgiven” (Matt 9:2); that of the woman with the hemorrhage (Matt 9:22); the blind man at Jericho (Mark 10:49). When the apostles, thinking that they have seen a ghost walking on the water, are terrified, Jesus reassures them: “Take heart, it is I, fear not” (*tharseite, egō eimi, mē phobeisthe*, Matt 14:27; Mark 6:50). To this may be compared Caesar’s order to the pilot terrified by the storm: “Take heart and make for the rough water; you bear Caesar and the fortune of Caesar” (*tharrōn ithi pros ton klydona; Kaisara phereis kai tēn Kaisaros tychēn*, Plutarch, *Caes.* 38.5; cf. *Ant.* 48.6).

This verb thus refers to courage that can be displayed in the midst of danger or simply with respect to a trial: martyrdom, exile, scorn, whatever goes against our desires or requires effort, an undertaking that is difficult and of uncertain outcome, like pleading a case (*P.Oxy.* 237, col. VIII, 17; Philo, *Post. Cain* 38: “If an accusation of impiety is brought against you, take heart – *tharreite*”), exposing oneself bravely to the cold (Hippocrates, *Vict.* 3.68, *tharseōn*; cf. 74, give oneself to exercises, *tharrein*), even “take on a pioneering role in a science” (Strabo, *Prolegomena* 1.1.4), and especially bravery or daring in battles, whether on the one hand the battles of war or of human life, or on the other hand the battles of initiation into the mysteries of salvation, where the exhortation to bravery in facing dangers in the long and perilous journey in the beyond, culminating in the supreme trial of judgment, implies a hope of immortality. In every instance, the imperative is meant to encourage someone who will be undergoing a trial. This is the nuance in John 16:33, where Jesus tells the apostles that persecutions will come and exhorts them not to give up: “In the world you will have to endure tribulation, but be bold (courage! – *tharseite*), I have overcome the world.” Similarly, Acts 23:11 – “The Lord, appearing to Paul, said ‘Take heart, for just as you have testified concerning me at Jerusalem, you must also testify at Rome’ ” (a vision is said to be “encouraging,” cf. Plutarch, *Pomp.* 68.3). In both cases, a motivation is provided with the exhortation, as is traditional, and the danger of death is in view.

Indeed, it is especially in the face of death that it is necessary to be intrepid (to *tharsos*, Epictetus 2.1.14; *tharrei*, Menander, *Dysk.* 692; Josephus, *Ant.* 7.266: “He said, ‘And you, O Samuis, take heart and fear not at all that you shall die’ ”: *sy te, eipen, ō Samoui, tharrei kai deisēs mēden hōs tethnēxomenos*; cf. 1 Macc 4:35). According to Codex Bezae, in response to the

prayer of the good thief, Jesus said to him, “*tharsei*” (Luke 23:43). It is not rare to see an epitaph, even in Latin, ending with *tharsei* and especially with *tharsei – oudeis athanatos* (“no one lives forever”), even on Jewish and Christian graves; because this is not only an exhortation to accept the common lot, but an audacious confidence in the eternal future. Thanks to faith, the fear of death is overcome. It is in this eschatological sense that St. Paul, in exile, takes courage (*tharrountes, tharroumen*), preferring to go be at home with the Lord. The Christian draws this energy from the certitude of the Lord’s presence and help, which prevails over anguish or the feeling of being abandoned: “We can say courageously (*tharrountas*) ‘The Lord is my help, I will not fear.’ ”

The Stoic meaning of *tharreō* is found in 2 Cor 7:16; 10:1–2, where the apostle rejoices at “being able in all things to be bold with” the Corinthians, to speak to them undiplomatically, with evangelical liberty and authority, and thus to communicate to them painful truths. He is accused of being timid in person, but bold, unflexible, assertive from a distance; so he protests that he is ready to demonstrate his boldness if circumstances require. Philo had shown that in addressing God piety (*eulabeia*) could go along with a certain audacity (*to tharreîn, Heir* 22) and the latter with a fear of saying what one thinks (ibid. 28). Epictetus lauded the conciliation of prudence and boldness – *eulabōs hama de tharrountōs*; they seem to be opposites, but in reality there is no contradiction between them (2.1.1).

When St. Paul, finally arriving at the Forum of Appius and at Three Taverns, meets the brothers from Rome who have come to greet them, “on seeing them he gave thanks to God and took courage, *elabe tharsos*.”

## θεοδίδακτοι, θεόπνευστος

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*theodidaktoi*, **taught by God**; *theopneustos*, **breathed or inspired by God**

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*theodidaktoi*, S 2312; TDNT 3.121; EDNT 2.139; MM 286–287; L&N 33.228; BAGD 356 | *theopneustos*, S 2315; TDNT 6.453–455; EDNT 2.140; NIDNTT 3.689–690; MM 287; L&N 33.261; BAGD 356; ND 3.30

The *theodidaktoi* Thessalonians are “taught by God” to love one another (1 Thess 4:9). *Theodidaktos* is a NT and OT hapax. It has been pointed out by Hugo Rabe in *Prolegomenon Sylloge*, (Leipzig, 1931, p. 91, 14). It is also found in Barn. 21.6, important for its dependence; Athenagoras, *Leg.* 2.32; Theophilus, *Ad Autol.* 2.9; and the Greek fathers. It is formed like *theo-stygēs* (Rom 1:30) and *theo-pneustos* (2 Tim 3:16), and its elements are found together in John 6:45, which depends on Isa 54:13; Jer 31:33. St. Paul might have been thinking

of these passages. Compare also *Pss. Sol.* 17.35 and Matt 23:8. Above all, compare 1 Cor 2:13 – *didaktois pneumatos*.” G. Mussies (*Dio Chrysostom*, p. 202) cites Dio Chrysostom 4.41: “And again, when he (Homer) calls kings *diotrepheis* and *diiphilous*, he seems to mean something other than the sustenance that he calls divine teaching and instruction” (*palin de hotan legē diotrepheis kai diiphilous, allo ti oiei legein auton ē tēn trophēn tautēn hēn ephēn theian einai didaskalian kai mathēteian*).

To express the sacred nature of the Scriptures, their divine origin, and their power to sanctify believers, perhaps St. Paul coined the verbal adjective *theopneustos*, “breathed, inspired by God.” We know that in biblical Greek *pneō* refers to the breath of Yahweh (Isa 11:4; Ps 147:18; 148:8); in the form of a noun in Acts 27:40 (*tēi pneousēi = aurai* = “to the breeze”), it expresses the action of the Holy Spirit. The compound *theopneustos* should be understood in a passive sense, as it is understood by: “divinitus inspirata” in the Vulgate; “divinitus instituta” in Codex Fuldensis; the parallel text 2 Pet 1:21 – “born along by the Holy Spirit, men spoke from God” (*hypo pneumatos hagiou pheromenoi elalēsan apo theou anthrōpoi*); Ambrosiaster’s gloss, “divinitus inspirata ... cujus Deus auctor ostenditur” (“whose author is shown to be God”); and almost all the Greek fathers and commentators. Underlying this theological conception of a sacred text is the Hellenistic concept whereby the tragic and lyric poets are considered to have written under inspiration from the gods, that they are their spokesmen, addressing their fellow citizens in the name of the divinity.

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## θεοσέβεια, θεοσεβής

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*theosebeia*, **reverence, piety**; *theosebēs*, **reverent, pious**

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*theosebeia*, S 2317; TDNT 3.123–128; EDNT 2.142; NIDNTT 2.91–92; MM 288; L&N 53.1; BAGD 358 | *theosebēs*, S 2318; TDNT 3.123–128; EDNT 2.142; NIDNTT 2.91, 94; MM 288; L&N 53.6; BAGD 358

The noun and the adjective in the LXX translate “the fear of God” or of Adonai. They are used with men and women who worship the true God and conform to his will. The meaning is as much moral as religious, connected with notions of purity, holiness, perfection, wisdom. *Theosebeia* is contradictory to sin (Sir 1:25); to possess it is a title of nobility.

This is exactly the nuance in John 9:31 – “God does not hear sinners; but if someone is pious (*tis theosebēs ēi*) and does his will, he listens to that person” – and in 1 Tim 2:10, where St. Paul exhorts the Ephesians to decency, “as befits women who profess *theosebeia*.” Just as spiritual *thrēskeia* is identified by its helping the unfortunate (Jas 1:27), the worship of God implies ethical uprightness.

In secular Greek, *theosebeia* is also mentioned in eulogies to point out the excellence of a person or an action, and especially with ethical value; but it is worth noting that the literature or the inscriptions that point it out are of predominantly Jewish origin. In the imperial period, an inscription from the theater of Miletus specifies the placement of the spectators: “Place for Jews and God-fearers, *topos Eioudaiōn tōn kai theosebōn*.” *Tōn kai* is not to be taken as introducing another category, distinct from Jews per se, namely proselytes; rather, these are Jews who are described as fearing God. In a synagogue of Tralles, in the third century AD, a certain Capitolina is described as *hē axiologōtatē kai theoseb[ēs] or theoseb[estatē]*. From the same period in Lydia,



in a synagogue of the region of Philadelphia, a basin for ablutions was offered by Eustathios the Pious. At Rome, Agrippa, son of Fuscus, is described as *theosebēs* (CII 500); in the Jewish catacomb of the Via Appia, a “Jewish proselyte [is also called] *Theosebēs*” (ibid. 202). The title thus seems to belong to the vocabulary of Jewish epigraphy; but it is not a technical term (cf. *sebomenoi*, *phoboumenoi*), and it would seem overly bold to see it as belonging exclusively to converts or proselytes added to the community of Israel.

Actually, the epitaph of an anonymous person who died at age eighteen and was apparently from Alexandria describes his virtue with respect to gods and men by these words: *dikaïos, theosebēs philanthrōpos*. In *Mart. Pol.* 3.2, “the whole multitude was astonished by the courage of the holy (*theophilēs*) and pious (*theosebēs*) race of Christians” (*tēn gennaiotēta tou theophilous kai theosebous genous tōn christianōn*). Even in the Jewish writings, in the papyrological documents that we have, *eulabeia* is a reverential title used from the fourth century to honor various personages in the Christian church: bishops, archbishops (*SB* 9527, 4), priests (*IGLS* 279), a church administrator (*SB* 10269 verso), deacons, the superiors of a religious order (*P.Stras.* 279, 12: “reverence the most *theosebēs* and long-lived common father, Abba Charisios,” *proskynēsete ton theosebestaton kai makrogēron koinon patera ton abba Charision*), abbots of monasteries, an anchorite (M. Naldini, *Il Cristianesimo in Egitto*, n. 86, 2, 24, 26), a widow or a consecrated virgin (*IGLS* 727), a “most pious sovereign” (ibid. 1875), and even those who make up the escort of eminent persons: Count John, for example, “with the very pious brothers James, Agathos, and Phoibammon.” The usage is constant in letters from the Byzantine period (cf. M. Naldini, *Il Cristianesimo in Egitto*, n. 42, 5; 49, 5; 83, 5; 84, 21).

We may speculate that this purely conventional designation is somehow derived from 1 Tim 2:10; in any event, it is likewise in a context of prayer that *theosebēs* is used in *Pap.Graec.Mag.* 4, 685 (vol. 1, p. 96).

## θρησκεία, θρησκός

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*thrēskeia*, **worship, liturgy, ritual, religion**; *thrēskos*, **religious, reverent**

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*threskeia*, S 2356; TDNT 3.155–159; EDNT 2.154; NIDNTT 3.549, 551; MM 293; L&N 53.1; BAGD 363 | *threskos*, S 2357; TDNT 3.155–159; EDNT 2.155; NIDNTT 3.549, 551; L&N 53.6; BDF §118(2); BAGD 363

These two terms, which occur frequently in the imperial period, are of Ionian origin and derive from *thrēskeuō*, “observe religious practices.” The biblical hapax *thrēskos* is unknown in Greek before Jas 1:26.

I. – The ritual and liturgical meaning of *thrēskeia* is its basic and most often attested sense: acts of worship (the term is often in the plural), ritual function, liturgy, religious observance, ceremony, in honor of a divinity, an emperor, a deceased person. In Wis 14:18, 27 and *T. Job* 2.2 it refers to the worship or veneration of idols; in Col 2:18 the *thrēskeia tōn angelōn*. The tyrant Antiochus scoffs at Eleazar for holding to Jewish practices (4 Macc 5:6, 13). Philo denounces the imposter who claims to be a prophet and leads his hearers into pagan superstitions, “toward the *thrēskeia* of the gods who are acknowledged in the various cities.” Plutarch recommends that the married person “shut out from the home superfluous ceremonies and foreign superstitions” (*periergois de thrēskeiais kai xenais deisidaimoniais apokekleisthai tēn auleion, Con. praec.* 19). In 174, the Tyrians of Puteoli mention “the expenditures that we have to make for the sacrifices and for the worship of our national divinities who have temples here.” On 14 June 171, the priests of the town of Bacchias ask the *stratēgos* to countermand an order of the *ekboleus*, who is sending them to work far from their temple; they say that they want to be in a position “to carry out each day the ceremonies of the gods for the preservation of our lord the emperor.” In 202–204, two priests declare that they have faithfully carried out the rites. Negligent priests are liable to a fine of two hundred drachmas.

II. – If *thrēskeia* is often used in a thoroughly material sense, for a purely ritual deed or action, it is normally an expression of an internal piety or a truly religious sentiment. This is certainly the case when Emperor Claudius prides himself on having promoted the cult of Apollo; and it is the inspiration behind a goodly number of religious rules posted on the doors of sanctuaries. Confirmation is provided by the frequent mention of *eusebeia*: “they worshiped the gods with *eusebeia*.” It is in this sense that St. Paul confessed to King Agrippa, “I have lived as a Pharisee according to the strictest sect of our religion” (*kata tēn akribestatēn hairesin tēs hēmeteras thrēskeias*, Acts 26:5; cf. Josephus, *Ant.* 12.271; 19.284). The emphasis is on the practice of external observances and on the faithfulness of traditional piety.

III. – But in this latter text, *thrēskeia* is properly understood as being religion pure and simple, or better, the liturgy and rites used in the adoration of God, the cult that honors God. Thus the expression in the sixth century, “Jewish with respect to religion” (*Ioudaiō tēn thrēskeian, P.Ant.* 42, 10 = *C.Pap.Jud.* 508) or “Samaritan with respect to religion” (*Samaritai tēn thrēskian, C.P.Herm.* 29, 7 = *SB* 9278, 7). Clement of Rome referred to the Christian religion as *thrēskeia hēmōn* (*1 Clem.* 62.1; cf. 45.7).

IV. – *Thrēskeia* takes on ethical connotations in Jas 1:26 – “If someone thinks that he is religious – *ei tis dokei thrēskos einai* – and does not bridle his tongue ... his religion (*hē thrēskeia*) is worthless,” his observances are vain; Jas

1:27 – “Religion that is pure and spotless before the God and Father – *thrēskeia kathara kai amiantos* – to take help to orphans and widows.” The best parallel is probably that of *Corp. Herm.* 12.23: “Adore this Word, my child, and worship him (*proskynei kai thrēskeue*). For there is only one way to worship God (*thrēskeia mia*): not being evil.” Philo emphasizes that “authentic worship” requires cleansing one’s heart of ingratitude, self-love, and presumption (*Sacr. Abel and Cain* 58); and Josephus notes that Isaac combined with the practice of all the virtues and with filial obedience a zeal for the *thrēskeia* of God (*Ant.* 1.222).

In defining true religion not by the the precise execution of rituals but by the carrying out of moral obligations and above all by brotherly love, St. James sided with the contemporary religious movement in the direction of the spiritualization of worship.

ἴδιος, ἴδια, ἰδίᾳ

*idios*, **particular, private, own; idia, one's own affairs, property, etc.; idia** (with subscript), **for oneself particularly**

*idios*, S 2398; *EDNT* 2.171; *NIDNTT* 2.839–840; MM 298; L&N 10.12, 28.67, 57.4, 58.47, 87.56, 92.21; BDF §§12, 14, 241(6), 286; BAGD 369 | *idia*, *NIDNTT* 2.838–840; ND 6.113–119, 125–127

Whether used as adjective, noun, or adverb, this term means “peculiar to, particular, private,” but its sense is weakened in the Koine, where it is usually equivalent to a possessive. It is used with respect to things as well as persons to express who they belong to: “If you were of the world, the world would love its own” (*to idion ephilei*, John 15:19); “wood must be taken from his own property” (1 Esdr 6:31); “Leaving there the things that belonged to us (*ta idia*, our goods), we followed you.” *Ta idia* means “his/her/ its property, goods”; cf. “a land that is not theirs” (*ouk idia*, Gen 15:13; 47:18; Deut 15:2; Prov 11:24); “no one said that anything he had was his own” (*idion einai*). That which is public or common (*koinon*) is always being contrasted with the private (*idion*): “Boulagoras rendered many services in a public capacity and in private.”

Often enough, *ta idia* refers to private business, personal interests: “Hold it as a point of honor to see to your own business” (*prassein ta idia*, 1 Thess 4:11); “each one has his own burden to bear” (Gal 6:5); “Each one must forget his individual sufferings (*apalgēsantas de ta idia*) and devote himself to the preservation of the common interest.” “He does not draw from it a meager profit for himself” (*eis idion*, *P.Mich.* 526, 15). To this we may connect on the one hand *idion* in the sense in which “the property” of fire is to burn, that of horses is to whinny (Philo, *Dreams* 1.108), and the good peculiar to humankind is knowledge (*Good Man Free* 12); and on the other hand to the expressions *ek tōn idiōn* and *ek tou idiou*, “at their/his/her own expense,” which recur constantly in the papyri and the inscriptions: “Apollonius has restored the damaged *propylon* at his own expense” (*ek tou idiou*); “he offered at his own expense” (*ek tōn idiōn anethēken*); “I paid out of my own pocket” (*BGU* 2243, 10; *ek tou idiou*).

*Ta idia* can refer to all the things that a person owns or has use of: fruits (Luke 6:41; *BGU* 1901, 3), an olive tree (Rom 11:24), a mount (Luke 10:34), sheep and flocks, members or organs of the body, a meal (1 Cor 11:21), pay

(3:8; 9:7), all that is personal. Its most common meaning is territorial: *idios*, like *topos*, can refer to a field (Matt 22:5; *P.Mich.* 423, 14), a country (Philo, *Virtues* 105; Josephus, *Ant.* 9.40), a city (Matt 9:1; 1 Esdr 5:8), a village (*P.Fouad* 26, 27; *SB* 8299, 20; *P.Cair.Isid.* 8, 11), and especially the place where one resides and of which one is an inhabitant, where one is at home (cf. French *chez soi*), one's house. Thus Paul stayed "two years in a house that he had rented" (*en idiō misthōmati*, Acts 28:30), the *episkopos* governs his own house well (1 Tim 3:4, 5, 12; 5:4), and the wicked angels left their own dwelling (Jude 6). In writing that the incarnate Word came to his own place (*eis ta idia*), St. John (1:11) means not only to locate this coming geographically in Palestine but also to set it in the particular property of the One by whom all things were made (Sir 24:6–12), as distinct from that which might belong to others; that is, among the beloved and chosen people. *Ta idia* therefore has an affective nuance, because only guests with whom one has affinity of mind and heart are received into a person's home. 2 John 10 forbids receiving a heterodox person (*mē lambanete auton eis oikian*).

The stability, security, intimacy, and happiness of home life are not absent from the numerous literary and papyrological texts that mention the return home of prisoners, soldiers, travelers, or workers. In any event, amnesty decrees regularly order "that those who have fled return home with amnesty from the accusations of which they are the object." We may compare John 16:32 – "You will be dispersed, each to his own home (*skorpisthēte hekastos eis ta idia*) and you will leave me alone." To convey the idea "aside, apart," the NT uses *kat' idian*, but the adverb *idia* (ἰδίᾳ), "for oneself particularly," is also used.

*Idios*, *idia* are similarly used for persons in a way synonymous with a simple possessive, notably with regard to members of a family: one's own brother and sister, mother, father (John 5:18; Josephus, *Ant.* 1.230; 9.99), spouse, son or daughter. If it is easy to identify *idios* when it is used as an attributive adjective (Matt 25:14, *tous idious doulous*; Josephus, *Ant.* 10.47), when it is used as a noun only the context can identify the referent: Peter and John, when released, go to "their own" (*ēlthon pros tous idious*). The word can mean men, people, companions, or retinue (Philo, *Flacc.* 27: Agrippa embarked *meta tōn idiōn*; Josephus, *Life* 246), troops (Philo, *Abraham* 214), compatriots (Philo, *To Gaius* 211, 327), partisans (Josephus, *War* 2.267); but usually the emphasis falls on an emotional attachment: relatives and friends. John 1:11 uses the masculine plural *hoi idioi* to emphasize the scandal of the rejection of the Messiah by the Israelites (cf. *P.Oxy.* 2778, 3–4: *hoi idioi ... ouk ēthelēsan*). It was neither humankind in general nor the Galileans who rejected him (Matt 13:57; Mark 6:4; Luke 4:24; John 4:44), nor even his compatriots who did not

accept his testimony (John 3:11; 5:43), but the Israelites, his table companions, who lived in his dwelling and were not willing to receive the Master of the house. They knew the heir and killed him (Matt 21:39; Mark 12:8; Luke 20:15). This selection evoked by *hoi idioi* is as marked in John 13:1, where Jesus, “having loved his own (*tous idious*) who were in the world, loved them to the end.” This refers to his *mathētai* (John 8:31; 13:23, 35; 15:8; etc.), a more restricted group than “his people” (1:11); these are close friends, favorites. It is he who has chosen them, those whom the Father gave and entrusted to him; this means above all the apostles, to whom the Lord was to give his last instructions and to whom he dedicated his final expressions of emotion.

After the disciple at the foot of the cross has heard Jesus say, “Behold your mother,” the evangelist adds, “And from that moment, the disciple took her into his own home” (*ap’ ekeinēs tēs hōras elaben ho mathētēs autēn eis ta idia*). Answering to the specification of the time (the hour), *idia* adds – as happens constantly in the Fourth Gospel – a specification of place: after Jesus’s death the beloved disciple took Mary into his own home and the mother of Jesus became his own mother (according to the Lord’s order). He considered her to be his own and surrounded her with filial affection and veneration, thus becoming as it were a brother of Christ.

## ἰδιώτης

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*idiōtēs*, **private individual, lay person, non-expert**

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*idiotes*, S 2399; TDNT 3.215–217; EDNT 2.172–173; NIDNTT 2.456–457; MM 299; L&N 27.26; BAGD 370

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The very diverse usages of this word are all homogeneous.

I. – The commonest sense corresponds to the French *particulier*, meaning “private individual” (SB 8232, 18; 8299, 52; 8444, 27, 54), as opposed to “officials” (SB 3924, 9, 25), persons charged with public offices, notably the king and the magistrates. Sometimes reference is to a common citizen (Thucydides 1.124.1; NCIG, n. 7, II, 6; P.Fay. 19, 12), sometimes to a taxpayer, as opposed to a tax collector (P.Hib. 198, 168, 170; P.Ryl. 111 a 17), sometimes to a miscellaneous unnamed person (P.Tebt. 812, 10: *ta tōn idiōtōn*, the affairs of private individuals; P.Ryl. 572, 65, 73). By extension the sense can be pejorative: a common person, a vulgar person, of the lowest social class, even a slave (Stud.Pal. IV, 306, p. 68).

II. – *Idiōtēs* refers to anyone who has no training or specialty, and therefore is contrasted with experts and professionals (cf. Hyperides, *Ath.* 9.19: “on every

other occasion, there is nothing of the beginner about him”); for example, the lay person as compared to the physician, the “common soldier” as compared to the officer, the amateur as compared to the professional (Xenophon, *Eq. Mag.* 8.1), the layman as compared to the philosopher or the poet (Alexis, frag. 269.1; cited by Athenaeus 2.28 c) or the orator – it is in this sense that St. Paul declares himself *idiōtēs en logō*, the lay person as compared to the priest; hence, any person who is unexperienced or who does not know the technique, as compared to the expert and the specialist (Epictetus 2.12.11; Plutarch, *De gen.* 1), that is, the “uninitiated.” According to 1 Cor 14:16, the *idiōtēs* does not understand anything that the glossolalic says, he has no grasp of this language and cannot respond “yes” (*amen* with the article), cannot join in a prayer the sense of which escapes him. It is in the same sense of the word that the members of the Sanhedrin note that Peter and John are *anthrōpoi agrammatoi ... kai idiōtai*, that is, common people, of a lower social class; hence uncultured, unlettered, unschooled.

III. – Finally, any person who does not belong to a given group and does not know its mindset and customs can be called *idiōtēs*, a foreigner vis-à-vis nationals. If, for example, at Corinth, in the middle of a charismatic meeting, “uninitiated persons or unbelievers should enter the church, will they not say that you are mad?” (1 Cor 14:23).

## ἱεροπρεπής

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*hieroprepēs*, **reverent and dignified**

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*hieroprepes*, S 2412; TDNT 3.253–254; EDNT 2.176; MM 300; L&N 53.6; BDF §119(4); BAGD 372

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Apparently unknown in the papyri, this biblical hapax is used to describe the conduct of the older Cretans in Titus 2:3 – *en katastēmati hieroprepeis*. In the inscriptions, the adjective describes religious processions and functions, such that the bearing of Christians would be analogous to the dignity and restraint of priestesses officiating in a temple, likely to inspire respect, even veneration.

But the extension of the term – from the language of religion to daily life at home – seems to be the work of Philo, who uses this word quite often. In the first instance he reserves it for God, God’s mysteries, oracles, and commandments, and prayers addressed to God; but he applies it also to the ethical life: “the offering of fasting and perseverance rises as the most holy and most perfect of offerings” (*Migr. Abr.* 98). Holiness (*hosiotēs*) is not only consecration to the service of God, but sanctification of the spirit (*Good Man*

*Free* 75). Virtue (*aretē*), which seems to hold a woman's rank, spreads abroad the good seed of principles that are useful in life, so that "the art of thinking receives holy and divine seed" (*Abraham* 101). Those who dedicate to God their thoughts, their words, their feelings "maintain them as truly sacred and holy objects for their possessor, *hieroprepes kai hagion ontōs phylaxantes tō ktēsamēnō*" (*Heir* 110). "The mind (*ho nous*) takes Virtue as its wife, because it has understood that her beauty is authentic and free of artifice, perfectly suited to a holy person (*hieroprepestaton*)" (*Sacr. Abel and Cain* 45).

The same meaning is found again in 4 Macc 9:25, where the oldest of the Maccabean brothers is described as "the noble young man, *ho eugenēs neanias*" (verse 13), defender of the law of God (verse 15), true son of Abraham and courageous (verse 21), a fighter of the battle for *eusebeia* (verse 23); finally "the saintly young man gave up the ghost." *Ho ieroprepēs neanias* sums up all the above-mentioned qualities; cf. 11:20.

Hence Titus 2:3 sees that Christians, consecrated to Christ by baptism and officiating in some way in the home, carry out a sacred function, a liturgy that unfolds in the presence of God; their holy life is characterized by a remarkable dignity, profound respect toward all, a very religious sense of God, "ut ipse quoque earum incessus et motus, vultus, sermo, silentium, quamdam decoris sacri praeferant dignitatem" ("that even their very gait, movement, aspect, speech, silence may manifest a certain dignity of holy grace," St. Jerome).

ἱκανός, ἱκανότης, ἱκανόω

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*hikanos*, **sufficient, capable**; *hikanotēs*, **sufficiency, enabling**; *hikanoō*, **to enable, make sufficient, capable**

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*ikanos*, S 2425; TDNT 3.293–296; EDNT 2.184; NIDNTT 3.728–729; MM 302; L&N 25.96, 59.2, 59.12, 59.44, 67.91, 75.2, 78.14, 78.50; BDF §§5(3b), 131, 187(8), 379, 393(4), 405(2); BAGD 374 | *ikanotes*, S 2426; TDNT 3.293–296; EDNT 2.185; NIDNTT 3.728–729; L&N 75.1; BAGD 374 | *ikanoo*, S 2427; TDNT 3.293–296; EDNT 2.185; NIDNTT 3.728–729; MM 302; L&N 75.3; BAGD 374

These derivatives of *hikō*, *hikneomai*, "reach, arrive, attain," are not all used with the same frequency, and they took on different meanings in classical Greek and in Koine. It is roughly correct that *hikanos* means "capable of" in speaking of persons and "sufficient" in speaking of things, but this sufficiency or capacity varies from "not very" to "much." In the LXX, the most common corresponding Hebrew is hardly illuminating: *day*, "sufficiency, that which is



enough or appropriate.” For example, looters steal what they need (Obad 5; cf. Hab 2:13), and the lion carries off what its young need. Sometimes the well-bred person gets by on little food (Sir 31:18); or “there are three things which are not satisfied and which never say ‘enough’ (*hikanon*, Hebrew *hōn*): the sterile womb, the ground without water, and fire”; sometimes – most commonly in late texts – the sufficient is that which satisfies, or a large enough amount, whether with respect to years (Zech 7:3; 1 Macc 16:3; 2 Macc 1:20) or duration (2 Macc 7:5; 8:25), money (2 Macc 4:45; Josephus, *Life* 68) and equipment, or a multitude of persons.

This is the almost constant meaning of the verb *hikanoomai*, which ordinarily corresponds to the Hebrew *rab* and can be translated “it is enough, it suffices” or even “it is too much.” Elijah beseeches God: “It is too much, Yahweh; take my life” (1 Kgs 19:4); “thus says the Lord Yahweh: it is too much (*hikanousthō*), princes of Israel! Get rid of oppression” (Ezek 45:9).

The NT attests these meanings, from “it is enough” to “numerous, many”: “a numerous herd of pigs (*choirōn hikanōn*) that were feeding” (Luke 8:32); Herod “asked Jesus numerous questions” (*en logois hikanois*, 23:9); “there were many lamps in the upstairs room.” The members of the Sanhedrin “gave a large sum of money to the soldiers” who guarded Jesus’ tomb. The adjective is used particularly with respect to meetings of people (“a numerous crowd”) and a long or rather long time, whether in days or years: for a number of years St. Paul had wanted to go to Rome (Rom 15:23).

It is Philo who fleshed out the sense of *hikanos* as “capable of” in applying it to people; he gave it the nuances of being apt, particular to (*Spec. Laws* 4.188), equal to (*To Gaius* 257), gifted for, in a position to do (*Flight* 40); seeds “are capable of producing plants like those which produced them” (*Unchang. God* 40; *Drunkenness* 212; *Cherub*. 65); at seven years, “a person is able to interpret nouns and verbs of familiar language.” It even becomes a noble term, since it is used frequently for intelligence and for the soul capable of receiving wisdom, or for magistrates skilled at governing and gaining honors. What is more, *hikanos* is introduced into the religious vocabulary, as with the prophet Jeremiah, a “worthy hierophant” (*hierophantēs hikanos*), and especially God, who is sufficient unto himself (*hikanos autos heautō ho theos*). This Philonian axiom is probably inspired by the translation errors of the LXX, which took *Shaddai* to mean “the sufficient one” as a designation of the “All-Powerful” God (Ruth 1:20–21; Job 21:15; 31:2; 40:2; Ezek 1:24): “The voice of Shaddai” comes out *phōnē hikanou*.

The grammar, even the theology, is the same as that which inspired John the Baptist: “The one who comes after me is stronger than I (*ischyroteros*, a divine attribute; Jer 32:18; Dan 9:4); I am not worthy (*ouk eimi hikanos*) to loose his

sandals” (Matt 3:11; Mark 1:7; Luke 3:16). Also, the centurion at Capernaum: “I am not worthy (*ouk eimi hikanos hina*) that you should enter my house” (Matt 8:8; Luke 7:6); and St. Paul: “I am not worthy to be called an apostle.” After all, “who is sufficient” (*tis hikanos*) for such a ministry (2 Cor 2:16)? The apostle specifies: “It is not that we ourselves are of sufficient capability (*hikanoi esmen*) to be able to chalk up anything to our own credit as coming from ourselves; but our qualification (*hikanotēs*) comes from God, who has made us sufficient (*hos kai hikanōsen*) to be ministers of a new covenant not of the letter but of the spirit” (2 Cor 3:5–6). Similarly, God has made Christians equal (*tō hikanosanti*) to sharing the lot of the holy ones (angels) in the light (Col 1:12). Finally, Paul writes to Timothy: “What you have heard from me in the presence of many witnesses you must entrust (like a deposit, *parathou*) to faithful men who will themselves be capable of instructing yet others” (*pistois anthrōpois, hoitines hikanoi esontai kai heterous didaxai*, 2 Tim 2:2). A “first sketch” of the apostolic succession has been seen here, guaranteeing a seamless continuity from Paul to Timothy (*kai ha ēkousas par’ emou*) and to Timothy’s hearers. The integrity of the gospel message is guaranteed, because the depositaries of the tradition are men of proven faith and faithfulness and because they are gifted and competent to communicate this teaching precisely; here *hikanotēs* is not only a human aptitude that makes a person worthy, up to the task at hand, but is also a divine enabling. It is God who qualifies his ministers (2 Cor 3:5–6).

There may be a legal nuance at Mark 15:15 – “Pilate, wishing to satisfy the people, released Barabbas to them and handed over Jesus ...” probably by virtue of a customary Paschal amnesty of which we are made aware by two documents; but *hikanos* surely has the sense of “surety, guarantee” in Acts 17:9, where it is said that the politarchs “took surety from Jason and the others and let them go.” The use of the adjective is well attested in a legal context and even in the literal sense of “guarantee.” We do not know whether the *hikanon* given by Jason was a monetary payment, cash bail, or a promise to the officials not to disturb the public order with gospel preaching, but certainly it was a commitment by way of a stipulation taken by one person with respect to another, that is, a security. Thus in AD 22, Sarapion informs his brother Dorion that, by order of the prefect, two officials have been incarcerated until the opening of the session, “unless they persuade the chief bailiff to accept bail for them until the session.” In the course of a trial, the *stratēgos* declares to Imouthe, “These two shall both pay you a security” (*hikanon soi hoi duo houtoi dotōsan*, *P.Oslo* 17, 17; second century).

ἴσος, ἰσότης, ἰσότημος

*isos*, **equal**; *isotēs*, **equality**; *isotimos*, **equal in dignity, worth, honor**

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*isos*, S 2470; *TDNT* 3.343–355; *EDNT* 2.201; *NIDNTT* 2.497–500, 502, 505, 508; MM 307; L&N 58.33; BDF §§194(1), 453(4); BAGD 381 | *isotes*, S 2471; *TDNT* 3.343–355; *EDNT* 2.202; *NIDNTT* 2.497–499; MM 307; L&N 58.32; BAGD 381 | *isotimos*, S 2472; *TDNT* 3.343–355; *EDNT* 2.202; *NIDNTT* 2.497–499; MM 307; L&N 58.34; BDF §118(1); BAGD 381

The adjective *isos*, “equal,” is used first of all for equality either for numbers and surfaces and hence arithmetic or geometric identity, or for equivalence: “What is squaring? Making an equilateral rectangle equivalent (*to ison*) to a given rectangle.” Another sort of equality (*isotētos*) is proportional (*dia analogias*) equality, where “the small quantities are equal to the large.” It is in this sense that interlocutors are equal (Philo, *Good Man Free* 126), like rewards (*Moses* 1.327) and favors (*To Gaius* 289), or that the athlete has a well-proportioned stature (Philostratus, *Gym.* 28).

Plato is the first to give a geometrical meaning to the hendiadys *isos kai homoios*, the first term of which refers to equality of size, the second sameness of form; but in practice no distinction was made between the two terms of this emphatic locution, which dates back to Homer, and it was seen as a sort of superlative to underline especially equality of rights between allies or adversaries. Both accept rights and responsibilities: “The Athenians are ready to make allies of us on equal footing, without guile or deceit.”

The five occurrences in the *Letter of Aristeeas* have only one meaning: “make oneself the equal of all” (*Ep. Arist.* 191, 228, 257, 263, 282). It may be said that the term is unknown in OT Hebrew; usually, *isos* in the LXX translates the Hebrew preposition *k*, which is used for comparison and analogy (as in the prayer that the leprous Miriam “may not be like one born dead”). Philo gives *isos* a technical exegetical meaning, equivalent to *id est* (“that is,” “in other words,” “as much as to say”). The equality referred to is obviously approximate; but Philo highly exalts *isotēs* as a “good such that none greater can be found” (*Spec. Laws* 4.165), a virtue that must be praised (*epainos isotētos autou*; *Joseph* 249; *Rewards* 59; *Decalogue* 162), honored (*Spec. Laws* 2.204; 3.74, 169; 4.235; cf. Euripides, *Phoen.* 536: *isotēta timan*), and cultivated (Philo, *Spec. Laws* 1.295; 2.21), because God is the creator of equality and of all that is excellent (1.265; 4.187). *Isotēs*, constantly associated with justice, is particularly assured under democracy (*Conf. Tongues* 108), which accords each that which is proper (Xenophon, *Cyr.* 2.2.18).

If all men are equal by nature (Aristotle, *Pol.* 2.2.6: *dia to tēn physin isous einai pantas*; Philo, *Spec. Laws* 2.68), maintaining a certain equality among them in life in society is a different task (Thucydides 2.65.10), because “equality preserves concord, and concord preserves the all-engendering world” (Ps.-Aristotle, *Mund.* 5.397). Now, in principle it is in a democracy that the maximum liberty and equality are found; but Xenophon already observed, “There is nothing in the world less conformable to equality than a system that puts the good and the wicked on the same footing” (*Cyr.* 2.12.8). Plutarch considers equality in politics actually to be a danger, since every constitution has its defects; and according to Aelius Aristides, what is best is to establish a well-ordered (*euschēmōn*) *isotēs*, a mixed constitution (*Orat. Rom.* 90).

In the papyri, *to ison* means a “copy,” as when the scribe adds to the text the simple notation *to ison* (*P.Erl.* 38, 10). A phrase that frequently occurs is “I have received a copy of this for verification” (*eschon toutou to ison achri exetaseōs*). The document in question may be a circular or a rescript (*P.Stras.* 32, 14; *P.Bon.* 17, 11; *P.Apoll.* 9, 5; *P.Lond.* 1225, 5; vol. 3, p. 126), but often more precisely a “double,” as with a petition to the *dekaprōtoi* that ends with the words “I have received a copy of this for judgment” (*eschon toutou to ison eis diarkisin*).

Equality may have to do with time, space, or number, especially sums of money and notably in the formula “an equal sum to the public treasury” (*eis to dēmosion tas isas*), as, for example, in these provisions from first-century wills: Whoever shall contest or put forward a claim “on one of these goods shall pay to the persons named above these damages and a fine of five hundred silver drachmas, and an equal sum to the treasury.” Or the equivalence referred to may have to do with thought and their expression. In AD 58, a physician writes, “I think that if I cannot give you the same, I can at least show you a little reciprocity for your affection for me.” Samos honors Diodorus, public physician, who “was the same for everyone (*en toutois ison*) and was not sparing in his care.”

In accounting, *ison* can mean that the sum of the entries on this line balance exactly with the entries on the preceding line (*P.Princ.* 42, 19, 21, 39; from the first century; cf. *P.Oxy.* 1867, 9 and 11). At Murabba‘āt (*P.Mur.* 90, 2), in an account for cereals and legumes, the proper name is followed by the commodity and figures, for example, “same as thirteen of wheat” (*ison pyrou τγ’*); the editor, P. Benoit, notes that *ison*, “equivalent,” means the exchange value; thus “fifteen seahs of lentils equals thirteen of wheat (wheat playing the role of a standard). We frequently encounter *ex isou* (*merous*) to refer to equal shares between two parties or a property held in common in equal shares by several heirs,” also *koinōs ex isou* (*P.Mich.* 175, 6; 554, 18; *P.Köln* 100, 11, 16, 23;

*P.Corn.* 8, 9 and 16; *SB* 9642, col. III, 7 and 13; 10500, 11; 10756, 11). Under Tiberius, a brotherhood held a banquet every month, thanks to the monthly contribution of twelve silver drachmas assigned equally to each of its members (*tas ex isou kat' onoma kekrimenas*, *P.Mich.* 243, 3).

In the NT, *isos* has the same meaning as in the papyri. In the parable of the Workers in the Vineyard, those who were hired at the beginning of the day complain about being “put on the same footing” as those who had only worked an hour (*isous autous hēmōn epioēsas*, Matt 20:12 – In giving them the same pay, you have made them equal to us!). Something similar happens with spiritual gifts: at Caesarea, Peter recognizes that God has given the Gentiles the same gift as Israel (*tēn isēn dōrean*); this “same gift” is salvation. When sinners make loans, they count on recovering the equivalent, a restitution equal to the sum loaned (*hina apolabōsin ta isa*, Luke 6:34), while Christians are to be ready to lend and receive nothing back. At the trial of Jesus before the high priest, the witnesses against him were not in agreement (*isai ouk ēsan*, Mark 14:56, 59). God has “arranged everything by measure, number, and weight” (Wis 11:20); Rev 21:16 describes the heavenly Jerusalem: “the length and width and height are equal” (*isa estin*). This shape of a city, in which the three dimensions are equal, is not representable; it is “thought” rather than “seen.” It is a geometric symbol that evokes the Egyptian pyramids, “eternal dwellings.”

There are two texts of major theological importance. According to Phil 2:6, the person of the historical Christ – preexistent, immutable in his abasement, then exalted, inseparable from his Trinitarian relations – did not during his sojourn on earth take advantage of his equality of rank and rights with God (*ouk harpagmon hēgēsato to einai isa theō*). The formula *einai isa theō* (accusative neuter plural functioning as predicate, cf. Job 11:12) = “to be on an equal footing with God,” is not synonymous with *isos theō* = “to be equal to God” (identity of nature); it places the emphasis on the “equality of treatment, dignity made manifest and recognized” of the one who was and remained of “divine condition,” but who – as a man, with his divine attributes limited, eclipsed – could say, “The Father is greater than I” (John 14:28), on account of his heavenly situation. We may compare the designation *isotheos* as applied to kings and eminent persons as a title of honor: “Darius, equal to the gods (*isotheos*), reigned on this earth” (Aeschylus, *Pers.* 856); of the various benefactors of humanity “some received divine honors” (Diodorus Siculus 1.2). It is decided that the name of Caesar “would be written in the hymns alongside the gods (*auton ex isou tois theois esgraphesthai*).... Those who have reigned are the object of other honors which make them equal to the gods (*allai te isotheoi timai didontai*)” (Dio Cassius 51.20); “Virtue makes many people

equal to the gods (*aretē men gar isotheous pollous poiēi*), but votes never had the power to make a god (*oudeis pōpote theos egeneto*)."

On the other hand, when the Pharisees declared that "He said that God was his own father, making himself equal to God" (*ison heauton poiōn tō theō*, John 5:18), they indeed understood that Jesus placed himself on the same level as God; his equality of being or of nature is an identity.

The two NT occurrences of *isotēs* belong to St. Paul. The first comes in connection with the collection for Jerusalem, a charitable work: "It is not a matter of afflicting yourselves in order to comfort others; what is necessary is equality (*all' ex isotētos* – this is the motivation). In the present circumstances, your surplus provides for their lack, so that their surplus may provide for your own lack, so that the result is equality" (*hopōs genētai isotēs* – this is the goal; 2 Cor 8:13–14). On this matter the apostle cites Exod 16:18 – the manna answered to each one's need. This social conception of *isotēs* is not that of Greek democracy but depends on that equality of conditions which was the Israelite ideal and which did much to provide for the sabbatical year and the jubilee year. According to Exodus, the equitable sharing of the manna seems to be ensured only by the brotherhood uniting the members of the chosen people: those who had gathered more than they needed gave from their abundance to those who were not sufficiently provided for. It seems that for St. Paul, however, the Corinthians, by their material contribution, are paying off their spiritual debt to their brothers in Jerusalem, and that in this act of beneficence there is established an equilibrium, a harmony, between the gentile and Jewish Christian churches.

As for the precept, "Masters, give your slaves what is just and equitable" (*to dikaion kai tēn isotēta tois doulois parechesthe*, Col 4:1), the first time can be understood as a reference to food and clothing, especially as just compensation for work done, as well as to promises to be kept, since the law did not establish anything. The "equitable" should have in view "that which comes under the master's personal initiatives," a good attitude on his part which sees his *doulos* on a certain plane of equality. His attitude is that of one person toward another, remembering that this person gives him service. It is less a strictly legal obligation than a subjective appreciation, both natural and Christian, that recognizes an equal in every neighbor (cf. Josephus, *Ant.* 16.32: *hous ison echein autois*), entirely different from that of an owner who treats his slaves as the living tools which by legal definition they are.

*Isotimos*. – This compound, unknown in the LXX, can have the sense of simple equality, of a sharing (Philo, *Heir* 177) of rights and obligations (*Good Man Free* 148), of the same rank, but its proper meaning, which also occurs much more commonly, is that of equality of dignity, honor, consideration:

“God grants to the wise as much honor as to the world” (*isotimon kosmō*, *Sacr. Abel and Cain* 8; *Sobr.* 54); “No one finds himself placed on the same level as God” (*isotimos theō*, *Conf. Tongues* 170), equal to him; greetings accord an honor equal to that of the soul (*isotimon psychēs*). Josephus uses this adjective almost exclusively for equality with superiors, kings, persons of rank: Aristobulus “conferred upon his next younger brother, Antigonus, honors equal to his own” (*War* 1.71); Ananos “loved to treat the humblest as his equals”; Seleucus Nicator granted to the Jews of Antioch privileges equal to those of the Macedonians and the Greeks (*Ant.* 12.119).

The term seems to have been part of the vocabulary of the royal court. “Lysander’s ambition offended only the first citizens and the equals” (*tois prōtois kai isotimois*, Plutarch, *Lys.* 19.1; at Sparta, the “equals” were citizens with full rights); Metellus had a good understanding (*homonoia*) with Sulla, because he was his “colleague and his kinsman by marriage” (*isotimon andra kai kēdestēn*, Plutarch, *Sull.* 6.9). This equality of rank is attested in an honorific description of Cyprus in 120 BC: “of those equal to the first friends” (*tōn isotimōn tois prōtois philois*, *SEG* 18, 581); *Apollodōrō tōn isotimōn tois prōtois philois* (*P.Ryl.* 253, 1); in the third century, the syndic Menelaos will have documents distributed “to the two tribes for the equality of honor” (*diairethēsontai eis tas dyo phylas hyper tou to isotimon einai*, *P.Oxy.* 2407, 34).

So then, when Pseudo-Peter addresses his letter *tois isotimon hēmin lachousin pistin* (2 Pet 1:1), we must translate, “To those to whom has been allotted the same precious faith as to us” (cf. “the same faith,” Titus 1:4) and understand this to mean not that the faith of the recipients of the letter is of the same sort or kind as that of the writer, but that this faith places them in a position of equal status and honor as the apostles, “with the same privileges as ourselves.”

# κ k

## καθηγητής

*kathēgētēs*, **guide, teacher, master**

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*kathegetes*, S 2519; EDNT 2.222; MM 312; L&N 33.245; BAGD 388–389

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In the midst of the invective that he unleashes against the scribes and the Pharisees – the titled teachers of the Jewish people, masters, fathers, or headmasters in the academic sense of these terms – Christ, addressing only his disciples, pronounces a threefold injunction that has no parallel in the other Gospels: “But you must not be called ‘Rabbi,’ for you have only one teacher (*ho didaskalos*), and you are all brothers. Neither shall you call anyone on earth ‘Father,’ for you have only one heavenly Father. Neither shall you be called *kathēgētai*, for you have only one *kathēgētēs*, the Christ.”

The three terms used are equivalent and mean “master-teacher,” even *kathēgētēs*, which can have the sense “guide, conductor” and thus would mean “educator, spiritual director.” In the literature, the papyri, and the inscriptions, however, it is most often attested with the meaning of “private tutor, master, salaried instructor”: “philosophy ... from Aristotle the *kathēgētēs*”; “Mnesarchus had ideas contrary to those of his master Philon” (*Philōni tou kathēgētē*, Numenius, frag. 28; ed. des Places, p. 80). In the first century, at Alexandria, young Theon mentions the poverty of teachers (*P.Oxy.* 2190, 7, 15, 24); in the second-third century, a mother, desolated at learning that the tutor of her child Ptolemy has left to find another position, urges her child to join forces with his *paidagōgos* to find another teacher. Such a teacher receives compensation in kind and in cash. At Thebes in Egypt, during Hadrian’s time, Julia Pasicleia is the wife of the teacher Acharistos (*Dittenberger*, Or. 408). Herodes Atticus erects a statue to his teacher Secundus (*SEG* XXIII, n. 115; cf. 117, 6). Indeed, disciples often set up funerary steles or compose inscriptions in honor of their *kathēgētai*; thus, in Lycaonia or in Galatia: “Siderion and Diadoumenos set (this) up for their *kathēgētēs* Phosphoros” (*Sidēriōn kai Diadoumenos Phosphorō tō heautōn kathēgētē anestēsan*, *MAMA* VII, 358); or at Rome, “Rebuilt for a *iatros Kaisaros* (emperor’s physician) who is a *patronus kai kathēgētēs agathos kai axios* (good and worthy patron and teacher).”

Several Hebrew or Aramaic equivalents of *kathēgētēs* are possible in Matt 23:10. The best would seem to be *môreh*, which refers to “one who is learned”



(Prov 5:13; Hab 2:18) and has messianic significance in Isa 30:20; Joel 2:23. We may recall the *môreh haššedeq*, the teacher of righteousness of the sect of the new covenant, tutor and leader of the community, called *Teacher* by antonomasia, raised up by God “to lead (the children of Israel) in the way of his heart” (CD 1.11; 4 QpPs 37) and made him “a father for the sons of grace” (1 QH 7.20), bring glad news to the humble (1 QH 18.14).

Over against this doctrinal and religious authority, Jesus sets up his triple *heis estin* (“there is one ...”): there is only one Teacher who should be trusted, only one Guide for the spiritual life. Faith is built on God alone.

## κακοήθεια

*kakoētheia*, **malice, malignity**

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***kakoetheia***, S 2550; TDNT 3.485; EDNT 2.237; MM 316; L&N 88.113; BAGD 397

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This perverse disposition of the heart is mentioned in three sin lists. Philo says, “You see all that the strong liquor of folly produces: bitterness, *malignity*, a hot temper, extreme rage, savagery, harsh sarcasm, the desire to hurt” (*Dreams* 2.192). Apollonius of Tyana specifies the reason for estrangement from a friend: *phthonou, kokoētheias, misous, diabolēs, echthras*. And St. Paul (Rom 1:29) inserts *kakoētheia* between deceit (*dolos*) and gossipers (*psithyristas*). M. J. Lagrange comments correctly: “like envy or jealousy, *kakoētheia* takes everything amiss: *esti gar kakoētheia to epi to cheiron hypolambanein panta* (‘*kakoētheia* means taking everything for the worse,’ Aristotle, *Rh.* 2.13.1389.). Aristotle thus treated it as a specific vice, but the popular understanding of the word was broader: ‘*kakoētheia men esti kakia kekrymmenē, kakotropia de poikilē kai pantodapē panourgia*, *kakoētheia* is hidden evil, varied mischief, miscellaneous villainy’ (Ammonius, p. 80 in the *Thesaurus*), hence a general inclination toward evildoing” (on this verse). Thus Xenophon says, “Some are capable of scorn and malignity and greed, others not” (*Cyn.* 13.16).

So *kakoētheia* can be translated, depending on the context, as “malignity,” “malice,” even “bad morals”; but the connotation of lying, intrigue, deceit is by far the most pronounced. Just as St. Paul links *dolos* and *kakoētheia*, *P.Grenf.* I, 10, 13 has “apart from any deceit or fear or force or cheating or compulsion or any malice or *kakoētheia* whatsoever or any detraction” (*aneu pantos dolou kai phobou kai bias kai apatēs kai anankēs kai hoias dēpote kakonoias kai kakoētheias kai pantos elattōmatos*); cf. Esth 8:12 f (LXX): “These friends, having through the specious reasoning of their

*kakoētheia* beguiled the sincere goodwill of their sovereigns.” According to Josephus, the lying serpent maliciously persuaded the woman to taste of the tree of wisdom (*Ant.* 1.42) and is deprived of its voice because of its malignity toward Adam (1.50). The malice of Salome and of Pheroras was directed against the young people (16.68; cf. the *psithyristai* of Rom 1:29). The enemies of the Jews slander them “through envy and malice, *dia phthonon kai kakoētheian*” (Josephus, *Ag. Apion* 1.222; cf. Plutarch, *Praec. ger. rei publ.* 12.807 a; 32.825 e; *Cic.* 5.6). By giving small gifts to those who possess great riches, “one gains a reputation for malice and meanness, *kakoētheias kai aneleutherias proslambanei doxan*” (*De E ap. Delph.* 1). A letter of 16 May AD 243, reproaches its recipient for having behaved shabbily (*P.Cair.Zen.* 88, 16; cf. Menander, *Epit.* 334).

So the word refers to perverse intentions, innate malice (*tē symphytō kakoētheia*, 3 Macc 3:22; cf. 7:3), an inclination to evil (*hē kakoēthēs diathēsis*, 4 Macc 1:25) that cannot be rooted out, but the effects of which can be neutralized by a temperate mind (4 Macc 2:16; 3:4).

κακοπαθέω, κακοπάθεια

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*kakopatheō*, **to suffer, undergo hardship; kakopatheia, hardship, distress, suffering**

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*kakopatheo*, S 2553; TDNT 5.936–938; EDNT 2.238; NIDNTT 3.719, 722, 725; MM 316; L&N 24.89; BAGD 397 | *kakopatheia*, S 2552; TDNT 5.936–938; EDNT 2.238; NIDNTT 3.724; MM 316; L&N 24.89; BDF §23; BAGD 397

Occurring frequently in the Hellenistic period, these terms express the idea of hardship and distress, with rather variable connotations: “And you say, ‘Ah, what fatigue (Hebrew *tlā’āh*)!’ ” (Mal 1:13); the redacting of a work of history is arduous toil (2 Macc 2:26–27); the strength of family ties is seen “in that we *suffer the hardships* of our kin along with them” (*Ep. Arist.* 241); “You are troubling yourself for no reason” (Menander, *Dysk.* 348); “Why are you so bent on mistreating yourself?” (ibid., 371); “You have been reduced to such a state!” (Philo, *Dreams* 2.181, *ti kakopatheis*); “the soul suffers from being housed by nature in the body” (Josephus, *Ag. Apion* 2.203); “many were in distress” (*Ant.* 12.336). In the second century AD, a Jewish woman attacked by another woman suffered greatly because of the blows she received and because of her fall (*hypotōn plēgōn kai tou ptōmatos deinōs kakopathein*) and she is at risk for a miscarriage (*paidion ektrōma ginesthai*). It is in this sense of enduring painful trials (Jas 5:13) and torments (2 Tim 2:9; 4:5) that *kakopatheō* is used in the NT.

The meaning of the NT hapax in Jas 5:10 poses a problem: Christians are exhorted to take the *hypodeigma tēs kakopatheias kai tēs makrothymias* of the prophets who spoke in the Lord’s name. Is *kakopatheia* subjective or objective? Should we translate “Take as your model the suffering and the patience of the prophets,” or “the endurance in suffering of the prophets”? The truth of the matter is that both meanings are attested in the literature, the inscriptions, and the papyri. “The human race increases and is created over many years in great suffering” (*kakopatheiais megistais*); “Most people endure much suffering, *karterousi pollēn kakopatheian*” (Aristotle, *Pol.* 3.6, 3.15.1278); “They took up a strong position ... to rest from their recent toils, *ek tēs progegenēmēnēs kakopatheias*” (Polybius 3.42.9; cf. 3.72.5); but Aratus was “quick to rise after being struck, thanks to his boldness and his endurance, *dia tēs autou kakopatheias*” (4.8.3); Numa “further perfected himself, thanks to exercise and the practice of endurance and of philosophy” (Plutarch, *Num.* 3.7). In his list of Moses’ virtues Philo includes “endurance of suffering” between “toilsome exertion” and “scorn of pleasure” (*Moses* 1.154; cf. *Spec. Laws* 2.60; *Cherub.* 88). “Through enduring these torments and through our patience – *dia tēsde tēs kakopatheias kai hypomonēs* – we gain the fruit of virtuous battle.”

The term is used first and foremost for the danger and toil of war: “You must blame yourselves either for your disasters or for your sufferings” (Thucydides 7.77.1); “The Romans endured severe hardships” (Josephus, *War* 1.148); “the patience of the Jews and their steadfastness in the midst of adversity” (6.37; cf. *Ag. Apion* 1.135; *Ant.* 1.185; 6.172); “taking on all the danger and all the toil”; soldiers are worn out by the trials they endure (Diodorus Siculus 17.12.2; cf. 17.10.5; 17.37.2). Similarly the toil of farmers: “You plant a vineyard at the cost of endless labors, of the sort that workers of the soil must endure”; and of porters, who toil physically “after the fashion of beasts of burden” (Philo, *Virtues* 88), “those who earn their living through any trade do not cease to suffer at any time or any place” (*Sacr. Abel and Cain* 38; cf. *I. Magn.* 65 a 26: *kakopathian ergontes*; b 14); which explains why the word is so often linked with *dapanē* (expense). Naturally, it occurs in the language of sports. Finally it comes to be used of a costly effort; hence the corresponding adjective is used in the sense of “hard-working, persevering,” as in this epitaph: *Leōn Androsthēnos kakopathe chrēste chaire*.

Since *kakopatheia* takes in the danger, trouble, and toil suffered by functionaries in the course of duty, by workers in their trades, by people in the course of their lives, 2 Tim 2:9 and 4:5 can be understood as referring to the hard apostolic labor that is not deterred by any difficulty or suffering.

*kakourgos*, S 2557; TDNT 5.484; EDNT 2.239; NIDNTT 1.561, 564; MM 317; L&N 88.114; BDF §§31(1), 119(1), 124; BAGD 398

This word presents no difficulty. It occurs only twice in the NT, where it refers to the two malefactors led with Jesus to Calvary “to be executed” and to St. Paul in prison, enduring sufferings and humiliation “even chains, like a malefactor” (2 Tim 2:9; cf. *Gos. Pet.* 26). But it is interesting to ask what sort of delinquent or criminal is meant.

Esth 8:12 *q* uses the word in its most general and pejorative sense: the Jews handed over to destruction by Amon “are not malefactors (= culprits), but govern themselves according to very just laws.” Sir 11:33 makes an easy play on words: “Be on guard against the evildoer (*apo kakourgou*), for he stirs up evil,” but this is the conclusion of a warning against the ploys of the intriguer, the heart of the proud, and slanderer, and sinner (verses 29–32). In Prov 21:15, the *kakourgos* is the “doer of iniquity” (Hebrew *pō ‘ēl ’āwen*) and is contrasted with the just person, who practices equity.

The word can refer to a simple good-for-nothing (Menander, *Dysk.* 258) or a villain (Philo, *Heir* 109) – whose impiety and *anomia* are mentioned in *BGU* 1854, 19 and *SB* 9691, 12 = *P.Abinn.* 54, 12 – a criminal (*P.Oxy.* 1468, 4), most often a thief or brigand (*lēstēs*, Matt 27:38 = Mark 15:27; Herodian, *Hist.* 1.10.2), operating in groups (*kollēgion kakourgōn*, *P.Gron.Amst.* 1, 4) that give themselves over to pillage (*P.Ant.* 97, 9; *P.Hib.* 62, 3; from 245 BC) without shrinking from violence (Philo, *Spec. Laws* 1.75). Thus it is that in AD 171 two pork merchants of Arsinoë were attacked on the road by brigands who beat them up, took their tunics, and stole a pig from one of them. These nameless bandits cannot be identified by their victim: “*epēlthan tines kakourgoi, housper agnoō*, several bandits whom I do not know attacked” (*P.Lund* IV, 13, 10; republished *SB* 9349; *P.Flor.* 9, 12; *C.P.Herm.* 52, 7), they work at night (*P.Mil.* 45, 6; republished *SB* 9515; *P.Lond.* 245, 9 = vol. 2, p. 272), break into a town (*P.Bon.* 22 a 9), a house (*P.Mich.* 425, 16; *P.Gen* 47, 6, 13), or a farm estate (*Pap.Lugd.Bat.* XIII, 8, 7), steal or kill sheep (*P.Lond.* 403, 8; vol. 2, p. 276 = *P.Abinn.* 49; *P.Lond.* 242, 6; vol. 2, p. 275), and do not hesitate to set fires; they burn harvested grains and hay (*P.Cair.Isid.* 65, 4; 66, 8; 67, 11; cf. *Gos. Pet.* 26). For Palladas, the *kakourgos* is a murderer (*androphonos*) headed for crucifixion.

The civil authority can take security measures against these malefactors, brigands, deserters, and other delinquents, like the ordinance of Ptolem

Euergetes calling for the arrest of *lēistai kai hoi loipoi kakourgoi* (*P.Hib.* 198, 93, 98; *BGU* 1764, 20). The two Gospel texts concerning these bandits emphasize their punishment. Sir 33:27 sets forth torture and trial by ordeal for the *oiketēs kakourgōs* (wicked servant); Cyrus had the feet and hands of *kakourgoi* and *adikoi* cut off and their eyes gouged out (Xenophon, *An.* 1.9.13). Thucydides 1.134.4 mentions “the Kaiadas (a pit or cavern) where *kakourgoi* were interred”; Philo, “the whips usually reserved for the degrading of the worst malefactors, *kakourgōn ponērotatous*” (Philo, *Flacc.* 75); Plutarch, the mines where the work is done by *kakourgoi* and foreign slaves (*Crass.* 34.1). Incarceration is the commonest punishment, at least as a provisional measure. Pentepres condemns Joseph as a good-for-nothing and sends him to the malefactors’ prison, *eis tēn kakourgōn heirkētēn enebalen* (Josephus, *Ant.* 2.59). Since the recovery of debts was in principle supposed to be carried out against the property of debtors and not their persons, Tiberias Julius Alexander orders “that in no event shall free men be imprisoned at all unless they are malefactors” (*SB* 8444, 17 = *Dittenberger, Or.* 669). A plaintiff of the third century, who claims to be innocent, was first led to the town prison, then “transferred to the prison of Crocodilopolis (the metropolis), (the police officer) claiming that I was a malefactor, *phaskōn einai me kakourgon*” (*P.Lille* 7, 20; cf. 28, 3). In 6 BC, the chief of police of Persea is ordered to transfer two malefactors who have been arrested, *hous synepsēkas kakourgous duo*.

καλύπτω, ἀνακαλύπτω, ἀποκαλύπτω, ἀποκάλυψις  


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*kalyptō*, **to cover, envelop, hide**; *anakalyptō*, **to unveil, uncover**; *apokalyptō*, **to reveal**; *apokalypsis*, **revelation**  


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*kalupto*, *S* 2572; *TDNT* 3.556–558; *EDNT* 2.246; *NIDNTT* 2.211–212; *MM* 319; *L&N* 28.79, 79.114; *BAGD* 401 | *anakalupto*, *S* 343; *TDNT* 3.560–561; *EDNT* 1.82; *NIDNTT* 2.212f.; *MM* 34; *L&N* 79.117; *BAGD* 55 | *apokalupto*, *S* 601; *TDNT* 3.563–592; *EDNT* 1.130–132; *NIDNTT* 3.309–312, 314; *MM* 63; *L&N* 28.38; *BAGD* 92 | *apokalupsis*, *S* 602; *TDNT* 3.563–592; *EDNT* 1.130–132; *MM* 63; *L&N* 28.38; *BAGD* 92

“*Kalyptō*. Verbal expression indicating that an object that intercepts the light or visual rays keeps another object from being seen, or, in the case of a living being, from seeing. The active forms of *kalyptein* have as subject, in Homer, the earth, water, clouds, the night, etc., but also deities who used nature to hide what they wanted hidden. The poets, moreover, provide an external cause for

the extinction of vision in the dead and wounded, placing outside of their persons the night in which they feel themselves enveloped.”

In classical Greek, this verb has three meanings: (a) “cover”; Homer, *Il.* 6.464: “May the earth poured over me cover me”; 10.29: Menelaus “covered his large pack with the hide of a spotted leopard”; (b) “envelop”; *Il.* 5.23: Hephaestus saved the life of Idaios “by enveloping him in darkness”; 5.507: Ares “enveloped the battle in a sudden night” and thus brought help to the Trojans; 5.553: death, “which ends all, enveloped them there”; (c) “hide”; *Il.* 3.381: Aphrodite “hid Paris behind a thick fog”; 21.318, 321: “his splendid arms will rest beneath the water, hidden beneath the silt (*kekalymmena*).... I will heap rubble on him to hide him (*kalypsō*).”

In the inscriptions, *kalyptō* is found in liturgical and funerary regulations. On the pedestal of a statue of a magistrate at Mariamnia: “the earth, which nurtured him like a mother, now covers him.” The verb is rare in the papyri, but much used in the LXX (for the Hebrew piel of *kāsâh*), from the simple meaning in such expressions as covering a cistern (Exod 21:33), fat covering the intestines (Lev 3:14), and “leprosy covering all the skin of the body” (Lev 13:12–13), to the meaning “fill, inundate, overrun”: God’s majesty covered the heavens (Hab 3:3); fear enveloped me (Ps 55:5; cf. Prov 10:6, 11; Sir 37:3; Hab 2:17). It is especially clouds that cover and envelop, but also hangings, drapes, and vestments that “hide” nudity. To cover one’s face is to hide from others’ looks. To keep words hidden is to keep them secret (*kalypson ta prostagmata*, Dan 12:4).

It could be said that this verb is unknown in Philo, since he uses it only in quoting Deut 23:13 (*Alleg. Interp.* 2.27; 3.158) and in commenting on Exod 26:1–14 (*Moses* 2.87). Josephus also knows the meaning “cover,” but he more often uses the word to mean “hide,” and with the pejorative nuance of “conceal”: the satrap conceals his machinations under signs of friendship (*War* 1.256); Antipater cleverly conceals his hatred (1.468); soldiers camouflaged in civilian clothes (2.176).

The Gospels know only the meaning “hide”: a boat is hidden by the waves (Matt 8:24); one who lights a lamp does not hide it with a vase or place it under a bed (Luke 8:16); “they say to the hills, ‘hide us’ ” (Luke 23:30; cf. Hos 10:18). If there is nothing hidden that will not be uncovered (*ouden kekalymmenon, ho ouk apokalyphthēsetai*, Matt 10:26), we must understand this to mean that what Jesus said in secret to his apostles will be promulgated by them to the whole world, and that the truth of the gospel, which is at first contradicted or unrecognized, will be recognized and accepted by the very pagans. In the same sense: “If, moreover, our gospel is veiled (perfect passive participle, *kekalymmenon*), it is so for those who are perishing” (2 Cor 4:3). The

gospel, which is light and illumination, must be manifest to all, but its brilliance is not perceived by the blind or those who have an opaque spot on their eye (E. B. Allo), a veil (*kalymma*, 2 Cor 3:15), due to Satan's action, so that they are incapable of understanding its message: the revelation of the Messiah. That is to say, the interior illumination of faith is necessary for perceiving the shining brilliance of the Son of Man (Luke 11:33–36).

Very important, theologically speaking, are 1 Pet 4:8 – “Show intense love among yourselves, since (causal *hoti*) love covers a multitude of sins” (*agapē kalyptei plēthos hamartiōn*) – and Jas 5:20 – “One who brings back a sinner from the error of his way will save his soul from death and cover a multitude of sins” (*kalypsei plēthos hamartiōn*). The exact parallelism of the two assertions indicates that we have here a Greek aphorism. The Syriac *Didascalia* (2.3.3) attributes it to Jesus himself, but it is certainly a quotation of Prov 10:12 according to the Hebrew text: “Love covers all faults.” To cover, veil, or hide sins is to efface them, pardon them. The OT affirms that works of mercy obtain pardon for sin from God, and the Lord pronounces the merciful blessed (Matt 5:7; 6:14–15; cf. 1 Pet 2:20; 3:8–9). We may affirm that in the NT, *agapē* has the value of an expiatory sacrifice and is a major element of spiritual worship (1 John 3:19–20).

*Anakalyptō*. – Apparently this verb is commonplace, meaning “unveil, remove a veil, uncover.” It was agreed that once seated, “the conspirators (disguised as women) would strike immediately, throwing off their veils”; “unveil the sacred robe” (*anakalypson ton hieron peplon*, *Pap.Graec.Mag.* 57, 17). In the LXX, that which was hidden in darkness is disclosed and made to appear, made known, like the sins of the wicked (Job 20:27; cf. Philo, *Dreams* 1.87; *Moses* 1.243), and more frequently this or that body part: “The Lord will uncover the form of the daughters of Zion” (Isa 3:17; piel of the Hebrew *‘ārâh*); the deported Egyptians will go “barefoot and with their shame uncovered” (Isa 20:4; Hebrew *hāśap*); notably for uncovering the pudenda.

*Anakalyptō* is sometimes associated with vision: with animals that have eyelids, “If they do not open them (*mē anakalyphthentōn*) they cannot see.” But in the OT, the verb is in a way sacralized, when God is the subject. Not only does he “reveal himself” (Isa 22:14), but “he makes a revelation to humans.” “He reveals that which is deep and hidden” (Dan 2:22), mysteries (2:28–29). Philo takes up this meaning: “the will of God is to reveal the secrets of things to those who wish to know the truth.” Virtue, like Tamar, sits at the crossroads with veiled face; but “in unveiling her (*anakalypsantes*), the curious behold (*katatheasōntai*) her beauty undefiled” (*Prelim. Stud.* 124).

It is in light of these data that we must understand the two NT occurrences of this religious verb. Comparing Judaism and Christianity, the synagogue and the

church, St. Paul says, “Until this day (cf. Deut 29:3; Isa 29:10; Rom 11:8) the same veil (*kalymma*) remains (on the heads of Jews, as the veil was upon Moses’ head) at the reading of the old covenant, for it is not unveiled (*mē anakalyptomenon*) that in Christ it (the covenant) is abolished” (2 Cor 3:14). The veil hinders seeing, and here, the understanding that the transitory old covenant is now outdated. The condition of Christians is quite different: “We all with unveiled faces (dative of manner, not instrumental, *anakekalymmenō prosōpō*) reflect like a mirror the glory of the Lord.” The new covenant, after all, is written not on stone tablets but on tablets of flesh, in the hearts of believers (2 Cor 3:3). All the same, since it is a question of knowledge, the apostle speaks no longer of uncovered hearts but of faces with no interposed veil, of uncovered persons who refract the divine light when they are turned toward Christ, who, illuminating them with the divine light, metamorphoses and divinizes them. The image is that of a permanent and transforming spiritual reflection. Everyone can perceive it, whereas the Israelites could not look upon Moses reflecting the divine light, so that he was obliged to veil it (Exod 34).

*Apokalypsis*. – This noun, unknown in Philo, Josephus, and the papyri, means literally “the act of uncovering” and corresponds exactly to the English “revelation.” Ben Sirach uses it for the divulging of a secret (Sir 22:22; 41:26 – *logōn kryphiōn*) and for the manifestation of that which was previously unknowable: “At a person’s end (comes) the revelation of his works” (*apokalypsis ergōn autou*, 11:27).

Simeon, drawing upon Isa 42:6 and 49:6 (*eis phōs ethnōn*) sees in the infant Jesus the Messiah, “a light for the revealing of the nations” (*phōs eis apokalypsin ethnōn*, Luke 2:32); ordinarily this *apokalypsis* is understood to mean the teaching of the Gentiles or the suppression of spiritual darkness, the drawing back of a veil; but that is not a translation; we must translate, “a light that will reveal itself to the nations” (E. Osty). The meaning of “manifestation” is evident when the word refers to the glorious Second Coming of Christ, coming from heaven, so that “apocalypse” has in view the eschatological future, the object of Christian faith, and awaited even by the very creation (Rom 8:19). Its technical meaning is given in the doxology in Rom 16:25, where “the revelation of a mystery (*kata apokalypsin mystēriou*) kept in silence from eternity” is a divulging analogous to the gospel and the kerygma; its object is Jesus Christ, who is henceforth announced. In fact, the apostle learned the mystery and the gospel not from human teachers, but “by revelation” from God and Christ, so that he could put the dispensation into effect. Heavenly manifestations and apocalyptic visions were multiplied in his life precisely because he was the herald charged with proclaiming to the world the truth of the saving divine truth, with being a bearer of the light. He teaches what he has



received by divine revelation, and his words are a revelation for Christians, to whom he brings new knowledge: “Of what use will I be to you if I do not speak to you in revelation (*en apokalypsei*), or in gnosis, or in prophecy, or in instruction?” (1 Cor 14:6). It is remarkable that in church meetings each one was concerned to bring to his brothers and sisters some additional light to allow them to know God better, to “disclose” him more and more: “May the God of our Lord Jesus Christ ... grant you a spirit of wisdom and of revelation that will make you truly know him.”

It is not surprising that the name *Apocalypse* should have been given to books recording the revelations of prophets. Also, the first word of the text of the Apocalypse of the apostle and prophet John (*Apokalypsis Iēsou Christou*, Rev 1:1) serves as the title of the work: in it Christ reveals himself, makes himself known, manifests himself as Lord and Redeemer, reigning in heaven and triumphing over Satan’s last assaults on earth. The veil that hides the future is lifted to make known God’s secrets concerning the future, the events of the church’s future as discernible by Christians.

κάμνω

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*kamnō*, **to work, take pains, become weary, lose heart, be ill**

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*kamno*, S 2577; EDNT 2.248; MM 320; L&N 23.142, 25.291; BAGD 402

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This intransitive verb is frequently used by Homer in the sense of “work, make an effort, take pains” a meaning attested up until the eighth century in the papyri. From this meaning, it comes to signify “grow weary, tire oneself out, take great pains.” Thus Heb 12:3 cautions “lest you grow weary, becoming faint of heart, *hina mē kamnēte tais psychais hymōn eklyomenoi*,” to which we may compare 4 Macc 7:13 (Eleazar, whose “bodily strength was spent, whose muscles were flabby, whose sinews were weakened – *kekmēkotōn* – became a young man again”) or 3:8 (“when evening came, David, covered with sweat and quite exhausted, *sphodra kekmēkōs*”). Job’s soul was tired (literally “disgusted,” Hebrew *qûṭ*) of life (*kamnōn tē psychē mou*, Job 10:1). A person is tired out by effort or a sustained attempt (*P.Stras.* 198, 10; second century); one suffers on account of bad news (*P.Michael.* 29, 6; cf. *BGU* 884, col. I, 11); besieged people whose spirits have flagged badly take fresh courage (Diodorus Siculus 20.96). Quite often the verb is used with negation. God says: “I am the one who marked out the way that leads to heaven and blazed the trail, like a highway for all suppliant souls, so that they might not tire out as they go, *hōs mē kamnoien badizousai*” (Philo, *Post. Cain* 31). “If you do not get what you

are looking for on the first try, persevere tirelessly, *epimene mē kamnōn*” (Philo, *Migr. Abr.* 220). Those who do not seek the truth zealously should take as their model those who are suffering physically (*tōn ta sōmata kamnontōn*) and who seek the care of a physician (Philo, *Good Man Free* 12). Moses did not let himself be worn down by Pharaoh’s threats (Josephus, *Ant.* 2.290, *oute ekammen*); from the time of Hadrian: “very light for his height, so that the one carrying him did not suffer, *hōs mē kamnein ton phorounta auton*” (*P.Giss.* 47, 8). In the third-fourth century, “Your enemy does not tire of making petitions, *ou kamnei de sou ho antidikos entynchanōn*” (*P.Oxy.* 2597, 6).

*Kamnō* finally means to suffer in the sense of being affected by an illness; *hoi kamnontes* = patients (Hippocrates, *Acut.* 1.1, 3.2, etc.), as in Jas 5:15, where the elders are called to pray over the sick person, “and the prayer of faith will save the sufferer, *hē euchē tēs pisteōs sōsei ton kamnonta*.” This meaning is the one found in the classical authors. It is current in the first century: “God offers the remedy for the salvation of the sick – *pros tēn tōn kamnontōn sōtērian* – by applying this balm to the wounds of the soul” (Philo, *Migr. Abr.* 124); “physical illnesses for which one goes to a physician” (*Good Man Free* 12); “When his son Obime was sick (*kamnontos*)” Jereboam sent his wife to consult the prophet Achias; “treatment for the sick” (*therapeian tōn kamnontōn*, Musonius Rufus, p. 20, 8); “You know that my brother Marcus has many dealings with the sick and with the clinic” (*tous kamnontas kai to iatrimon*, *P.Ross.Georg.* III, 2, 9; cf. *P.Gron.Amst.* I, 11).

## καπηλεύω

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*kapēleuō*, to peddle, to traffic in something for gain

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*kapeleuo*, S 2585; *TDNT* 3.603–605; *EDNT* 2.249; MM 321; L&N 57.202; BAGD 403

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“We are not among the many who hawk the word of God about, *hōs hoi polloi kapēleuontes* (Vulgate *adulterantes*) *ton logon tou theou*.” The verb occurs only here in the Bible. It derives from *kapēlos*, which by contrast with *emporos* (a considerable merchant) normally refers to a small shopkeeper, a retailer, a reseller, a peddler, a second-hand dealer, and by extension any trafficker or merchant; tradition most often makes the *kapēlos* a wine merchant, even though this specialization is poorly attested before the first century, when it is denounced for misdeeds already noted by Isa 1:22 – “*hoi kapēloi sou misgousi ton oinon hydati*, your *kapēloi* mix the wine with water.”

If *kapēloi* have a reputation for falsifying what they sell or cheating on the price, what are we to do with the verb *kapēleuō*? It has the two connotations of “falsify” and “reap illicit profits,” which the commentators are wrong to separate. Moulton-Milligan, to support the sense “deal in for purposes of gain,” cite *BGU* 1024, col. VII, 23, referring to a prostitute: “*hoti ton men bion asemnōs diēgen, to de telos ... ekapēleuen*, because she led an indecent life, she ended by selling ...”; but this text is from the fourth century and contains the only occurrence of *kapēleuō* in the papyri.

Aeschylus (*Sept.* 545) uses *kapēleuein tēn machēn*, meaning “do a half-way job at fighting, wage pseudo-combat”; Philo: “She who ought to share a man’s bed, not for pay like a courtesan who peddles the flower of her beauty, *hōs hetairan to tēs hōras anthos kapēleuousan*” (*Virtues* 112); “A certain Apelles, a tragedian, who they say had in the flower of his youth peddled his beauty, *ekapēleuse tēn hōran*” (*To Gaius* 203); “One hears of irregularities: businessmen and traders (*emporoi* and *kapēloi*) will for filthy lucre (*glischrōn heneka kerdōn*) cross seas and traverse the whole earth” (*Migr. Abr.* 217). Philostratus: “This is what I have against trainers who make merchants of themselves (*kapēleuontōn*), for they peddle the good qualities of the athletes (*kapēleuousi gar pou tas tōn athlētōn aretas*) to achieve their own interests” (*Gym.* 45). Palladas: “Fortuna, who traffics in all of human life (*Tychē kapēleousa*) ... who mixes and then draws off again (*synkykōsa kai metantlous au palin*), see how she in her turn is a tavern keeper (*kautē kapēlos esti*), not a goddess; having received from fate a profession to match her character” (*Anth. Pal.* 9.180). This last text emphasizes the scorn directed at the profession of *kapēlos*; cf. Lucian: “The Phoenicians ... you must regard them as gods, although for the most part they are mere *kapēloi* and fishmongers” (*Tox.* 4). This pejorative flavor, which St. Paul preserves, is present in all of the references just given; the love of lucre cannot be disentangled from shady dealings and guilty deeds; it is in fact their motive.

It is more illuminating to follow J. J. Wettstein in tracing behind the Pauline usage the philosophical use of the term, in which the sophist is disqualified for selling his teaching. The tradition goes back to Plato: “Is a sophist not a merchant or shopkeeper (*emporos tis ē kapēlos*), selling the commodities that nourish the soul.... Those who peddle their knowledge from city to city, selling it wholesale and retail (*pōlountes kai kapēleuontes*) praising to their buyers all that they offer for sale” (*Prt.* 313 c–d). Philostratus: “he went off to buy and sell and to hackney wisdom, *apēge tou chrēmatisesthai te kai tēn sophian kapēleuein*”; Lucian: “the philosophers sell their teaching like tavern keepers (*hōs kapēloi*), and most of them (*hoi polloi*) mix their wine with water and misrepresent it (*dolōsantes*).”

We must conclude that the apostle has in mind those preachers who do not proclaim the word of God in all its purity; they alter it, falsify it by introducing elements foreign to the revelation – 1 Tim 1:3; 6:3 calls this *heterodidaskalein* – after the fashion of shopkeepers who sell adulterated goods; by so doing, this preaching loses its power to convert and give spiritual life. This hucksterism is aimed not only at making a profit (cf. 1 Cor 9:5–14) but for building a reputation, inspiring admiration, gaining personal advantages, prestige, credit, authority.

The papyri add nothing to this semantic, apart from the names of several tavern keepers or merchants. In the patristic literature, *theokapēlos*, *christokapēlos*, *kapēleuein ta theia* refer to people who abuse Christianity by either falsifying or selling the truth.

κατάγω

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*katagō*, to lead, take, conduct, bring back, restore, return

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*katago*, S 2609; EDNT 2.257; MM 325; L&N 15.175, 54.16; BAGD 410

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This compound of *agō*, which has no theological meaning in the NT, rather often keeps the same meaning as the simple verb (“lead, take, conduct”), notably in geometry, where it refers to “the consistent operation of tracing a line from a point toward a limit,” and where it is often synonymous with *epizeugnymi*. Literally, however, it means “bring from above to below, bring down,” for example: “transport wood from the mountains to the city” (Plato, *Critias* 118 d), bend the branch of a young tree to the ground (Euripides, *Bacch.* 1065), “bend the head toward the ground” (Lam 2:10); “Michal let David down through the window”; and very often, go or take someone to another place: “The Philistines took Samson down to Gaza”; “Gabinus went down to Egypt” (Josephus, *War* 1.175); go down to Caesarea (*Ant.* 16.62; cf. *P.Tebt.* 338, 14). It is exactly in this sense that the Jerusalem brothers “took Paul to Caesarea and sent him to Tarsus” (Acts 9:30).

*Katagō* quite often means “bring back,” for example bringing back the banished to their homes or bringing someone back to power, that is, “restore,” then “return” (Xenophon, *An.* 3.4.36; Philo, *Cherub.* 3) and “bring” or “bring back.” But the maritime meaning is the commonest from Homer on: “Ulysses sailed for Troy” (*Od.* 19.186); “We arrived at Geraestus” (3.178; 10.140); “they put straight in”; “ships of Alexandria ready to set out” (Philo, *Flacc.* 27); “the Jews who disembarked” (Philo, *To Gaius* 129); “He disembarked at the port of Augustus at Caesarea” (Josephus, *War* 1.613); “He reached Dicaearchia”

(2.104; *Ant.* 14.378). These are just like Acts 27:3 – “The following day we landed at Sidon”; 28:12 – “Having landed at Syracuse, we remained there three days.”

In the papyri, the meaning is almost exclusively “transport” from one place to another, generally by water (*katagein apo ... eis*), whether the cargo is wood (*SB* 8242, 3), wine (6798, 28; *P.Mich.* 30 e, 2; *PSI* 1123, 6, 21), legumes, etc., but also a man or a woman required to appear before a magistrate, as when a certain Egyptian is to appear before the chief of police (*Takolkeileōs ton Peunis Hōrou tou Angatos mētros Taonnōphrios katagin eis ton archephodon*, *P.Ryl.* 681; second century); this is what we call a warrant to come before a judge, where *katagō* then means “appear,” that is, present oneself by order before a judge or court. So Acts 22:30; 23:15, 20, 28, where the usual translation is “make Paul go down before the Sanhedrin,” could strictly in the first text mean that the tribune brought Paul to the Tower of Antonia to conduct him to the place where the Sanhedrin met; but in the three other cases, the verb signifies a judicial appearance “before you as if you wanted to get more accurate information concerning his case” (23:15).

There remains the difficult text at Rom 10:6 – “Do not say in your heart, ‘Who will ascend to heaven?’ that is, to bring Christ down (*tout’ estin Christon katagagein*), or ‘Who will go down to Sheol?’ that is, to bring Christ up from the dead.” The first words, “Do not say in your heart,” are from Deut 8:17; 9:4; “Who will ascend to heaven?” and “Who will go down to Sheol (the abode of the dead)?” are suggestive of Deut 30:12–13. But this double journey was known to the Greeks and the Romans as well as to the Hebrews, for whom it became a proverbial expression for something impossible, although God can communicate that which is inaccessible to humans. It is precisely the unbeliever who would think of climbing up to heaven to search for a Savior or going down to the abode of the dead to bring Christ back to life. In reality, for the believer whose confidence is in God, redemption is already accomplished; Christ has already come down from heaven; he has already been resurrected. Salvation is quite close at hand, and there is no need for a long journey. One has only to accept it, welcome it with an open heart.

How was St. Paul able to enunciate this truth, which is so simple, by means of so subtle an exegesis (?) of Deut 30:12–13? He was led to it by the gloss on this text in the Targum according to the recension in Codex Neofiti (*Tg. Neof.* fol. 432 b): “The law is not in heaven, so that you must say, ‘Can we have someone like the prophet Moses to ascend to heaven and bring it to us.’ ... Neither is the law beyond the great sea, so that you must say, ‘Can we have someone like the prophet Jonah to go down into the depths of the sea to bring it back up to us and help us understand its precepts so that we may carry them

out.’ ” For St. Paul, faith puts righteousness within reach. He applies to Jesus what this targum says about Moses and Jonah, a type of Christ (Matt 12:40; Acts 7:35–39).

καταλλαγή, καταλλάσσω

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*katallagē*, **reconciliation**; *katallassō*, **to reconcile**

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*katallage*, S 2643; TDNT 1.258; EDNT 2.261–263; NIDNTT 3.166–168; MM 329; L&N 40.1; BAGD 414 | *katallasso*, S 2644; TDNT 1.254–258; EDNT 2.261–263; NIDNTT 3.166–169, 171–172; MM 329; L&N 40.1; BDF §193(4); BAGD 414

For pagans and Christians alike, *reconciliation* is the action of reestablishing friendship between two persons who are on bad terms, to replace hostility with peaceful relations; but in the nature of the case, secular parallels can hardly shed light on the theological elaboration of so specifically Christian a reality as the reconciliation of God with humans, the immediate effect of redemption. The parallels usually apply to the reestablishment of good relations in the political, social, familial, or moral sphere and have to do with a change of feelings or circumstances; in banking jargon, *katallagē* means changing one currency into another, an exchange (*P.Oxy.* 1937, 8; *P.Corn.* 3, 11; *PSI* 859, 4; *P.Hib.* 100, 4; *T. Job* 25, 3) or a replacement (*P.Apoll.* 79, 7).

Nonetheless, the contexts of these “changings” or reversals (cf. Jer 48:39) can be instructive, especially for 1 Cor 7:11, where St. Paul recalls that the Lord prescribed that a woman should not separate from her husband, but in case there was a separation, the wife should not remarry but remain *agamos* or be reconciled with her husband, *ē tō andri katallagētō*. We might compare Judg 19:2–3, where a Levite’s concubine is angry at him (*ōrgisthē autō*) and leaves him. He “went after her to speak kindly to her and reconcile her to him (*tou diallaxai autēn heautō*) and take her back home”; 1 Esdr 4:31: “if the husband feels that the wife is bitter against him, he caresses her to reconcile her to him (*hopōs diallagē autō*).” In a will from AD 96, the legator in bequeathing her house to her son asks that forty drachmas be given to his sister Tnepheros, who has a room set aside in her building, in case she is ever separated from her husband, until she is reconciled, *ean apallagē tou andros mechri hou ... katallagē*. The best parallel is a contract from AD 124 for remarriage between two Jews; El’ēaios having formerly repudiated his wife Salome takes her back again with a dowry of 200 denarii, which he acknowledges having received: “now the same Elaios son of Simon agrees to reconcile anew and to take back

the same Salome ... as wedded wife” (*nynei homologei ho autos Elaios Simōnos ex ananeōseōs katallaxeī kai proslabesthai tēn autēn Salōmēn ... eis gynaiika gametēn*).

In the OT, *katallagē* in the religious sense is peculiar to 2 Macc, where the almighty, merciful God, angry at sin (2 Macc 1:5; 5:20; 7:33) but hearing the prayers of his servants (1:5; 8:29), renounces his momentary wrath and is reconciled anew (*palin*, 7:33) and wholly (*eis telos*, 8:29). On the basis of this *katallagē*, the temple is rebuilt (5:20), victory over enemies is assured (8:29), peace is guaranteed. The Pauline theology of reconciliation also involves the cessation of a state of hostility, which is replaced by peaceful relations and mutual agreement, but there is a profound difference: “If, while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, how much more, now that we are reconciled, shall we be saved by his life; and not only [have we been reconciled], but we glorify God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we have now obtained reconciliation.” “God has reconciled us to himself through Christ’s mediation and has given us the ministry of reconciliation – to us who know that in Christ, God was reconciling the world to himself, taking no account of their sins, and putting in our (mouth) the word of reconciliation.” “For Christ, then, we are ambassadors, seeing that it is God who exhorts through us. We implore on Christ’s behalf: be reconciled with God.” It appears from these texts that Pauline *katallagē* is a transformation or a renewing of relations between God and humans, in accord with the framework mentioned in pagan texts:

(a) First there is a state of hostility between God and humans; the latter are designated *echthroī*, *asebeis*, *astheneis* (Rom 5:6), *hamartōloi* (verse 8), under the domination of the devil, enrolled in his army. Hence God’s anger, stirred by the offense against him (verse 10), so that the fruit of the *katallagē* is to be saved from this avenging wrath (verse 9; Eph 2:3).

(b) God *always* takes the initiative in reconciliation, “not charging their trespasses to their account” (2 Cor 5:19). Not only does he change his feelings, but he grants pardon to his adversaries (cf. Col 2:13–15), establishes fresh relations with humans; reconciliation is characterized by a reestablishment of peace; it is a “pacification.”

(c) Christ is the instrument of this reconciliation (2 Cor 5:18–19), because he offered himself as a sacrifice for the expiation of the sins of the world (Rom 5:10, *dia tou thanatou*, through his death), which were obstacles to unity and peace (cf. Heb 9:22); and God, who willed this offering, accepted it.

(d) The apostles are the agents of the *katallagē*, like ambassadors (*presbeuomen*) charged with working out a peace settlement; they actualize it and make it possible for everyone and ask each one’s consent. Their ministry is

to promulgate and transmit the *katallagē – ton logon tēs katallagēs* (2 Cor 5:19–20) – which presupposes that humans must sign on for the reconciliation to be efficacious.

(e) It is for each one to accept it for himself or herself, to sign on to it: “let yourselves be reconciled with God” (2 Cor 5:20), do what is necessary to that end: have faith and repent.

(f) A new state of affairs results, like a new *ktisis* (creation, 2 Cor 5:19), a resurrection (Rom 11:15), salvation, justification, peace (5:1), life (5:10), and *kauchēma*: a confident, proud, joyful assurance of beatitude (verse 11).

## καταναρκάω

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*katanarkaō*, **to burden, to benumb**

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*katanarkao*, S 2655; EDNT 2.265; MM 330; L&N 57.224; BDF §181; BAGD 414–415

The simple verb *narkaō*, “become numb, paralyzed,” is used of sinews (Gen 32:26, 33), arms (Dan 11:6), the mass of “crippled” bone (Job 33:19, Theodotion) that precludes movement and confines to bed. Hippocrates observes that the patient is susceptible to paralysis and coma, together with a lack of feeling (Hippocrates, *Liqu.* 1.3), and that “a large quantity of cold water dulls the pain” (6.2–3).

The compound *katanarkaō* also belongs to the medical vocabulary, but St. Paul, in three occurrences of the word, gives it an active sense, unusual in Greek literature – and also figurative: *ou katenarkēsa outhenos* (2 Cor 11:9), *ou katenarkēsa hymōn* (12:13), *ou katanarkēsō* (12:14). Most modern versions translate: “I avoided being a burden to you ... I was not a burden to you ... I will not burden you.” They are following the Vulgate (*nullus onerosus fui*) and the Peshitta, Chrysostom, and Theodoret, who see the word as a synonym of *barynō*. This is also in line with St. Jerome’s identification of the usage as a Cilicisms. It is indeed possible that from the meaning “be numb and dull” there was a transition to “be inactive, burdensome.” The apostle would mean that his presence at Corinth was not taxing for the community.

But LSJ translates “to be slothful” (cf. Hesychius, *narkē-oknēria*). E. B. Allo better follows the medical meaning “anaesthetize,” proposing, for lack of a better translation, *enjôler*. The verb is unknown in the papyri.



*katantao*, S 2658; TDNT 3.623–625; EDNT 2.265; NIDNTT 1.324–325; MM 330; L&N 13.16, 13.121, 15.84; BAGD 415

Unknown in classical Greek and in the Gospels, quite rare in the inscriptions, but common in Polybius, Diodorus Siculus, and the papyri, this verb, which means “arrive at, reach, come to, end up at,” is sometimes used literally, sometimes metaphorically. In the first case, someone goes to a certain place or city, or to see a certain person: “which brought him to Jerusalem” (2 Macc 4:21), “the king came to Tyre” (verse 44); Paul arrived at Derbe and Lystra (Acts 16:1; cf. 18:19, 24; 20:15; 21:7; 25:13; 27:12; 28:13); *katantan eis to gymnasium* = come to the gymnasium; one sojourns at a place that is the terminus of a march or a voyage.

In the figurative sense, the idea of movement or change is often preserved, with the suggestion that the event happens at the desired moment, at a named point, as if following a trajectory; or that the person obtains what he or she was counting on (“he had himself named high priest,” 2 Macc 4:24), achieves his or her goal. If the subject is a thing, it comes to a certain person – “Is it to you alone that the word of God has come?” – and the verb *katantaō*, used in legal texts, especially in wills, often means “fall one’s lot” or, as we would say, “devolve.” 1 Cor 10:11 has often been understood in this sense: “We, upon whom the consummation of the ages has come,” like the receiving of an inheritance; but the idea is more that of an encounter or a confrontation. Circumstances evolve. We read concerning a small group of artisans that they would consider it a simple wish to be able to “arrive at” fulfilling the orders they have received (*P.Phil.* 10, 6), or that “the quite large number of inhabitants that used to live in these towns have today reached the point of being only a few, *nynei katēntēsan eis oligous*.” Or one may hope to benefit from help received, which would vindicate the step of approaching someone to ask for relief. It is in this sense that the body of Christ is built and that all believers should arrive at (*katantēsōmen hoi pantes*, Eph 4:13) true unity. The goal is set, the people of God aim toward it, are moving toward this end, which has not yet been attained. The goal is the encounter with the bridegroom, Christ, but also an inheritance; and also entrance into a place – Paradise.

**katartizō, to make, prepare, restore, establish**

→see also ἐξαρτίζω, καταρτίζω

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**katartizo**, S 2675; TDNT 1.475–476; EDNT 2.268; NIDNTT 3.349–350; MM 332; L&N 13.130, 42.36, 75.5; BDF §§74(1), 126(1a); BAGD 417–418

Derived from *artios* (“complete, perfect, suitable, exactly fitted”), the compound *katartizō* is a technical term of primitive parenesis. Its range of meanings, both extended and homogeneous, is well indicated by the variety of Hebrew words that it translates in the LXX: *pā‘al*, “do, make, prepare” (Exod 15:17; Ps 68:29); *pēlal*, “finish, complete, restore” (2 Esdr 4:12–13, 16; 5:3, 9, 11; 6:14); *yāsād*, “found, establish, or ordain, decree” (Ps 8:3; cf. *šāt*, Ps 11:4); *tāmak*, “hold, uphold, keep” (Ps 17:5); *šāwāh* (in the piel), “equalize, make level, place” (Ps 18:34); *hūl* (in the piel), “be in labor, writhe with anguish” (Ps 29:9); *kūn* (in the niphal), “establish, strengthen, found, or prepare, dispose” (Ps 68:10; 74:16; 89:38); *kānan*, “designate” (Ps 80:16). From the etymology and usage of the word, its basic sense is to put in or restore to a condition, to make an object fit for its purpose, prepare it and adapt it to its usage, hence to adjust and perfect. This arranging or adapting to an end applies to things, to persons, or to members of a society. The verb is used:

(1) of a founding or creating, notably by God, who “founded” the sun (or the light, *B, S*) and the moon (Ps 74:16); “By faith, we understand that the worlds were organized (set in order, arranged, ornamented) by a word from God”; “the god of gods, who founded the world” (*ho theos tōn theōn, ho ton kosmon katartisamenos*, *Pap.Graec.Mag.* 4, 1147; vol. 1, p. 112), who puts his might to work (Ps 68:29), establishes his laws (Ps 11:4), arranges or prepares his dwelling place in the midst of his people (Exod 15:17), mends or protects the vine that he has planted (Ps 80:16), causes or prepares the deer to give birth (Ps 29:9). It is also used for the great king in Israel who built the temple and finished it for them (*ōkodomēsen auton kai katērtisato auton autois*, 2 Esdr 5:11; cf. 6:14). Finally, God “fashions” praise from the mouths of infants.

(2) for a strengthening or sustaining, as of a worn down people (Ps 68:10), of the conduct of the faithful (Ps 17:5) whose energy and agility are restored (Ps 18:34), of a dynasty that will endure forever (Ps 89:38).

(3) in architecture, of restored walls of a city or of a sanctuary (2 Esdr 4:12–13, 16; 5:3, 9); *BGU* 1854, 3: “to restore to the temple of the city of Herakles” (*katartisasthai eis to en Hērakleous polei hieron*, AD 8).

(4) of the master of a house who offers a room to a guest and prepares it, makes it comfortable and suits it perfectly for the well-being of the guest.

(5) when a woman has assembled the pieces of fabric for making a garment; the finished work is “ready to wear.”

(6) when the mistress of a house has prepared a meal for the family; she says that “it is ready” to eat (Dioscorides).

(7) when a pharmacist has, thanks to a successful mixture of ingredients, made a potion to heal a sick person; he describes the result as *katartismos*: its composition is perfect, the remedy is ready to take (“prepare disks weighing precisely one drachma in the scale,” *katartizoio de kyklous drachmaious plastingi diakridon arthos eryxas*, Nicander, *Ther.* 954; second century BC).

(8) in medicine, for the surgeon or bonesetter who puts a dislocated member back in place, thus restoring to the patient the use of the arm or leg.

(9) of the potter who has formed a vase that is ready to be delivered and suited for a certain use.

(10) of the sailor who outfits his boat, the admiral who arms a fleet that is ready to set sail, the general who equips an army that is ready to set out on a campaign.

(11) of the fisherman who, returning from fishing, repairs his nets, putting them in order for reuse (Matt 4:21; Mark 1:19).

(12) of the treasurer who is in a position to make a payment.

(13) of the educator who, having given a complete *paideia* to the child, can leave him to lead an adult life. In this sense, “if someone should be taken in a fault, you, the spiritual ones, set him right (reclaim, restore: *katartizete ton tououton*) with a spirit of gentleness” (Gal 6:1); “we ask with great urgency that we may see you again and mend the deficiencies (fill in the gaps) of your faith (*katartisai ta hystērēmata tēs pisteōs hymōn*,” 1 Thess 3:10); Christian discipleship implies mending one’s ways (cf. *Ep. Arist.* 144: *tropōn exartismōn*).

(14) in political language: to calm, appease the factions, restore unity. While there were divisions (*schismata*) in the Corinthian community, Paul exhorts the believers to be reconciled in one and the same Spirit, to maintain harmony between one another (1 Cor 1:10). The passive imperative *katartizesthe* in 2 Cor 13:11 can be translated with the same nuance: “come to an agreement among yourselves” with no element of discord, or “work at restoring yourselves”; that is, let yourselves be brought to a place of completeness, of perfection.

In all these usages and on all levels, the idea of setting in order and arranging is overshadowed by that of adapting to an end, as is apparent in Heb 13:21 – “may the God of peace make you ready for all good work to do his will” – and 1 Pet 5:10 – “The God of all grace ... will himself equip you (*autos katartisei*), will strengthen you (*stērixei*), will fortify you, establish you.” We

may conclude that *katartizein* is a major element in the *paideia* of the primitive church and – especially in St. Paul – in “edification,” that the Christian life involves steady progress in preparation for glory, or the restoration and reordering of whatever is deficient either in one’s personal life or in one’s relations with one’s neighbor.

## καταφεύγω

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*katapheugō*, **to flee, take refuge**

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*katapheugo*, S 2703; EDNT 2.270; MM 334; L&N 15.62, 21.15; BAGD 420

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It is hardly possible to specify whether, in its two NT occurrences, this verb means “flee” or “take refuge.” According to Acts 14:6, in the face of the pagan and Jewish uprising against them at Iconium, Paul and Barnabas *kataphygon eis tas poleis*, fled to or took refuge in the cities of Lyconia – Lystra, Derbe – and the surrounding area. Moderns take this to mean that they “went to seek refuge in” these cities, but in that case *en* rather than *eis* would be expected; in addition, it is surprising that of the several “cities of refuge” mentioned, one, namely Lystra, should be the place where Paul was stoned and left for dead. So it seems preferable to say that the apostles fled, ran away from Iconium, even though this meaning is less attested.

In the papyri and the inscriptions, *katapheugō* is a kind of technical term used by those who present an appeal to the emperor, to the king, the prefect, the *stratēgos*, a magistrate. The appeal may be made by a widow who is shabbily treated (*kataphronōn*), “thus, after appealing to you, O king, I shall receive justice” (*P.Magd.* 2, 8; from the third century BC; cf. *P.Hib.* 238, 10); or by weavers seeking exemption from public service: “*anankaiōs epi se kataphygamēn*, by necessity we have appealed to you” (*P.Phil.* 10, 13; from AD 139; cf. *SB* 10195, 12); or by plaintiffs who place themselves under the protection of a magistrate (*P.Oxy.* 2131, 7; *C.P.Herm.* 19, 9, 12; *BGU* 2061, 8; *SB* 9897, recto 9). All of them emphasize their need for help (*P.Oslo* 22, 12: “*epi se katapheugō asthenēs kai aboēthetos*, I flee to you weak and helpless”; from the second century AD; *P.Tebt.* 327, 28; *P.Cair.Zen.* 59447, 10; 59852, 10), which is why they appeal with fervor (*spoudazō*, *SB* 9886, 5; *espeusa*, *P.Fouad* 26, 34) and humility (*P.Mich.* 529, 13: “*kataphygon epi tas podas sou, deomenos*, I have fled to your feet, pleading”) to a superior whom they describe as “benefactor of all people” (*P.Oxy.* 2342, 37; cf. *PSI* 1323, 4; *SB* 10196, 43), “savior” (*P.Mich.* 422, 32), “savior of all people” (*P.Tebt.* 769, 87; *P.Fouad* 26, 50; *P.Mich.* 174, 18; *P.Oxy.* 2563, 46; *P.Cair.Zen.* 59421, 9; 59618, 7); they

appeal to his nobility (*epi tēn sēn andreian katapheugō tharrōn*, *P.Oxy.* 1468, 9; *PSI* 1337, 17) and to his power (*P.Tebt.* 326, 4; *P.Cair.Isid.* 66, 16).

The persecuted, the oppressed, and fugitives seek refuge, security, and justice either with an authority (Josephus, *War* 1.131; *Life* 113), or in a place, notably in a temple that has the privilege of inviolability. This custom perhaps allows us to specify the sense of the aorist participle “*hoi kataphygontes*, we refugees,” in Heb 6:18, which could be seen as a term for Christians. They are, after all, exiles and pilgrims on this earth, whose hope of heaven has all the appeal of a city of refuge or place of asylum. This figurative meaning can be compared to the Philonian framework, with which this epistle – addressed, it would seem, to a group of persecuted exiles – has so many other points of contact: “The law permitted a murderer to take refuge (*katapheugein*) not in the temple, since he was not yet purified ... but in a holy city, an intermediate place between the temple and profane soil, a sort of secondary temple.... The law aims to take advantage of the prerogatives of the city of reception to assure the refugee (*tō kataphygonti*) of the most secure safety (*bebaiotatēn asphaleian*).” “Those who do not have a solid faith in God their Savior first of all seek refuge in the help of creatures (*katapheugousin epi tas en genesei boētheias*) ...; then if someone says to them, ‘Fools! Seek refuge with the only physician for the diseases of the soul (*katapheugete ... epi ton monon iatron psychēs*)’ ... in spite of them, the wretches turn late and not without trouble to seek refuge with the only Savior, God (*katapheugousin ... epi ton monon sōtēra theon*).”

καταφθείρω

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*kataphtheirō*, **to corrupt, ruin**

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*kataphtheiro*, S 2704; *TDNT* 9.93–106; *EDNT* 2.270; MM 334; L&N 88.266; BAGD 420

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False teachers oppose the truth and have a corrupt mind: *houtoi anthistantai tē alētheia, anthrōpoi katephtharmenoi ton noun* (2 Tim 3:8; same link between these two verbs, 1 Macc 8:11). The only more or less close parallel is Uzziah, “who was puffed up and corrupted; he became unfaithful to Yahweh his God” (2 Chr 26:16; cf. 27:2 – “*ho laos katephtheireto*, the people were corrupted”; Lev 26:39 – “those among you who remain will waste away [Hebrew *māqaq*] because of their sin”). In most of its LXX occurrences, *kataphtheirō* translates the Hebrew *šāḥaṭ*, “destroy, cut down; corrupt, pervert.” These two meanings are used together: “God saw that ... all flesh had corrupted their ways on the earth. So behold I shall destroy them” (Gen 6:12–13; commented on by Philo,

*Unchang. God* 141–142), but this second meaning is by far the best attested, especially with respect to the destruction of a city, of the whole earth (Gen 9:11; cf. Isa 24:1 – *bāqāq*), of a kingdom (1 Macc 8:11), of a ravaged land, of its products (Judg 6:4), its fruits, its harvests (Wis 16:19, 22), and its trees (Dan 4:14; cf. Dittenberger, *Syl.* 1157, 74). So the idea is that of devastation, always with the connotation of violence (1 Macc 15:31). When the verb is used with humans as the object, it means their extermination (2 Chr 12:7; 24:23; 25:16; 35:21); they succumb (Exod 18:18, Hebrew *nāḥal*); these victims (2 Macc 5:14) lose their life like “water that is spilled to the ground” and cannot be regathered (2 Sam 14:14).

In the papyri, *kataphtheirō* is used of a business deal that will come to nothing if no decision is made: “you must give me an answer so that I may not be ruined” (*ei dei sē apophasin moi dounai hina mē entautha kataphtheirōmai*, *PSI* 377, 11); caviar which, if it cannot be sold, must be eaten, “so that it will not go bad like the rest” (*hina mē kataphtharē hōsper kai ta loipa*, *P.Cair.Zen.* 59121, 3); of a harvest that is in danger of being ruined (*P.Cair.Zen.* 59132, 5; cf. *SB* 6794, 5; *P.Tebt.* 769, 25, 85); a horse that has died or become useless, “but your horse has been ruined” (*ho de para sou hippos katephthartai*, *P.Cair.Zen.* 59093, 5 = *SB* 6720, 5); of an invasion of grasshoppers that has destroyed everything (*P.Tebt.* 772, 2; from the third century BC; cf. *SB* 6769, 18); of unused cargo ships (*P.Haun.* 12 a 6; republished in *SB* 9425 a) that founder where they are berthed (*P.Magd.* 11, 9; third century BC); above all, of prisoners who languish (*P.Cair.Zen.* 59831: “to waste away in prison,” *en tō desmōtēriō kataphtharēnai*) and are in danger of atrophying or dying: “so that he may not waste away in prison” (*hopōs mē symbē auton kataphtharēnai en tē phylakē*, *P.Mich.* 85, 5); “not to leave me to rot in jail for five months” (*mē hyperidein me katephtharmenon en tē phylakē mēnas* **η'**, *P.Tebt.* 777, 11; cf. *P.Petaus* II, 19; *BGU* 1847, 21).

These usages show that the false teachers of 2 Tim 3:8, their minds wasted or ravaged – today we speak of losing one’s mind – are radically incapable (cf. the perfect passive participle) of carrying out any magisterial function. When one’s ability to think and reason is corrupted, one is straightaway disqualified for teaching (cf. *adokimoi*; cf. Titus 1:16).

καταφρονέω, καταφρονητής

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*kataphroneō*, **to scorn, disdain**; *kataphronētēs*, **scoffer**

→see also περιφρονέω

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*kataphroneo*, S 2706; TDNT 3.631–632; EDNT 2.270; NIDNTT 1.461–462; MM 334–335; L&N 88.192; BAGD 420 | *kataphronetes*, S 2707; TDNT 3.632; EDNT 2.270; NIDNTT 1.461–462; MM 335;

The verb, meaning “scorn, disdain,” connotes a lack of respect or consideration when its object is a person: “Who then would take the risk if he had to see himself surrounded with scorn rather than honor?” (*anti tou timasthai kataphronēthēsomenos*, Isocrates, *Archid.* 6.95); “to avoid being scorned and merit public esteem” (*mē kataphronēsesthai, all’ eudokimēsein en tois pollois*). This disdain or irreverence become impiety when directed toward the deity; the *kataphronountes* (Hebrew *bāgaḏ*) are the ungodly and traitors (Prov 13:15; Hos 6:7). It is in this sense that the Jew takes no account of the treasures of divine goodness which ought to move him to repent: “Have you nothing but scorn for the riches of God’s kindness, patience, longsuffering?” (Rom 2:4); likewise: “No one can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will cleave to (*anthexetai*) the one and pay no attention to the other (*tou heterou kataphronēsei*). You cannot serve God and Mammon.” To give all one’s attention and zeal to one *kyrios* implies absolute lack of interest toward another master.

In the category of the unjust, the most guilty are sensualists, the insolent, and blasphemers, “those who follow the flesh, by covetousness of that which defiles, and scorn lordship” (*kyriotētos kataphronountas*, 2 Pet 2:11). For the slaves of carnal passions, it is no longer wealth that is sovereign but the *sarx* (flesh); this being so, they have no use for and thus reject or annul (Jude 8), deny (2 Pet 2:1; Titus 1:16) the yoke of Christ the Lord, his supreme authority, his teachings, his will, and his control. One scorns “the king’s decrees” (4 Macc 4:26, *ta dogmata*; Dittenberger, *Syl.* 705, 36; Josephus, *Ant.* 2.207, a *prostagma*; 6.331; 10.257; 12.207). Disdain here is refusal and disobedience (*Ant.* 6.142, 147; 11.130); a common meaning of *kataphroneō*: “Some are capable of disdaining perversity and cupidity; others are not” (Xenophon, *Cyn.* 13.16); commonly in Philo. In 2 Pet 2:10, not only do those referred to snap their fingers at a prohibition, but they treat lightly the *kyriotēs* (lordship) of Christ; this is an insult, a well attested meaning of the verb: “He insults me, Thebes” (*kataphronei me*, Euripides, *Bacch.* 503).

Heb 12:2 exhorts Christians to behold Jesus, who endured the ignominy of the cross, “despising the shame” (*aischynēs kataphronēsas*). The emphasis is not on suffering, but on the humiliation of this punishment, which was reserved for slaves and criminals (cf. *oneidismos*, 10:33; 11:26; 13:13). It is also an allusion to the mockery, the ridicule, and the insults to which the saint par

excellence was subjected by “sinners.” Nothing could be more abject! Precisely: to “scorn” is to “laugh at,” “mock” (Josephus, *Life* 337, 347).

The meaning “humiliate, shame” is found in 1 Cor 11:22, with regard to participation in the Lord’s Supper, when some have plenty to eat and others have nothing: “Do you scorn the church of God (*tēs ekklēσίας tou theou kataphroneite*) and do you wish to shame (*kataischynete*) those who have nothing?” One cannot take part lightly in a sacred ceremony (Philo, *Moses* 1.102; *Decalogue* 85), because that would be to profane it, commit an impiety, and incur mortal punishment.

“Take care not to scorn one of the least of these little ones (*mē kataphronēsēte henos tōn mikrōn toutōn*), because their angels in heaven constantly behold the face of my heavenly Father” (Matt 18:10). Scorn is the clear opposite of respect, here powerfully motivated. Not only in judgment but also in conduct it is necessary to take account of these little ones who are so honored by God. These *mikroi* are not young children (*nēpioi*) but insignificant, negligible Christians who are not ordinarily taken into account. In this category we may include the poor, the members of an inferior social class in the community, and also the weak, the fragile, those easily offended, even the handicapped (cf. Eph 4:22). They must be taken care of because of their great dignity in God’s eyes.

Unconditional submission of the young to their elders was common to oriental, Greek, and Roman antiquity. So also St. Paul confirms Timothy’s authority at Ephesus with the words, “Let no one despise your youth” (*mēdeis sou tēs neotētos kataphroneitō*, 1 Tim 4:12). The verb has the sense “treat with disdain, pay no attention to.” The scorn for a person is constantly mentioned in the Hellenistic era and is justified in many ways, notably by the youthfulness of the one disdained: “Darius had only scorn for Alexander’s youthfulness” (*kataphronēsas tēs Alexandrou neotētos*). A certain Antinous, a daredevil, “scorns my passivity” (*apragmosynēs*, *P.Ant.* 36, 12; *P.Oxy.* 2410, 3; cf. Josephus, *War* 6.337: *rhathymia* = softness), “my mediocrity” (*P.Panop.Beatty* 1, 173; *P.Ryl.* 659, 7; *P.Oxy.* 3126, col. II, 10), because I am a foreigner” (*P.Magd.* 8, 11), “because my husband is dead” (*kataphronōn hoti ho anēr mou tetelytēken*, *P.Magd.* 2, 6; cf. *P.Gen* 31, 10: *kataphronōn mou tēs chēreias*); “as a helpless woman” (*hōs gynaikos aboēthētou*, BGU 291, 9), “because I am an orphan,” “scorning me because of my weak vision.” Hence to “scorn” is to refuse to give justice, to give back a stolen object, a borrowed ass, to pay a servant’s wages; no interest is shown in the complainant because of his or her lack of social, financial, or political status. Here again scorn is a lack of respect and consideration.



“Let slaves who have believers as masters not scorn them because they are brothers” (1 Tim 6:2); *mē kataphroneitōsan* explicates 6:1 – masters are worthy of respect (*pasēs timēs axious*). They must be esteemed. If it is true that spiritually, Christian masters are the equals of Christian slaves, of “brothers,” one must respect the social hierarchy. What is more, *agapē*, the enemy of arrogance, inspires even more respect and devotion (cf. Philm 16: *adelphos agapētos*), so that the servant’s “service” becomes a gracious “benefit” (*euergesia*) that rules out all negligence.

As for St. Paul’s apostrophe at Pisidian Antioch, “Behold, scoffers (*hoi kataphronētai*), wonder and perish” (Acts 13:41), it is a quotation of Hab 1:5, where the prophet threatens Israel with terrible punishment. In the Greek OT this substantive always translates the Hebrew *bāgaḏ* (Hab 2:5), *bōgdīm* (1:5), *bōgdōt* (Zeph 3:4) and thus would mean “arrant traitors.” It is used only once in Philo: “They do not profess scorn for divine things”; and it is used in a favorable sense in Josephus and Plutarch.

## κατέχω

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*katechō*, to hold, keep, take ill, contain, constrain, occupy, hold to

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***katecho***, S 2722; TDNT 2.829–830; EDNT 2.271–272; MM 336–337; L&N 13.150, 31.48, 37.17, 54.22, 57.1, 85.9; BDF §400(4); BAGD 422–423

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The meanings of this verb are multiple, though rather homogeneous, and can be defined thus: seize, hold strongly, keep, detain, contain, take possession, occupy. They are all attested in the NT.

1. “Hold strongly.” – “Those who hear the word with a noble and good heart hold to it (*ton logon katechousin*) and bear fruit by persevering.” Thus it is that “a ram is held in the thicket by its horns” and Saul wished to seize Samuel (Josephus, *Ant.* 6.152; 6.169; 9.69). Metaphorical usages are common: “Dizziness seized me” (2 Sam 1:9; Job 15:24), or rage, a passion (Philo, *To Gaius* 338), but also ardor and love for the best (*Rewards* 15, 26), zeal and love for the good and for virtue (*Change of Names* 108, 153, 199; *Unchang. God* 138; *Flight* 58, 195). Finally, one can be “seized” and inspired by God.

2. “Be taken ill, suffer from an illness.” – “The first one to go down (into the pool at Bethesda) after the stirring of the water was healed of whatever illness gripped him (whatever illness he had).” The expression is common: Philo, *Prelim. Stud.* 138; *Spec. Laws* 1.118; 2.136; *Cherub.* 42; *To Gaius* 16, 267, 357: “a shaking seized me”; Josephus, *War* 1.236: “Herod was detained by illness”; *Life* 48: “taken with a sudden onset of fever”; *PSI* 299, 3 and 5:

“because I was taken quite ill, so that I could not even move” (*hoti keteschethēn nosō epi poly hōs mē dynasthai mēde saleuesthai*); “but when my illness was lessened” (*hōs d’ekouphisthē moi hē nosos*).

3. “Keep.” – “I would like to keep Onesimus with me, because he serves me on your behalf in these chains I am in for the gospel.” Cf. Gen 24:56 – “Abraham’s servant said, ‘Do not keep me ... Let me go’ ”; Philo, *Alleg. Interp.* 3.197: Abraham sent the horses back to the king of Sodom but “kept the goods that God had given him”; *Joseph* 163: Jacob sent his sons to buy grain in Egypt, but he kept his youngest son home (cf. 185, 201, 233); *Dreams* 1.95: “Lenders keep the goods taken as security until they recover their own property” (cf. Josephus, *Ant.* 4.269). Josephus, *War* 1.267: “Herod dispersed across Idumea men who were more burdensome than useful, keeping with him the most stalwart and the most beloved.” Kopres writes to his father, Heron: “Do not think that I am keeping back the workers; it is the *epimelētēs* alone who is keeping them.”

Often, one is kept in spite of oneself: “The crowds came to Jesus and kept him (*kateichon auton*) so that he would not leave them” (Luke 4:42). Manoah said to the Angel of the Lord: “Permit us to keep you” (Judg 13:15–16; 19:4). To be “held by force” (Philo, *Joseph* 209; *Moses* 1.319) is to no longer be at one’s own disposal, and often to be arrested and imprisoned: Joseph’s master took him and put him in the stronghold, the place where the king’s prisoners were kept (*topon en hō hoi desmōtai ... katechontai*, Gen 39:20; cf. 42:19); Philo, *Alleg. Interp.* 3.21: “You would have kept the soul in prison” (*katesches en desmōtēriō*); *Prelim. Stud.* 41: “forgetfulness holds captive”; *P.Flor.* 61, 60: “You deserve to be whipped, having taken it upon yourself to hold an honorable man and woman” (*axios men ēs mastigōthēnai, dia seautou kataschōn anthrōpon euschēmona kai gynaikan*); *P.Lond.* 1914, 35: “He came, arrested him, and put him in prison”; 422, 3 (vol. 2, p. 318; cf. Diodorus Siculus 12.65); *P.Petr.* 45, col. II, 4: the money was seized; *P.Mich.* 616, 11: “He impounded my property until I should pay my debts to the treasury.” It is in this sense that, according to Rom 1:18, human godlessness and unrighteousness “hold the truth” captive in the chains of unrighteousness (*anthrōpōn tōn tēn alētheian en adikia katechontōn*). By not adhering to the truth from the heart and not submitting their conduct to it, they somehow shackle the divine truth and hold it in check. Thus the satanic power is held back to burst forth at the great day. In explaining the delay of the Parousia, St. Paul writes, “You know what holds it back (*to katechon oidate*) so that it will not be revealed before its time. For the mystery of ungodliness is already set in motion. Only when the one who is now holding it back (*monon ho katechōn*) is out of the way, then the ungodly one will be revealed.”

In NT kerygma and catechesis, *katechō* (“hold, keep”) in a favorable sense has become a technical term: “You hold the traditions just as I transmitted them to you” (*kathōs paredōka hymin tas paradoxeis*, 1 Cor 11:2); “You are saved, if you hold to the terms in which I evangelized you” (*sōzesthe, tini logō euēngelisamēn hymin ei katechete*, 1 Cor 15:2). It is not enough to receive the divine message by faith; one must hold to it, keep it intact, retain it unshakably. “Prove everything, keep the good (*to kalon katechete*), reject the bad.”

4. “Contain.” – The idea of keeping passes easily into that of “contain, master, dominate.” Philo, *Post. Cain* 5: “The circle of heaven contains the universe within itself”; *Alleg. Interp.* 3.13: “They contain themselves with patience”; Josephus, *War* 2.40: “Varus went up to Jerusalem to contain the rebels” (cf. 2.213, 214); 4.587: “The soldiers with great difficulty contained their desire to pillage”; 6.257, 260; “Catullus, unable to contain himself ...”

5. “Constrain.” – “We have been freed from the law, being dead (by baptism) to that which held us in constraint” (*apothanontes en hō kateichometha*, Rom 7:6). Philo, *Spec. Laws* 2.124: “subjected to this inexorable law, which refuses immortality to every human creature”; *P.Cair.Isid.* 77, 18: “even though they were compelled by the laws (*katechomenoi apo tōn nomōn*) to keep the children”; *P.Amh.* 97, 17: “I will not be bound by my promise” (*ou kataschethēsomai tē hyposchesei*).

6. “Occupy, take possession of.” – A guest who takes the first place runs the risk that the host will say, “Give place”; “then, in embarrassment, you will have to take the last place” (*ton eschaton topon katechein*). Jdt 5:19 – “Returned from the dispersion, they reoccupied Jerusalem”; Philo, *To Gaius* 155: “This quarter of Rome, beyond the Tiber, was occupied and inhabited by Jews” (cf. 216); *Change of Names* 113: “those who held the place.” Constantly in Josephus: Antiochus Epiphanes, after taking Jerusalem, occupied the city for three years and six months.” *P.Oslo* 40, 50: “The creditor shall be able to take possession of the house when he wishes”; *P.Mich.* 424, 5; a complaint to the *stratēgos*: “Sotas wanted to take possession of my property by force” (*ta hyparchonta mou kataschein bia*).

7. “Have, possess.” – “The time is short. Henceforth ... let those who buy be as if they did not possess” (*hoi agorazontes hōs mē katechontes*, 1 Cor 7:30); “thought of as having nothing, but possessing all things” (*hōs mēden echontes kai panta katechontes*, 2 Cor 6:10). Thus Yahweh, the master of everything (Isa 40:22), gives his people ownership of Canaan; money is possessed (Job 27:17), or a sickle (Jer 50:16), or a sword, or a goat (Philo, *Flight* 151). *P.Berl.Zill.* 4, 19: “He claims as his own property the paternal field and the vineyard”; *P.Oxy.* 237, col. VIII, 22: How can it be that the Egyptian widows claim their husbands’ properties (*katechein ta hyparchonta*) by virtue of local Egyptian

law, according to their marriage contracts? In religious language, *katechō* means “have in possession,” and in everyday language, “victimize” (Josephus, *Ant.* 1.34), “envelop” (*War* 1.148), “oppress” (*P.Oxy.* 532, 23); so that human thought can be “possessed by the love and thirst for wisdom” (Philo, *Creation* 5; cf. *Alleg. Interp.* 1.43; 2.102) and “seized like Korybants (priests of Cybele) by divine inspiration.”

8. “Sail along, make for.” – “Having put the foresail to the wind, they made for the beach” (*kateichon eis ton aigialon*, Acts 27:40). Or at least that is how this verb (in the imperfect) is translated, as a technical navigational term. But hardly any exact parallels are known. It was necessary to begin with “hold” (the course), then add various nuances. The idea is to sail in a certain direction, steer for, aim it, travel toward.

## κατηχέω

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*katēcheō*, to cause to ring in the ears, inform, instruct, catechize

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*katecheo*, S 2727; TDNT 3.638–640; EDNT 2.273; NIDNTT 3.771–772; MM 337; L&N 22.190, 33.225; BDF §159(1); BAGD 423–424

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Unknown in the LXX, rather poorly attested in classical Greek, and appearing late on the scene, this verb derives from *ēcheō*, “resound,” and means “cause to ring in the ears, instruct by word of mouth,” hence “inform.” Thus it was that the brothers at Jerusalem heard that Paul was teaching apostasy against Moses to all the Jews (Acts 21:21, *katēchēthēsan peri sou*); but when they saw him perform a vow at the temple, they recognized that “there is nothing in what they have heard about you” (verse 24, *hōn katēchēntai peri sou*). This meaning is current in writing from that period: “As he had heard it said (*katēchētai*) that the temple at Jerusalem was the most beautiful sanctuary in the world ...” (Philo, *To Gaius* 198). King Agrippa writes to Josephus: “It is plain to see that you do not need to be taught concerning our learning from the beginning. When you meet me, however, I myself will tell you by word of mouth about many things that are generally unknown” (*se polla katēchēsō tōn agnooumenōn*, Josephus, *Life* 366). In the second century, the prefect of Egypt says that he has been informed about the dealings of the *telōnai* who extort money from tourists.

Nevertheless, information communicated to someone teaches, and *katēcheō* tends to mean “instruct, give instructions,” as in *P.Lips.* 32, 1 (= *P.Stras.* 41, 37) in 250, where a lawyer declares, “He taught me nothing at all (*eme oudepote katēchēsen*),” and is answered, “Today you taught someone (*sēmeron tina edidaxas*).” In the fourth century, the Christian Copres writes, “We have given

the lawyer instructions for the twelve.” This is the meaning of five of the seven NT occurrences of the verb, all with a religious meaning; although without the later technical flavor of “catechesis,” they refer to instruction in the gospel given to believers: “Apollos was taught in the ways of the Lord, *houtos ēn katēchēmenos tēn hodon tou Kyriou*” (Acts 18:25); this is not knowledge through hearsay but doctrinal instruction properly speaking. St. Paul would rather speak five words with understanding, that is, in an intelligible language, “in order to instruct the others as well, *hina kai allous katēchēsō*,” as befits the role of prophecy (cf. 1 Cor 14:3), than ten thousand words “in tongues” that those who hear would not understand at all.

For discerning between good and evil, for evaluating his deeds, the Jew has no need to consult the obscure voice of conscience, because he is constantly informed, taught, by the law. In his dedication to Theophilus, St. Luke specifies that his purpose is “*hina epignōs peri hōn katēchēthēs logōn tēn asphaleian*, so that you may know precisely the solidity of the teaching that you have received” (or “in which you were instructed,” or “concerning the things that you have learned about” – Luke 1:4). Widely varying interpretations have been given for this verse: some say that Theophilus was an eminent person or a pagan official who had been prejudiced against Christianity by tendentious information and that St. Luke wanted to clarify his judgment. Others speculate that Theophilus was an outsider who was interested in the new religion and that the evangelist wanted to give him reliable information. More likely, he was a good Christian, who, having been taught the *logoi* of the faith, would see his belief confirmed by exposition of the teachings and life of the Savior. The *logoi* he was taught do not constitute a systematic exposition, much less a mystagogic catechesis. It is not possible to specify whether it was a pre-or postbaptismal liturgy; but certainly the formula already has something specifically Christian-catechetical about it, and it would be too weak to translate *katēchēthēs* “you have heard tell,” as if this referred to the mere receiving of news. We might take it to mean that Theophilus, like Apollos (Acts 18:25), had received an initial, incomplete knowledge, but *asphaleia*, which is the key word, and the aorist “seem to indicate that the instruction had ended.” A written document, objectively informed, composed in an orderly fashion, like this Gospel, would confirm these *logoi* and demonstrate their trustworthiness.

Gal 6:6 recommends: “Let the person who is being taught the word (*ho katēchoumenos ton logon*) give part of all his goods to the catechist (*tō katēchounti*),” i.e., to his instructor in the faith (cf. Phil 4:15). This is perhaps not exactly “the one who prepares the candidate for baptism,” but it is certainly the one who teaches the gospel; this person’s relation to the “catechumen” on the doctrinal level is that of teacher to initiate, a debtor-and-creditor

relationship, according to Phil 4:15. These catechumens are attested in the third-fourth century in three letters of recommendation: “give a proper reception to our brothers Ero and Horion and Philadelphos and Pechusis and Naarouos, who are catechumens *tōn synagomenōn*, and Leo, a catechumen *en archē*”; “welcome the catechumen Serenos” (*katēchoumenon Serēnon ... prosdexai*, M. Naldini, *Il Cristianesimo in Egitto*, n. 20, 4; republished in *SB* 10255); “receive them then with love as friends, for they are not catechumens” (*prosdexai oun en agapē hōs philous, ou gar katēchoumenoi eisin*, *P.Oxy.* 2603, 26; cf. M. Naldini, n. 47).

καυχάομαι, καύχημα, καύχησις

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*kauchaomai*, **to boast**; *kauchēma*, **grounds of boasting**; *kauchēsis*, **boastfulness**

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*kauchaomai*, S 2744; *TDNT* 3.645–653; *EDNT* 2.276–279; *NIDNTT* 1.227–228, 2.874; MM 339; L&N 33.368; BDF §§148(2), 187(4), 196, 231(1); BAGD 425 | *kauchēma*, S 2745; *TDNT* 3.645–653; *EDNT* 2.276–279; *NIDNTT* 1.227–229; L&N 25.203, 33.368, 33.371, 33.372; BAGD 426 | *kauchēsis*, S 2746; *TDNT* 3.645–653; *EDNT* 2.276–279; *NIDNTT* 1.227–228; L&N 25.204, 33.368, 33.371; BAGD 426

The etymology of *kauchaomai* is disputed, but the meaning of this verb, which is usually intransitive, is clear: “boast, glory in, put one’s human confidence in.” *Kauchēma* is “what one is proud of, claim to glory, event on which excessive confidence is based.” *Kauchēsis* is “vainglory, boastfulness, the act of boasting, of showing oneself off.” The verb appears for the first time, with a pejorative meaning, in Sappho: “May Doricha not have occasion to boast that for the second time he has left for a delightful love” (*P.Oxy.* 1231, frag. 1 col. I, 10); then Theocritus 5.77: “I tell the truth in everything without boasting”; Herodotus 7.39: “You cannot boast that you have outdone the king in generosity”; Aristotle, *Pol.* 5.10.1311: “The king boasted at (*eis tēn*) having enjoyed his youth.” Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse, was more vain about his poems than about his military success (Diodorus Siculus 15.6.2); Agathocles was proud of his former occupation of potter. There is a certain lack of moderation in this self-exaltation, which in the end offends the gods: “Untimely insolence (*to kauchasthai para kairon*) accompanies the song of folly” (Pindar, *Ol.* 9.38). *Kauchēsis* is related to pride (*hyperēphaneō*) in Philodemus of Gadara, *Vit.* 10, col. XV, 14–22; cf. *T. Reub.* 3.5. We may therefore conclude that for the most part *kauchaomai* and its related nouns are pejorative and add,

with R. Bultmann, that if there are occasions for expressing legitimate pride, the Greek sensibility feels that it is a violation of *aidōs* and a sign of *aneleutheria* to blow one's own horn.

This sense is obviously present in the LXX, notably in the Wisdom writers: at death, "the pride of the godless perishes" (Prov 11:7); "those who place their confidence in their fortune and glory in their great wealth" (Ps 49:6); "Who can boast of having a pure heart?" (Prov 20:9); no one can boast of being Elijah's equal (Sir 48:4). It is precisely "vainglory" to boast of presents that one does not give (Prov 25:14), to congratulate oneself about the morrow when one does not know "what it may bring to birth"; but it seems that the basic meaning of *kauchaomai* is (a) "exalt": "Do not exalt yourselves (*mē kauchasthe*; hiphil of the Hebrew *rābāh*, make great, augment), do not speak haughty words"; (b) hence, a completely original nuance of "joy": "Let all those exult in you (Hebrew *ālāṣ*) who love your name" (Ps 5:12); "Cry out with joy (Hebrew *rānan*), all you who have an upright heart" (32:11); "Let the saints rejoice in glory" (*en doxē*); (c) the substantive *kauchēsis*, which always translates the Hebrew *tiperet* (ornament, adornment, beauty), has an aesthetic connotation: "Our God, we thank you and praise your glorious name" (or "your brilliant renown," *to onoma tēs kauchēseōs sou*, 1 Chr 29:13); "White hairs are a splendid crown" (Prov 16:31; cf. Sir 31:10); "I place a magnificent diadem on your head" (Ezek 16:12; 23:42); an adornment of jubilation (Ezek 24:25); "objects that made up your splendor" (*ta skeuē tēs kauchēseōs sou*, Ezek 16:17; 23:26). (d) The LXX gives to the verb the sense "be proud" and to *kauchēma* that of "honor," "pride," "object of praise," Deut 10:21 – "God is the object of your praise" (Hebrew *thillāh*); 26:19 – "Yahweh has declared today ... that he will make you superior to (*hyperanō*) all the nations that he has made in renown, in honor, and in glory" (*onomaston kai kauchēma kai doxaston*). (e) The peculiar contribution of the OT to the semantics of *kauchaomai* is to give this verb a religious meaning and to pose the radical contrast between human vainglory and divine honor. "Yahweh said to Gideon, 'The people that is with you is too numerous for me to deliver Midian into their hands, lest Israel boast (Hebrew *pā'ar* in the hithpael, derive glory, vaunt oneself) against me, saying, 'It is my own hand that saved me''" (Judg 7:2); "Let the wise glory not in his wisdom, let the brave glory not in his bravery, let the rich glory not in his wealth; but let the one who glories glory in this, that he understands and knows me." The honor and pride of a religious soul is to belong to God and to be consecrated to God's worship: "Save me, O God of our salvation ... deliver us so that we may give thanks to your holy Name, so that we may glory in your praise" (*kauchasthai en tais ainesesi sou*).

In the NT, our three terms are unknown in the Gospels and the Johannine writings and appear almost exclusively in St. Paul, who uses them extremely often and consequently in their various meanings. The religious meaning is predominant. It originates with the OT theology and expresses a fundamental conviction of the new faith: all exaltation of the creature by virtue of its qualities, advantages, or spiritual or temporal successes, partakes of the character of a lie. Everything has been given by God, so to God alone belong the praise and the glory. The emphasis is on this exclusivity of *kauchaomai*: “Let the one who glories glory in the Lord” (2 Cor 10:17; 1 Cor 1:29, 31), not “in the flesh,” not in works (Eph 2:9), not in humans and their applause. The brilliance, celebrity, and honor in which people take pride are contradictory to the Pauline *kauchaomai*: “May I glory in nothing but in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ” (Gal 6:14), a degrading punishment, shame and scandal for human wisdom, but for believers the source of joy, because all the benefits of salvation derive from it. Thus one is elevated, magnified, and honored with such a spiritual glory that human “glory” becomes as nothing. So one “glories” not only at being destined for a blessed eternity but also in all that leads to it and allows it to be obtained: tribulation (Rom 5:3), weakness, infirmities. As for personal qualities and merits that each one may have, there is no matter for boasting in them and even less for exalting oneself to the detriment of one’s neighbor (*physiousthe kata*, you are puffed up against), because a creature is insignificant, possesses nothing in its own right; everything comes from God: “What do you have that you did not receive? And if you indeed received, why do you boast?” (1 Cor 4:7; Eph 2:9).

St. Paul innovates not only in giving the verb *kauchaomai* the positive meaning “be proud,” but also “be proud of others” (Gal 6:13). 2 Cor 7:14 – “If in front of Titus I was somewhat proud of you, I have not been embarrassed by it; but just as we have spoken truthfully in everything, so also our pride (*hē kauchēsis hēmōn*) in Titus’s presence is found to be the truth”; “I knew well your eagerness (for the collection), concerning which I express pride in you (*hēn hyper hymōn kauchōmai*) before the Macedonians” (2 Cor 9:2). Reciprocally, the Corinthians are proud of their apostle (2 Cor 5:12). But the word also has the pejorative sense “boast,” and most commonly “exalt oneself unduly.” It is a psychological trait of Paul’s adversaries to get themselves noticed by exaggerating or twisting the truth (2 Cor 11:12); the apostle replies that he himself boasts but without going beyond the “measure,” the “limit,” that is, in conformity with the divine “rule” that in the case at hand established his ministry to the Gentiles along with all the work that he (Paul) has done in the apostolic field of action.



The *kauchēma* is normally what one is proud of. St. Paul almost always uses this word in a positive sense, notably with respect to deeds, work accomplished, virtues that entitle a person to honor. It is the apostle who provided the basis for or legitimated Christian pride, for example, when he insisted on working with his own hands so as to be able to preach the gospel for free: “No one will take away my grounds for pride (*to kauchēma mou oudeis kenōsei*), because if I evangelize it is not grounds for pride for me (*ouk estin moi kauchēma*); it is a necessity that is incumbent upon me.” All the other occurrences apply to the pride that Paul takes in the fervor of Christians or that they feel at being disciples of such an apostle: “You have indeed recognized that we are a grounds of pride for you (*kauchēma hymōn esmen*) just as you (will be) for us at the Day of our Lord Jesus.”

Despite what is often said, *kauchēma* and *kauchēsis* are often synonymous in St. Paul (cf. Rom 3:27; 4:2; 1 Cor 15:31; 2 Cor 1:12; 5:12; 11:10); but normally *kauchēsis* is pride per se, which is neither vanity nor arrogance, nor on the other hand mere contentment or satisfaction, but rather honor, a feeling of dignity and nobility. The apostle gives the precise nuance: “So I have this pride in Christ Jesus for the service of God” (Rom 15:17). This exaltation and this joy are legitimate only “in Christ” and even “in God’s service,” by the preaching of the gospel; they belong to a conscientious and faithful servant, but one who has lofty sentiments. “Our pride (*hē kauchēsis hēmōn*) is in this: the testimony of our conscience ... we have comported ourselves in the world and in particular towards you in the grace of God” (2 Cor 1:12); “[By] the truth of Christ [that is] in me (an oath formula), this basis for pride (*hē kauchēsis hautē*) will not be taken away from me.” Just as the farmer is proud of the harvest or the artisan of the object that is the fruit of his labor, St. Paul expresses the joy and honor that he feels at the fruitfulness of his ministry: “Who then is our hope, our joy (*chara*), the crown of our pride (epexegetic genitive), if it is not also you, in the presence of our Lord Jesus, at his appearing?” (1 Thess 2:19). Not only is *kauchēsis* Christianized, but its joy is fulfilled and fixed in the eschatological age.

ΚΕΝΟΣ, ΚΕΝΩΩ

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*kenos*, empty, vain; *kenoō*, to empty, evacuate, purge

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*kenos*, S 2756; TDNT 3.659–660; EDNT 2.281–282; NIDNTT 1.546–547; MM 340; L&N 32.60, 57.42, 72.10, 89.53, 89.64; BDF §§182(1), 207(3), 211; BAGD 427–428 | *kenoo*, S 2758; TDNT 3.661–662; EDNT 2.282; NIDNTT 1.546–547; MM 340; L&N 76.27, 87.70; BAGD 428

The dictionaries are ordinarily content to give the adjective the two meanings “empty (without content)” and “vain (without reality),” but the nuances are extremely varied, and the principal ones are found in the NT. In its literal sense, *kenos* is used to describe objects: an empty house (Menander, *Dysk.* 223; *P.Flor.* 294, 52), buildings (Josephus, *War* 2.636; *SB* 9898, 11; 10728, 10, 3), vats (*O.Bodl.* 344, 1), a cistern (Gen 37:24), jugs (Judg 6:16), vases (2 Kgs 4:3; Jer 14:3), containers (*P.Oxy.* 2982, 9; *SB* 6767, 19; Josephus, *Ant.* 5.223; 9.48, 49; *P.Ross.Georg.* V, 5, 10), baskets (*P.Ross.Georg.* II, 29, 6), jars (“ten drachmas for empty jars,” *P.Mich.* 601, 11–12; *P.Cair.Zen.* 59741; *PSI* 859; *P.Tebt.* 815; frag. II, verso 27), “empty rack for four bottles” (*tetralagynon kenon*, *P.Wisc.* 30, col. I, 10); a small box emptied of its jewels (*P.Ryl.* 125, 26; from AD 28–29), plates are emptied by pigs (Philo, *Contemp. Life* 55), a boat (Josephus, *War* 2.645; *Life* 167), a ship (“my boat, even when empty [*kenon to ploion*] could not go down to Alexandria,” *P.Magd.* 11, 15; from 221 BC); “I brought the boat to land and left it there six months unused” (*apo kenōn mēnas*, *P.Haun.* 12, A 5 = *SB* 9425; cf. Job 7:3, *mēnas kenous*). *Kenos* is also used for beasts that are not laden (*P.Mert.* 80, 4): two unburdened camels (*kamēlous kenous dyo*, *SB* 10914, 3); an inscription at Palmyra distinguishes between camels that are not laden (*kenai*) and those that are (*engomoi*, Dittenberger, *Or.* 629, 166). Also, a city is said to be empty of people or of defenders.

With regard to persons, *kenos* is used from Homer on for empty hands. The LXX often uses this meaning, either to forbid appearing before God without a sacrifice (Exod 23:15; 34:20; Deut 16:16; Sir 35:4), or to express the absence of gifts that one should have brought to someone else or that one should have received. It is in this sense that in contrast to the hungry, who are filled, the Virgin Mary declares that God “has sent the rich away empty-handed.” This is not a reference to the upsetting of social conditions but to messianic benefits: forgiveness and salvation. God does not take away the wealth of the wealthy, but he does not give them *his* goods; they are not despoiled, but neither do they receive anything. In the same fashion, in the parable of the Wicked Husbandmen, the servant who comes to collect the fruit of the vineyard is sent away brutally, empty-handed (*aposteilan kenon*, Mark 12:3; Luke 20:10–11).

Hence the nuance “useless, without effect or result, vain.” Thus Saul’s sword did not return without success (2 Sam 1:22), projectiles do not remain without effect (Josephus, *War* 5.61), or brotherly affection proves vain (1.275), or violence useless (*Ant.* 19.27); likewise certain expenditures (*P.Mich.* 203, 12), and especially vain or fruitless words from which no profit may be drawn (Job 6:6; 15:3; Wis 1:11). The words of this law “are not for you a vain word, but are your life” (Deut 32:47). A vain desire (*kenē orexis*) is one that is not satisfied; the cares of mortal life are vain because they serve no purpose (Philo,

*Drunkennness* 152: *kenai spoudai*). *Kenon poiein* means to leave empty, that is, fruitless (Isa 32:6; 45:18; cf. 49:4). It is in this sense that St. Paul's visit to Thessalonica was not without success (*tēn eisodon ... ou kenē gegonen*). The litotes is effective in 1 Cor 15:10 – "His grace to me did not become useless" (*ou kenē egenēthē*), meaning that it was prodigiously effective. If the Corinthians surpass themselves in the Lord's work and know that their toil is not useless (*ho kopos hymōn ouk estin kenos en Kyriō*, 15:58), this means that despite obstacles and disappointments their efforts will come to fruition; they will triumph.

In 1 Cor 15:14 – "If Christ is not raised, then our preaching is in vain, and your faith is also in vain" – the meaning is more forceful. Ordinarily *kenos* means "without content, without object," but here it has to be "nothingness, absolute void." This "nothing" meaning occurs already in Aristotle: "For certain ancients (Parmenides and Zeno), the empty is nothingness" (*to kenon ouk on*, *Gen. Cor.* 1.8.325); Jer 18:15 – "They burn incense to nothingness" (*eis kenon ethymiasan*, cf. 51:58; Isa 59:4; 65:23; Ps 25:3). This meaning is especially Philonian: "The Creator made the idea of air and of the void ... the void is very deep and immense"; "a nothing (*ouden estin*), without consistency, mortal realities that go into the void (*kata kenou bainonta*) like dreams." So when Job 7:16 considers life to be like a breath (Hebrew *heḥel*), it envisages it as being flimsy, next to nothing; and according to the LXX of the messianic Ps 2:1, quoted in Acts 4:25, the peoples plot vain things (*emeletēsan kena*) that cannot succeed: they plan nothingness (cf. 1 Macc 9:68; 4 Macc 8:18).

This meaning of inanity, often expressed by *eis kenon* ("in vain"), is the commonest in St. Paul: "Provided that our toil was not in vain" (*eis kenon genētai ho kopos hēmōn*, 1 Thess 3:5). "We urge you not to receive the grace of God in vain" (*mē eis kenon tēn charin tou theou dexasthai hymas*, 2 Cor 6:1), that is, not to let it be inefficacious, fruitless; here *kenos* has a religious and moral meaning. The connotations are athletic in the formula "run in vain" (Gal 2:2; Phil 2:16), which evokes the efforts of the athlete who does not obtain success but pours himself out for nothing. The LXX also uses *dia kenēs*, "without reason, without purpose," to express the groundlessness of an action.

In this figurative sense *kenos* quite often has a pejorative nuance, synonymous with "false, lying"; *kenē doxa* is a false or erroneous idea. Abraham judges that the customs of the Egyptians are "empty and contain no truth." A person may be empty of knowledge (Philo, *Heir* 194), of wisdom (*Change of Names* 270), prudence (*Flight* 45), or sense (*To Gaius* 119), like the croaking of frogs (*Sacr. Abel and Cain* 69). Hopes especially are described as vain (because deceptive; *kenai elpides kai pseudeis*), and more and more conceit (*Prelim. Stud.* 61), vanity (*Drunkennness* 39, 40), bragging and pride.

*Kenos* then means “deceptive, lying”; it amounts to wind (Hebrew *heḥel*) or smoke (Philo, *Cherub.* 91), hence is futile. This is the word’s meaning in Eph 5:6 – “Let no one mislead you with vain reasonings (*mēdeis hymas apatatō kenois logois*), for because of such things God’s wrath falls on those who are disobedient.” One falls into error when one does not take into account the supreme rule of truth, which is divine revelation. Specious arguments are only pretexts for doing evil (1 Pet 2:16; Jas 1:14; 3:14). Likewise Col 2:8 – “Take care that no one kidnaps you by means of philosophy, vain deception, according to the tradition of men.” The prestige of eminent teachers and prestigious masters makes their hearers fall prey to illusion; this is the victory of imposture (cf. *P.Tebt.* 741, 23).

Finally, *kenos* means “foolish, senseless,” and is used to describe presumption (Philo, *Rewards* 94: *kenon auchēma*) or conceptions: “What a stupid and vain idea (*anoēton kai kenon*) ... to think that you could be Alcmena’s son” (Aristophanes, *Ran.* 530); “vain and stupid foolishness” (*kenē kai mataia anoia*, *P.Oxy.* 2713, 15; same adjectives linked, *Ep. Arist.* 137, 205; cf. 194; Plutarch, *Art.* 15.6). It is also applied to persons: “I do not aspire to follow beyond: I would be a fool” (*keinos eiēn*, Pindar, *Ol.* 3.45); “The fullness of time that makes you old makes you also foolish” (*tou nou kenon*, Sophocles, *OC* 931). When Haemon says, “It is no threat to reply to your vain arguments” (*kenas gnōmas*), Creon replies, “It will cost you dearly to dare to reason with me when you yourself are so empty of reason” (*ōn phrenōn autos kenos*, *Ant.* 753–754; cf. 709). Those who worship idols and forget the true God are empty brains (*hoi kenoi phrenōn*). This is like the apostrophe in Jas 2:20 – “O foolish man (*ō anthrōpe kene*), do you wish to know that faith without works is sterile?” It is equivalent to *aphrōn* (1 Cor 15:36); a head without a brain is incapable of reflecting and understanding.

The verb *kenoō*, which is much less common, means “to empty, evacuate,” and hence “purge” in Philo: the physician decides to purge (*kenoō*), cut, and burn for the good of the patient (*Cherub.* 15); “I will purge the sick one” (*kenōsō ton kamnonta*, *Alleg. Interp.* 3.226). In a metaphorical sense, “A perfect thought purifies and purges the soul of its sins” (*Dreams* 1.198; *Decalogue* 13). The verb is only used twice in the LXX to translate the pual of the Hebrew *’āmal*, “waste away, languish” (Jer 14:2). In the papyri, nothing can be added to the three references given by Moulton-Milligan: “I finished unloading (*exekenōsa*) on the 18th of the same month” (*BGU* 27, 7; cf. *P.Ryl.* 125, 24); “It is easy for a god ... to empty of his swinish wealth the dirty usurer and hoarder.” The strong meaning “annihilate, destroy,” corresponding to certain usages of *kenos*, is well attested in Vettius Valens (*kenōsin bion*, 2.22; p. 90, 7)

and is perceptible in Philo, *To Gaius* 117: “That which seemed to still hold solid slips away and falls in ruins.”

This is certainly the nuance in the five uses by St. Paul, who does not have the mission of “evangelizing with learned speech, lest the cross of Christ be nullified” (aorist passive subjunctive, *hina mē kenōthē*). St. Paul’s claim to glory is his apostolic disinterest, whereby he preaches the gospel freely; “no one will nullify” (*oudeis kenōsei*, future active) this claim (1 Cor 9:15); the apostle’s pride before the Macedonians in the generosity of the Corinthians will not be annulled, reduced to nothing. “If those who rely upon the law were the heirs, then faith would be reduced to nothing (*kekenōtai hē pistis*, perfect passive) and the promise annihilated (*katērgētai hē epangelia*).”

There remains Phil 2:7, *heauton ekenōsen*, well translated by the Vulgate’s *exinanivit*, “He annihilated himself.” The causative denominative verb *kenoō*, used here in the aorist indicative and without complement, but followed by a reflexive pronoun, has no parallel in Greek and looks like a hapax; it does not mean a voluntary renunciation, nor even a stripping, but an inanition. Its meaning is metaphorical; so it is not a “theological” technical term, but a term of a religious soul contemplating the mystery of Christ and gaining the sense of divine transcendence and creaturely nothingness. That is to say, the translation “annihilate” must not be given up; it says what it means, especially in a hymn; and this kenosis is relative. Christ did not cease to be God and did not become something else; his mode of existing and his *morphē* changed when the Word assumed an earthly condition through the incarnation; but his personal identity is immutable. The subject of *ekenōsen* is not the incarnate Christ, but the preexistent Lord who by his assumption of human nature is “reduced to nothing.” This was a legitimate expression at a time when it had not yet been defined that “He” had one person with two natures. The best parallel is 2 Cor 8:9 – “He made himself poor, although he was rich” (*eptōcheusen plousios ōn*).

## κεράτιον

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*keration*, **carob pod; karat (monetary unit)**

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*keration*, S 2769; EDNT 2.283; MM 341; L&N 3.46; BAGD 429

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The prodigal son of Luke 15:15–16, given the job of feeding pigs, “desired (*epethymēi*, imperfect tense for habitual action) to fill his stomach with the carob pods (*keratia*) that the pigs were eating.” The carob tree (*Ceratonia siliqua*) can grow to a height of forty feet and a circumference of six feet. Its leaves are leathery and evergreen, its flowers reddish, and locusts do not attack

it. Its abundant fruit, the *keration* (diminutive of *keras*, so literally “small horn”) – which only appears, according to the rabbis, seventy years after the tree is planted and three years after it flowers (cf. Str-B, vol. 2, p. 214) – is a long pod, thick and flat (about five or six inches long and one inch wide) that contains a sweet-tasting pulp that is used as livestock feed. “This fruit is quite sour when green, but dried carob pods are sweeter, and people snack on them as Orientals do with chick-peas, peanuts, etc.” They are also used in a pharmaceutical extract and in syrup form (*akanthēs keratia*, *P.Leid.* X, col. XII, 35; from the third-fourth century; cf. Dioscorides, *Mat. Med.* 1.114); they are helpful for gastroenteritis.

Carob is hardly mentioned in the papyri except in the accounts of a farmer from AD 78 (*P.Lond.* 131, 7; vol. 1, p. 189). But from the third-fourth century, in Egypt the word refers to a monetary unit, the karat (cf. the Latin *siliqua*). Phoibammon asks his brother to buy for him while he is at Alexandria “a robe of Antioch, embroidered, not much worn, for about ten *keratia*, a small chair for the workshop, some ink, a pen from Antioch, a copy priced at one and a half *keratia*” (*P.Fouad* 74, 7–9). “The master knows that a *phelonis* (cloak) costs more than ... *keratia*.” In a private account from the third-fourth century, we read: “21 *nomismatia* (the name of a coin), 6 *keratia* on the installment account ... for the baker 19 *keratia* on the children’s linens ... 3 *keratia* on the wine.” In the fifth century, one *artabē* of wheat is worth three *keratia*, and one *artabē* of barley almost two *keratia* (*P.Sorb.* 61, 8, 13). In a receipt handed over to an *epimeletēs*: “I declare that I have received from your majesty four *nomismata* (*solidi*) ... less five *keratia* that were given me as my annual salary for both jobs, that of dyer and that of tapestry-maker, which I have carried out....” For 33 *knidia* of wine I received 24 *keratia*” (*P.Berl.Zill.* XIII, 3). “I will pay annually a rent of ten *keratia* in common currency”; etc.

### κερματιστής, κολλυβιστής, τραπεζίτης

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*kermatistēs*, **money changer**; *kollybistēs*, **changer**; *trapezitēs*, **changer, banker**

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*kermatistes*, S 2773; *EDNT* 2.284; MM 342; L&N 57.205; BAGD 429 |  
*kollubistes*, S 2855; *EDNT* 2.306; MM 353; L&N 57.205; BAGD 442 |  
*trapezites*, S 5133; *EDNT* 3.367; MM 640; L&N 57.216; BAGD 824

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All along the court of the Gentiles in the temple at Jerusalem – as under a portico at Ephesus and at Delos in the first century (*trapezeitikē stoa*) – there were shops set up where the salt, wine, and oil needed for the sacrifices were

sold. There also were the tables of the money changers, who supplied to the Jews the Tyrian shekels (*tetradrachma*) and half-shekels (*didrachma*) used for buying their offerings and paying the temple tax (two drachmas). Hence John 2:14 – “Jesus found seated in the temple the sellers of cattle, of sheep, and of doves, and the money changers seated, *tous kermatistas kathēmenous*,” before their low tables full of coins. The designation *kermatistēs*, unknown from other sources, is derived from *kermatizō*, “reduce to small bits, change money,” and *kerma*, “coin”; but as opposed to the literary texts, the papyri show that this term refers not so much to small change as to the amount of hard cash one has available for purchases and other daily needs.

John 2:15 continues: “He ran them all out ... and he poured out the money of the changers, *kai tōn kollybistōn execheen to kerma*.” *Kollybistēs*, “changer,” a word that is late and rare in popular Greek and is disapproved by the Atticists, derives from *kollybos*, which means “ ‘coin,’ ‘exchange premium or rate,’ and – in the plural – ‘delicacies.’ *Kollybistēs* relates to the first two meanings.” In changing a certain coinage for another, from copper to silver, for example (*P.Ryl.* 192, 10), the *kollybistai* took a fee, the *kollybos* (Hebrew *qālḥōs*); the same word also referred to the rate of exchange. In 160 BC, Delphi, having received a donation of “eighteen thousand silver drachmas of Alexander” from King Attalus II, converted into local currency, asks that “to cover expenses and costs for the journey (of the ambassadors) it be permitted to charge an exchange premium (*ek tou kollybou*) and that those who carry out the transaction should give an accounting to the city” (Dittenberger, *Syl.* 672, 32). If the island league praises Timon, banker at Delos, for changing money without charging a *kollybos* (*IG XII*, 817, 4, 8–10), the changers of the banks of Oxyrhynchus are accused of shutting down and not accepting the bad imperial currency; the *stratēgos* forces them to reopen and accept all legal tender. Thus the *kollybistai* are true bankers.

In fact, it was the exchange tables that gave birth to banking and constituted its first function, to which were later added deposits, lending, receiving payments, and other financial operations. The word *trapezitēs* appears for the first time in a very mutilated inscription discovered at the Athenian agora that has to do with exchanging gold currency, in the fifth century (*SEG X*, 87, 19), where it means “changer.” Later it means the head of the bank, the one who trafficks in gold and silver, tests the coins (Epictetus 1.20.8–9), gives credit, etc. These are the *trapezitai* alluded to in the parables of the minas and the talents, which censure the lazy servant for not carrying his money to the bankers (Matt 25:27) or the bank (Luke 19:23), which would have allowed his master to recover his money “with interest” (*syn tokō*).

The two evangelists are referring to an investment deposit, which usually yielded interest at a rate of twenty percent, hence investments were made “to bear fruit.” The depositor is considered as an associate whose money, far from remaining unproductive, is sure to bring a profit; and bankers would have attracted customers by offering good investments; but unreliable payers and bankruptcies were not rare, at least in Greece and at Rome; in Egypt, we have several hundred banking papyri, and where monetary transactions were carried out through banks, the administration of the latter seems to have been more seriously controlled; money brought profits there, since the interest rate for private loans in the third century was twenty-four percent. In Israel, of course, lending for interest was forbidden, but interest was allowed on commercial loans, since the *šulḥanîm* (a Hebrew term derived from *šulḥān*, table) achieved returns on the funds that were invested with them.

So we must conclude that the Lord does not condemn lending at interest in the parable of the minas and of the talents, but that he only condemns its practice in the sanctuary. There is a distinction between the usurer who exploits the misery of the poor (cf. *Tabula of Cebes* 31, 3: “*mēde gignesthai homioius tois kakois trapezitais*, not to become like the wicked *trapezitai*”) and the *trepezitēs* who aids business people and well-off members of the public (*P.Tebt.* 890; *Dittenberger, Or.* 484, 9; cf. R. Bogaert, “Changeurs et Banquiers,” p. 270). This would be confirmed by this *logion agraphon*, if it is authentic: “*gignesthe dokimoi trapezitai*, be good bankers.” This is by far the best attested extracanonical sentence, since seventy witnesses to it have been found. Nevertheless, this is an exhortation not to be honest bankers, but to be like expert money changers who can tell the difference between true and counterfeit money and reject that which is worthless.

κολακεία

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*kolakeia*, **flattery**

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***kolakeia***, S 2850; TDNT 3.817–818; EDNT 2.306; MM 352; L&N 33.367; BAGD 440

The etymology of this biblical hapax (1 Thess 2:5) is unknown. Its very rare occurrences in the papyri – hardly four or five instances can be found – and its denominative verb *kolakeuō* evidence two meanings. One is neutral, “something pleasant”; the other is pejorative, “flattery,” associated with the idea of deceit or lying. Under the first heading, in *T. Abr.* A 16, the Most High tells Death, who is being sent to Abraham and will appear in a very attractive form,



“Do not frighten him; instead, take an attractive form – *mē ekphobēsēs auton alla meta kolakias touton paralabe*.” In addition, Death explains to Abraham, “It is with great calm and in a pleasing form that I come to the just, *en hēsychia pollē kai kolakia proserchomai tois dikaios*” (17). But in the third century AD: “I ask you, the prefect asks you, do not try to fool me”; “like a wine with no odor at all, kept in a jar, you show no emotion in the wake of flattery.”

This last meaning is that of *kolakeuō* in the LXX, contrasting with *pikrainō* (1 Esdr 4:31). Wis 14:17 denounces the sculpted images venerated on the orders of the tyrants: “They made a visible image of the king which they honored ... to flatter zealously one absent as though he were present.” In several literary texts, the *kolakeia* is friendly: “The young girl fusses over (or adulates) my companions the nymphs and honors them earnestly” (Menander, *Dysk.* 37). “The trainer must exercise the athletes, or rather flatter them ... when he is working as well as when they are exercising” (Philostratus, *Gym.* 29). But most often the nuance is pejorative: “But you have spoiled this radiant glory, thanks to an unexpected noise, some joke by the shepherds” (Sophocles, *Ichn.* 154). The slave of Demos “flatters, cajoles, fawns upon him, tricks him” (Aristophanes, *Eq.* 48); “a hundred heads of accursed flatterers, in a circle, licked their lips” (*Pax* 756); “Is it not a great bondage to see those people invested with public office, them and their paid flatterers” (*Vesp.* 683). “With good reason that person obtains more from both gods and humans who instead of flattering them when they are in an awkward position remembers them especially when his circumstances are most prosperous.”

The comedians and the moralists list the characteristics of the *kolax*, who is bent on profit, and distinguish him from the compliant person (*areskos*) who acts disinterestedly but out of “an innate desire to please” (Theophrastus, *Char.* 5). Having defined flattery as “a shameful business, but profitable for the flatterer” (*Char.* 2.1), Theophrastus concludes, “In review, you will see the flatterer say and do all the things that he hopes will ingratiate him” (*Char.* 2.13). In this Theophrastus is the heir of Aristotle, who makes *kolakeia* a vice opposed to kindness: “There are two kinds of people who are always trying to please. The first, who wants only to make people happy, is the compliant person. The second, whose goal is to make people happy in order to profit in money or in goods that can be bought with money, is the flatterer” (Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 4.12.1127–10); “All flatters are servile” (*Eth. Nic.* 4.9.1224); “flattery and the flatterer are gratifying, because the flatterer pretends to be an admirer or a friend” (Aristotle, *Rh.* 1.11.1371). Moreover, the Stagirite places friendship between animosity and flattery (*Eth. Eud.* 3.7.1233–38) and emphasizes the contrast between the friend and the flatterer.

From then on *kolakeia* is an item in catalogs of vices, starting with Philo, who inserts it along with perfidy (*apistia*) and cheating (*phenakismos*) and deceitfulness (*apatē*, *Sacr. Abel and Cain* 22). Sometimes flattery is presented as a vice opposite to *philia*: “In friendship, people fear the deceits of flattery as being very harmful”; sometimes as betraying the truth: false piety, which “flatters the One who is not vulnerable to flattery, who loves true worship ... that of a soul who brings truth as a pure and sole offering”; sometimes as spawning vanity: “All the people ... flattered Gaius by treating him with undue seriousness and conspiring to inflate his vanity.”

So this is a vice that has diverse sources: natural inclination, as with Eurikles, “glib at dispensing flattery, without seeming to do so” (Josephus, *Ant.* 16.301); the desire to please one’s neighbor; to glorify a prince (thus becoming a characteristic vice of a courtier); to excite the admiration of the crowd (thus becoming a vice of the orator): “Behold the flatters assassinating their victims and attacking their ears day and night; not only do they approve every word uttered, but they endlessly string together declarations and tirades. With their lips they express a thousand good wishes, but in their hearts they are always cursing” (Philo, *Migr. Abr.* 111).

These usages of *kolakeia* can help determine in what sense St. Paul, who had never used a word of flattery toward the Thessalonians, thus provided a guarantee of the authenticity of his apostolic utterances (1 Thess 2:5); (a) whereas the flatterer is a deceiver and fawner, the emissary of Jesus Christ had always spoken only the truth; (b) he refused to gain the sympathy of his hearers by cajoling or flattering them; (c) he had not sought personal gain (money, hospitality, prestige) through more or less devious dealings; (d) his *agapē*, which does not hesitate to reprimand and correct, proves to everyone the authenticity of his affection – the opposite of blameworthy leniency. On this integrity of St. Paul’s conduct, cf. 1 Cor 1:17ff.; 2:1, 4 ff.

κοπιᾶω, κόπος

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*kopiaō*, to work hard, grow weary; *kopos*, trouble, suffering, fatigue  
→see also μόχθος

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*kopiaō*, S 2872; TDNT 3.827–830; EDNT 2.307; NIDNTT 1.262–263; MM 354; L&N 23.78, 25.289, 42.47; BAGD 443 | *kopos*, S 2873; TDNT 3.827–830; EDNT 2.307–308; NIDNTT 1.262–263; MM 355; L&N 22.7, 42.47; BAGD 443

Derived from *koptō*, “smite, strike a hard blow, cut, cut off, chop,” hence figuratively “tire out,” the action noun *kopos* means “a blow,” and usually “trouble, suffering, fatigue.” It is often associated with its synonym *mochthos* and especially with *ponos*, which figures in the Stoic vocabulary. It is difficult to translate it precisely, because it is used for every kind of physical and moral suffering, affliction, torment, difficulty, effort, and weariness, but in secular Greek especially for fatigue: “to know what effect a bath at the wrong time or needless fatigue will produce” (Hippocrates, *VM* 21); “spontaneous weariness (*kopoi automatoi*) is a sign of illness” (Hippocrates, *Aph.* 2.5; cf. Philostratus, *Gym.* 53); “fatigue and sleepiness are enemies of study” (Plato, *Resp.* 7.537 b); “I am exhausted with fatigue.”

Nevertheless, the substantive and the verb *kopiaō* are not much used in classical Greek, although they are common in the LXX, where their meaning becomes more precise and more intense (especially the verb), because being tired becomes “be exhausted, tired out.” Amalek “cut off the retreat of those who were lagging behind when you were exhausted and tired out” (Deut 25:18); “They struck down the Philistines from Micdash ... and the people were exhausted” (Hebrew *’ûp*, 1 Sam 14:31); Ahithophel: “I would fall upon David when he is exhausted and weak”; one is worn out with moaning and weeping (Ps 6:6; 69:3). If *kopiaō* means “make a toilsome effort” (1 Sam 17:39), it is used rather frequently in the sense of “work hard,” either physically or intellectually. Judg 5:26 – the workers’ hammers (*kopiōntōn*, B); Eccl 2:18 – “I have hated all my work on which I have worked under the sun”; Wis 9:10 – “wisdom has worked beside me”; Sir 11:11 – “Such a person works, tires himself out, and presses on (*esti kopiōn kai ponōn kai speudōn*) and for all that is only in greater want”; 24:34 – “I have toiled not for myself alone but for all those who seek wisdom” (cf. 33:18; 51:27). We may note the formula “work in vain” or “for nothing,” which St. Paul takes up.

Rarely *kopos* has the meaning “fatigue” (Gen 31:42) or “burden” (Deut 1:12; Hebrew *ṭōrah*) or the softened meaning “boredom” (Sir 22:13), “care” (29:4), “depression” (Job 4:2), but usually retains the sense of “trouble, suffering, misfortune, misery.” Twice there is the intellectual nuance, “painful thinking” (Ps 73:5; Sir 13:26).

These words are almost unknown in Philo. In Josephus, *kopiaō* always means “grow weary,” but *kopos* retains the connotation of “excessive fatigue, exhaustion,” as a result of battle (*War* 5.307; *Ant.* 7.299), a night march (*War* 5.68), wandering in the wilderness (*Ant.* 2.257), crossing the sea (3.25), work (7.48), illness (5.315), the sacrificing of victims (8.244). It brings on sleep (*Life* 136; cf. *T. Issach.* 3.5), makes rest necessary (*Ant.* 5.315), affects beasts of burden (1.336: *kopon tōn hypozygiōn*).

All the preceding meanings are attested in the papyri and the inscriptions, first of all in the most weakened sense: “boredom, discouragement.” In the third century, Ptolemaeus writes to his father that he himself will come with friends to take delivery of five loads of wood, so that his father might not have the burden of transporting it (*hina mē sy kopias*, *P.Mich.* 511, 15); “We are not in the habit of inconveniencing the *stratēgos*” (*hina mē kopous parechomen stratēgō*, *P.Giss.Univ.* 27, 13); the trip taken by the mother of Dioscoros cannot inconvenience anyone (*mēdeis soi kopon parechē*, *P.Princ.* 70, 10). Then “fatigue, weariness”: a letter from Nicanor in the second-third century begins thus: “I have grown weary of writing you, and you have not answered me” (*egō kekopiaka graphōn soi, kai sy moi ouk antegrapsas*, *P.Oslo* 160, 1). Usually exhaustion is the point. In February 107, Apollinarius, who is assigned to the Roman legion at Bostra, which is opening a route through the *limes* of Arabia, writes, “I give thanks to Sarapis and to good fortune. While everyone is being worn out all day long (*pantōn kopiōntōn*) cutting stones, I, as *principalis*, walk around doing nothing (*diakinō mēden poiōn*).” But the job is not without danger. At the same period, Terentianus writes from Alexandria to his father, “You know that we are working hard now to clean up the tumult and sedition in the city” (*oides gar hoti kopiōmen arti diotei kathairoumen ton thorybon kai akatastasian tēs poleōs*, *P.Mich.* 477, 28–29). *Kopiaō* means “work,” *kopiatai* are gravediggers, and *kopos* is “expense, costs,” and especially difficulties: “We never had so much difficulty in winnowing it (barley)” (*P.Oxy.* 1482, 6); “With great difficulty (*meta pollōn kopōn*) we made him accept the obligation to see to it (the silage of Poïs) at the former rent” (*P.Sarap.* 92, 11); “With great difficulty I obtained from Penemgeus, with no written document, the eighty drachmas that I have sent you” (*P.Sarap.* 97, 5). These *kopoi* are also “torments” which sometimes are expressed in groans and cries of pain: “Brother, the torments and headaches of this city” (*adelphē, tous kopous kai tas kephalargias tēs poleōs tautēs*, *P.Apoll.* 45, 1; eighth century); “It is for my torment (*eis tous kopous mou*) and not for my rest (*ouk eis anesin*) that they laid hands on him” (*P.Apoll.* 45, 13); for the reconciliation of a mother and her son who are involved in a lawsuit: “I send you the letter addressed to me on the subject of this painful trial” (*charin tou kopou*).

With regard to the NT formula *kopon (kopous) parechō tini* (“give care, make trouble for someone”), Moulton-Milligan compare *BGU* 844, 12: “For he troubles me in my weakness” (*kopous gar moi parechei asthenountei*, AD 83); *P.Tebt.* 21, 10: “If he gives you trouble, go up with him” (*ean de soi kopous parechē synanabaine autō*, 115 BC). We may add *P.Princ.* 70, 10; *P.Giss.Univ.* 27, 13; *Pap.Graec.Mag.* 14 b (vol. 2, p. 132); *SB* 8247, 8; 9017, 28; 9271, 4 (first-second century), and an ostrakon in which Paulina complains to her

brother Titus concerning her husband's poor behavior and asks him to intervene: "Because my husband Aponius gives me trouble since he knows that I have no one" (*hoti kopous moi parechei Apōnios ho emos anēr dia to eidenai auton hoti oudenan echō*).

The six occurrences of *kopiaō* in the Gospels – where *kopos* does not appear – conform to secular Greek usage: the lilies of the field neither toil nor spin (Matt 6:28 = Luke 12:27); "Come to me, all you who are weary and overburdened, and I will give you rest." After the miraculous catch of fish, Simon Peter declares to Jesus: "We wore ourselves out all night without catching anything" (Luke 5:5). When Jesus arrived at Jacob's well at noon, in the heat of the day, after climbing the high plateau of Samaria, Jesus was more than usually tired (*kekopiakōs*, "exhausted," John 4:6); the day's journey was unusually difficult. This explains not only the fact that he did not go with his disciples to buy provisions at Sychar but also that he sat down just as he was (*houtōs*), i.e., on the ground, without choosing some other place. The important text (because it seems to be at the root of the Pauline identification of *kopos* with the apostolic ministry) is John 4:38 – "I sent you to harvest that which has cost you no trouble; others have taken the trouble (have labored, sown, etc.) and you have entered into their labor" (*ho ouk hymeis kekopiakate; alloi kekopiakasin, kai hymeis eis ton kopon autōn eiselēlythate*). The contrast between sowers and reapers is made in terms of the labor provided by the former and the relatively easy work done by the latter. Jesus is the one who defined the apostolic ministry as *kopos*, painful toil.

Beginning with his earliest epistles, St. Paul uses *kopiaō* and *kopos* to refer to his own labor, and in the first instance his manual work. After all, he was a tentmaker (Acts 18:3, *skēnopoios*); this was rough work, since the Ephesians made off with overalls or aprons (*simikinthia*) and handkerchiefs that were soaked with the apostle's sweat (Acts 19:12). This was not a temporary occupation for him, but a trade at which he worked in order not to have to live off of the communities that he evangelized: "You remember, brothers, our labor and fatigue (*ton kopon hēmōn kai ton mochthon*). Night and day we worked (*ergazomenoi*) in order not to be a burden on any of you" (1 Thess 2:9; repeated at 2 Thess 3:8). "We wear ourselves out working with our own hands" (*kopiōmen ergazomenoi tais idiais chersin*, 1 Cor 4:12). To the Ephesian elders, he notes that the money so earned allowed him to help with the needs of the poor; this work – in Christian terms – is thus inspired by brotherly love: "I showed you that it is by working thus (*houtōs kopiōntas*) that we must sustain the weak and remember the words of the Lord Jesus, 'It is more blessed to give than to receive' " (Acts 20:35).

But this labor comes to encompass more and more all of the efforts, cares, constraints, austerities, and labors of the apostolic ministry. If a church is submitted to trial and danger, Paul fears that his “trouble” in building it up might have been in vain, his sacrifices pointless (1 Thess 3:5; Gal 4:11; Phil 2:16). He did not spare himself: “I worked more abundantly than all (the other preachers)” (1 Cor 15:10; *ekopiasa*); “Are they ministers of Christ? I more. In more abundant labors (*en kopois perissoterōs*),” in prisons, blows, danger of death, hunger and thirst (2 Cor 11:27). The proclamation of the gospel in the midst of the worst adversities is a dramatic battle: “For this cause I wear myself out in the fight (*eis ho kai kopiō agōnizomenos*) with the energy of Christ, who works mightily in me” (Col 1:29); “it is for this that we toil and fight” (*kopiōmen kai agōnizometha*).

Another series of texts uses *kopos* and *kopiaō* to refer to the achievements of the Christian life, the efficiency of faith, endurance in hope, love’s labors and devotion; “Beloved brethren . . . surpass yourselves in the Lord’s work (*en tō ergō tou Kyriou*), knowing well that your labor is not in vain in the Lord” (*ho kopos hymōn ouk estin kenos en Kyriō*, 1 Cor 15:58). In the edification of the church and the service of God, the “labors” are diverse, notably among the founders of communities, apostles, and preachers. The labor of the “converter” is one thing; the lesser toil of those who follow another (2 Cor 10:15); a part of the fruits belongs first of all to the farmer who has worked hard (2 Tim 2:6, *ton kopiōnta geōrgon*), although “the one who plants and the one who waters are one; but each one shall receive his own pay, according to his own toil” (*ton idion misthon lēmpsetai kata ton idion kopon*, 1 Cor 3:8). In the first place are those responsible for the churches: “We ask you, brethren, to recognize those who toil among you (*tous kopiōntas en hymin*), those who are your superiors in the Lord” (1 Thess 5:12), the elders, “especially those who toil at the word and at teaching,” but also Christian families, like the household of Stephanas and those who have the same zeal and collaborate with each other, spending themselves without sparing any trouble (1 Cor 16:16), and also women of signal devotion, like Mary (Rom 16:6), Tryphena, Tryphosa, and Persis (16:12) who toiled so (*polla ekopiasen*), probably in service to the poor, in hospitality, helping the preachers, etc.

We may sum up in a few words. In the NT, *kopos/kopiaō*, “work hard,” means (1) constant, exhausting manual labor; (2) the fatigue of long, incessant missionary wanderings; (3) blows, wounds, and suffering endured in the course of stonings and riots; (4) slanders and insults by enemies, the humiliations of imprisonment; (5) the difficulties of governing and exercising apostolic authority; (6) the preparation of sermons, speeches given in the open air, the editing of epistles; (7) care for all the churches and for each soul (2 Cor 11:28–

29; Heb 13:17), who will not be saved on the steep path except through costly endurance and violence (Matt 11:12). There is no Christian life, no apostolic ministry, without rough, persevering labor.

κοσμέω, κόσμιος

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*kosmeō*, to put in order, adorn, prepare; *kosmios*, respectable, well ordered

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*kosmeo*, S 2885; TDNT 3.867; EDNT 2.309; NIDNTT 1.521, 524, 526; MM 355–356; L&N 79.12; BAGD 445 | *kosmios*, S 2887; TDNT 3.895–896; EDNT 2.309–313; NIDNTT 1.521, 524; MM 356; L&N 66.10, 88.48; BDF §59(2); BAGD 445

The denominative verb *kosmeō* – formed from *kosmos*, meaning “order, good order,” then “adornment” (Strabo 3.4.17), “ornament” (*SB* 8381, 1; 8550, 3), and “glory, honor” (*SB* 8140, 26) – always retains the fundamental meaning “to put in order,” and so “to prepare” the table (Dittenberger, *Syl.* 1038 A 11), a meal (Sir 29:26; Ezek 23:41), or a lamp that someone “puts in order” by filling it with oil (Matt 25:7); to organize or finish a work (Sir 38:28). Thus the Creator not only brought beings into existence but ordered them well (Ps 104:24), made an orderly work (Sir 16:27; 42:21). What we call the cosmos (*P.Lond.* 981; vol. 3, p. 241), the universe, is the “order of the world.” These wise arrangements ornament things and persons (Sir 25:1; Eccl 12:9), especially buildings; Solomon decorated the temple with precious stones; the royal house was decorated with hangings (Esth 1:6); the unclean spirit, returning to the dwelling from which it was driven out, “finds it empty (available), swept (cleaned), decorated,” ready for the spirit to move back in; the scribes and Pharisees build the tombs of the prophets and adorn the monuments to the righteous, multiplying the sculptures on the facade or in the underground chambers, like Phasael providing for the decorating of the tomb of his father Antipater, *taphon ekosmei tō patri* (Josephus, *Ant.* 14.284). By “ordering the [sacred] seasons perfectly,” David set the liturgical calendar and adorned its feast-times (Sir 47:10; cf. 50:14; 2 Macc 9:16). Finally, *kosmeō* is used in particular for sacred (Sir 45:12; 50:9) or royal vestments, and for women’s dress or accoutrements, as for the heavenly Jerusalem – at the same time a city and a woman – prepared like a fiancée (Rev 19:7) and adorned for her husband.

Cultic regulations often specified the dress of worshipers (Dittenberger, *Syl.* 999, 2–13). Similarly, St. Paul, in prescribing the appearance of the Ephesians in their assemblies for worship, tells them “to be attired decently (*en katastolē*

*kosmiō*), to adorn themselves with modesty and sobriety (*meta aidous kai sōphrosynēs kosmein heautas*),” just as 1 Pet 3:5 set forth a model for the dress of Christian women, namely that worn by the holy women of old (“*ekosmoun heautas*, they adorned themselves”). The verb chosen – “put oneself in order” – here refers to the correctness of a well-fitted garment, in no way outlandish or provocative: Christian women should dress themselves in good taste, “appropriately.”

The connection between *kosmios*, *sōphrōn* (*sōphrosynē*), and *aidōs* is so constant in the Hellenistic period that it must be considered a literary topos from Xenophon on; its point is always to emphasize conformity to the rules of decency and modesty, the control of attitude and bearing: beauty is joined in its possessor “with modesty and reserve, *met’ aidous kai sōphrosynēs*” (Xenophon, *Symp.* 1.8; cf. *Cyr.* 8.1.31); “the goal of human learning is to inspire restraint and moderation (*aidō kai sōphrosynēn*) in the soul, virtues whose most visible manifestation is that one blushes if the occasion arises” (Philo, *Heir* 128); virtue “causes to arise and contemplate beauty that is noteworthy for its modesty and moderation (*aidous kai sōphrosynēs*), beauty that is unmarred, unspotted, truly pure”; a young man dresses with modesty and restraint, *aidoi kai sōphrosynē kosmeitai neos*; the prostitute can put on a decent exterior, *schēma kosmion kai sōphrōn* (*Spec. Laws* 1.102; cf. Plutarch, *Praec. ger. rei publ.* 4.800 f: *anēr sōphrōn kai kosmios*), but Moses expels her from the city, because she is a stranger to “decency, modesty, chastity, and the other virtues (*kosmiotētos kai aidous kai sōphrosynēs*).”

The honorific decrees sum up the life of an honest person in two words, *zēsanta kosmiōs* (having lived *kosmiōs*), often explicated *zēsan kosmiōs kai sōphronōs* (MAMA VIII, 472; cf. *I.Magn.*, 162, 6; from the first century); a physician: “for his medical art and the *kosmiotēs* of his way of life” (*epi te tē technē tēs iatrikēs kai tē kosmiotēti tōn ēthōn*, *I.Magn.* 113, 11 = Dittenberger, *Syl.* 807). “Having lived a life that was modest and *kosmios* and praiseworthy ... for his *kosmios* conduct” (*zēsas bion aidēmona kai kosmion kai axion epainou ... epi tē kosmiō anastrophē*, MAMA VIII, 414, 9, 14); “having lived *kosmiōs* and modestly and as a paragon of virtue.” Similar praise is accorded women whose virtue is adorned with “restraint, moderation, decency” (Philo, *Sacr. Abel and Cain* 27), like Flavia Ammion in the first century, “on account of her virtue and the *kosmiotēs* and purity of her life”; Ammia in the second century, “pure and moderate and adorned with all virtue in manner of life and wifely affection”; Appia: “moderate and *kosmios* daughter” (*thygatera sōphrona kai kosmian*, MAMA VIII, 469, 4; cf. 407, 14). These virtues are like apparel that gives an air of style and distinction, *dia tēn kosmiōtatēn autēs* (Dittenberger, *Or.* 474, 9, at Pergamum). The Greeks have such a sense of



beauty that they see the virtues, or perfect deportment, as a sort of ornament that enchants the eyes and stirs admiration. The Christians of Asia Minor would consequently have appreciated this union of the ethical and the esthetic in the exhortations of St. Paul that use the language of their contemporaries.

A slightly different connotation is present in the quality required of candidates for the *episkopē*: *sōphrōn*, *kosmios*, *philoxenon* (1 Tim 3:2), which would be understood in the sense of “well-mannered, honorable, distinguished.” These men must have not only a decent life, like the women, but dignity, combining seriousness and courtesy. Much more so the *kosmios* man, who has a “sense of responsibility, a feeling of duty and decency ... who is able to give each his due and does nothing but what is honest, just, and appropriate.”

A new connotation appears in Titus 2:10, where Christian slaves honor the teaching of our Savior God through their virtue, *hina tēn didaskalian* ... *kosmōsin en pasin*; that is, the doctrine that came from Christ and is preached in the church (*didaskalia*) receives from the behavior of the slaves not just new luster, the adornment that works add to the truth, but a tribute. In the first century, moreover, *kosmeō* commonly means “honor, do homage, make famous.” By raising a monument to one’s mother, one does homage to her, just as “Tabeis has adorned his very sweet mother Koudan” (*MAMA VIII*, 108). Lolla “has adorned the virtues of her ancestors by the example of her way of life”; one “adorns” a *gymnasion* by attracting ephebes to it; a city is honored (Mic 6:9, *tis kosmēsei polin*; Dittenberger, *Syl.* 326, 15; Thucydides 2.42.2) by edifices; a province (*SEG XXIII*, 433, 2, *kosmēsein Thessalian*), all Greece (*SEG I*, 329, 47), or one’s country is adorned by sentiments worthy of one’s ancestors, city, country. Thus renown is consolidated or augmented by an irreproachable manner of life. So slaves, these *sōmata* or *res* at the bottom of the human hierarchy, are able, through the splendor of their conduct, to honor God and increase the attractiveness of the gospel in the hearts of pagans.

κρύπτη

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*kryptē*, **hidden or secret place**

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***krupte***, S 2926; *TDNT* 3.957–1000; *EDNT* 2.322; MM 361; L&N 28.78; BAGD 454

This substantive is a biblical hapax whose meaning cannot be precisely determined. It appears for the first time in the third century BC in two analogous “architectural” texts. Callixenus, *Alex.* 1: “Walls and windows surrounded the

‘crypto-portico’ on every side”; *PSI* 547, 18 gives a list of parts of a house (doors, windows, etc.), adding “the crypt (i.e., cellar) similarly plastered.” In the first century, Strabo mentions that “before the entrance there are crypts, numerous and long” (*prokeintai de tōn eisodōn kryptai tines makrai kai pollai*, 17.1.37); and Josephus says that “Castor and his companions set the tower afire and jumped through the flames into the vault beneath it.” From these data the conclusion is drawn that *kryptē* means an underground chamber or vault, a cellar, a covered passageway, a hidden corner or corridor; but none of these meanings seems to fit the Gospel text.

According to Luke 11:33, “No one lights a lamp to put it in the cellar (?) or under the bushel (*eis kryptēn tithēsin oude hypo ton modion*) but on the lampstand (*all’ epī tēn lychnian*) so that those who come in see the brightness.” The Jewish lamp (*lychnos*, Hebrew *nēr*), made of terra-cotta, is a small oil receptacle with a wick. It is placed on a wooden or bronze lampstand (*lychnia*, Hebrew *mnôrâh*) so that from a goodly height the flame can illuminate the whole room. This useful arrangement is contrasted with putting the lamp under a bushel, where the light would be useless. The *modios* is not a vessel for grain but a small piece of furniture, a sort of tub in the form of a truncated cone whose base is supported by three or four feet and which contains the wheat supply needed for the household. It can be used as a table or a plate. The purpose of the light being to illuminate, hiding it by placing it under a piece of furniture would be useless.

In fact, Luke 11:33 is a doublet of Luke 8:16, which is more explicit: “No one, after lighting a lamp, hides it under a vase (*kalyptei auton skeuei*) or places it under a bed.” Most likely the verb *kalyptō* was used first and gave rise to *kryptē*, whose meaning it specifies; that meaning is preserved in Gos. Thom. 33: “For no one lights a lamp (and) puts it under a bushel, nor does he put it in a hidden place, but he puts it upon the lampstand, so that all who go in and come out may see its light.” At least if we are not to envision a Greco-Roman dwelling, this *kryptē* cannot be a cellar; an ordinary Palestinian home did not have one. We might well identify it with “the niche opened up in a wall where objects were packed in,” or as we would say today, “in the cupboard.” Finally, the most correct translation seems to be “in a nook.”

Be that as it may, the light of Luke 11:33 is Christ himself and his teaching, which appear with the best possible visibility. In Matt 5:15, the light is that of the disciples; they radiate the light of revelation, taking care not to hide it.

κυριακός

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*kyriakos*, belonging to the emperor; belonging to the Lord

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*kuriakos*, S 2960; TDNT 3.1095–1096; EDNT 2.328–331; NIDNTT 2.510, 518; MM 364; L&N 12.10; BDF §113(2); BAGD 458

A. Deissmann noted that the adjective *kyriakos* is not a biblical word, but it is frequently attested in secular Greek. St. Paul and St. John borrowed it from the commonly used, official language: “concerning the emperor” or better “belonging to the emperor”; it derives from *kyrios* in the sense of “possessor.”

Its first known occurrence is in the edict of Tiberius Julius Alexander, 6 June 68: “knowing that it also suits the emperor’s accounts (*tais kyriakais psēphois*) that those who are able should carry out these activities of their own volition, zealously”; “that in no case shall free men be kept in any prison at all, at least if they are not malefactors, nor in the *praktoreion*, with the exception of debtors to the imperial accounts, *opheilontes eis ton kyriakon logon*” (ibid., line 18); these debtors to the state or to the imperial finances are payable to the proprietor.

The *kyriakos logos* is constantly mentioned in the papyri, as is *kyriakos phiskos* in the inscriptions. But this adjective is used with many other terms, notably to lands on which the *fiscus* is payable (*kyriakē gē*; *P.Giss.* 48, 8; *P.Petaus* 25, 20), over against *ousiakē gē*. To the examples supplied by Moulton-Milligan, we might add *ta kyriaka ktēmata* (property, *P.Oxf.* 3, 4), *tē pros ta kyriaka pragmata epimeleia* (business, *P.Brem.* 37, 10), *tas kyriakas misthōseis* (rents, *P.Mich.* 174, 9), *proteron ousa hypo kyriakon chorton* (pasture, *P.Mich.* 620, 76), *kyriakos oinos* (wine, *P.Oxy.* 1578, 7), *apophora en tē tautēs kratēsei kai kyriakē apophora tōn periteinomenōn* (payment, *SB* 6951, 28; cf. 9050, col. V, 12; from the first-second century); “whatever the sum we are assessed for the *fiscus*, we pay it” (*P.Oxy.* 2562, 10).

It is clearly in a much loftier sense of the word that 1 Cor 11:20 notes that to participate in the Eucharist without practicing brotherly love “is not to eat the Lord’s Supper, *ouk estin kyriakon deipnon phagein*.” Rather, it is a private meal, one that no longer has the spirit of the liturgical act that was instituted by the Lord and remains consecrated to him. This formula was the inspiration for an inscription on a eucharistic table: *Hygiainōn phage kyriakon (deipnon)*” (*SB* 7265). Pagan texts mention the *hagia kyriakē*, and in ecclesiastical language *to kyriakos (oikion)* seems to mean “the house of the Lord,” the church.

Sunday is mentioned in this way in Rev 1:10 – “I was in the Spirit on the *kyriakē hēmera*” (*egenomēn en pneumati en tē kyriakē hēmera*). To this compare this tomb inscription from the seventh century: “God’s servant fell asleep at the tenth hour, at the dawning of the Lord’s Day, the day of the resurrection of Christ” (*hōra dekatē diaphaousais kyriakēs tais anastaseōs tou Christou*, *SB* 7564, 15); and in pagan texts, *Sebastē* refers to the day of the

emperor, when his birthday was celebrated. This was a way of specifying a precise date, for example: “In the twentieth year of Tiberius Caesar Augustus, in the month of August, on the day of *Sebastē*.” But in the Christian religion, the Lord’s Day is the one that is set aside for him.

κύριος, κυριεύω

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*kyrios*, **master, lord, Lord, sir**; *kyrieuō*, **to be master, take possession of, possess**

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*kurios*, S 2962; TDNT 3.1039–1095; EDNT 2.328–331; NIDNTT 2.508–520; MM 365–366; L&N 12.9, 37.51, 53.62, 57.12, 87.53, 87.56; BDF §§5(3a), 188(2), 254(1), 268(2), 147(3); BAGD 458–460 | *kurieuo*, S 2961; TDNT 3.1097; EDNT 2.328; NIDNTT 2.510, 518; MM 364–365; L&N 37.50; BDF §177; BAGD 458; ND 5.74

The substantive *kyrios*, “master, legal representative, sir,” was formed in the fourth century BC from the substantivized adjective *to kyrion*, “master of, having authority, sovereign,” from which it is barely distinguishable. The first meaning of this adjective is “having power”; “taste for the beautiful and irresistible might” (*dynamis kyriōteron*, Pindar, *Ol.* 1.168), whether it is a matter of self-control, of being master of a city (Plutarch, *Quaest. conv.* 6.8.2) and governing it, of successful politics (Demosthenes, *Chers.* 8.69), and especially being head of an estate: “My mother no longer had power (*kyria*) over her property to give me what she would have liked.” The second meaning is “decisive, regular, important, principal,” “highest of all” (*Ep. Arist.* 2), such as an “appointed day” (Euripides, *Or.* 48) or a day “marked by a new birth” (Aeschylus, *Ag.* 766), official (*P.Princ.* 165, 10) or a “decisive opinion, because we rely on numerous authorities” (Plato, *Leg.* 1.638 d). Hence it is used for authorized witnesses (*Phlb.* 67 b; *Symp.* 218d), and the meaning “valid” occurs constantly in the papyri, notably with the present imperative *estō*, whether regarding a stipulation (*P.Fouad* 38, 10), a security deposit (20, 11; *P.Mert.* 98, 18; *P.Oxy.* 3204, 26), a proxy (*P.Phil.* 16, 8, *epitropikē*), an agreement (*P.Fouad* 33, 34; *P.Stras.* 399, 13), a receipt, a sale, a contract, a will (*P.Wisc.* 13, 9, *diathēkē*; *P.Köln* 100, 18; *P.Col.* VII, n. 188, 25; *SB* 10756, 18), an act of cession (*parachōrēsis*, *BGU* 1738, 29; *P.Wisc.* 9, 30), a deposition (*cheirotegraphia*), a lease (*misthōsis*), or any written act: *to gramma*, *hē graphē kyria* (*SB* 11248, 63, 102).

The substantive *kyrios* refers to the one who commands, a boss, a master, notably the owner of a slave, but also the master of a household (Menander,

Dysk. 73, 98), the head of a family (*P.Oxy.* 288, 36), the head and master of inhabitants (Plutarch, *Arat.* 50.9; Josephus, *Ant.* 11.54), an officeholder (prophet, priest, scribe, *C.Ord.Ptol.* 43, 2; *P.Köln* 85, 1), the owner of a ship (*BGU* 1932, 11) or of real estate. This is the sense of “the master of the house” (*ho kyrios tēs oikias*) in Mark 13:35 (cf. *P.Tebt.* 5, 147: *tous kyrious tōn oikiōn*).

In Greek and Egyptian law, a wife or daughter is assisted by a legal guardian, a tutor (*ho kyrios*), which would indicate a different legal capacity for women than for men; but the documents vary a great deal. Sometimes it is specified that the woman contracts “with a guardian” (*meta kyriou*, *P.Aberd.* 30, 4; 65, 1; *P.Alex.* 7, 8), sometimes “without guardian” (*chōris kyriou* or *aneu kyriou* [*BGU* 2070, 6], *mē echousa kyrion* [*P.Stras.* 241, 5]). This legal meaning does not occur in the Bible.

As a common title of courtesy, *kyrios* is used for a speaker (as the French still say *maître*, cf. English *mister*; Epictetus 3.23.11, 3.23.19; cf. 4.1.57; *BGU* 2190, 1: *tō megaloprepestatō kyriō Phoibammōni magisteri*), a physician (2.15.15; 3.10.15), a soothsayer (2.7.9), a philosopher (3.22.38). It becomes the equivalent of the English “sir” (*P.Wisc.* 21, 5, 12; *P.Brem.* 12, 20 and 27; *P.Phil.* 33, 17; *P.Oslo* 49, 10; *P.Laur.* 39, 10; 41, 1; 107, 5; *P.Genova* 70, 1, 4; 84, 1) or “madam” (*P.Oxy.* 3313, 28: “we wish you good health, madam,” *errōsthai se euchometha, kyria*) as when the cithara player Nero addresses his audience, “Sirs (*kyrioi mou*), hear me favorably” (Dio Cassius 61.20.1). Much more respect is implied, however, when the word is used for superiors, a *stratēgos* or the prefect – as we use “Excellency” – and when used for members of the same family it takes on connotations of affection, even veneration. It is used by a son to his father (*tō patri kai kyriō pleista chairein*), by a son or daughter to a venerated mother (*tē kyria mou mētri*), to a husband, a brother, a sister, even a son (*P.Oxy.* 123, 1 and 24; *P.Mich.* 510, 1).

With its meanings “lord” and “master,” *kyrios* inevitably took on a religious meaning. Pindar already terms Zeus “*kyrios* of all.” In the Hellenistic period, *kyrios* is the constant epithet with sovereign divinities, notably Isis (“I have come to find our divine Lady Isis”) and Sarapis, but also for all the other gods – Hermes (*P.Giss.* 85, 6; *SB* 10278, 5), Artemis (*BGU* 535, 9), Soknopaios, etc. – to the point that Brutus can say, “I am neither king nor god” by saying *oute basileus oute kyrios* (Plutarch, *Brut.* 30.3).

In effect, we can say that in the Orient “Lord” always expresses royal dignity, connoting the dependency of subjects or vassals in submission to the sovereign. In the fourteenth century BC, the Amarna letters call Pharaoh “lord” (*bēlu*) and his vassal “servant” (*ardu*); he is master of people and lands. In Egypt, the Ptolemies, as successors of the Pharaohs, inherit their divine character: Ptolemy XII is “the Lord King God” (*Dittenberger*, *Or.* 186, 8), and

Ptolemy XIV and Cleopatra are *hoi kyrioi theoi megisthoi*. At Rome, the emperor was divinized. Augustus was called *theos kai kyrios kaisar Autokratōr* in 12 BC; his successors almost always retained the title *kyrios*, especially Nero: “Nero, lord of the whole world” (*ho tou pantos kosmou kyrios Nerōn*). The word not only expresses sovereignty and majesty but also, in connection with the idea of divinity, suggests to the whole world that Caesar the beneficent god (SB 9735) and Roman savior, and he alone, dominates the whole world. Oaths were sworn *per genium Caesaris*.

In the LXX, the commonplace meanings of *kyrios* are again found: “master of a household” (Judg 19:22–23), “owner” of a bull (Exod 21:28–29; 22:10–15), of a cistern (21:34), or of a slave (21:4–6, 8; Judg 19:11–12; cf. Gen 39:1–4, 8, 16); and especially the courtesy title, with nuances ranging from simple “sir” for a person not known by name (Gen 24:18; 31:35) to “Your Excellency.” It is the formal term for the sovereign (“My lord the king”) who is God’s anointed (1 Sam 26:23; 2 Sam 1:14, 16).

The great innovation of the LXX is on the religious level. On the one hand, it uses *kyrios* to translate not only the Hebrew *’ādōn*, *’dōnāy*, Aramaic *mārē*, but especially the divine tetragrammaton (YHWH), so that the term for the God of Israel is “Lord.” He himself affirms, “I am the Lord” (*egō eimi Kyrios*). On the other hand, “theology” is elaborated in terms of this sovereignty of a powerful, transcendent God who must be feared and loved. His throne is in the heavens (Ps 103:19; Sir 1:8). He is the Most High (*Kyrios hypsistos*, Ps 97:9; Sir 26:16; 50:19; Dan 2:19), whose glory abides forever (Exod 16:7, 10; Num 14:10; Hab 2:14; Ezek 8:4; Ps 104:31; 138:5), the Lord God Almighty. He has servants to whom he gives his orders (*prostagmata*) and who call upon him as *despota kyrie* (Jdt 11:10; Isa 10:33; Jonah 4:3; Dan 9:15; Sir 23:1; 2 Macc 15:4; cf. Philo, *To Gaius* 286; Josephus, *Ant.* 20.90) or as “Lord King” who reigns forever (Exod 15:18; Ps 146:10), the equivalent of “Lord and God” (Jer 31:18; Bar 2:27; 3:6). It is insisted that he is “the Lord God of the gods” (Ps 50:1; 95:3; 96:4), “the Lord is great, our Lord is greater than all the gods.” This is not only a confession of his transcendence but a proclamation that he is unique – in a world (first of all Alexandrian) which bowed down before so many other *kyrioi* both flesh and blood and wood or metal.

In the NT, the secular meanings of *kyrios* are again found, notably as an expression of respect and a formal address, but especially the designation of God as Lord of heaven and earth (Matt 11:25; Luke 10:21; cf. Acts 17:24), the God of Israel, the master of times (Mark 13:20; Acts 1:24; 2:47) and of people (Luke 1:28, 38; 2 Thess 3:16). He must be served (Rom 12:11; 2 Tim 2:24) and pleased (1 Cor 7:32, 34; Eph 5:10); his work must be done (1 Cor 16:10). He is

unique (“one Lord,” Eph 4:5), and when his power and sovereignty are exalted, he is obviously thereby contrasted with falsely divinized sovereigns.

The chief innovation of the NT – because it founds the new religion – is the application of this title to Jesus, and that straightforwardly as a royal and messianic title. It is not easy to know what meaning the word had on the lips of those who were asking him for a miracle, although the Canaanite woman adds “Son of David” (Matt 15:22; 20:30). In any event, strangers, disciples, and apostles always address Jesus as Lord, and the Master acknowledged the fitness of this title: “You call me Master and Lord, and you are right; that is what I am.” In the eschatological parables, given at the end of his career, Jesus presents himself as king: “You do not know when your Lord will come” (Matt 24:42). After Easter morning, Mary Magdalene calls him “Rabboni,” and the apostle Thomas worships him: “My Lord and my God” (John 20:25). Resurrected, Jesus is the heavenly king: “God has made him Lord and Christ” (Acts 2:36), the “Lord of glory” (1 Cor 2:8; 2 Cor 4:4), the God of the Christians.

St. Paul elaborates this theology in contrast to the ideology of divinized humans: “If there are indeed claimed gods in heaven and earth, many gods and many lords, for us there is only one God the Father ... and one Lord Jesus Christ”; “We preach ... Christ as Lord” (2 Cor 4:5; Col 2:6; 3:24); “Let every tongue proclaim that Jesus Christ is Lord,” that is, God. Such is the object of faith profession and worship: “Believe in the Lord Jesus and you will be saved.” Henceforth Christians are “those who call upon the name of our Lord Jesus Christ,” that is, who worship his divine majesty and implore his sovereign protection.

*Kyrieuō*. – This denominative verb, signifying “be master, take possession of, possess,” is normally construed with a genitive object, but beginning from AD 6 (*P.Köln* 155, 6), it appears more and more frequently construed with the accusative (*P.Grenf.* I, 21, 13; *P.Lond.* 121, 188; vol. 1, p. 111: *tou kyrieuontos tēn holēn oikoumenēn*). Its subject can be any holder of authority, even a child who holds royal power (Josephus, *Ag. Apion* 1.148) or officials (*proedroi*) who could assess fines (Aeschines, *In Tim.* 1.35), but especially military leaders and princes who take possession of or seize land, property, or persons; and eminently the sovereign God, master of everything: *ho kyrieuōn* (*Ep. Arist.* 45, 269; *Pap.Graec.Mag.* 1.214: “the ruler of all the angels” [*ho kyrieuōn pantōn angelōn*]; XII, 115: “ruler of the whole universe” [*ho kyrieuōn tou pantos kosmou*]). In Epictetus 2.19.1, *ho kyrieuōn logos* is the ruling or dominating argument.

In the papyri, the verb most often designates the owner of a slave (*P.Oslo* 40, 19) or of a house and property, but especially one who has the rights to the

produce of some land, the harvest from a certain territory. So it is constantly associated with the verb *krateō* or *epikrateō* (SB 11215, 9), *katakrateō* (Philo, *Alleg. Interp.* 3.220), but also *despozō* and *archō* (ibid. 3.187).

Much used in the LXX, which uses it to translate the Hebrew verb *māšal*, “reign, dominate,” *kyrieuō* has God as its subject only once, when Jehoshaphat says, “Yahweh, God of our fathers, are you not God of the heavens, and do you not govern all the kingdoms of the nations?” (2 Chr 20:6; cf. Dan 2:38). In fact, from its first occurrence it seems to have a pejorative nuance, since it expresses a punishment, if not a curse – that of the woman after the fall: “Your husband will have dominion over you” (Gen 3:16). It is also used for the extermination of enemies (Exod 15:9, Hebrew *yāraš*) and in Yahweh’s punishment of his people in the time of the judges: “Those who hated them had dominion over them.” The other occurrences are neutral and refer only to the exercise of power, command, especially by generals and kings who seize territory or make themselves masters of their inhabitants.

It is in this sense that Jesus states, “The kings of the nations exercise authority over them (*kyrieuousin autōn*), and their princes are called benefactors” (Luke 22:25), but a pejorative nuance is not excluded (cf. Mark 10:43, *katakyrieuō*; Acts 19:16; 1 Pet 5:3), since this mode of governing is in contrast to that of the Christian community, whose apostles are *diakonoi* (Luke 22:26). There is even a certain irony: despite this tyranny, the title “benefactor” is conferred upon them. This nuance of despotism, constraint, or tyranny is found again in 2 Cor 1:24 – “It is not that we hold dictatorial power over your faith, but we cooperate for your joy.” There is only one *Kyrios*, whose transcendence is hailed by 1 Tim 6:15 – “the King of those who reign and the Lord of those who wield sovereignty.” What is new in the NT is the metaphorical meaning of *kyrieuō*: death no longer holds sway (Rom 6:9), nor does sin, since it has been dethroned by grace (6:14); but the law retains its authority, and “Christ has died and lived in order to hold sway over the dead and the living” (Rom 14:9). He has conquered every sovereignty, and the legitimacy of his dominion can never be contested.

κῶμος

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*kōmos*, **festive procession, feast, drunken feast**

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*komos*, S 2970; EDNT 2.333; MM 367; L&N 88.287; BAGD 461

The first meaning of this term is “festive procession,” something that formed a part of certain religious festivals, like the Anthesteria; this was a parody of



official processions and is linked to the birth of theater, since in it are found disguises, masks, mimic dance, and even exchanges of invective. Secondly, *kōmos* refers to the Apollonian paeon or the Dionysiac dithyramb, associated with the arts of music and dance; thus in the catalogs of winners at the City Dionysia, *kōmoi* are the choruses sung and danced in honor of Dionysus.

In the Hellenistic era, *kōmos* is used for a dinner and the diversion that go along with it, notably joyous singing. In the vision of the decurion Maximus: “like a spring flower, I stirred up my festal song.... Calliope sang a festal song.” The epitaph of a young woman who died at the age of twenty: “At the moment when the noise of the feast ... was going to resound in my father’s home.” But these feasts, accompanied by music and dance, degenerated, ending up in drunkenness and license. Philo denounces them: “In all your feasts and gatherings, see what exploits there are that stir up admiration and imitation ... drunkenness, drunken behavior, parties” (*methē, paroinia, kōmoi*, Philo, *Cherub.* 92; cf. Dio Chrysostom 4.110).

The Bible uses the word only in this pejorative sense, making *kōmos* mean a drunken dinner party: “no more intemperate parties or drunkenness” (*mē kōmois kai methais*, Rom 13:13); “the works of the flesh ... drunkenness, orgies” (*methai, kōmoi*); “You fulfilled the will of the pagans in debaucheries, lust, free-flowing wine, orgies, drinking (*oinophlygiais, kōmois, potois*) – immoral, idolatrous practices” (1 Pet 4:3).

λαγχάνω

*lanchanō*, to cast lots, be chosen by lot, receive as one's lot, receive

*lagchano*, S 2975; TDNT 4.1–2; EDNT 2.335; NIDNTT 1.478; MM 368; L&N 30.104, 30.106, 57.127; BDF §§171(2), 229(2), 400(3); BAGD 462

This verb, much used in classical Greek but unknown in Matt and Mark, has three meanings in the NT. First of all: “cast lots.” At the foot of the cross, “the soldiers said to one another, let us not tear it (Jesus’ tunic), but let us cast lots to see whose it shall be.” Next: “to be chosen by lot.” It was the custom of the members of the priestly class to cast lots for the division of tasks in the temple service, and Zechariah, of the class of Abdia, “was chosen by lot to burn the incense,” in the same manner in which Saul was chosen to become king of Israel (1 Sam 14:47). In the inscriptions, *lanchanō* is constantly used for a person chosen by lot to carry out some mission or function, notably the priesthood. But at Jerusalem the preparing and offering of the daily sacrifice were determined by casting lots four times: “The attendant said to the priests, ‘Go and cast lots to decide who shall immolate, who shall shed (the blood), who shall get the coals from the inside altar and from the lamp, and who shall carry the parts up the ramp – the head and the legs and the feet....’ The attendant said to them: ‘Those who have not yet burned incense, come draw lots’; they drew lots, each having his part.” Thus the priest Zechariah was chosen to offer the sacrifice of incense. This was a memorable occasion, because a priest did not have this task more than once in a lifetime.

The third meaning of *lanchanō* is “receive as one’s lot, gain a share, be paid one’s part,” like Solomon, whose lot it was to receive a good soul (Wis 8:19), or Judas, “who received this ministry as his portion.” If sometimes, as in these two texts, *lanchanō klēron* is used (*P.Oxy.* 2407, 21; *SEG* IX, 1, 16 and 37; Dittenberger, *Syl.* 1109, 127; second century AD; Philo, *Moses* 1.157), or *ek klērou* (*P.Tebt.* 382, 5; from 30 BC to AD 1; *P.Mich.* 557, 10; from AD 116), this complement is usually suppressed (*P.Tebt.* 383, 14; in AD 46), and the verb means “to be awarded a right,” for example, a share of the sacrifices, the right to take part in something, privileges (*I.Priene*, 364, 8; Philo, *Sobr.* 54). In the papyri it is seen especially with regard to the parts of an inheritance or in contracts for the division of property. In the first century: “If I die, I leave my dwelling, which I obtained by the dividing of an inheritance” (*tēn mou oikēsēn*

*hē elachon ek diaklērōseos*, *P.Dura* 16 b 7); “one of the houses was allotted to Polemocrates.... They were awarded it in the following manner ...” (*P.Dura* 19, 3, 6). “Horion for his part obtained....”

Obviously, the verb has commonplace uses, such as “If you are not present, this matter will not receive a solution” (*lysin ou lanchani touto*, *P.Mert.* 80, 14); but also in funerary inscriptions: “The season that fell my lot was short” (*meikron men egō t’elachon kyklon*, *CII*, 1510, 7 = *SB* 6647); “Here lies Dalmatia.... She lives; she has found a path that is the end of death” (*thanatoio telos lachousa keleuthon*, *I.Thas.*, 370, 20, a Christian epitaph from the fourth century).

It is with this connotation of value that we must understand 2 Pet 1:1 – “Simon Peter ... to those who have obtained a faith as precious as ours” (*lachousin pistin*; cf. Jude 3, *pistis paradotheisa*, “the faith handed down”). The emphasis is on God’s free grace at the source of the distributing and the giving. We might compare Homer: “The subtle plan whereby Achilles would accept Priam’s gifts” (*hōs ken Achilleus dōrōn ek Priamoio lachē*); *Sib. Or.* 3.580: “It is with justice that, having received their portion in the law of the Most High (*nomou Hypsistou lachontes*), [the holy race of] the pious shall dwell in their cities and in their luxuriant countryside in happiness and prosperity.”

## λάθρα (λάθρα)

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*lathra*, **secretly**

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*lathra*, *S* 2977; *EDNT* 2.335; *MM* 368; *L&N* 28.71; *BDF* §§26, 435; *BAGD* 462

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“Call someone secretly” is a common expression. “Herod, having had the magi summoned secretly, learned from them the precise time of the appearing of the star” (Matt 2:7, *lathra kalesas*); “Saul gave this order to his servants: Speak secretly to David to tell him ...” Speaking or acting in secret can be a sign of discretion; thus a person might speak in a low voice, as when Martha invites her sister to join her and Jesus. Most often, however, this sort of secrecy goes along with evil intentions and evil deeds; sometimes it simply expresses surprise. In any event, acting secretly is the opposite of acting out in the open: “when the Jews everywhere began to agitate and to meet, when, both in secret and openly (*ta men lathra, ta de kai phanerōs*) they had brought great trouble on the Romans” (Dio Cassius 69.13). Thus St. Paul protests against the lictors at Philippi, “Having beaten us publicly ... now they throw us out secretly” (*kai nyn lathra hēmas ekballousin*).

So *lathra* expresses what no one knows or sees – as when David arose secretly and went to the place where Saul was encamped, or when Moses' mother nursed her child in her house for three months, away from most of the people (*lanthanonta tous pollous*, Philo, *Moses* 1.9; cf. Acts 26:26) – so that even interested parties are not alerted.

This nuance of nondisclosure should be retained in John 11:28, where Mary, who is busy receiving the condolences of her Jerusalemite relations, is warned in a low voice by her sister that the Master is waiting for her. It is also the connotation in Matt 1:19 – “Joseph, her husband, being a just man and not wanting to expose her in public, decided to repudiate her secretly.” M. J. Lagrange explains his situation in this way: “Three options were available to Joseph: denouncing Mary (Deut 24:1; Lev 5:1); repudiating her secretly; or taking her with him, which would make the marriage definite.” The whole emphasis of the expression is on his decision for clemency and even more on the discretion of the planned separation, which would leave the mother's honor intact. Denouncing his fiancée publicly, bringing a judicial action, could have led to her receiving the death penalty. Even with a private arrangement, avoiding a scandal could be difficult. Now Joseph, while he had scruples about accepting as his wife a fiancée who was expecting a child that was not his, and even though he had decided to send her away, wanted above all to avoid making a spectacle, avoid defaming Mary or tainting her reputation. The secrecy (*lathra*), then, has to do with the motive for the separation.

Since this much is clear, we might wonder why St. Matthew credits this twofold decision to Joseph's justice. If we understand *dikaioσynē* in the biblical sense of giving God and neighbor their due, it is not clear how it requires a secret break in the relationship. The truth, however, is that in the Koine, in sacred as well as secular texts, “justice” is synonymous with perfection and encompasses all the virtues, including first of all prudence, and in this sense: Joseph, a reflective man, does not unthinkingly follow an impulse; he deliberates (*dikaioσ, thelōn, eboulēthē, enthymēthentos*), and that is why his decision is so thoroughly discreet. Moreover, the just person, often synonymous with *epieikēs* (Josephus, *Ant.* 6.263; 10.155; 3 Macc 7:6–7; cf. above, pp. 34ff.), keeps from hurting anyone (*Ep. Arist.* 148; Diogenes Laertius 10.150). “Justice casts out hatred; humility destroys jealousy; the person who is just and humble is afraid to commit an injustice” (*T. Gad* 5.3). Such a person is therefore not only magnanimous (Antoninus Liberalis, *Met.* 5.1) but also benevolent and beneficent: “the just person must be benevolent” (*dei ton dikaion einai philanthrōpon*, Wis 12:19; *SB* 9974, 7; 10113, 8), possessing even *philostorgia*. And since *ḡdāqâh* is linked with *ḥesed*, the just person is merciful. Such is the testimony of 1 Sam 24:18 (“You are more just than I, because you paid me

back with good, whereas I paid you back evil”) and the blessing of Tobias by Raguel (“Excellent man, son of an excellent man, just and almsgiving, may the Lord give heaven’s blessing to you and your wife ...” – Tob 9:6, Sinaiticus). This is more than adequate to clarify St. Matthew’s vocabulary and vindicate St. Joseph’s goodness and generosity.

λακτίζω

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*laktizō*, **to kick**

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*laktizo*, S 2979; TDNT 4.3; EDNT 2.335; MM 368; L&N 39.19; BAGD 463

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One of the first things the Lord said to Saul on the road to Damascus was “It is difficult for you to kick (*laktizō*) against the goads” (*sklēron soi pros kentra laktizein*, Acts 26:14). The metaphor is taken from agricultural life: the farmer prods the ox with his goad, and the ox resists. *Laktizō* means “strike with the heel or the foot”; hence “kick” or “stamp” when the subject is an animal; “kick” when the subject is human, whether kicking a door or striking another person. Euripides also uses the word, however, for the “tide that drove the ship to the shore” (Euripides, *IT* 1396).

But the expression “kick against the goad” is proverbial in Greek and Latin literature (cf. J. J. Wettstein). Aegisthus says “Are your eyes not open to see what you see? Do not kick against the goad; if you stumble on it, you will be hurt” (Aeschylus, *Ag.* 1624); in other words, kicking against the goad is a threat against the recalcitrant person, who is treated more roughly than if he had been compliant. The same nuance is present in Ocean’s words to Prometheus: “You still are not humble. You do not yield to suffering, and to your present evils you intend to add others. If you will learn from me, you will stop kicking against the goad. Take thought that he is a hard monarch who is not accountable to anyone” (Aeschylus, *PV* 323). “Placing the yoke on one’s neck and wearing it lightly, that is the right approach. To kick against the goad is to take a slippery path” (Pindar, *Pyth.* 2.94). Resisting is even portrayed as impossible or impious: “Rather than kick against his goad – a mortal against a god – I will sacrifice to him ...” (Euripides, *Bacch.* 794–795). “Wanting to be faithful to the old one, I have ruined my shoulder blades.... The fact is that it is folly to kick against the goad” (Terence, *Phorm.* 76–77). “Strike the goad with your fists, and it is your hands that will suffer” (Plautus, *Truc.* 768).

It is hardly credible that Christ would have quoted Euripides or any other classical author, especially since it is difficult to come up with a corresponding Aramaic form of the citation. So what we have is St. Luke using a traditional

metaphor to express how the Lord's order nipped in the bud any vague desire that Saul the Pharisee may have had to resist, which would have been both painful and futile. More than that, to be a *theomachos* (one who fights against God) would amount to criminal impiety.

λαμπρός, λαμπρότης, λαμπρῶς

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*lampros*, shining, brilliant, splendid; *lamprotēs*, brilliance, splendor, magnificence; *lamprōs*, brightly, brilliantly

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*lampros*, S 2986; TDNT 4.16–28; EDNT 2.339; NIDNTT 2.484, 486; MM 370; L&N 14.50, 79.20, 79.25; BAGD 465 | *lamprotes*, S 2987; EDNT 2.339; NIDNTT 2.484–486; MM 370; L&N 14.49; BAGD 466 | *lampros*, S 2988; EDNT 2.339; NIDNTT 2.484, 486; MM 370; L&N 88.255; BAGD 466

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These terms, derived from *lampō*, “shine, beam” (2 Cor 4:6), all express something like luminosity and brilliance. The Bible uses them especially for heavenly bodies: “The sun, the moon, and the stars that shine” (*onta lampra*, Ep Jer 60); “the wise shall shine like the brightness of the firmament” (*hōs hē lamprotēs tou stereōmatos*, Hebrew *zōhar*, Dan 12:3). “Around midday, O king, I saw on the road, shining around me and those who were with me, a heavenly light more brilliant than the light of the sun” (*hyper tēn lamprotēta tou hēliou*, Acts 26:13). The morning star is radiant (*ho astēr ho lampros ho prōinos*, Rev 22:16). The bright sun (*lampron hēlion*, Philo, *Dreams* 2.282; *Anth. Pal.* 9.450); “Noble souls have in them something royal, a certain brilliance (*to lampron*) that envious fate cannot dull” (Philo, *Good Man Free* 126); Judah became bright like the moon (*Ioudas egeneto lampros hōs hē selēnē*, *T. Naph.* 5.4). The epitaph of the silversmith Canopus: “My eyes have closed to the sun’s brilliant light.” “The bright parts of the moon separate and demarcate the dark parts” (Plutarch, *De fac.* 4 c; cf. 2).

The NT uses *lampros* above all with clothing. Herod dressed Jesus in a brilliant or splendid robe (*peribalōn esthēta lampran* Luke 23:11). The Peshitta translates “scarlet garments” (*zehôrîta*) and the Vulgate *indutum vesta alba*; but the text does not indicate the color, white or purple. It is a luxurious festal garment, befitting a king or a celestial being, like the angel who appeared to Cornelius “in shining raiment” (*en esthēti lampra*, Acts 10:30). The accent is on beauty, richness, and magnificence, as is the case in Jas 2:2–3 – “If a man wearing a gold ring on his finger and dressed in fine clothes (*en esthēti lampra*) comes into your assembly and also a poor man in ragged clothes (*en rhypara esthēti*, dirty and worn, in tatters), if you look with favor on the one wearing the

fine clothes (*ton phorounta tēn esthēta tēn lampran*) ...” The fine clothes indicate the high social rank of the one wearing them: wealthy, a person of consequence. Theophrastus also characterizes the vain “dressed in a splendid cloak (*pareскеuασμενος lampron himation*) and wearing a crown on his head, he appears in public.”

The substantive *ta lampra* refers to opulence and splendor, the adverb *lamprōs* to magnificence: “He was a rich man and he dressed in purple and in fine linen, feasting extravagantly every day”; *lamprōs* refers not only to the quantity and quality of the dishes, but also the setup and atmosphere of the feast, the dishes, the service, the music, etc.

Finally, *lamprotēs* refers to a glorious condition, a spiritual state, a shining quality. Thus reference is made to “the great glory and splendor of the Lord” (Bar 4:24), of the Lord’s magnificence (Ps 90:17, Hebrew *nōam*); “Glorious and unchanging is his wisdom” (Wis 6:12). There is also a “splendor of the saints” (Ps 90:3, Hebrew *hādār*; Bar 5:3); and, very prosaically, a *lampra kardia kai agathē* (Sir 30:25), referring to a person who has a good appetite.

The papyri show hardly any other meaning of *lampros* than “glorious repute” or “illustrious memory” (*tēs lampras mnēmēs*, *P.Michael.* 41.13; *Pap.Lugd.Bat.* I, 3, 2; *P.Mich.* 611, 3; *REG* 1940, p. 232, n. 189; 1955, p. 274, n. 243). From the second century on, this adjective is used with cities, generally in the superlative: Hermopolis (*C.P.Herm.* 22, 4; 52, 3; 53, 4; *P.Alex.* 37, 4; 565, 2), Tubis (*C.P.Herm.* 79, 2), Alexandria (*P.Alex.* 12, 2: *stratēgō tēs lamprotatēs poleōs tōn Alexandreōn*; *P.Oxy.* 3191, 2; 3245, 4; *P.Mich.* 606, 5; *SB* 10621, 2; *P.Oxy.* 2347, 8; *P.Princ.* 37, 2, 14; *IGLS* 821, 2), Lycopolis (*P.Princ.* 82, 2), Antinoite (*P.Oxy.* 2347, 4), Antinoopolis (*P.Ant.* 31, 3; 35, col. II, 2; 36, 5; 38, 2; 102, 4; *BGU* 1663, 6; *P.Köln* 52 and 53; *P.Cair.Isid.* 94, 2; *P.Mich.* 607, 5; *SB* 10568, 1), *hē lampra Lydōn Hermokapēleitōn polis* (a fourth-century millitary, J. and L. Robert, “Bulletin épigraphique,” in *REG*, 1960, p. 196, n. 358; cf. p. 179, n. 274: *tēs lamprotatēs Histrianōn poleōs*), Side (*ibid.*, 1951, p. 194, n. 219), Mesembria (*IGRom.* I, 769), Hermopolis (*BGU* 2133, 1; 2135, 3; *P.Tebt.* 335, 18), Termesson (*TAM* III, 80, 82, 942, 943), Sagalassi (*ibid.* 113), especially the very famous Oxyrhynchus (*P.Oxy.* 1678, 14; 3183, 2, 5; 3184, 5; 3187, 2; 3192, 6; 3195, 5; 3203, 5; 3246, 9; 3249, 19; 3254, 5; etc. Cf. *P.Coll. Youtie* II, pp. 486, 536, 541, 545, 550; *SB* 10289, 3; *P.Fuad I Univ.* 13, 2:40, 4; *P.Mich.* 612, 6), with the insistent *en tē lampra kai lamprotatē Oxyrynchitōn*. Often such designations go further: *etelesthē en tē lampra kai logimōtatē kai semnotatē Panopoleitōn polei* (*P.Oxy.* 2476, 17); *megalēs archias kai semnotatēs kai lamprotatēs* (*Pap.Lugd.Bat.* II, 2, 4; 6, 8; *P.Princ.* 38, 1).

*Clarissimus* (= Greek *lamprotatos*) is the title given VIPs, especially very high-ranking officials. For example, a petition is presented before “clarissimus Mamertinus” in AD 147 (*Pap.Lugd.Bat.* XVI, 33, 17). It is used for consuls, various *comites*, magistrates (*IGLS* 530, 4), prefects, the scholastic tax assessor (*ibid.* 734, 2; *P.Ant.* 104, 1), a *logothētēs* (*P.Stras.* 347, 1), the “imperial clerk (*singularis*) of the ducal office” (*SB* 7439, 9), the pretorian prefect (*Aeg.* 1972, p. 138, 1), benefactors who build sanctuaries (*IGLS* 297, 3; 1570, 2), an Alexandrian “corrector” (*Dittenberger, Or.* 711), synagogue rulers; but also for ancestors (*TAM* II, 838 f 5), and women: Isidora, *hē lamprotatē* (*P.Oxy.* 3169, 184), or Gellia Babbia *tēn lamprotatēn* (*SEG* XXII, 481); Theodosia (*P.Laur.* 26, 6; cf. 14, 19).

*Lamprotēs* is an everyday term of respect (*hē sē lamprotēs*) that is used even in private correspondence, like the steward of Lady Martyria: “Would your Splendor please send me a *congius* of Spanish oil ... if your Splendor agrees” (*P.Sorb.* 62, 1, 3). It is often reinforced with an adjective indicating authenticity (*tēn gnēsian hymōn lamprōtēta*, *P.Ness.* 75, 1), or affection (*hē hymetera adelphikē lamprotēs*, *SB* 7036, 1; *P.Alex.* 40, 1; *aspazomai tēn sēn lampran adelphotēta*, *C.P.Herm.* 45, 1). Even though all of these texts are later than the first century AD, they show that NT *lamprotēs* should be interpreted in the sense of lavishness and magnificence, the emphasis being on radiant splendor.

## λανθάνω

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*lanthanō*, to be hidden, unknown; to escape notice

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**lanthano**, S 2990; *EDNT* 2.339; MM 370; L&N 28.14, 28.83, 29.13; BDF §§149, 414(3), 435; BAGD 466

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Often synonymous with the passives of *kalyptō*, *kryptō*, and their compounds, the verb *lanthanō*, “be hidden, unknown, invisible,” is used with physical, intellectual, and even supernatural meanings: to draw near without being noticed, to pass unseen, to escape being seen.

Jesus, “going into the house, did not want anyone to know, but he could not remain hidden” (*ouk ēdynēthē lathein*, Mark 7:24; cf. Wis 10:8, *mēde lathein dynēthōsi*). Being hidden is the opposite of being discovered; being invisible is the opposite of being recognized; one is hidden from others’ eyes, like the sick woman in Luke 8:47 or the adulterous woman of Num 5:13, 27 (Hebrew *‘ālam*) who dissembles, and troops that hide from the enemy. The Bible uses this verb especially in the sense of not knowing about something. “The matter was



hidden from the eyes of the assembly” (Lev 4:13); “your good deed has not escaped my attention” (Tob 12:13); “Wisdom escaped every human, and it was hidden from the birds of the sky” (Job 28:21). St. Paul declares that King Agrippa is “not ignorant of these things, since they did not take place in a corner.” The emphasis can be on disclosure and publicity: “so that nothing may escape your attention” (*hina mēden sou tēn epimeleian lanthanē*, P.Oxy. 2228, 43); “for my servant is not unaware of these things” (*tauta gar ou lanthanei ton doulon mou*, P.Ryl. 629, 21); “lest you somehow escape the notice of the whole body” (*to sōm’ holon mē pou lathēis*, SEG VIII, 464, 35; Stud.Pal. XX, 54; col. II, 14; SB 8960, 16), but also on the error of appreciation. Or the emphasis can be on a mistaken valuation: one’s perception does not correspond to the hidden reality. Thus it is that “through hospitality, some have entertained angels without knowing it,” and that Croesus “after receiving the stranger into his home had without knowing it (*elathona*) fed his child’s murderer” (Herodotus 1.44).

*Lanthanō* is used concerning God’s omniscience, which misses nothing – *oudeis mē lathē* – and concerning the knowledge of faith. If the false teachers wish to ignore creation by a word of God (*lanthanei autous*, 2 Pet 3:5), there is one thing that does not escape the attention of believers (*mē lanthanatō hymas*), namely, that with the Lord one day is as a thousand years. Nothing is lacking in their religious knowledge.

λαός

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*laos*, **people, population, community, multitude**

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*laos*, S 2992; TDNT 4.29–57; EDNT 2.339–344; NIDNTT 2.795–801, 805; MM 370–371; L&N 11.1, 11.12, 11.55, 87.64; BDF §§44(1), 134(1), 262(3), 147(3); BAGD 466–467

There is hardly anything to add to Strathmann’s excellent article (TDNT, vol. 4, pp. 29–57), nor to the known connotations of this word, which is rare in the Koine outside the Bible: the “population” of a city (Gen 19:4), members of a tribe (Gen 49:16), like those of Hamor and Shechem, who intermarry “so that they may be one people” (*hōste einai laon hena*, Gen 34:22), inhabitants of a country (2 Kgs 16:15; Ezra 4:4; 10:2, 11; Neh 10:31) or an indigenous population, and above all the honorary and religious designation of Israel as the “people of God,” the community (Hebrew *‘ēdāh*) or assembly (*qāhāl*), who belong to Yahweh, keep his law, and worship him. The Christian community (*synagōgē*, *ekklēsia*) inherits this title, which from that point means the

assembly of those who believe in Christ, made up of people from every race and every tongue (Luke 1:17; Acts 15:14; 18:10), both Jewish and pagan (Rom 9:25; Eph 2:14). No text explicitly cancels this title for Israel; it is as if the church constitutes a new, faithful generation (succeeding a wicked and adulterous generation, Matt 12:39; Mark 8:38; Luke 11:29) in the *laos tou theou*, which is essentially characterized by God's call on the one hand and on the other by the consecration of its members and its assembly to the Lord.

We must insist on the quite commonplace meaning of *laos*, “crowd, multitude” – almost synonymous with *ochloi* or *anthrōpoi*, “people,” taking in individuals or referring to a collective whole (Philo, *Rewards* 125; *P.Petr.* 45, 3, 3) – and the legal and political sense in which “the people” expresses the idea of an organism, tied together by legal structures directed toward the common good. From that point, *laos* designates a group of people subject to a hierarchy, a distinct and inferior class, even the serfs attached to the land in Polybius 4.52.7. This usage is so widespread that in the papyri *laoi* is customarily translated “common folk, peasants.” But C. Vandersleyen, who cites twenty-six papyri, of which twenty-two are from before Christ, believes that the *laoi* constituted the superior stratum of the Egyptian population, the class that governed the country villages; they were only one part of the population, farmers, for example, as distinct from the mass of farm laborers. They undertake initiatives (*P.Lille* 16, 2 and 8) and enjoy not only a relative autonomy but also the confidence of the officials: “let the *laoi* and the other farmers estimate their produce” (*P.Rev.* 42, 11). Apollonios apologizes to this limited group for not being able to give them a personal audience; he will send a *chrēmatistēs* to meet them at Philadelphia (*P.Cair.Zen.* 59203, 3, 7, 17–17; cf. 59204, 5; 59292, 566, 650). They announce the time for beginning the harvest, they evaluate the harvest, they busy themselves with collecting taxes and they discuss them; they carry out public works (*PSI* 577, 23; *P.Petr.* II, p. 52; 15, 1 b; 13, 45, 3), excavations (*SB* 7179, 4), drainage projects (*P.Petr.* II, p. 14; 14, 11, 4). They are officials, hence an élite, hierarchically above the common folk, associated with the “village leaders.” C. Vandersleyen is right to translate *laoi* “noteworthy.”

This noble meaning is present in the phrases *Senatus Populusque Romanus* and *Majestas Populi Romani*. It is also the meaning of the title written on the banners in 1 QM 4.13: “On the large ensign at the head of all the people shall be written ‘People of God,’ the name of Israel and of Aaron, and the names of the twelve tribes of Israel.”

*leipō*, to fall short, be incomplete, lack

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*leipo*, S 3007; EDNT 2.347; NIDNTT 3.247–248, 251, 253; MM 372; L&N 57.43, 57.44, 71.33; BDF §§75, 101, 180(4), 189(3), 393(4); BAGD 470

The *Suda* offers the definition *leipesthai*: *hēttēsthai*; in the papyri, this verb is often used in accounting for a deficit, a negative balance; in the NT, it always has the sense “to be wanting, insufficient, incomplete.”

When active and intransitive, it is synonymous with *hystereō* and indicates a lack. To the wealthy and virtuous young man, Jesus said, *eti hen soi leipei*, exactly like Epictetus: “You came to me not long ago as a man in need of nothing (*hōs mēdenos deomenos*). And what could you even imagine needing (*hōs endeontos*)? ... Caesar knows you, you have many friends at Rome, you fulfill your obligations, you know how to oblige in turn one who obliges you.... What are you lacking (*ti soi leipei*)?” (2.14.19).

The passive is used in the NT only by St. James, either with the genitive of the thing lacking or with *en* and the dative: “... so that you may be perfect and complete, lacking nothing (*en mēdeni leipomenoi*). If anyone among you lacks wisdom (*ei de tis hymōn leipetai sophias*), let him ask God.” The combination of *teleios* (the adult, one who has achieved maturity, as opposed to a *nēpios*, 1 Cor 2:6; Col 1:28) and *holoklēros* (complete in all parts, whole, intact, cf. Acts 3:16) has the force of a superlative, to which the negative adjunct – in Hebrew gnomic style – adds nothing: the absence of any deficiency is already included in the idea of its perfection (the perfect being that from which nothing is lacking). This deficiency or shortcoming can be minimal or serious, like that of Christians who “are naked and lack daily food” (*gymnoi hyparchōsin kai leipomenoi tēs ephēmerou trophēs*); the latter detail serves to indicate the urgent need for help, which Christians must provide for their brothers and sisters in the faith (Gal 6:10). The choice of the passive *leipomai* conveys the idea that these poor folk have been left behind, as it were, by their brothers; the expression is from the vocabulary of the racetrack, where an athlete is “passed by” by his fellow runners, but it is also used for other competitions, for example, a musicians’ contest at Messina (*liptheis ton biotou stephanon*) or for the “defeat” before a tribunal of a litigant who has no means of defense or who is overwhelmed by the testimony. In a way this is the situation of Menelaus, who “seeing that he was already defeated (*ēdē de leleimmenos*) promised large sums to Ptolemy, the son of Dorymenes, to win the king over.”

St. Paul left Titus in Crete “to finish organizing what remains (to be set in order).” The present participle of *leipō* clearly has here the sense of incompleteness, something that constitutes a lack or is insufficient. Similarly,

Combalos asked “to go finish what remained to be built, for he had left the temple incomplete” (Lucian, *Syr. D.* 26). Since the churches provide for the needs of itinerant preachers, giving them food, funds, means of transportation, information on routes, etc., the apostle concludes: “Take good care of Zenas the lawyer and Apollos, so that they may lack nothing” (*hina mēden autois leipē*, Titus 3:13).

λειτουργέω, λειτουργία, λειτουργικός, λειτουργός

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*leitourgeō*, **to perform official service for a civic or religious community**;  
*leitourgia*, **civic or religious (priestly) service**; *leitourgos*, **serving, ministering**; *leitourgos*, **official, minister**

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*leitourgeo*, S 3008; TDNT 4.215–229; EDNT 2.347–349; NIDNTT 1.551–553; MM 372–373; L&N 35.22, 53.13; BAGD 470–471 | *leitourgia*, S 3009; TDNT 4.215–229; EDNT 2.347–349; NIDNTT 3.551–553; MM 373; L&N 35.22, 35.25, 53.13; BAGD 471 | *leitourgos*, S 3010; TDNT 4.231; EDNT 2.347–349; NIDNTT 3.551–552; MM 373; L&N 35.24; BAGD 471 | *leitourgos*, S 3011; TDNT 4.229–231; EDNT 2.347–349; NIDNTT 3.551–553; MM 373; L&N 35.23; BDF §27; BAGD 471

Whatever their semantic evolution, these terms retain their etymological significance: *leitourgos* = *lēitos* (Ionian, “public, relating to the people”) + *ergon* (“work”). Sometimes the emphasis is on the work and its toilsome nature, sometimes on its official and somewhat statist character; the denominative verb *leitourgeō* means “carry out a service” and the *leitourgia* in the inscriptions and the papyri are duties or functions:

(1) Originally the verb *leitourgeō* was used for the execution of a voluntary service for the state; people would of their own volition undertake a patriotic or public project.

(2) Later, it was used for services that the state imposed on citizens who were specially qualified by virtue of their intelligence or wealth. “The use of compulsory service, based on *leitourgia*, was built into an institution in Egypt under Roman rule.” The burden was so heavy that a number of those who were liable for service took flight (BGU 372; *P. Oslo* 79) or submitted multiple petitions to trade assignments or be exempted. No matter how much the *stratēgos* promised to apportion public duties fairly, certain persons were nevertheless shielded from any obligation while others had several *leitourgiai* imposed on them.

(3) *Leitourgeō* came to mean any kind of service, whether that of a worker for his master (Aristotle, *Pol.* 3.5.1278); of tailors (*P.Cair.Zen.* 59477, 13: *hoson an chronon leitourgōmen soi*, “for whatever length of time we work for you”); for an actor’s role (Epictetus 1.2.12); for a peasant who works in another’s place (*P.Oxy.* 1067, 19); for musicians (*P.Oxy.* 731, 4; AD 8–9; 1275, 12; *P.Corn.* 9, 5; *Pap.Lugd.Bat.* VI, 54, 10); for dancers (*P.Grenf.* II, 67, 6; *P.Oxy.* 475, 18); and even for prostitutes. In the LXX, the Hebrew *‘ehed* is taken to mean “slave” and *hōdāh* “service” or “work,” as opposed to inaction: *corvée*. The Hebrew verb *‘āhad* is translated by *leitourgeō* as well as by *ergazomai* and *douleuō*.

(4) At least since Aristotle, and frequently in the papyri, these terms have a religious meaning: “Thaues and Taous, the twins, who serve in the great temple of Sarapis at Memphis.” This in the most common significance of these words in the LXX, which gives them sacerdotal connotations having to do with the priests and Levites who officiate at or carry out the worship services in the sanctuary: *pas ho leitourgōn en tē skēnē tou martyriou*. In Isa 66:6, the *leitourgoi* are in parallel with the *hiereis*: “You shall be called priests of Yahweh, officiants of God” (*leitourgoi theou*; cf. Joel 1:9, 13; 2:17).

These various meanings are found also in the NT:

(1) Service rendered by one person to another: to help one’s neighbor is a *leitourgia*. Thus Epaphroditus was delegated by the Philippians to see to Paul’s needs (*hymōn de apostolon kai leitourgon tēs chreias mou*); he carries out a friendly or brotherly “office.” The collection for the saints of Jerusalem is an obligation, a debt of gratitude that the pagan converts cannot shirk, even while its performance is voluntary: “If the Gentiles have shared in their spiritual goods, they should in turn help with their temporal goods” (Rom 15:27). The reference to monetary contributions places this text in agreement with secular usage (cf. *P.Oxy.* 2924 and 2941, the *leitourgōs* responsible for distributing wheat or bread). But this same collection has religious connotations in 2 Cor 9:12: “the ministration of this holy service” will bring thanksgiving to God.

(2) In calling imperial officials (*archontes*, Rom 13:3) *leitourgoi theou*, in a sense ministers who are appointed by God and who apply themselves to carrying out their responsibilities well (verse 6) in order to promote good order and assure the well-being of the people, St. Paul uses the word *leitourgōs* in the sense found in the papyri: municipal officials, functionaries responsible for a particular area. It is an obligation that is imposed, and financial responsibilities go along with it (verse 7).

(3) In the religious sense, the angels are ministers of God in the service of the elect, that is, they are spiritual beings who carry out public functions under the authority of a sovereign. They do not act on their own initiative. They are

under the orders of the Lord, who constantly sends them out to serve. Just as Athens and the other cities send their *leitourgoi* to represent the city on diplomatic missions, God sends Paul as a minister of Christ Jesus to the Gentiles (Rom 15:16). His job is to be a *leitourgos*, which in itself implies no cultic functions; but he goes on to say “for the *hierourgia* of the gospel,” so his is in fact a sacred ministry and, more than that, a priestly function. Paul’s whole apostolate is conceived as a *leitourgia*, since he accepts the shedding of his blood as a libation “for the sacrifice and oblation of the faith” of the Christians (*epi tē thysia kai leitourgia tēs pisteōs hymōn*, Phil 2:17). It is generally agreed that “of your faith” is a genitive of explication and that *leitourgia* describes the sacrifice, emphasizing its public character and the ritual value of the offering, analogous to that of the temple. The sacrifice offered is faith itself, extending to take in all the moral activity that it enjoins (1 Thess 1:3; 2 Thess 1:11), which constitutes a new and spiritual worship, a pleasing fragrance to God (Phil 4:8; 2 Cor 2:14–17; Rom 12:1). Thus the Christian life is a sacrificial offering or a liturgical sacrifice.

(4) All the other NT texts have a priestly meaning. “When the days of his ministry (*hai hēmerai tēs leitourgias autou*) were accomplished, Zechariah returned to his house” (Luke 1:23). At Antioch, the prophets and teachers hold a worship service (literally, “doing service to the Lord,” *leitourgountōn de autōn tō Kyriō*) and appoint Paul and Barnabas as missionaries. Ministers stood (Deut 10:8; 17:12; 18:7), and Heb 10:11 says, “Every priest stands each day and performs his religious functions (*leitourgōn*), often repeating the same sacrifices.”

Heb 8:2, having described the resurrected Christ as the heavenly high priest, calls him “*leitourgos* of the sanctuary and of the true tabernacle prepared by the Lord, not by a human.” *Tōn hagiōn leitourgos* is the priest in charge of the sanctuary, the one who presides at worship there. A double nuance must be retained. On the one hand, this minister is active, since the *leitourgos* is a worker; thus his intercession to God is constant. On the other hand, since it is emphasized that this tabernacle is pitched not by any human but by God, the accent falls on the absolute nature of Christ’s accomplishment: in carrying out his priestly duty, he obeys the will of God. This faithfulness is indispensable for a mediator (Heb 8:6), since it assures him of a hearing with God. These two latter texts offer the assurance that he carries out a priestly function in heaven, a much more efficacious ministry than that of the old covenant. Obviously, Hebrews borrows the word *leitourgos* from the vocabulary of the LXX and retains its religious and specifically sacerdotal meaning, but for Greek ears this word evokes an official function carried out by a person who has been put in charge on behalf of a group. Thus it would be plain that the exercise of the

heavenly liturgy is something other than a sinecure. The title of heavenly high priest is not some sort of honorific title for the heavenly Christ; it is the appropriate description for the *archēgos* who is always interceding for the salvation of humans (Heb 2:10).

λεπίς

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*lepis*, **peel, shell, strip, sheet, scale, scab**

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*lepis*, S 3013; TDNT 4.232–233; EDNT 2.349; MM 374; L&N 8.57; BAGD 471

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As we would expect from the meaning of the verb *lepō* – “to peel, strip, or bark” – *lepis* refers to “any covering that one peels off or breaks,” whether skin, hull, or shell; but it can also be a metal strip, a plaque used as a facing, like that with which the altar was covered. This is the meaning that constantly recurs in the papyri: “metal plates and nails for the wagons” (*lepidas kai hēlous tais hamaxais*, *P.Cair.Zen.* 59782 a 68); iron plates (*lepidas sidēras kistas*, *BGU* 544, 8); a silver plate (*eis lepida argyran auto to onoma grammatōn* ρ’). In the sixth century, a double measure of wine is given to Makarios, a maker of nails, for putting a veneer on a boat.

But in Aristotle: “what feathers are to a bird, scales are to a fish” (*HA* 1.1.486). Similarly, five of the six occurrences of *lepis* in the LXX refer to fish scales: “All that has fins and scales and lives in the water, whether in the sea or in the river, you may eat. But that which has neither fin nor scale (Hebrew *qasqeset*) will be for you an abomination” (Lev 11:9–10; Deut 14:9–10).

None of these meanings fits in the account of instantaneous healing of Saul’s temporary blindness when Ananias laid hands on him: “Something like scales (*hōs lepides*) fell from his eyes and he regained his sight” (Acts 9:18). This sense of *lepis* – scale or scab on an injury – is peculiar to the medical writers. It is not surprising to find this word coming from the pen of Doctor Luke, who perhaps had in mind the father of Tobias: “When his eyes began to hurt, he rubbed them, and the white films scaled off from the corners of his eyes” (*kai elepisthē apo tōn kanthōn tōn ophthalmōn autou ta leukōmata*, Tob 11:12).

ληρος

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*lēros*, **delirium, babbling**

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This noun, practically unknown in the papyri, is a technical term in the medical vocabulary for the delirium caused by a fever, especially in the clinical observations of Hippocrates: Python, “first day; acute fever, delirious” (*pyretos oxyis*, *lēros*, Hippocrates, *3 Epid.* 1.1; first patient); Chaerion, “fifth day, generally worse, delirious” (*panta parōxyntē, lēros*, *ibid.* 1.2; fifth patient); Herophon, “sixth day, raving,” etc. This meaning seems too strong as a description of the remarks of the holy women to the effect that they had found the tomb empty on Easter morning. According to Luke 24:11, their words appeared to the apostles to be *hōsei lēros*, “drivel, and they did not believe them.” Here the word is understood in its sense from familiar, sarcastic conversation. A good example is supplied by Aristophanes, who, having compared tragedy to a woman (*Ran.* 95, 939ff.), declares “what before you was tragic trumpery” (1005), playing on the two senses of the word *lēros*: prattle, and baubles or trinkets, women’s cheap jewelry. Similarly Menander: “Sostratus, see how embarrassed I am before these women – You are babbling” (*Dysk.* 872). Antiochus to Eleazar, when the latter refuses to eat pork: “Will you not wake up from the foolishness (*apo tou phlyarou*) that your philosophy produces? Will you not abandon your ravings (*ton lēron*)?” (4 Macc 5:11). Philo describes the mythological tales of paganism as empty babbling (*mythikon lēron*, *Post. Cain* 165; *Prelim. Stud.* 62); and Josephus: “If these words are nothing more than the vain babbling (*lēros*) of someone who is trying to turn aside the storm that he has stirred up” (*War* 3.405).

## ληστής

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*lēstēs*, **brigand, bandit**

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*lestes*, S 3027; *TDNT* 4.257–262; *EDNT* 2.351–352; *NIDNTT* 3.377–379; MM 375; L&N 39.37, 57.240; BDF §27; BAGD 473

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Derived from *leis* (“plunder”; cf. *lēizomai*, “carry off as plunder”), *lēstēs* should not be considered to be synonymous with *kleptēs*, as is shown by the fact that many texts use both terms together as designating distinct categories of malefactors. A *kleptēs* is simply a thief who contrives to appropriate another’s property, like Judas (John 12:6), working by night when possible (Matt 24:43; Josephus, *War* 4.402). A *lēstēs* is a brigand who uses violence (cf. *harpax*), carries out armed theft and pillage (cf. Plutarch, *De superst.* 3: “the one who



guards his house does not fear *lēstai*,” *ou phobeitai lēstas ho oikourōn*), like Barabbas, a *lēstēs* according to John 18:40, who according to Luke 23:19 “had been thrown in prison for an uprising in the city and for murder” (*kai phonon*); cf. Mark 15:17. That *lēstai* are also murderers is attested by Ezek 22:9, where these brigands “shed blood.” So what is the biblical conception of the *lēstēs*?

Thieves and brigands are often described as bold (*tis tōn lēstōn, ho tolmērotatos*, Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 5.25.1), courageous (*tōn lēstōn tous andreiotatous*, Josephus, *Life* 77), strong (*hoi ischyontes*), taking what they want (Ep Jer 57), despite doors, locks, and bolts (verse 17). Their shrewdness (Jer 18:22 – they dig a pit, they set traps) and their rapacity, which keeps up with their greed, are such that they carry off more than they need (Obad 5), they ransack everything (Hebrew *šāḏaḏ*), and the havoc they wreak is like that due to war (Ep Jer 13; cf. Philo, *Good Man Free* 37: *ē kata lēsteias ... ē kata polemon*; Dio Cassius 55.28.3: “The Isaurians then by their brigandage started a war that became quite serious”; Josephus, *War* 2.65: “These men filled all Judea with a veritable brigands’ war,” *lēstrikou polemou*). But while the simple *kleptēs* sneaks into a house, the *lēstēs* or highwayman waits *en tē hodō*.

*Lēstai* came primarily from among runaway slaves, bankrupt peasants, and military deserters and made up an armed band (Hebrew *gdūd*), which is precisely a characteristic of brigandage, and that is why *lēstai* are so often mentioned in the plural), notably in the parable of the Good Samaritan, where the man who was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho “fell into the hands of brigands who robbed and beat him, then went on their way, leaving him half dead.” They attack people but also raid flocks (for numerous examples see *m. B. Qam.* 6.1 *et passim*) often enough that they are particularly feared by shepherds (*m. Pe’a* 2.7; Josephus, *Ant.* 16.272) and are compared to ferocious beasts (*thēriōdous*, in an edict of Agrippa I [or II]; *Dittenberger, Or.* 424, 2). It is known that these *lēstai* hid in caves or grottos (*spēlaion*), which are plentiful in the hills of Judea and which served as repositories for booty and as refuges. The Lord alluded to this when he combined Isa 56:7 and Jer 7:11 (Hebrew *pārīš*): “It is written, ‘My house shall be called a house of prayer,’ and you have made it a brigands’ cave” (Matt 21:13; cf. Mark 11:17; Luke 19:46).

It would appear that brigandage reached epidemic proportions in Syria-Palestine; but it wreaked havoc throughout the ancient world, whether in Egypt, where certain police officers (*lēstopiastai*) were given the specific duty of putting down banditry and everyone was expected to cooperate in the effort. In Asia Minor, brigandage was never eliminated; not only were the mountainous regions particularly conducive to it, but its coastline provided choice sites for piracy, “brigandage at sea”; so much so that Seneca could write: “If anyone has not fallen into the hands of pirates, it is because they have been spared by

shipwreck” (Seneca, *Ben.* 6.9.2). Italy’s lot was no better, nor was Spain’s. In these circumstances, we can understand that not only does romanesque literature constantly have brigands interrupting its heroes’ wanderings, but all the writers point out the dangers that these highwaymen pose for travelers. In the first century AD, any major trip was a dangerous adventure. So it is neither a mere figure of speech nor an exaggeration when the apostle, referring to his missionary activity, mentions “long trips, often on foot, in danger from floods, in danger from brigands” (*kindynois lēstōn*, 2 Cor 11:26); these dangers must be understood in terms of the references given above.

Of course, such a plague, “the scourge of piracy,” had to be combatted not only by the people who were attacked – it was permitted to kill a thief who was caught in the act – but especially by the duly constituted authorities, either by the arrest and trial of bandits or by punitive expeditions. In Judea, the emperor, the procurators, and notably Herod took the initiative in this repression. We can understand what an insult it was to the Lord when they came to arrest him like a common criminal: “You have set out to capture me as if I were a brigand (*hōs epi lēstēn*), with swords and clubs.”

At Rome, brigands fell within the scope of the *lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficiis* (Paulus, *Sent.* 23.1) and later were condemned to be killed by beasts or crucified. In Palestine in the first century, “a day did not pass that Festus did not put many *lēstai* to death” (Josephus, *Ant.* 20.161; cf. 20.168); the leaders of bands, like Tholomaïos and Menahem, were executed (20.5; *Life* 21). This is why two *lēstai* were crucified at Calvary. The evangelists’ phrase “with Jesus” (*syn autō*) emphasizes the infamy of the treatment inflicted on the Lord and suggests that Pilate also wanted to impress the people with his disdain for a Jewish messiah, a revolutionary: since he claims to be the Christ, he is a king of bandits.

λίθοι ζῶντες

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*lithoi zōntes*, **living stones**

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*lithoi zontes*, S 3037, 2198; TDNT 4.270–271; EDNT 2.352–353; NIDNTT 3.393; L&N 2.23; BAGD 472(2)

Nothing is more normal than for stones to be called large (Matt 27:60), beautiful (Luke 21:5), or precious (1 Cor 3:12; Rev 17:4; 18:12, 16; 21:11, 19), but it is odd that they could be living, given that stone is so inert that it is used as a symbol of death; to be petrified is to remain motionless (Isa 50:7). Still, stone is also, and perhaps preeminently, a symbol of firmness, solidity, and

immutability, and in NT usage the metaphor and its meaning are expressed simultaneously to the point that the latter wins out over the former. Furthermore, the idea of life is not contradictory to that of stone. After all, “God can raise up children for Abraham from stones” (Matt 3:9; Luke 3:8; a pun on the Hebrew *ḥānîm*, “stones,” and *hahānîm*, “children”); and if the disciples are silent, the stones will begin to cry out (Luke 19:40; cf. 4 Ezra 5:5).

Now Simon bar-Jona, who received from the Lord the unusual nickname *Lithos*, reflected on its meaning and elaborated a “theology of stone”: “As you draw near to him, the living stone (*lithon zōnta*) rejected by men, but with God chosen, precious ... you yourselves, like living stones (*hōs lithoi zōntes*), be built into a spiritual house.... See, I am putting in Zion a choice stone, a cornerstone, precious.... This stone that the builders rejected has become the head of the corner and a stone of stumbling” (1 Pet 2:4–8). Christ is like a stone of great price chosen by God to become the “cornerstone” of the church-temple that he will build (John 2:19; Eph 2:20–22) and which will therefore not be built by human hands (Mark 14:58; Acts 7:49). To the contrary (*men ... de*), the builders scorned and rejected this stone, and it became an occasion for falling, a “stone of stumbling” for unbelievers (*hōs lithou proskommati*, Isa 8:14; Rom 9:32–33).

Since believers are “transformed in the same image” as their Lord (2 Cor 3:18), it is natural for them to take the form of “living stones” so as to be built into the same structure. Since the turn of phrase is unusual, St. Peter softens it with *hōs*: *like* or *as* stones. No doubt he borrowed the idea from the Latin language, in which a stone is considered to be “living” if it has not yet been cut out of the mountain, “the mother country of rocks” (Ovid, *Met.* 7.204), “a living rock still held in the earth by its roots” (ibid. 14.713), still lodged in its natural abode. In this sense, the repetition “living stone – living stones” would imply that Christians, far from being added to Christ like heterogeneous elements in the building of the church, share in the same nature and in its value for building, since they remain forever an integral part of it (cf. Deut 32:18; Isa 51:1). This nuance does not exclude the idea of growth, which is demanded by the context, so the image is that of the ongoing concretion of these living stones.

λιθόστρωτος

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*lithostrōtos*, **pavement**

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*lithostrotos*, S 3038; EDNT 2.353; MM 376; L&N 7.71; BAGD 474

“Pilate sat down in judgment at the place called *Lithostrōtos*, in Hebrew Gabbatha.” Etymologically, *lithostrōtos* is “[a place] paved with stone.” The word is attested by four papyri from the third-fourth century, always as an adjective: the Sosias bank is to the south of the Colonnade, on the paved avenue (*epi tou lithostrōtou dromou*, *P.Oxy.* 2138, 15); on the paved avenue of the god Hermes Trismegalos (*epi tou lithostrōtou dromou Hermou theou trismegalou*, *P.Flor.* 50, 97). By correcting the text slightly, H. Schmitz (*The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, vol. 17, p. 256) brings a reading from another papyrus into conformity with this: *pros tō lithostrōtō dromō Hermou theou trismeg* (*P.Amh.* 98, 2). There is also a mutilated administrative letter from Hermopolis, *epi tou lithostrōtou* (*P.Stras.* 138, 7; republished in *SB* 8020).

As a noun, *lithostratos* commonly means the pavement of the temple, and in John 19:13 it is a proper place-name. At Delos, the dedication of a pavement in the first century: *Poplios Plōtios Leukiou Rhōmaios to lithostrōton*. A century later, at Kourion, when J. Seppius Celer was consul, Trajan built or extended a *lithostrōtos*, a paved route, to the propylaeum leading to the Paphian Way.

## λικμάω

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*likmaō*, **to winnow, shake, scatter, pulverize, destroy**

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***likmao***, S 3039; *TDNT* 4.280–281; *EDNT* 2.353; MM 376; L&N 19.47; BAGD 474

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After quoting Ps 118:22 (“The stone that the builders rejected is become the head of the corner” – Luke 20:17), Jesus adds this comment: “Whoever falls on this stone will be shattered, and the one on whom it falls will be broken to pieces” (*eph’ ho d’ an pesē likmēsei auton*, verse 18). At least this is the translation suggested by the context for the NT hapax *likmaō*. But in secular texts this denominative verb, formed from *likmos*, “winnowing basket,” means “to winnow,” *likmēsis* is the winnowing, the *likmētēs* is the winnower (*P.Phil.* 17, 10 and 23; cf. *likmainontes andres*, *Ostr. Tait-Préaux* 1723, 8; second century), and there is a winnowing tax (*likmētra*, *P.Oslo* 33, 15, AD 29; *SB* 7373).

In the LXX there is another meaning, derived from the one just discussed: first “shake” (“I will shake the house of Israel, as one shakes with a sieve” – Amos 9:9, Hebrew *nūa* ), then “carry off, scatter to the wind.” The wicked person, carried off as if by a gale, becomes a wanderer, “the wind will chase him away from his place” (Job 27:21; Hebrew *śā’ar*, in the piel); “the nations are dispersed like dust before the wind” (Isa 17:13); “I will scatter them to the

winds” (Jer 49:32; Hebrew *zārâh*, in the piel); “They will destroy the ramparts of Tyre and demolish its towers; I will sweep away her dust” (Ezek 26:4; Hebrew *sāḥâh*, in the piel). Still with an agricultural connection, Isa 30:24 prophesies: “Your oxen and asses will eat fodder spread out with the shovel and the fork” (Hebrew *mizreh*). So we get to the well established meaning of *likmaō* as “scatter, disseminate,” which is used predominantly with the technical sense of divine punishment: “I will scatter the Egyptians (*diasperō*) and disperse them (*likmēsō autous*)” (Ezek 29:12; repeated in 30:23, 26); “I scattered them (*diespeira*) and they were dispersed (*elikmēsa*)” (36:19). To punish Israel’s sins, Yahweh “will disperse them beyond the River” (1 Kgs 14:15; cf. Isa 30:22; Wis 11:20). Hence the axiom of divine justice: “The one who dispersed Israel will gather him together again” (*ho likmēsas ... synaxeî auton*, Jer 31:10).

There is a transition from the idea of winnowing to that of sorting, culling; then chase away, scatter, reduce to dust, and finally destroy or crush. The best parallel to Luke 20:18 is Dan 2:44 (Theodotion’s version): “He will pulverize and break up all these kingdoms” (*leptynei kai likmēsei pasas tas basileias*).

## λόγιος

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*logios*, **eloquent, articulate, learned, eminent**

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***logios***, S 3052; TDNT 4.136–137; EDNT 2.356; NIDNTT 3.1081, 1106, 1117; MM 378; L&N 27.20, 33.32; BAGD 476

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A Jew of Alexandrian origin, Apollos was upon his arrival at Ephesus introduced as an *anēr logios* (Acts 18:24; biblical hapax). This is a term of honor that was current in the first century BC, but it is not easy to translate, because it can refer to rather varied qualities.

(a) The most widespread meaning of *logios* would seem to be “eloquent, articulate, speaking well.” “Eloquent men tend to make long expositions and long speeches” (Philo, *Post. Cain* 53); “Does not a slight sickness suffice to paralyse the tongue, to stitch shut the mouth of seasoned orators?” (*tōn pany logiōn*, *Cherub.* 116). “You are the most unjust of men not to be grateful at all when, mute that you were, I made you eloquent” (*logios men ex aphōnou*). Plutarch associates *hoi logiōtatoi kai kalliphōnotatoi* (“having the best voices,” *De sol. an.* 973 a; cf. *Con. praec.* 17: *hoi philologoi logious*). “I myself might justly rebuke those eloquent Greeks ... who sit in judgment and revile” (Josephus, *War* 1.13). “Timothy remembered Philopappos and Maximus Statilius ... those most eloquent and very dear men.” If the gods who preside over arts and letters are *theoi logioi*, Hermes is the one for whom this epithet is

most suitable: “Hermes passed for the most eloquent of the gods” (Lucian, *Gall.* 2; cf. *Pseudol.* 24). Beginning in the fifth century, and especially with Justinian, it is the normal description for a lawyer, and especially for the *defensor civitatis*, corresponding to the Latin *eloquentissimus*: *tō logiōtatō ekdikō Hērakleous poleōs*. Lawyers are usually addressed *logiōtate ekdike kyrie* (*P.Oxy.* 902, 18; 1885, 17; *P.Flor.* 377, 18) or *lamprotate ekdike, logiōtate kyrie* (*P.Oxy.* 1883, 10). This sense of the word – mastery of the art of oratory – would be quite suitable for Apollos, who is fairly bubbling with enthusiasm and fervor (*zeōn tō pneumatī elalei*, Acts 18:25), preaching with *parrēsia* (boldness, verse 26), with contagious assurance and conviction, which won him such prestige in the community at Corinth (1 Cor 1:12; 3:4–6, 22; 4:6; 16:12).

(b) Eloquence often goes along with erudition, and *logios* also means “learned, scholarly, well-read.” “There were more sensible and learned youths than he (Tiberius) in his day” (Philo, *To Gaius* 142). “Learned people (*hoi logioi*) thought that the security of the temple was dissolving by itself” (Josephus, *War* 6.295). Plutarch: *tous sophous kai logious* (*De prim. frigid.* 955 d); “the most learned of the Romans” (*Num.* 12.2), “the most learned of the Delphians” (*De def. or.* 42); “Aristotle, the most learned of the philosophers” (*Alex.* 7.2); “She does not refuse to converse with the learned” (Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 2.33.7; cf. 3.19.3). Since Phrynichus notes that the ancients called *logios* a person who knew the costume of each people and could thus make them known (ed. Lobeck, p. 198), this term can be given the nuance “informed” or “competent,” like Diodorus Siculus, according to Eusebius (*Praep. Evang.* 1.6.9). Thus well-informed writers tell about marvellous cures effected by Sarapis (Strabo 17.1.7); “we have received a very old tradition handed down by well-informed men from all of Greece” (Philo, *To Gaius* 237); “These truths were already known among the most illustrious learned ancients” (*Post. Cain* 162); “Judas the son of Sariphaeus and Matthias the son of Margalothus, the most learned of the Jews and peerless interpreters of their ancestral laws” (Josephus, *Ant.* 17.149); “the most learned (*hoi logiōtatoi*) of the natives retell a myth” (Diodorus Siculus 2.4.3; cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus 5.17.3; 6.1.2). The adjective is applied especially to the Egyptians who passed on to the historians their knowledge of their ancient traditions: “The account that I had from the most learned high priests of this learned land of Egypt.” So *logios* could be translated “expert,” as with Hippodamus of Miletus, who “professed to be an expert (*logios boulomenos*) about all of nature” (Aristotle, *Pol.* 2.8.1.1267), the Etruscan *haruspices* (*hoi logioi*) in interpreting dreams (Plutarch, *Sull.* 7.7; cf. *De def. or.* 433 d: *hoi logiōtatoi Delphōn*), Akesinos the expert physician (*iatros logios*, Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 4.7.4). Applied to Apollos, this meaning of the word is particularly felicitous, since he was “powerful in

the Scriptures ... and taught accurately about Jesus” (Acts 18:24–25). Thus he passed on a tradition concerning which he was perfectly informed, and he had a complete mastery of the Holy Scriptures. He was a scholar who could communicate his convictions energetically.

(c) Finally, *logios* is a title of honor, and this nuance is not to be ruled out in Acts 18:24, where we could take *anēr logios* to mean an “eminent or quite distinguished man.” Thus in the third century, *huios logios* means “noble son” (*P.Oxy.* 2476, 4). “To His Magnificence the archon and his very distinguished colleague” (*kai tō logiōtatō autou symponō*, 1919, 2; seventh century); *archontos Pyrrakou tou logiou*. “Timothy was remembered ... by his very distinguished and very dear friends” (*emnēsthē ... tōn logiōtatōn kai philtatōn*, *Dittenberger, Or.* 408). This nuance of affection and admiration is probably involved in the use of the term by St. Luke, who was clearly impressed by the prestigious young Alexandrian academician.

λοιδορέω, λοιδορία, λοίδορος

*loidoreō*, to insult; *loidoria*, insult; *loidoros*, insulter

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*loidoreo*, S 3058; *TDNT* 4.293–294; *EDNT* 2.359; *NIDNTT* 3.346–347; *MM* 380; *L&N* 33.393; *BDF* §§152(1), 420(2); *BAGD* 479 | *loidoria*, S 3059; *TDNT* 4.293–294; *EDNT* 2.360; *NIDNTT* 3.346; *MM* 380; *L&N* 33.393; *BAGD* 479 | *loidoros*, S 3060; *TDNT* 4.293–294; *EDNT* 2.360; *NIDNTT* 3.346–347; *MM* 380; *L&N* 33.395; *BAGD* 479

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The meaning of these terms evolved within biblical Greek, even though a number of usages have parallels in the secular language. In the LXX, they are used especially to translate the Hebrew *rîḥ*, “to quarrel,” and in the Pentateuch often refer to the dispute of Meribah. This is also the meaning of these terms in the Wisdom writings, with respect to the quarrelsome woman (Prov 25:24; 27:15; Hebrew *māḏōn*) and the quarrelsome man (26:21), and it is specified that “it is an honor for a man to refrain from dispute” (20:3). The sense becomes more pejorative in Prov 10:18 – “insult,” Hebrew *dibâh* – and in Ben Sirach (22:24; 27:21), where insults go together with curses (29:6) and the insulter with the proud (23:8). Finally, the coarsest insults go together with blasphemies (2 Macc 12:14) and are the expression of hatred (Josephus, *Ant.* 17.37).

In the NT, the Pharisees abuse the man born blind (John 9:28), and when St. Paul called the high priest a white-washed wall, he was accused of insulting him (Acts 23:4); *loidoria* is thus a form of *hybris*. Words lead to blows; insults provoke fights, and blood flows. Christ was subjected to insults and blows, and

Christian slaves are urged to imitate his determined silence: “Abused, he did not abuse in return.” The apostles give an example: they do not fail to reply with patience and forgiveness, and all Christians should likewise refrain from returning harm for harm (1 Pet 3:9), blessing those who curse them (Luke 6:28; Rom 12:14). The Lord abolishes the *lex talionis* (Matt 5:38–39), replacing it with the response of love.

This is not without merit, for every insult is an offense against one’s honor, especially since it is often accompanied by scornful mocking. But St. Paul does not tolerate any concession, but places the mocker between the idolator and the drunkard as being unworthy to be called a brother (1 Cor 5:11) and excluded from the kingdom of God (6:10). This severity is astonishing. We must remember, however, that the entire Bible similarly denounces sins of speech and that “most people enjoy listening to insults” (Josephus, *Ag. Apion* 2.4). People insulted each other for the most trifling reasons. There were even “insult duels” (Philo, *Husbandry* 110; Stobaeus, *Flor.* 19.4; vol. 3, p. 530). Common folk went at it no holds barred. Epictetus presents the man who, at the theater, took sides in an improper way: “So why did they insult you? Because everyone detests whatever hampers him. They wanted to give the wreath to someone, you preferred someone else. They were hampering you and you them. You turned out to be stronger. They did what they could – insulted the one who hampered them.... Don’t farmers revile Zeus when he hampers them? Don’t soldiers revile him? Is Caesar not reviled endlessly ...?” (3.4.6–7).

If the texts that are hardest on *loidoria* are those in 1 Cor, the reason must be that this vice was especially widespread among the lower-class folk descended from the freedmen with whom Caesar had populated the city in 44 BC, whose numbers were swelled by colonists so vulgar that they provoked the complaints of the poets Alciphron (Alciphron, *Ep.* 3.15) and Crinagoras (*Anth. Pal.* 9.284). We also know what a passion they had for the Cynics, who specialized in uncouth aggressiveness: “Here are your outstanding characteristics: being impudent and rude and insulting everyone equally, kings like commoners; that is how you attract attention and make yourself seem manly ... all the traits of a wild beast or a savage animal. Far from you are modesty, decency, and moderation.”

λουτρόν

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*loutron*, **bath**

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*loutron*, S 3067; TDNT 4.295–307; EDNT 2.361; NIDNTT 1.150–153; MM 381; L&N 53.43; BAGD 480



This is not the place for a theological study of baptism (Eph 5:26; Titus 3:5), on which the secular texts shed no light. But if a sacrament is a sign of a sacred reality, it is important to ask what that sign represented for first-century Jew or Greek. In the case of *loutron*, there are three meanings: the place where one bathes, the bathroom; bath water (Sophocles, *Ant.* 1201: *lousantes hagnon loutron*); the action of bathing. This third meaning is the one used in the LXX.

(a) The bath, public and private, was quite widespread in antiquity, and the papyri supply abundant documentation for these bath houses, their founders, their employees, their management, their functioning, and their prices. The bath is in the first instance a hygienic practice, a cleansing – one washes to be clean – but there are many other motives: bathing for pleasure or enjoyment in the rivers, baths for relaxation, to dispel cares, bathing to counter the heat (Sus 1:15, Theodotion; Aesop, *Fab.* 73), baths to complement athletic exercises, remedial baths to treat sickness or for the aged, and for farmers exhausted by their toils: *gerontika loutra therma* (Plato, *Leg.* 6.761 c).

(b) If bathing is first of all due to the desire for cleanliness, water is also a means of achieving purity and getting rid of moral stains. Philo highlights this correspondence between the efficacy of water for the body and the symbolism of the soul: “They cleanse their bodies with baths and lustrations, but they do not wish to be bothered to cleanse their souls of life-staining passions” (*Cherub.* 95); “By thus washing away that which makes dirty, by making use of the lustral waters of intelligence and its means of purification, it should shine splendidly” (*Change of Names* 124; cf. *Plant.* 116, 162). Similarly the Pythian Oracle: “Proceed with purity of heart, stranger, into the sanctuary of the pure god. Wash at the spring of the nymphs. A few drops suffice for the good; but the ocean would not be enough water to purify the wicked” (*Anth. Pal.* 14.71; cf. Euripides, *Hipp.* 317: “my hands are pure; it is my heart that is stained”). Thus the bath has a religious significance and is a rite practiced not only in Israel and by Jewish sects but also among the Greeks, and perhaps among all peoples, especially when drawing near to the deity: “One cannot enter the sanctuary without first washing the body in a complete bath” (Philo, *Unchang. God* 8). This purifying effect of bathing is highlighted in Eph 5:26 – “Christ loved the church; he gave himself up for it, so as to sanctify it by purification through the washing of water with a word (*tō loutrō tou hydatos en rhēmati*), because he wanted to present it to himself all shining, without spot or stain or anything of the sort, but holy and pure.” The instrumental dative *tō loutrō* specifies the manner – “purification carried out by means of and in the form of a bath with water,” – qualified by *en rhēmati*, a reference to the sacramental formula. This is a reference to baptism, which washes away sins (*apolouesthai*, Acts 22:16; 1 Cor 6:11) and whitens the soul (*leukainō*, Rev 7:14).

The whole pericope teaches that the union of Christ with humanity is the model for conjugal love in the church: a love that is intimate, a love that is fecund. From that point on *loutron* does not envisage cleanliness or a purification that is necessary after a sexual act, but the fecundity which for the Greeks was the principal purpose of marriage. It is reminiscent of the prenuptial bath of young women, the *loutron ... nymphikon*; since water was for the earth a source of fertility, the nuptial bath would be a fertility rite, intended to enhance the likelihood of procreation; at the very least it enhances access to a new mode of existence (Euripides, *IT* 818). In Eph 5:26, purification-cleanliness (*katharizō*) is also sanctification-consecration (*hina autēn hāgiasē*): Christ takes as his bride the church, which he has washed of its sins (cf. Acts 22:16).

(c) If water is the condition of life and fertility, then bathing or immersion, by the very structure of the act – entering and leaving – symbolizes also the erasure of the past, the end of a former existence, and makes a renewal possible: one is born again of the water and of the Spirit. The baptized person is a new creation. The rite of the *loutron* symbolizes this transformation. Having been begotten by the bath, one comes out from it strong and well. Hence Titus 3:5 – “He saved us, according to his mercy, by a bath of regeneration and renewal of the Holy Spirit.” St. Ambrose comments accurately: “The father has begotten you by the washing” (*Sacr.* 5.19; *Sources Chrétiennes*, 25, p. 93).

## λύκος

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*lykos*, **wolf**

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*lukos*, S 3074; *TDNT* 4.308–311; *EDNT* 2.362; MM 381; L&N 4.11, 88.121; BAGD 481

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The biblical wolf (Hebrew *z'ah*) is a predator, a ferocious beast, associated with the lion (Jer 5:6; Prov 28:15; *Jos. Asen.* 12.9–10), feared for its voraciousness. It tears its prey to pieces: *lykos harpax* (Gen 49:27; Ezek 22:27). A common carnivore in Transjordan and more ferocious than the jackal, it terrorizes shepherds. It is described as “thirsty” (*lykos dipsōn*, Prov 28:15; the Hebrew has “bear,” *dōh*), the wolf of the steppes (Jer 5:6), the wolf of the evening.

The wolf has always been mentioned as attacking above all ewes or lambs. Between them no truce is possible, and the golden age, when all living creatures will be at peace, is described as a time when wolves and lambs will live and feed together. In a metaphorical sense, the wolf became a literary cliché, symbolizing the wicked exploiter of the weak (Prov 28:15), especially leaders,

rulers, and judges who ruin their subjects, extort from them, or reduce them to servitude. This shows how fearsome a prospect the Lord set before his disciples: “I send you as sheep in the midst of wolves” (Matt 10:16; Luke 10:3). They are in danger of being devoured!

In principle, the flock is in the care of a shepherd who will defend them against wild beasts, but “the hireling ... sees the wolf coming, leaves the sheep, and runs away – and the wolf ravages and scatters them (*kai ho lykos harpazei auta kai skorpizei*) – because he is a hireling and does not care for the sheep.” For “the wolves hunt down and catch the one that is deprived of protection” (Xenophon, *Eq. Mag.* 4.18), and the wage-earning servant is not interested in the flock because it does not belong to him. Just the opposite of the Good Shepherd, he sees to his own safety before that of the sheep.

False prophets, teachers of lies, present the most reassuring exteriors (*en endymasi probatōn*), but in reality they are “ravening wolves” (*lykoi harpages*) who destroy or disturb the faith and life of the disciples. So St. Paul exhorts the Ephesian elders to be watchful: “I know that after I leave grievous wolves will enter in among you and will not spare the flock.”

λυπέω, λύπη, λυπηρός

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*lypeō*, to pain, make sad, grieve; *lypē*, grief, distress, sorrow; *lypēros*, causing or marked by grief, pain

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*lupeo*, S 3076; TDNT 4.313–322; EDNT 2.362–364; NIDNTT 2.419–420; MM 382; L&N 25.275; BDF §§196, 235(3); BAGD 481 | *lupe*, S 3077; TDNT 4.313–322; EDNT 2.362–364; MM 382; L&N 25.272, 25.273, 25.285; BAGD 482 | *luperos*, BAGD 482

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Grief or displeasure (*lypē*) can affect the soul (*lypeō*, “make sad, sadden”; in the middle, *lypeomai*, “be distressed, be sad”) with more or less force; but it is always the opposite of joy, elation, happiness. It is used first of all for the physical suffering associated with childbirth (Gen 3:16, Hebrew *ʾiṣāḥôn*; cf. Philo, *Alleg. Interp.* 3.200, 216–219) and of man’s painful toil (Gen 3:17; 5:29; Philo, *Worse Attacks Better* 121), both being part of the human condition in punishment for sin: “Short and painful is our life.”

Since “pain is preceded by fear and followed by grief” (4 Macc 1:23; cf. Philo, *Worse Attacks Better* 119), grief resides in the heart or in the soul (Bar 2:18; Sir 30:21; Matt 26:38); it is true torment (Sir 37:2), bitterness and dejection (Matt 26:37, *ērxato lypeisthai kai adēmonein*), accompanied by groanings (Isa 35:10; Ps 55:2; Wis 11:12), by tears and pangs of anguish (2 Cor

2:3–4; Tob 3:1); makes everything mournful (Isa 1:5; Lam 1:22; Hebrew *dawāy*); saps one's strength of body (Sir 38:18), of character (1 Macc 6:4; Philo, *Heir* 270; *Decalogue* 144), of mind; and dries out the bones (Prov 15:13; 17:22). Sadness causes sleeplessness but can also cause drowsiness (Luke 22:45 – *koimōmenous ... apo tēs lypēs*). The sorrowing person lets himself go (Josephus, *Ant.* 8.356) and becomes ill (1 Macc 6:8–9), may even die: “I am dying of deep grief in a foreign land” (6:13). Sarah, daughter of Raguel, “was so deeply grieved that she wanted to hang herself” (Tob 3:10). This is the kind of deep grief that Jesus calls “sorrowing unto death,” and St. Paul warns against letting a person “be overwhelmed by excessive grief” (*mē pōs tē perissotera lypē katapothē ho toioutos*, 2 Cor 2:7). Such excessive sorrow can even lead a person to curse God (Isa 8:21).

The pagan Isidoros prayed to Isis to deliver him from all sorrow, and the *Letter of Aristeeas* asks “How can a person be free of all sorrow?” Ben Sirach prescribes: “Do not give your soul over to sorrow.... Remove grief far from you, for it has destroyed many, and there is no profit in it.” The wisdom writers denounce those who bring grief to others, especially the son who grieves his mother (Prov 10:1; Tob 4:3 – *mē lypēsēs autēn*; 10:13; cf. Bar 4:8) and the daughter who grieves her father. The NT is more subtle and recognizes that there is such a thing as virtuous grief: that which is stirred by unfortunate events or by the acceptance of servitude in conformity with the divine will. Peter is distressed that the Lord seems to doubt his loyalty (John 21:17, *elypēthē*); the apostles are all sad at the announcement that Jesus will die (Matt 17:23; *elypēthēsan sphodra*) and at his leaving.

While the apostle clearly renounces coming to Corinth *en lypē*, since his visit could only bring grief to the community (2 Cor 2:1; cf. Dio Chrysostom 30.9), he is not sorry that his severe letter brought sorrow to the recipients; for, he says, there are two kinds of sorrow: that which is “according to God” (*to kata theon lypēthēnai*, 2 Cor 7:11), and which stirs to repentance (*eis metanoian*, verse 9; cf. Plutarch, *De tranq. anim.* 19; *De sol. n.* 3), fervor, zeal, and faithfulness; and a “worldly sorrow” that brings death; this would be the sorrow of the rich man who was attached to his goods and refused to follow Jesus (“he went away sorrowing”), of the Christian who gives alms unwillingly. It is also the displeasure of Herod when Salome asks him for the head of John the Baptist (Matt 14:9; cf. Dan 6:14).

There is another series of texts in which the meaning “grief, sorrow, distress” cannot be retained, and where we must substitute “irritation, indignation, disgust.” This is especially clear in the parable of the Unmerciful Servant, whose master had unconditionally annulled his enormous debt (ten million dollars!), but who refused to listen to the plea of one of his fellow

debtors who owed him an insignificant sum and threw him into prison. His fellow workers, according to Matt 18:31, *elypēthēsan sphodra* – were outraged or shocked at such conduct. This connotation of exasperation with *lypeomai* comes from the LXX, which sometimes links this verb with another denoting anger, sometimes gives it the meaning “irritation, exasperation,” translating the Hebrew verbs *hārah* and especially *qāṣap* – nuances that are known both in Greek and in the Koine.

This is certainly how we must interpret the *lypē* of the Twelve when the master tells them that one of them will betray him (Matt 26:22; Mark 14:19); of course they were deeply grieved, but first and foremost they were indignant. Similarly, in the conflict between the strong (*dynatoi*) and weak (*asthēneis*) at Rome over the issue of foods, St. Paul raises the point of brotherly love: “for if your brother is grieved on account of food” (*ei gar dia brōma ho adelphos sou lypeitai*, Rom 14:15). This is a euphemism. The brother is not envisioned as being saddened or even annoyed, but shocked, hurt. Finally, “Do not grieve the Holy Spirit” (Eph 4:30) means do not offend him.

λύτρον, λυτρόω, λύτρωσις, ἀπολύτρωσις, ἀντίλυτρον

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*lytron*, **ransom**; *lytroō*, **to set free, redeem, deliver**; *lytrōsis*, *apolytrōsis*, **redemption, liberation, deliverance**; *antilytron*, **ransom**

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**lutron**, S 3083; TDNT 4.328–335, 340–349; EDNT 2.364–366; NIDNTT 3.189–192, 194–197; MM 382–383; L&N 37.130; BAGD 482 | **lutroō**, S 3084; TDNT 4.328–335; EDNT 2.366; NIDNTT 3.189–190, 192; MM 383; L&N 37.128; BDF §180; BAGD 482–483 | **lutrosis**, S 3085; TDNT 4.328–335, 351; EDNT 2.366; NIDNTT 2.189–190, 193, 198–199; MM 383; L&N 37.128; BAGD 483 | **apolutrosis**, S 629; TDNT 4.328–335, 351–356; EDNT 1.138–140; NIDNTT 3.189–190, 193, 199–200; L&N 37.128; BAGD 96 | **antilytron**, S 487; TDNT 4.328–335; EDNT 2.366; NIDNTT 3.189, 197; L&N 37.130; BAGD 75; ND 2.90, 3.72

We have to remember that these terms derive, directly or indirectly, from the verb *lyō*, “loose, destroy, dissolve,” because they almost always refer to an emancipation, a liberation.

I. – In the LXX (ninety times), the verb *lytroō* usually has God as its subject and corresponds to the Hebrew *gā'al*, “set free” (in the subject capacity as *gō'el*); or to *pādāh*, “redeem, deliver, save”; or to *pāraq*, “pull away” (from danger). God is the liberator, the *gō'el* of his people: “I will deliver you from servitude (in Egypt). I will redeem you with outstretched arm.” The issue is not

the means, only the fact: deliverance from slavery, that of a foreign yoke. This is exactly the sense in which St. Luke understands *lytrōsis*: “The Lord, the God of Israel, has come and he has carried out the deliverance of his people (from their enemies)” (Luke 1:68; cf. Ps 111:9; Mic 4:10); “Those who were awaiting Jerusalem’s deliverance” (Luke 2:38); the Emmaus disciples thought that Jesus “would deliver Israel” (*lytroomai*, Luke 24:21); the signs presaging the ruin of Jerusalem will allow the persecuted disciples to lift up their heads “because your deliverance draws near” (Luke 21:28, *engizei hē apolytrōsis hymōn*).

If *lytroō* is ordinarily used for the liberation of a prisoner or a slave, it is also used for deliverance from difficulties, cares, some constraint, danger: “Yahweh has delivered my soul from all distress” (2 Sam 4:9, Hebrew *pādah*; 1 Kgs 1:29); “awaiting the liberation of our body” (Rom 8:23, *apolytrōsis*; cf. Eph 1:14; 4:30). Martyrs do not accept deliverance (*tēn apolytrōsin*) at the price of recantation, because they are counting on a better resurrection (Heb 11:35). Hence, *lytroō* is synonymous with *sōzō* in its secular sense: “preserve safe and sound, spare”; this leads to its psychological and religious usages: “He is the one who will deliver Israel from all its sins.” In none of the texts hitherto cited is there any idea of providing compensation or a sum of money to “purchase” freedom. It is even said, “You were sold for free; you will be redeemed without money.”

II. – In contrast, in the sphere of human relations, it is possible to “redeem” a field, a house, even a person who has become another’s property: “When your brother is in difficulty and sells his property, then his closest redeemer shall come and shall redeem (Hebrew *gā’al*) the thing sold by his brother” (Lev 25:25). If a brother has sold himself to a resident alien, “after he has been sold, there remains for him a right of redemption; one of his brothers shall redeem him.” This meaning of *lytroō* (recuperating one’s property by paying off its price) occurs constantly in the papyri: “You shall give to my friend Serapion a hundred drachmas and you shall recover my garments” (*lytrōsasa mou to himatia*). Stratonikos writes to his wife, “A sign when I told you to redeem the new tunic (*sēmeion hote eipa soi lytrōsai ton kainon chitōna*) and give them the receipt that is in the nook (*thyris*) of the vestibule” (*SB* 7574, 3; cf. 9834 a 9). “The aforementioned mortgage shall remain valid and the borrower shall not be free (*lytrōsontai*) until he has first paid the above-named sum with interest” (*P.Mich.* 333, 25; from AD 52; cf. *P.Erl.* 60, 9). A father, Cyrinus, “paid fifty solidi to deliver his son” (*P.Ness.* 56, 8). This is the meaning evoked by primitive catechesis in referring to salvation as redemption: Jesus Christ “gave himself for us in order to free us from all iniquity” (*hina lytrōsetai hēmas apo pasēs anomias*); “It is not with corruptible goods, with silver or gold, that you

have been redeemed from the foolish way of life that you inherited from your fathers, but with precious blood” (1 Pet 1:18; cf. Isa 52:3).

III. – Neither St. Paul nor St. Peter originated this metaphor for salvation (redemption); it comes from the Lord himself: “The Son of Man came ... to give his life as a ransom for the many” (*dounai tēn psychēn autou lytron anti pollōn*). Salvation is a liberation. The death of the just is a ransom acceptable to God. Humans, being slaves of darkness and sin (Rom 6:17, 20; Col 1:13) were incapable of liberating themselves (Matt 16:26), and Christ gave his life as the price for their emancipation. This meaning of *lytron* – price of deliverance (of a slave or prisoner), ransom – is the meaning in the LXX, and the disciples understood it spontaneously, since emancipation from servitude or captivity upon the payment of ransom was so common in the first century.

For the liberation of a slave in 167 BC (*P.Hamb.* 96, 16 and 21); in AD 86, *P.Oxy.* 48, 6 (*epi lytrois*); in 88 for six drachmas (2843, 19: *lytrōn argyriou*); in the year 100 (49, 8; 349, 6; 722, 30, 40); in the second century (*Pap.Lugd.Bat.* XIII, 23, 7; 24, 6–7; *P.Stras.* 238, 21–22; *SB* 6294, 10); in the third century a *manumissio inter amicos*: “I free Helen, a slave born in my house, and I receive for her ransom two thousand two hundred Augustan drachmas.” In place of the *lytra* (the plural is the more common form), there is also the expression *timas argyriou* (*SEG* XVI, 355–360), which evokes the verbs of purchasing *agorazō* (1 Cor 6:20; 7:23; 2 Pet 2:1; Rev 5:9; 14:3–4) and *exagorazō* (Gal 3:13; 4:5), emphasizing the payment by Christ for the disciples whose Master and Lord he has become. If a slave did not have enough money to free himself, his friends got up a subscription; thus the Jewish community of Oxyrhynchus paid fourteen talents of silver to free a mother and her two children (*metaxy philōn ēleutherōsamen*, *P.Oxy.* 1265, 8–9 = *C.Pap.Jud.* 473).

We are just as well informed concerning the liberation of prisoners of war. Often in antiquity wars were waged to acquire laborers, and the armies were followed by slave merchants. The axiom occurs constantly: “The one who is taken in war belongs to the conqueror” (Aristotle, *Pol.* 1.6.1.1255–7); the law of war transformed prisoners into slaves (Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 8.3.8; cf. 9.23.5; Philo, *Moses* 1.142). The prisoner, who was like captured booty (Plato, *Resp.* 5.468 *a–b*), took on an exchange value and would not be freed except for ransom. “According to the law, one who was ransomed from enemies became the property of the one who freed him and was not released except by ransom.” Here again, generous souls intervened. Thus Philopoemen spent the income from his expeditions to ransom captives (*lyseis aichmalōtōn*, Plutarch, *Phil.* 4.5; cf. *Arat.* 11.2, *lytrōsin aichmalōtōn*); and a slave Antiochus was consecrated to Pythian Apollo “after he paid their ransom (that of his masters, who were

captives abroad) to redeem them from the enemy” (*apeilaphotes par’ autou lytra ek polemiōn*).

IV. – These sociological facts are illuminating, especially in that they show that the one freed is the property of the one who has paid the ransom, but the metaphor must not be reified. Philo often gives *lytron* a spiritual meaning: “Firstfruits and ceremonies constitute the ransom of our soul, because they deliver it from brutal masters and return it to freedom.” In an inventory of third-century BC offerings, “(someone) dedicated ... another small vial on the profit from ransoms” (*allo phialon to apo tōn lytrōn*, *I.Did.* 428, 9). In an inscription at Koula, *lytron* means “presents this ransom.” It can also be the payment of a debt to the deity (Lucian, *Dial. D.* 4.2). In this sense, a human sacrifice can be offered to deliver a people: “It was the custom of the ancients, in cases of grave danger, that the leaders of the city or of the people, in order to avert the destruction of everyone, would hand over the most beloved of their children to be sacrificed as a ransom to the avenging gods” (*lytron tois timōrois daimosin*). This is the way in which the blood of Jesus had expiatory value. The “price” paid was the “precious” blood (1 Pet 1:19, *timō haimati*).

This “redemption/deliverance” by means of ransom is in Heb 9:12 called “an eternal redemption” (*aiōnian lytrōsin*), that is, forever valid. Elsewhere what is at issue is the “remission of sins” (Eph 1:7; Col 1:14; cf. Rom 8:2), of “transgressions of the time of the first covenant” (Heb 9:15), linked with righteousness and sanctification (1 Cor 1:30; Rom 3:24), always referred to using the compound form *apolytrōsis*. This term thus becomes almost synonymous with salvation. When the Holy Spirit is its author, it is the definitive consummation of the kingdom of glory (Eph 1:14; 4:30), but it is always “the redemption that is in Christ Jesus” (Rom 3:24), whereby the redeemed belong to God.



# μ m

## μαίνομαι

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*maivomai*, **to be furious, enraged, mad, insane**

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***mainomai***, S 3105; *TDNT* 4.360–361; *EDNT* 2.375–376; *NIDNTT* 1.527–530, 3.230; MM 385–386; L&N 30.24; BAGD 486

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Occurring frequently in classical Greek (cf. Preisker, in *TDNT*, vol. 4, pp. 360–361), this verb has two meanings in the Koine: “be furious, enraged,” and “be raving mad, insane.” The latter meaning, which is the most common, is the only meaning in the LXX. This madness often takes on the familiar sense of a person thought to be the self-deceived, like Rhoda when she announces that Peter is at the door and everyone knows that he is in prison: *Mainē* – “You are raving!” Those people are called crazy whose words or actions fly in the face of common sense, whose reasoning or conduct is not understood, who do not observe propriety and decorum. When St. Paul defends his cause before Festus and affirms the resurrection of Christ, the procurator interrupts him: “*Mainē, Paule*. You are mad, Paul. Your great learning has driven you insane (*eis manian*).” To which he replies: “I am not mad, most excellent Festus. To the contrary, my words are true and sensible.” This could be compared to Philo: “ ‘You are raving, it is not possible, you are completely mad.’ ‘I am neither mad nor silly enough to lose sight of the course of an argument’ ” (*Flacc.* 6).

This sort of madness is specifically that which is attributed to the preachers of a religion that one refuses to follow or to believers whose convictions are astounding. Thus it was said of Jesus: “He is possessed by a demon and has a deranged mind.”

## μακάριος, οὐαί

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*makarios*, **happy, blessed**; *ouai*, **woe**

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***makarios***, S 3107; *TDNT* 4.362–370; *EDNT* 2.376–379; *NIDNTT* 1.215–216; MM 386; L&N 25.119; BDF §127(4); BAGD 486–487 | ***ouai***, S 3759; *EDNT* 2.540; *NIDNTT* 3.1051–1054; MM 464; L&N 22.9; BDF §§4(2a), 58, 136(5), 190(2), 412(5); BAGD 591

The adjective *makarios* can have the most commonplace meanings, as to describe a “happy day” (Plutarch, *Oth.* 15.4) and “happy times,” or a hero like Perseus, who had wings and could change irksome people into stone (Menander, *Dysk.* 153). It takes on an affective nuance in the interjection *ō makari*’ (“my dear”) and means “blessed” in religious texts.

In fact, it is the successor of *makar*, which Homer used as an epithet with the gods, almost synonymous with “immortal,” and which remained in constant use throughout the Hellenistic period. If the deity is by definition removed from the vicissitudes of existence here below, then the blessed deceased who live in the isles of the blessed (*makarōn nēsoi*) are likened to him. The adjective *makarios* makes its appearance with Pindar, who uses it to describe a mortal, Karrhotos, son of Alexibias; likewise Xenophon: “He considered himself most happy at the thought of having a right-hand man who would give him the leisure to do what he pleased” (*Cyr.* 8.3.48). But given the vicissitudes of existence here below, Aristotle said that a person could be called happy only after his death (*Eth. Nic.* 1.1100–1101; 10.1178.). In addition, if the term is still applied to the living in the Hellenistic period, it becomes more and more a description of the dead. A name is preceded by *ho makarios* (*hē makaria*), which can be translated, depending on whether the person so described is pagan, Jewish, or Christian, “late,” “happy,” or “blessed.”

The first biblical beatitude is that of Leah, who, when her servant gave birth to a second son of Jacob, stated, “ ‘I am happy, because my daughters will call me happy!’ So she called his name Asher,” that is, Felix (Gen 30:13; cited by Philo, *Migr. Abr.* 95). The queen of Sheba exclaims before Solomon, “Happy are your wives, and happy are your servants here who stand constantly before you, hearing your wisdom” (1 Kgs 10:8; 2 Chr 9:7). These human macarisms are rare in the LXX, and not once is Yahweh called “blessed” after the fashion of the Greek gods. On the contrary, it is God alone who grants humans happiness, and the originality of the OT lies in multiplying beatitudes in favor of those who believe, love, and adore Yahweh; happy are those who hope in him, count on him, take shelter and find their strength in him!

This “fear of Yahweh” is such that one takes pleasure in his commandments (Ps 1:1; 112:1; 128:1–2; Prov 8:32; Sir 34:15; *1 Enoch* 99.10) and sees the Lord’s hand in trials (Ps 94:12; Job 5:17; Tob 13:16; *Pss. Sol.* 10.1). The originality of the OT is to frame exhortations to virtue in macarisms. One can only be happy if one is purified of sin (Ps 32:1–2, quoted at Rom 4:7–8; Sir 14:2; 31:8; cf. Wis 3:13 – “Happy is the sterile woman who has remained pure”), practices justice (Ps 106:3; Prov 20:7; Isa 56:2), walks in the law of Yahweh (Ps 119:1–2), cares for the poor (Ps 41:1), does not blunder with one’s lips (Sir 14:1; 28:19), and if having been told what pleases God (Bar 4:4) one

has found wisdom (Prov 3:13; Sir 14:20; 25:9) and awaits the fulfillment of the prophecies about the events of the eschaton.

Philo, expressing his Jewish faith in terms of his Greek culture, is the one who insisted the most on “the blessed and fortunate nature of God.” God is even the only one to know felicity, because he is the only true Beauty, the Uncreated, the Immortal, “the Being who knows immutability, felicity, and triple beatitude.” The man who has a “desire for immortality and a happy life” (Philo, *Contemp. Life* 13) “will live a life of felicity and beatitude, marked by the teachings of piety and holiness.” Hence the macarism, “Happy are those to whom it has been granted to use the potions of wisdom.”

All the thinkers of antiquity expressed their opinions on happiness. Homer identified it with wealth, that is, possession of the good things of life, which implies a good wife and children. Others think of power (Euripides, *IT* 543; *Bacch.* 904), fame or glory (Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 3.1.106; vol. 3, p. 57, 12), a life of pleasure (Euripides, *Alc.* 169), “to be able to live in joy without suffering any disfavor of fate makes for happiness for mortals” (*El.* 1357–1359); hence freedom from any trouble or misery (Plato, *Resp.* 5.465 d), full, constant, unmixed satisfaction that is lacking in nothing; but the futility of this dream allows the conclusion that “Among humans none is happy.” In addition, Aristotle (*Top.* 2.112a) defined the happy person, following Xenocrates (frag. 81), as “the one whose soul is virtuous” (cf. Marcus Aurelius 7.17; Isocrates, *De Pace* 8.143); but how can this be attained, since according to Livy “We can no longer endure either our vices or their remedies”?

It is in terms of this context that we must understand the nine beatitudes of Matt 5:3–12 and Luke 6:20–22. They constitute not only the exordium of the Sermon on the Mount but the specific teaching of the Messiah to the members of the kingdom that he is founding, and hence the essence of the gospel ethic, which is summed up in the axiom “Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” (Matt 6:21). More than a fundamental attitude of a person, this appeal is that of an option that is as radical as it is paradoxical. First of all, Jesus is making an appeal to happiness. It is impossible to insist too strongly on the meaning of this *makarios*, repeated ten times (in Matt) and intensified by the present imperatives “Rejoice and be glad (*chairete kai agalliasthe*), for your reward is great in heaven.” This is much more than contentment; it is an interior joy that becomes external, elation translated into shouts, songs, acclamations. The explanation is that God will be the source of this beatitude. – Secondly, the new faith implies a reversal of all human values; happiness is no longer attached to wealth, to having enough, to a good reputation, power, possession of the goods of this world, but to poverty alone, because these beatitudes envision one or another aspect of the *ptōchoi* of the OT. These are essentially

religious souls, in submission to God's law, obedient to his will. God is their only recourse and their only hope, and they are entirely ready to accept his gifts. They are profoundly humble, modest, unassuming, the "little ones" who are not taken into account and who possess nothing on earth; they are starving and weeping. More than scorned, they are exploited by the powerful and the rich, who prey on them, oppress them, and persecute them. It is to these afflicted ones that the Holy Spirit promises happiness, consolation, and satisfaction. These are the little people whom God wished to save and to whom he wished to give justice. It is therefore to them that the good news is announced (Matt 11:5; Luke 7:22), along with consolation (Sir 48:24) and peace (Isa 52:7). The poor are the beneficiaries of the coming or appearing of the reign of God and his justice, because they wait for it (Mark 15:43; Luke 2:25); their hearts are open to it, because their miserable condition makes them appreciate spiritual values, which are the only true wealth. Hence St. Matthew's specification "poor in spirit," which applies to the indigent as well as to the wealthy who are detached from their possessions. Poverty, according to Jesus, is that of all people who are dissatisfied with earthly goods – all is vanity – and who have from the outset a sense of their own personal nakedness. Happy are those who are so aware of the nothingness of the earth and who cry out "Come, Lord Jesus!" (1 Cor 16:22; Rev 22:20). Finally, their wage (*misthos*) will be "great in heaven" (Matt 5:12; Luke 6:23), surpassing in every way the efforts and sacrifices they have undertaken: "In good measure, shaken, pressed down, running over will it be given into your bosom" (Luke 6:38), literally unimaginable and unspeakable (1 Cor 2:9). They will enter "into the joy of the Lord" himself (Matt 25:21, 23), which is an infinity of conscious perfection; "being with Christ, which is better by far" (Phil 1:23).

In the NT, not until the Pastoral Epistles is God described as *makarios*: "the gospel of the glory of the blessed God" (1 Tim 1:11); "the blessed and only Sovereign" (1 Tim 6:15). It is correct to see here a polemical intention against the imperial cult, because *makarios* describes the only *Dynastēs* (Luke 1:52; Acts 8:27), a title of the Most High (Sir 46:5–6), who reigns in the heavens and over the world (2 Macc 12:15; 15:4, 23). Humans owe him worship and absolute obedience.

Regarding Christ, happiness lies in recognizing him as he is, in not being "scandalized by him" (Matt 11:6; Luke 7:23), in seeing and hearing him (Matt 13:16; Luke 10:23). This discernment is a gift of the Father (Matt 16:17). It is the beatitude of faith, that of the Virgin Mary – "Blessed is she who has believed" (*makaria hē pisteusasa*, Luke 1:45) the word of the Lord – but also a mother's honor. The last macarism pronounced by Jesus is for all those who believe without relying on a visible presence (John 20:29). To this we may join

the beatitudes of hope. In the course of their earthly pilgrimage, Christians “await the blessed hope (*tēn makarian elpida*) and appearing of the glory of our great God and Savior, Jesus Christ” (Titus 2:13). Their life has meaning only in light of this “final end,” which is the object of all their hopes: their meeting with Jesus Christ, who is currently invisible. Describing this hope as “blessed” means that its object is at once infallible and divine. From now on he rejoices the soul: “Happy are they who are invited to the marriage feast of the Lamb” (Rev 19:9). They prepare for this and remain watchful (Rev 16:15); they wash their garments and remain pure in order to have the right to the tree of life (Rev 22:14). Since they have had a share in the first resurrection, the second death (that of sin and damnation) will have no power over them (Rev 20:6). They listen obediently and observe what God has taught them (Rev 1:3; 22:7). Rev 14:13 therefore can set forth this paradox: ‘Blessed are the dead that die in the Lord from now on. Yes,’ says the Spirit, ‘for they rest from their labors; for their works follow with them.’ ”

The other beatitudes have to do with faithfulness, that of watchful and diligent servants who will be rewarded by their master (Luke 12:37, 38, 43; 24:46); of disciples who conform to the example of humble, loving service set by the Lord (“Happy are you if you do it”); of the charitable, because “it is more blessed to give than to receive.” Happiness is envisaged not on the psychological but on the eschatological level, because God will reward the giver, as Jesus promised: “You will be happy in that they (the poor, the crippled, the lame, and the blind) will not be able to repay (your invitation), because they (God) will repay you at the resurrection of the just” (Luke 14:14).

By virtue of this divine judgment, the happiness of Christians will always lie in perfect unity of loyalty and conscience and in exact conformity to God’s will in every action: “The one who looks intently into the perfect law, the law of liberty, and remains (thus), and becomes not a forgetful hearer but a doer – this person will be happy in what he does” (Jas 1:25), even if he is abused and suffers for righteousness. One is then identified with Christ and, after enduring the trial, assured of receiving the “crown of life” (Jas 1:12). In the NT, *makarios* always describes persons, never actions (cf. 4 Macc 7:22). It is therefore not poverty as such that is blessed, but the poor; and poverty is not a matter of possessing nothing but of being detached from everything.

St. Luke follows the beatitudes of the Sermon on the Mount with what are quite improperly called four “maledictions” against the rich. Introduced by the adversative conjunction *plēn*, “nevertheless, only,” they are designed to reinforce the beatitude of the poor, conformably to Semitic usage, which links blessing and cursing. Here, however, rather than the traditional contrast between *eulogeō* and [*epi*]kataraomai (sole exception, Eccl 10:16–17: *ouai soi*,

*polis ... makaria sy*), St. Luke uses *ouai*, which is almost unknown in secular Greek, but which attests that this is not a “malediction.”

So what is the meaning of this interjection? *Ouai* is a transliteration of the Hebrew *’ôy, hôy*, a sort of onomatopoeia, a cry of pain, terror, indignation, and sometimes threat, a declaration of misfortune and a complaint against a certain person or group, given one’s misery or privations. According to the context it must be translated “Alas,” “Ah,” or “Woe.” In the LXX, *ouai* is said of a nation or a city that is “lost” or is sinning; complaints are made about ills that beset (1 Sam 4:8), betrayal (Isa 24:16; Jer 10:19), an enemy invasion (Jer 4:13; 6:4), but also of woes that are the consequences of our sins (Lam 5:16; cf. Isa 3:9). Complaints are voiced about “the one who is alone and falls, who has no one to help him up” (Eccl 4:10), but more often *ouai* expresses sometimes the terror experienced in the face of the horrible fate that awaits the wicked, the ungodly, the sinner, “because today the time of their punishment has arrived” (Jer 50:27), sometimes the moaning that marks funerary lamentation and which takes this form: “Alas, my brother! Alas, my sister!” (Jer 22:18; 34:5; Amos 5:16; Ezek 2:10).

Thus the supposed Lucan “maledictions” of the Sermon on the Mount are at the same time a threat to and a lamentation over the rich, the satisfied, those who feast, laugh, and are flattered by their friends. They are truly the most miserable of all people, because wealth makes it very difficult to get into the kingdom of God (Luke 18:24–25). Not that wealth is cursed – Jesus was surrounded by wealth (Mary of Bethany, the holy women, Zacchaeus, Joseph of Arimathea, Nicodemus, etc.) – but the satisfactions that it provides usually make it difficult to detect the attraction of spiritual goods; they fix the heart on earth (Luke 8:14; 12:34). When filled with earthly goods, what does one want from God? So, unfortunate indeed are those who have been deceived concerning true values and risk losing out on eternal beatitude. But, Jesus affirms, this depends on God alone and on his mercy – precisely for the rich (Luke 18:27).

More serious are the “maledictions” uttered against the “scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites ... blind guides, because you close up the kingdom of heaven against men”; these evil teachers lead the people to spiritual ruin, making “sons of Gehenna.” To them applies the statement, “Woe to the world because of stumblingblocks ... woe to the man through whom a cause of stumbling arises. It would be better for him to have a millstone hung around his neck and be thrown into the sea” (Matt 18:7; Luke 17:1). This is the case with Judas, who is not cursed, but for whom the Lord laments, “Woe to the one through whom the Son of Man is betrayed. It would have been better for him

not to have been born” (Matt 26:24; Mark 14:21; Luke 22:22). How could one not bewail such a disastrous fate?

The other NT *ouais* are almost trivial in comparison with these spiritual catastrophes: “Woe to me if I preach not the gospel” (1 Cor 9:16) means “I would be unfortunate and worthy of laments if I were not faithful to my calling.” In the time of the desolation of Judea, “Woe to those who (must flee and) are pregnant and those who are nursing in those times” (Matt 24:19; Mark 13:17; Luke 21:23). At the end of time, the distress will be such that the angels announce, “Woe, woe, woe to those who live on the earth.” The two last lamentations have as their object the destruction of the wealth (Rev 18:16) of those who “enriched themselves” (18:19).

μαραίνω

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*marainō*, **to wither, dry out**

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*maraino*, S 3133; *EDNT* 2.385; MM 388; L&N 13.94; BDF §72; BAGD 491

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Jas 1:11 compares the fragility of wealth to that of vegetation scorched by the hot sun: “The sun arises with the searing wind and dries out the plant, whose flower is fallen and lovely appearance lost. Thus the rich person will wither in his undertakings” (*houtōs kai ho plousios en tais poreiais autou maranthēsetai*). Used in cultured Greek from Homer on, *marainomai* often refers to plants that dry out, flowers that fade. The best parallel is Philo, *Spec. Laws* 1.311: God does not derive glory from wealth, or opinion, or sovereignty, realities that do not partake of the nature of a true good; “the time of their failure comes quickly, and they wither before they have fully come to flower.”

This verb is also used for the sick and for people who are exhausted, or for a disappointed lover, but especially in epitaphs for those who died prematurely and unexpectedly: “Fate, which ends all things miserably, or the common law of death, consumed me.”

μάρτυς

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*martyς*, **witness**

→see also αὐτόπτης

The components of this term's meaning can be analyzed as follows:

(a) A witness is a person who was present at a material fact or at the accomplishment of a legal action. He is informed because he was there; he saw or heard: "I have seen and I bear witness (*martyreō*) that he is God's Chosen One" (John 1:34; cf. verse 15); "We testify concerning that which we have seen" (3:11); "The one who came from heaven testifies concerning that which he has seen and heard." God, who knows everything and is everywhere present, from whom nothing is hidden, is the witness par excellence, "faithful and trustworthy."

(b) The biblical *martys* is not a mere eyewitness, simply present at a happening; he is active (cf. *C.P.Herm.* 31, 4: *martyras martyrountas*; 32, 25), called upon to tell what he has seen and heard, to proclaim what he knows. The mission of the Twelve is to bear witness to the resurrection of Christ: "You are witnesses of these things" (*hymeis martyres toutōn*, Luke 24:48); "You shall be my witnesses" (*esesthe mou martyres*). This proclamation is Paul's calling: "The God of our fathers chose you in advance ... to see the Just One and hear the voice of his mouth, because you shall be a witness to him to all people concerning the things that you have seen and heard" (Acts 22:15; cf. 26:16; 1 Cor 1:6; 2:1). The apostle testifies concerning Jesus, which is why St. John wrote his Gospel and his apocalypse. All missionary preaching is a *martyrion* announcing the advent of salvation (1 Cor 1:6; 2:1; 2 Thess 1:10; 1 Tim 2:6; 2 Tim 1:8), so that it can be said that the disciples "hold to the testimony of Jesus" (Rev 12:17; cf. 19:10; 20:4; Acts 22:20).

(c) These missionary-preachers are not content to tell about the deeds and words of Jesus – and this is where their testimony differs from a legal witness – they express their personal conviction and identify with the cause that they defend. In proclaiming of the Lordship of Jesus, they make public confession of their faith. It is not simply a matter of reporting facts – which need to be interpreted – but of speaking and vindicating the truth, of somehow insisting on doing it justice. In the secular world, legal actions were originally oral actions done in the presence of witnesses, and subsequently these actions done in writing, so witnesses sign and authenticate the document, guaranteeing its validity. The document could be a will, an adoption, a contract, the renewal of a lease, etc.; also "the witnesses' names are written in the act" (*P.Magd.* 12, 3), and their deposition is often confirmed by an oath. When there are a great many witnesses, as in 2 Tim 2:2; Heb 12:1, their credibility is heightened, their



persuasion is stronger, and the validity of their testimony is strengthened. In many texts in the NT, as in the papyri, the witness does not stop at supplying proofs, “he vouched for the outcome of the matter in which he had taken part. The witness was originally a defender and assistant. He was responsible not only to tell what he had seen and heard, but more than that to intervene in the suit. The witness was really a guarantor and stood surety.” Testimony, in the prophetic and kerygmatic sense (Rev 11:3), is thus not only a means of persuasion (Aristotle, *Rh.* 1.1354–7), but it adds the seal of conviction, which guarantees the truthfulness of the message. It is above all in this sense of “guarantor” that we must interpret the expression “Jesus, the faithful and true witness” (Rev 1:5; 3:14; cf. *engyos*, Heb 7:22), just as God had stood surety for him (John 8:18; cf. 3:33; 6:27; 1 John 5:9). The same thing is true of the *martyrion* embodied in missionary preaching (2 Thess 1:10; 1 Tim 2:6; 2 Tim 1:8), for the apostle devotes himself to it body and soul. The same is even the case with the scribes and Pharisees: “Woe to you, because you build the tombs of the prophets, when it was your fathers who killed them. Thus you are witnesses.”

(d) So there is not only oral testimony; actions also are part of the act of testifying – *martyria tōn ergōn*. The supreme testimony, leaving no room for discussion, is the “testimony” of the self, the giving up of life: martyrdom. At the end of the first century, the name *martys* was given to the Christian who had sealed his profession of faith with his blood; for example, at Pergamum, there was “Antipas, my faithful witness, who was killed among you.”

(e) Testimony is given before hearers (cf. Epictetus 3.24.113) who form an opinion on what has happened on the basis of the solidity of the account that they hear and the credibility of the *martys*. NT witnesses, if they are set on proclaiming the gospel message, have as their main goal to persuade: “so that you may also believe.”

μαστιγόω, μαστίζω, μάστιξ

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*mastigoō, mastizō, to whip; mastix, whip, scourge*

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*mastigoo*, S 3146; TDNT 4.515–518; EDNT 2.395–396; NIDNTT 1.161–164; MM 390; L&N 19.9, 38.11; BAGD 495 | *mastizo*, S 3147; TDNT 4.515–518; EDNT 2.396; NIDNTT 1.161–162; MM 390; L&N 19.9; BAGD 495 | *mastix*, S 3148; TDNT 4.518–519; EDNT 2.396; NIDNTT 1.161–163; MM 390; L&N 19.9, 23.153; BAGD 495

The whip (*mastix*) was not only used for correcting horses (Prov 26:3; cf. Nah 3:12; Diodorus Siculus 17.60.4) but was the special implement of Israelite discipline (Hebrew *mûsār*), whether wielded by the father against his children, by the authorities against lawbreakers, or by God himself for the perfecting or purifying of his own people as well as for the punishing of sinners. The *theia mastix* (2 Macc 9:11; cf. 3:26), obviously metaphorical, encompasses all the evils inflicted upon humans, especially sicknesses and diseases – “as many as had afflictions” (*hosoi eichon mastigas*) – which were considered to be punishment for sins.

Beatings were painful and cruel and could lead to death (Xenophon, *Cyr.* 1.3.18; Cicero, *Verr.* 2.4, 39, 85, “*moriere virgis*”; *Dig.* 48.19.8.3: “*plerique dum torquentur deficere solent*”). Beginning with Deut 25:2–3, whipping is a judicial punishment and a method of torture. In use in the first century, it was applied to the disciples: “They will whip you in their synagogues” (Matt 10:17); “I send you prophets, sages, scribes. Some of them you will kill and crucify, and some you will whip in your synagogues and chase from city to city.” In the Greco-Roman world, the whip was a punishment or torture reserved for slaves, at least according to the law; thus it is understandable that St. Paul should have said to the centurion, “Are you permitted to whip a Roman citizen who has not been condemned?” Customarily whipping was carried out after a death sentence had been passed (Matt 27:26; Mark 15:15). But according to John 19:1, “then Pilate took Jesus and had him whipped”; the procurator was not satisfied that the accused was guilty, but only wanted to give some satisfaction to the accusers by having Jesus punished so that he could then set him free.

Because the custom (*synētheia*, John 18:39) was to free a prisoner at each Passover, Pilate offered to release Jesus or Barabbas. Was this really a pardon (*indulgentia*) or an *abolitio* to forestall sentencing, carried out at the great festivals? Exegetes differ as to the legal character of this proceeding, which has no basis in imperial law. But that is just the point: this is not a matter of official, written law, but a custom that varied from country to country, depending more or less on the will of the authorities, whereby amnesty was granted to prisoners on the occasion of a great festival. The twofold witness of Mark and John is beyond suspicion. According to John 18:39, in Palestine this ritual was attached to the Passover, the religious festival celebrating the anniversary of the liberation of the chosen people. A case in which an official took similar initiative has been pointed out by A. Deissmann; it is the account of a hearing in the year 85, in which the prefect of Egypt, G. Septimus Vegetus, addresses Phibion: “You deserve to be whipped (*axios men ēs mastigōthēnai*) ... however, I will pardon you as a concession to the crowd.”

μεγαλειός, μεγαλειότης, μεγαλοπρεπής, μεγαλύνω, μεγαλωσύνη, μέγεθος

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*megaleios*, **sovereign, mighty, magnificent**; *megaleiotēs*, **greatness, grandeur**; *megaloprepēs*, **magnificent**; *megalynō*, **to magnify, exalt, call great**; *megalōsynē*, **majesty, greatness**; *megethos*, **greatness**

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*megaleios*, S 3167; TDNT 4.541; EDNT 2.398; MM 392; L&N 76.8; BAGD 496 | *megaleiotes*, S 3168; TDNT 4.541–542; EDNT 2.399; NIDNTT 2.424–426; MM 392; L&N 76.2, 87.21; BAGD 496 | *megaloprepes*, S 3169; TDNT 4.542–543; EDNT 2.399; MM 392; L&N 12.6, 79.14; BAGD 497 | *megaluno*, S 3170; TDNT 4.543; EDNT 2.399; NIDNTT 2.424–425; MM 392; L&N 33.358, 79.124, 87.15; BAGD 497 | *megalosune*, S 3172; TDNT 4.544; EDNT 2.399; NIDNTT 2.424–426; MM 392; L&N 12.5, 87.21; BAGD 497 | *megethos*, S 3174; TDNT 4.544; EDNT 2.401; MM 393; L&N 78.2; BAGD 498

I. – According to Sir 45:24, God granted to Phinehas and his descendants “the sovereign dignity of the priesthood” (*hierōsynēs megaleion*). In AD 37, *to megaleion* is used for the emperor (Dittenberger, *Syl.* 798, 4). In the third-fourth century, it is a title used for an authority to whom a petition is addressed (*deomai tou sou megaliou*, *P.Michael.* 30, 10), whether the prefect, the *stratēgos* (*P.Oxy.* 1204, 10; 2113, 21; *P.Mert.* 91, 18; *P.Panop. Beatty* 2, 157), the *logistēs* (*PSI* 767, 12; *P.Oxy.* 2187, 6, 22), the *defensor civitatis* (*P.Ross.Georg.* V, 27, 11). But when the crowd at Pentecost is said to have marveled at hearing in their own languages *ta megaleia tou theou* (Acts 2:11; NT hapax), the expression is based on the LXX, where the word is used only with a religious meaning: God’s grandeur (Deut 11:2, Hebrew *gōdēl*), power (Sir 43:15; 2 Macc 3:34; 7:17), wisdom (Sir 42:21), glory (17:13). The word suggests mighty deeds, magnificent works, such as creation, the miracles surrounding the exodus, or salvific manifestations (3 Macc 7:22). They are evident, and they bring praise to their author.

The noun *megaleiotēs* similarly refers to the grandeur of God, but also to that of his people (Dan 7:27; Hebrew *rhû*) and of Solomon (2 Esdr 4:10). In the papyri, it is used for the greatness of the pyramids (*Dittenberger, Or.* 666, 26 = *SB* 8303, first century) and as an honorific title (*P.Oslo* 83, 13; *P.Oxy.* 2131, 17; 3028, 6), especially for the emperor from the first century on. Claudius writes to the Alexandrians in 41: “Each one reading this letter individually will wonder at the majesty of our god Caesar and show gratitude.”

II. – According to Anaximenes, *to megaloprepesteron* is the opposite of *to tapeinoteron* (*Rhet. ad Alex.* 2.3.32; cf. 2.6.4). In 112 BC, Hermias asks Horus

to receive the Roman senator Lucius Memmius with special magnificence. *Megaloprepēs* is the adjective for Jeremiah in 2 Macc 15:13, and in the papyri of the fifth to seventh centuries is it used for anyone at all who is being honored or asked for a favor: a secretary (*P.Oxy.* 1843, 1), a benefactor (*PSI* 1425 recto 9), a master (*P.Lond.* 1786, 2, 30; *P.Ant.* 198 verso), an archon (*Pap.Lugd.Bat.* XIII, 8, 6; *P.Mert.* 43, 16, 25; *SB* 9453, 4), a *praeses provinciae*, and consuls (*P.Stras.* 317, 1; *P.Ness.* 15, 1). In the eighth century, the term became purely a stock phrase used in letter-writing, as can be seen in the papyri of Apollonos Ano, which are weighted down with “your magnificent Brotherliness” (*P.Apoll.* 9, 1; 15, 1; 26, 1; 55, 2) or “Friendliness” (21, 1) and the ridiculous “I embrace your Magnificence through this letter” (31, 6; 46, 11). But in the Bible, *megaloprepēs* always retains its meaning as a designation for God (Deut 33:26; 2 Macc 8:15). At the transfiguration, the voice comes from “the magnificent glory,” meaning the divine glory; cf. the *megalōsynē* of Heb 1:3.

III. – There is no meaningful pagan parallel to the biblical *megalynō*, which in some instances is used in a secular way, for if a person or a kingdom grows in stature and in power, this increase is the fruit of divine blessing (Gen 12:2; 1 Chr 29:25; 2 Chr 1:1; Sir 45:2; Wis 19:22). The word has religious meaning in that the faith confesses that God is great, as are his grace (Ps 57:10) and his works (1 Sam 12:24). Furthermore, to call God great, or magnify him (*megalynō*) is to exalt or celebrate him, which is the principal business of the psalmist: “I will exalt the name of Elohim through thanksgiving” (Ps 69:31). So also the Virgin Mary: “My soul magnifies the Lord.” Again, it is in line with the LXX use of the word when St. Paul speaks of magnifying Christ by his life or by his death, i.e., giving him glory and praise, because the Lord is exalted when the gospel is proclaimed. This nuance can already be detected in 1 Cor 10:15 – “As your faith grows, we shall be enlarged in our sphere of action, among you and even beyond” (cf. 1 QH 5.25; *Odes Sol.* 29.1, 11).

If God’s mercy shows his greatness (Luke 1:58), believers proclaim it (Acts 10:46; 19:17); and they also exalt his apostles (5:13).

IV. – *Megalōsynē*, unknown in the papyri, is a divine attribute: “Yahweh is great and worthy of praise, and his majesty (Hebrew *gdôlâh*) is unsearchable,” sometimes associated with his power, sometimes with his mercy. Finally, the word is used as a name for God himself: the great high priest has taken his seat on high, in the heavens, “at the right hand of the Majesty.” Hence David’s doxology, “Thine, O Yahweh, is the majesty, the might, the splendor, the glory” (1 Chr 29:11), taken up by Jude 25: “To the only God, our Savior, through Jesus Christ our Lord, be glory, majesty, dominion, power, before all ages and forever, Amen.”

V. – In Eph 1:19 (the extraordinary or infinite greatness of the divine power, *to hyperballon megethos tēs dynamēōs autou*), the NT hapax *to megethos* recalls Exod 15:16 (Hebrew *gāḏōl*); and 2 Macc 15:24, which thus describes the arm of God. In the LXX, it ordinarily translates the Hebrew *qômâh*, referring to the loftiness of an object, or the height of plants and people (1 Sam 16:7; Cant 7:8; Xenophon, *Cyr.* 1.4.3). In the latter case, moral and social stature can be the point; which is a point of contact with the usage of the papyri, where from 60 BC (*BGU* 1816, 25) *to megethos* is a term of honor, especially for the prefect, analogous to *megaloprepēs*, and is an essential element of petitions addressed to him. Even loftier expressions are required for the emperor (*Dittenberger, Or.* 519, 24), and the nuance of might appears in the third-century formula “I take refuge with your Majesty” (*epi to son megethos katapheugō, P.Tebt.* 326, 4; *P.Stras.* 5, 6; cf. Xenophon, *Symp.* 8.1). But the exact parallels to Eph 1:19 come from Philo: “In approaching the altar ... you must keep your eyes fixed on the greatness of God” (*to tou theou megethos apoblepōn, Spec. Laws* 1.293); “God grants his benefits not in proportion to his own grace, which is infinite and endless, but according to the capacity of those who receive them.”

## μεθοδεία

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*methodeia*, **method, technique, machination**

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***methodeia***, S 3180; *TDNT* 5.102–103; *EDNT* 2.401; *NIDNTT* 3.935, 943; *MM* 394; *L&N* 88.158; *BDF* §23; *BAGD* 499

This noun is unknown in Greek before Eph 4:14; 6:11. It is derived from the verb *methodeuō*, “follow closely,” then “pursue by devious means,” hence “capture, trick, seduce.” The noun *methodos* is also used in both positive and negative senses. In the papyri, *methodeia* does not appear before AD 421, and it is always used in the administrative and financial sense of “method” of collecting taxes. But in Eph 4:14, it refers to the shrewdness (*panourgia*) of the false teachers, whose “devices” lead people into error (*planē*), and in Eph 6:11 it has to do with the devil’s ambushes or ensnaring maneuvers. So this *methodeia* can be defined as the well-thought-out, methodical art of leading astray, what we would call “machinations.” The *Suda* gives this definition: *methodeias: technas ē dolous*.

μεριστής

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*meristēs*, **apportioner, distributor**

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*meristes*, S 3312; EDNT 2.409; MM 398; L&N 63.25; BAGD 505

“Someone in the crowd said to him, ‘Master, tell my brother to share the inheritance with me’ (*merisasthai met’ emou*). He said to him, ‘Man, who appointed me a judge or apportioner (*kritēn ē meristēn*) between you?’” (Luke 12:14). Derived from *meris*, “part,” *meristēs* can mean nothing else in this context but “apportioner, distributor.” “Here it can mean only the person who arranges things in actual fact, as opposed to the *kritēs*, who gives a legal solution” (M. J. Lagrange, on this verse). But this term is rare, though far from unknown. It is an epithet for Sarapis and a function of Ammon: “His maternal grandfather is the distributor of life, Ammon, who is also Zeus of Greece and Asia.” These are “distributions” in Magnesia: “to give them distributions for sacrifice” (*dounai de autois tous meristas eis thysian*, *I.Magn.* 54, 36); and in Istria financial officials known as “distributors,” who are thus the best parallel to the biblical text.

We do not know what difference of opinion set the two brothers in Luke 12:14 at odds, but A. Steinwenter has noted the legal importance of the text and we know from “house-by-house inventory declarations (*kat’ oikian apographai*)” how frequent transfers of real property were, notably “dividings of inheritance,” where the origin of the property ownership is noted (“having belonged to,” *P.Bru.* 1–18) and respective parts that revert to each of the co-owners (*hekastō meros*, *P.Bru.* 16), a third (11), two-thirds (18), a fourth (16). A whole property can be owned jointly by four (10) or three (*P.Wisc.* 18) brothers, or two, as in Luke 12:14. One understands the difficulty of specifying the rights of each one and the ease of abusive claims. To illustrate the difference of opinion in the Gospel, we may cite the case of Aurelia Maria, from the village of Hermopolis. She complains to the prefect that her deceased parents had left her all their human property (*panta ta anthrōpina*), but her brother Onnophris seized them and sold some. She appeals to the prefect’s “philanthropy” to compel him to restore everything and proceed to “an equitable distribution” (*ex isou diameristhēnai*, cf. *PSI* 452, 8: *ex isou merous*).

μεσίτης

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*mesitēs*, **mediator, intermediary**

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*mesites*, S 3316; TDNT 4.598–624; EDNT 2.409; NIDNTT 1.372–376; MM 398; L&N 31.22, 40.6; BAGD 506

Unknown in classical Greek and derived from *mesos*, the noun *mesitēs* is commonly used in the Hellenistic period, especially in literary writings; it is less frequent in the papyri and rare in the inscriptions. It is used for someone who stands or walks in the middle, between two persons or two groups; the context indicates the reasons for this intervention. For example, Herod intervened on behalf of those who were seeking something from Agrippa (*tōn par' Agrippa tinōn epizētoumenōn mesitēs ēn*, Josephus, *Ant.* 16.24). He had “great influence in persuading Agrippa to perform good deeds, although he was not slow to do them on his own. Thus he reconciled the inhabitants of Ilium with Agrippa when he was angry with them” (*Ant.* 16.25–26). Thus this vague term “intermediary” can refer to very different persons, but it usually has legal connotations.

I. – Its only occurrence in the LXX refers to an arbiter in a dispute (Job 9:33, Hebrew *bayin*), which is the most frequent meaning in the papyri: the *kritēs mesitēs*, “Akylos, judge-arbiter in the trial of Apollonios.” In a judicial register from the third century, it is recounted that the opposing parties “accused each other; they shall appear within ten days.... We appointed Dorion as arbiter for them” (*P.Lille* 28, 11; cf. *P.Mil.Vogl.* 25, col. IV, 36).

II. – If the mediator intervenes in business transactions as a negotiator or business broker (*P.Tebt.* 406, 10), he is most often mentioned as a peacemaker whose business it is to reconcile opposing parties. The *Suda* gives this definition: *mesitēs: ho eirēnopoios*. It is significant that in speaking of a mediator-conciliator, Philo always mentions that he intervenes in an atmosphere of “paralyzing fear” (*Dreams* 1.142) and where someone is frightened. The mediator’s commonest role is to have a treaty signed by two enemy states. The consul Q. Marcius Philippus asks the Rhodians to intervene between kings Antiochus and Ptolemy, who are fighting (*tous Rhōdious mesitas apodeixai*).

III. – The *mesitēs* also plays the part of a witness, in the legal sense of the word, and thus the term becomes synonymous with *martys* (*BGU* 419, 8). At a marriage between a soldier and a widow, the inventory of the *paraphernalia* was done before *andrōn hikanōn mesitōn* (men who were capable witnesses, *P.Dura* 30, 13) who could recognize the existence of a debt (*P.Cair.Isid.* 62, 15; reprinted in *SB* 9167), being present at the paying of a sum of money.

IV. – Finally, *mesitēs* designates one who stands surety, thus becoming synonymous with *enguos*. The *mesitēs* is the guardian of oaths (Josephus, *Ant.* 4.133; Epictetus, *Ench.* 33, 5; Heraclitus, *All.* 23.8), of deposits, and of

contracts: Medea, Jason's repudiated wife, wanting to take vengeance on her husband, cut her children's throats, fled from Corinth, and took refuge at Thebes with Hercules, "for he, the guarantor of the pact concluded at Colchis (*touton gar mesitēn gegonota tōn homologiōn*) had promised to protect her if Jason should break faith" (Diodorus Siculus 4.54.7). The friendship of Orestes and Pylades is placed under the protection and the guarantee of the deity; thus it takes on a changeless character.

It is Philo who first gave *mesitēs* a religious meaning (cf. also *T. Dan* 6.2), attributing a mediating and conciliating character to the angels (*Dreams* 1.142–143) and to Moses (*hoia mesitēs kai diallaktēs*) making prayers and supplications and asking forgiveness for sins (*Moses* 2.166). St. Paul also makes this last attribution. But 1 Tim 2:5, setting forth a baptismal profession of faith or a liturgical acclamation, stipulates "for there is one God, one mediator between God and humans, the human Christ Jesus." Not only does this text describe Christ as a mediator, placing him in the middle as an intermediary between God and humans, the sole valid representative of both parties; but it also specifies that "he gave himself as a ransom for all" in order to actualize the salvation willed by God. Thus he reconciled those whom sin had set at variance. This is not a temporary assignment, but his permanent function: the God-Man was, so to speak, born to be the Peacemaker!

In Heb 8:6; 9:15; 12:24, where Christ is portrayed as the great high priest, mediation becomes a new chapter in NT Christology. It is specified that the essence of his priestly mediation is not simply to intercede on our behalf (Heb 7:25) but first and foremost to offer himself as a sacrifice and thus redeem our sins; but it is also stated that he opens the heavens and provides access to the blessed city. The fact that Christ's mediation is always set in relation to the *diathēkē kainē* (new covenant) shows that Christ is first and foremost the pledge or guarantee of the covenant; his shed blood is the surety that guarantees God's performance of all of its clauses and which is valid for all humankind. This meaning – "guaranturesurety" – is to be noted in favor of the soteriological optimism of the new covenant.

μεταλλάσσω

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*metallassō*, to exchange, leave, pass away

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*metallasso*, S 3337; TDNT 1.259; EDNT 2.414; NIDNTT 3.166–167; MM 403; L&N 57.142, 68.50; BDF §179(2); BAGD 511



*Allassō* and almost all of its compound forms (*diallassō*, *katallassō*) have the basic meaning “to change”; but just as *apallassō* often has the nuance “put an end to, cease,” *metallassō*, in the Koine, almost always has the sense of “pass away.” This is its only meaning in the OT and by far its predominant meaning in the papyri. In AD 124, a contract for remarriage successively takes up the eventuality of the death of each spouse: “If the same Eleaios, son of Simon, should die (*metallazei ... ton bion*) before the same Salome.... If Salome, daughter of John Galgoula, should die (*metallazei ton bion*) before the same Elaios” (*P.Mur.* 115, 10, 12); “If one of the two dies” (*P.Dura* 17, 35; *BGU* 1574, 11; 1662, 6; 1783, 11); in the will of Taptollion at the beginning of the second century, “If any of them should die childless and intestate.”

If, in literary Koine and several papyri or inscriptions, *metallassō* retains its classical meaning “leave” a place or “change, exchange,” the usage just discussed shows how radical a change is envisioned: it is a substitution. Hence the nuance “exchange” in Rom 1:25–26: the pagans have turned aside and distanced themselves from the true knowledge of God and traded him for the lie of idols (*metēllaxan tēn alētheian tou theou en tō pseudei*). This is not an evolution but a substitution. The punishment that followed was the perversion of sexual relations: a traffic contrary to nature. The verb *metallassō* in the second verse is used to mark the strict correspondence between moral deviation on the one hand and the “replacing” of God with idols on the other hand. It looks like a weaker usage, but it nevertheless evinces a subversion and even a sort of contradiction between two attitudes.

## μετανοέω, μετάνοια

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*metanoēō*, **to know after, change one’s mind, repent**; *metanoia*, **repentance**

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***metanoēō***, S 3340; *TDNT* 4.975–1008; *EDNT* 2.415–419; *NIDNTT* 1.357–359; MM 403–404; L&N 41.52; BDF §235(2); BAGD 511–512 | ***metanoia***, S 3341; *TDNT* 4.975–1008; *EDNT* 2.415–419; *NIDNTT* 1.357–358; MM 405; L&N 41.52; BAGD 512; ND 4.160

Repentance in the literal sense is very close both to *metamelomai* (“be afflicted, troubled by a certain misdeed that one has committed”), which can express every kind of regret, sorrow, and disgust, and also to *epistrephō* (“turn toward, pay attention, turn back, convert”). This is proved by the fact that these terms are often linked or even used in each other’s place. Nevertheless, *metanoēō*, in accordance with its very etymology, has a meaning of its own, attested in secular literature as well as in Scripture.

I. – Just as *pronoeō* means “know before, foresee,” *metanoeō* is literally “know after,” the particle *meta* indicating proximity or concomitance. This is the sense of its earliest known use, by Epicharmus ( 460 BC): “The wise man must not know after but know before” (*ou metanoein, alla pronoein chrē ton andra ton sophon*). To repent is first of all to change one’s mind (Plato, *Euthd.* 279 c; Diodorus Siculus 1.67.5), change intentions (Josephus, *Ant.* 2.322), change plans (Ag. *Apion* 1.274), and reflect, which implies a time later than the first knowledge (Wis 12:10 – *topon metanoias*; Philo, *Alleg. Interp.* 3.106: “God grants time to repent”); one “reconsiders” a first opinion (Isa 46:8).

II. – Still in line with its etymology, *metanoeō* has to do first of all with a change of mind or feelings resulting from this after-knowledge: “But when we reflected ... we had to change our minds.” According to the *Tabula of Cebes* 10, the function of *metanoia* is to introduce “a new form of thought and feeling”; after coming under the influence of Deception (*apatē*), whence derive ignorance and error, there is no other recourse than Repentance. For Philo, the soul declares that it repents of its errors in past judgments, the fruit of thoughtlessness; it must open itself to repentance, which is the younger sibling of perfect innocence (*Dreams* 1.91; cf. *Virtues* 180; Josephus, *Ant.* 7.264); in the face of difficulties, it changes its conceptions (*Dreams* 1.182), but it can “return to better feelings.”

III. – What characterizes this evolution is that it is accompanied by regret, sorrow, or shame at the former opinion or attitude: “The next day regrets (*metanoia*) developed, with the reflection (*analogismos*) that the resolution settled upon was cruel and serious – to wipe out an entire city rather than the responsible parties alone.” “He will not have to reproach himself, do battle against himself, repent, torment himself” (Epictetus 2.22.35); “The Athenians were taken by profound repentance and deeply missed (*pothos*) Cimon” (Plutarch, *Per.* 10.3); “Blame and reprimand beget shame and repentance (*metanoian kai aischynēn*), the former being similar to sorrow, the latter to fear.” “They will speak to one another with regret (*metanoountes*) and with anguished spirits they will moan” (Wis 5:3); “Those who repent and anguish (*tous metanoountas kai achthomenous*) of their former error say, ‘Unhappy people that we are.’ ” Aristobulus, full of remorse over the murder of his brother, falls ill, afflicted with great pain and vomiting blood (Josephus, *Ant.* 13.314).

If *metanoia* “is a sort of reproach (*epilēpsis tis*) that one addresses to oneself when one thinks that one has let something useful go by ... an honest man would never be able to repent of letting a pleasure go by” (Marcus Aurelius 8.10), the regret can simply be over being caught in some deed (Philo, *Virtues* 152) or having given up some good (*Virtues* 208), or even over having done

something good, as when Pharaoh repented of having let the Hebrews leave (*Moses* 1.167; cf. *Flacc.* 181; *To Gaius* 303, 337, 339). Plutarch, *Tim.* 6.4: “Repentance makes us ashamed of even a good action, while determination based on science and reason does not vary, even when our undertakings have failed.”

IV. – Normally repentance follows the offense (Plutarch, *Cam.* 38.5); in any event, it entails a change of conduct or of future status, and in principle it could be for the better or for the worse, as with two murderers who spared a child because it smiled at them but then repented (*metenoēsan*) and sought to kill it (Plutarch, *Conv. sept. sap.* 21). “The person who claims to have repented while still committing injustices is not in his right mind” (*Flight* 160); it is all a question of loyalty and faithfulness: “The law orders giving absolution to a person on the condition that he proves the sincerity of his repentance not by a simple promise but by actions” (*Spec. Laws* 1.236); “I would pardon him for the past if in the future he would repent and be loyal to me” (Josephus, *Life* 110); “I promised pardon on the condition that they would change their attitude” (*Life* 262). In the OT, the object of repentance is sins committed (*Wis* 11:23; 12:19; *Sir* 17:24; 48:15) as much as the malice that inspired them (*Jer* 8:6; 18:6), but it is not simply a case of a psychological evolution of a person coming around to himself, but of satisfying God’s requirements. *Metanoia* becomes a religious idea, because it is God who leads the human heart to repentance and pardons only those who are repentant. *Ep. Aristides* 188 inherits this conception: “The best thing you can do to maintain the royal power is to imitate God’s indefectible mercy; for in showing magnanimity and in punishing the guilty with more indulgence than they deserve, you will turn them away from evil and lead them to repentance.”

V. – In the NT, *metanoēō* and *metanoia* (56 occurrences) retain this basic meaning, “change opinions, regret, be grieved about something,” but they are used almost exclusively for the attitude of unbelievers and sinners returning to God, and they are laden with a new theological density; they form an essential part of the kerygma lexicon, urging “conversion” to Christianity. There is no longer any question of distinguishing between change of thoughts, of heart, of actions. The change is that of the soul, of the whole person (the new creature), who is purified of stains and whose life is transformed, metamorphosed. It is significant that the present imperative *metanoēite* sums up the preaching of John the Baptist in the wilderness (*Matt* 3:2; *Mark* 1:15) in connection with faith, entrance into the kingdom of God, and purification from sins. This latter is not just any regret or repudiation but affliction, “remorse” that inspires a desire to make reparation, even expiation. Jesus defined his mission: “I did not come to call the righteous but sinners to repentance” (*Luke* 5:32); “If you do

not repent, you will all perish”; and he sends the Twelve to make the same proclamation: “They preached repentance” (*ekēryxan hina metanoōsin*, Mark 6:12; Luke 24:47).

St. Peter would be faithful to this assignment on the day of Pentecost: “Repent (*metanoēsate*, aorist imperative) and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins” (Acts 2:38; cf. 3:19). He requires Simon Magus to make this break with wickedness (8:22); and if he presents Christ as Savior “in order to give Israel repentance and remission of sins” (5:31), St. Paul would understand that this gift was for the Gentiles (11:18) and all people (17:30; 20:21).

The apostle Paul knows that no one can be converted unless led by divine mercy: “God’s kindness calls you to repentance” (Rom 2:4; 2 Pet 3:9), but he fears that many will not have repented of the impurities that they have committed (2 Cor 12:21). According to Heb 6:1, *metanoia* is part of the first baptismal catechism, “repentance from dead works and faith in God”; but the renewal of repentance is impossible for an apostate (Heb 6:6), as it was for Esau, although he sought it with tears (Heb 12:17; cf. Wis 12:10). In Revelation, Christ urges “lukewarm” or discouraged Christians to correct themselves, to return to their first works and have zeal (2:5, 16, 21, 22; 3:3, 19), but he denounces the “rest of humankind,” unrepentant idolaters, fornicators, blasphemers.

The modern pastoral definition of repentance – “remorse at having offended God with the firm intention of making up for one’s offenses and falling into them no more” – is quite in line with Revelation. Nevertheless, the essence is missing: namely, that this contrition is inspired by the knowledge of God and has as its effect eternal salvation.

μετέχω, μετοχή, μέτοχος

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*metechō*, **to share, participate**; *metochē*, **participation**; *metochos*, **partner**

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***metecho***, S 3348; TDNT 2.830–832; EDNT 2.420; NIDNTT 1.635–636, 639; MM 405; L&N 23.2, 34.31, 34.32, 57.6; BDF §169(1); BAGD 514 | ***metochē***, S 3352; TDNT 2.830–832; EDNT 2.420; NIDNTT 1.635–636; MM 406; L&N 34.7; BAGD 514 | ***metochos***, S 3353; TDNT 2.830–832; EDNT 2.420; NIDNTT 1.635–636, 639; MM 406; L&N 34.8; BDF §182(1); BAGD 514; ND 1.84–85

Only the context permits a judgment as to whether a given *metochos* is an ordinary companion or an associate in the legal or moral sense. It is synonymous with *koinōnos* and indicates a certain *de facto* or *de jure* alliance;

for example, those who share a house (*P.Petaus* 13, 14; 14, 13, 16, 58, 112), *geōrgoi metochoi* (farmers; *SB* 266, g 5; cf. *P.Petaus* 126, 2), especially those who have a common profession or public function, in particular tax collectors. Beginning with the third century BC, we see associates, like Zeno and Crito, and eventually Sostratos, acting as *metochoi*, pooling their funds and making them available to the actual farmers, Demetrios and Hippocrates; they takes risks, but they also get a large part of the profits. A century later: “Paid to the bank of Hermouthis for a quarter of the fishermen of Memnoneia ... by Pamonthes, son of Teos and his associate, 1,800 drachmas” (*Pamōnthēs ... kai ho metochos*, *P.Rein.* 125, 5). These are parallels to Luke 5:7 – “Simon and the others who were in the same boat ... signaled to their associates (*metochois*; cf. verse 10: *koinōnoi*) in the other boat that they should come help them.” These men not only worked and fished together; they pooled their resources to pay for boats, nets, and the right to fish on the lake, and they divided the fishing revenues according to their respective interests in the partnership. So we must think of Peter and the first apostles not only as living in community but also as being partners in the firm of “Simon and Co.,” so closely associated that they were together to hear John the Baptist on the banks of the Jordan, that they went back to fishing together, and that, in full agreement, they abandoned “their net” and their business to follow Jesus. The participation together (*metochē*) constituted a perfect community (cf. Ps 122:3 – *hē metochē autēs epi to auto*) and better: a mutual affinity.

A *metochos* can have a share in material goods or in spiritual realities; the emphasis is then on matching rights of ownership, as with the baptized, who are “sharers of the heavenly calling” (*klēseōs epouraniou metochoi*, Heb 3:1), “sharers of the Holy Spirit” (*metochous genēthentas pneumatōs hagiou*, 6:4), “sharers in Christ” (*metochoi gar tou Christou gegonamen*, 3:14). Since they are all sons of God (2:9, 13), belonging to the same family (2:11), brothers of Christ (2:12), Christians share Christ’s lot, have common use of his riches (6:4), and are associated with him in the closest possible way.

This nuance of intimate sharing, of assimilation, already suggested by the use of the verb *metechō* for eating or instruction, is revealed by its interchangeability with *koinōneō*: “So, since children have flesh and blood in common (*kekoinōnēken*), he also shares (*meteschen*) in these same things.” If *metechō* is used for a band of malefactors, it is used above all for sharing in honors and responsibilities: “I have reached the age of sixty-eight and I should be enrolled among the members of the *gerousia* who have lived the same number of years, so as to share in the privileges of the *gerousia*.” Finally, one may share in priestly and cultic functions. A decree from Delphi for Telesagoros of Abai stipulates “that he have a share (*metechēin*) in the exercise

of every office and every priesthood to which the noble families of Delphi have a share (*metechousi*)” (*SEG* II, 294, 11; first third of the first century AD). An epigram of Serenos: “It was for libations and sacrifices that we came here (to Philae), desiring to participate in them” (*deomenoi kai toutōn metaschein*, *SB* 8681, 8; second century). At Imbros: “Let the *praktores* participate in the sacred affairs (*metechein tōn hierōn*) like all the other Imbrians.” This sacred meaning is that of 1 Cor 10:17, where the Christians share in a single Loaf: *hoi gar pantes ek tou henos artou metechomen* (cf. verse 16, *koinōnia*); and 10:21, where it is said that one cannot participate in the Lord’s table and in the table of demons. One takes part by communing with others.

### μετεωρίζομαι

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*meteōrizomai*, **to be raised, suspended, exalted; to be in suspense, be anxious**

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*meteorizomai*, S 3349; *TDNT* 4.630–631; *EDNT* 2.420; MM 405; L&N 25.232; BAGD 514

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After prescribing “Take no thought for what you shall eat or what you shall drink,” Jesus adds *kai mē meteōrizesthe* (Luke 12:29). The Vulgate translates literally *et nolite in sublime tolli*. And indeed the ordinary meaning of the verb is “to be raised, suspended” in a physical sense; but it is hard to see what sense this definition makes of the text, which urges confidence and denounces anxiety.

With the support of Thucydides 8.16.2, which uses *meteōrizō* for a boat driven to the open sea, some have leapt to the conclusion that this verb can mean “agitate (with disquiet),” a meaning nowhere else attested. As for other meanings, the sense of prideful exaltation or haughtiness, the preponderant denotation in the LXX, does not fit here.

M. J. Lagrange (on Luke 12:29) is right to point out that the moral sense of *meteōros*, which started from “to be on high, be suspended” and evolved into “be in suspense, be anxious.” He cites Josephus, *Ant.* 8.218: the crowd is agitated, anxious to hear what Rehoboam will say; *War* 4.118: “Titus knew that many, giving in to private hatred and personal hostility, would denounce innocent people if he sought out the guilty. So it was better to leave the guilty party in suspense and fear” (*einai meteōron en phobō*).

The denominative verb *meteōrizomai* is well-attested in this sense: Herod, when he named his successors, was very disturbed (*memeteōristo polla*) because of their rivalry and the hopes that he had given his sons (Josephus, *Ant.*

16.135). In the second century, Julius Clemens writes to his brother Arrianus: “You know that I am anxious (*ginōskōn hoti meteōrizomai*) if you do not write me frequently concerning your affairs” (*P.Mich.* 484, 5–6); “I am very anxious and astonished concerning this” (*Pap.Lugd.Bat.* I, 13, 2). In the following century, Appia urges his mother Serapias: “Do not be upset; we are doing well” (*Kyria, mē meteōrizou, kalōs diagomen*). Thus we can with complete certainty translate Luke 12:29 “do not be anxious.” This is not a *crux interpretum*.

## μετριοπαθῶ

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*metriopatheō*, to suffer (or experience emotion) with moderation; to sympathize

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*metriopatheo*, S 3356; TDNT 5.938; EDNT 2.421; MM 406; L&N 88.65; BDF §187(7); BAGD 514–515

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According to Heb 5:2, the high priest must be able to sympathize with the ignorant and the straying (*metriopathein dynamenos*). At least that is the sense suggested by the context, which insists that Jesus was really human, that he was in every respect like his brothers, and that he learned to be merciful through his experience of human weakness. But according to its etymology (*paschein metriōs* or *kata to metron*) the biblical hapax *metriopatheō*, which unknown in the papyri and the inscriptions and is a term of school philosophy, would mean “suffer with moderation,” as at *Ep. Arist.* 256: philosophy requires “properly carrying out the present responsibility while remaining within measure” (*metriopathē*).

According to Aristotle (see Diogenes Laertius 5.31; *De vit. et poes. Hom.* 135), followed by the Stoics, *metriopatheia* – “patience, the daughter of moderation” (Plutarch, *De frat. amor.* 18) – is the golden mean between indifference or insensitivity (*apatheia*) and extreme reaction, hypersensitivity, frantic excitement (*ametria tōn pathōn*). The sage must be neither too easily moved (*pathētikos*) nor unfeeling (*apathēs*) but *metriopathēs* (cf. Plutarch, *De virt. mor.* 12; Ps.-Plutarch, *Cons. ad Apoll.* 3 and 22; Plutarch, *De cohib. ira* 458 c; *De frat. amor.* 489 c), far from excess. This is an eminently Philonian virtue: “The excellent and profitable lessons of reason ... neither immoderate convulsions ... nor impassibility ... preferring the golden mean to the extremes, holding to moderation in the emotions (*metriopathein*)” (Abraham 257); “In my view, modesty, truthfulness, moderation in the emotions (*metriopatheia*), humility, and innocence are weighty ...; immodesty, lying, excess in the emotions (*hē ametria tōn pathōn*), pride, wickedness are enemies” (*Virtues*

195); “Moses thinks that he must remove and suppress the short-tempered element of the soul, because what he prefers is not moderation in the emotions (*ou metriopatheian*) but the total absence of the emotions” (*Alleg. Interp.* 3.129); “Aaron strives for moderations in the emotions” (*ibid.* 3.132); “The one who is perfect thinks of nothing petty or base; moderating the emotions is not his desire (*oude metriopathein bouletai*); he goes well beyond this, having entirely suppressed the passions everywhere” (*ibid.* 3.134); “Well-trained in misfortune ... I have been treated as a prisoner, I have lived as a foreigner, I have worked for wages, I have toiled at another’s bidding, I have been threatened even with death ... I have personally suffered a thousand unendurable evils. Through it all, I have learned to moderate my emotions (*eph’ hois paideutheis metriopathein*), and I have not given in” (*Joseph* 26).

On the basis of these texts, some commentators interpret Heb 5:2 to mean “who can restrain his anger against the ignorant and the wayward.” As opposed to Moses, who gave in to unbridled wrath stirred up by sin (Exod 32:19), the high priest should be mild, though not weak and not excessively indulgent. But this golden moderation, this balance, has no point of contact with the immoderate spectacle of Christ’s suffering at Gethsemane (Heb 5:7–8), nor with the fact that he learned compassion for his human brothers and sisters precisely through being engulfed in weakness himself (5:2). Moreover, Philo made of *metriopatheia* a virtue of those who were on the way (like Aaron), whereas *apatheia* was for him the virtue of those who had achieved perfection, like Moses (*Alleg. Interp.* 3.144); and it is impossible to detract in the slightest from the perfection (*teleiōsis*) of the high priest of the new covenant, which is so insistently affirmed by Hebrews – a major element of which is merciful lovingkindness.

So it seems preferable to consider *metriopatheō* in the vocabulary of this letter as a synonym of *sympatheō* (Heb 4:5), associated with feelings of magnanimity, of *epieikeia*, of *praotēs*. These connotations of goodness, kindness, patience suggest that Christ’s *metriopatheia* is not to be understood in terms of the traditional Stoic vocabulary, nor even, as is often the case with compound forms, according to its etymology. Rather, it means that commiseration, sympathy is innate in the priest’s nature. Being weak himself (5:2), he puts himself on the level of sinners (Gal 6:1); his moderation in compassion comes from within, from his experience of his own weakness (*astheneia*, Heb 4:15; 5:2; cf. Matt 26:41), though without sin. This innocence makes him even more merciful.

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μνησκομαι, μνεία, μνήμη, μνημονεύω, μνημόσυνον



*mimnēskomai*, to remember, mention; *mneia*, memory, mention; *mnēmē*, memory, mention, faculty of memory; *mnēmoneuō*, to remember, keep in mind; *mnēmosynon*, monument, memorial, thing remembered

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*mimneskomai*, S 3403; TDNT 4.672–678; EDNT 2.430; NIDNTT 3.230, 233, 240–242, 245; MM 412–413; L&N 29.7, 29.16; BDF §§26, 155(1), 175, 311(2), 341, 396, 416(2); BAGD 522 | *mneia*, S 3417; TDNT 4.678–679; EDNT 2.434; NIDNTT 3.230, 238, 242, 246; MM 414; L&N 29.7, 29.18; BAGD 524 | *mneme*, S 3420; TDNT 4.679; EDNT 2.435; NIDNTT 3.230–231, 238, 240; MM 415; L&N 29.7; BAGD 524–525 | *mnemoneuo*, S 3421; TDNT 4.682–683; EDNT 2.435–436; NIDNTT 3.230, 240–243; MM 415; L&N 29.7; BDF §175; BAGD 525 | *mnemosunon*, S 3422; EDNT 2.436; NIDNTT 3.230, 233, 236, 238, 242; MM 415; L&N 29.12; BDF §110(2); BAGD 525

From Homer to the papyri, the verb *mimnēskō* in the middle voice means “have in one’s head, think about, remember, mention,” and is normally construed with the genitive for the object of memory. Its meanings can be divided into three principal groups: (a) “put oneself in mind of, recall”: “Farewell, and remember the things that I have said” (*errōsō kai memnēsō tōn eirēmenōn*, *P.Mert.* 12, 26; AD 58); “You know the one I am talking about” (*P.Mert.* 85, 6); “For it is necessary to remember your nobility” (*anankaion gar esti mimnēskesthai tēs kalokagathias sou*). Sometimes there is a legal nuance: “inform, make appeal”; in a letter from the first half of the first century, Nemesios protests against the decision of an *archaimachirophoros*: “It is necessary that they inform (or appeal to) the *stratēgos*.” Sometimes the nuance is affective (“I evoke for you”) and expresses commonality of feelings: “Remember us, as we remember you” (*P.Ant.* 44, 16); “Every time I think of you ... I weep” (*P.Mich.* 465, 9); “with us he constantly mentioned you.”

(b) To mention is also to evoke the memory of, recall, commemorate; it is in this sense that the verb appears in tomb inscriptions and takes on a religious value. A pilgrim in his *proskynēma* associates his wife and children; “I heard (the voice of Memnon) four times and I remembered (*kai emnēsthēn*) Zeno and Arianus, my brothers.” A husband carries out an act of adoration by proxy for his absent wife. In letters, the writer asks to be remembered in prayers (*BGU* 2006, 3; second century BC; *C.P.Herm.* 9, 9; 47, 6).

(c) To remember is again to “take care, concern oneself with,” a reason for acting: *kata touto memnēmenos* (*P.Oxy.* 2407, 34); “You did not write me at all, and you took no thought for the security of the house” (1070, 48); “Take care to send me the letter from Evangelus by the hand of someone trustworthy” (*mnēsthēti pempasai moi ... tēn epistolēn*, 2984, 11).

These meanings are also found in the LXX, which almost always translates the Hebrew verb *zākar* with *mimnēskomai*, giving it considerable theological resonance. To be sure, the psychological meaning (“memory of the past”) is attested a number of times: people remember the fish eaten in Egypt (Num 11:5; cf. Ezek 23:27; Ps 137:1, 6) and things that happened in a foreign land (Wis 19:10), money left on deposit (Tob 4:1), and fatherly words of command (6:15), but the evocation of the past is blurred in favor of the nuance “consider, reflect,” usually with a view to beneficent intervention. This sort of memory is first of all attributed to God, who “remembers” to put aside evil and bless people. It is an expression of his faithfulness: he remembers his covenant in answering prayers (Exod 2:24; Ps 105:8; 106:45; 111:5). He remembers that men are of flesh (Ps 78:39; 88:5; 89:47; 103:14; 136:23); his mercy stirs wonder: “What is man that you remember him, the son of Adam that you concern yourself with him?” (Ps 8:4 = Heb 2:6–9), despite his smallness! The faith of Israel is expressed in this conviction: “Yahweh remembers us; he will bless us,” and “religion” means beseeching God to remember. God is asked not to remember ancestors’ offenses (Ps 79:8; Bar 3:5) or personal transgressions (Ps 25:7); “Even in your wrath, remember with pity” (Hab 3:2; Jer 31:20), because the Lord acts according to his grace (Ps 25:6; Isa 64:8), remains attached to his own (Ps 74:2; 106:4) and remembers their sacrifices and offerings (Ps 20:3). Confidence is absolute: “Remember me and take care of me.”

On the human side, the great moral principle is to think of Yahweh, after the fashion of Tobias: “I remembered God with all my soul”: remaining mindful of all his marvelous deeds, notably the whole history of Israel under the manifest guidance of Providence (Deut 7:18; 8:2, 18; 9:7; 15:15; 16:3, 12; 24:18, 22; 32:7), but also remembering the Lord’s commandments and the law of Moses to do them (Exod 20:8; Num 15:39–40; Deut 5:15; Josh 1:13; Ps 103:18; Isa 63:11; Mal 3:22); one takes into account prophecies (Tob 2:6) and the words of an angel (Tob 8:2). So this memory is a source of obedience, a taking into consideration that inspires courage and faithfulness (Amos 1:9), especially in times of distress (Isa 26:16, Hebrew *pāqad* = look upon with attention and interest). It is expressed also in worship, where the Lord’s benefits are celebrated: “Remember that his name is exalted” (Isa 12:4; 63:7); “Remember to magnify his work, which is sung by men” (Job 36:24; Bar 2:32); “I want to commemorate your name in every generation” (Ps 45:17; 71:16; 78:35; Isa 17:10); close relations are associated with this celebration, as when Jonathan writes to the Spartans, “We do not cease to remember you on our feasts and other holy days in the sacrifices that we offer” (1 Macc 12:11).

This memory, which is in reality a reflection, is a preponderant element in Israelite moral pedagogy. The wicked do not think about doing mercy (Ps 109:16), take no thought for the poor (Eccl 9:15; Sir 16:17), have no interest in wisdom (Sir 15:8; Bar 3:23; Isa 57:11); but the wise person remembers his parents with gratitude (Sir 7:28; 23:14), remembers that “we all will die” (8:7) and that the divine wrath will not be slow in coming (7:16). Thus “memory” has bearing on the future: “In all your actions, remember your end and you will not sin.” Moral conduct is determined by this “memory,” this judicious judgment, informed by the experience of the past and by human psychology.

The meanings of the verb are less numerous in Philo and Josephus, where the meaning “mention, cite” is by far the most frequent and “remember the past” only a little less so: “the intelligence thinks the present, remembers (*memnētai*) the past, awaits the future.” But one also remembers the future: according to Solon, it is in the fifth cycle of life that “man thinks of marriage” (Philo, *Creation* 104), is preoccupied with it (cf. *Heir* 12); “Remember that you will even have to make war against the Romans” (Josephus, *Life* 209). That is to say, this remembering consists of thinking, meditating, reflecting, and finally “taking into account” certain information in view of an action to be undertaken. Only Philo uses the verb with a religious sense: God is “the one who ought to be remembered constantly”; “If you remember your own nothingness ... you will also remember God’s transcendence” (*Sacr. Abel and Cain* 55); finally, the meaning of memorial: in celebrating a sacred meal, one remembers the sacrifices (*Plant.* 162: *tōn thysiōn memnēmenoi*; cf. *Decalogue* 94).

In the NT, “remembering” has lost much of its importance, probably because of what was completely new in the covenant instituted by Jesus. God’s remembering is mentioned only four times: first, in the words of the Virgin Mary (Luke 1:54) and of Zacharias (Luke 1:72), in terms that partake very much of OT language (Ps 98:3; 106:8), to celebrate the *mirabilia Dei*, God’s merciful intervention in messianic salvation; then in two texts in Hebrews that are simply quotations. Heb 2:16 quotes Ps 8:5 (“What is man that you should remember him?”); Heb 8:12 quotes Jer 31:34 (“I will remember their sins no longer”).

On the other hand, the human activity of remembering is often mentioned, notably with regard to the recent past (“If you remember that your brother has something against you” [Matt 5:23]), and especially with regard to words that have been uttered: the Pharisees and the chief priests remember that Jesus had announced his resurrection (Matt 27:63), and Peter remembers that the Master had predicted his denial; but this is a matter of recalling a prophecy to memory, as for example when the angels remind the holy women (Luke 24:6, 8), and this is not a simple evocation but includes understanding, as when the apostles come

to understand the purification of the temple while meditating on Ps 69:10 (John 2:17, 22), or the triumph of Palm Sunday in light of Zech 9:9 (John 12:16). In baptizing the centurion Cornelius, Peter remembers what Jesus had said concerning the baptism in the Holy Spirit (Acts 11:16). To remember words “spoken aforetime” (*proeirēmenōn*) by the prophets, the apostles, and the Lord and Savior Jesus Christ means not only to accept and believe them but to obey them, because this submission is the rule of thought and of life (Jude 17; 2 Pet 3:2). In addition, St. Paul praises the Corinthians for remembering him (*mou memnēsthe*) “and holding to the traditions just as I transmitted them to you.”

As in the wisdom writers, “remembering” can be a simple recollection that allows reflection, but also the origin of beneficent and helpful conduct, and there is mixed with it a positive affective reaction to helping the unfortunate. St. Paul, imprisoned at Rome, remembers Timothy’s tears (2 Tim 1:4), probably on the occasion of the apostle’s arrest. The captive cannot get this wrenching farewell scene out of his mind.

*Mneia*. – This substantive has two meanings: “memory” and “mention” (to make mention of someone). In the former case, it is used especially with the verb *echō* (“keep the memory”). In this sense, “you always keep a good memory of us” (*echete mneian hēmōn agathēn pantote*, 1 Tim 3:6).

Classical Greek and the LXX usually use the formula *mneian poieō*, “make mention of.” The inscriptions from the Hellenistic era give a religious value: “I, Menelaos, come to the great goddess Isis, and I mention (*mneian poioumenos*) my own people for good.” It appears many times in letters, beginning in the third century with the correspondence of Zeno: “making mention on every occasion” (*em panti kairō mneian poioumenoi*, SB 6720, 3); “to make mention of us” (*peri hēmōn mneian poēsai*, 6784; 8142 = SEG VIII, 552). The soldier Antonius Maximus writes to his sister Sabina: “making mention of thee before the gods here” (*mneian sou poioumenos para tois enthade theois*). A woman, Isias, writes to her “brother” Hephaistion (her husband?), a refugee at the Serapeum at Memphis: “All those who are in the household continually make mention of you” (*hoi en oikō pantes sou diapantos mneian poioumenos*). So we can see that Paul was conforming to good contemporary usage from his first letter (“always making mention concerning you all,” *pantote peri pantōn hymōn mneian poioumenoi*) to his last (“without ceasing I keep your memory” [2 Tim 1:3]).

*Mnēmē*. – This action noun is quite often synonymous with the preceding word, but it especially evokes the faculty of memory and not the objective memory itself (*mnēma*, a commemorative monument, tomb, etc.). Facts are entrusted to memory (2 Macc 2:25); one remembers what is past (Wis 11:12). In making psalms, one remembers the holiness and goodness of God (Ps 30:4;

97:12; 145:7); but according to Eccl 1:11, the memory of the ancients, the wise (2:16), the dead is lost. *Mnēmēn echō* is to retain the memory, *mnēmēn poieō* is to mention, evoke, bring to mind. This latter meaning is that of the NT hapax: “I will be zealous that on every occasion after my departure you will be able to bring these things to mind” (*tēn toutōn mnēmēn poieisthai*, 2 Pet 1:15; parallel to *hypomimnēskēin peri toutōn*, 1:12, and *en hypomnēsei*, 1:13). To evaluate this effort, we should remember that Philo wrote his treatise *On the Special Laws* “to awaken the memory of lovers of knowledge” (*Spec. Laws* 4.238), because “the ancient tradition is transmitted ... to the memory of contemporaries and of the generations that follow” (*Sacr. Abel and Cain* 78). Indeed, Philo is the theologian of *mnēmē*, an innate faculty (*Creation* 18; *Alleg. Interp.* 2.43; 3.91–93; *Spec. Laws* 1.334), but one given by God, so that it is almost always seen as beneficent, forgetfulness being an illness of the memory (*Prelim. Stud.* 39–41; *Change of Names* 84; *Virtues* 176). Of course, it is first of all the recording of the past and “through memories, the flame of noble qualities is kept alive” (*Migr. Abr.* 16; *Dreams* 2.37); but for Philo, the memory is above all a religious faculty: a memory of the good (*Alleg. Interp.* 3.18; *Husbandry* 133); “memory is for keeping and observing the holy precepts” and it is indispensable to the disciple for profiting from the Master’s counsel.

*Mnēmoneuō*. – This denominative verb, which is construed either with the genitive or with the accusative, is practically synonymous with *mimnēskō*, like its meaning “recall, remember” both in the classical literature and in the papyri: “I exhort you to remember me in your holy prayer”; “urging you to remember me also” (*parakalōn mnēmoneuēs kamou*, *C.P.Herm.* 8, 10); “Remember your oath concerning the holy church.” Likewise in the LXX, where one remembers the past, but this evocation is especially a reflection, a thinking that determines conduct.

Philo gives *mnēmoneuō* its exact nuance “keep in mind” in his commentary on Gen 2:15 – “‘keep’ (*phylattō*) means ‘remember’ (*mnēmoneuō*)” (*Alleg. Interp.* 1.89). Quite fundamental for the soul: “a memory free of forgetfulness, keeping everything that merits being kept.” This is the meaning of the verb that the evangelists place exclusively in Jesus’ mouth: “Do you not retain the memory (*ou mnēmoneuete*) of the five loaves that fed the five thousand?” Likewise St. Paul, who keeps in mind the virtues of the Thessalonians (1 Thess 1:3), exhorts Christians to remember him affectionately (Acts 20:31; 1 Thess 2:9; col. 4:18) and to be faithful to his teachings (2 Thess 2:5) or to those of Christ (Acts 20:35). Converted Gentiles must retain the memory of the time when they were “without Christ” (Eph 2:11), and this evocation is always a call to faithfulness and devotion (Gal 2:10). Consequently, to “retain the memory of

Jesus Christ” (2 Tim 2:8) is not simply the act of remembering but thinking and deepening one’s faith by drawing out the consequences.

According to Heb 11:15, the patriarchs did not hold on to the memory of (attachment to) their native land, and on his deathbed Joseph calls to mind the exodus of the Israelites. The exhortation to preserve the memory of the *hēgoumenoi* is always a recommendation to faithfulness.

*Mnēmosynon*. – This neuter noun, a substantivized form of the adjective *mnēmosynos*, normally means that which one remembers or “that which evokes a memory.” Herodotus uses the word in the sense of material constructions or creations that perpetuate the memory of a person: “Queen Nitocris left monuments (*mnēmosyna*) which I will describe” (1.185); “Moeris built as a monument of his reign” the propylaea of the sanctuary of Hephaestus. In the LXX, *mnēmosynon* means “the one evoked” when it translates the Hebrew *zēker*, but it is part of the liturgical vocabulary and translates sometimes the Hebrew *’azkārāh* regarding an oblation: “the priest shall burn the memorial portion on the altar” (Lev 2:2, 9, 16; 5:12; 6:8; Num 5:26; Sir 15:16), this good odor which is pleasing to God (cf. Sir 38:11; Tob 12:12); sometimes *zikārōn*: Passover in the Feast of Unleavened Bread (Exod 12:14; 13:9), the stones in the ephod (Exod 28:12; 39:7; Josh 4:7), the breastplate (Exod 28:29; 30:6), the bells (Sir 45:9, 11; 50:16) are calls to remembrance for Israel, especially the remembrance of their offenses. In any event, the sacrifice of the righteous is acceptable, “his memorial will not be forgotten” (Sir 35:7).

Given the spiritualization of the cult in the Hellenistic period and the Israelite tradition guaranteeing that the memory of the righteous will be a blessing, we can understand the reward Jesus gave Mary of Bethany, who anointed his body with a view to his burial: “Everywhere throughout the world ... what she has done will be told in memory of her” (*eis mnēmosynon autēs*), that is, in her honor. Following the LXX, we must understand that this *zikārōn* will be universally remembered and applauded, but also that it is acceptable to heaven, where God blesses this woman. Similarly, the angel affirms to Cornelius, “Your prayers and alms have ascended as a memorial before God,” that is, have been accepted with favor.

μισθός, μισθόομαι

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*misthos*, **reward, compensation, wage, punishment**; *misthoomai*, **to hire or lease**

→see also ὀψώνιον; δοῦλος, οἰκέτης, οἰκεῖος, μίσθιος, μισθώτος, μίσθωμα; ὑπηρέτης

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*misthos*, S 3407; TDNT 4.695–728; EDNT 2.432–433; NIDNTT 3.138–139, 141–145; MM 413; L&N 38.14, 57.173; BAGD 523 | *misthoomai*, S 3409; TDNT 4.695–728; EDNT 2.432; NIDNTT 3.138–139; MM 413–414; L&N 57.172; BAGD 523

It is not right that *misthos* is usually translated “wage” in most NT texts, even though the meaning “reward, counter-gift” is basic. Hector says to the Trojans, “Who among you will undertake to accomplish the deed (*ergon*) of which I speak, for a great reward (*dōrō epi megalō*)? The price of his trouble will be assured him (*misthos de hoi arkios estai*)”; “We have come on Zeus’s command to hire our services out by the year to the noble Laomedon for an agreed wage” (*misthō epi rhētō*). The price is freely agreed to, pursuant to an understanding between the two parties; it is justly payable, because it corresponds to the value of that which is supplied. The *misthos* is remuneration for work. Plato gave the definition: “Those who sell the use of their strength, calling *misthos* the price of their trouble, are described as *misthōtoi*” (*Resp.* 2.371 e).

Wages are mentioned constantly in papyri that record contracts (*P.Tebt.* 815, from the third century BC, *misthoi* rise from three or four obols to one drachma four obols). In AD 99, a twenty-six-year-old woman, Tenetkoueis, is hired by an olive presser; she will receive a wage at the same rate as the workers from the village of Euhemeria (*P.Fay.* 91, 23). In 48, Menodoros takes on Fuscus as an apprentice flax-weaver: “I will pay you (Fuscus’s father) a monthly wage of four drachmas.... He will have three days off each month, for which I will not dock his salary.... If I breach this contract at any point, I will immediately pay you damages and expenses, the wages due from me.” In contracts for wet-nurses, certain bonuses are added to the wage: Helen undertakes “to nurse Corinthia at home with her own milk for two years ... receiving for her expenses and nursing a monthly wage of ten drachmas plus two *kotylai* of oil, one *keramion* of wine ...” *Misthos* is used for the wages of agricultural workers (*P.Apoll.* 48, 2, 5, *geōrgoi misthioi*) as well as for the pay of sailors or stonecutters (*P.Mich.* 37, 2, 15), grooms (*P.Oxy.* 1862, 27; 1863, 8), brickmakers (*P.Mert.* 44, 2), harvesters (*P.Mert.* 91, 12), camel-drivers (*P.Oxy.* 1911, 156), shepherds (*P.Princ.* 152, 8), a barber (*P.Magd.* 15, 3, verso), a building contractor (*P.Köln* 104, 9: *oikodomou*; *P.Oxy.* 2875), a gilder (*P.Köln* 52, 16, 18, 64, 66, 71), a domestic. It is often noted that wages are paid daily.

A ruler or general pays his troops in many different ways (*opsōnion*, *metrēma*, *doma*, etc.), and first of all in rations (*trophē*, food allowance) and *misthos*, wages in kind (“Eumenes promised his men that he would pay them in

three days”); but this usage is completely exceptional in the papyri (*P.Ross.Georg.* V, 61 A, 11).

*Misthos* can have wider meanings, both literal and figurative. Panouptaeiom specifies to his wife that the man who has come to her should receive a reward of forty drachmas (*misthou tou erchomainou epi se*, *P.Ant.* 43, 22). Pindar evoked the “sweet reward” (*misthos glykys*) that every man draws from his labors (*Isthm.* 1.41), and Aristophanes refers to a drink as “a bowl of wages to gulp down” (*Eq.* 905). In addition, *misthos* – which always refers to a compensation – often takes on the nuance of an emolument, an honorarium, reward, notably in the realm of arts and letters: “You wish to give Protagoras money to pay him for his lessons” (Plato, *Prt.* 311 b); a sophist gives himself out “as a master in education and in virtue, daring to claim at the outset a wage in exchange for his lessons.” King Attalus II of Pergamum makes a foundation at Delphi in 169–159 “so that the regular wages of teachers may be guaranteed.” Honoraria for physicians are justified: “Physicians receive their honoraria for having healed their patients” (*arnyntai ton misthon tous kamnontas hygiasantas*). For the construction of the temple of Asclepius at Epidaurus, “Theodotus, the architect, receives an annual salary of 352 drachmas” (C. Michel, *Recueil*, n. 584, 9). There are emoluments for poets (Aristophanes, *Ran.* 367), actors (*P.Oxy.* 1025, 19), dancers, and flute-players.

There are “allowances” for officials and magistrates, who for all that are not wage earners, but they are granted a *misthos* – which can be an honor – because those who fulfill an *archē* in the city serve the interests of the citizens (Plato, *Resp.* 1.345 e–347 d); this reward is like an honor and privilege (Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 5.1134.). Also, *misthos* often means “costs, expenses, disbursements,” as for funeral expenses (*misthos tois ērkasi auton*, *P.Fay.* 103, 3), expenditures for clothing (*IG XI*, 2; 110, 17); “We will pay your travel expenses.” Hence the meaning “present, bribe,” so often pejorative: Balaam was bought “for money (*epi misthō*) by the enemies” (Philo, *Migr. Abr.* 114); Lampon, the corrupt bailiff, “got his accursed wage (*ton eparaton misthon*), or better, his bribe (*to misthōma*).” Euripides reports an accusation of venality against soothsayers: “Teiresias, you want to be paid well (*misthos pherein*) for observations of winged omens as well as sacrificial victims” (*Bacch.* 257). *Misthos* refers to honoraria that priests received for their cultic activities (Dittenberger, *Syl.* 42, 91 and 130). An ordinance of Ptolemy II and Cleopatra II protects temple revenues, notably earnings on workshops and wages (*P.Tebt.* 6, 25 = *C.Ord.Ptol.* 47). Eating consecrated bread is a privilege granted to priests “as a reward (*misthon*) for the services that they provide.”

In classical and Hellenistic Greek, *misthos* sometimes has the figurative sense of “retribution, punishment,” sometimes “recompense.” Isocrates: “For a



sophist, the noblest and greatest recompense (*misthos*) is that some of his disciples should turn out to be men of courage and intelligence, esteemed by their fellow citizens” (*Antid.* 15.220); Pindar: “Glory in sincere praise is the recompense that befits good men” (*Nem.* 7.63); “I will go to seek at Salamis the gratitude of the Athenians as recompense” (*Pyth.* 1.77; cf. Euripides, *IT* 593); Ps.-Plutarch: “Agamedes and Trophonius, after building the temple at Delphi, asked Apollo for their reward.” Christianity would retain this meaning, using *misthos* to describe the recompense that God gives his elect.

In the semantic evolution of *misthos* (Hebrew *sākar*), the language of the LXX accentuates first of all the “worker’s wage” by accentuating its moral character as “justly due.” It contrasts it with “free service”; it is a compensation for labor (Tob 2:14; 5:3; 12:1; Eccl 4:9; Wis 10:17; cf. Philo, *Moses* 1.141–142), the price of works produced (2 Chr 15:7; Jer 31:16) and of services rendered (Deut 15:18). Its sum is freely agreed. Not only is it a very serious thing not to pay the worker his wage (Jer 22:13; Mal 3:5; Sir 34:22 – *misthon misthiou*), but it is insisted that it must not be deferred, because the hireling counts on it (Job 7:2; cf. Philo, *Husbandry* 5; *Plant.* 36), even if he wastes it (Hag 1:6), because it is thanks to his *misthos* that he can feed himself and rest (Sir 11:18). Otherwise, and above all, the LXX uses *misthos* in the sense of reward, usually divine, beginning with the text where Yahweh declares to Abram, “Fear not, I will be your shield; your reward will be very great.” Boaz says to Ruth, “May God return what you have done to you, and may your reward be perfect from Yahweh” (Ruth 2:12). As much as the godless cannot expect any remuneration (Wis 2:22), so much “the one who sows righteousness has an assured reward” (Prov 11:18); “the righteous live forever; their reward is with the Lord” (Wis 5:15); “You who fear the Lord, have confidence in him; your reward will not be lost” (Sir 2:8); “The Lord’s blessing is the recompense of the godly person” (Sir 11:22; cf. Isa 40:10; 62:11); “The Lord gave me my tongue as my reward; with it will I praise him.”

In the four Gospels, the word *misthos* is found exclusively in the sayings of Christ, notably in the Sermon on the Mount, where it retains its OT meaning of “compensation, recompense,” but at the same time enriches and focuses it in terms of the interiority and spirituality of the new ethics. If the principle of reward – a major aspect of a religious ethic – remains fundamental (God repays each one according to his or her works), it is applied in an original manner under the new covenant, which is contrasted with the old covenant, especially in St. Matthew. The first text is the beatitude: “When they insult you and persecute you and speak all manner of evil against you falsely *on my account*, rejoice and be very glad, because your reward will be great in heaven” (*hoti ho misthos hymōn polys en tois ouranois*). This formulation recalls Gen 15:1 – the

clear sense is that the persecuted will receive ample compensation for their suffering – but its grandeur suggests that it is not a case of just remuneration. In addition, the recompense is not for the suffering, but for the virtues of endurance, even gladness, that were displayed, and these are the fruit of the Holy Spirit.

Finally, and especially, it has to do with disciples of Jesus who are persecuted “because of him” (*heneken emou*) and who will receive their reward from God “in heaven,” which can only be eternal beatitude. So this is not a just wage but a free and lavish gift, even though it is granted because of evils borne. In the same sense: “If you love those who love you, what reward will you get for that (*tina misthon echete*)? Do not the publicans do the same?” The question, addressed to the disciples, as opposed to sinners (publicans), teaches that benevolent deeds inspired by mere natural goodness by virtue of purely human sympathy or friendship, do not deserve any particular “reward”; the Most High is not grateful for them. The disciples must show respect and benevolence toward their neighbor (friend or enemy) by the love of God. Then God will take notice of what is done for him and will grant what is more than a wage: his favor.

More straightforward still is the exhortation not to practice one’s “righteousness” in order “to be seen by men (*pros to theathēnai*), lest you have no reward with your Father who is in heaven (*misthon ouk echete para tō patri hymōn*).” When a person practices Jewish acts of righteousness – alms, prayer, fasting – in order to “be seen” so as to be praised, these honors given by humans are the only compensation that one will be able to receive; there will be none other. One must therefore live righteously, religiously, that is to say, for God and before God, in order to please him, in God’s sight alone, who will then give a reward according to his own measure (which means a magnificent reward) for that which was done for him; hundredfold is more than a wage.

Almost all the other uses of *misthos* by Jesus have in view the apostles as missionaries, and first of all the hospitality given them: “The one who receives a prophet as a prophet will receive a prophet’s reward (*misthon prophētou lēpsetai*), and the one who receives a righteous person as a righteous person will receive a righteous person’s reward.” For a disciple of Jesus, God is the only “rewarder” who is worth anything, even with regard to insignificant gestures: “Whoever gives a glass of cold water to one of these little ones (thirsty representatives of the gospel) *because he is my disciple*, I tell you truly, will not lose his reward.” This “little one” (Hebrew *qāṭōn*; cf. *Sipre Deut.* 345) is the Lord’s property (cf. Mark 9:41 – *hoti Christou este*, “because you are Christ’s”). His human worth matters little; the kindness shown him has a sure reward, which here must be the living water that wells up to eternal life (John

4:14). Remarkable bonus or recompense! The apostles might have had scruples about being a burden to hearers who received them, but Jesus reassures them: “Remain in that house, eating and drinking whatever they have, for the worker is worthy of his hire” (*axios gar ho ergatēs tou misthou autou*). Here the wage is room and board (cf. Matt 10:10 – *axios gar ho ergatēs tēs trophēs autou*). What one receives in a receptive home is not alms; it is the due of those sent by God. The Lord applies the requirement of Israelite law to his disciples and consequently understands *misthos* in its meaning of a just remuneration for work done or service rendered.

This is especially so in the parable of the Workers in the Vineyard, where the owner makes a series of hirings (*misthōsasthai ergatas*, Matt 20:1, 7) at the first hour of the day, at nine o’clock, at noon, a three o’clock, and even at five o’clock. He agrees on a wage (*symphōnēsas*, 20:2) and promises to give what is just (*ho ean ē dikaion dōsō hymin*, 20:4). That same evening, conformably to Deut 24:15, he orders his steward to distribute the wages (“give them their wage,” *apodos autois ton misthon*, 20:8), that is, the freely agreed and equitable reward for the labor provided. We are familiar with the indignation of the workers hired at daybreak at receiving the same wage as those who had worked only one hour (20:17). Was this a breach of justice? No. The master emphasizes to the complainant, “I have done you no wrong; you had an agreement with me; take what is due you” (20:13–14). But, as master and lord, he is autonomous and free if it pleases him to grant more to someone else “because I am good” (20:15). This is the essence of the parable: if the righteous are justly remunerated by God, God can without offending against anyone give freely to sinners. That is to say that entrance into the kingdom is not a wage or a reward but a gift. This parable makes clear and explicit the fundamental teaching of the Gospels: God is the only payer of a *misthos* that is worth anything in the spiritual order, and that says something about the role that his justice and *agapē* play; the theology of “merit” must take this into account.

With St. Paul, *misthos* almost always means “wage.” Paul and Apollos had worked together, but in different ways, for the “edification” of the church at Corinth: “The one who plants and the one who waters are one; but each will receive his own wage according to his own work.” It is clear that there is a reward and that it is proportional to the work (*idion* twice repeated: his own wage, his own work) and individual (for each one, *hekastos*); moreover, there are different degrees of *misthos*, because there are good (1 Cor 3:14) and mediocre (3:15) workers; consequently, the wage is not eternal life, but a particular gift. Finally, gospel workers are like hired servants whose *kopos* (labor) God values and consequently rewards: he pays them for what they have done. Still regarding his ministry, the apostle writes “If I work willingly

(according to my own initiative, *ei hekōn touto prassō*), I have a wage (*misthon echō*); but if I am compelled (*akōn*), it is a stewardship (a responsibility, *oikonomian*) that is entrusted to me. What then is my wage (*tis oun mou estin ho misthos*)? – That in evangelizing, I may set forth the gospel free of charge.” This text is difficult, but we recall that a slave who does only his duty does not expect a reward from his master (cf. Luke 17:10). If the apostle wants to obtain a reward from God, it will not be for his stewardship of the preaching of the gospel; he must do something more: preach free of charge, without counting on receiving any material advantage in return. It is the disinterestedness that will be rewarded. This initial gratuity suggests the gratuity of the divine compensation.

2 John 8 preserves the metaphorical meaning of spiritual reward. By following the heretical teachers, Christians would lose the fruit of their apostles’ labor: “Take care that you do not lose what we have gained but receive a complete (or perfect) wage,” that is, heavenly beatitude, the recompense for orthodoxy and fidelity, resulting from the “what we have done” (*ha ergasametha*) of the preachers. The supreme rewards will be given at the end of the world (Rev 11:18, *dounai ton misthon*), but will have to do especially with reward, since punishment and recompense (admission to the heavenly Jerusalem) will be distributed by the sovereign Judge (cf. Isa 40:1; 52:11) according to the disposition of each: “Behold, I come quickly, and my recompense is with me (*ho misthos mou met emou*) to render to each as his work is (*hōs to ergon estin autou*)” (Rev 22:12). For the faithful, Christ draws upon *his* goods to pour out his generosity upon them: “ ‘Bringing my reward with me’ almost means ‘I am your reward.’ ”

*Misthoō*. – Its only NT occurrence is the aorist middle infinitive at Matt 20:1, 7 (*misthōsasthai ergatas*), a form used constantly in the papyri and meaning “hire for oneself,” the object being sometimes a thing, a house, a field, sometimes a person. It will suffice to cite some examples, first for the hiring of workers (*P.Lips.* 111, 11, *misthōsai ergatas*) or the leasing of two slaves for a year; but more often it has to do with the leasing of land, whether a field (for example, for one year, with the rent being half of the harvest) or a farm, or fruit groves (*P.Stras.* 321, 3; AD 93–94), a palm and olive grove (“I propose to you that I lease [*misthōsasthai*] the olive and date harvest for the past year 13 and coming to maturity this year 14 from the palm and olive grove that belongs to the town of Philadelphia”), but also a lease of a flock (*P.Alex.* 12, 5; *C.P.Herm.* 27, 11), of a dwelling, a room (*BGU* 2204, 9, 28) or several rooms (*P.Yale* 71; *P.Stras.* 338, 7), a butcher shop (*P.Alex.* 32, 6; *P.Oxy.* 1890), a windmill (*P.Mil.Vogl.* 53, 7), a cellar (*P.Oxy.* 3203, 9), a grange (*BGU* 606, 16), baths (*P.Mich.* 312, AD 34), a weaving shop (*P.Oxy.* 1035, 1), a perfumery and

ointment factory (*P.Fay.* 93, 6), even fishing rights (*P.Oxy.* 3270, 8), or the farming out for a year of the *phoretrea* (transport expenses) revenues.

## μίσθωμα

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*misthōma*, (agreed) price, pay, rent; rented dwelling

→see also δοῦλος; μισθός, μισθόομαι; ὑπηρέτης

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*misthoma*, S 3410; *EDNT* 2.433; *NIDNTT* 3.138–139; *MM* 414; *L&N* 57.175; *BAGD* 523

Acts 28:30 – *emeinen de dietian holēn en idiō misthōmati*: During his stay at Rome, Paul lived for two whole years in the lodgings that he rented. At least that is how most commentators translate this text, understanding *misthōma* from the context to mean “rented dwelling”: the apostle lived “in his own private home,” where he received visitors and friends.

But *misthōma*, unknown in the papyri, never has this meaning. It always refers to an agreed-upon price, a wage. For example: “The Delphians had to pay a fourth of the (agreed) cost of the building of the temple”; a ban on “carrying a prostitute’s hire to the temple” (*misthōma pornēs*, Philo, *Spec. Laws* 1.280; cf. 104; Machon, in Athenaeus 13.581 a); Lampon, the corrupt clerk, “got his accursed pay (*misthon*), or rather his payoff (*to misthōma*)” (Philo, *Flacc.* 134). The same usage is found in the inscriptions of the fourth-third century BC. At Amorgos, in a rental contract on the precincts of Zeus Teminites, “the lessee shall put down a security deposit ... and pay the lease each year in the month Thargelion.” At Naxos, in a mortgage on the property of some minors, the tenant agrees that each year until the children are of age he will pay a rent of 400 drachmas to secure 3500 drachmas of capital: “For the house and the tile roof mortgaged for the benefit of the minor children of Epiphron, for a capital sum of 3500 and an annual lease of 400 drachmas.”

The interesting point about the epigraphical data is that it attests the frequent use of *misthōma* in contracts for the lease of real estate. Through the *locatio-conductio*, one person agrees to allow another the use of a property in return for a fixed price. This is how the Vulgate interprets Acts 28:30 – *in suo conducto* – and this usage of *misthōma* is seen as a latinism. Certainly *en idiō misthōmati* could be interpreted to mean “at his own expense”; but it seems preferable to give to this noun the meaning that French tourist agencies give the word *location*, the action of taking a lease. Hence it would mean the apartment or lodging that Paul had personally rented.

## μνηστεύω

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*mnēsteuō*, to seek a woman's hand in marriage, become engaged, marry

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*mnesteuo*, S 3423; EDNT 2.436; MM 415; L&N 34.74; BDF §§68, 188, 191(4), 316(1); BAGD 525

The Homeric occurrences of this verb (“seek a woman’s hand in marriage”) show that this specialized meaning derives from a broader meaning (“solicit, seek”), whence come all the various nuances in the matrimonial process: “court,” seek a wife (Theognis 1112), aspire to marriage (Plato, *Leg.* 6.773 *b*, *mnēstheuein gamon*), ask for a woman’s hand (the youngest son of Astraeus asks for Helen’s hand in marriage). Iphigenia, having set out on a journey to join her fiancé, declared that “his marriage proposal made her leave the land of the Greeks.” In the LXX, the verb translates the Hebrew *’āraś* and usually means “become engaged,” but it means marriage when the angel says to Tobias, “I will speak to Raguel so that he will give you his daughter in marriage” (Tob 6:12), and the ambiguity remains when God promises eternal engagement/marriage, with no rupture forever.

In the NT, the verb is used only three times, always in the passive, and always referring to the Virgin Mary, and the meaning “engaged” is incontestable in the first two occurrences. Regarding Christ’s genealogy: “Mary, his mother, was engaged to Joseph (aorist participle, *mnēsteutheisēs tēs mētros autou*); before they had lived together, she was found pregnant by the power of the Holy Spirit.” Likewise when the angel was sent “to a virgin engaged to a man named Joseph (perfect participle, *emnēsteumenēn andri*), and the virgin’s name was Mary.” The title *parthenos*, written up front, before the young woman’s name, is a personal title of honor *par excellence*, and the perfect tense of the participle suggests that this virginity abides. As for the coming to Bethlehem for the census “with Mary, his fiancée, who was pregnant” (Luke 2:5), we can still understand the perfect participle (*emnēsteumenē autō*) as referring literally to engagement, but we cannot exclude the possibility that the marriage had been accomplished, so “wife” is also a possible translation.

## μορφή

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*morphē*, stature, form, condition, feature, external appearance, reproduction

→see also εἰκόν

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*morphe*, S 3444; TDNT 4.742–752; EDNT 2.442–443; NIDNTT 1.705–708; MM 417; L&N 58.2, 58.15; BAGD 528

Current in classical and Hellenistic Greek, with a wide range of meanings – “stature, form, condition, feature, external appearance, reproduction” – *morphē* is used relatively little in the Bible. Gideon asks Zebah and Zalmunna, “ ‘What were the men like that you killed at Tabor?’ They said, ‘They were like you, each of them having the features (Hebrew *tō’ar*) of sons of kings’ ” (*hōs eidos morphēs huiōn basileōn*, Judg 8:18). Eliphaz did not recognize the features (Hebrew *tmûnâh*; a representation of a person or thing) of the person before him (*ouk ēn morphē pro ophthalmōn mou*, Job 4:6; cf. Wis 18:1). In many sacred and secular texts, the word refers to good looks, an attractive appearance, charming features.

Beginning with Isa 44:13, where the sculptor of idols gives them a human form (*hōs morphēn andros*), this meaning of distinctive or characteristic form or structure (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Dem.* 50, 54; Heraclitus, *All.* 65.2) is applied especially to a person, notably in Philo: “The body was created when the artist took a lump of clay and shaped it into a human form” (*Creation* 135; Philo, *Migr. Abr.* 3); “When the woman in turn had been fashioned, the man saw a sister appearance (*eidos*) and a kindred form (*syngenē morphēn*), and he rejoiced.” But *morphē* is used especially for a form *represented* in an image or sculpture: “Gaius filled the synagogues with images (*eikonōn*) and statues in his own form (*tēs idias morphēs*)” (Philo, *To Gaius* 346; cf. Josephus, *Life* 65); “This sanctuary ... had never admitted an image fashioned by human hand” (ibid. 290); “the golden shields bore no figure nor any other forbidden thing” (ibid. 299). This meaning recurs constantly in epigrams, notably those of the *Palatine Anthology*: “It was a god who caused this metal to flow into the likeness of his bodily form” (2.314, *eidei morphēs*; 1.34; cf. 36. 50; 11.412) “Painter, you capture only the forms; the voice is beyond your grasp” (11.433). Hence the meaning “feature, bearing”: “The image of my form (*eikona morphēs*), once engraved by bold Eros in the burning depths of your heart” (5.274; cf. Moschus, *Eur.* 2.10: the woman “had the features of a foreigner”; Euripides, in Stobaeus, *Flor.* 34.33; vol. 5, p. 836); “Everything about his features (*morphē*) inspired veneration.” Next it comes to mean the “look, physique” of a person, “countenance, portrait”: “A messenger of Zeus, Callistratus, offers you this likeness of him” (13.2; cf. 13.24; cf. Plutarch, *Ages.* 2.4: We have no portrait of him, *tēs de morphēs eikona ouk echomen*), often with an aesthetic sense. Thus Antiochus I of Commagene has himself “represented” in the mid-first century BC.

In the tomb inscriptions, *morphē* is commonly used to refer to the former or the present “form” of the deceased, the two not being the same. At the end of the high imperial period, the epitaph of a black slave at Antinoöpolis contrasts *psychē* and *morphē*: “My soul embellished the blackness of my appearance ...; in the tomb I have hidden everything, my thoughts and the form that clothed me before”; “His sons prepared the likeness of their noble father with a body of stone (*morphēnta lithou*) as a memorial.”

Although *morphē* is often very close in meaning to *eikōn*, and later on even becomes synonymous with it in Gnosticism, the texts cited disallow identifying them, as does this inscription from Laodicea, which distinguishes the two terms: “I bear the (bodily) form of Docticius, but the image of his divine virtue is carried on the lips of each person.” This should be taken into account in the translation of Phil 2:6–7 (*hos en morphē theou ... morphēn doulou labōn*), which the *Bible de Jérusalem* correctly renders “Lui, de condition divine ... prenant la condition d’esclave.” It is characteristic of *morphē* to be modified, to appear to be changed, to take on new features, like the risen Lord appearing to the disciples at Emmaus *en hetera morphē*. He had a new mode of being and a new appearance, analogous to that at the transfiguration (*metamorphousthai*, Matt 17:2). This is why in epiphanies of heavenly beings the *morphē* is indeed said to be different, but not without affinities with earthly forms.

This changing of *morphē* is to be compared on the one hand with the theme of “descent and ascent” because of the double *morphē* in Phil 2:6–7 (*morphē theou, morphē doulou*) – which owes nothing to the gnostic redeemer myth, which had not yet been concocted – and on the other hand with the consistent meaning of this term in the magical papyri. Whereas the Christian faith affirms that God is invisible and that no human has seen him or can see him (John 1:18; 6:46; 1 John 4:12; Rom 1:20; 1 Tim 1:17; 6:16), the magicians call upon the deity as having a “form” and pray him to appear in his “true form.” This is a signal favor, for the *Eight Books of Moses* acknowledge that no one has been able to see this true divine form. The devotee of Hermes Trismegistos knows that his god appears in the East in the form of an ibis, in the West in the form of a dog’s head, in the North in the form of a serpent, and in the south in the form of a wolf. What the mystic wishes to contemplate and be united with is “the sacred form” (*Pap.Graec.Mag.* 4, 216; vol. 1, p. 78; cf. XIII, 271; vol. 2, p. 101), the “gracious or joyous form,” and in the case of Aphrodite, her beauty made manifest: *epikaloumai se ... deixasa tēn kalēn sou morphēn*.

It is clear from all of these examples that the use of *morphē* in the hymn in Phil 2 is entirely to be expected in a context of metamorphosis or incarnation, but that it would be risky to give it a precise theological meaning.



μόχθος

*mochthos*, **toil, labor, misery**

→see also κοπιάω, κόπος

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*mochthos*, S 3449; *EDNT* 2.444; *NIDNTT* 1.262; MM 418; L&N 42.48; BAGD 528

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This noun is a Pauline word in the NT and always refers to the difficult conditions under which he carries out his ministry, at Thessalonica (1 Thess 2:9; 2 Thess 3:8) and throughout his whole life (*en kopō kai mochthō*, 2 Cor 11:27). This must be a traditional pairing (cf. Euripides, *Ion* 103: *ponous ek paidos mochthoumen aei*), for it is attested not only in Jer 20:18; Sag 10:10; *T. Jud.* 18.4; but also in Philo, who, citing Num 23:21, “there will be no misery in Israel” (Hebrew *’āwen*), glosses: “there will be no misery or distress among the Hebrews” (*ouk estai ponos ē mochthos en Hebraiois*, *Moses* 1.284). Job’s wife complains to her husband, “In vain have I toiled in misery” (*eis kenon ekopiasa meta mochthōn*, *T. Job* 24.2). In an ordinary figure of speech of this sort, it is not possible to distinguish precisely the meanings of the components.

Be that as it may, the word is much used in the LXX, notably twenty-two times in Ecclesiastes, where it refers to the miserable toil and trouble of humans under the sun, translating the Hebrew *’amal* (cf. Deut 26:7). Its use to translate *perek* (Lev 25:43, 46, 53; Ezek 34:4) and *yġā’* (toil, exertion, Isa 55:2; Jer 3:24; Ezek 23:29) shows both the variety of its connotations and the miserable nature of the work or tribulations so described. Pauline *mochthos* should be compared to the Hebrew *tlā’āh*, “fatigue, misery, adversity, evil,” used by Moses when he tells his father-in-law “all the difficulties he had encountered on the way” (Exod 18:8) and when he addresses the king of Edom, “You know the difficulties that we have encountered” (Num 20:14; cf. Neh 9:32).

*Mochthos* is rare in the papyri and does not appear before the fourth century (*P.Ryl.* 28, 117; cf. *P.Lond.* 1674, 63; from the sixth century). In two inscriptions where it is used it has the same meaning as in St. Paul: the trials of life. In an epitaph, a young man who died at age nineteen addresses his father: “By way of consolation I address these words to you.... Sheltered from sorrow, I led a good life before leaving for Hades. With you I had an abundance, I knew no deprivation, I never experienced misery in my life.” Twice each year Agrios offers a banquet for the people of Panopolis “inviting the priests of each class and his comrades in toil.”

Philostratus (*Gym.* 47; cf. *mochtheō*, 42) uses this term for athletic exercises; Xenophon (*Symp.* 2.4) uses it for the toils of free men; Vettius Valens (12.2; cf. 77, 14) and Manetho (6.383) for the hard labor of porters.

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*muthos*, S 3454; TDNT 4.762–795; EDNT 2.445; NIDNTT 2.643–645, 647; MM 418–419; L&N 33.13; BAGD 529

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This word, which can be transliterated “myth” or translated “fable, legend” (cf. Aesop), is used only once in the OT, but Titus and Timothy are told that in their teaching they must not make any concession to fables (1 Tim 1:4; 4:7, *paraitou*), which are opposed to the truth (Titus 1:14; 2 Tim 4:4). 2 Pet 1:16, connecting the object of faith with historical reality, says: “It was not by following sophistic fables that we acquainted you with the power and advent of our Lord Jesus Christ, but having beheld his majesty with our own eyes.” Thus it is amazing that modern exegetes and theologians have undertaken to demythologize the Bible and that literary types use the term and the idea of myth quite ambiguously.

In classical Greek, *mythos* has some very commonplace and very diverse meanings: word (Ps.-Plutarch, *Cons. ad Apoll. 2: mythos eumenēs*, a friend’s kindly word), discourse, conversation, proverb, message, order, rule, opinion, counsel (as opposed to *ergon*), story, tale. Beginning with Pindar, however, it takes on a technical value. Sometimes it means “fable, story, apologue, allegory, fiction used for instruction” – and is thus often synonymous with dupery, illusion, the unreal, as opposed to a veracious account (*logos*), one that is credible (*pistos*), true (*alēthes*). Sometimes it means myth proper, i.e., the whole collection of legends or traditional stories concerning the gods, the demigods, or events before the first known historical facts: mythology or cosmogony. In the beginning, after all, in Greece as in the ancient orient, myth and cult were closely linked; no people on the earth, except the Hindus, had a world so rich in myths as the Greeks, especially with Homer, who was supposed to have taught in myth concerning all religious, moral, and human truths. But how to “add faith to Homer and his fables” (Epictetus 3.24.18) when the gods sleep, lose their temper, lie, become frightened, commit multiple adulteries and rapes and other outrageous acts? Furthermore, beginning in the sixth century BC with Xenophon of Colophon and Theagenes of Rhegium, then with Plato and the Pythagoreans, in reaction to the traditional religion, a theological reinterpretation of the myths was elaborated: thanks to allegory, the immoral legends were transposed and purified to yield a deeper, covert meaning (*hyponoia*), an idea or reality that was not accessible or utterable in straightforward language. Thus myth becomes a didactic literary genre, a form of exposition, a means of demonstration that expresses reality in a pictorial

form – what the rhetor Heraclitus calls a “philosophy in symbols.” It matters little that “these things never happened but always are so,” and it is a “pious investigation” to discern beneath the material component and the symbolic expression a certain religious truth or moral idea. The heterodox Ephesians and Cretans, trained according to the currently fashionable principles of hermeneutics, must have applied this method of symbolic and allegorical interpretation to the Bible, producing all kinds of intellectual fantasies.

But the pagans themselves denounced the fallacious character of the legendary accounts: “Those who risk speaking or writing about those countries must be seen as ignorant or as spinners of tales” (*agnoein kai mythous diatithesthai*, Polybius 3.38). Strabo, contrasting history against myth and lies (5.1.9; 9.3.11–12), mentions that honors supposedly awarded at Rhea and on Crete belong to the realm of legend and not history (*tous de legontas mythologein mallon ē historein*, 10.3.20). With respect to the stories about the Amazons: “In the case of all the other peoples, myth and history each have their own domain and are cleanly separated: myth is the name given all that is ancient, fabulous, or outlandish; while history is the label for the truth, whether the event be ancient or recent, and with rare exceptions does not admit anything fantastic” (11.5.3; cf. 11.6.2, *philomythia* = love of legends). With regard to the production of electrum, Diodorus Siculus observes: “A number of the ancients recorded fables (*mythous*) that we do not believe at all and which are refuted by the facts.... We must hold fast to historical truth” (*prosekteon tais alēthinais historiais*, 5.23; cf. 4.8.4; 4.77.9). Plutarch contrasts tales and fictions (*mythōdē kai plasmatian*) to a true account (*alēthei logō*, *Cam.* 22.3; cf. *De glor. Ath.* 4: *ho de mythos einai bouletai logos pseudēs eoikōs alēthinō*; *Art.* 1: *mythōn apithanōn kai paraphorōn ... pantodapēn pylaian*; *De def. or.* 46.1; *De Pyth. or.* 2); “The terra firma of history rests on facts; I could with justification speak on more remote ages. Beyond that lies the land of marvels and tragic legends, populated by poets and mythologers, and there one finds no proof, no certitude” (*Thes.* 1.2–3). In *De Is. et Os.* 20, Plutarch notes that this history of the two divinities “in no way resembles the contradictory fables, the vain fictions that the poets and mythologers, after the fashion of spiders weaving their webs, spin out from themselves and build upon with no foundation ... despite the difficulties that myth presents when it narrates the woes suffered by the gods.” “It is history that separates the truth from legend” (*tou mythōdous apekrithē to alēthes*, *De Pyth. or.* 24). *Mythos* is “a useless fabrication” (*plasma kenon*, *De def. or.* 46).

This negative evaluation of the *mythoi* is shared by Jewish authors, notably by Philo, who calls them surmises (*Post. Cain* 2), contradictory fabrications (*Sacr. Abel and Cain* 13), fiction (*Decalogue* 56). He constantly writes of the

*mythou plasma* and the commandment to flee it (*Rewards* 8), because this counterfeit is opposed to the truth (*Flight* 42); “they left behind mythical fictions to stand in the clarity of the truth” (ibid. 102); “the life devoted to unreason is fiction and myth ... a life submerged in lies, always missing the truth” (*Prelim. Stud.* 61; cf. *Migr. Abr.* 76); “shameless Pleasure, creator of prodigies and spinner of tales, decked out like a tragic actor” (*Sacr. Abel and Cain* 28) is contrasted with austere – but true – Virtue. “Those who pursue fictionless truth rather than imaginary myths” (*Rewards* 162; cf. *Heir* 228); “going to dwell with Truth and the veneration of the only venerable Being, far from mythical fictions” (*Spec. Laws* 4.178; cf. 1.43). “Among lawmakers, some prescribed, baldly and in the open, that which was just in their eyes; others encompassed their thought in superfluous swelling, deceived the multitudes with clouds of illusion, masking the truth under mythic fictions ... a lying strategy, full of fraud” (*Creation* 1–2; cf. 157). “Perhaps someone thinks that the lawmaker (Moses) is alluding to the fables of the poets concerning giants (cf. Gen 6:4), but tale-weaving is entirely foreign to him, and he walks in the footsteps of truth itself” (*Giants* 58); “let no one see a myth in his words” (ibid. 7; cf. *Husbandry* 97).

The rejection of myth in the Pastorals and in 2 Pet 1:16 is along the same lines. We must insist on the definition given by *Suda*: “myth: a false account posing as the truth” (*mythos: logos pseudēs eikonizōn tēn alētheian*). Dreamed-up tales, fables that are invented and hence unreal, are opposed to the *logoi* of the true faith (1 Tim 4:6; 2 Tim 4:4).

## μυκτηρίζω, ἐκμυκτηρίζω

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*myktērízō, ekmyktērízō, to turn up one’s nose at, ridicule, mock*

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***mukterizo***, S 3456; *TDNT* 4.796; *EDNT* 2.445; MM 419; L&N 33.409; BAGD 529 | ***ekmukterizo***, S 1592; *TDNT* 4.796–799; *EDNT* 1.419; L&N 33.409; BAGD 243

Translating Gal 6:7 “God is not mocked” is accurate – even though the context means “God is not trifled with, is not duped” – but does not convey the nuance or ridicule and humiliation, disdain, scoffing insult, which would be better conveyed by our expressions “thumb one’s nose at” or “hold up to ridicule.”

Derived from *myktēr*, “nostril,” these verbs mean “turn up or wrinkle the nose” as a sign of mockery or scorn. Mockery and derision are expressed by words or deeds, by tricks of facial expression: laughing and making faces, ridiculing someone, letting him know how little one thinks of him, thus

reducing him to a sort of psychological, moral, or social nothing. This amounts to an assault on that person's dignity, on the right that everyone has to respect from others, on the basic need to be thought well of by others, which is an important element in human happiness.

In this farcical mimicry that constitutes mockery of another person, the ancients attached a particular sense of scorn or disgust to wrinkles (Latin *ruga*) of the nose: *Naso rugato*; Horace, *Sat.* 1.6.5–6: “You do not turn up your nose at men of low birth” (“[non] naso suspendis adunco ignotos”); *Sat.* 2.8.64: Balatron turns up his nose with each word (“suspendens omnia naso”); Persius, *Sat.* 3.87: “These things make the public and the brawny youths wrinkle their noses and double up with bursts of laughter”; 5.91: “Let anger fall from your nose and a wrinkled grimace” (“ira cadat naso rugosaque sanna”); Quintilian, *Inst.* 11.3.80: “Scorn, contempt, and loathing are usually signaled with the nose” (“Naribus ... derisus, contemptus, fastidium significari solet”).

In the LXX, *myktērīzō* and *ekmyktērīzō* sometimes translate the Hebrew *hāṭal*, “mock,” as with Elijah's sarcasm at the expense of the prophets of Baal (1 Kgs 8:27), but most often they translate *lā'ag*, which has connotations of shame and ridicule (Jer 20:7; Ezek 23:32; Job 22:19; 34:7; Ps 2:4; 44:14; 80:7). In Neh 3:36 and Prov 11:12; 15:20; 23:9, the verb *būz* emphasizes the scorn or shame endured, like *nā'aš* (Prov 15:5). To be the butt of sarcasm is bitter (2 Macc 7:39). When scorning a neighbor and letting him know that one has a low opinion of him, one often shakes one's head to express mockery (2 Kgs 19:21 = Isa 37:22; Ps 22:8; cf. Job 6:4), grinds one's teeth (Ps 35:16), or even spits: Nicanor, in mocking the priests and treating them with scorn, went so far as to defile them (1 Macc 7:34). In the NT, *ekmyktērīzō* is used for the Pharisees and officials who turn up their nose at Jesus (Luke 16:14; 23:35); for scornful laughter (*katagelaō*, 8:53); for making sport of him (*empaizō*, Matt 27:29, 31, 41; Luke 23:36). They abuse him (*oneidizō*, Matt 27:44), insult him (*blasphēmeō*, Luke 22:65), they shake their heads (Matt 27:40), just as the apostles would be derided (*chleuazō*, Acts 17:32; *diachleuazō*, 2:13).

To laugh at God and scorn him is to attack his transcendence, for he is the very essence of perfection; hence it is a blasphemy radically opposed to faith.

μωραίνω, μωρία, μωρολογία, μωρός

*mōrainō*, to be dazed, mad, foolish, act stupidly; lose savor, become insipid;

*mōria*, disorder, folly, nonsense; *mōrologia*, foolish talk, nonsense; *mōros*,

foolish, dull, insipid

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*moraino*, S 3471; *TDNT* 4.832–847; *EDNT* 2.449–450; *NIDNTT* 3.1023, 1025; L&N 32.59; BAGD 531 | *moria*, S 2472; *TDNT* 4.832–847; *EDNT* 2.449–450; *NIDNTT* 3.1023, 1025–1026; L&N 32.57; BAGD 531 | *morologia*, S 3473; *TDNT* 4.832–847; *EDNT* 2.450; *NIDNTT* 3.1026; MM 420; L&N 33.379; BAGD 531 | *moros*, S 3474; *TDNT* 4.832–847; *EDNT* 2.449–450; *NIDNTT* 3.1023–1026; MM 420–421; L&N 32.55, 32.58; BDF §§13, 263(4); BAGD 531

A denominative formed from *mōros*, the verb *mōrainō* is sometimes intransitive (“be dazed, besotted, mad; to speak or act foolishly”), sometimes transitive (in the passive, “become mad”). But since *mōros* also has the meaning “dull, inert,” “flat, insipid” (Dioscorides 4.19: *rhixai geusamenō mōrai*), we can understand that the corresponding verb might mean “lose savor, become insipid.” Thus Jesus compares his disciples to a salt acting on humankind; they are intended to give it a new quality: “You are the salt of the earth, but if the salt becomes tasteless (*ean de to halas mōranthē*), with what will it be salted? It is no longer good for anything other than being thrown out and trodden underfoot” (Matt 5:13). Salt has a double function: preserving and seasoning the foods to which it gives taste and savor. That is to say, “it has no worth apart from its action on other objects.” If it becomes tasteless, it loses its property and becomes *analon*, “saltless” (Mark 9:50), ceases to be salt; thenceforth it is unusable, because it is impossible to imagine what could be used to season it anew, a salt to salt it with. Thus the disciple – salt that ought to add seasoning – if he loses the “virtue” of the gospel, is no longer good for anything. Certainly it is impossible to imagine “desalted” salt, but the aorist passive subjunctive *mōranthē* is to be taken metaphorically as applying to disciples who are no longer worthwhile in the spiritual order; they are denatured or nonexistent, “nothings.”

This is a monstrous evolution. St. Paul denounces it from the other direction, in pagans or thinkers: the most cultivated of people have substituted for the worship of the true creator God the worship of human or animal images! Concerning this idolatrous perversion, he says, “Claiming to be wise, they became stupid” (*phaskontes einai dynatoi emōranthēsen*). Here the verb *morainō* has its LXX meaning, “be foolish, do something stupid” (Hebrew *bāʿar*); cf. “All men are beasts, lacking in knowledge.”

This very pejorative meaning belongs to the adjective *mōros* and the noun *mōria*. The first means “blunted, dazed, stupid” in classical Greek and in Koine: “Was he so stupid that he did not understand that this way would lead to this end?” (Epictetus 2.2.16); “deceits of foolish words of ventriloquists.” *Mōria* similarly means disorder, extravagance, stupidity, nonsense. Herodotus 1.131:

“The Persians accuse of folly those who erect statues of gods, temples, and altars”; 1.146: “It is nonsense to say that the Ionians of Asia are more Ionians than the other Ionians”; Plato, *Leg.* 7.818d: “It would be foolish to believe that these sciences are not necessary to those who seek understanding.”

But in the LXX, *mōros* has become a religious and wisdom adjective, especially in Ben Sirach, where the “foolish person” is especially one who lacks judgment (*mōros* is synonymous with *aphrōn* and *anous*, Ps 49:11; and with *asynetos*, Ps 92:7), who is misguided and thinks only in insanities (Sir 16:23), is incapable of learning (21:14; 22:7, 10) because lacking intelligence (22:11) and memory. He is a weak mind (42:8), lacking character (22:18) and nobility (Isa 32:5), incapable of keeping a secret (Sir 8:17). So he must be avoided (4:27), because his speech is as stupid (20:16 – “A fool says, ‘I have no friend’ ”; 19:11; 20:20) as it is irritating (21:16; 27:13); he speaks without thinking (21:26) and says nothing (33:5) even though he speaks up loudly (21:20) to set forth his nonsense (Isa 32:6). His conduct is all just as stupid (Sir 21:18); he makes insults (18:18) and knows no discretion (21:22). It is impossible to love him (20:13; 25:2), above all because he is a schismatic (50:26). According to the literal sense of the texts, the *mōros* would be a fool, an uncouth being, lacking education and culture, with no discernment, circumspection, or wisdom, committing countless blunders. But this lack of intelligence is contrasted with the wisdom and “good sense” that are God’s gifts, so that the *mōros* cannot discern God’s ways; he is lacking in spiritual sense and remains as it were in a stupor in the face of the revelation of the divine mysteries and the divine will.

Such is the meaning of *mōria*, *mōros*, *mōrainō* – whose crudity must be retained – in 1 Cor 1:18–27: “The language of the cross is nonsense (*mōria*) for those who are en route to perdition.... Has God not smitten the wisdom of the world with nonsense (*emōranen*)? ... It pleased God, through the nonsense (*diatēs mōrias*) of preaching to save those who believe ... a crucified Christ, nonsense (*mōria*) to the Gentiles, but the power of God and the wisdom of God.... God’s nonsense (*to mōron*) is wiser than men....” Is there anything more absurd for a reasonable person to hear than a preacher’s declaration that a Jew who was poor, condemned to death by the highest political and religious authorities of his nation, was crucified like a slave? He is risen! This is the Son of God, and he has saved the world! The proclamation of this ignominy is not folly – it is nonsense. God’s making folly of the “wisdom of the world,” which wants the means to be proportional to the end, is what confirmed the vocation of the first Christians. God did not choose them from among the philosophers, the wealthy, the powerful, but from the small, the humble: “God chose the stupid things (*ta mōra*) of the world to shame the wise” (1 Cor 1:27). That means that people must believe, must give themselves over to God in adherence

to mysteries that derail human logic and human good sense: “Let no one be deceived! If anyone believes that he is wise among you in this world, let him become stupid (*mōros*) in order to become wise, for this world’s wisdom is stupidity (*mōria*) with God.”

There remain three NT texts where *mōros* functions in accord with current usage without any theological meaning. The most trivial is the parable that is unfortunately called the parable of the Ten Virgins; it is simply a matter of young women of whom five were little twits (*mōrai*; Matt 25:2, 3, 8) and the others “sensible” (*phronimoi*). The most serious is that of the man who in anger calls his fellow a fool: *mōre!* This insult is punished by “the gehenna of fire,” because it is an expression of hatred, and “whoever hates his brother is a murderer” (1 John 3:15). Finally, the Lord himself twice calls the scribes and Pharisees *mōroi kai typhloi* (fools and blind, Matt 23:17) in denouncing their casuistry, which set the gold in the temple above the sanctuary itself – which is absurd.



ναύκληρος

*nauklēros*, **ship's owner and manager**


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*naukleros*, S 3490; *EDNT* 2.458; MM 422–423; L&N 54.29; BAGD 534; 4.16, 17

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It took a storm and the wreck of a great ship and its two hundred seventy-six passengers at the island of Malta to get the word *nauklēros* into the Bible: “The centurion paid more attention to the pilot and the ship’s owner (*tō kybernētē kai tō nauklērō*) than to what Paul said” (Acts 27:11); but even though this person is mentioned abundantly, from the sixth-fifth century BC, in literary and papyrological texts, it is very difficult to define his role, although this was a major figure in the maritime world and in associations of seafaring folk. Each translator of Acts 27:11 gives it a different meaning.

What is remarkable is that here St. Luke associates the *nauklēros* with the *kybernētēs* (like Philo, *Spec. Laws* 4.186; *Dreams* 2.86; Josephus, *Ant.* 9.209; *P.Lille* 24, 3–4; *P.Hib.* 39, 5–6; 98, 12–13) as constituting the principal personages on board and forming together with the *prōreus* a sort of senior staff of the vessel. We can understand, then, that the centurion would consult with the authorities, whose judgment in matters of navigation would obviously carry more weight than the opinion of his prisoner.

The *kybernētēs* is rightly named first, because of his technical knowledge of maritime questions – whereas the *nauklēros* is not necessarily an expert – and he commands the sailors; he is a professional navigator, and it is he who, if need be, will order jettisoning the cargo (*ho kybernētēs ekeleue*, Achilles Tatius, *Leuc. et Clit.* 3.2.9; cf. 1.1.5; Athenaeus 2.37 c). So he is clearly the master on board, at the head of the hierarchy. This is why he is called *kyrios* (Artemidorus Daldianus, *Onir.* 2.23), and his authority is often likened to that of a political leader; but then what has the *nauklēros* come to do here?

According to the etymology – *naus*, “ship” and *klēros*, the “lot” or “share” allotted by fate – the *nauklēros thalassios* (*P.Oxy.* 87, 6–7), or *magister navis*, does not in principle direct the navigation of a ship, but he is its owner, and hence its manager (Xenophon, *An.* 7.2.12; Strabo 2.3.4), especially in the classical period. This means that he is an important person whose opinions must be heard and taken into consideration, because he is also the ship’s operator, and – unlike modern shipowners – he travels on his own ship

(*nauklērokybernēntes ploiou idiou or idiōtikou*) and is a merchant (*nauklēros emporos, nauclerus mercator*, Plautus, *Mil. Glor.* 1109–1110; 1175–1182; Tacitus, Ann. 12.5). Now there were risks both for merchant and for maritime transporter: paying back the loans that were made for the big venture, seeing to it that the merchandise arrived at the agreed place, preserving them from any deterioration; but there are also all the dangers of the sea, pirates, serious damage (*P.Magd.* 11, 3–4 = *P.Enteux.* 27), storms, and the possible necessity of jettisoning the cargo and of shipwreck. Thus he has his say in all of these conjunctures, and we can understand that the centurion in Acts should have insisted on consulting him; but as the *nauklēros* could be simply the owner's agent (*P.Lond.* 1940, 63) and the charterer of the vessel (*P.Lille* 22 and 23; cf. *P.Tebt.* 823–825; 1034–1035; *P.Ryl.* 576), or even an anonymous mariner, we cannot say for certain what kind of person the *nauklēros* in Acts 27:11 was. It would seem that he was the owner, but this possibility would be excluded if his ship was carrying the *annonae* (the Roman tax in kind on the grain harvest), for then it would belong to the imperial fleet. In that case, he would be the public transport official. It is best to consider him to be the *nauklēos agōgēs*, the transport official (*P.Magd.* 11, 5).

## νοσφίζομαι

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*nosphizomai*, to set aside, remove, divert, steal

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*nosphizomai*, S 3557; EDNT 2.478; MM 430; L&N 57.246; BAGD 543–544

Christian slaves are not to steal anything at all (Titus 2:10, *mē nosphizomenous*). But Ananias and Sapphira kept back a portion of the price of the sale of their property (Acts 5:2–3). Derived from *nosphi* (“apart, aside,” *SB* 8511, 10), *nosphizesthai apo* means “set aside” (*P.Rev.*, col. 27, 10; *I.Thas.* 336, 2: “Fate took away my life at the age of eighteen”), “remove,” and hence “divert to one's own profit, steal,” as with Menelaus, who “stole several gold vases from the temple” (2 Macc 4:32; cf. Josh 7:1).

In the Hellenistic period, *nosphizō* occurs commonly in the literature, sometimes with respect to plunder, sometimes with respect to fraudulent removal or restitution. Its use is identical in the papyri, where the dishonesty of these diversions is emphasized. Moulton-Milligan cites this oath from the third century AD, in which a man swears that he will “peculate” nothing (*oute autos nospheioumai*) and adds that if he finds out that someone is stealing (*nosphizomenos*) he will denounce him. The guilty party must make double restitution. In AD 25, a contract for *paramonē* (continued service by a slave

whose manumission is deferred) provides for sanctions if something belonging to Harmosis is damaged or stolen (*ē katablaptousi ē nosphizomenos haliskētai tōn Harmōsios*, *P.Mich.* 587, 20).

## νουθεσία, νουθετέω

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*nouthesia*, **admonition, reprimand**; *noutheteō*, **to instruct, lecture, admonish, reprimand**

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*nouthesia*, S 3559; *TDNT* 4.1019–1022; *EDNT* 2.478; *NIDNTT* 1.568–569; MM 430; L&N 33.339; BAGD 544 | *noutheteo*, S 3560; *TDNT* 4.1019–1022; *EDNT* 2.478; *NIDNTT* 1.567–568; MM 430; L&N 33.339; BAGD 544

A compound of *nous* and *tithēmi*, the verb *noutheteō* basically means “put something in someone’s mind,” hence “instruct, lecture,” sometimes by way of refreshing the memory, sometimes by way of making observations or giving warnings. In the latter case, *nouthesia* often means “reproach” or “reprimand” (Wis 16:6). These meanings are common to secular and biblical Greek, although the latter places greater emphasis on corporal punishment, punishment being above all an element of child-rearing.

Eliphaz says to Job: “You instructed many people.” This is not so much a matter of doctrinal teaching as of instruction aimed at developing the ability to reflect, correcting errors and reinforcing what is good. Events, warnings, punishments are practical lessons that make one aware of faults committed, warn the guilty and dispose them to correct themselves: a disaster is “a warning to all those who are able to reflect”; how much more the reprimands of those who have the competence and the authority! In other words, *nouthesia* is a major component of education (*paideia*): “If you desire to become the slave of the wise person, then you will accept your share of reprimands and correction” (*nouthesias kai sōphronismou*), which make up for a lack of moral training (*apaideusia*, Philo, *Alleg. Interp.* 3.193); “What is good and profitable for those who need to be rebuked is admonition” (*nouthesia*, *Prelim. Stud.* 157); “ill treatment according to the law gives the world a perfect good: admonition, which cannot be praised too highly” (ibid. 160); the irrational powers are mastered “with blows of reprimand and correction” (*Worse Attacks Better* 3); “After training the people entrusted to his rule through relatively mild directives and exhortations, then by more severe threats and admonitions, Moses called upon them to give a practical demonstration of the lessons they had learned” (*Rewards* 4; cf. *Migr. Abr.* 14).

Obviously, parents are responsible to reprimand, admonish, and correct their children; and divine *nouthesia* is nearly always described as fatherly child-rearing, which reprimands and punishes with moderation, with regret, and as little as possible; God corrects or warns people with great consideration (*Ep. Arist.* 207). He admonishes to avoid having to punish (Philo, *Moses* 1.110). This is a model for the training of believers by the leaders of the community, in particular by St. Paul, who never ceased warning or reprimanding with tears each Ephesian or Corinthian Christian: “I write these things not to shame you, but as to beloved and respected children, to set your minds aright.... You do not have many fathers.” All apostolic pastoral care can be summed up in these warnings-admonitions: “Warning every person and instructing every person in all wisdom, in order to make every person perfect in Christ.” In the brotherly life, after all, reciprocal warnings waken the conscience of the delinquent and lead back to the right path those who have gone astray (*T. Benj.* 4.5; *T. Jos.* 6.8); “reprimands and rebukes bring about repentance and shame, one of which leads to sorrow and the other to fear” (Plutarch, *De virt. mor.* 12; cf. *De adul. et am.* 28). The exact nuance varies from case to case: “Teach each other in all wisdom, admonishing one another” (*didaskontes kai nouthetountes heautous*, Col 3:16); “Rebuke those who are disorderly” (1 Thess 5:14); but even the disobedient person must not be treated as an enemy – “reprimand him as a brother” (2 Thess 3:15; cf. in the Roman period: “do not take it too hard that I write to rebuke you,” *mē bareōs eche mou ta grammata nouthetounta se*, SB 6263, 26; third century; 7975, 18 = PSI 1334). Brotherly correction presupposes that Christians are spiritual adults and are, like the Roman Christians, “able to warn each other” (Rom 15:14).

νοῦθος

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*nōthros*, **dull, sluggish, negligent, stupid**

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***nothros***, S 3576; TDNT 4.1126; EDNT 2.483; MM 432; L&N 32.47, 88.249; BAGD 547

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Setting out to explicate a lofty theological theme, the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews is worried about the receptivity of his readers, “since you have become *nōthroi* in hearing” (*epei nōthroi gegonate tais akoais*). The three occurrences of *nōthros* in the LXX belong to the Wisdom writers. Julius Pollux (*Onom.* 1.3.43) gives as synonyms *bradys*, *nōthēs*, *amelēs*, *argon*, *diagōn*; so it means “slow, lazy, faltering, slack, timid, negligent.” In Polybius, it is applied above all to the intellectual faculties: “Hanno showed his stupidity” (1.74.13);

“There was not one who was foolish enough or stupid enough (*oudena houtōs alogiston oude nōthron*) to hope ever to return to his country by fleeing” (3.63.7); “This same man was slow of thought (*nōthros men en tais epinoiais*), timid in accomplishment (*atolmos d’ en tais epibolais*), and incapable of facing danger head on.”

But dullness is seen also in achievements: “Minucius denigrated Fabius in front of everyone, presenting him as a man who, in the conduct of operations, acted with laxity and laziness” (*hōs agennōs chrōmenon tois pragmasi kai nōthrōs*, Polybius 3.90.6); “Aratus, in every undertaking and in all combat operations, showed timidity and indolence” (*pasi tois tou poleμου pragmasin atolmōs echrēto kai nōthrōs*, 4.60.2); Parmenion was “slow and not very active” in battle (Plutarch, *Alex.* 33.10). “Why do we continue to be lazy, careless, apathetic, and looking for excuses not to work?” Incompetent trainers, through their poor technique, get their athletes into bad shape, make them lazy, sluggish, less daring, not in a condition appropriate to their age. A Christian inscription from Eumeneia: “Aurelius Zotikos (?) Lykidas, I call God to witness that I built this tomb at my own expense, since my brother Amianos was negligent (*nōthrōs echontos Amianou tou adelphou mou*), and I order that Phronime and Maxima, my sisters, be placed in it.” The brother (apparently the older brother) did not prepare and maintain the tomb of the two sisters.

So *nōthrotēs* is culpable negligence, the failure to perform an obligation or a customary duty (cf. *UPZ* 110, 95), and it is this inertia or lackadaisical attitude toward Christian doctrine that the author of Hebrews denounces in his readers. Whereas when they were converted they must have been eager to learn about Christ and the tradition of the church (Heb 2:3; cf. Acts 2:42), they subsequently became – and remain, cf. the perfect *gegonate* – listless, in a depressed state, as it were, like people weakened by sickness after the fever has fallen.

This medical meaning is well attested in the papyri, even though it is not a technical term but corresponds to our expressions “to be unwell, to suffer from an illness,” especially in letters: “I feel very poorly (*leian de nōthreuomai*); perhaps it is the climate? I do not know” (*P.Mert.* 82, 14; second century; cf. *nōthron de estin leian*, in W. H. S. Jones, *The Medical Writings of Anonymus Londinensis*, Cambridge, 1947, p. 104; *Hermes Trismegistus*, frag. 24, 14: “The south produces limpness, because it receives clouds that the atmosphere creates through condensation”); “I did not find anyone to send to you because I was sick” (*P.Mich.* 477, 36); “Until today I was worried about you because you were doing poorly when you left me”; *P.Tebt.* 421, 5: “Your sister is ill” (cf. 422, 5). Psychological health depends on the body; bodies are fitted to the souls that descend to become incarnate: “for lively (*oxesi*) souls, lively (*oxea*) bodies;

for sluggish (*bradesi*) souls, sluggish (*bradea*) bodies; for active (*energesin*) souls, active (*energē*) bodies; for lazy (*nōthraís*) souls, lazy (*nōthra*) bodies, for strong (*dynatais*) souls, strong (*dynata*) bodies.”

Thus *nōthros* is used in reference to body and soul alike, for interior dispositions as well as practical accomplishments. The “dull” or “listless” recipients of Hebrews suffer first of all from a kind of depression, a lower intensity in their spiritual life; but this also translates into indolence and laziness in intellectual labor, notably in devotion to the exegesis of the Word of God.

ξενία, ξενίζω, ξενοδοχέω, ξένος

*xenia*, a house, apartment, or room for guests; *xenizō*, to receive and give lodging to a guest; to startle through novelty, surprise by being unusual; *xenodocheō*, to receive a guest, show hospitality; *xenos*, strange, foreign; stranger, foreigner, guest

→see also παρεπίδημος; φιλοξενία, φιλόξενος

*xenia*, S 3578; TDNT 2.1–36; EDNT 2.485; MM 433; L&N 7.31, 34.57; BAGD 547 | *xenizo*, S 3579; TDNT 5.1–36; EDNT 2.485; MM 433; L&N 34.57; BDF §§126(2), 196; BAGD 547–548 | *xenodocheo*, S 3580; TDNT 5.1–36; EDNT 2.485–486; NIDNTT 1.686; MM 433; L&N 34.57; BAGD 548 | *xenos*, S 3581; TDNT 5.1–36; EDNT 2.486; NIDNTT 1.686–689; MM 433–434; L&N 28.34; BDF §182(3); BAGD 548

In the Bible, *foreigner/stranger* is not a technical or official designation. It refers to anything that is foreign whether in the category of language, land, social groups, or religion (Acts 17:18 – *xenōn daimoniōn ... katangeleus*; Achilles Tatius 2.30: *deomai pros theōn xenōn kai enchōriōn*; Josephus, *Ag. Apion* 2.251, 267), and the emphasis is on the psychological reality. The *xenos* is sometimes simply a guest, sometimes a traveler (2 Sam 12:4, Hebrew *’ārāh*), a passerby, or a traveler who has no place to sleep (Matt 25:35, 38, 43, 44) and is seeking shelter. Most often it refers to immigrants or non-natives, who are not part of a town, city, or country; these can be business travelers (*P.Oxy.* 1672, 4; first century AD; *Pap.Lugd. Bat.* XVI, 29, 17), but the Egyptian papyri that supply lists of them designate as *xenoi* above all “foreign laborers” – most often, it would seem, construction workers.

Among the foreigners, some held important posts or carried out important functions, as attested by various honorific decrees; others had significant and more or less durable relations with a given community. Sometimes they were tolerated, and sometimes viewed with suspicion or scorn, but a helpful and hospitable attitude is also attested. There was always a place for Hellenistic philanthropy, and one of its most common manifestations was hospitality. Thus *xenos* means “guest-friend,” as Ariaeus was the guest-friend of Menon (Xenophon, *An.* 2.4.15); and in Rom 16:23 Gaius of Corinth (1 Cor 1:14) provides lodging not only for St. Paul, but for every traveling Christian, and probably opens his house for meetings of the community as well. Nevertheless,

the foreigner per se is usually a mysterious, unfamiliar person (*P.Hib.* 27, 38) – at least unexpected – who is hard to understand and hard to get on with. Furthermore, the adjective *xenos* is used for unusual rains (Wis 16:16), a strange death (19:5), remarkable or odd tastes (16:2–5), “differing and strange” or surprising doctrines.

These remarks do not yet account for Eph 2:12 – “At that time, you were without Christ, excluded from the commonwealth of Israel, strangers to the covenants of the promise (of salvation)” – and 2:19 – “You are no longer strangers or sojourners (*ouketi este xenoī kai paroikoi*) but fellow-citizens of the saints, you belong to the household of God” (cf. Philo, *Cherub.* 120ff.). *Xenos* here has its classical Greek technical – political and legal – function. If the cultural foreigner is a barbarian, one who does not speak Greek, he is politically excluded from the *polis* and deprived of citizenship both in his home city and in the city to which he has come; he is in a sense an outlaw, possessing neither right nor privilege, unable to own land or marry a citizen; he is an inferior being, a second-class person (Plutarch, *De Alex. fort.* 1.6) who can be expelled (Thucydides 2.39.1), under the jurisdiction of the tribunal for foreigners (Dittenberger, *Syl.* 364; 619, 50; 647, 35). It is to this privation of rights that St. Paul refers; Christ’s work was to assimilate the Gentiles completely to Israel in the house of God. Already in the OT, God loved and protected the “sojourner” (Hebrew *gēr*; Lev 19:10; 23:22; Deut 10:18; Philo, *Moses* 1.36), who was in a way integrated by the law into the chosen people (Exod 12:48; 20:10; Deut 14:29; cf. Ezek 47:22). This people had been a “stranger” in Egypt (Exod 22:20; 23:9) and was obligated to show hospitality to the stranger and love him as one of its own (Lev 19:34; cf. Stählin, “ξένος,” in *TDNT*, vol. 5, pp. 9–10).

The verb *xenizō*, “to lodge, receive a guest,” has no theological connotations in the Bible. The biblical hapax *xenodocheō*, condemned by Atticists, is used with respect to the Christian widow who should be written on the church roll “if she has shown hospitality” (1 Tim 5:10), this eagerness to put up guests being one of the prime works of charity, practiced notably by women, and widows excelled at it (1 Kgs 17:10).

In the Bible, *xenia*, derived from *xenizō*, refers to the house or apartment, the place where friends or strangers are received. Thus St. Paul asks Philemon: “Prepare me a room” (verse 22). This is by far the commonest meaning in the papyri: “I am writing so that you may be able to help Apis and put him up” (*xenian de autō poiēsēs*, *P.Oxy.* 1064, 10; cf. 118, verso 18); someone asks for purple in order to be able to show hospitality (931, 7); in the building of a house, provisions are made for chapels and for guest quarters. The preparation of the door for such a room by carpenters is noted a number of times in accounting records. But *xenia* is also a gathering and dinner to which



acquaintances are invited. Since *ta xenia* also refers to gifts given on the occasion of a visit by a VIP, some have wished to give the word this meaning in Acts 28:23, where the Jews of Rome come to see Paul *eis tēn xenian*; which, however, seems to refer to his apartment.

ὄγκος

*onkos*, **bulk, mass, weight, fullness, turgidity**

*onkos*, S 3591; *TDNT* 5.1–36; *EDNT* 2.491; MM 437; L&N 13.149; BAGD 553

This biblical hapax (Heb 12:1) has at least three meanings. (a) “The bulk of a body, its mass, or its volume.” What Plato called *ton tōn sarkōn onkōn*, Aristotle and Philo label *onkos sōmatikos*: “We must offer the first fruits of our bodily mass, which is truly built of earth and wood” (*Prelim. Stud.* 96); “When our crowded and noisy element desires the houses that are in Egypt, that is, the bodily mass, it lapses into pleasures that bring death.” (b) “Weight, heaviness.” Cf. Philostratus: “Those who eat to excess have sagging brows, shortness of breath, hollows under their collarbones, flabby sides; they show a certain heaviness” (*onkou ti endeiknymenoi*, *Gym.* 48); “When the mind is grasped by one of the themes of philosophical contemplation, it submits to its impulse and follows it until it forgets all bodily heaviness” (*ton sōmatikon onkon*); (c) “fullness”; in a positive sense, “gravity”; in a pejorative sense, “turgidity, distension.” In Hippocrates, Diodorus Siculus, and Aelian, it often refers to obesity; but usually it means a fatuousness, an outgrowth of pride or vanity. Hesychius gives this definition: *onkos*: *physēma*, *hyperēphania*, *eparsis*, *megethos*.

The sports metaphor in Heb 12:1 – “casting aside every weight” (*onkon apothemenoi panta*) – conforms on the one hand to the traditional discipline of the athlete who runs stripped (*gymnos*), unburdened of every weight, with complete freedom of movement. On the other hand, it fits in with the Philonian principle of what could be called “spiritual unballasting,” which is necessary for all virtuous people. Commenting on Gen 37:17 – “they are gone from here” – where he sees an allusion to the weight of the body (*sōmatikon onkon*), Philo understands Moses to be showing that “all those who, in order to attain virtue, persevere in the effort, after leaving behind the terrestrial regions, have decided to rise without dragging along with them any of the miseries of the body. He declares that he has heard them say, ‘Let us leave for Dothan.’ Now Dothan stands for suitable detachment” (*Worse Attacks Better* 27); “Our soul often moves by itself, having shed all the weight of the body (*holon ton sōmatikon onkon ekdysa*) and cleared away the press of the senses” (*Dreams* 1.43); “If you

seek God, O my thought, seek him after exiting yourself; as long as you abide in the weights of the body (*menousa de en tois sōmatikois onkois*) or in the presumptions of the intelligence, you are not in pursuit of divine things” (*Alleg. Interp.* 3.47). At this point it is difficult to remove the author of Hebrews from the spirituality and vocabulary of the Alexandrian philosopher.

ὀθόνη, ὀθόνιον

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*othonē, othonion, linen cloth, strip, bandage*

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***othone***, S 3607; *EDNT* 2.493; MM 439; L&N 6.153; BAGD 555 | ***othonion***, S 3608; *EDNT* 2.493; MM 439; L&N 6.154; BAGD 555

In their various usages, these two nouns are nearly synonymous, and the diminutive – usually occurring in the plural – is diminutive in form only, retaining the same meaning as the noun from which it is derived. The basic meaning is “linen cloth” of whatever shape or size (cf. *P.Cair.Zen.* 59594, 3: *epanēkein diaphora tōn othoniōn*; *P.Mich.* 607, 30: *othonion Tarsikon Aigyption*); but the emphasis is on its fineness and whiteness. At Joppa, Peter saw an “object” (*skeuos*) descend from heaven, like a large piece of cloth.

The three occurrences of *othonion* in the OT refer to garments of fine cloth (Judg 14:13; Hos 2:5, 9), which is the dominant meaning in the papyri. It is known that in Egypt the production of these fine materials was monopolized by the state workshops and the temples, which paid a fee to the treasury for the right to make them: *telos othoniōn*. Hence the abundance of texts beginning with the third century BC: while Petosiris was at the temple of Moithymis, brigands entered his house, robbed his wife and his mother of their clothing, and took his daughter’s “linen robe worth one hundred drachmas.” *Othonia* and linen tunics are bequeathed in wills (*P.Oxy.* 15, 12), a woman wears one to her home as a dowry (*Pap.Lugd.Bat.* II, 5, 17). They are mentioned in inventories along with names of garments such as *himation*, *chitōn*, *chlamys*, *hypokamisa*, *sindon*, etc. In various instances a *kainon othonion* is specified (*P.Hib.* 793, col. VI, 1), the color saffron (*P.Oxy.* 1679, 5), children’s clothing (*P.Alex.* 39, 11, *hyper othoniōn tōn teknōn*) or a mother’s clothes (*SB* 9876, 7; cf. *P.Lond.* 1942, 4–5), or the fact that someone lacks *othonia* (S. Witkowski, *Epistulae Privatae Graecae* 1, 3).

On the basis of these usages, a number of modern interpreters identify the *othonia* which according to St. John covered the body of Jesus in the tomb as the winding-sheet (*sindōn*), the piece of cloth mentioned by the Synoptics. Thus the *othonia* would be a large linen sheet of fine weave. But this interpretation

accounts for neither the plural form, which should at least be translated “linens” (these are mentioned a number of times in burials), nor the force of the verb *deō* in John 19:40, where we are told that Joseph of Arimathea and Nicodemus “took Jesus’ body and bound it with *othonia*.” We may compare Lazarus leaving the tomb, wrapped hand and foot in bandages. Jesus says to them, “Unbind him and let him go” (John 11:44). If he had been simply wrapped in a shroud, he could have freed himself; but he could not, because he was fettered, bound hand and foot. Clearly the *othonia* are precisely these wrappings, these bandages, which hold the body fast and allow the close fitting of the large shroud, conformably to Jewish custom.

If this meaning of *othonion* is not attested in the papyri, it is current in the medical vocabulary and was remarked upon by Dom Augustin Calmet and J. J. Wettstein (on Luke 24:12). Hippocrates knew the meaning “fine linen,” but he repeatedly uses the plural for the strips that the physician uses for fractures and dislocations (*Liqu.* 1.2; 5.2; 7.1); they have to be strong, but also light, fine, supple, clean, and appropriately sized (*Off.* 8, 11, 12, 22). If they are wrapped too tight, the compression causes swelling, etc. Among the objects in the physician’s supply chest, J. Pollux mentions the *othonion* together with bandages and ties, *desma*, *epidesma*, *telamōn* (*Onom.* 4.181).

So even though the translation “bandages, strips of linen” did not appear in French Bibles until 1879 with the versions of E. Reuss and L. Segond, E. Delebecque is quite right to translate Luke 24:12 “He saw only the bandages,” and F. M. Braun was right to translate John 19:40 “They wrapped him in linens, binding him with bandages, according to the burial custom of the Jews.”

## οἰκονομέω, οἰκονομία, οἰκονόμος

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*oikonomeō*, **to administrate, manage affairs**; *oikonomia*, **management of a household, a city, or the world**; *oikonomos*, **steward, household manager, city treasurer**

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*oikonomeo*, S 3621; EDNT 2.498–500; NIDNTT 2.253–255; MM 442; L&N 46.1; BAGD 559 | *oikonomia*, S 3622; EDNT 2.498–500; NIDNTT 2.253–256; MM 442; L&N 30.68, 42.25, 46.1; BAGD 559–560 | *oikonomos*, S 3623; TDNT 5.149–151; EDNT 2.498–500; NIDNTT 2.253–255; MM 442–443; L&N 37.39, 46.4, 57.231; BAGD 560; ND 4.160–161

*Oikonomos* and *oikonomia* are derived from *oikonomeō*, a compound of *oikos*, “house,” and by extension “things pertaining to the house,” and *nemō*, “distribute, apportion,” and then “administrate, rule.” *Oikonomeō* can mean

“manage one’s affairs” (Ps 112:5) as well as “make an inventory” (2 Macc 3:14), “make arrangements, arrange” (*PSI* 584, 17; 597, 3); “distribute” parts of sacrificial animals (*Fouilles de Delphes* III, 3; 238, 6). But in the literal sense of the word, *oikonomia*, which suggests good order, is as much an art (*technē*) as a science (*epistēmē*), whether it means taking care of property (cf. Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*) or seeing to the relations between master and slaves (cf. Aristotle’s *Oeconomica*). In the first century, *oikonomia* means the management of a household (*oikos*), the administration of a city (*polis*), the running of the world (*kosmos*), and, in a religious sense, the governing of the universe by God.

The first mention of *oikonomos* in the NT is Luke 12:42 – “Who then is the faithful and prudent steward whom the master will set over all his household to distribute the ration of wheat at the appointed time?” For the *oikonomos* is chosen for his abilities to carry out this function: hard-working, zealous, competent, circumspect. “What is required of stewards is that they be found faithful,” worthy of the master’s confidence. The person in question is a slave who distributes the work or the pay among his colleagues. We are quite familiar with these *oikonomoi*, these majordomos “over the household” (2 Kgs 4:6, Hebrew *‘al-habayit*; 16:9; 18:3), notably Eliakim (2 Kgs 18:18, 37; 19:2; Isa 36:3, 22; 37:2), a confidential aide and sometime ambassador of King Hezekiah, associated with the elders and the priests, the court archivists and scribes, and in charge of administrating the royal property; he is master of the palace. Similarly, Artemidorus is “chief of the household” for Apollonius (the *dioikētēs* of Ptolemy II Philadelphus): *ho epī tēs oikias*, who distributes the rations to the servants, for the most part slaves, and accounts for the cost of the upkeep of their clothing. Above all, there is Zeno, the steward and business agent of the same master: he oversees the livestock (*P.Cair.Zen.* 59166; 59340), directs the brewery (59297), processes the oil (*P.Rev.* col. 40, 2–8; 46, 8–20; 47, 1–9; 51, 19), controls the textile revenues (*ibid.* 107, 1–2; cf. *P.Tebt.* 703, 87–117), the brick-making labor (*P.Cair.Zen.* 59451), the dikes (59296) and irrigation works (59277; 59825), constructs buildings, hires staff (59329, 59610; *PSI* 345), makes decisions about the farming land (*P.Mich.Zen.* 76): “I have sent you the *oikonomos* Heracleides as you asked so that he may make the arrangements for the grape harvest” (*P.Fay.* 133, 2); he also manages the workforce (*P.Cair.Zen.* 59062; 59342), especially the reapers (59301; 59451; *P.Mich.Zen.* 73), whose wages he pays (*P.Cair.Zen.* 45; *P.Wisc.* 1). He buys and sells, is responsible for transfers of funds (*P.Cair.Zen.* 75; *P.Rev.* 41, 14–19), has an account at the bank at Philadelphia (*P.Cair.Zen.* 59022; 59297; *P.Mich.Zen.* 38). On occasion, he settles disputes and acts as police chief. Such freedom of action, extensive authority, and power cannot have been free of

abuses, but these are rarely attested. In Luke 16:1–3, the *oikonomos* is not a slave like the steward of a woman of consular rank (J. and L. Robert, “Bulletin épigraphique,” in *REG*, 1960, p. 195, n. 355; J. Schmidt, *Vie et mort des esclaves dans la Rome antique*, Paris, 1973, p. 24), but a free man like Arion, who managed all the wealth of Hyrcanus (Josephus, *Ant.* 12.199–200: *hos hapanta to en Alexandreia chrēmata autou dōkei*). He was steward over extensive property and was guilty of misappropriation of funds: “There was a rich man who had a steward (*hos eichen oikonomon*) who was accused of squandering his wealth.... ‘Prepare the accounts of your administration, for you can no longer be steward.’ So the steward said to himself, ‘What shall I do? For my master is taking the *oikonomia* from me?’ ” “Prepare the accounts of your administration” (*apodos ton logon tēs oikonomias sou*, cf. Matt 25:14–30; Luke 19:11–27) is the start of an accounting operation through which the official gives an account to his master in accord with the precise rules set forth by Callistratus (*Dig.* 35.1.82). P. Jouanique groups these rules under four headings: (a) Examination of records (“*legendas offere rationes*”): presentation of receipts, of papers that give evidence of receipts and disbursements, etc.; (b) Verification of figures (“*computendas offerre rationes*”): comparison of the balance to cash on hand; (c) Material payment of the balance in cash (“*reliqua solvere*”); (d) Settlement of account (“*subscribere rationes*”). We know how the *oikonomos* falsified the acknowledgements of debt – that was an easy matter – but what is remarkable is his statement of his intentions. “I know what I will do, so that they will receive me into their houses when I have been removed from the *oikonomia*” (Luke 16:4) corresponds exactly with the words of Sostratus: “Money is an unstable thing. If you are sure that you will have it forever, keep it and do not share with anyone. But if you are not its master ... do not refuse to be generous with it.... To the extent that you have control over it, use it generously, help everyone, enrich as many people as possible through your own means. There is an imperishable treasure. And if ever your fortunes change, you will get your recompense. It is better to have a true friend before you than hidden riches that you keep buried in the ground” (Menander, *Dysk.* 797–812).

An *oikonomos* in the NT may be not only the majordomo of a household or the overseer of a rural estate but a city treasurer, like Erastus, *ho oikonomos tēs poleōs*. This official is not a mere cashier, although it is his job to pay for an inscription or provide the crowns for benefactors, but a financial administrator with very wide-ranging powers (*C.Ord.Ptol.* 24, 3; 33, 9) who organizes banquets (*I.Magn.* 101, 89) and provides for sacrifices, at which he is associated with the priests. This must have been a person of some importance, since *oikonomoi* are mentioned so often in the inscriptions – for example, “Diodorus the younger, being *oikonomos*, dedicated the statue of Agathe Tyche,

under the *stratēgia* of Claudius Proclus Cestianus” – and since King Ptolemy Euergetes II and Queen Cleopatra address them together with high officials: “to the *stratēgoi*, garrison commanders, *epistatai* of the guards and police chiefs, *epimelētai*, *oikonomoi*, and *basilogrammateis*, and other officers of the royal administration.” In an official letter, the *oikonomos* is to be consulted on the same level as the *epistatēs*, the police chief, and the royal scribe (*P.Ryl.* 572, 41; cf. 575, 8).

So when St. Paul asks: “Let people think of us as servants of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God” (*hōs hypēretas Christou kai oikonomous mystēriōn theou*, 1 Cor 4:1; cf. 9:17), or when he stipulates that “the *episkopos* must be blameless as God’s steward” (*hōs theou oikonomon*), he positions this post precisely: having governmental authority over subordinates, but more importantly being itself subordinate to God. No matter how extensive the powers of *oikonomoi*, they are not the owners of the treasures of truth and grace that are entrusted to them; as they administer these treasures they must remain aware of their dependency and of the accounting that they will have to give. Hence their obligation to be faithful.

This extension of *oikonomia* to the religious sphere is not novel. The apostle uses it especially in the prison epistles: “the *oikonomia* of the fullness of time,” “the *oikonomia* of the grace of God, which he has entrusted to me for you” (Eph 3:2), “the *oikonomia* of the hidden mystery” (3:9); “I have become a minister (of the church) according to God’s *oikonomia* (plan of salvation), the carrying out of which has been entrusted to me for you” (Col 1:25). *Oikonomia* is the activity of the *oikonomos* (Luke 16:2–4), in the form of the dispensation of salvation, its actualization for each one, thanks to the minister of God. In the papyri, *oikonomia* certainly refers to the act of administering, but more often to legal or judicial action: “He is debarred, from such time as he receives a copy of the present petition, from carrying out any legal proceedings against me or molesting either my person or the above-named guarantors” (*P.Rein.* 7, 34; second century BC). A mother of three children who knows how to write pleads for the right to sign, without being represented by a *kyrios*, in any transaction (*chōris kyriou chrēmатizein en hais poiountai oikonomiais*, *P.Oxy.* 1467, 8; cf. *P.Magd.* 32, 6; Epictetus 3.24.92: a ruling and a well-ordered measure); a transaction (*P.Tebt.* 30, 18), a procedure (*P.Tebt.* 318, 18), a sale contract (*Pap.Lugd.Bat.* II, 7, 27), a proxy (*P.Fouad* 36, 32; *P.Mil.* 39, 5), an agreement (*P.Mich.* 262, 10; AD 35), an arrangement (*P.Tebt.* 764, 24; *SB* 9454, 9), any contract. Ministers of the church are therefore written into the new “covenant” to actualize the redemptive purpose and plan of salvation; their job is to put it into effect as well as possible. They are dispensers of salvation, but only in that

they “put into effect the measures” (cf. *Ep. Arist.* 24; Polybius 4.67.9) taken by God from all eternity.

ὀκνέω, ὀκνηρός

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*okneō*, to hesitate, delay; *oknēros*, lazy, idle, negligent, burdensome

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*okneo*, S 3635; *EDNT* 2.505; MM 444–445; L&N 67.125; BDF §392(1b); BAGD 563 | *okneros*, S 3636; *TDNT* 5.166–167; *EDNT* 2.506; MM 445; L&N 22.8, 88.250; BAGD 563

In literary Greek of the first century, *okneō* means “hesitate.” This is often its meaning in the LXX (Tob 12:13), where, however, it translates the niphal of the Hebrew *ʾāšal*, always with negation: “Do not hesitate to set out” (Judg 18:9); “Do not be slow to give thanks to God” (Tob 12:6); “Let this comely slave not delay to come to my lord” (Jdt 12:13). In Sir 7:35, *mē oknei* is synonymous with *mē amelei*: “Do not hesitate to visit the sick, for it is for such deeds that you will be loved.” When the disciples of Joppa ask Peter to come without delay, they use the same turn of phrase as Balak to Balaam in Num 22:16 – *mē oknēsēs dielthein*.

The adjective *oknēros* (Hebrew *ʾāšēl*) is always pejorative in the Bible. It refers to the lazy person, or the loafer, who stays in bed (Prov 6:9; 26:4), whose “hands refuse to work.” Such a person is eminently worthy of scorn, inspires disgust, even has the face to justify his inactivity. This is the case with the wicked and idle servant (*ponēre doule kai oknēre*) of the parable of the talents (Matt 25:26), who not only has failed to work to produce a profit on his master’s property but in addition makes excuses for his idleness.

The nuance of culpable unconcern in Rom 12:11 (*tē spoudē mē oknēroi*) is well attested in the papyri, where the author of a letter forbids the neglect of his instructions (*P.Mich.* 221, 14; *P.Oslo* 82, 9; 128, 12; *P.Oxy.* 2190, 44; 2275, 9; 2596, 11; *SB* 9497, 26). The recipient is expected to be active, diligent, quick to act (*P.Mert.* 22, 3; *P.Oxy.* 1775, 8: *ouk ōknēsa oute palin ēmelēsa*; *PSI* 837, 15; Menander, *Mis.*: *oknērōs kai tremōn eiserchomai*, in *P.Oxy.* 2656, 266), especially when it comes to helping someone in need: *spoudasate autō aoknōs ... kai hēmīs ouk oknēsōmen* (*P.Lond.* 1916, 16; cf. 2090, 6; *PSI* 1414, 21).

As for the remark in Phil 3:1 – “To write the same things to you is not burdensome to me” (*ta auta graphēin hymin, emoi men ouk oknēron*) – is not only a common formula in letters, but an expression of fervor and zeal in affection, used with loved ones: “It is not burdensome for me to write to you” (*ou mē oknēsō soi graphin*, *P.Mich.* 491, 14); “Do not be afraid to write letters,



because I am extremely glad to get them” (ibid. 482, 22); “Dearest brother, do not hesitate to write to me” (*glykytate adelphe, graphōn moi mē oknei*, *P.Mert.* 85, 16); “Do not hesitate to write me concerning your health” (*mē oknēsēs graphein moi peri tēs hygiās sou*, *P.Harr.* 107, 15; cf. *P.Mich.* 490, 12; *SB* 10652, B 11); Diogenes writing to his mother in the first century: “If you write to me about anything at all that you need, do not hesitate to write to me; you know that I will do it immediately.”

ὁλοκληρία, ὁλόκληρος

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*holoklēria*, **wholeness, health**; *holoklēros*, **whole, intact, without defect, healthy**

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*olokleria*, S 3647; *TDNT* 3.767; *EDNT* 2.508; MM 446; L&N 23.131; BAGD 564 | *olokleros*, S 3648; *TDNT* 3.766–767; *EDNT* 2.508; MM 446; L&N 59.30; BAGD 564; ND 4.161–162

*Holoklēros* – one of many compounds of *klēros* – means first of all “whole, intact,” the state of being complete, not mutilated. In the LXX, it refers to rough stones, not worked by iron tools, that are used for building the altar of Yahweh (Deut 27:6; Josh 8:31; 1 Macc 4:47; cf. Josephus, *Ant.* 12.318), seven full weeks (Lev 23:15), intact wood, untouched by fire. Hence “complete justice” (Wis 15:3) and “perfect, mature piety” (4 Macc 15:17). Priestly and cultic regulations require that the priest and the sacrificial victim be *holoklēroi*, i.e., without any defect, absolutely whole physically. On the spiritual level, Jas 1:4 notes as a fruit of endurance “that you may be perfect and complete, lacking in nothing”; and 1 Thess 5:23, “May the God of peace himself sanctify you wholly and preserve you wholly (*holoklēron*) – body, spirit, and soul – without fault.”

The inscriptions and papyri from the imperial period make *holoklēria-holoklēros* synonymous with *hygieia-hygies*: good health. For example, two female feet in a votive offering to Artemis, at Kula in Lydia: “For the wholeness of my feet” (*hyper tēs holoklērias [tōn] podōn*, Dittenberger, *Syl.* 1142, 3; first-second century). In the same city, a woman who appeared at the temple with an unclean cloak recovered her health and offered this votive inscription: *egenomēn holoklēros* (L. Robert, *Hellenica*, vol. 10, 1955); at the *prytaneion* at Ephesus, Favonia thanks the gods “because I am well” (*hoti hololkērousan me*, ibid.). At Sardis, after a dream, a barber dedicated an Asclepius to the nymphs for his health (*anethēken tais Nymphais autou holoklēria Asklēpeion*, *I.Sard.* VII, 94).

The papyrological attestations are even more numerous: from the third century: “Above all I pray for your health” (*pro men pantōn euchome soi tēn holoklērian*, *P.Mich.* 214, 4; cf. 216, 4; 219, 2, 5; 221, 3; *P.Oxy.* 1158, 2; 2598, 4; *P.Alex.* 627, 4; *P.Iand.* 100, 4; *PSI* 831, 4; 972, 3; 1412, 4; *P.Lond.* 1917, 3; *P.Princ.* 73, 3; 101, 4; *SB* 6222, 2; 9605, 6); “I pray that you may be entirely healthy” (*errōsthai se holoklērounta euchomai*, *P.Oxy.* 1490, 11; cf. 1495, 4); “You wrote nothing concerning your health ... write back to me about your health” (*antigrapson moi prōton men peri tēs holoklērias sou*, 1593, 5–9; 2601, 28; *P.Ryl.* 624, 11); “Having made careful inquiry concerning your health” (*akreibōs pyntanomenos peri tēs holoklērias sou*, 1667, 3; cf. 1668, 2–3; 1670, 3; 1678, 2; 1680, 3; 1683, 6; *C.P.Herm.* 14, 5). It is in this sense of the word that St. Peter declares concerning a miraculous healing, “Faith gave him this perfect health (or this complete healing)” (*tēn holoklērian tautēn*, Acts 3:16).

## ὁμοθυμαδόν, ὁμόφρων

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*homothymadon*, **together, unanimously, in unity**; *homophrōn*, **of one mind**

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*omotumadon*, S 3661; *TDNT* 5.185–186; *EDNT* 2.511; *NIDNTT* 3.908–909; MM 448; L&N 31.23; BDF §122; BAGD 566 | *omophron*, S 3675; *EDNT* 2.517; MM 450; L&N 30.21; BAGD 569

*Homothymadon*, which occurs especially in Job (14 times) and in Acts (10 times) and corresponds to the Hebrew *yaḥaḏ*, *yaḥdāw*, has at least three meanings:

(a) “Together,” when said of people, a crowd, a mass of individuals: “They threw themselves all together” upon Steven (Acts 7:57); at the silversmiths’ riot at Ephesus, “They rushed all together to the theater.” As the adverb *yaḥaḏ* often means “also, likewise” (cf. Job 6:2; 17:16; 31:38; 34:15), *homothymadon* expresses simultaneity: “All the people answered at once,” as one person.

(b) Conformably to its etymology (*homos*, “same,” and *thymos*, “soul” or “heart”), *homothymadon* designates not only a gathering of persons, but their agreement together, even their unanimity. The authorities at the Jerusalem Council decide: “It seemed good to us, being of one accord, to chose men and send them to you with our beloved Barnabas and Paul.” When approaching someone “together,” whether “to sympathize with him and comfort him,” as when Job’s friends come (Job 2:11), or to offer congratulations (Jdt 15:9), the point is that the feelings of the participants are in harmony. Thus the apostles and the believers are “together” at Solomon’s Portico (Acts 5:12), and thus the Samaritan crowds follow Philip’s preaching (8:6).

(c) *Homothymadon* expresses in a unique way the brotherly communion of believers praying to God. Unity of hearts in one and the same movement is the characteristic of prayer, so much so that the prayer of a “discordant” Christian will not be heard. *Homothymadon* became a technical term for the unity of the Jerusalemites in calling upon the Lord and for the unity required of all disciples by Rom 15:5–6: they must try to have a common mind (*to auto phronein*) in Christ, “so that with one heart and one mouth you may glorify the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.”

This oneness of heart is described as brotherly harmony by 1 Pet 3:8 – “Finally, be of one mind, sympathetic, brotherly, with motherly tenderness” (*pantes homophrones, sympatheis, philadelphoi, eusplanchnoi*). As early as Homer, *homophrosynē* is praised as a virtue, establishing accord and harmony of thoughts and feelings, among fellow-citizens or members of a group, between spouses, especially between brothers. This is precisely the nuance of 1 Pet 3:8. According to Strabo, “The Lacedaemonians thought it difficult to face the Parthians head on, because of their numbers, their perfect harmony, and the fact that they regarded each other as brothers” (*pantes homophronas, hōs an allēlōn adelphous nomizomenous*, 6.3.3). In a funerary epigram for the two brothers Letoios and Paulos: “Farewell, two brothers with one heart (*ō glykerō kai homophrōne*)! On your tomb there should be erected an altar to Concord (*bōmos Homophrosynēs*).” Philo thought that Moses in his legislation envisaged “agreement, community feeling, concord (*homophrosynē*), a balance of temperaments, all that could bring homes and cities, peoples and countries, and the whole human race to supreme happiness” (*Virtues* 119). Christian harmony will be more intimate and more binding: “that they may be one” (*ina ōsin hen*, John 17:22).

ὁμολογουμένως

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*homologoumenōs*, **incontestably, obviously, as agreed by all**

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***omologoumenos***, S 3672; TDNT 5.199–220; EDNT 2.516–517; MM 449–450; L&N 33.276; BAGD 569

This adverb (a biblical hapax), formed from the present passive participle of *homologeō*, introduces the hymn to the risen Christ at 1 Tim 3:16 – “and *homologoumenōs* great is the mystery of godliness” (*mega estin to tēs eusebeias mystērion*); this mystery is the object of “the common faith” of the church (Titus 1:4). This adverb may have either a rhetorical or a legal meaning. In the former case, it means “incontestably, ineluctably” and describes an

indubitable axiom or the conclusion of an unimpeachable argument; thus it is almost synonymous with “obviously.” This is how the Vulgate interprets the text: “manifeste magnum ...”

But in the Stoic vocabulary, *homologoumenōs* means that which must be affirmed or confessed, that which must be agreed to, and refers to an agreement. Thus it is used by jurists for something that supports testimony, a fact that is universally recognized, is beyond dispute, “in everyone’s opinion.” This meaning of unanimous consent is the most widely attested: “Then everyone was unanimous in this opinion of them” (Polybius 2.39.10); “Zeus, the first of the gods, as we all recognize” (*ho tōn theōn megistos homologoumenōs*); “All people, if you ask them, will agree” (Sallustius, *De Deis et Mundo* 1.2); Melchizedek is recognized as a “just king, by unanimous consent”; “Iberians and others, unanimously recognized as the most warlike of the barbarians in those parts” (Thucydides 6.90.3). So we must translate 1 Tim 3:16: “Yes, as all agree, great is the mystery of godliness.”

But given the theological context, *homologoumenōs* calls to mind the *homologia* of the baptismal credo (Rom 10:10), which is not a mere contractual agreement but a proclamation and a promise. Here it is “as a spontaneous cry” on the part of all Christians: “omnium confessione” (Ambrosiaster).

ὀνειδίζω, ὀνειδισμός, ὀνειδος

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*oneidizō*, to reproach, blame, curse, mock, blaspheme; *oneidismos*, reproach, cursing, mockery, blasphemy; *oneidos*, reproach, shame, disgrace

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*oneidizo*, S 3679; TDNT 5.239–240; EDNT 2.517–518; MM 450; L&N 33.389, 33.422; BDF §152(1); BAGD 570 | *oneidismos*, S 3680; TDNT 5.241–242; EDNT 2.517–518; MM 450; L&N 33.389; BAGD 570 | *oneidos*, S 3681; TDNT 5.238–239; EDNT 2.517–518; MM 450; L&N 87.73; BAGD 570

These terms have an especially wide range of meaning (cf. the Hebrew *hārap*, *herpāh*), from simple reproach to cursing and blasphemy, with invective, mockery, affront, insult, and abuse included in between. In the language of the LXX, *oneidizō* has a technical meaning, because it goes along with declarations of war, is the deed of enemies. It is also an Israelite term for the period of slavery in Egypt and for all the defeats suffered by the chosen people: a dishonor. When directed toward God *oneidismos* is impious blasphemy, and Israel suffers *oneidismos* “on account of” the Lord. Whatever its source, *oneidismos* is shameful, causes blushing, and is dreaded above all else, because

it implies scorn, as with the Sabbaths that are the object of derision (1 Macc 1:39).

We must remember this semantic resonance when we hear the beatitude concerning insults and persecutions, the insults directed at Christ by the bandits crucified with him (Matt 27:44; Mark 15:32), and the application to Christ of Ps 69:10 (“The insults of those who insult you have fallen upon me,” Rom 15:3). In three instances, *oneidizō* has the meaning “cast blame” for a real or imagined fault, in conformity with a usage well attested in the OT.

The substantive *oneidismos*, unknown in the papyri, is used for the candidate for the episcopacy (who would be subject to ridicule and derision, if he did not have “a good reputation with outsiders” [1 Tim 3:7]); and for Christians in the world, insulted and persecuted for their faithfulness to God, the emphasis being on insults and shame (Heb 10:33). They are exhorted to go outside the camp, that is, to give up on Mosaic religion, worship, laws, and observances to join Christ “in bearing his shame” (Heb 13:13). The Lord was condemned as a blasphemer, ridiculed by his people, crucified like a slave; his passion was the supreme ignominy (*aischynē*, 12:2). Those who are his will experience similar shameful treatment when they break ranks with their former coreligionists; they will be humiliated, despoiled, ostracized. In faithfulness they will not fall short of Moses, who deemed “the shame of Christ a superior wealth to the treasures of Egypt” (11:26). By way of anticipation, he took his share of the abusive treatment of which the coming Savior would be victim. Christians continue to do so. Reading these uses of *oneidismos*, which are all in agreement, may give us a precise idea of the words meaning, but it cannot make real to us the emotive density of this term in the world of the first-century Christians.

ὄνος

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*onos*, **ass, donkey**

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*onos*, S 3688; TDNT 5.283–287; EDNT 2.522; MM 452; L&N 4.31; BAGD 574

A distinction is made between the wild ass (the *onos agrios* or onager, Gen 16:12; Isa 32:14; Job 39:5–8; Ps 104:11), which is described as “swift” (Hebrew *pēre* ) or “fleeing” (Hebrew *ārôd*), and the domestic ass, which is bigger and faster than the Western variety. It is a valuable commodity for inhabitants of Palestine, because, at very little expense, it is good for everything: beast of burden (Gen 42:26; 45:23; 1 Sam 25:18; Neh 13:15;

Josephus, *Life* 119; *P.Oslo* 48, 5; *P.Ryl.* 142; *BGU* 362, col. I, 6; *PSI* 1037, 10) and trace animal for farm jobs, it serves as a mount (Exod 4:20; Num 22:21; *P.Oxy.* 112; *P.Fouad* 28, 4: *epikathēmenos onō*; AD 59), because it is sure-footed and easily governed; she-asses (Hebrew *ʾātôn*), which are even more peaceable and manageable, are preferred by women (Num 22:23, 33; 2 Kgs 4:24). Originally, the great and the wealthy rode asses (Judg 5:10; 10:4; 12:14), but later they reserved for themselves the horse, which was used in the army. So Zech 9:9 announced that the Messiah, the modest prince of peace, would enter the capital “riding an ass, the colt of an ass.”

This prophecy was effectively realized when Jesus made his messianic entry into Jerusalem. One of the interests of the Matthean redaction is to note the relation of the colt, which was male, with its mother: “the colt with her” (*pōlon met’ autēs*, Matt 21:2). Because this foal had never been ridden, its mother was led along with it to make it more docile: “they led the ass and the colt” (*ēgagon ton onon kai ton pōlon*, 21:7). We have numerous papyri relating the sale of an ass with her young and giving the description of one or the other (*BGU* 982; *PSI* 882; *P.Grenf.* II, 46; *P.Wisc.* 15; *P.Oxy.* 3145; etc.) notably *P.Stras.* 251 (AD 69–79), and this latter published with a learned commentary by Sophia M. E. van Lith in *CPR* VI, 3, n. 2: In AD 114, in the Arsinoite, an ass and her male offspring were sold for eighty-eight drachmas; the color, sex, [teeth], and age of the animal are specified: *peprakenai autō onon thēleian myochroun kai ton epakolouthounta pōlon arrena melanon anaporriphous*. The mother is referred to as a “female ass” (*onon thēleian*), gray in color; her colt is male (*pōlon arrena*) and full-grown (*epakolouthounta*). The last term, *anaporriphous*, used constantly in the sale of slaves or animals, is a guarantee against hidden faults and can be translated, “not subject to rejection” or “no annulment of sale possible.”

## ὀρέγομαι, ὄρεξις

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*oregomai*, to extend oneself, reach out, aim for, aspire to; *orexis*, passionate desire

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*oregomai*, S 3713; *TDNT* 5.447–448; *EDNT* 2.531; *NIDNTT* 1.460–461; MM 456; L&N 25.15; BDF §171(1); BAGD 579–580 | *orexis*, S 3715; *TDNT* 5.447–448; *EDNT* 2.531; *NIDNTT* 1.460–461; MM 456; L&N 25.16; BAGD 580

In the Bible these terms do not have the technical meaning that they have as part of the Stoic vocabulary. The NT hapax *orexis* in Rom 1:27 – “the men were

consumed with desire one for another” – has the banal sense of our word *passion*.

The verb *oregō* in the middle voice (“extend oneself, stretch oneself out”), when used with the genitive, means “tend toward, aim for, aspire to, try to reach.” In a pejorative sense, it is used of the greedy, whose *orexis* for money causes them to flaunt the demands of faith and morality; in a positive sense, it is used for the patriarchs, who aspired to the heavenly country. In both cases, the inclination is so intense that it requires the sacrifice of other good things; thus an *orexis* is a passionate desire.

*Oregomai* has the sense of “be ambitious” in 1 Tim 3:1 – “If anyone aspires to the episcopacy, he desires a noble work.” This desire for a duty or a function has no philosophical connotation; it is almost a literary commonplace: “Of the things that God offers and gives, what is there that is not great and worthy of aspiration?” (*oregei*, Philo, *Abraham* 39); “John dreamed (*oregomenon*) only of revolution and burned to have command (*epithymian echonta*)” (Josephus, *Life* 70); “angry that they wanted to change the status quo and aspired to novelties” (*kai neōterōn oregoito*); “they each aspired to this first place” (Thucydides 2.65.10); “Tyndarides having aspired too openly to the supreme power.”

## ὀρθοποδέω

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*orthopodeō*, to walk steadily, without wobbling

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*orthopodeo*, S 3716; TDNT 5.451; EDNT 2.531; NIDNTT 3.351–352; MM 456; L&N 41.36; BDF §120(4); BAGD 580

Gal 2:14 – *hote eidon hoti ouk orthopodousin pros tēn alētheian tou euangeliou*. M. J. Lagrange translates: “When I saw that they were not walking straight according to the truth of the gospel, I said to Cephas ...” and comments: “*orthopodein* has not been found elsewhere: it can mean only ‘walk straight’ (the classical *euthyporein*) in contrast to those who walk to the side, like a boat tacking into the wind. In ethical terms, it means to act with uprightness and loyalty.” But the *Bible de Jérusalem* translates: “Quand je vis qu’à l’égard de la vérité, leur marche manquait de fermeté” (“When I saw that with respect to the truth of the gospel their walk was lacking in firmness”; cf. *NJB*, “When I saw, though, that their behaviour was not true to the gospel.”) So should we translate “walk straight” or “have a firm step”? The question is settled by three papyri:

(a) A letter of December 7, AD 117: *nē tēn sēn moi sōtērian kai tēn tou tekniou mou kai orthopodian*; (b) a papyrus at the University of Michigan (inv.

337): *to pedeion orthopodei en emoi hina*; (c) Nicander of Colophon (*Alex.* 419): *orthopodes bainontes anis smygeroion tithēnēs*.

In each case, the word refers to children who are beginning to get around on their own two legs without having to hold the nurse's hand to keep from falling. Thus our verb would be the opposite of *chōleuein*, “walk unsteadily, limp” (Heb 12:13); “the unbeliever will have twisted feet, as it were, and will be entirely unable to walk right.” So *orthopodeō* is just the right word for indicting Peter's vacillations at Antioch, “hobbling back and forth” (cf. Gal 2:12).

## ὀρθοτομέω

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*orthotomeō*, **to handle correctly**

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***orthotomeo***, S 3718; *TDNT* 8.111–112; *EDNT* 2.531; *NIDNTT* 3.351–352; *MM* 456–457; *L&N* 33.234; *BDF* §119(1); *BAGD* 580

Timothy must dispense the word of truth correctly, *orthotomounta ton logon tēs alētheias* (2 Tim 2:15). *Hodon temnein* means to trace or follow a route (Herodotus 4.136; Josephus, *Ag. Apion* 1.309); “Archelaus opened straight routes” (*hodos eutheias eteme*, Thucydides 2.100.2); and because “whatever is drawn with a straight ruler is necessarily straight,” the expression “make a path straight” took on a metaphorical sense (Prov 3:6; 11:5; 1 QH 12.34). This is especially so in rhetoric, where *orthon legein* means to express oneself correctly (Aristotle, *Gen. Cor.* 1.314; Iamblichus, *Myst.* 1.3 = 7.13), with the nuance of the golden mean: “No matter which of us has spoken more correctly (*orthoterōn eirēken*); everyone must follow a middle path (*meson tina temnein*)” (Plato, *Leg.* 7.793 a); “to advance along the route that our present discussion has started out on” (*tēn nyn ek tōn parontōn logōn tetmēmenēn hodon*, *ibid.* 800 e; cf. Xenophon, *Oec.* 18.2, *mesotomōn*). For the rule in Greek dialectic is *orthoepia*: expressing oneself with exactness and precision, without error or flaw, respecting the linguistic proprieties. Thus it is diametrically opposed to distortions and falsifications of the Word of God (2 Cor 2:17; 4:2) by bad exegetes who twist texts (2 Pet 3:16). The Vulgate translates well: “recte tractantem verbum veritatis.” As opposed to the mythologizing orators and fabulists who adulterate the revealed teaching, Timothy will be faithful to convey its traditional meaning (2 Tim 2:2, 8) and express it in adequate terms (cf. 1 Cor 2:13).



## ὁροθεσία

*horothesia*, **the determining of boundaries**

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*orothesia*, S 3734; *EDNT* 2.533; MM 459; L&N 80.5; BDF §119(3); BAGD 582

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In his Mars Hill discourse, St. Paul says that God fixed the limits of human dwelling: *tas horothesias tēs katoikias autōn*. Derived from *horothetēs* (from *horos*, “boundary, limit,” and *tithēmi*, “assign, fix”), “marking a limit,” the substantive *horothesia*, meaning “the delimiting or determining of boundaries” more than “boundary, limit,” was unknown until the discovery in 1903 of a rather mutilated Fayum papyrus (*BGU* 889, 17: *tēs ... horothesias tou th ...*; from AD 151; cf. *P.Apoll.* 63, 20, from the eighth century, *horothesia tou lakou oinou*, the limit of a vat of wine?) and in 1906 of *I.Priene* XLII, 8: *dikaian einai ekrinan tēn Rhōdiōn krisin te kai horothesian*, “they decided that the Rhodians’ decision and demarcation were fair” (after AD 133). H. J. Cadbury adds a Greco-Latin inscription from first-century Romania that gives a series of decisions by Roman legates concerning the borders of the former Milesian colony of Histria at the mouth of the Danube. These decisions are confirmed by the governor of Mesia, Marius Laberius Maximus, beginning thus: “Horothesia Laberiuou Maximou hypatikou. Fines Histrianorum hos esse constitui” (“I establish this as the border of the Histrians”). *Horothesia* is *limitatio*, the determining of boundaries.

## ὄρος

*oros*, **hill, cliff, mountain, necropolis; land bordering the desert, boundary**

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*oros*, S 3735; *TDNT* 5.475–487; *EDNT* 2.533–534; *NIDNTT* 3.1009, 1013–1014; MM 459; L&N 78.44; BDF §§48, 126(1b); BAGD 582

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With the relative exception of Galilee, Palestine is a mountainous region – in the most general sense of the term, since *oros* often means a mere hill (Luke 4:29; *P.Ness.* 31, 37; cf. Matt 18:12; *T. Job* 13.1–3) and the mount where Jesus was tempted is described as a “very high mountain” (Matt 4:8). In the papyri and in a geographical sense, *to oros* means both mountain and desert, as opposed to the valley and inhabited areas. It can mean a simple escarpment, a more or less steep cliff next to the walls of a city (*P.Monac.* 13; *SB* 7800, 7), a high place where an irrigation system stops (*P.Oxy.* 729, 7 and 9), threatened

with silting up. *To oros* comes to mean the area near the desert, a border zone or a band of land more or less distant from the town, and finally “limit.”

Brigands flee to or do their marauding in the desert regions: “we fell into a den of thieves at Mount Maro.” Thus it is not surprising that the devil should appear to tempt Jesus on a mountain or in the desert (Matt 4:1, 8). But it is also on these uninhabited heights that cemeteries are established, so *oros* can mean necropolis (*P.Ryl.* 153, 5); thus the Gerasene demoniac stayed “in the tombs and in the mountains” (Mark 5:5).

Mountains always have religious significance: the throne of God, a cultic center, a place of sanctuary – “Our fathers worshiped on this mountain” (John 4:20). Thus, according to the Hymn to Isis of Isidorus, at the New Moon the royal statue was paraded *en orei*, i.e., in the desert. According to the NT, not only did Jesus climb a mountain “to be apart” (Matt 17:1; cf. Mark 9:2; Luke 9:28; 2 Pet 1:18), “alone in that place” (Matt 14:23; cf. Mark 6:46; Luke 6:12; John 6:15), i.e., to seek solitude for prayer; but it was also there that he taught the Sermon on the Mount (Matt 5:1; cf. 8:1; 15:29; John 6:3), chose his apostles (Mark 3:13), and appeared to them after his resurrection (Matt 28:16). The mountain is the place for communications from God (Gal 4:24–25; Heb 8:5; 12:20) and the symbol of heaven (Heb 12:22; Rev 14:1; 21:10).

Beginning in AD 334 (*P.Lond.* 1913; the Meletian monastery of Hathor), *oros* together with the name of a founder or patron signifies a monastery – this religious establishment situated at the most distant borders of cultivated land.

## ὀψώνιον

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*opsōnion*, **ration, wage, pay, compensation**

→see also μισθός, μισθόομαι

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*opsonion*, S 3800; *TDNT* 5.591–592; *EDNT* 2.555; *NIDNTT* 3.144–145; *MM* 471–472; *L&N* 57.118, 57.166, 89.42; *BDF* §§111(4), 126(2), 141(8); *BAGD* 602; *ND* 2.93

A compound formed from *opson*, “cooked fish, fish,” hence “food,” and *ōneomai*, “to buy, acquire,” the substantive *opsōnion* occurs quite frequently in Koine, where it is almost synonymous with *misthos*, which it tends to replace; it is condemned by Phrynichus, who derides Menander for saying “*opsōniasmos* and *opsōnion* ... and countless other unlearned, bastardized expressions.”

In a military context, *opsōnion* is the wage paid in cash to which is added a compensation in kind, a certain quantity of grain, i.e., provisions. According to this definition, “Antiochus opened his treasury and distributed a year’s pay to

the soldiers” (1 Macc 3:28); Simon, son of Mattathias, “spent much of his own wealth supplying weapons to the men in the army and paying them a wage” (1 Macc 14:32). John the Baptist counsels the customs officers, “Do not harrass anyone, do not make false accusations, and be content with your wages.” These *strateuomenoi* are not soldiers in the strict sense of the word but auxiliaries to the publicans, hence police officers; and their *opsōnion* perhaps does not have the technical meaning of “pay”; it would rather be the “ration” that they get, even their usual “profit.”

In fact, from its first occurrence, *opsōnion* refers to a purchase of food and means provisions, the supplying of provisions, or resources, notably in the papyri, but the commonest meaning is that of remuneration for a given task. In AD 8–10, a worker, setting forth the conditions of his hiring, asks that he be paid either a daily wage or an annual wage (*misthos*) and that even when there is no work his employer pay thirteen drachmas, two obols for his daily means (*dōsete moi kat’ opsōnion argyriou drachmas dekatris dyo obolous*, *P.Oxy.* 731, 10; cf. *P.Cair.Zen.* 59176, 71–76, 92–93; *PSI* 332, 33). *Opsōnion* is used for the pay of the *rhabdouchos* at the sanctuary of Apollo Koropaios, the remuneration for the teachers at Pergamum, the pay of officials (*I.Priene* 121, 33–34; 125, 4), the wages of a secretary (*P.Mich.* 371, 4), of guardians (*P.Mert.* 27, 4; *P.Princ.* 96, 3: *ops. paidariōn*; *Pap.Lugd.Bat.* XVI, 19, 7, *ops. hydrophylakōn*; VI, 24, 64: *ops. bibliophylakōn*), of a harpist (*P.Cair.Zen.* 59028), of slaves (*ibid.* 59027; 59043, 59059: *opsōnia ta tois sōmasi*), of farmers (*P.Mich.Zen.* 89), of gardeners (*PSI* 332, 13), of vine-dressers (*ibid.* 414, 4 and 10), of a fisherman, remuneration for services (*P.Oxf.* 10, 21; *P.Oxy.* 2474, 42); cf. receipt for wages (*P.Ryl.* 559: *Marōn peri tou opsōniou*). So when St. Paul says that he has despoiled the Macedonian churches in order to have sufficient resources to carry out his ministry at Corinth in complete freedom, we must not translate *labōn opsōnion pros tēn hymōn diakonian* (2 Cor 11:8) as “accepting wages or pay from them” but rather “subsides”: gifts, food, clothings, money, the cash to provide for his own subsistence.

This would also be the sense of 1 Cor 9:7, which is usually translated “Who, serving in an army, ever supports himself with his own pay (*idiois opsōniois*)? Who plants a vineyard and does not eat its fruit? Or who shepherds a flock and does not drink of the milk of the flock?” The soldier does not have to provide for his own subsistence. The emphasis is not so much on costs or expenditures as on food and provisions, as suggested by the two other texts and by the Lord’s pronouncement: “The worker is worthy of his upkeep” (*axios esti tēs trophēs autou*, Matt 10:10). The gospel worker must be free of all personal cares and any extraneous business to devote himself fully to his apostolic task. As for death as the wages (Latin *stipendium*) of sin (Rom 6:23), this

exceptional metaphorical usage of *opsōnia* contrasts with the free gift (*charisma*), the *donativum*, the largess handed out by the emperor or a victorious general. The *opsōnia* of sin are thus not a payment, but rather a wage, or a price, or better a just and necessary reward, even a “compensation” due for the impious work that is *hamartia*, which cannot go unremunerated.

παιδαγωγός, παιδευτής

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*paidagōgos*, **servant working as a child's guardian and tutor**; *paideutēs*, **teacher, instructor**

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*paidagōgos*, S 3807; TDNT 5.596–625; EDNT 3.2; NIDNTT 1.370, 3.775, 778–779; MM 473; L&N 36.5; BAGD 603 | *paideutes*, S 3810; TDNT 5.596–625; EDNT 2.3; NIDNTT 3.775–778; MM 474; L&N 33.244, 38.5; BAGD 603

These two terms are not synonymous. The first, unknown in the OT, is used twice by St. Paul and in a pejorative sense: “You may have ten thousand *paidagōgoi* in Christ, but at least you do not have many fathers, for in Christ Jesus, through the gospel, I am the one who fathered you.” “The law was our *paidagōgos* until Christ” (Gal 3:24). In both cases, the *paidagōgos* is in an inferior position, and in the second case a temporary position; for the law, imposing discipline and punishments on the Israelites, played the role of an overseer or guardian until Christ ushered in the age of liberation.

Etymologically, the *paidagōgos* is one who shows the way to a child, thus one who teaches a child how to behave. Until the age of six or seven, the Greek child was cared for almost exclusively by its mother (cf. Plato, *Prt.* 325 cff.). At that age, it was not allowed to go out alone but was entrusted to a *paidagōgos* who went with it on its walks and took it to school, keeping it away from possible accidents or dangers, carrying its bags, watching over its outward bearing and behavior, and seeing that it completed its daily program of lessons, games, and various duties (Plutarch, *An virt. doc.* 2; Clement of Alexandria, *Paed.* 1.7.54–55). Usually *paidagōgoi* were slaves, foreigners or invalids incapable of performing other work. Brutal and often drunk (Clement, *Paed.*), they were not sparing with blows, and when the children – in whom they inspired fear – became adolescents, they saw their oversight as a form of tyranny. Such is the classic portrait of the *paidagōgos*.

But in the Hellenistic period, the “accompanying” role of the *paidagōgos* expanded and became nobler; his protection was not exclusively negative. He formed the child’s character and morality and even became its private tutor, if not its teacher. The Persian kings chose for their children “the wisest, the most just, the most moderate, the most courageous” (Ps.-Plato, *Alc.* 121 e); some received the title of citizen, and the Egyptian papyri attest that they not only received honoraria but became objects of respect. Funerary monuments even

attest to a certain veneration. In the second-third century, a mother, after writing to her son, “see to it that you devote yourself to your *paidagōgos* as it is fitting to do to a teacher,” (*melēsato soi te kai tō paidagōgō sou kathēkonti kathēgētē se paraballein*) concludes: “Greet your highly esteemed *paidagōgos* Eros” (*aspasai ton timiōtaton paidogōgon sou Erōta*, *P.Oxy.* 930, 18ff.). It is most likely with this nuance of esteem that Paul refers to the tutor-teachers of the Corinthians (1 Cor 4:15), who nevertheless could not be on the same level as the father who conceived his child and retains his full rights as its educator.

Thus the *paidagōgos* comes close to being a teacher-instructor (*paideutēs*), in the first instance because in the Bible the *paidagōgos* is seen as an educator who corrects and punishes, and also because the *paideutēs* is an example and a teacher of life and wisdom more than of knowledge. Finally, like the *paidagōgos* who contributes to the education of the children, the *paideutēs* trains disciples: “you who bear the name of Jew ... being taught by the law ... a guide of the blind, a light to those who are in darkness, an educator of the ignorant (*paideutēn aphronōn*), the teacher of infants (*didaskalon nēpiōn*).” But it is still the case that the *paideutēs* proper is a teacher (Sir 37:19), an instructor. In 169 BC, Attalus II of Pergam sent the necessary funds “so that his foundation should remain in perpetuity and the regular compensation of the instructors should be guaranteed.”

## πανήγυρις

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*panēgyris*, **festal assembly, sacred festival**

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*paneguris*, S 3831; TDNT 5.722; EDNT 3.9; MM 476; L&N 51.4; BAGD 607

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“You have drawn near to Mount Zion and the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and myriads of angels in festal assembly” (*panēgyrei*, Heb 12:22). A NT hapax, *panēgyris* (a compound formed from *pan* and *ageirō*) retains the richness of its usual meaning in secular Greek, which must therefore be outlined.

(a) The emphasis is first of all on the number and universality of the participants at a meeting (*megalē xynodos*, Thucydides 3.104.4). Usually it is an assembly of all the people of a city or a country, even of people of the same race, hence a public meeting (*P.Oxy.* 41; cf. Theophrastus, *Char.* 6.7), a general or plenary assembly whose members are quite diverse. In the *panēgyris* of Heb 12:22, we may thus see a reference to the density of the heavenly population, a reiteration of *myriades angelōn*: the angels make up a varied multitude that is

beyond counting, as is also the case in the demography of the heavenly court in Revelation.

(b) The fundamental meaning of *panēgyris* is “festival”: a major gathering of people to celebrate a formal occasion. This is its meaning in its four occurrences in the OT, where *panēgyris* is always associated with *heortē* (“feast”; Hos 2:11; 9:5; Amos 5:21; Ezek 46:11). In fact, this meaning is so predominant that *panēgyris* is normally synonymous with joy: “The usual sorrow is doubled especially on the occasion of feasts for those who cannot celebrate them, for they miss the delight that a large gathering brings.” “Full of gratitude for your gifts, those to whom you have dispensed wealth and great favors for their perpetual possession reserve a tithe for you, celebrating each year on the occasion of your festival.” Even though these celebrations, which were accompanied by banquets where the wine flowed freely, sometimes degenerated into occasions for license, in themselves they provided rest for the body and joy for the soul; so much so that the word *panēgyris* was used even for small get-togethers: “You are invited to celebrate the birthday of my son Gennadius (*tēn panēgyrin tēs genethliou*) by dining with us on the sixteenth at seven o’clock.” Surely this connotation is at the forefront in Heb 12:22 – the society of the angels is a joyful assembly, the heavenly Jerusalem a place of beatitude. The message for Christians who are on their way there is that they will find happiness and exultant joy.

(c) Given the abundant, quasi-technical usage of *panēgyris* for the Olympic, Isthmian, Pythian, Nemean, etc., games, we must include a sports meaning in Heb 12:22. These competitions not only attract the largest crowds, they also celebrate a victory (cf. Strabo 5.2.7), and here a reward. In effect, Hebrews defines the Christian life as an athletic trial, describes the conditions for training and winning, points to the prizes offered and the crowd of spectators who admire and encourage the athletes of faith (12:1–2). So it is not surprising that the epistle uses a compatible metaphor to evoke the glory and joy that are in store for the victors, namely, the metaphor of the jubilant *polis*, of a *panēgyris* at which the whole assembly of the elect celebrates and sings the praises of the garlanded competitors.

(d) All of the Greeks’ great national festivals, and especially the Olympic Games, had a religious character. The crowd came together with the priests around a common sanctuary where sacrifice was offered. *Panēgyris* or “sacred festival” is constantly associated with *thysia*. This meaning of liturgical observance is clearly present in Heb 12:22, where the heavenly joy is tintured by religious seriousness and reverence. On the one hand, the epistle pictures heaven as a place of worship, where the great high priest and *leitourgos* officiates (8:2); on the other hand the myriads of angels are *leitourgika*

*pneumata* (1:14), born agents of divine worship, occupying themselves with praising God and proclaiming God as sovereign and universal judge: “and let all the angels of God worship him” (*kai proskynēsatōsan autō pantes angeloi theou*, 1:6).

(e) There is one last meaning of the pagan *panēgyris* that may have been assumed by the writer of Hebrews. Before it came to refer to the praise of a personage, *panēgyris* (Latin *laudatio*) was used for ceremonial orations written or declaimed by sophists, rhetors, or orators at a great festival before a large audience. This rhetorical meaning shows up in the context of Heb 12:22, where the old and new revelation are contrasted. The ones who heard at Sinai asked that they be spoken to no more, so terrified were they at the manifestations of divine power. The beneficiaries of the new covenant can draw near to Zion and come to the *panēgyris* of the angels, for they are united with the mediator Jesus, whose blood *speaks* better things than that of Abel (verse 24). So they are invited – and this is the point of the image of the heavenly Jerusalem – not to refuse to hear the one who speaks from highest heaven (verse 25). The throne of God is not only an object of worship, an altar to be approached in a liturgical procession (4:16), but is also the source of oracles promulgated on earth, exactly as in Revelation. The *panēgyris* of Hebrews, religious and joyful as it is, is also eloquent. It is no longer the praise of Athens, as uttered by Lysias or Isocrates, but the praise of the glory of God, the expression of his will, the *panēgyris* of the city of the living God, that abides as a perpetual feast.

### παραγγελία, παραγγέλλω

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*parangelia*, **command, order**; *parangellō*, **to pass the word along, order, prescribe**

→see also ἐντολή

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*paraggelia*, S 3852; TDNT 5.761–765; EDNT 3.16–17; NIDNTT 1.340–341; MM 480–481; L&N 33.328; BAGD 613 | *paraggello*, S 3853; TDNT 5.761–765; EDNT 3.16–17; NIDNTT 1.340–342; MM 481; L&N 33.327; BAGD 613

According to its etymology, the first meaning of *parangellō* is “announce from one to another,” hence, pass the word within the group, give a password, pass along a notice, communicate a message, make known. Thus Claudius Lysias “made known” to Paul’s accusers that they should speak against him (Acts 23:30; cf. Josephus, *Ant.* 2.311), and Judas “had his orders passed to those who were with him.” In the papyri, in AD 75/76, a borrower is *notified* that he must



make good his debt (*P.Yale* 64, 18 and 22); and in the third century, a Roman citizen *informs* Epimachos of the terms of his will.

But even more frequently this verb and the corresponding noun mean “order, prescribe.” The subject is God or his Word (*P.Lond.* 1915, 4), Moses or Virtue with their commands (Philo, *Heir* 13; *Prelim. Stud.* 63), the prefect, the *stratēgos* (Onasander, *Strategikos* 25; *P.Oslo* 84, 15; *P.Oxy.* 1411, 16), the *topotērētēs* (*P.Apoll.* 12, 5), an imperial officer (*P.Oxy.* 2268, 5), the *riparius* (*P.Oxy.* 2235, 23), a local VIP (*P.Oxy.* 1831, 6, *meizōn*), the *prostatēs* or president of a club (*P.Mich.* 243, 4; under Tiberius), the gymnastic teacher *vis-à-vis* athletes (Philo, *Alleg. Interp.* 1.98), above all military commanders: “Holophernes gave the order to his whole army ... to strike camp ... and join combat” (Jdt 7:1); Antiochus ordered his troops to parade armed (2 Macc 5:25; cf. 13:10; 1 Macc 5:58).

Consequently, *parangelia* would normally be an injunction, command, order (Philodemus of Gadara, *Rh.* I, pp. 78ff.; *Pap.Lugd.Bat.* VI, 15, 144; *P.Lond.* 1231, 16; vol. 3, p. 109), even a summons (*P.Ness.* III, 29, 3). In this sense the high priest and the Sanhedrin formally forbid the apostles to preach (Acts 4:18; 5:28) and the praetors at Philippi order the jailer to guard their prisoners carefully. But context gives each occurrence of the word a particular nuance that cannot always be specified precisely. When Paniskos writes to his wife Ploutogenia *parēngeila soi exerchomenos hoti mē apelthēs eis tēn oikian sou* (*P.Mich.* 217, 3; third century, republished SB 7249), it is possible to translate either “I asked you” or “I ordered you, when I am gone, not to go back to your house.” *Parangelia* can take on the mild sense of exhortation or counsel, and it is also known to correspond to the *litis denuntiatio*, the summons to appear in court.

In light of these usages, we can see that Jesus gives instructions to the Twelve (Matt 10:5; Mark 6:8) and strongly advises the cleansed leper not to tell anyone about the miracle. But he sharply forbids the apostles to reveal his messianic identity (Luke 9:21 – *epitimēsas autois parēngeilen*), and he commands the unclean spirit (8:29), as he orders the Twelve not to leave Jerusalem (Acts 1:4) and to preach to the people (10:42).

St. Paul similarly orders the prophetic spirit of the servant woman (Acts 16:18), but it seems that his *parangeliai* are ethical prescriptions, rules for Christian living (1 Thess 4:2; 2 Thess 3:4, 6; 1 Cor 11:17), with regard to marriage, for example (1 Cor 7:10), or the obligation to work (1 Thess 4:11; 2 Thess 3:10). The verb is imperative, and the commands are repeated; but this is still as much teaching as commanding, giving both doctrine that must be received and rules that must be followed.

In the Pastorals (and the word *pastoral* here means a *mandamus*, like a bishop's letter), St. Paul passes on his instructions to his favorite disciple, who must in turn teach and command: "I asked you to remain faithfully as Ephesus *hina parangeilēs*" (1 Tim 1:3; cf. 6:17). Timothy must act with authority; for him this is a serious obligation: *tērēsai se tēn entolēn* (1 Tim 6:13–14). But if the verb *parangellō* retains all the force of a military command addressed to a soldier (1:18; 2 Tim 2:3), the substantive *parangelia* means rather "mandate, obligation, duty"; "This is the mandate that I entrust to you, my child Timothy" (1 Tim 1:18); "The goal of this command is love" (1:5), which is the essence of the gospel and of the whole Christian life.

### παραδειγματίζω

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*paradeigmatizō*, **to make an example by punishment or public derision; to disgrace, dishonor**

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*paradeigmatizo*, S 3856; TDNT 2.32; EDNT 3.17; NIDNTT 2.291, 293; MM 481–482; L&N 25.200; BAGD 614

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Unknown in the papyri and rare in literary Greek, this verb means to make an example of a malefactor by punishing him; then make an example of by exposing to derision, to public scorn; and finally to disgrace, to dishonor. A NT hapax, *paradeigmatizō* in its four OT occurrences always emphasizes the idea of publicness and has connotations of shame (Jer 13:22, Hebrew *hāmam*) and exemplary punishment, as with the hanging of the leaders of Israel (Num 25:4; hiphil of *yāqa* ' ; cited by Philo, his only use of the word, *Dreams* 1.89) or Esther's prayer: "Make an example of the one who took the initiative against us." These usages correspond to our term "to pillory," meaning to expose a guilty party to public scorn.

So we translate Heb 6:6 – "The apostates crucify the Son of God on their own account and ridicule him publicly." Their official repudiation of their sworn faith is an insult to Christ, like an insult hurled at him, a sort of repetition of Calvary in caricature, especially of the scenes described by Matt 26:67–68; 27:38–43. The apostate who professes to be one and proves the claim by his actions tramples the Son of God underfoot with the whole world looking on! But in the case in point, it is he who openly manifests his scorn.

### παραδίδομι

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*paradidōmi*, to hand over, give back, become ripe, commend (oneself), transmit, deliver, betray

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*paradidomi*, S 3860; TDNT 2.169–172; EDNT 3.18–20; MM 482–483; L&N 13.142, 21.7, 23.110, 23.200, 33.237, 37.12, 37.111, 57.77; BDF §§187(1), 323(1), 390(3), 402(2); BAGD 614–615

Among the very numerous forms of *didōmi* with a prefix, the compound *paradidōmi* is by far the commonest in the NT; its semantics is interesting, as much because of its orthographic variations, especially in the papyri, as because of its multiple meanings. But given the Koine’s taste for expressivity, this compound is often purely synonymous with *didōmi*.

I. – The first meaning is “hand over, give something to someone” (*tini ti*). Thus Jesus “bent his head and gave over [his] spirit” to his father. Human beings are handed over: a slave to his master or a child to its mother (Josephus, *Ant.* 1.217), a young woman to her husband (Tob 7:13; *Jos. Asen.* 4.10), but also objects: a scepter (Esth 4:17), a sword (2 Macc 15:15), the helm of a ship to a pilot (Philo, *To Gaius* 149), grain (Josephus, *Life* 73; cf. 69), weapons (*War* 2.450). Raguel “handed over to Tobit Sarah his wife and half his property: slaves, cattle, and money” (Tob 10:10); Judith “handed over to the servant the head of Holophernes” (Jdt 13:9). God hands over Canaan to Israel (“I swore to give the land to your fathers”), a city, a stronghold, the royal palace (Josephus, *War* 1.143). The government is given into the hands of the great (*War* 1.169), the care of the affairs of the land (*Life* 226, *pragmatōn epimeleian*), the administration of Egypt to Joseph (*Ant.* 2.89, *oikonomian*; cf. 6.32), the power (7.30, *archēn*; 7.110, 351; 9.104; 11.321, 334; 14.104; *hēgemonian*, 8.53), the kingdom (7.93, *basileian*; 7.256; 9.280; 10.48, 82; 16.92), the high priesthood to Aaron (4.18; 5.361), the responsibility of offering sacrifices is given to the priests (11.137). In the papyri, things left by the deceased are given over to the heir (*ha kai paredothē*, *P.Tebt.* 406, 9), bundles of reeds to a friend (*P.Oxy.* 742, 7; second century BC), oil to a factory (*P.Tebt.* 728, 3; second century BC), cats to a third party (*P.Tebt.* 764, 32; *ta Hōrou ktēnē*), a she-ass to its buyer (*P.Corn.* 13, 9), a letter personally delivered (*P.Ant.* 43, verso 1), ankle bracelets (*P.Apoll.* 8, 17), the responsibility for sacred vestments, etc.

II. – The thing given can be simply restitution, a “giving back.” Demetrius asks Jonathan to give hostages back to him. This meaning occurs frequently in the papyri, notably in cases where *paradidōmi* is correlated with *paralambanō* (cf. 1 Cor 11:2, 23; 15:3): “At the end of the lease, I will give back to you (*paradōsō*) goats and sheep in equal numbers, adults of good quality, just as I received from you (*parelabon*)”; “After the time I will give back the two

*arourai* free of weeds as when I received it”; “at the expiration of the lease, I will return the lot to you: two *arourai* just planted in legumes ... three *arourai* cleared of stubble” (*P.Bour.* 17, 4).

III. – In the parable of the Growing Seed, the farmer finally takes the sickle and harvests when the fruit is ready (*hotan de paradoi ho karpos*, Mark 4:29; cf. Joel 4:13), literally, when it “renders,” that is to say, when it is ripe, when the time has come. We may compare Gen 27:20, where Jacob says, “God gave over (Hebrew *qārâh*) the game to me,” and Exod 21:13 – God provides, brings (Hebrew *’ānâh*) the occasion, permits favorable circumstances.

IV. – *Paradidōmi* also means to give oneself over “to the one who judges justly,” and thence “commend.” Paul and Barnabas are commended to the grace of God (Acts 14:26; 15:40), that is, are placed under the Lord’s protection, entrusted to his power, as much for their personal safety as for the success of their mission. This meaning is homogeneous with that of the preceding uses of *paradidōmi* – one delivers or abandons oneself into another’s hands.

V. – When one parts with a possession (a material or moral good, an opinion, a word, a writing ...) to give it to others, one “transmits” it. This meaning of *paradidōmi*, particularly frequent in the NT, especially regarding doctrine that is thus made known, is constant in secular Greek: “The ancients transmitted this tradition to us” (Plato, *Phlb.* 16 c; Plato, *Ep.* 12.359d); “The various sciences are preserved and transmitted to posterity forever only by means of letters.” The epitaph of the perfumer Casios: “rewards and numerous crowns which he was the first to wear and which he passed on to his children” (*SB* 4299, 6); “Andromache passes my letter (*ta grammata*) on to you.” Likewise in the LXX: “It is possible for you to observe, not so much according to the ancient histories that have been transmitted to us, as in examining what happens under your feet” (Esth 8:12 g); “whatever you deal out (*ho ean paradidōs*), let it be by number and weight” (Sir 42:7). Wis 14:15 has to do with idolatrous religious traditions: a father who had lost his son passed on mysteries and initiations to his subjects (*paredōke tois hypocheiriois mystēria kai teletas*).

Philo uses *paradidōmi* with meanings from “pass on” a calf from the stable to a servant (*Abraham* 108) and the “transmission” of old fables to the passing down of knowledge, of arts and letters, of cultic ceremony (*To Gaius* 298: *thrēskeia*; cf. 237), and of the sacred books, “passed on for the use of those who are worthy of them” (*Moses* 2.11). Likewise Josephus, who speaks of passing on a password (*Ant.* 19.31, 188) and of history passing on memories for those who want to learn, but especially the transmission of facts recorded in the sacred books (*Ant.* 2.347; 3.89); and of Moses as the one who transmitted the laws.

In the NT, it is the first instance the divine revelation that is passed on: “Everything has been passed on to me by my Father (*panta moi paradothē hypo tou patros mou*), and no one knows the Son but the Father....” What is involved is (1) revelation (*apokalyptō*), (2) the transmission of knowledge (*epiginōskō*) that is (3) total or universal, the sum total of revealed doctrine. According to Luke 1:2, the facts of the gospel have been passed on to us (*kathōs paredosan hēmin*) by “those who were from the beginning eyewitnesses and servants of the word.” Believers are those who accept this testimony: “You were obedient from the heart to the rule of doctrine that was passed on to you” (*hypēkousate de ek kardias eis hon paredothēte typon didachēs*). “I praise you that in all things ... you hold to the traditions as I passed them on to you” (*kathōs paredōka hymin tas paradoseis katechete*, 1 Cor 11:2); the traditions of the universal church, to which every believer must submit, have to do with doctrinal teaching, ethics, and discipline, and even usages and customs (the deportment of women in liturgical assemblies). Regarding traditions of worship and especially articles of faith – for example, the institution of the Eucharist – the apostle takes care not to claim paternity for himself (through personal revelation), and he emphasizes the origin: “I received (*parelabon*) from the Lord (*apo tou Kyriou*) the same thing that I passed on to you (*ho kai paredōka hymin*).” Likewise the most primitive and most essential article of the *credo*, Christ the Redeemer: “I passed on to you in the first place what I myself received (*paredōka hymin en prōtois ho kai parelabon*), that Christ died for our sins ... and was resurrected.” Finally, the whole content of the faith, that is, the whole truth revealed by God, is transmitted to the faithful by an immutable tradition, like a deposit entrusted lest it vary.

*Paradidōmi* in the NT is also a transmission of power. At the ascension, Jesus proclaims, “All power has been given to me (*edōthē moi pasa exousia*) in heaven and on earth.” Again, it is a passing down of property, entrusted with a view to its bearing fruit (Matt 25:14); also of civil and religious laws, institutions and rites which are supposed to be inviolable, and which were passed down by Moses (Acts 6:14, *ta ethē*); and finally the decrees or decisions of the Jerusalem Council, which Paul and Timothy passed along in the cities that they visited so that they would be observed (Acts 16:4, *ta dogmata*).

VI. – The predominant sense of *paradidōmi* (Hebrew *nātan*) in the OT is pejorative; God is almost always the subject, and very often the verb is reinforced with a prepositional phrase: God “is delivering into your hand” your adversaries, enemies, oppressors whom the Lord hands over unconditionally to his people. It is an exceptional case when *paradidōmi* with this meaning has a favorable sense, because one is normally “delivered” into subjection, troubles, evils, suffering, and woe – as when Job is given over to the power of Satan

(*paradidōmi soi auton*, Job 2:6; *T. Job* 20.3) or Samson is given over into the hands of the Philistines (Judg 15:12; 16:23–24) – and especially to death; but the links between this “delivering” and God and justice show that often punishment is involved, which is why he so often “delivered” the chosen people. “The children of Israel did that which was evil in the eyes of Yahweh and Yahweh delivered them into the hands of Midian for seven years”; “You have handed us over because of our sins” (Isa 64:6; Sir 4:19); “I hand you over for devastation” (Mic 6:16).

The NT inherits this theology: God gives up his people and lets them give themselves to the worship of stars; he gives idolaters over to impurity and servitude to dishonorable passions, and “he did not spare the angels who sinned, but handed them over to the dark dungeons of Tartarus, where he holds them in reserve for judgment.” In the same sense of the word, Paul hands over the incestuous Corinthian man to Satan – who will afflict him with sickness, frustrations, defeats, and ruin – “for the loss of his flesh”; or Hymenaeus and Alexander, who had shipwrecked their faith and were consigned to Satan “to learn not to blaspheme any longer.” Satan is as it were God’s official agent of punishment, carrying out the sentences of the heavenly Judge, just as the king handed over the merciless debtor to the torturers.

What is new is that *paradidōmi* is made a technical term for Jesus’ passion. This verb is used by the Master in his predictions of his passion (“The Son of Man must be delivered into the hands of men”) and by the evangelists; and St. Paul mentions it: “The Lord, on the night that he was handed over (*en tē nykti hē paredideto*) took bread....” The term is to be taken first in its legal and judicial sense, but it conveys moreover a moral or psychological nuance and a theological value. *Paradosis* was also used for treason (*prodosia*). Judas Iscariot is always called *ho paradidous*, “the traitor,” the one who betrays or betrayed Jesus. The verb rather often also connotes this nuance of criminality: desertion to another camp, breach of sworn faith, betrayal of someone’s trust. It is certain that the first Christians saw Christ’s crucifixion less as an atrociously painful form of torture than as an ignominy and a result of perfidy. To say that Jesus was handed over, then, means that he was betrayed.

Moreover, *paradidōmi* is also used for people who give themselves in self-sacrifice for God or neighbor, like Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego, who “delivered their bodies rather than serve and worship any other god than their God.” And it was predicted that the Servant of Yahweh would be handed over to death for redemption from sins (Isa 53:6, 12). This religious meaning is inseparable from *paradidōmi* in the death of Jesus: God gave him over (Rom 4:25; 8:32), or he gave himself over (Gal 2:20), offering himself as a sacrifice of acceptable savor (Eph 5:2, *hyper hēmōn*, “for us”). The accent is as much on

the love that inspires this offering as on the totality of the gift and its cost: our redemption. Consequently to “deliver oneself” to God or neighbor becomes a major principle of Christian ethics.

VII. – *Paradidōmi* often has the judicial meaning “deliver to court or to prison.” In 248 BC, Pyrrhus wrote to Zeno: “Know that Etearchos delivered me to the *praktōr* on the tenth of Epeiph” (*P.Mich.* 58, 6; cf. “to the *nomophylax*,” *P.Oxy.* 3190, 3); “If you arrest the slave, hand him over to Semphtheus, who will bring him to me” (*P.Hib.* 54, 21; 245 BC); “Send us under good guard the woman who gave you the contraband oil in her possession” (*P.Hib.* 59, 3); “Deliver Pamoun to the police officer whom I have sent.” Likewise, the princes of the priests and the elders of the people led and delivered Jesus to Pilate (Matt 27:2; Mark 15:1; cf. John 18:30, 35); the scribes and the chief priests appoint men “to deliver him to the power and authority of the governor” (Luke 20:20; cf. 24:20, *eis krima thanatou*); Paul and certain other prisoners are remanded to the care of a centurion (Acts 27:1); “Pilate gave them the centurion Petronius and some soldiers to guard the tomb” (*Gos. Pet.* 31). The apostles will be handed over before courts (Matt 10:17, 19, *eis synedria*; cf. 24:9; Mark 13:9, 11; Luke 21:12), and every debtor is exhorted to be reconciled with his creditor before the latter delivers him to the judge (*tō kritē*) and the judge to the officer (*tō hypēretē*), lest he be thrown in prison.

## παράθηκη

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*parathēkē*, **deposit**

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*paratheke*, S 3866; *TDNT* 8.162–164; *EDNT* 3.22; MM 483–484; L&N 35.48; BAGD 616; ND 2.85

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In the Pastorals, St. Paul three times uses the expression *parathēkēn phylassein*, in a metaphorical sense, in accord with contemporary usage, because not only was money entrusted to the care of a third party, but so could be a person (*P.Oxy.* 2600, 7; cf. 1 Pet 4:19; *Jos. Asen.* 13.11–12) or a harvest of grain (*P.Oxy.* 3049) or of words, i.e., secrets. According to Philo, the divine gifts entrusted to humans are like deposits that must be guarded carefully, especially in carrying out a public (*Spec. Laws* 4.71) and sacred function: “Not everyone gets to guard the deposit of the divine mysteries” (*Sacr. Abel and Cain* 60, *parakatathēkēn phylaxai*). In this sense the Jews received the oracles of God as a deposit (Rom 3:2).

Ulpian would later define this term contract, the establishment of which required no formality other than the freely expressed consent of the one

accepting the deposit: “that which is placed in someone else’s custody” (“quod custodiendum alicui datum”); the object is deposited for its protection. It remains the property of the depositor; it does not belong to the depositary, and the depositary cannot dispose of it. Not only must he guard it “like something sacred and divine” (Josephus, *Ant.* 4.285), but he must immediately return it intact when asked, without delay or discussion. This is the meaning of the constant repeated appearance in the contracts of the phrase “according to the law of deposits.” In addition, Ps.-Plato gave this definition: *parakatathēkē: doma meta pisteōs* (*Def.* 415 d). Whether a literal or a metaphorical deposit is intended, the emphasis is always on the good faith and fidelity of the depositary: “The setting up of a deposit is the most sacred thing done in social life, because it depends on the good faith of the depositary.” Thus the protection of the gods is invoked, and it was common to deposit valuables in the temples, which became savings banks; such was the case with, among others, the temple at Jerusalem and the Artemision of Ephesus. People often left agreements, documents, and especially wills in these places of safety. The word *parathēkē*, not found in other Pauline letters, fits quite well in 1 and 2 Timothy, which are precisely Paul’s last will and testament, instructing his favorite disciple to preserve intact and inviolable the wealth of teaching that he has passed on to him throughout his life.

Sometimes this *parathēkē* has been taken to mean the pastoral office entrusted to the Ephesian pastor; but in the context of these two epistles, it is much more likely that it refers to the preservation of the “wholesome teaching” (*hygiēs didaskalia*) which must be kept from the degradations or corruptions of heterodoxy. The disciple can draw on supernatural resources for preserving the gospel and the tradition and sheltering them from adulteration, namely, the Holy Spirit who indwells us (2 Tim 1:14) and is supposed to act with particular efficacy in the organs of the ecclesiastical hierarchy.

## παρακοή

*parakoē*, **disobedience**

→see also εἰσακούω, ἐπακούω, ὑπακούω, ὑπακοή

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*parakoe*, S 3876; TDNT 1.223; EDNT 3.29; NIDNTT 2.172, 175; MM 485; L&N 36.27; BAGD 618

Unlike the verb *parakouō*, which occurs rather commonly, the substantive *parakoē* is rare. It is unknown in the LXX and in the papyri earlier than the eighth century. The word would hardly be worth discussing except for its



theological importance in Rom 5:19. After characterizing Adam's sin (*hē hamartia*, verse 12) as a transgression (*hē parabasis*, verse 14) and a false step (*paraptōma*, verses 15–18; cf. Wis 10:1), St. Paul defines it as disobedience (*parakoē*), the original human transgression, punishable by death: “Just as through the disobedience of one man (*dia tēs parakoēs*) all became sinners, so also through the obedience of one (*dia tēs hypakoēs*) will all be justified.” This disobedience of Adam, the antithesis of Christ's obedience, has as its effect the constituting of humankind as a race of sinners. “The notion of original sin is affirmed again, because *kathistēmi*, ‘institute, constitute, establish,’ indicates more than a juridical assessment.”

While *sin* or *transgression* can mean the violation of a law, the failure to observe a commandment, *parakoē* expresses above all a refusal to listen, turning a deaf ear. This etymological nuance is retained in Heb 2:2, where because the *logos* pronounced by the angels was valid (*bebaios*), i.e., authoritative and obligatory, all corruption, whether commission (*parabasis*, Rom 2:23; Gal 2:15) or omission (*parakoē*, the willful and culpable refusal to take the divine word into consideration) was sanctioned by a just penalty.

In 2 Cor 10:6, as in Rom 5:19, *hē parakoē* is contrasted with *hē hypakoē*; the apostle will punish all disobedience – those who do not submit to his oral teachings and precepts – once the obedience or submission of the community is complete, i.e., firm and unanimous.

παραμυθεομαι, παραμυθία, παραμύθιον

*paramytheomai*, **to advise, encourage, console, comfort**; *paramythia*, **comfort, encouragement, support**; *paramythion*, **comfort, encouragement**

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*paramutheomai*, S 3888; TDNT 5.816–823; EDNT 3.32; NIDNTT 1.328–329; MM 488; L&N 25.153; BAGD 620 | *paramuthia*, S 3889; TDNT 5.816–823; EDNT 3.32; NIDNTT 1.328–329; MM 488; L&N 25.154; BAGD 620 | *paramuthion*, S 3890; TDNT 5.816–823; EDNT 3.32; NIDNTT 1.328–329; MM 488; L&N 25.154; BDF §111(4); BAGD 620–621; ND 3.79; 4.14, 166

A compound of the rare denominative verb *mytheomai*, “speak, retell, converse,” and the prefix *para*, the verb *paramytheomai* belongs especially to cultivated Greek. In the Hellenistic period it almost always has affective connotations, with the highly nuanced meanings of “advise, encourage, console, comfort, speak calming words to, appease, soothe.”

I. – A number of these occurrences have no particularized meaning, but most are found in a context of trials, difficulties, or sorrow. One goes to the

troubled person *eis paramythion* (SB 10652 B 10; beginning of second century; *I.Lind.* 441, 9: *eis paramythian tou patros*), to console or to comfort. Calm and gentle speech can reassure the heart (*P.Ryl.* 653, 6), dissipate fear (Plutarch, *Alc.* 13.6; *Sert.* 16.2: *epeirato paramytheisthai dia logōn* – “he tried to console with words”), comfort the afflicted (Lucian, *Peregr.* 13). Thus many Jews from Jerusalem “had come to Martha and Mary to console them concerning their brother” (*hina paramythēsōntai autas peri tou adelphou*, John 11:19, 31). We know that consolation, which was practiced among the rabbis as among the Greeks and Romans, was considered a “work of love”; but the Johannine use of *paramytheomai* for consolation is in accord with contemporary usage, since this verb and the nouns derived from it apply especially to consolation and comfort concerning a death. It is likely that these visitors from Jerusalem gave the sisters at Bethany reasons to hope (cf. John 11:22–27); in any case, hope and consolation go together in a large number of texts. Finally, we should note that the term *psēphismata paramythētica* (“decrees of consolation”) is used for decrees that are intended both to honor a deceased person and to console the grieving family.

II. – The meaning “comfort, encourage” is even more widespread than the previous meaning; it is a properly divine activity and in the Bible has a religious meaning. Judas Maccabeus encourages (*paramythoumenos*) his companions: “with the help of the Law and the Prophets, by reminding them of the battles that were already behind them, he filled them with renewed zeal.” In St. Paul’s language, *paramytheomai* and the related nouns have a technical meaning, *paraklēsis* that teaches, persuades, stimulates. Apostolic “exhortation,” at root doctrinal, is the source of courage: “We exhorted you, encouraged you, adjured you to walk worthy of God.”

The emphasis is sometimes intellectual: reasoning in order to persuade or advise. Courtiers persuade the authorities to shed innocent blood (Add Esth 16:5); “philosophy reasons with it gently” (*ērema paramytheitai*). This calm, gentle manner of speaking, which reassures and comforts, is a form of *paraklēsis*, especially effective for smoothing out opposition within a community. In any event, the prophet, by virtue of his charism, has a divine power to persuade that contributes to the solid edification of the Christian church: “speaks to humans for their edification, encouragement, and comfort” (*anthrōpois lalei oikodomēn kai paraklēsin kai paramythian*, 1 Cor 14:3).

With respect to Christians who are fearful or timid (*oligopsychoi*), victims of fears, doubts, or scruples, or who lack strength to deal with daily hardships or with persecution, the brethren must encourage them: *paramytheisthe tous oligopsychous* (1 Thess 5:14).

III. – In these words (*paramythion*, *paramythia*, *paramytheisthai*), there is more than comfort or encouragement, but a real stimulation, strength for overcoming difficulties. The word is used not only for reassurance (Xenophon, *Hell.* 4.8.1; *paremythounto*), and for encouraging and prodding to action (a letter to Emperor Hadrian: *paramythoumenon kai protreponta*, *P.Fay.* 19, 6); but for supplying a lack (Lucian, *Dom.* 7: *paramytheomai to endeon*), bringing help (cf. *P.Oxy.* 1631, 13: *paramythikē ergasia*; cf. *P.Ryl.* 653, 6: maintaining the irrigation system). Such, it would seem, is the meaning of *paramythion* in Phil 2:1 – “If there is any exhortation in Christ, if there is any stimulation to love (*ei ti paramythion agapēs*), if there is any fellowship in the Spirit, if there is any tender mercy and compassion, then complete my joy ...”

The meaning “sustenance, support” is attested especially for *paramythia*. In 332, three people from Theadelphia complain to the prefect about the number of their fellow-citizens who are evading public service, moving to neighboring nomes and abandoning their own town, “and so we beseech your Mightiness, in our poor and neglected condition, to order the *epistatēs* of the peace to hand over our townspeople so that we may through this strengthening (*dia tautēs tēs paramythias*) live in our town and always give thanks to your glorious Fortune.” In the Byzantine period, *paramythia* referred to the compensation or surety on a mortgage (*P.Flor.* 382, 65), the security, which was an application of the classical notion of *paramythia*; and the word came to mean “salary, compensation,” especially in the bookkeeping formula *hyper paramythias*.

παραπλήσιον, παραπλησίως

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*paraplēsion*, **near, similar to, like**; *paraplēsiōs*, **similarly, likewise**

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*paraplesion*, S 3897; *EDNT* 3.33; MM 489; L&N 64.9; BDF §184; BAGD 621  
| *paraplesios*, S 3898; *EDNT* 3.33; MM 489; L&N 64.9; BAGD 621; ND 3.79

The preposition and the adverb, both unknown in the LXX, are NT hapaxes; and the adverb seems to be attested nowhere in the papyri. Both are formed from *plēsios*, “near, close, neighboring,” and etymologically refer to either the closeness of a place or a more or less total resemblance (“almost alike”), at least in classical Greek; but in the Koine the meaning often blurs into “nearly.”

*Paraplēsion* in Phil 2:27 retains the nuance of approximation: Epaphroditus was ill, quite near to or actually on the point of dying; he had a brush with death. In the papyri, it is used to mean “analogous,” for comparing facts, people, or things that are equivalent or “of the same sort”; so the meaning is “similar, like,” like writing the same things to another correspondant. The

similarity can even amount to identity: “It is and will be the same with Pontus, and this is coming about already.” “It is impossible that after the conflagration the world should become like coal” (= “become coal” – Philo, *Etern. World* 90).

The same difficulty of evaluating the degree of similarity appears for *paraplēsiōs* in Heb 2:14, where Christ shares the human conditions after the fashion of his brethren according to flesh and blood. Should we understand this to say “in exactly the same manner” or “in a manner nearly like” – in order to preserve Christ’s sinlessness, his human nature not being corrupt – in which case we would say “in his own way,” or perhaps in a vague sense “similarly, likewise,” neither including nor excluding some particular difference. This last interpretation is the best attested in the first century: “An equality of the same order is seen in the members of living beings” (Philo, *Heir* 51); “likewise in all the towns” (Josephus, *Life* 187); “the people of Asochis, like those of Japha, gave them a noisy reception” (ibid. 233); “to become a good distance runner, one must have robust shoulders and neck, like an athlete who competes in the pentathlon”; “Orpheus made a vow to the gods of Samothrace, just as he did the first time.” It would seem that the nuance of Heb 2:14 is that cited by the Greek fathers – “with no difference” – a translation that follows the context. Christ assumed a human nature exactly like that of other mortals, even though its principle of existence was the person of the Word of God – but this is a distinction made by later theology. Nevertheless the choice of the word *paraplēsiōs* seems to hold some nuance – could it be that of the virginal conception?

## παράφω

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*parapherō*, **to bring, carry off, remove**

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*paraphero*, S 3911; EDNT 3.35; MM 491; L&N 15.162, 31.75, 90.97; BAGD 623

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This verb presents no other difficulty than its multitude of meanings, which can be sorted out only according to context.

I. – The first meaning, “bring,” appears in Judg 6:5, where the Midianites bring their tents beyond the borders of their kingdom. The sense is that of carrying something, sometimes in a physical sense, like “waterless clouds carried by the wind,” and sometimes in a mental sense, as when David, pretending to be mad, appears deranged. Compare the English expressions “carried away” and “transports of delight.”

II. – The exhortation of Heb 13:9 (*didachais poikilais kai xenais mē parapheresthe*) uses the passive in a figurative sense: “to varied and strange doctrines do not let yourself be led”; or “do not be carried off, away from the right path,” by these teachings. This epistle often uses compound verbs in *para-* to express a deviation, a turning aside, a marring, a positioning next to the right place: *pararreō* (2:1), *paradeigmatizō* (6:6), *paraiteomai* (12:25), *parapikrainō* (3:8, 15–16), *parapiptō* (6:6).

III. – The second aorist imperative (*parenenke ... ap’ emou*, Mark 14:36; Luke 22:42; cf. Matt 26:39 – *parelthatō*) should be translated “remove (or take back) this cup from me.”

## παρεισφέρω

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*pareispherō*, **to bring in alongside or in addition**

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*pareisphero*, S 3923; EDNT 3.37; MM 492; L&N 68.64; BAGD 625

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This biblical hapax (2 Pet 1:5), “bring in alongside or in addition,” rare in classical Greek, is attested in only one papyrus dating from 113 BC: “A certain Thracian from Kerkesephis, whose name I do not know, fraudulently brought oil (*pareisenēnochota elaion*) into the house where Petesuchos lives.” It means “bring an amendment” in Demosthenes (*C. Lept.* 20.88) and corresponds to *eispherein psēphisma* in the inscriptions, which means “introduce or propose a decree,” “pay a fine” (*MAMA VI*, 11). This second verb is used for bringing absolute courage into a just war (Onasander 4.2), and the expression *eispherein pasan spoudēn* is used constantly in the sense of putting one’s zeal into something, bringing all one’s good will to bear.

Everyone agrees that this is clearly the meaning in 2 Pet 1:5, where the compound form corresponds to the Koine’s common preference: “So therefore bring all your diligence to bear to add to your faith virtue....” (*kai auto touto de spoudēn pasan pareisenenkantes epichorēgēsate en tē pistei hymōn tēn aretēn*).

## παρεπίδημος

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*parepidēmos*, **foreigner temporarily in a place, sojourner**

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→see also ξενία, ξενίζω, ξενοδοχέω, ξένος

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*parepidemos*, S 3927; TDNT 2.64–65; EDNT 3.38; NIDNTT 1.690; MM 493; L&N 11.77; BAGD 625

Among the foreigners, distinguished from the natives in a city in Egypt or Greece were the *katoikountes* (cf. the *paroikoi*, Exod 12:45; Lev 22:10), or residents, who had obtained the right of domicile; and the *parepidēmoi*, or sojourners, foreigners who were only passing through the city, not establishing themselves there; for example, they stayed only long enough to unload cargo or to settle a business matter. Neither category of people has the right to citizenship, but the second are only passing through; their stay is temporary. The verb *parepidēmeō* and the substantive *parepidēmia* occur much more commonly than *parepidēmos*, but they always mean a brief sojourn outside one's customary home. For example: foreigners who find themselves temporarily at Priene (*tōn parepidēmōntōn xenōn*, *I.Priene*, 111, 139; cf. *Dittenberger, Or.* 268, 9; *SB* 1568, 4, *hoi parepidēmōntes en tō Arsinoitē*); praise is given "to the delegates Aristodamos, Aristeus, Antanor, because they sojourned (*parepedamēsan*) and reported in a fashion entirely worthy of the city of Magnesia and the people of Epirus" (*I.Magn.* 32, 40); "Whereas the transients at Philae, *stratēgoi, epistatai* ... compelled us to pay the costs of their presence...." "The Messenian ephors suffered much on account of the sojourn of Dorimachos."

In the third century BC, Zeno, a native of Caunus, calls himself or is labeled a *parepidēmos* in Egypt. In a will from the same period, a certain Philo leaves to his heirs (his wife and his daughter) a debt of 150 silver drachmas owed him by the Syrian *parepidēmos* Apollonios, also called in Syriac Jonathas. The LXX gives this term a religious meaning, since in prayer the Israelites present themselves as nomads, without hearth or home, whose only security and support is in Yahweh, and also since Abraham says at Hebron "I am a resident alien and a sojourner in your midst"; a saying that is evoked at Heb 11:13, where the patriarchs are supposed to have confessed that they were "strangers and exiles on the earth" (*xenoi kai parepidēmoi eisin epi tēs gēs*).

This profession of faith and of hope was influenced by Philo, who said that "every wise soul has received heaven as its country, the earth as a foreign (*xenēn*) land; it considers the corporeal dwelling as someone else's property in which it must sojourn (*parepidēmein*)." When St. Peter addresses "the elect, strangers in the Diaspora" (1 Pet 1:1), he means that the recipients of his letter are not natives and citizens of an earthly country, where they are making only a provisional, relatively brief sojourn; their abode is elsewhere: in heaven (cf. Phil 3:20). This exile is strongly emphasized by repetition: "Dear friends, I urge you as aliens and strangers (*hōs paroikous kai parepidēmous*) to abstain from carnal desires." This is not a chance metaphor but an adequate summary of the supernatural condition of Christians (*hōs* = "as, being"). For them, life is a pilgrimage (Gen 47:9; 2 Cor 5:6–8); they are only "passing through" on earth,

so they have the mindset of travelers who do not adopt the thoughts or customs or mores of the country that they traverse; they have a different set of values than the natives that they rub shoulders with. The citizens of heaven keep themselves from all that could sully their holiness (1 Pet 1:13–15).

## παρθενία, παρθένος

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*parthenia*, **virginity**; *parthenos*, **unmarried young woman, virgin**

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***parthenia***, S 3932; *EDNT* 3.39; *NIDNTT* 3.1072; MM 494; L&N 23.64; BAGD 626–627 | ***parthenos***, S 3933; *TDNT* 5.826–837; *EDNT* 3.39; *NIDNTT* 3.1071–1072; MM 494; L&N 15.86, 85.25; BAGD 627; ND 4.222–226

There is no known etymology for *parthenos*, which usually refers to a “young woman” who is not yet married or a “virgin,” as distinct from “woman” (*gynē*): “leaving behind the name of virgin, a young woman is called a woman (or wife).” So this term is usually linked with the idea of youth (*parthenou koras* = the young virgin), of beauty, and even of nobility. It can then be meant in the strict sense of purity and literal virginity: “My soul is virgin” (*parthenon psychēn echōn*, Euripides, *Hipp.* 1006); “water that flows from a pure spring” (*parthenou pēgēs*, Aeschylus, *Pers.* 613); in the Argolid a fountain was shown in which Juno recovered her virginity each year by bathing (Pausanias 2.38.2–3). In AD 37, the inhabitants of Assos took an oath “by our pure and virgin” (*hagnēn parthenon*) city-guardian goddess. In the classical and Hellenistic periods, not only is this esteem for virginity affirmed – as with Atalanta, who when she “came to the age of puberty wished to remain a virgin” – along with an association between youth and innocent living, but also virginity takes on religious meaning. Virgin goddesses like Artemis, and better, the warrior Athena, are honored. The pagan cults attest to the consecrated virginity of their priestesses and their prophetesses, which presupposes that their innocence is valued by the gods, so that their intervention is especially efficacious. The case of the Vestals is only one example, but there are also the Pythia, who drew near to the god “with a virgin soul” (Plutarch, *De Pyth. or.* 22), and many others: “She claims that she will remain a virgin all her life; she is consecrated to the cult of Artemis.... She exalts virginity and does not fall far short of divinizing it. She calls it pure, unpolluted, immaculate.”

The papyri and especially the inscriptions confirm these meanings: *parthenoi* are “girls.” Epitaphs, especially Jewish ones, use the word to point to the youthfulness of the deceased, who had “reached the flower of age” (*CII* 1508), or was of marriageable age. The term takes on a religious coloring in the

fourth century BC at Cyrene, where “young women” have to be purified, and are associated with young brides (*nympha*) before the consummation of their marriage, and with women (*gyna*). Cult regulations associate them with children in taking part in cultic ceremonies; they sing hymns in processions. With the decree of Canopus in the third century, “sacred virgins” appear at festal assemblies in honor of the gods; in a regulation for the Andanian mysteries, one of the “virgins” is identified as the priestess of Apollo Karneios (*hai parthenoi hai hierai*). This has nothing to do with physical integrity or with virtue; it is a functional title.

The LXX uses *parthenos* (Hebrew *btûlâh*) for an adolescent girl who has not been engaged (Exod 22:15–16), “who has not belonged to a man” (Lev 21:3), sometimes emphasizing youthfulness, sometimes physiological virginity: “young virgins who had not had relations with a male” (Judg 21:12). This point is as novel as it is constant (“Here is my daughter, who is a virgin”), but it implies nothing about the virtue or the personal feelings of the one so described: she is a virgin, since she is not married and everyone thinks she is one. This is what confirms the meaning of *partheneia* (Hebrew *btûlîm*): physical integrity, the distinctive index of virginity. Only two texts translate the Hebrew *’almâh* as *parthenos*. The first concerns Rebekah (Gen 24:43); the second speaks of the miraculous sign of salvation given to Ahaz: “The adolescent (*hē parthenos*) will become pregnant and will bear a son; you shall call his name Immanuel” (Isa 7:14). Matt 1:23 attests its literal messianic meaning. It has been consecrated by the Christian tradition, which refers it to the virgin birth of Jesus.

Philo seems to be the first to have understood *parthenia* as an actual virtue and gives it its distinguishing traits, always including nobility and beauty. This has to do not only with physical integrity, nor even with simple purity, but with an interior and very spiritual orientation that allows one to enter into relationship with God. God communes “with the nature that is undefiled, pure, in all truth virgin.... When God begins to have commerce with the soul, he makes a virgin again of what has become a woman.” His model would be the female Therapeutae, contemplatives who serve and honor God, for the most part “aged virgins (*gēraiai parthenoi*) who have not observed chastity (*hagneian*) by constraint – like some Greek priestesses – but on their free resolve, from a passionate desire for wisdom: seeking to imbue their lives with it, they have renounced bodily pleasures.”

Luke 2:36 is faithful to the language of the LXX when it specifies that the prophetess Anna had lived “with her husband seven years *apo tēs parthenias*.” On the other hand, St. Matthew no longer understands *parthenos* to mean “young woman” (Hebrew *’almâh*) but literally “virgin,” since the point is that



Joseph is being reassured concerning his fiancée's virtue (Matt 1:23). The meaning of the term in Luke 1:27 is much disputed: Gabriel is sent from God "to a virgin engaged to a man named Joseph ... the virgin's name was Mary" (*pros parthenon emnēsteumenēn andri ... to onoma tēs parthenou Mariam*). This text is not to be taken in isolation; it plays an important role in the design of Luke 1–2; the strict meaning "virgin" was retained by the whole tradition, in which the religious meaning has great weight, the ideal of virginity not being unknown among contemporaries (Epictetus 3.22.26–27), notably the Essenes. Not only does Luke write *parthenos* first, before the name of the young woman, but he repeats it and wants to emphasize its weight; it is the title par excellence of the person whom the angel addresses with such great respect, the one whom Christian tradition calls "the Blessed Virgin Mary."

On the other hand, once more, the title of the "parable of the Ten Virgins" (*deka parthenois*, Matt 25:1, 7, 11) is wrong. M. J. Lagrange noted: "The ten virgins are young women, friends of the fiancée, and the fact of their virginity has no bearing on the parable" (on this text). We might even say that the question of their virginity does not arise; here *parthenos* retains its secular and OT sense, "young women"; they are the bride's young companions and friends, and they participate in the joyful procession planned for the marriage ceremony; they surround the bride when she goes to meet her fiancé, who is escorted by young men who are his friends. Five of them are foolish (*mōrai*), scatterbrained, idiots who bring lamps with no oil; and five are sensible (*phronimoi*) – their lamps are filled.

Acts 21:9 is more difficult to interpret. At Caesarea, the evangelist Philip "had four virgin daughters who prophesied" (*thygateres ... parthenoi prophēteuousai*). The clearest point to be made is that there is a certain connection between virginity and prophecy; but *parthenos* could also be interpreted simply as meaning unmarried young women, thus noting a fact but allowing no conclusion that these *parthenoi* intended never to marry and had a vow of virginity. Otherwise, in pointing out that these young women were virgins, Luke may have intended to point out their singular circumstance: they were really virgins and even had that virtue.

The definite text on virginity in the NT is 1 Cor 7:25–34 ("And concerning virgins," *peri de tōn parthenōn*), which means men as well as women (*Jos. Asen.* 4.9; 8.1); the Lord had given no precept on this matter. The apostle gives his reasoned opinion: virginity is better than marriage for both sexes, first because marriage is inopportune given the dramatic eschatological circumstances, but especially on the spiritual level because the person who is *agamos* has no concern other than the Lord and ways of pleasing him. What is more, the virgin remains holy in both body and spirit. Virginity means freedom

for consecration to the Lord; it means not only bodily purity, but essentially the will of the heart to belong more completely to Christ and to be available for his service. The case of the father who hesitates to let his *hyperakmos* (7:36, about to pass the flower of age) daughter (*parthenos*) marry resembles that of Phokos, who “kept on moving back the time for his daughter’s marriage” (Ps.-Plutarch, *Amat. nar.* 4.774 e). All things considered, such a father does well if he lets his daughter marry (*kalōs poiei*, 7:36), but he does better (*kreisson poiēsei*) if he does not give her in marriage.

Since the OT had portrayed Yahweh as the husband of the nation of Israel, and in Eph 5:22–32 Christ is the husband of the church, St. Paul presents himself as best man in the uniting of the Corinthian community with the Lord, or “as a father gives his daughter to the chosen husband” (E. B. Allo): “I betrothed you to one man (*heni andri*) as a pure virgin (*parthenon hagnēn*) to be presented to Christ.” The metaphor refers to all souls that are purified from their sins. The same interpretation has been made with the 144,000 virgins before the Beast and its worshipers: they have been redeemed from the earth; they sing a new song in honor of the Lamb, whom they follow wherever he goes; “these are the ones who have not defiled themselves with women, because they are virgins (*parthenoi gar eisin*) ... they are immaculate (*amōmoi eisin*).” “Virgins” is to be taken literally, but it is impossible to apply it to all Christians, notably those who are married and could not have been defiled (*emolynthēsan*) by virtue of their marital relations. This must have to do with an elite among the redeemed, a definite category of ascetic Christians, separated from other people, the “firstfruits” taken from the whole of the Christian assembly and consecrated exclusively for the service of God and the Lamb, for whom they constitute a sort of bodyguard. They would have been “defiled” if they had defaulted on their resolve (cf. 1 Tim 5:12 – *tēn prōtēn pistin athetēsan*, “they annulled their first commitment”). As things stand, however, they are beyond reproach. We may think of the “eunuchs who make themselves such for the sake of the kingdom of heaven.” There is no more energetic way of expressing the will to definitive self-renunciation with regard to sexual satisfactions for the love of God; which is the very definition of Christian virginity.

## παρουσία

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*parousia*, **presence, arrival, visit, manifestation**

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*parousia*, S 3952; TDNT 5.858–871; EDNT 3.43–44; NIDNTT 2.887, 898–903, 907, 932–934; MM 497; L&N 25.158, 28.29; BAGD 629–630; ND 4.167–168

Just as the verb *pareimi* has the two meanings “be present” and “become present (arrive),” the substantive *parousia* means sometimes the presence of persons or things; sometimes arrival, coming, visit. In the Hellenistic period, it refers (except in commonplace uses) either to a divine manifestation – often very close to *epiphaneia* (1 Tim 6:14; Titus 2:13; 2 Tim 4:1, 8) and *phanerōsis*, and even *apokalypsis* – or the formal visit of a sovereign, his “joyous entry” into a city that honors him as a god (Dittenberger, *Syl.* 814, 36: “the gods always present at his side to protect and preserve him”). Receiving Demetrius Polyorctes, the Athenians compare him to Demeter because of the similarity of their names and sing “Like the greatest and best loved gods, they now present themselves to our city (*gē polei pareisin*); for this auspicious occasion has brought us Demeter and Demetrius together.” The days of the prince’s sojourn are considered “holy days” (*hiera hēmera tēs epidēmias tou Autokratoros Traianou Adrianou kaisaros*, *I.Did.* 254, 10; cf. *P.Tebt.* 116, 57: *en tois [chronois] basileōs parousias*) and sometimes as marking the beginning of a new age. An inscription from Tegea is dated “the sixty-ninth year of the first *parousia* of the god Hadrian in Greece” (in *BCH*, vol. 25, 1901, p. 275). Beginning with the third century BC, there is the *parousia* of a Ptolemy (*P.Petr.* II, 39, *e* 18), then of Ptolemy Philometor and Cleopatra (*UPZ* 42, 18; cf. 109, 12), of Ptolemy II Soter (*P.Tebt.* 48, 13), of Ptolemy Philopator (3 Macc 3:17), of Germanicus (*SB* 3924, 34 = *Chrest. Wilck.*, n. 413), and those of Hadrian.

In line with these usages, the NT uses *Parousia* for the glorious coming of the Lord Jesus at the end of time, his Second Coming. This return of Christ must somehow be filled out with the pomp and magnificence that characterized royal and imperial “visits.” There were great feasts, *panēgyreis*, including speeches of praise, gifts, games, sacrifices, dedications; statutes and buildings were erected, coins and medallions were struck, sentences were commuted, gold crowns were given (*Dittenberger, Or.* 332, 26–39), honors were multiplied. Glory and joy on the part of the people were in response to the prince’s active and beneficent presence. All of this pales in comparison to the coming of the Pantokrator, but it explains why the NT uses the term *parousia*.

## παρρησία

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*parrēsia*, freedom of speech, candor, boldness, public speech, categorical affirmation

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*parresia*, S 3954; *TDNT* 5.871–886; *EDNT* 3.45–47; *NIDNTT* 2.734–737; *MM* 497; *L&N* 25.158, 28.29; *BDF* §§11(1), 198(4), 264(3); *BAGD* 630–631

This word, a compound of *pan* and *rhēma*, is specifically Greek; there is no corresponding Hebrew word. It belongs to the literary language and is rather rare in the papyri and the inscriptions.

I. – In Greek literature, the first meaning of *parrhēsia* is political: the right to make one's thoughts known, to say what one will. It is a citizen's privilege, the sign of his political liberty, characterizing the democratic regime of the *polis*. The citizen has the right to express his opinions freely in the marketplace.

This freedom of speech implies the truth of what is said, so that *parrhēsia* means "candor, straightforwardness"; Demosthenes, *1 Philip*. 4.51: "I have laid my thoughts before you without hiding anything, in all candor"; *2 Philip*. 6.31: "I am going to speak to you openly (*meta parrhēsias*); I will not conceal anything"; *4 Philip*. 10.53–54: "If I must speak the whole truth candidly"; Philo, *Sacr. Abel and Cain* 12: "Moses said frankly that he did not speak easily"; 35: "I will hide nothing from you but say to you frankly"; Diogenes: "I am the liberator of men and the physician of their passions. In short, I want to be the prophet of truth and of candor" (*alētheias kai parrhēsias prophētēs einai boulomai*, Lucian, *Vit. Auct.* 8; cf. *Dial. Mort.* 11.3). Porphyry: "If it is necessary to speak without reticence and with all candor" (*ei gar dei mēden hyposteilamenon meta parrhēsias*, *Abst.* 1.57.1).

To speak candidly, proclaim the truth, and eschew evasions and lies exposes a person to danger (Josephus, *Ant.* 16.377) and presupposes the overcoming of obstacles; hence the third nuance of *parrhēsia*: "hardiness, courage, audacity, confidence." According to Wis 5:1, "The righteous person stands boldly (*en parrhēsia*) before those who have tormented him"; Philo, *Joseph* 73: "I will give opinions that are conducive to the common good, even if they are not of such a nature as to please.... I leave flattering words to others. In my speeches I will pursue the salutary and the useful. I will distribute praise, warning, or blame without flaunting foolish and misplaced arrogance, but showing, to the contrary, a sober candor" (*nēphousan parrhēsian*).

This freedom of language, synonymous with candor (Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 4.3) is sometimes contrasted with timidity or self-consciousness, sometimes with flattery (Dio Chrysostom 32.26–27). It is practiced between friends who are not afraid to blame each other as well as toward superiors, even tyrants, with whom one must guard one's freedom of speech: "Boldness (*eutolmia*) and freedom of speech (*parrhēsia*) are admirable virtues when they are addressed opportunely to superiors" (Philo, *Heir* 5, who cites Menander's *Paidion*; cf. Stobaeus, *Flor.* 62.19.19; vol. 4, p. 425). Even the servant, if he knows that he has committed no offense, retains this freedom of speech toward his master (*Heir* 6); "Famous people grant the humble free speech" (*Spec. Laws* 4.74); "The man who does not allow anyone in his household to speak freely is a petty

tyrant” (*Spec. Laws* 3.138). *Parrhēsia* does not fear the widest publicity; it proclaims its convictions: “Wisdom raises her voice publicly in the streets” (*Prov* 1:20); “Let those whose actions benefit all use full freedom of expression; let them go out in public and converse with large crowds” (Philo, *Spec. Laws* 1.321; Plutarch, *De exil.* 16).

This *parrhēsia*, which is not confined to speech but includes conduct, does not depend on prejudices and what people will say (Philo, *Flacc.* 4). It is exalted by the philosophers, especially the Cynics, notably Diogenes, who considers it the best thing that can be found in people (*erōtētheis ti kalliston en anthrōpois, ephē parrhēsia*, Diogenes Laertius, 6.2.69; cf. Aelius Aristides 2.401 and the collection of sayings “concerning *parrhēsia*” in Stobaeus, *Flor.* 3.13; vol. 3, pp. 543ff.); “*parrhēsia* is a completely indispensable good” (Philo, *Heir* 14); “The freedom of speech of the good man is so great that he dares not only to speak and cry out, but actually to shout out from real conviction and true emotion” (*Heir* 19). The soul addresses God: “You, master, are my country, my family, my ancestral home; you are my right, my freedom of speech, my abundant wealth” (*Heir* 27); the soul, “because there is something of divine inspiration in it, expresses itself freely” (Philo, *Change of Names* 136); an inscription from Pergamum: “He adorned his life with the noblest freedom of speech” (*kekosmēke ton autou bion tē kallistē parrēsia*, *Dittenberger, Or.* 323, 10). But we know of the excesses of Diogenes and his disciples, who think that everything is permitted and breach conventions, the proprieties, and even good sense. *Parrhēsia* degenerates into insolence or impudence toward humans and blasphemy toward the gods. In addition, Philo, who makes a virtue of candor, denounces excess and requires moderation in free speech: this freedom must not be used without respect for neighbor (*Heir* 29; *Dreams* 2.83ff.). Joseph addressed the king “with freedom of speech tempered by modesty” (*parrhēsia syn aidoi*, *Joseph* 107), a candor without impudence (*parrhēsia tēn aneu anaischyntias*, *Joseph* 222); noble souls meet arrogant boasting with candor (Philo, *Good Man Free* 126). The right measure is hard to determine; on the one hand, one must not speak except with a pure conscience (*Spec. Laws* 1.203; Josephus, *Ant.* 2.52, 131) and according to the ties that bind you to your interlocutor; and on the other hand, virtuous *parrhēsia* excludes verbiage with clarity and sobriety. The example of Burrus, “who employed great freedom of speech,” is instructive. When Nero asked him a second time about a matter that he had already explained, Burrus replied, “When I have once stated my mind, do not ask me again” (Dio Cassius 62.13). It is this form of *parrhēsia* – categorical affirmation (cf. *parrhēsiazomai*, Philo, *Sacr. Abel and Cain* 66) – that the Lord commanded: “Let your speech be yes

[if it is yes], no [if it is no]. Anything in addition comes of evil” (Matt 5:37; cf. Jas 5:12).

II. – In the Gospels, *parrhēsia*, always occurring as an adverbial dative (παρρησία) or in the locution *en parrhēsia*, is used exclusively (except for John 7:13) regarding Jesus, and almost always with the verbs “say, speak”; it has the quite traditional sense of publicness and clarity. Jesus announces his passion “openly” to his disciples (Mark 8:32); “He said to them clearly (without ambiguity)” (John 11:14); “If you are the Christ, tell us frankly” (John 10:24); “The hour is coming when I will not speak to you in parables, but I will speak to you of the father in full clarity” (John 16:25, 29). The nuances of “publicness, freedom,” and even “boldness” are clear: “See, he speaks freely and no one says anything to him” (John 7:26; cf. 7:13); they apply not only to his words but also to his attitude and conduct: “No one does things in secret (*en kryptō*) if he wants to become a public figure” (*en parrhēsia*, out in the open, publicly; John 7:4); “Jesus did not show himself in public among the Jews” (John 11:43). This multiplicity of Johannine usages result neither from chance nor from purely literary considerations; it has a theological intention: the divine revelation is clear and is spread as widely as possible (Isa 45:19; 48:16; Prov 1:20). The Word made flesh announces the word of God with full assurance, is fully in control of its spread despite the opposition and schemes of his opponents, and thus announces it boldly, as a light shines in darkness. Summing up his ministry, he testifies to his divine authenticity on the basis of the fact that his testimony has been fulfilled with *parrhēsia*: “I have spoken to the world publicly (παρρησία, openly). I always taught in the synagogue and in the temple, where the Jews meet; I have said nothing in secret (*en kryptō*)” (John 18:20).

This courageous freedom of speech, this liberty of language, is still clearer in the Acts of the Apostles, where it becomes an apostolic virtue, with the emphasis being on the frankness of the preacher and thus on the truth of his message. Peter says, “Let me tell you with full assurance ...” (Acts 2:29). The members of the Sanhedrin are amazed at the boldness of Peter and John, men with no education and no culture (4:13); the church prays the Lord to grant that his servants may speak his word with boldness, despite threats and hostility (4:29, 31). This is what Paul does at Damascus (9:27–28, *parrhēsiazomenos*), at Pisidian Antioch with Barnabas (13:46), at Iconium (14:3), at Ephesus (19:8), and before King Agrippa in person (26:26); likewise Apollos (18:26). The church spreads, thanks to this free proclamation – full of assurance – of the word of truth. Hence the conclusion of Acts: for two years at Rome, Paul taught “with full freedom and without obstacle” (*meta pasēs parrhēσίας akōlytōs*, 28:31). We could cite Plutarch: “You have hearers ... who ask only to seek and

know the truth, banishing any spirit of dispute and polemic, and granting you to say everything with complete freedom” (*syngnōmēs de panti logō kai parrhēσίας*, *De def. or.* 38.431 d).

III. – St. Luke’s theology is largely dependent upon that of St. Paul. The latter, from his first epistle, saw his preaching as the expression of a freedom of speech guaranteed by the missionary’s audacious assurance in the midst of direst danger. Alluding to the events of Acts 16:11–40, he writes, “In spite of the sufferings and insults that we had just endured at Philippi, our God gave us the boldness to proclaim the gospel of God to you (*eparrēσίαςmetha en tō theō hēmōn lalēsai pros hymas*) amid strong opposition” (1 Thess 2:2). The insistence on difficulties, obstacles, and persecutions shows that the point is not simply assurance, but exceptional courage that is not limited to the proclamation of the word but encompasses all of the apostle’s conduct. If he has to summon all his human resources, he is especially strengthened by God’s help; which explains why he was not vulnerable to fear or shame, but on the contrary was full of pride (cf. 2 Cor 7:4, *kauchēsis*; cf. Heb 3:6, *kauchēma*). He did not give in to the temptation to falsify his message but was resolved to keep putting out the word no matter what it cost: “Nothing will confound me; to the contrary, I will remain fully assured” (Phil 1:20). This is expressed clearly in 2 Cor 3:12 – “Having such a hope, we exercise great boldness (*pollē parrēsia chrōmetha*), not like Moses, who used to veil his face,” which is glossed by 4:2 – “We have set aside all shameful pretense; we do not walk in deception, nor do we distort the word of God. Rather, by the manifestation of the truth we commend ourselves to every human conscience in God’s sight.” God is the giver of this *parrhēsia*, which does not weaken (Eph 3:12) and grants it in answer to prayer (Eph 6:19). Sometimes it is a matter of the candor that one uses with a friend (Phlm 8) or of the broadest possible publicness: “Having despoiled the principalities and powers, Christ put them on display in public (*en parrhēsia*, conspicuously), leading them in his triumphal procession” (Col 2:15). If deacons who carry out their function well “gain much assurance in the faith that is in Christ Jesus” (1 Tim 3:13), we can understand that this subordinate office can be exercised with the pride of serving, or with frankness in action, a sort of tranquil audacity that allows bold, unswerving expression of convictions, after the fashion of St. Stephen. It allows one to approach one’s neighbor without any hesitation, not letting oneself be at all discouraged by criticism, taking initiative freely.

IV. – In the Epistle to the Hebrews, *parrhēsia* has become the virtue of every Christian, linked with hope (Heb 3:6), as at 2 Cor 3:12, and oriented no longer toward people but toward God, as at Job 27:10 – the evildoer cannot address God with assurance (*mē echei tina parrhēsian* [Hebrew *šadday*] *enanti*

*autou*); but Joshua addresses the Lord boldly. This is reasoned confidence, a free and easy attitude: purified from sin, Christians can approach the throne of grace in security to receive mercy (Heb 4:16); they are sure to gain entry into the heavenly sanctuary, thanks to the blood of Jesus (10:19). There is no longer any obstacle; this is a right that eliminates hesitation and doubt and justifies boldness. It extends to allowing them to count on a reward: “Do not lose your assurance, which has a great and just reward” (10:35; cf. Dio Chrysostom 34.19 – “I fear lest in the end you will abandon your confidence,” *dedoika mē teleōs apobalēte tēn parrhēsia*). This certitude of salvation is obviously the product of the theological virtues.

This eschatological *parrhēsia* is that of 1 John: “Abide in him (Christ), so that when he appears we may have assurance (*schōmen parrhēsia*) and may not be confounded by him (*mē aischynthōmen*, dishonored, put to shame; cf. Phil 1:20) at the Parousia” (1 John 2:28). “If our heart does not accuse us, we have assurance toward God” (*parrhēsia echomen pros ton theon*, 3:21); “Love is perfected in this, that we have assurance on the day of judgment” (*hina parrhēsia echōmen*, 4:7). There is no better guarantee of salvation than a soul filled with love. *Agapē* gives audacious confidence in the most fearful of all situations: the day of judgment, when no one is beyond reproach, and condemnations are without appeal. Love excludes worry and apprehension; it reassures. Johannine *parrhēsia*, then, is always a boldness, consisting of freedom and confidence, that allows one to present oneself before a superior without fear, and also before persecutors or any interlocutor who may contradict or accuse. This same filial confidence is expressed in prayer: “See what assurance we have with him: if we ask anything according to his will, he hears us” (5:14).

## πειθαρχέω

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*peitharcheō*, **to obey, be persuaded, comply willingly**

→see also εἰσακούω, ἐπακούω, ὑπακούω, ὑπακοή; πείθω, πείθομαι, πειθός, πεισμονή, πεποιθήσις

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*peitharcheo*, S 3980; TDNT 6.9–10; EDNT 3.62; NIDNTT 3.588–589; MM 500; L&N 36.12; BDF §187(6); BAGD 638–639

Normally construed with the dative case, but in Hellenistic Greek sometimes with the genitive, this verb is ordinarily translated “obey,” and it is indeed true that in the literature, the papyri, and the inscriptions it often refers to strict obedience: of rulers to God, servants to their masters, princes to their fathers



(Josephus, *War* 1.454: *tō patri panta peitharchein*), women to their husbands, private citizens or officials to their superiors, peoples to their conqueror. But on the one hand, there are different nuances with these different instances of submission; and on the other hand the proper verb for obedience in the NT is *hypakouō*, and the peculiar nuance of *peitharcheō*, which is not strictly synonymous with it, must be maintained. When during the storm St. Paul says, “You should have listened to me (*peitharchēsantas moi*) and not left Crete” (Acts 27:21), he does not mean strict submission but voluntary consent. Similarly, when God gives the Holy Spirit “to those who are obedient to him” (*tois peitharchousin autō*, Acts 5:32), this expression means not so much those who remain flawlessly faithful as those who accept his word, submit gladly to his will and his inspiration, and conform to his providential arrangements. This meaning of *peitharcheō* – let oneself be persuaded, willingly comply with a rule – is well attested in literary texts and inscriptions: “It is necessary for the learner to be submissive to the orders of virtue” (*tois parangelmasin aretēs peitharchein*, Philo, *Prelim. Stud.* 63); “to give complete obedience to things that are ordered for the common good” (*peitharchein de pantōs tois hyper tou koinē sympherontos epitattomenois*, *I. Magn.* 114, 8; cf. Dittenberger, *Syl.* 22, 7).

This consent or willingness to fall in with a given arrangement, to adapt to the requirements of an institution, given the nuance of St. Peter’s famous principle: *peitharchein dei theō mallon ē anthrōpois* (Acts 5:29), is ordinarily translated “It is necessary to obey God rather than men” (cf. Josephus, *Ag. Apion* 2.293: “What is more just than obeying the laws,” *peitharchein tois nomois*; Marcus Aurelius 5.9: “You submit to reason”). But Peter and John had said (Acts 4:19), “Whether it is just before God to listen to you (*akouein*) rather than God, judge for yourselves.” Thus it is less a matter of material obedience than of recognizing authority, of submitting clearly and willingly to this or that hierarchy.

It seems that in Titus 3:1 *peitharcheō* retains the sense of strict, concrete obedience – “Remind them to be in submission to the constituted powers and authorities, to obey, to be ready for every good work” – but the linking of *hypotassomai* and *peitharcheō* enriches the latter verb with the meaning of the former: Christians, in submitting to the authorities, accept their subordinate position, consent to a social and political order, observe the norms of a public institution. Their obedience is not only faithfulness to the laws, but respect and a sort of loyalty toward a power that they are persuaded is legitimate. In this sense of the word, the attitude of the wise person toward Nature will be “a feeling of submission (*peitharchōn*) and goodwill” (Marcus Aurelius 10.14).

πείθω, πείθομαι, πειθός, πεισμονή, πεποίθησις

*peithō*, to (try to) persuade; *peithomai*, to be persuaded; *peithos*, persuasive; *peismonē*, persuasion, influence; *pepoithēsis*, confidence, assurance, boldness

→see also πειθαρχέω

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*peithō*, S 3982; TDNT 6.1–9; EDNT 3.63; NIDNTT 1.588–593; MM 500–501; L&N 25.166, 31.82, 33.301; BDF §§101, 159(1), 187(6), 322, 341, 392(1e), 397(2); BAGD 639 | *peithomai*, TDNT 6.1–9; EDNT 3.63–64; NIDNTT 1.587–593; L&N 31.46, 36.12, 36.34; BAGD 639–640 | *peithos*, S 3981; TDNT 6.8–9; EDNT 3.63; NIDNTT 1.588, 592; MM 500; L&N 33.304; BDF §§47(4), 112, 474(4); BAGD 639 | *peismone*, S 3988; TDNT 6.9; EDNT 3.67; NIDNTT 1.588, 591–592; MM 502; L&N 33.303; BDF §§ 109(6), 488(1b); BAGD 641 | *pepoithesis*, S 4006; TDNT 6.7–8; EDNT 3.70; MM 503; L&N 31.82; BDF § 68; BAGD 643

The basic meaning of the verb *peithō* (conative), *peithomai* is “persuade, be persuaded,” in whatever fashion: better if by reasoning and entreaty, worse if by money or violence. It runs the whole gamut of nuances, from “convince, accept, believe,” to “conform, submit, give in, obey.”

All these meaning are found already in Homer, where *peithō* in the active and transitive sometimes means “persuade”: “Priam was not able to persuade the soul of Hector” (Homer, *Il.* 22.78); “I will persuade him to fight you face to face.” Sometimes it is in the middle: “admit, trust”; “without admitting yet (*epeitheto*) that it was indeed his father” (*Od.* 16.192); Athena to Ulysses: “humans place their confidence in weak friends” (20.45); “I am still too young to count on my arm.” The perfect expresses persistence in a state of confidence: “The young have confidence in their own strength” (*Il.* 4.325). Hence “hear and believe”: *oude me peiseis* = “I will not listen to you” (*Il.* 1.132; 6.360; 9.345); Zeus to Thetis: “so you will believe me” (*pepoithēs*, 1.524); Athena to Ulysses: “Perhaps you will believe me” (*Od.* 13.344); “Thus spoke Athena, and the poor fool believed her” (*peithen*, *Il.* 4.104). To be convinced and believe is finally to obey: “How can an Achaean readily obey your orders?” (*peithētai*, *Il.* 1.150; cf. 79); “Son of Atreus, the Argive army will obey your voice above all others.”

According to varying contexts, *peithō* can mean to convince others (*Od.* 14.123), to change someone’s mind (1.43; cf. Xenophon, *An.* 3.1.26), and notably to appease: “Let us think how to calm him, to convince him with friendly gifts, with soothing words” (*pepithōmen*, *Il.* 9.112; *Od.* 3.146: he flattered himself that he appeased the goddess). The verb can mean “accept an invitation” (*Od.* 17.177) as well as “submit” (*Il.* 23.645) and “dupe” (*Od.*

2.106), but it also suggests the idea of stimulating, setting in motion: “persuading the storm-winds with the help of the north wind” (*pepithousa thyellas*, *Il.* 15.26).

In the classical period, the meanings of certitude and belief are well established, especially with the perfect. “I am sure (*pepeismai*) that Protagoras will have no trouble elucidating” the difficulty (Plato, *Prt.* 328 e); “I am sure (*pepoitha*) that for him the lightning will come, bringing fire.” Of course, “persuade, convince” remains the basic meaning. “Sostratus sought to persuade the brother” (Menander, *Dysk.* hyp. 6); “The law defends him against compulsion (*tō biasasthai*); his character defends him against persuasion (*tō peisai*)” (*Dysk.* 254); “you who think of persuading a free young woman to sin” (*Dysk.* 290). So also the meaning “obey.” “They thought that the other Milesians would obey” (Herodotus 5.29; cf. 33); “for seven days they obeyed and did as ordered” (6.12); “we should obey him.” But our verb is not synonymous with *hypakouō*, first of all because it denotes following advice, giving in to reasons, taking an opinion into account, giving a favorable hearing; one draws inspiration and conforms to it (Xenophon, *An.* 7.3.39), gives one’s approval (*An.* 5.6.29) or does as asked (Pindar, *Pyth.* 1.59; Hesiod, *Th.* 474). Finally, having been won over by persuasion (*pepeismenos*, Xenophon, *An.* 7.2.12), one decides, and – this is the second point – it is a voluntary commitment to action, like a stimulus to participate in an undertaking.

Given the importance of personal conviction in the person from whom one wishes to obtain something, we can understand that Aristotle should have posed the question, “Must one obey one’s father in everything?” (*Eth. Nic.* 9.2.1164–23). He replies that one need not grant one’s father everything any more than one sacrifices everything to Zeus. Musonius also asks himself whether to obey in everything (*panta peithesthai*, frag. 16) and answers that one cannot submit to unjust or shameful commands: “He is obedient who listens to the voice of obligation and follows it assiduously.” One must obey Zeus, whose law ordains that people should be virtuous; so one must discern whether paternal orders are good, honest, and beneficent.

In the inscriptions, the meaning “persuade” is predominant from the fourth centuryBC on. The constitutive decree of the second Athenian confederation (377 BC) prescribes: “The people shall immediately appoint three delegates who shall go to Thebes to persuade (*peisousi*) the Thebans to act for the best.” But there is also the meaning “accord, consent” in the lease of a garden by the coreligionists (*orgeōnes*) of the physician Hero: “if a cordial understanding (*peithei*) comes about with Charops and the *orgeōnes*.” Then there is “convince” in the honorific decree of Istrus for Agathocles around 200 BC: “He convinced (*epeise*) the barbarians to do our city no harm”; “For six hundred

*chrysoi*, he convinced Zoltes and the Thracians not to invade the territory”; “He convinced King Rhemaxus to give us five hundred horsemen for our defense.” Finally, there is “drag along, lead”: “as far as possible, without letting himself be dragged along by the one who has just breached (the texts written on the stele).”

The papyri add hardly any new shades of meaning, but the frequency of the occurrences confirms the classical meanings while nuancing them, notably in Zeno’s correspondence: *pepeismai* = “I am persuaded.” To be persuaded is to be convinced and have confidence: *pithontos soi* = having confidence in you (SB 7354, 5; cf. line 8: “look, do not trust,” *blepe, mē pisthēs*), rely on (*P.Fouad* 26, 41) and believe (SB 4630, 6), and finally being in accord (*P.Oxy.* 2562, 11: *episthēmen pros heautous*), “agree, give one’s consent.” This is how the verb is often used in contracts where one subscribes to what is written or to what has been read: “with this agreement, with whom they also consent after reading it” (*tē homologia tautē, hois kai ex anagnōseōs pepismenoi eisin, P.Mich.* 322 a 37; a division of property in AD 46; cf. lines 39, 43–47); “because I consent to it as it stands” (*dia to pepeisthai me kathōs prokitai*). Not only does one attest to one’s good faith (“confidently without any guile,” *pepeismenōs pantos dolou chōris, BGU* 2203, 13; “willing and in agreement, without force or deception,” *hekōn kai pepeismenos aneu bias kai apatēs, P.Köln* 157, 11); but this freely given consent is elaborated upon (“willing and in agreement, out of a self-chosen decision,” SB 8988, 49; 9586, 9; 9763, 25; “we think it good and we agree,” *eudokoumen kai peithometha*), with full knowledge of the facts (“we know and agree,” *oidamen kai pepismetha, P.Oxy.* 1868, 2). The meaning thus confirmed is a guarantee (“I will confirm and I agree to everything as it is set down,” *bebaiōsō kai pithomai pasi hōs prokeitai, PSI* 1239, 23). Hence the meaning to obey, submit, be ready to carry out a certain decision or conform to given instructions. In *Apokrimata* 56 (p. 7), we may translate the imperative *peithou* either “obey” or “execute” (cf. 12; SB 9526, 12 and 56).

For their part, the prefects or *epistratēgoi* use the euphemism *pepeismai* to express (in the repression of an abuse) their confidence in their subjects’ obedience to their decrees. For example, Tiberius Julius Alexander: “I am persuaded that in the future no one will any longer recruit farmers or tenants by force.”

With the LXX, the verb *peithō* takes on an entirely different tone. The meaning “persuade” is rare and late, and “believe” is exceptional: “I believe (*pepeismai*) all that the prophet Jeremiah says.” Rather, this verb almost always corresponds to the Hebrew *bāṭaḥ* or one of its derivatives and thus expresses confidence (Deut 28:52; Judg 9:26; 18:10, 27). But one can put one’s trust either in false supports or in the true God: “What is the meaning of this

confidence in which you trust?” The faith of Israel is to put its trust in Yahweh, which means relying on him (2 Chr 14:10, niphal of the Hebrew *šā’an*; 16:7–8; Isa 10:20; 17:7) or taking shelter under his wings. To have this confidence is to feel secure; also, the Hebrew *lāḥeṭaḥ*, Greek *pepoithōs*, means that one dwells, lives, or walks in security; that is, one rests in quiet tranquility.

The Letter of Aristee asks, “What is the end of eloquence?” and answers, “to persuade the adversary (*to peisai ton antilegonta*) ... persuasion comes about by the power of God.” Philo often gives the verb the meaning “persuade” or “be convinced,” for example, of the existence of the Most High God, but he is far from being the writer who uses it most often in the sense “obey”: *Cherub* 9: “to obey virtue is fine”; *Alleg. Interp.* 1.95: “the man obeyed God’s counsels” (*Abraham* 252, 256); *Drunkennes* 33: “submit as a child does to its parents”; *Dreams* 2.24, 108: “a servant, I learned to obey them as masters.”

In the whole literature, it is the writings of Josephus that use this word most abundantly (nearly five hundred occurrences), obviously in rather varied meanings. “Persuade” and “convince” are predominant, but with multiple nuances, because if no one consents and surrenders easily (*War* 1.32, 144, 254; *Life* 149; *Ag. Apion* 2.117, 153), others refuse their consent and ingenious ways must be devised to gain it (*Ant.* 4.251; 7.172; *Ag. Apion* 2.200–201), being confident of success: “I will persuade Caesar” (*War* 2.201) and bringing proofs (*Ant.* 8.48). It is with words, speeches, and arguments that one succeeds in convincing. Sometimes it is a matter of mere opinion, sometimes advice, or requests (*Ant.* 20.121, 135, 142, 145, 161), even attempts to entice (*War* 1.274; *Ant.* 2.41, 50) or finally incite to action (*Life* 190) and hence “convince”; from there, one may urge, charge, or order.

The shades of variation with the meanings “accept” or “submit” are just as varied: one may be influenced (*Ant.* 5.243, 269, 315), respond to an invitation (5.168), give in to opinions or requests, consent, give one’s accord (*Ant.* 5.172; 20.32; *Life* 151), follow advice that is given. Often, however, it is obedience in the strict sense and submission that is intended: the young must obey their elders (*Ant.* 3.47); one obeys God, the law and lawmakers (1.41, 190; 2.287; 5.152; 6.131, 136; *Ag. Apion* 2.162), the words of prophets (*Ant.* 9.51, 59, 267; 10.105), priests (*Ag. Apion* 2.194), officials (*Ant.* 14.232), justice (17.316), an edict (19.314), orders.

Finally, *peithō* has the meaning “put one’s confidence in, trust” (*War* 5.369; 6.348) promises, wealth or arms, numbers, persons. One is “proud (*pepoithōs*) of one’s tall and handsome figure” (*War* 2.57) or the influence of one’s father-in-law (1.447); but above all one must count on God’s help. The NT, especially St. Paul, retained all this richness of meaning.

When transitive (in the present, the imperfect, and the aorist), conative *peithō* means “want or try to persuade.” At Caesarea, King Agrippa says to Paul, “You want to persuade me to become a Christian.” Defining his ministry, the apostle declares, “Knowing (*eidotes*) what the fear of the Lord is, we try to persuade people”; but in the language of St. Luke, the verb has a technical meaning: “try to convince” an audience to act, to adopt a certain way of life, to “persevere in God’s grace.” At Ephesus, the silversmith Demetrius noted that in almost all of Asia, the apostle had convinced and won over (*peisas*) a considerable crowd everywhere he preached (Acts 19:26). With regard to individuals, where the giving of opinions and advice is concerned, persuasion brings appeasement. The princes of the priests say to the guards at Jesus’ tomb: “If the matter reaches the ears of the procurator, we ourselves will appease him.” Thanks to love shown in action, “we know that we are of the truth, and before him we will set our hearts at rest (*peisomen*),” we will convince it even while it is making accusations against us.

In the perfect and the pluperfect (with *epi*, *eis*, *en* plus the dative), *peithō* has the meaning, so common in the LXX and in Philo, of “have confidence, trust.” In the parable about the expulsion of demons, the stronger one takes away from the vanquished the panoply in which he had placed his confidence. It is assurance, like that of those who are sure that they are righteous (*tous pepoithotas hoti*, perfect participle) and scorn others (Luke 18:9), whereas they ought to place their confidence in God and God’s mercy. This confidence, then, is certitude: “I give thanks, being sure of this (*pepoithōs auto touto*): the one who has begun this excellent work in you will carry it through to completion on the day of Christ Jesus” (Phil 1:6); “To remain in the flesh is more necessary for your sake. In this certitude I know that I am going to remain with you all” (1:25; cf. 2:24). If the apostle’s confidence is so strong, it is because it is founded on the Lord, but he also uses the perfect *pepoitha* as the papyri do, where a superior (diplomatically or pedagogically) expresses his conviction or desire that those subject to him will be obedient: “I am persuaded in the Lord that you will not think otherwise.” The nuances of the middle and passive voices are varied; sometimes falling into line with an opinion, following a suggestion, expressing a more or less strongly held opinion; sometimes, in fact usually, expressing an absolute conviction, faith in the literal sense: the brothers of the wicked rich man would not be persuaded even if they saw a dead person resurrected; the people were convinced that John the Baptist was a prophet (20:6 – *pepeismenos estin*, perfect passive participle). After St. Paul’s sermons at Thessalonica and at Rome, Luke notes that some were persuaded (= believed) and others did not believe. Here again the apostle uses the perfect to express pedagogical optimism that is respectful and stimulating for his

superiors: “I am persuaded (*pepeismai*) regarding you, brothers, that you are yourselves full of goodwill, having all knowledge, capable of admonishing each other.” But when he speaks of his conviction in his faith, Paul’s certitude is as complete as it is well-founded: “I am sure (*pepeismai*) that neither death nor life ... will be able to separate us from the love of God.”

Finally, the meaning “obey” is evident in Heb 13:17 – “obey your leaders and be in submission” (present middle imperative, *peithesthe tois hēgoumenois hymōn*) – and in Jas 3:3 – “We put bits in horses’ mouths so that they will obey us.” One obeys the truth (Gal 5:7) or unrighteousness (Rom 2:8); that is to say, one conforms to certain moral principles, submits to and remains faithful to their requirements, just as one joins with, is won over by certain persons (Acts 4:36–37, *epeithonto*, imperfect middle).

*Peithos*. – This adjective, corresponding to the classical *pithanos*, “persuasive,” is not only a biblical hapax, but is not attested elsewhere in Greek: “My speech and my preaching (have) not (consisted) of persuasive words of wisdom, but in demonstration of Spirit and of power.” We must interpret this as meaning that faith is based not on the philosophy, rhetoric, logic, or wisdom of preachers who are able to entice minds, but on the public and incontestable (apodictic) testimony of the Hebrew, who manifests himself (*pneumatōs*, genitive of cause) in the assurance and the power inspired in preacher and hearers alike. It is the contrast between human discourse, demonstrative reason on the one hand, and on the other omnipotent outpourings or exhibitions of the Holy Spirit reaching the heart.

*Peismonē*. – This noun does not appear in Greek before the biblical hapax in Gal 5:8. Before saying, “I am persuaded (*pepoitha*) regarding you ...” (5:10) and after having asked, “Who has hindered you from obeying (*peithesthai*) the truth?” the apostle goes on, “This *peismonē* is not from the one who calls you.” We can take the noun in a passive sense as referring to a new conviction of the Galatians, of which they have recently been persuaded; but more likely it has the active sense of a suggestion that cannot come from God, referring to the Judaizing preachers who must have inclined the Galatians to abandon Paul’s gospel. Thus *peismonē* would have a pejorative meaning: a bad influence. This can still be detected in Ignatius of Antioch: “Christianity is not a work of persuasion but a work of power” (Ign. *Rom.* 3.3; quoted in the sixth century, *P.Lond.* 1674, 36).

*Pepoithēsis*. – A late coinage from the perfect *pepoitha*, and unknown in the papyri, this substantive is a hapax in the LXX: “What is the meaning of this confidence (Hebrew *biṭṭāḥôn*; cf. Isa 36:4; Eccl 9:4) in which you trust” (2 Kgs 18:19); and in Philo: “Counting on the virtues of their ancestors” (Philo, *Virtues* 226); but Josephus uses it six times in the sense of assurance or boldness

(regarding a quarrel, *Ant.* 11.299); of confidence in oneself (19.317), in one's strength (1.73), in arms or money (3.45); it can be inspired by someone else's attitude (5.74) or by God (*apo tou theou*, 10.16). One depends or relies on a *dynamis*. St. Paul is the only NT author to use this term (four times in 2 Cor, out of a total of six) – which is very close to *parrhēsia*. Usually it refers to his own personal confidence.

(a) Confidence in people. The apostle, henceforth certain of the Corinthians' respect for him and the good welcome that they will give him, decided in this assurance (*tautē tē pepoithēsei*) to go to see them (2 Cor 1:15). In the meanwhile, he sends a brother to them to gather the collection; and this brother is all the more zealous because he has great confidence in them (*pepoithēsei pollē tē eis hymas*), confidence gained either on his own visits to Corinth or from Titus's accounts (2 Cor 8:22). One can also depend on human advantages, Israelite privileges: a Hebrew, son of a Hebrew, Paul would have reason to put his confidence in the flesh (Phil 3:4 – *kaiper egō echōn pepoithēsīn kai in sarkī*).

(b) One can also depend on God: Jesus Christ, “in whom we have boldness and access with confidence through faith in him” (*en hō echomen tēn parrhēsia kai prosagōgēn en pepoithēsei dia tēs pisteōs autou*, Eph 3:12). Assurance and confidence bring access to God; they come from faith in the power and love of God, which make it possible to draw near to him. One is sure of being welcomed.

(c) This assurance is a personal feeling produced in the heart by Christ: “We have such assurance (*pepoithēsīn toiautēn echomen*) through Christ before God” (2 Cor 3:4). Paul's confidence in the efficacy of his ministry is not an illusion, not vainglory, not presumption; it is based solidly on the certitude that a tree is recognized by its fruits. What is more, this certitude is produced in him by Christ in person. Much more than that, it is true and authentic in God's presence, which means that it is valid and in line with God's own judgment. Hence the apostolic authority and even boldness which Paul does not hesitate to put into play against his detractors (2 Cor 10:2).

πεῖρα, πειράζω, πειρασμός, ἀπείραστος

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*peira*, **attempt, trial, testing, experience, proof**; *peirazō*, **to try, tempt**;  
*peirasmos*, **temptation, trial, testing**; *apeirastos*, **inexperienced, not susceptible to temptation**

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*peira*, S 3984; TDNT 6.23–36; EDNT 3.64; NIDNTT 3.798–799; MM 501; L&N 68.58; BAGD 640 | *peirazo*, S 3985; TDNT 6.23–36; EDNT 3.64–7;



*NIDNTT* 3.798–799, 801–802, 808–810; *MM* 501; *L&N* 12.36, 27.31, 27.46, 68.58, 88.308; *BDF* §§101, 171(2), 310(1), 392(1a); *BAGD* 640 | *peirasmos*, *S* 3986; *TDNT* 6.23–36; *EDNT* 3.64–67; *NIDNTT* 3.798–800, 802; *MM* 501; *L&N* 27.46, 88.308; *BAGD* 640–641 | *apeirastos*, *S* 551; *TDNT* 6.23–26; *EDNT* 1.119; *NIDNTT* 3.798–799, 802, 809; *MM* 56; *L&N* 88.309; *BAGD* 83

In classical Greek, *peira* means “attempt, trial, experience” and sometimes “a putting to the test”; and these meanings are retained in the Koine. Zeno knows from experience whether or not the potter Pettukamis is capable (*P.Cair.Zen.* 59500, 1; cf. *P.Princ.* 169, 3); Ammonius asks his brother, “Try to do this for me.” But the meaning “proof” is asserted: “He found a man to supply the proof” (Menander, *Dysk.* 722); “You have given me sufficient proof of your character” (*Dysk.* 770); Moschion “gave proof of a gifted mind”; hence an athletic “trial.” The LXX uses this word to translate the Hebrew *massâh* (Deut 33:8), and elsewhere uses it for an experience; likewise Philo: “Every day we have experience of it” (*Worse Attacks Better* 131); “I have had the experience for a long time”; but it is emphasized that these experimentations are sources or means of knowledge. Philo does not use *peirasmos*, nor does Josephus, who gives preference to *peira* meaning “proof,” “test” (*Ant.* 20.28), “trial” and “test” or “attempt,” but also “means, occasion, expedient.”

The expression *peiran lambanō*, “to make an attempt, to experiment,” is traditional. Deut 28:56 uses it for the woman “who will not venture to put the sole of her foot on the ground” (piel of the Hebrew *nāsâh*); Heb 11:29, 36 for the Egyptians who tried to cross the Red Sea, and for martyrs who experienced derision and floggings.

In preference to the denominative *peiraomai*, the Koine uses *peirazō*, which is rare in secular Greek, but to which biblical language gives an altogether singular density, with the basic meaning “trial” and always translating the piel of the Hebrew *nāsâh*. Its secular meanings are rather rare, but always it is a question of trial and exploration. Hence the religious and moral meaning, “temptation,” which is a trial of virtue by means of affliction or adversity, or even by Satan’s intervention. In the faith of Israel, God is always its author; it is a basic element of his pedagogy: *per molestias eruditio*. The two most significant instances are those of Abraham, whom God tested by asking him to sacrifice Isaac (Gen 22:1), and of the wandering of the chosen people in the wilderness (Exod 15:25). These trials are a sounding or a test that allows Yahweh to assess the quality of his servants; this purpose is mentioned endlessly. But the “temptation” reveals not only what is hidden, demonstrates not only the sincerity and the moral resources of the believer, but is also for the believer a means to perfection, because he has to suffer in order to remain

faithful to his resolves and his decision for God; he emerges from the trial purified and more convinced than ever to serve his Lord, whose sovereignty over him he thus confesses to be total. This is why Jdt 8:25 paradoxically urges giving thanks to “the Lord our God, who puts us to the test like our fathers”; and this is why David, who is so religious, asks, “Search me, Yahweh, test me, examine my heart and my mind” (Ps 26:2), because he knows that those whom “God has put to the test, he has found worthy of himself” (Wis 3:5). The wisdom writings insist on the benefits of this painful pedagogy by attributing it to the divine wisdom: “Wisdom tries her sons by her precepts” (Sir 4:17) and takes them on difficult paths. Her disciples are called to experience for themselves what is good or bad for their souls (Sir 37:27; 39:4). If they have thought they could find happiness in the joys of this world, they recognize that these pleasures are empty (Eccl 2:1), and that is the confession of their wisdom (7:23; cf. Wis 2:17; 19:5). Finally, on the psychological level, “The one who has not been tried knows little.”

People are thought to “tempt God” when they seek to obtain signs or proofs of his goodness or power, or when they make untimely demands; they irritate God because of their lack of faith and undue demands, which amount to a kind of defiance, which is monstrous on the part of a creature.

The substantive *peirasmos* did not appear in secular Greek before the first century, but it remained unknown in the papyri. The LXX gave it the meaning “temptation”: “They called the place Massah (*Peirasmos*) because there they tempted God” (Exod 17:7; cf. Deut 6:16; 9:22; 29:2; Ps 95:8), and it is repeated that “in temptation Abraham was found faithful” (Sir 44:20; 1 Macc 2:52), because “To the one who fears the Lord no evil will come; but if he is in trial, he will again be delivered” (Sir 33:1). The whole moral life of the wise person depends on his clear-headedness and victory in testing: “The furnace proves the potter’s vases. The testing of a person is in his reasoning” (Sir 27:5), which discerns the just and the unjust, the good and the evil, and makes good choices that are in accord with God’s will. Hence the universal maxim: “Child, if you wish to serve the Lord, prepare your soul for testing” (*eis peirasmon*, 2:1).

NT theology and language inherit these conceptions of *peirasmos*, but the major “temptation” was that of Christ, which is reported by the three Synoptics and which puts down “temptation” as an essential element in the life of disciples, like a wandering in the wilderness. The Devil submitted the Savior to an “examination” to find out about his identity, and he especially tempted him to substitute a political and earthly messianism for redemption by the cross, and finally to “tempt God” by performing wonders having no other point than to signal the vainglory of their author. Christ emerged victorious from these *peirasmoi* by quoting Scripture, that is, by conforming strictly to the will of

God. In the course of his ministry, he underwent many other trials or temptations, all the difficulties of his existence, the traps set by his enemies, the reproofs of the religious leaders – which affected him deeply – and he says to the Twelve, “You are the ones who have stayed with me in my trials” (Luke 22:28 – *en tois peirasmōis*). The trials of the agony at Gethsemane, when he still had the chance to escape death and the tortures of Calvary, were certainly the most painful. The Epistle to the Hebrews gives them a major place in its Christology: the experience of suffering that Jesus underwent because of the likeness of his human nature to ours first taught him compassion for our weaknesses, then gave him the power to “come to the aid of those who are being tried (or tempted),” like a conqueror coming to the aid to those who are still embroiled in battle.

God is the one who tests, and the Christian, aware of his weakness, asks the favor of exemption from this examination: “Lead us not into temptation” (*mē eisenenkēs hēmas eis peirasmon*). *Eispherō* (here in the aorist subjunctive) means “lead, transport, bring, introduce,” and followed by *eis*, “cause to enter into” the *peirasmos*, which is not an incitation to evil, a wicked solicitation – which is what “temptation” suggests in modern English – but a difficult or painful trial. This test permits an assessment of the strength, the faithfulness, the love of the believer (which is a good thing), but it is dangerous, and that explains the humble request to be excused from it.

Pagans, Jews, and sinners often used the excuse that some deity had forced them to do evil, but Sir 15:11–15 protests that God can not urge evil, and Philo says that God is only the cause of good (*Decalogue* 176). Jas 1:13–14 takes up this teaching: “Let no one when he is tempted say, ‘I am being tempted by God.’ For God cannot be touched by temptations to evil and neither does he tempt anyone. In reality, each one is tempted when drawn away and enticed by his own covetousness.” The immediate cause of the temptation is internal: *epithymia*, that evil and imperious desire that each person has, which draws the heard and sets a snare – which takes account of the warfare described by St. Paul (Rom 7:14–24).

In this latter text, *peirazō* is clearly pejorative, as it is also in all the instances where the temptation is attributed to the devil. Just as Jesus was tempted by the devil – for no wicked inclination could come from his immaculate human nature (Matt 4:1) – it is Satan who intervenes to snatch away the word from human hearts in order to keep them from being saved (Luke 8:12). Christian spouses are not to deprive each other “lest Satan tempt you because of your trouble in remaining continent” (1 Cor 7:5); he can even ruin the fruits of the apostolic ministry (1 Thess 3:5). The source of the tribulations of the faithful sifts them, hoping that they will fail. His sinister

interventions are so universal and unrelenting that Jesus calls him *ho peirazōn*, “the Tempter.”

All of NT pastoral theology emphasizes, after the fashion of the OT, the preponderant role of *peirasmos* in the life of believers. It occurs in various periods with greater or lesser intensity (*en kairō peirasmou*, Luke 8:13) and in varied forms, the most pronounced form being “tribulation,” painful and dangerous personal or social conditions that put everyone’s faithfulness to the test: “Dear friends, do not consider the fiery trial you are suffering something strange.” In fact, this *peirasmos* is providential, is a test of Christian authenticity, for the participants in Christ’s sufferings (1 Pet 4:13); it is a purification, like that of metal in a furnace. This marvelous fruitfulness makes it possible to understand that for a believer under the new covenant the most dangerous and painful *peirasmos* can be a source of joy and even gladness. Jesus had commanded believers to bear fruit by persevering; Jas 1:2 explains, “Always reckon it as joy, brethren, to be exposed to trials of all sorts (*peirasmōis poikilois*), knowing that the trial of your faith produces patience.” “Happy is the person who endures trial, for after being proved he will receive the crown of life that [God] has promised to those who love him” (Jas 1:12). This is the blessedness of hope. 1 Pet 1:6 goes one better: “This is what fills you with joy, even while at present you are afflicted – since it is necessary for a little while – by various trials.”

On the other hand, there is a danger of succumbing when a Christian has committed an offense (*en tini paraptōmati*) and someone who is “spiritual” attempts to restore him; the latter must act with gentleness (*en pneumati praytētos*), “for you also are capable of being tempted” (Gal 6:1). No one is indefectible. This propensity to sin is particularly frequent with those who want to get rich (*hoi boulomenoi ploutein*); “they fall into temptation (*empiptousin eis peirasmon*) and snares and many foolish and harmful desires that plunge people into ruin and perdition.” So missionaries who are false apostles are to be tested, like the Nicolaitans who disturb the community at Ephesus; as a result of this discernment they are recognized as liars. Finally, Christians must also “test” themselves; the *peirasmos* that makes one turn in upon oneself is an examination of conscience.

Although *peirasmos* is painful and dangerous, God matches it to our strength, so that no one can ever say that it is insurmountable: “No temptation has come upon you that is not of human proportions, but God is faithful, who will not let you be tempted beyond your strength, but with this temptation will also produce this outcome (*ekbasin*, result) that you may bear it.” Jesus had taught that prayer is the secret of victory: “Watch and pray, that you may not come into temptation” (Matt 26:41 = Mark 14:38 = Luke 22:40, 46; cf. 1 Pet

5:8 ff.). He himself had prayed for Peter, that he should not fail (Luke 22:32). It is the faith of the church that “the Lord knows how to deliver the godly from testing” (2 Pet 2:9), that is, those who seek divine help. To the church at Philadelphia, which imitated Christ’s patience, Christ prophesied: “Because you have kept the word of my patience, I also will keep you in the hour of temptation that is ready to come upon the whole inhabited world to test those who dwell upon the earth.” We may add with 2 Pet 5:7–8 that faith makes it possible to resist the devil’s most violent assaults.

## περιαίρέω

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*periaireō*, **to remove (from around)**

→see also ἐξαίρέω

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*periaireo*, S 4014; *EDNT* 3.73; MM 504; L&N 13.38, 15.204, 54.24, 68.43; BAGD 645

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Common in the LXX, where it most often translates the hiphil of the Hebrew *sûr*, “take away, remove,” this verb means literally “remove from around,” i.e., take off something that one is wearing, especially a garment or a veil (Gen 38:19), like Moses when he spoke with God. Next comes the meaning “to detach,” for example the anchors from a ship; and finally “remove” means “move away, cause to disappear,” as when hope of being saved from the storm fades to the point of disappearing altogether (imperfect passive, *periēraito*, Acts 27:20).

The sole theological usage of *periaireō* in the NT is in Heb 10:11, where the priests of the old covenant busy themselves with the offering of daily sacrifices, which, however, “can never take away sins.” The verb, like *aphaireō* (10:4) expresses first of all the idea of removing something that one has in oneself, the extraction of which is thought to be difficult (cf. Thucydides 1.108.3: rase fortifications). The idea is not that of a diverting or of an ordinary relinquishing but of a complete suppression. This nuance of abolition is well attested: the husband abrogates or annuls his wife’s vows (Num 30:13, 14, 16; hiphil of *pārar*); the royal quality of the house of Saul is abolished; a dispute that is settled is said to be abolished (*P.Got.* 13, 11); the *stratēgoi* take away from the tax collectors any pretext or occasion for extortion (*P.Panop.Beatty* 2, 237; cf. *Pap.Lugd.Bat.* 1, 21, 23). In the religious sphere, God totally removes sins (1 Chr 21:8), removes injustices (Zeph 3:15), takes away infirmities (Deut 7:15) and death. But sin is so deeply embedded in humans that the OT economy was

powerless to root it out. Only the sacrifice of Jesus Christ succeeded in removing it.

## περικάρμα, περίψημα

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*perikatharma, peripsēma, wash-water, offscouring, filth; ransom*

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*perikatharma*, S 4027; TDNT 3.430–431; EDNT 3.74; NIDNTT 1.479–480, 3.102; MM 506; L&N 79.53; BAGD 647 | *peripsema*, TDNT 6.84–93; EDNT 3.80; NIDNTT 1.479–480; MM 510; L&N 79.53; BAGD 653

1 Cor 4:13 – “We have become as the filth of the earth, the refuse of all, up to the present” (*hōs perikatharmata tou kosmou egenēthēmen, pantōn peripsēma heōs arti*). These two terms, which are quite vulgar and very close in meaning (cf. Hesychius, *peripsēma: perikatamagma*), are used for the wash-water and scrapings from dirty dishes, which is thrown out after washing or purification, thus any kind of uncleanness or filth. Finally, they are terms of abuse and base insult when applied to humans. No doubt this nuance of lowliness is to be retained in 1 Cor 4:13. It is even probable that the apostle was treated as “filth” by the people in the course of some disturbance at Ephesus, Corinth, or elsewhere.

In Prov 21:18 (*perikatharma*, translating the Hebrew *kōper*) and Tob 5:19 (*peripsēma*), the two nouns have the sense of ransom. The second noun has a religious meaning in Dionysius of Alexandria: Christians “after caring for their brother (who had the plague) died themselves, having transferred to themselves the death of others ... departing as the offscouring of their brothers” (*apiontes autōn peripsēma*, in Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* 7.22.7). The purifying agent, in effect, is thought to absorb the impurity of the purified object (cf. *P.Tebt.* 550: *perikath*[?]) and thus cleanse it; and since St. Paul adds a complement to each term (“of the world” ... “of all”), his words recall the formula *peripsēma hēmōn genou* (“become our offscouring”) pronounced at Athens, according to Photius (*Lex.*, p. 425, 3) and the *Suda*, when criminals were thrown into the sea as expiatory victims for warding off public calamity. On the sixth and seventh of the month Thargelion, the city was purified (*polin kathairein*) by the cathartic ritual of the *pharmakoi*, which could be compared to the scapegoat of Lev 26:21–22: Two men who were driven through the city were supposed to take on its impurities. Then they were chased from the city to get rid of the uncleanness with which they were laden. Thanks to these “human cures,” the evil is abolished. We cannot exclude from 1 Cor 4:13 this sense of sacrifice through which the guilt-bearer expiates and purifies those who offer him. Thus the

meaning would be that St. Paul, scorned and rejected by people, sacrifices himself for them (2 Cor 4:10ff.; 6:9; Phil 2:17); he is willing to become an expiatory victim, and by so doing he assimilates his apostolic function to that of the crucified Redeemer, Christ (Gal 6:17; Col 1:24–25).

### περιλείπομαι

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*perileipomai*, **to remain (after someone or something has been removed)**

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***perileipomai***, S 4035; *EDNT* 3.74; *NIDNTT* 3.247; MM 506; L&N 85.66; BAGD 648

This passive verb refers to the result of a subtraction, that which remains. According to 2 Macc 1:31, after the liquid was poured on the wood and the sacrifice was consumed by fire, “Nehemiah ordered them to pour the remaining liquid on the large stones”; in 8:14, it refers to the Israelites’ remaining property after the high priests have taken what they want. It is used for ships that succeed in making it through (Polybius 1.37.2), fields that remain uncultivated (*UPZ* 110, 168), a remaining portion (*BGU* 1132, 12; from 13 BC), animals reserved for sacrifice (*PSI* 409, 12).

But this verb is also used for human survivors (*P.Giss.* 82, 23: *pros to hēmas tous eti perileipomenous*), “the remnant of Israel and of Judah” (2 Chr 34:21), old men who would have seen Solomon’s temple in its original glory (Hag 2:3), the survivors of a battalion received by Agesilaus (Plutarch, *Ages.* 22.8). It is in this sense that 1 Thess 4:15, 17 contrasts the dead (literally, “those who have fallen asleep,” *tous koimēthentas*), and “we who are (still) alive, those left” (*hēmeis hoi zōntes, hoi perileipomenoi*). The present passive participle *perileipomenoi* was current with this meaning in the first century: “Those of the priests who survive (*hoi perileipomenoi tōn hiereōn*) reconstitute the genealogies, extracts from the archives” (Josephus, *Ag. Apion* 1.35); “Every time one of the brothers was led away, those who remained (*hoi perileipomenoi*) said, ‘Do not dishonor us, brother’ ” (4 Macc 13:18); at the martyrdom of the seventh brother, the tyrant thought that the mother, “already having lost so many sons ... would urge the one who remained to obey and save himself” (12:6; cf. Herodian, *Hist.* 2.1.7).

### περιπίπτω

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*peripiptō*, **to fall around or beside, turn over, to befall, to happen upon**

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→see also ἐμπίπτω; πίπτω

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*peripipto*, S 4045; TDNT 6.173; EDNT 3.76; NIDNTT 1.608; MM 507; L&N 15.85, 37.11, 90.71; BDF § 202; BAGD 649

The primary sense of this word (“fall around, beside; turn over”) and the secondary sense (“collide,” Plutarch, *Them.* 15.4) are both found in 2 Macc 9:7, where after Antiochus has suddenly tipped out of his chariot “all the limbs of his body were tortured because of the violence of his fall” (*dyscherei ptōmati peripesonta*).

Things that happen to us are said to “befall” us (Epictetus 3.2.1; *SB* 8858, 15; 10654, 6; *C.Ord.Ptol.* 83, 30), or else we “fall into” them (2 Macc 6:13; Josephus, *Ant.* 20.48); and when we meet people unexpectedly we “fall upon” them (Josephus, *War* 3.499; *P.Oxy.* 1639, 20). Usually the circumstance is unpredictable or unforeseen. This element of chance, whether lucky or unlucky, is expressed by the phrase *peripiptein periptōmati*. Thus it was Ruth’s luck to happen upon a parcel of land belonging to Boaz (Ruth 2:3), and the messenger bringing news of Saul’s death happened to be on Mount Gilboa (2 Sam 1:6; cf. *BGU* 1881, 8). The circumstantial character of the situation, event, or meeting is seen partly from the use of the verb predominantly with *ean* (*T. Dan* 4.5; *P.Mert.* 43, 5), *ei* (*PSI* 1265, 11; *P.Tebt.* 704, 20), *mēpote* (*UPZ* 108, 34; 144, 33); cf. Menander, *Dysk.* 244: “If something should happen to her, the blame will touch me as well.”

All these examples are of untoward events or sad situations: to be suddenly stricken with a punishment (2 Macc 6:13; cf. Josephus, *Ant.* 20.48); touched by misery and need (*PSI* 767, 42; *SB* 9401, 7), danger (Josephus, *Life* 83), captivity and servitude (*Ant.* 8.229; *T. Jos.* 10.3), serpents and scorpions (Philo, *Alleg. Interp.* 2.84, 86), shipwreck (*T. Abr.* A 19), all sorts of misfortunes (Josephus, *War* 7.219) and evils (2 Macc 10:4; Marcus Aurelius 2.11; Dittenberger, *Syl.* 495, 58), notably sickness, all “that a person tries to avoid” (Epictetus 3.2.1; cf. Philo, *Spec. Laws* 1.224). It is with these connotations in mind that we read of the misadventure of the man who was traveling from Jerusalem to Jericho when “he suddenly fell into the hands of brigands” (*lēstais periepesen*). Cf. the Pythagorean Hipparchus: “for this reason being about to fall into the hands of either brigands or a tyrant” (*ē lēstais dia touto mellontes peripiptein ē tyrannō*, in Stobaeus, *Flor.* 108.81; vol. 4, p. 982; cf. Diogenes Laertius 4.50: *pleōn ... lēstais periepese*; Artemidorus Daldianus, *Onir.* 3.65). In a context that is just as catastrophic, the ship taking Paul to Rome washes up on the island of Malta where it strikes “a place between two seas.”



Jas 1:2 uses the verb in a figurative and pejorative sense – as do Prov 11:5 (*peripiptei adikia*), *P.Tebt.* 278, 32 (*thymou peripesite*, beginning of the first century), and Philo (*Unchang. God* 73) – with respect to the various temptations to which Christians may be exposed (*hotan peirasmois peripesēte poikilois*). There is no reason to limit these temptations to trials that come from without, but the choice of this verb – rather than *eispherō* (Matt 6:19), *eiserchomai* (26:41; Mark 14:38; Luke 22:40, 46), *lambanō* (1 Cor 10:13), *empiptō* (1 Tim 6:9), *hypomenō* (Jas 1:12) – emphasizes that they are unexpected, unlooked for; they are abrupt encounters, and one bumps into them as into obstacles. On the other hand, the encounter brings grief and regret; it tends to disturb the Christian’s peace. One is disoriented by this “putting to the test” of one’s faithfulness. Cf. 1 Pet 1:6 – “suffering grief in various trials” (*lypēthentes en poikilois peirasmois*). This is why St. James urges the opposite response – “count it a complete joy” – because it is the occasion for a greater good.

### περιποιέομαι, περιποίησις

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*peripoieomai*, **to preserve, reserve, keep for oneself, acquire; to bring about, to effect for oneself; peripoiesis, an acquiring or preserving**

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*peripoieomai*, S 4046; *EDNT* 3.76; *NIDNTT* 2.838–839; MM 507; L&N 21.24; BAGD 650 | *peripoiesis*, S 4047; *EDNT* 3.76; *NIDNTT* 2.838–839; MM 508; L&N 57.62, 90.74; BAGD 650

In the middle voice, the verb *peripoieō* means “preserve, reserve, keep for oneself.” “The one who seeks to preserve his life (*tēn psychēn autou peripoiesasthai*) will lose it (*apolesei autēn*), and the one who loses it will save it (*zōogonēsei autēn*)” (Luke 17:33). This meaning of “saving a life” occurs repeatedly in secular Greek as well as in the LXX, where it often contrasts with *apothnēskō* (Ezek 13:19; cf. Ps 79:11) and *apollyō* (“the profit that they had gained is lost,” Jer 31:36; cf. Prov 6:32; Heb 10:39).

The meaning “acquire for oneself” predominates, whether with respect to goods (Gen 31:18; 36:6; Hebrew *rākaš*), a reputation (1 Macc 6:44, with the reflexive pronoun, which is pleonastic: *peripoēsai heautō onoma aiōnion*; cf. Xenophon, *An.* 5.6.17; *Ep. Arist.* 121; *P.Ryl.* 712, 4; *PSI* 1075, 7), power (Thucydides 1.9.2), the crown (Josephus, *Ant.* 14.386), the goodwill of another (Polybius 3.6.13), a friend. Thus God has acquired a people (Isa 43:21), the church. He has become its acquirer and owner; he has exclusive rights to the redeemed; they are his personal property, the people whom he has acquired

(*laos eis peripoiēsin*, 1 Pet 2:9; cf. Exod 19:5). The emphasis is on the original acquisition and the strictly guarded ownership of the “holy nation,” over which God retains permanent mastery (cf. Sir Prologue 11), but there is an affective value; the *sgulâh* (Hebrew) is a treasure that one possesses as one’s own.

*Peripoiēomai* also means “to bring about, to effect for oneself,” as when deacons “who serve well gain a good standing for themselves.” The meaning can be close to the active “procure” (cf. Prov 22:9; 2 Macc 15:21), common in the inscriptions for “supply resources” for a people or a city. A decree from Samos in the third century BC, in honor of Boulagoras: “He procured many advantages and much profit for the city through his judgments” (*SEG* I, 366, 22); a century later, a decree of the Athenian *klērouchoi* for Euboulos of Marathon: “through his sustained efforts, he often secured the interests of the Athenians of Delos” (*I.Delos* I, 1498, 16); a decree of Hanisa in Cappadocia in favor of Apollonius, “bringing his zeal and ardor to bear, through a legal proceeding he procured for the people the inheritance (claimed by others).”

The substantive *peripoiēsis*, a technical term in business language, rare in the LXX and the papyri, is used three times in the NT in an eschatological sense, and in a formula that appears to be stereotyped: Christians are predestined *eis peripoiēsin sōtērias*, i.e., for the possessing of salvation, or *eis peripoiēsin doxēs* (for the possessing of glory, 2 Thess 2:14). In Heb 10:39 – “We are not people for shrinking back and being destroyed (*eis apōleian*), but people of faith for the possessing of life (*eis peripoiēsin psychēs*; the *nomen actionis* for the act of possessing).” The saving of the soul, as opposed to perdition, is the definition of the spiritual salvation of a person, called *sōtēria psychōn* in 1 Pet 1:9.

## περιφρονέω

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*periphroneō*, **to be reflective, circumspect; to scorn, despise**

→see also καταφρονέω

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***periphroneo***, S 4065; TDNT 3.633; EDNT 3.80; NIDNTT 1.461–462; MM 510; L&N 76.25; BAGD 653

This biblical hapax has positive and pejorative meanings. The positive sense is “to be reflective, circumspect.” The pejorative sense is “to scorn, despise,” which is the meaning in Titus 2:15 – “Let no one despise you” (*mēdeis sou periphroneitō*). So it seems that this verb is synonymous with *kataphroneō*, since Paul wrote to Timothy “Let no one despise your youth” (*mēdeis ... kataphroneitō*, 1 Tim 4:12). There is nevertheless a shade of difference; the

latter verb means “turn up one’s nose at, have no respect for, take no account of, pay no heed to.” Again and again in the papyri of *P. Enteux*, complainants consider that this or that official pays no attention to them (44, 4; 68, 11) because they are orphans (9, 6), or aged (25, 8; 26, 9; 48, 7), or foreign (29, 11), or widowed (13, 6). In the case of Timothy, at the head of the church at Ephesus, his youth was a handicap because it inclined the believers to despise or simply ignore his authority.

Titus, on the other hand, had an energetic temperament. He gave firm instruction and corrected sinners. He ran the risk of running afoul of the weak points and the temper of the Cretans, who might stand up to him or at least react disdainfully. Thus the inhabitants of Corcyra, priding themselves on their superiority, treated the Corinthians disdainfully (*periphronountes*, Thucydides 1.25.4), and Pericles “out of a presumptuous confidence, for the pleasure of winning and to show off his strength, faced the Lacedaemonians.” Thus there is an element of insolence in *periphronēsis*, as in the case of children who rebel against their parents’ authority and fail to show them the respect (*tēn timēn*) that is due them.

Nevertheless, *periphroneō* and *kataphroneō* are often synonymous. Audacious and arrogant false teachers “despise authority” (*kataphronountas*, 2 Pet 2:10); this is rejection and rebellion. For their part, Eleazar and the Maccabeus brother despise pain (4 Macc 6:9; 14:1, *periphroneō*); cf. Christ, who despised the shame of the cross (*kataphroneō*, Heb 12:2), and in the papyri of the seventh-eighth century, where more than mere negligence or abstention is involved: “I had to abandon my humble occupation.”

## πίπτω

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*piptō*, **to fall, fail**

→see also ἐπίπτω; περιπίπτω

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*pipto*, S 4098; *TDNT* 6.161–166; *EDNT* 3.90–91; *NIDNTT* 1.608, 610–611; MM 514; L&N 13.59, 13.97, 13.122, 15.118, 15.119, 17.22, 20.60, 23.105, 24.40, 24.93, 30.107, 56.32, 68.49, 75.7, 87.56, 90.71; BDF §§77, 80, 81(3); BAGD 659–660

In the Bible, sparrows and grain fall to the earth. When the subject is a human, sometimes the word refers to a fall, sometimes to the act of throwing oneself on someone’s neck. Usually one falls on one’s face to venerate someone; directed toward God, this prostration is an act of adoration. Metaphorically, those who fall, as opposed to those who remain standing, are those who fail, sinners, with

a connotation of degeneration: “Remember whence you have fallen” (Rev 2:5; cf. Luke 10:18).

But there are different sorts of falls. If the *paidotribēs* teaches the ephebes “how to overcome enemies without falling on the ground” (*SEG* XX, 662, 10), it is nevertheless possible to stumble and fall but rise again (Rom 11:11 – “Did they stumble so as to fall?” – *mē eptaisan hina pesōsin*), which is the situation of the just and of the Jews, and which gives grounds for hope.

The interpretation of 1 Cor 13:8 is more delicate: *hē agapē oudepote piptei*, which has sometimes been understood to mean “Love never falls (from its rank)” (E. B. Allo) or “never loses its prerogatives.” The apostle contrasts *agapē* with the passing charisms that will disappear (*katargeomai*) and cease (*pauomai*), bringing together the present (the present indicative, *piptei*) and the future (*oudepote*, “never at any time”) and making *ou ... piptō* synonymous with *menō* (“abide”). Clearly excellence is implied, and the context shows that staying power is involved. But is the point that love is long-lived or that it is permanent? In the latter case, the text would mean that love holds fast, does not yield, does not let itself be defeated; consequently it does not cease to act and to inspire virtuous activity. But on the one hand, it must grow cold in the last days (Matt 24:12); and on the other hand *piptō* is predominantly used in the sense of “succumb, fall dead, perish” or – when the subject is a house, a wall, a city – “collapse, be annihilated.” While this meaning does not necessarily exclude the one discussed before, the text would mean that love is never abolished, never ceases to exist, even in heaven. It is indestructible, *en aphtharsia* (Eph 6:24), whereas faith and hope are limited with respect to time.

## πιστικός

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*pistikos*, **trustworthy, authentic**

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*pistikos*, S 4101; *EDNT* 3.91; MM 514; L&N 79.97; BDF §113(2); BAGD 662

This adjective, used to describe the costly nard that Mary of Bethany poured over Jesus (Mark 14:3, Vulgate *spicatus*; John 12:3, Vulgate *pisticus*), does not occur in the LXX. It is most likely derived from *pistos*, “worthy of confidence, faithful,” and it is usually used to describe humans as “trustworthy persons,” especially with respect to the handling of money (*P.Apoll.* 83, 9; 87, 1 and 9; 97, col. II, 20). Since this meaning cannot apply to the perfume in the Gospel account, other explanations have been sought.

But *pistikos* is in fact used to describe things, in particular oil, and there is nothing wrong with the translation “a perfume of true nard.” This is how

Theophylact understood the text: “it means either a species of nard that is called ‘*pistikē*’ or else genuine nard” (*pistikēn de nardo noei, ētoi eidos nardou, houtō legomenon pistikē, ē tēn adolon nardon*, on Mark, PG, vol. 123, 645 b). These perfumes were quite expensive and were often counterfeited. “Nard is counterfeited with pseudonard.... Pure (*sincerum*) nard is distinguished by its lightness, its reddish-brown color, the sweetness of its fragrance, its pleasant flavor” (Pliny, *HN* 12.26.12; cf. 13.1.16: “so many ways of counterfeiting”). Thus the perfume of Mary of Bethany was extremely expensive pure, “authentic” nard.

## πίστις

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*pistis*, **faith, confidence, fidelity, guarantee, loyalty**

→see also ὑπόστασις

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*pistis*, S 4102; TDNT 6.174–228; EDNT 3.91–97; NIDNTT 1.593–595, 597–606, 3.1211–1213; MM 515; L&N 31.43, 31.85, 31.88, 31.102, 31.104, 33.289; BDF §§163, 206(2), 233(2), 400(2); BAGD 662–664; ND 2.94

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No secular text can offer a parallel to NT or OT “faith,” but *pistis*, which derives from *peithomai* (“be persuaded, have confidence, obey”), connotes persuasion, conviction, and commitment, and always implies confidence, which is expressed in human relationships as fidelity, trust, assurance, oath, proof, guarantee. Only this richness of meaning can account for the faith (*pistei, kata pistin, dia pisteōs*) that inspired the conduct of the great Israelite ancestors of Hebrews 11.

The usage of *pistis* in the papyri is usually legal, and its predominant meaning is “guarantee, security.” Pursuant to a loan granted him by Zeno, Philo reckons that his creditor is claiming more than his due. The judges ask for a statement of credits and debts that both parties agree is correct, and they decide – with respect to the contested sums – that the adversaries must exchange guarantees (*pisteis*) in the Serapeum of Parmentiscos. In 108 BC, 150 *artabai* of borrowed grain are guaranteed by a mortgage on the cultivated lands owned by the borrowers; these ask the *epistatēs* of Akoris to require written guarantees from their lender. *Pisti Didymou* means “with Didymos’s guarantee” (*P. Warr.* 5, 15) or “Didymos stood surety” (*P. Princ.* 26, 5). *Pistis* must be given this meaning of “guarantee” in Acts 17:31 – God has given a “guarantee” through a man that he will resurrect the dead; and that is the meaning of *hypostasis* in Heb 11:1 – “Faith is the guarantee of things hoped for,” well translated in the Peshitta by *pyso*. The substantive *hypostasis*, literally “that which is placed

beneath,” hence “support, base, foundation,” has already been used (Heb 1:3) in its philosophical meaning, “substance” as opposed to accidents, “reality” as opposed to appearances. Hence its psychological and moral meaning: “that which is at the bottom of one’s soul, firmness, confidence, courage”; but in the papyri, it also refers to a right of possession, the entirety of an inheritance (*P.Oxy.* 138, 26; 488, 17; 1274, 15; *P.Harr.* 90, 2), its guarantee (*P.Eleph.* 15, 3), or better, the collection of documents stored in the archives as surety and constituting the evidence for a property right (*P.Oxy.* 237, col. IV, 39; VIII, 26, 34, 42; *UPZ* 222). Thus faith is the true title attesting to one’s ownership of the heavenly property that one hopes for, and thus the guarantee that one will obtain them in the future.

Faith is also “plighted faith,” respect for a commitment, the carrying out of obligations (*P.Mert.* 32, 2), as with the young widows who “have rejected their first faith.” This *pistis*, which encompasses good faith, loyalty, and fidelity, is described as “*ingens vinculum fidei*” (“the great bond of faith,” Livy 8.28) and is the basis of all contracts. This is probably the sense of 2 Tim 4:7 – “I have kept the faith.” This refers not to the conservation of the (theological) faith, but to fidelity (cf. Josephus, *War* 6.345: *pisteis etērēsa* = “I kept my word”; *Ant.* 15.134), and more exactly to the fidelity shown by those who serve a superior, such as mercenaries, royal and imperial officials, those who have a duty: Paul testifies to his painstaking faithfulness to his duty as apostle in the service of Jesus Christ.

*Pistis*, then, implies complete loyalty (1 Tim 1:5, *pisteōs anypokritou*; *P.Abinn.* 59, 17: “I, Plas, will restore to you completely, in all loyalty”; *P.Mert.* 90, 12: *pisteōs kai epieikias charin*). Heb 10:22 links fullness of faith and a true heart (*alēthinos*), in other words, sincerity and fidelity, just as the papyri link *pistis* and *alētheia*; *P.Oxy.* 70, 4: “every valid written contract has *pistis* and *alētheia*” (*pasa kyria engraphos synallagē pistin kai alētheian echei*); *P.Flor.* 32 b 14: “I swear ... that I have made the copy truly and faithfully” (*exomnymi ... ex alētheias kai pisteōs tēn apographēn pepoiēsthai*); *P.Stras.* 152, 14: “that I have made the copy truly and faithfully” (*ex alētheias kai peisteōs tēn apographēn pepoiēsthai*); *BGU* 1151, 17. Cf. 1 Thess 2:13; 1 Tim 2:7; Titus 1:1. The *pistos anēr* is a man worthy of confidence (1 Tim 1:12), loyal citizen, faithful friend, someone who is trusted: “if you find someone who is completely trustworthy among those who are with you” (*ean tina heurēs kata parontas echonta peistēn pollēn*, *P.Fay.* 122, 22); “being well-disposed and showing complete fidelity toward me” (*eunoousē moi kai pasan pistin moi endeiknymenē*, *P.Oxy.* 494, 9); “thanks to his kindness, his faithfulness, and his family ties” (*eunoia kai pisti kai tē tou genous oikeotēti*, *P.Tebt.* 326, 10); *BGU* 326, col. I, 15; *P.Lips.* 28, 31: “to watch over ... with noble fidelity” (*phylaxai*

... *meta kalēs pisteōs*, an act of adoption). Testators often appeal to the fidelity of their executors or their heirs in carrying out their final wishes (*P.Oxy.* 1901, 48; 2474, 6, 22; *P.Stras.* 277, 7); but numerous complainants who had thought that their adversaries would show fidelity toward them declare that they have been deceived (*P.Cair.Isid.* 74, 11; *P.Mert.* 91, 12; *P.Oxy.* 71, col. II, 11). Normally a complainant expresses confidence in the judge (*P.Stras.* 296 r 16). *Pistis eunoias* is confidence inspired by the beneficence of the statesman (Plutarch, *Praec. ger. rei publ.* 28.821 b; *Ti. Gracch.* 33.7); cf. *pistin echein*: “have confidence in” (idem, Plutarch, *Mor.* 1101 c) or, more frequently, “merit or have the confidence of” (ibid. 91 a; 146 b; 699 d; 984 f; *Praec. ger. rei publ.* 14.809 f; 15.812 f; 31.822 f). In Luke 17:5, *prosthes hēmin pistin*, the only instance in the Third Gospel where *pistis* is not preceded by the definite article, we must translate “Have faith in us.”

It is often impossible to distinguish between practical fidelity and good faith. For example: “knowing the faithfulness (sincerity) of my goodwill” (*epi tosouton pistin eunoias mathousa*, *P.Mil.Vogl.* 73, 11); “trusting in my good faith and my assurance” (*peithomenon tē emē pistei kai dexia*, *P.Mich.* 485, 12). In a stipulation of a contract (a deposit, a divorce, etc.), the signatory sometimes completes this common formula to emphasize his fidelity: “In good faith the buyer has asked and in good faith the seller has confessed” (*pistei epērōtēsen ho ēgorakōs kai pistei hōmologēsen ... ho peprakōs*, *P.Dura* 26, 28; 31, 32); “making good and urging in his own good faith, Hermeias Hephaisias” (*bebeiountos kai tē idia pistei keleuontos Hermeiou Hēphaista*, *BGU* 887, 4; *SB* 9219, 4, 24; *PSI* 1254, 8); “speak as an ambassador and a person worthy of trust” (*hōs presbytēs kai pisteōs axios eipe*, *P.Lips.* 32, 2); “from Deios, who professes his good faith” (*para tou Deiou exomologoumenou tēn pistin*, *P.Mil.Vogl.* 25, col. III, 32; *P.Flor.* 86, 11). This good faith and goodwill are often called *kalē pistis* (*P.Tebt.* 418, 15; *P.Oxy.* 2187, 29; *P.Cair.Isid.* 94, 11; *BGU* 1574, 18; *SB* 7523, 2; 7996, 7; 9174, 11; 9193, 7), but fidelity also enters in: “We will pay faithfully” (*meta kalēs pisteōs*, *P.Oxy.* 913, 14; 3089, 16). This same idea is expressed by *hē agathē pistis* (*P.Oxy.* 140, 16; *BGU* 314, 19; *P.Mil.* 48, 13 = *SB* 9011). This honesty of intent and action is often highlighted with the words *hygiēs-hygiainō* ([be] sound, healthy), cf. *P.Oxy.* 1031, 18; 2120, 8: “carrying through soundly and with all fidelity” (*hygiōs kai meta pasēs pisteōs diapraxamenos*); *SB* 8029, 13: “with sound fidelity, not negligently” (*meth’ hygiōs tēs pisteōs akataphronētōs*); *Pap.Lugd.Bat.* XI, n. 2, col. I, 10: carrying out a public service “soundly and faithfully, flawlessly” (*hygiōs kai pistōs amemptōs*); *P.Hamb.* 19, 17; *PSI* 86, 13; *Stud.Pal.* XX, 34; *P.Flor.* 2, 10, 45, 143; *P.Stras.* 177, 20; 532, 9–10. We may compare soundness in the faith (*hina hygiainōsin en tē pistei*, Titus 1:13; cf. 2:2).

In the NT, *pistis* is often linked with *agapē* (1 Tim 1:14; 2:15; 4:12; 6:11; 2 Tim 2:22; Phlm 5) and once with *phileō* (Titus 3:15). In the first case, the ideas are specifically religious, but Greek and Roman ears were accustomed to hearing *fides* and *amicitia* together. Thus the inhabitants of Oxyrhynchus showed their goodwill, faithfulness, and friendship toward the Romans (*hē pros Rhōmaious eunoia te kai pistis kai philia hēn enedeixanto*, *P.Oxy.* 705, 32 = *C.Pap.Jud.* 450), just as the Alexandrian Jews commend their request to Claudius on the basis of their fidelity and friendship (*dia tēn pros Rhōmaious pistin kai philian*, Josephus, *Ant.* 19.289; cf. Polybius 2.11.5; 2.12.2; 20.9.12; 20.10.2).

## πλεονεξία

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*pleonexia*, **consuming ambition, greed**

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***pleonexia***, S 4124; *TDNT* 6.266–274; *EDNT* 3.102–103; *NIDNTT* 1.137–139, 2.845–846; MM 518; L&N 25.22, 88.144; BAGD 667

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This substantive, which etymologically (*pleon-echō*) means “have more, want more,” can be used in a favorable sense for gain or profit; but in practice it means either “consuming ambition” (Xenophon, *Hell.* 3.5.15; *Cyn.* 18.10; Diodorus Siculus 19.1.3) that aims at supremacy and is linked with arrogance (Philo, *Moses* 1.56; *T. Jud.* 21.8 – “exalted [*hypsoumenoi*] in *pleonexia*”; cf. *T. Naph.* 3.1; *T. Gad* 2.4; 5.1; *T. Asher* 5.1; *T. Benj.* 5.1; Musonius, frag. 3; ed C. E. Lutz, p. 40, line 28) and is thus a social vice, since equality rules out superiority (Philo, *Spec. Laws* 4.54 – *to isonpleonexias allotrion*; cf. *Change of Names* 103; *Contemp. Life* 70); or more often “greed” for wealth, covetousness gone amuck, various forms of *epithymia* (Josephus, *Ant.* 17.253; Musonius, frag. 17, p. 108, line 13), the desire to have what is forbidden, more than one’s due – for example, in a sharing out (Philo, *Moses* 1.324). Not only is *pleonexia* insatiable (Sir 14:9) and excessive (Philo, *Rewards* 121), it is also aggressive and does not hesitate to wrong a neighbor or gain his property through extortion. Thus it is synonymous with hardness and rapacity (Josephus, *War* 7.256), reducing a human to the level of the wild beasts, which were “born to live through violence” (*apo bias kai pleonexias*, Musonius, frag. 14; p. 92, line 22; Dio Chrysostom 38.31). It is a vice of rulers and officials. It should be compared on the one hand to the disinterestedness of St. Paul, who was never moved by flattery or greed; and on the other hand to the greed of the false teachers, who not only approach their ministry like business persons with an



eye on the bottom line but even derive dishonest gain by exploiting those who are taken in by false exegesis, myths, and syrupy speech.

The parable of the Foolish Rich Man, who values life in terms of material wealth, is a commentary on the warning “Guard against all *pleonexia*” (Luke 12:15; cf. Musonius 4, p. 48, line 9; frag. 6, p. 52, line 18; frag. 8, p. 62, line 17; Dio Chrysostom 13.32; 17.22), which is included in the sin lists of Mark 7:22 and Rom 1:29 (cf. Philo, *Sacr. Abel and Cain* 32), presented in the former as one of twelve evil things that come out of a man’s heart and defile him, in the second as the fruit of a perverted mind. In Mark, greed is associated especially with carnal disorders, as in Eph 4:19; 5:3; Col 3:5; Philo, *Spec. Laws* 1.173 (cf. 1 Cor 5:10–11); in Romans, it is linked mainly with injustice and wickedness.

The secular literature denounces greed as a very great vice: “Greed is a very great evil for humans; for those who wish to have their neighbors’ goods often fail and are vanquished.” St. Paul portrays it as the object of God’s wrath (Col 3:5) and excludes the greedy from a share in the kingdom of God (1 Cor 6:10; Eph 5:5), and 2 Pet 2:3, 14 calls them “accursed.”

## πληροφορέω, πληροφορία

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*plērophoreō*, **to convince fully, accomplish fully, fully discharge (a debt or obligation)**; *plērophoria*, **fullness, richness**

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*plerophoreo*, S 4135; *TDNT* 6.309–310; *EDNT* 3.107–108; *NIDNTT* 1.733, 735, 737; MM 519; L&N 13.106, 33.199, 68.32; BDF §119(1); BAGD 670 | *plerophoria*, S 4136; *TDNT* 6.310–311; *EDNT* 3.107–108; *NIDNTT* 1.733, 735; MM 519–520; L&N 31.45; BAGD 670

The noun, unknown in the LXX, is attested in the papyri by only one text that is so badly mutilated that it is not possible to determine in what sense it is used. In three of the four NT occurrences, it means “fullness”: fullness of understanding (of the mystery of God), of hope (meaning its definitive realization; Heb 6:11 – *pros tēn plērophorian tēs elpidos achri telous*), of faith (meaning absolute certitude, without doubt or hesitation; Heb 10:22 – *en plērophoria pisteōs*; cf. *1 Clem.* 14.1: *tis peplērophorēmenos agapēs*). In 1 Thess 1:5, St. Paul declares that he has preached the gospel not only in words, but “with power (*en dynamei*) and in the Holy Spirit and with much *plērophoria*.” Given the absence of the preposition *en* before *plērophoria*, we could translate “complete assurance,” but if St. Paul had meant that, he would have written *en pasē parrēsia* (Phil 1:20; cf. 2 Cor 3:12; 7:4; 1 Tim 3:13; *meta pasēs parrēsias*, Acts 28:31); and at any rate it would be odd for the apostle to emphasize his personal

conviction. So it is better to translate “with power, with the Holy Spirit and every kind of richness.”

The verb *plērophoreō* plainly has the meaning of full and complete conviction in the case of Abraham, who is convinced (*plērophorētheis*, aorist participle) that God has the power to make good on his promise (Rom 4:21); in the case of Christians who are unsure about what practical stance to take but who are to act only with a conviction that is thought out, mature, justified in their conscience (Rom 14:5 – “let each one be fully convinced in his own mind,” *hekastos en tō idiō noi plērophoreisthō*, present passive imperative); in the words of Epaphras, who prays for the Colossians “that you may stand perfect, fully assured in all the will of God.” This perfect passive participle *peplērophorēmenoi* can also be translated “accomplished, well established,” but the important thing is that it is practically synonymous with *teleioi*, “perfect, complete,” and that it has to do with being confirmed, strengthened, stabilized; which is close to the sole use of *plērophoreomai* in the OT, “the heart of the sons of men is filled (*eplērophorēthē en autois*) with [the desire] to do evil.”

But in 2 Tim 4:5 (“Do the work of an evangelist, completely fulfill your ministry” – *tēn diakonian sou plērophorēson*) and 4:17 (“The Lord helped me and strengthened me so that through me the proclamation might be carried out” – *to kērygma plērophorēthē* – “and all the Gentiles might hear”), the verb clearly means “accomplish perfectly,” “carry out the best one can.” This meaning is found in the papyri with respect to carrying out a promise or an agreement: “Insofar as on each occasion I give you written confirmation with respect to the matters in this document, I will not be guilty of neglect” (*hoti hoson hekastote dia grammatōn se plērophorō peri tōn ontōn en tois enthade grammasin, egō ouk esomai aitios ameleias*, PSI 1335, 27; third century; cf. 1345; sixth-seventh century); “having been fully satisfied by the power that was exhibited” (*plērophorētheis malista ek tēs dynameos tēs emphaneistheisēs*, SB 8988, 38; eighth century). Sometimes the papyri give this verb the sense of completing a piece of business, of finishing with a subject. This usage confirms the nuance of 2 Tim 4:17 – the apostle is aware that he is crowning or putting the final touches on his calling as a *kēryx* (1:11) by finishing off his ministry with this last proclamation at Rome. But in the papyri the commonest use of *plērophoreō* is “pay off a debt,” meaning either a financial or a moral obligation – which emphasizes the force of the command in 2 Tim 4:5, “Fulfill your ministry completely.” This *diakonia* is a sacred assignment from God (Acts 12:25; Col 4:17; cf. 2 Cor 4:1; 5:18; 1 Tim 1:12). It is an obligation that cannot be shirked, a function that must be carried out perfectly and to the last.

Hence the narration *peri tōn peplērophorēmenōn en hēmin pragmatōn* (Luke 1:1) must be translated as in the versions (Old Latin, Vulgate, Palestinian

Syriac, Sahidic and Bohairic Coptic), “an account of the deeds accomplished among us,” despite the fact that the Peshitta and Eusebius took this perfect passive participle to mean total conviction. The decisive events of salvation were brought to completion, perfected by Christ. There is perhaps a reference to the perfect fulfilling of the Scriptures, the fullness of the accomplishment, and also completion.

πολιτεία, πολίτευμα, πολιτεύομαι, πολίτης

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*politeia*, **constitution, system of government, (right of) citizenship**;  
*politeuma*, **(place of) citizenship, act of administration, association, resident community of foreign nationals**; *politeuomai*, **to live (as a citizen)**; *politēs*, **citizen**

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*politeia*, S 4174; TDNT 6.516–535; EDNT 3.130; NIDNTT 2.801–804; MM 525; L&N 11.67, 11.70; BAGD 686 | *politeuma*, S 4175; TDNT 6.516–535; EDNT 3.130; NIDNTT 2.801–805; MM 525–526; L&N 11.71; BAGD 686 | *politeuomai*, S 4176; TDNT 6.516–535; EDNT 3.130; NIDNTT 2.801–804; MM 526; L&N 41.34; BAGD 686 | *politēs*, S 4177; TDNT 6.516–535; EDNT 3.130; NIDNTT 2.801–804; MM 526; L&N 11.68; BAGD 686

The “urban” or “civic” metaphors for the Christian life in the NT, and especially in St. Paul, are quite coherent. Heaven is like a city (*polis*); Christ is its sovereign (*Kyrios*), and it has its own laws and constitution (*politeia*), namely, the gospel. Christians are its citizens (*politai*; cf. this Christian letter from the fourth century: “for we believe that your citizenship is in heaven” – *pisteuomen gar tēn politian sou en ouranō*, SB 2265, 5) and are not treated as foreigners or sojourners there; they have the rights of citizenship (*politeuma*) and are fellow-citizens of the saints (*sympolitai*). Such a citizenship carries with it rights and privileges but also obligations and responsibilities. Each one is then required to “live as a citizen” (*politeuomai*), i.e., according to the laws and the spirit of this city, conformably to its statutes.

I. – The heavenly Jerusalem is the “city of the living God,” the perfect and eternal city, where the elect will be gathered together and to which they are constantly drawing nearer (*proselēlythate*, Heb 12:22) during their pilgrimage on this earth. In other words, the city is first of all seen as a dwelling place, the center for a group or a populace. The citizen (*politēs*) is one who – living in community with his compatriots – is a legal subject and participates in the political life of the city (cf. Plutarch, *Cim.* 17.3). St. Paul was more than a little proud of his home city: “a citizen of Tarsus in Cilicia, no obscure city” (Acts

21:39); to which we may compare this third-century Roman inscription: “Tarsus, the first and greatest and most noble metropolis.”

II. – The defining characteristic of a *politēs* is possessing *politeia*, the right of citizenship. Rome and the Greek cities used to grant this honor to their benefactors, to particularly deserving persons, veterans and military leaders, politicians, men of letters, officials, physicians whose merits they wished to honor or reward or whose services they wanted to gain. Thus citizenship was a title of nobility (*eugeneia*) that placed its beneficiary in the ranks of the aristocracy. But this “decoration” could also be bought, not only in Greek cities that by this means bolstered their impoverished treasuries but also at Rome (at first only with difficulty – the price varied between 200 and 1,000 drachmas). Antony was generous in this respect (Cicero, *Phil.* 5.4.11); Claudius gave citizenship without restraint and it became a veritable commodity, like merchandise with fluctuating prices. In fact, the number of *cives*, one million in 70/69 BC, increased by a factor of four by 28 BC, of five by AD 14, nearly six by AD 47; and the prestige of the title was correspondingly diminished.

This information greatly enhances our understanding of the clash between the chiliarch Claudius Lysias, who boasted that he had purchased citizenship at a high cost (*egō pollou kephalaiou tēn politeian tautēn ektēsamēn*) and Paul, who answered “But it was mine by birth” (Acts 22:28–29). Inheriting the title greatly increased its value. Apart from the honor involved, citizenship conferred many practical advantages. Especially with respect to legal proceedings, the *civis* was free to choose his court in his own country and to be judged according to its laws or to appear before Roman magistrates. St. Paul used this right to appeal to the supreme jurisdiction of the emperor, just as he referred to the *lex Valeria* (c. 300 BC) and the *lex Porcia* (c. 198 BC) that prohibited the scourging of Roman citizens.

*Politeia* also refers to the organization or system of government of the state, its constitution, its ancestral institutions, and finally “the commonwealth of free men,” the life of the citizen within his city, his political activity, all the forms of interaction with the life of the state. Hence pagans – outsiders, “cut off from the commonwealth of Israel and foreigners to the covenants” (*apēllotriōmenoi tēs politeias tou Israel kai xenoi tōn diathēkōn*, Eph 2:12) – were not only incapable of being incorporated in the Israelite theocracy, but they were as alien as they could be to the covenants, “without Christ,” having no hope of salvation (Acts 26:6–7), without God’s providence and help. Only citizens benefited from the protection of the *polis* and its worship. But through baptism, the Gentiles became *sympolitai tōn hagiōn*, “fellow citizens with the saints and members of the family of God”; their names are written in the rolls of the heavenly Jerusalem (Luke 10:20), and they possess full rights of citizenship and

the attendant privileges, in particular equality with the “natives,” i.e., the Jews (cf. Eph 2:14–16) or the angels, those great elder denizens of the celestial city (Heb 12:23), and even brotherhood with them, since they are henceforth members of the same family (*oikeioi*, Gal 6:10; 1 Tim 5:8). They are no longer outsiders (*allotrioi*).

III. – *Politeuma*, which is sometimes synonymous with *politeia* (Dittenberger, *Syl.* 543, 6), appears in the fourth century BC and can refer to an act of administration, government, legislation (Josephus, *Ant.* 1.5; 11.157; *Ag. Apion* 2.145), the party in power (cf. the constitution of Carthage, Polybius 3.8.2), but more formally an association (*SB* 8929, 18: “for the provisions of the association” – *epi tōn tou politeumatōs euōchiōn*); 9812, 3–6: an association of soldiers in Alexandria (*politeuma tōn en Alēxandria pheromenōn stratiōtōn* = *SEG* XX, 499), or a community, a civic body, a political entity. *Tōn Ioppitōn politeuma* is the citizenry of Joppa (2 Macc 12:7). The women of Panamara are invited as a group to the feasts of Hera and are distinguished as such from the men. In the strict sense of the word, a *politeuma* is an organization of citizens from the same place, with the same rights (*isonomoi*) in the midst of a foreign state. We have particularly full information for the Jewish communities at Berenice in Cyrenaica, at Antioch (Josephus, *Ant.* 12.28–33; *War* 7.44ff.), and especially at Alexandria, colonies of immigrants living in the midst of a populace of a different race, but having a religious character, professing the worship of the true God.

So we see how St. Paul could write “For our part, we are citizens of heaven,” especially since the “community” at Philippi, largely made up of Antony’s veterans, and then Augustus’s (Strabo 8.331; Appian, *BCiv.* 5.3.11 and 13; Dio Cassius 51.4.6) enjoyed the municipal rights of the *jus italicum*. Not depending on a governor but reporting directly to the imperial capital, represented by a proconsular praetor, its inhabitants were proud of their “country” and their autonomy. The Pauline *politeuma* of Philippians, then, is not so much a reference to their citizenship, nor even their status as a “colony”; it should be understood in terms of their metropolis or capital city, which lists its members among its citizens. It is a community of foreign nationals (foreigners to paganism) with a threefold meaning: (a) local (the *politēs* has ties to a place, a city) – our *politeuma* is in heaven; (b) political – like every analogous *civitas*, conferring liberty and equality on all its members, full rights; (c) constitutional and legal – exclusive dependency on the supreme authority of the *Kyrios*, Jesus.

IV. – Such a status brings with it a certain spirit and a certain way of life corresponding to the *polis* that one is a part of and the *politeuma* that one is under. The Israelites had a particularly vivid awareness of their place in their

people's tradition and law, of what they called *politeuesthai*, "living as a citizen"; which leads to personal behavior that is conformed to the common law, a nuance of public life. In this sense, St. Paul proclaims before the Sanhedrin: "I have lived before God with a clear conscience," observing the laws of the divine *politeia*. According to Xenophon (*Cyr.* 1.1.1), this verb means subscribe to a rule, submit to a discipline (*Ep. Arist.* 31; Dittenberger, *Syl.* 618, 12; the oath of Itanos: "I will live ... according to the laws" – *politeosomai* ... *kata tous nomous*, *I.Cret.* 4.8.28 = *Syl.* 526); it becomes synonymous with *peripateō*, *anastrephō*, *poreuomai*, *diexagō*, *prassō*, but is always opposed to *idiōteuō*, "to live as a private individual." It is with civic connotation that the apostle instructs Christians, "Live as a citizen worthy of the gospel of Christ," conforming as such to the laws of the celestial city. To live out one's citizenship is to conduct oneself according to the demands of the *politeia*, which means first of all being willing to take on a public function, to consider oneself in all of one's actions as a member of a social body, and accordingly to say nothing and do nothing that is not appropriate for a citizen of heaven (cf. *UPZ* 110, 78 = *P.Paris* 63). But it is also a call to honor, to preserve one's country's spirit or mindset – *noblesse oblige* – and this nuance of praise is in literary terms in agreement with the usage of the inscriptions and the papyri: "the rest of the citizens who choose to act more nobly."

## πολυτελής

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*polytelēs*, **expensive, rare, luxurious, precious**

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*poluteles*, S 4185; *EDNT* 3.133; MM 527; L&N 65.3; BAGD 690

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In its various usages, this adjective means "oppressively expensive" or "rare and luxurious," even "sumptuous" (*SB* 10498, 6), in any event requiring a major outlay; and hence "precious," like certain perfumes (Mark 14:3) or wines of a great vintage (Wis 2:7). It is the usual adjective for valuable stones, either as construction materials or as what we would call precious stones; and for rich clothing, sometimes with a pejorative nuance. Thus St. Paul asks Christian women to come to church correctly attired "not with braided hair, gold, pearls, or costly clothing." This is not a ban on elegance or a certain sort of style, but on flashy luxury or a provocative appearance that not only could stir up envy or lust but also is altogether out of place when a sinful creature presents herself before God and comes to implore his mercy. Taking up the wisdom theme that places spiritual beauty high above all the joys of the world, St. Peter also instructs Christians to adorn themselves with virtues rather than with jewels and

cloaks. “This is precious before God” (*ho estin enōpion tou theou polyteles*, 1 Pet 3:4) does not mean that a gentle and quiet *pneuma* is very costly, since its value is not monetary; but as with the “seven mountains of precious stones” of *Enoch* 18.6, which hold stones that are medicinal and beautiful (colored, etc.), we are to understand that the feminine virtues are very useful in God’s sight, for he regards and values them highly.

## πόνος

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*ponos*, **tiring labor, hard work, fatigue, suffering, pain**

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*ponos*, S 4192; *EDNT* 3.135; *NIDNTT* 1.262; MM 528; L&N 24.77, 42.49; BAGD 691

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The first attested meaning of *ponos* is “tiring labor, hard work,” after which one rests, and then “the product of labor,” a meaning that is particularly common in the LXX: “A people whom you do not know will eat the fruit of your labor.” In various contexts, *ponos* refers to the work of one’s hands (Josephus, *Ant.* 19.113), physical efforts (*sōmatikōn ponōn*, Dittenberger, *Syl.* 708, 11), spiritual efforts (*ponoi psychēs*), brief suffering (2 Macc 7:36), like the pain of childbirth (Isa 66:7), and other toils that are constantly renewed. Sometimes it is only a matter of fatigue produced by effort, which is linked to exercise (Philo, *Alleg. Interp.* 3.135: *askēsei kai ponō*; *Migr. Abr.* 31); sometimes pain (*Moses* 1.284: *ponos ē mochthos*), all that is “bitter and unpleasant” (*Post. Cain* 156) and opposed to pleasure (4 Macc 1, 4, 9, 10). The range extends from simple care (Philo, *Heir* 48) and simple difficulties (Wis 9:16; Sir 29:4), like those of a voyage (*P. Ryl.* 624, 4: *tous tēs hodou ponous*), but accompanied by dangers and hence by moments of crisis (“I am in difficulty summer and winter,” *P. Col.* IV, 2, n. 66, 17) to evil of the most diverse sorts, what we call “trials,” misfortune (Isa 59:4), calamity (Obad 13, Hebrew *’ēd*), sufferings that overwhelm the heart (Sir 3:27; Isa 53:11; 65:14; Jer 6:7; Bar 2:25); hence the pairing *kopos kai ponos*, trouble and woe.

Effort, labor, and care vary with the circumstances, first of all in education: “the disciplinarian approach to education gives much trouble” (Plato, *Soph.* 230 a); “the effort of education” (*paideias ponon*, Philo, *Migr. Abr.* 223; *Spec. Laws* 2.240; *PSI* 875, 24); then in the assimilation of “sciences that cost much effort to learn.” In the practice of a trade, the laborer “uses four times as much time and trouble preparing grain.” In hunting, “the fawn pursued with effort (*syn ponō*) will be caught by the dogs” (Xenophon, *Cyn.* 9.6); “one exhausts the animal with fatigue” (*ponō*, *ibid.* 9.20; cf. Josephus, *Ant.* 2.2, 334). In war, “It is

for their country that they toil and fight with enemies.” In athletics, “those who go to work at gymnastic exercises” (Plato, *Leg.* 1.646 c); young people are “more exhausted by their efforts (*ponois*) than this type of exercise (*en agōnia*) entails.” Finally, and especially, in the medical vocabulary: “With patients who have long fevers, there come ... many pains in the joints” (*ta arthra ponoī*, Hippocrates, *Aph.* 4.44; cf. 45; Plato, *Phdr.* 244 b); with the Athenian fever, “the illness descended upon the chest” (Thucydides 2.49.3); those who have just been circumcised are in pain (Gen 34:25, Hebrew *kā’ēh*); the trouble of insomnia.

Antisthenes is the first to give *ponos* its technical moral meaning and consider it a good thing. The Stoics classify it as “indifferent” (Diogenes Laertius 7.102; cf. 7.166). Musonius poses the question: “The proposition that *ponos* is not an evil does not seem plausible to me; the contrary proposition, that *ponos* is an evil, seems more plausible, because every evil is to be avoided” (frag. 1); but he concludes that *ponos* is not an evil, and he reports the question posed by a young Spartan to the philosopher Cleanthes, “Is *ponos* a good thing?” (cf. Diogenes Laertius 7.172). He was “so well trained in virtue that he believed that *ponos* was closer to the nature of good than to that of evil.” This is also Philo’s opinion: “*ponos*, enemy of ease,” without which nothing noble is possible among mortals (*Sacr. Abel and Cain* 35–41; 42–45), is rewarded by God (Philo, *Alleg. Interp.* 1.80), especially effort toward goodness and virtue (*Sacr. Abel and Cain* 120; *Worse Attacks Better* 27). So he adds a great deal to the pagan ethic that exhorted disdaining *ponos* (Musonius, frag. 7).

Philo is the one who introduced *ponos* into the ethical vocabulary. He is the only one to praise effort or toil at length – *philoponia* – to the point that he contrasts the virtuous with those who do nothing of effort (*Worse Attacks Better* 34: *ponon ouk eidotes*). Indeed, *ponos* is linked with zeal in the service of God (*Sacr. Abel and Cain* 37): “All good things come from toil and increase with it” (ibid. 40, 41, 113, 115, 120). Nevertheless, it is not effort pure and simple that deserves praise, but effort carried through with art (*Worse Attacks Better* 17: *ho ponos ... ho meta technēs*) and with the goal of virtue. God “changes the bitterness of effort to sweetness” (*Post. Cain* 154); he does not let effort go unrewarded for those who struggle (ibid. 78, *tois askētais*). So one must persevere in “continuous, tireless *ponos*.”

So when St. Paul writes of Epaphras that “he does not cease to struggle for you (*pantote agōnizomenos*) in his prayers” (Col 4:12) and that he “exerts great efforts” (*echei polyn ponon*, 4:13) for the Christians of Colossae, Laodicea, and Hierapolis, he is not only using a traditional athletic metaphor but also suggesting that this servant of Christ embodies a costly state of mind and activity, concerns and cares, efforts and fatigue, physical and spiritual suffering;



that he is engaged in a taxing labor that requires overcoming a thousand difficulties. We would say “takes great pains, goes to a great deal of trouble.”

The three occurrences of *ponos* in Revelation have the meaning “suffering” or “calamity”: at the punishment of the kingdom of the Beast, the godless “gnawed their tongues in agony” (*ek tou ponou*). The medical metaphor is used with regard to blasphemers: “because of their pains and their wounds” (*ek tōn ponōn autōn kai ek tōn helkōn autōn*, Rev 16:11). Finally, in the age to come there will be no (*ouk estai eti*) death, no mourning, no crying, no *ponos* (21:4), that is, no labor, fatigue, suffering, misfortune; it is the end of all trials, the abolition of sin’s punishments.

### πορθέω

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*porthēō*, **to sack, ravage, ruin, lay waste**

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*porthēo*, S 4199; EDNT 3.137; MM 529; L&N 20.37; BAGD 693

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This verb, unknown in the LXX, is current from Homer to the Koine with the meaning “sack, ravage, ruin” a city, “lay waste” a territory. The word implies physical or moral violence against persons. Its three NT occurrences pertain to the persecution of the church by St. Paul before his conversion, so that in Acts 9:21 (*ho porthēsas ... tous epikaloumenous to onoma touto*) several French translators make this verb synonymous with *diōkō* (1 Cor 15:9; Phil 3:6): “Is this not the one who persecuted (or hunted down) those who call upon this name at Jerusalem?”

In Gal 1:13 – “You have heard of my doings when I was in Judaism: I persecuted the church of God beyond measure and ravaged it” (*hoti kath’ hyperbolēn ediōkon tēn ekklēsian tou theou kai eporthoun* [G: *epolemoun*] *autēn*). *Eporthoun* should be taken as a conative imperfect, “I would have liked to annihilate it.” The imperfect *eporthēi* in Gal 1:23 is the same: the Christians of Judea said, “The one who once persecuted us (*ho diōkōn pote*) today preaches the faith that he then wanted to destroy (*hēn pote eporthēi*).” Here *pistis* has its objective sense, “doctrine,” which matches the singular “church of God,” referring not to a particular community but to the whole primitive church.

### ποταπός

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*potapos*, **of what origin, from what country; of what sort, of what kind**

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*Potapos*, the only form of this word found in the Greek Bible, is the Hellenistic variation of *podapos*, formed by popular assimilation to *pote*. The basic meaning is “of what origin, from what country?” This meaning remains common in the Koine, in the literary language as well as in the inscriptions, for example in this Jewish epitaph from the first century: “Ask Samuel, son of Doras, who he is, whence he comes.” This sense is perhaps not absent from Matt 8:27, where, after the miracle of the calming of the storm, the people ask, “*Potapos estin houtos*, that even the wind and the sea obey him?” This could be just a synonym for the interrogative *tis*, “Who then is this?” (cf. the parallels at Mark 4:41; Luke 8:25), but we cannot rule out the nuance “What is his origin? Where does he come from?” Similarly, when the Virgin Mary is surprised by the very unusual greeting addressed to her by an invisible being: *dielogizeto potapos eiē ho aspasmos houtos* (Luke 1:29; D reads *podapos an*). Certainly she is trying to understand the meaning of the angel’s words (*epi tō logō*), but she is probably also trying to place the angel. In any event, this is the interpretation taken in *Prot. Jas.* 11.1 – “She looked around her, to the right and to the left, (to see) where the voice was coming from” (*pothen hautē hē phōnē*).

All the other NT occurrences mean “of what sort, what kind,” synonymous with *poios* but with an intensive nuance, pointing to a distinctive category: “If this man were a prophet, he would know who and of what sort this woman is (*tis kai potapē hē gynē*) who is touching him and that she is a sinner” (Luke 7:39). The nuance is admiration in Mark 13:1 – “What stones, what a building!”; 2 Pet 3:11 – “Seeing that everything is to be dissolved in this way, what sort of people should you not be (*potapous dei hyparchein*) through the holiness of your conduct.” “What sort of persons” expresses originality and greatness, the distinctive nature of these great beings. It is almost an exclamation, as at 1 John 3:1 – “Behold what manner of (extraordinary) love the Father has given us (*potapēn agapēn dedōken hēmin*) that we should be called children of God; such we are.” Here *potapos* seems to combine three meanings: *qualis*, *quantus*, *unde*. The kind of love, *agapē*, that we are given is an exceptional, prodigiously generous love, coming from heaven; its nature is divine.

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ποτίζω

*potizō*, to cause or give to drink, water, irrigate

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*potizo*, S 4222; TDNT 6.159–160; EDNT 3.142; NIDNTT 2.274–275; MM 531; L&N 23.35, 43.9; BDF §§155(7), 159(1); BAGD 695

The first meaning of this verb, “cause to drink, give to someone to drink,” is used first of all for people. Lot’s daughters decide, “Let us cause our father to drink wine” (Gen 19:32–35; hiphil of Hebrew *šāqāh*); Hagar “gave the boy to drink”; a physician “gave the patient pure wine to drink” (Hippocrates, *Aph.* 7.46) and occasionally administered his potion badly. When Jesus was crucified, a soldier took a sponge, soaked it with vinegar, fastened it to a reed, and “gave him to drink” (*epotizen auton*, Matt 27:48; Mark 15:36), thus fulfilling the prophecy of Ps 69:21. Animals are watered: “On the Sabbath day, does not everyone water his ox or ass?” *Potizō*, finally, is used for the water that waters and moistens the surface of the ground (Gen 2:6; 13:10), a garden (2:10; Deut 11:10), a vineyard (Isa 27:3), trees (Eccl 2:6; Sir 24:31), plants.

In the papyri, the verb is constantly used in the sense of “irrigate”; and in the third century BC (*P.Cair.Zen.* 59155, 3; *P.Tebt.* 787, 26; *P.Haun.* 9, 3); “water the ground immediately by hand” (*eutheōs potison tēn gēn apo cheros*, SB 6733, 3; cf. *P.Stras.* 193, 5); Psentae writes Zeno, “I irrigated (*soi epotisa*) half of the thousand *arourai* for you” (*P.Lond.* 2061, 3); “the water in the canal has not risen more than a cubit, so the ground has not been irrigated” (*potizesthai*, *Pap.Lugd.Bat.* XX, A, p. 266; *P.Wisc.* 77, 37).

By making God the subject of this verb, the LXX gives it a religious value: “I will give water in the desert and streams in the steppe to water my people, my chosen” (Isa 43:20); “God waters the sons of Adam with the torrent of his delights” (Ps 36:8); “floods of abundance” (78:15). Wisdom gives her disciple “the water of wisdom” to drink. Hence the catechetical commands that are taken over by the NT: “Whoever shall give one of these little ones even a glass of cold water to drink (*hos ean potisē*) because he is a disciple, truly I tell you, that one shall not lose his reward” (Matt 10:42; Mark 9:41). In the parable of the Last Judgment: “I was thirsty and you did not give me anything to drink” (Matt 25:35, 37, 42)!

St. Paul uses the verb metaphorically: “I have given you milk to drink (*gala hymas epotisa*), not solid food” (1 Cor 3:2); the image of the milk diet reserved for babies was current as a way of referring to elementary teaching, as opposed to the deeper doctrine fed on by the “spirituals.” “I planted, Apollos watered (*epotisen*), but God gave the increase. Now neither is the one who plants anything, nor the one who waters (*ho potizōn*), but the one who gives the increase, namely, God. The one who plants and the one who waters (*ho potizōn*) are but one ... but each one will receive his own wage in proportion to his own labor.” The one who waters only works from the outside, but his *kopos*

– which is tiring and useful – merits a reward, because he contributes to the fruitfulness of the planting.

The most important text from the theological point of view is the one where the apostle compares the church to the human organism, its unity and the solidarity of its members: “We have all been watered by one Spirit” (*pantes hen Pneuma epotisthēmen*, 1 Cor 12:13). This aorist passive refers to baptism (cf. *ebaptisthēmen*), which infuses new life and new power. Compare the image of drinking in John 7:37–39: “If anyone thirsts, let him come to me and drink ... rivers of living water will flow from within him (Isa 48:21). He said this concerning the Spirit that those who believed in him were going to receive” (John 4:13–14). The filling of the Holy Spirit causes effects comparable to those of drunkenness (cf. Acts 2:13 – “they are full of new wine”), but it is poured out from heaven: “The gifts of God, brought by the blowing (*epipneusthenta*) of the highest graces” (Philo, *Prelim. Stud.* 38). From there on, the apostle’s thought was inspired not only by the OT, where God gives water to his own, but by the current of thought flowing from Philo, who had often underlined this teaching: “Melchizedek brings wine instead of water, and he gives it to souls to drink unmixed so that they may find themselves possessed by a divine drunkenness that is more sober than sobriety itself.” Those who are still at the preliminary stage of instruction, “thirsty as they are for knowledge, settle near the sciences that can quench their thirst and water their souls” (*potizein tas psychas autōn*, *Flight* 187); “This well is the divine wisdom, from which drink ... all souls that are enamored of contemplation, that are possessed by a love of perfection” (*Flight* 195); “The divine word goes forth like a wellspring of wisdom, after the fashion of a river, to water and irrigate the Olympian and celestial sprouts and plants of souls that are enamored of virtue, as if they were in Paradise” (*Dreams* 2.242).

So the choice of *potizō* in 1 Cor 12:13 suggests first of all fullness and abundance. (The corresponding French word, *abreuer*, often has this nuance of “fill” – hence the magnificence of God’s gift, which floods even the mountains [Ps 104:13] – or “inundate,” cover with waters that overflow or come flooding in.) There are also nuances of excellence, of fervor (cf. drinking in someone’s words) and gladness (Philo, cf. the fruit of the Holy Spirit, Gal 5:22); of fruitfulness (cf. John 6:53–54), because dry lands are watered so that they will be productive; and finally of immanence, impregnation, and assimilation, because if one drinks to quench one’s thirst, the thirst is not satisfied until the liquid is swallowed, absorbed.

*pragmateia*, (civic or cultic) business; *pragmateuomai*, to tend to business, manage profitably

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*pragmateia*, S 4230; TDNT 6.640–641; EDNT 3.144; NIDNTT 3.1155, 1158; MM 532; BAGD 697 | *pragmateuomai*, S 4231; TDNT 6.641–642; EDNT 3.144; NIDNTT 3.1155, 1158; MM 532; L&N 57.197; BAGD 697

In the LXX, the noun and the verb are both used almost exclusively for royal and cultic matters. *Pragmateia* retains the meaning of public business in the edict of Tiberius Julius Alexander, who, with respect to the farming of taxes (*telōneia*) and term leases (*misthōsis ousiakē*) acknowledges: “some harm to *ta pragmata* has resulted from the fact that many people without experience in such an activity (*toiautēs pragmateias*) have been compelled to undertake it” and orders: “It is fitting that those who are capable should carry out these activities (*pragmateuesthai*) of their own free will and with zeal.” But the broad meaning “occupation” (UPZ 9, 13; *P.Mich.* 174, 8; second century AD) is the definition in 2 Tim 2:4, which observes that no soldier involves himself in the affairs of this life (*empleketai tais tou biou pragmateiais*), conformably to the language of Philo, who uses *pragmateiai* for “the occupations that we live by.” In other worlds, the soldier on a campaign is engaged full-time, is on duty from morning to night and no longer occupies himself with working for his living. No other job demands such exclusive dedication to duty as that of the soldier.

The verb *pragmateuomai* can have the commonplace meanings “strive” (Plutarch, *Them.* 19.4; Josephus, *Ant.* 12.180), “give oneself over to one’s pursuits” (Xenophon, *Cyr.* 2.4.26; Philo, *Flacc.* 57; *P.Oxy.* 2106, 16), “be busy about a matter” to bring it to completion (Philo, *Dreams* 1.53; *P.Tebt.* 812, 9). In the papyri, its most common meaning is “carry out a function.” When it is a private matter, the *pragmateuomenos* is a businessman or agent; when it is public business, the participle describes the official (*P.Oxy.* 34, 2; *P.Hamb.* 168, a 12), especially in the royal administration and specifically the tax collector; all those who see to the king’s business.

Given on the one hand this title of nobility and financial specialization, and on the other hand the religious or cultic use of the verb in the LXX, we can see what an appropriate word this is in the parable of the ten minas: the nobleman gives ten minas to his servants, telling them, “Turn them to good account until I return” (*pragmateusasthe en hō erchomai*, Luke 19:13), i.e., put them to work earning returns in business or in the bank while I am away. The *douloi* here are not slaves, but free men, more specifically officials in the service of the claimant to the throne who must demonstrate their competence and faithfulness by drawing a profit from what they have received. The emphasis is on this

exploiting, this turning to good account; for this reason J. Dauvillier compared the parable to a provision in Sumero-Akkadian law, namely 99 in the Code of Hammurabi: the contract “for selling, buying, and investing for profit.” *Ussâp*, from the verb *apasu*, “increase,” is the distinctive element of the contract, referring to the profits to be made by the traveling agent who, in the course of his journeys will sell, then buy, then sell again and finally buy again; his enterprising spirit and his business acumen will allow him to realize considerable profits. So *pragmateuomai* means not “do business” but administrate, manage profitably the capital at your disposal.

### πράκτωρ, σπεκουλάτωρ

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*praktōr*, **court officer**; *spekoulatōr*, **attending soldier or bodyguard available for special assignments**

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*praktor*, S 4233; TDNT 6.642; EDNT 3.145; NIDNTT 3.1157; MM 533; L&N 37.92; BAGD 697 | *spekoulator*, S 4688; EDNT 3.263; MM 582; L&N 20.70, 33.196; BDF §§5(1b), 109(8); BAGD 761

“The judge will hand you over to the agent, and the agent will throw you in prison.” The debtor here is one who would be wise to reach an amicable settlement with his creditor, because if the creditor files suit, the debtor will certainly be sent to prison for his debts. The carrying out of the judge’s sentence is entrusted to the *praktōr*, which is sometimes translated “police soldier” sometimes “court officer.” Well-attested in Greece in the classical period, this official is charged with collecting monetary fines at the demand of the magistrate who imposes them. A good parallel would be our bailiff, then our tax collector. The office is copiously attested in the papyri from the Ptolemaic and Roman periods.

*Praktores* appear very frequently in the papyri from the third century AD as agents of courts of justice, either as tax collectors and receivers or as executors of private debts. In the former case: “Chrysippos, *praktōr*, asks that Asclepiades, son of Dorion, be forced to pay the (tax) money” (*P.Lille* 28, 13); in the latter, the complainant asks the *stratēgos* to make the *praktōr* intervene to recover what a certain Peithias owes him (*P.Magd.* 41, 5). Similarly, two tax collectors demand payment from Phileas for a debt of four silver drachmas (*P.Fay.* 14, 1; cf. *BGU* 530, 36). As a fiscal agent recovering debts owed the state, the *praktōr* is described as *praktōr tōn basilikōn (prosodōn)*; *UPZ* 153, 12, 24; 154, 11; 155, 12; *SB* 1178 a 12; 3937, 12; *P.Petr.* III, 26, 14–15). As a collector of private debts, he is called *praktōr tōn idiōtikōn*, but if *xenoi*

(resident aliens) are involved, he is called *praktōr tōn xenikōn*. Thus in a royal ordinance of the second century BC relating to taxes on transactions: “On slaves sold by the executors of private debts (*xenikōn praktores*), the buyers shall pay 19 drachmas per 100, in addition to the action fee of 1 percent” (*P.Col.* 480, 15). Having been assaulted and struck by Peithias, a complainant – who cannot file a lawsuit – asks the king to write the *stratēgos* to send the *xenikos praktōr* to “make Peithias pay the price of his violence and give it to me” (*P.Enteux.* 74, 17; cf. *P.Flor.* 55, 26; *P.Oxy.* 1203, 11; *BGU* 1325, 40; 1826, 47; 1827, 24; *PSI* 1105, 8; *P.Fam.Tebt.* 29, 15, 41; *P.Tebt.* 5, 221). These agents are stationed in particular towns (*P.Lund* IV, 1, 10; *P.Corn.* 16, 20; *O.Mich.* 126, 2; *P.Hamb.* 80, 1; 81, 1, 8; 82, 4; 83, 5; cf. *P.Ryl.* 659, 7), at Memphis (*UPZ* 118, 1, 15, 24), at Oxyrhynchus (*PSI* 1328, 5, 19, 61), at Bacchias (*SB* 11106, 3–4); thus it is easy for them to draw up papers; otherwise, they move (*P.Mich.* 505, 8; *P.Cair.Zen.* 59499, 46: *ho praktōr elthen pōlōn auten*; *P.Tebt.* 21, 3–5; 35, 8; *SB* 7244, 37; 7376, 20).

When the *praktōr* collects taxes in kind, he is *praktōr sitikōn*; for taxes payable in money, he is *praktōr argyrikōn*. But these taxes or imposts are almost beyond numbering. Thus there are *praktores dēmosiōn* (*P.Ryl.* 141, 6), *laographias* (*BGU* 1892, 75; *P.Mich.* 582, 16; *P.Alex.* 16, 2, 11; *P.Ryl.* 595, 1 and 189; from AD 57; *P.Col.* I, recto, 1 *a–b*; *SB* 1026, 15; cf. W. L. Westermann, C. W. Keyes, *Tax Lists and Transportation Receipts from Theadelphia*, New York, 1932, pp. 3 ff. *O.Oslo* 8, 3; 10, 3), *politikōn* (*PSI* 776, 2; *P.Oxy.* 1419, 2), *hierōn* (*P.Eleph.* 17, 5; 25, 2); *metropolitikōn* (*P.Oxy.* 1538, 18), *stephanikōn* (*aurum coronarium*; *BGU* 62; 362, 542; 548; *P.Lond.* 474, 477; *PSI* 733, 5 and 38; *P.Stras.* 199, 2; *SB* 10293, 16; *P.Oxy.* 1441, 1), *balaneiou* (*BGU* 362; *P.Rein.* 130; *SB* 10424, 1, from July 2, AD 65), *annōnas oxou* (*P.Mich.* 390, 4), *ousiakōn* (for the lands attached to estates, *P.Mich.* 599, 1), *gerdiakou* (the tax on weavers), *elaiou* (*P.Tebt.* 119, 54), *geōmetrias* (*P.Rein.* 134, 3; *O.Wilb.* 35–39), *chōmatikou* (tax on dikes, *P.Sorb.* 65, 1), *naubiou* (*P.Fam.Tebt.* 35, 4; *P.Oxf.* 9, 5), etc.

Obviously one official could not carry out all these tasks; so there were not only associates who together with him formed a board in a given locality – *hoi metochoi praktores* – but also numerous subordinates: *cheiristai* (*SB* 9203, 4; 9237, 1, 9, 25; *BGU* 345), *grammateis* (secretary, scribe, or clerk; *P.Sorb.* 65, 2; *P.Kroll* 2, 12), *boēthoi* (*O.Mich.* 6, 4; *Hermogenes boēthos tōn praktorōn*) and especially the *hypēretai*, who are by far the most commonly mentioned. These are often portrayed as assistants or adjuncts of the *praktōr* with the power to represent him and act in his name, hence having the same powers. In Matt 5:25, a parallel text to Luke 12:58, the judge hands over the recalcitrant debtor to a “beadle” or bailiff who has him incarcerated: *ho kritēs tō hypēretē* (cf. *UPZ*

118, 18, *tou kritēriou hypēretēs*). But the very term *hypēretēs* indicates that this is an underling, a subordinate officer. Furthermore, the *hypēretēs* is almost anonymous, whereas the *praktōr* is almost always named, because he is the titled officer. Finally, it is always mentioned that the action is done *dia praktorōn* (*P.Erl.* 48, 31; *P.Lond.* 2016, 9; *P.Brem.* 43 r 20, 29; *P.Bon.* 33, 4; *SB* 7196 r, col. VI, 13; v col. IV, 16; 8972, 2, 5, 8) or *meta praktorsi* (*P.Erl.* 105, 86) and that the debtors address and pay only them, whereas these expressions are never used with *hypēreteis*. In short, *hypēreteis* act on the orders of their superiors: *hypēretēs ho para tou praktoros* (*P.Hamb.* 168, a 19; third century BC).

Obviously, these tax collectors were not always tenderhearted folk, and sometimes they abused the modest circumstances (*metriotēs*) of those subject to them (*P.Ryl.* 659, 7); the latter are rightly or wrongly “disturbed” by their investigations and lodge complaints (*P.Lond.* 2008, 7; third century BC; cf. *P.Cair.Zen.* 59460). Abuses are inevitable (*PSI* 1160, 8). Sometimes it even happened that with the connivance of his secretary or the town secretary the *praktōr* tried to rip off a taxpayer (*Pap.Lugd.Bat.* XIII, 22, 7, 10, 16; *P.Mert.* 8, 19). But normally these court officers had the responsibility of carrying out judicial sentences; their functioning was strictly limited. For example, an ordinance of Ptolemy Euergetes II in 121–118 BC: “The collectors of private debts (*tous tōn xenikōn praktoras*) shall not arrest the royal farmers or their subordinate workers, nor the other subjects who according to earlier ordinances cannot be enslaved, under any pretext” (*P.Tebt.* 5, 222; cf. *P.Rein.* 18, 39–42). Already in the third century BC, *P.Hal.* I, 126 forbids the *praktōr* and his assistants from arresting members of the privileged classes (royal emissaries, etc.): *mēde ho praktōr mēde hoi hypēretai paralambanētōsan toutous*. During the time of Claudius or Nero, someone declares “he never gave an armed guard to a tax collector” (*oudenī dedōken tois praktōrois machairōphoron*, *P.Mich.* 577, 7).

Nevertheless, as we can see from Luke 12:58, it was indeed the *praktōr* to whom the magistrate gave the arrest warrant (cf. *P.Oslo* 20, 3; *P.Tebt.* 34) so as to put the debtor in prison (*desmōtērion*). It is surprising that imprisonment for debts was contemplated at this time, since an ordinance of Ptolemy VI Philometor or Ptolemy V Epiphanes (163 or 186 BC) had forbidden the practice, though only in Egypt: “None of the *stratēgoi*, *epistatai*, *epimeletai*, tax collectors, ... or other officials who manage the affairs of the king, the cities, and the temples shall arrest anyone for a private debt or offense or out of personal animosity” (*SB* 9316, col. II, 12). But was this execution of a writ against the person of the debtor ever actually suppressed? Not only do we see the practice eventually accepted by borrowers in the first century BC (*P.Oxy.*



1639, 16–17; *P.Yale* 60, 12–13; from the year 6–5) and actually carried out in AD 23 (*P.Oxy.* 259), but in 68, the edict of the prefect of Egypt, Tiberius Julius Alexander, has to intervene once again because of the imprisonment of debtors and reserve the *praktoreion* for debtors to the state alone: “As certain ones, under the pretext of serving the interests of the state, have had outstanding debts payable to others transferred to themselves and have imprisoned certain people in the *praktoreian* and in other prisons (*kai eis allas phylakas*), which I have heard were closed precisely in order that the recovery of debts should be carried out against property, not persons.... I order that in no case shall free men be incarcerated in any prison whatsoever (*eis phylakēn hēntinoun*), unless they are criminals, nor in the *praktoreion*, except for debtors to the imperial treasury.” These liberal measures must have been unknown in first-century Palestine.

The *spekoulatōr* occasionally appears together with the *telōnēs* and the *praktōr* in accounts from the second century AD (*P.Cair.Goodsp.* 30, col. VII, 31; cf. real estate registries from the fourth century, *P.Flor.* 71, 652, 763, 811). This official also carried out the functions of the tax collector in the fourth century, as in this sworn declaration: “To Valerius ... apion, *spekoulatōr* and gold and silver tax collector” (*spekoulatori apaitētē chrysou kai asēmou*, *P.Cair.Isid.* 127, 1; *P.Mich.* 644, 13). Hence the complaints about harrasing investigations in connection with the *embolē tou sitou* (*P.Oslo* 88, 20; *P.Oxy.* 1223, 21) and even outright accusations (*CPR* V, 2, n. 12, 4). This person is in effect an official with wide-ranging responsibilities (*P.Ross.Georg.* V, 61, 61 A verso 2 ff.; cf. I, 17, 22; *P.Oxy.* 3079, 6) and rather high in rank, since one is seen, still in the fourth century, addressing to the chief of police of Taampemou an order to immediately provide an ass and a guard to the sentinel he has sent to him (*P.Oxy.* 1193, 1). This appears to be a superior officer: “I handed you over to my lord Halladius, but also to my master Hesychius the *spekoulatōr*” (*parathēmēn de se kai tō kyriō mou Helladiō, alla kai tō despotē mou Hēsychiō tō spekoulatori*, *P.Oslo* 59, 9). He is associated with the *eparchos* (*P.Oxy.* 1223, 21), with the *dēmosioi iatroi* (*P.Harr.* 133), and with the *frumentarii*. He may have a certain amount of wealth, or at least freedom of action. In the fifth century, the *spekoulatōr* Gennadios invites “his lord Makarios” to dinner to celebrate the birth of his son (*P.Oxy.* 1214, 1). His dignity is apparent in the Lebanese inscription dedicated to the health and victory of the reigning sovereigns by “Severa ... wife of Theodoros, former *spekoulatōr*” (*apo spekoulatoros*, *IGLS* 2980; cf. *P.Mich.* 469, 24; *P.Laur.* 42, 4).

Such are the features of this personage, unknown in the LXX, that can be drawn from the papyri, all rather late. None of this matches the name of the office (Hellenized from the Latin *speculator*) or the picture in Mark 6:27 of a

low-ranking underling: “The king (Herod), immediately sent a guard (*spekoulatora*).... He went and decapitated him (John) in the prison, brought the head on a platter, and gave it to the young woman.” Etymologically, a *speculator* is one who looks (from afar), observes, then a scout, spy, explorer; finally, one who brings news, a messenger, courier. Since these men are always near the prince, waiting for his mail to be ready, they become bodyguards (Tacitus, *Hist.* 2.11; Suetonius, *Claud.* 35) and are called upon to perform quite varied services. In the imperial army, the *speculatores* perform different functions than in the pretorian guard (*CIL* III, 1650); they are attached to the headquarters staff of the provincial governor, under the orders of an *optio* (*CIL* 14137) with the rank of *principalis*. In a given legion (*CIL* VI, 3358: “*speculator exercitus Britannici*”) they constituted a “*schola speculatorum*” (ibid. III, 3524).

As underlings who were available for all sorts of assignments, *spekoulatōres* could carry out an execution. M. J. Lagrange compares Mark 6:27 to the Hebrew *rāšîm*, runner-bodyguards who sometimes served as executioners; thus “the king (Saul) said to the runners who were with him, ‘Turn around and put to death the priests of Yahweh’ ” (1 Sam 22:17; cf. 2 Kgs 10:25). This meaning of *speculator* is current in the first century in Latin authors: “The centurion in charge of the execution ordered the guard to sheathe his sword (*condere gladium speculatorem jubet*) and led the prisoner back” (Seneca, *Ira* 1.18.4); “During the civil war, a master who was on the list of the proscribed was hidden by his slave, who put the rings of the condemned man on his fingers and his clothing on his back. He presented himself thus to the police (*speculatoribus occurrit*), saying that he asked nothing more than that they should carry out their orders and stretched out his neck to them” (Seneca, *Ben.* 3.25). So also in the acts of the martyrs. At the moment of his execution, St. Paul prayed in Hebrew, and while he was praying, “as the *spekoulatōr* relieved him of his head, milk spurted into the soldier’s garments” (*hōs de apetinaxen autou ho spekoulatōr tēn kephalēn, gala epytisen eis tous chitōnas tou stratiōtou*, *Mart. Paul* 5; ed. Lipsius, p. 115, 17). In the *Acts of Appian*, the *spekoulatōr* could be a *speculator Augusti*, i.e., a member of the imperial bodyguards, chosen from the pretorian cohort.

So we must classify the *spekoulatōr* of Mark 6:27, a biblical hapax, as one of the Latinisms of the Second Gospel.

πραῦπάθεια, πραῦς, πραῦτης

*praypatheia*, **moderation, mildness, leniency**; *prays*, **moderate, mild, lenient**;  
*praytēs*, **moderation, mildness, leniency**

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*praupatheia*, TDNT 5.939; EDNT 3.146; MM 534; L&N 88.59; BAGD 698 | *praus*, S 4239; TDNT 6.645–651; EDNT 3.146–147; NIDNTT 2.256–264; MM 534; L&N 88.60; BDF §§26, 47(4); BAGD 698–699 | *prautes*, S 4240; TDNT 6.645–651; EDNT 3.146–147; NIDNTT 2.256–259; MM 534; L&N 88.59; BDF §§26, 47(4); BAGD 699; ND 4.170

These terms, which have no etymology, are used relatively little in the inscriptions and are exceptional in the papyri; they belong to the literary language, where they have a rather curious semantic evolution. To be sure, their meaning has to do with mildness, but that definition is rather loose.

*Praos*, a word that is not found in Homer, appears for the first time in Herodotus, but it is the verb *praynō* that is originally most used. In Ps.-Homer, *H. Hermes* 1.417, Apollo, who is angry, lets himself be calmed by the lyre; in Hesiod, patient mules are tamed (Hesiod, *Op.* 797; *Th.* 254). Xerxes seeks to calm his team (Aeschylus, *Pers.* 190; cf. Xenophon, *Eq.* 9.10: calm a horse); Darius counsels Atossa to calm their son with gentle words. In medicine, *praynō* expresses the diminution of evil: “the fever lessened.”

In the classical period, *praotēs*, a calm and soothing disposition, is contrasted with rage and savagery (Plato, *Symp.* 197 d). It implies moderation (Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1125 b), which permits reconciliation (Chilon, in Stobaeus 4.7.24; vol. 4, p. 255). Solon makes it a precept: “Be mild toward your own” (*pros isthi*, Stobaeus 3.1.72; vol. 3, p. 115). Hero is a beneficent sovereign who is “full of mildness toward the citizens” (Pindar, *Pyth.* 3.71); and for the first time the kindnesses of this quality are specified: Jason, exuding affable words with a mild voice, set forth the bases of a conciliating debate (*Pyth.* 4.136). The *praotēs* of the Spartan general Brasidas gained everyone’s sympathy.

In the orators, *praotēs* becomes a leniency and an indulgence – which is not without naivete – that is characteristic of the natural goodness of the Athenians. Andocides, for example, owes his impunity to the Athenians and their lack of leisure (Lysias, *C. Andoc.* 34); “The leniency of your character, Athenians, gives great help to the guilty” (Demosthenes, *C. Mid.* 184; cf. *Embassy* 104; *C. Timocr.* 51); “Will their impudent and criminal acts find leniency with you?” This forbearance, which implies mutual aid between associates, is the mark and the virtue of a political regime: “In a democracy, there is more mildness (than in an oligarchy)”; laws are rigorously established, but “in punishment there is more leniency than the laws ordain.” Also, *praotēs* is synonymous with “moderation”; it makes rulers more accommodating and humane. “I want to urge you ... to try mildness and humaneness.... Harshness (*chalepotēs*) is painful for those who practice it and those who suffer it; *praotēs* is well esteemed with humans and all other living beings” (Isocrates, *Phil.* 116); it

“mellows” all relations (Isocrates, *Paneg.* 47; cf. 102; Xenophon, *Cyr.* 2.1.29) between citizens (Plato, *Resp.* 2.375 c) even while it remains implacable toward enemies (*Tim.* 18 a). Thus *praotēs* spreads throughout the land (Isocrates, *Evag.* 49, 67; *Hel.* 37) and even adversaries are won over (Xenophon, *Ages.* 1.1.20). In AD 41, Emperor Claudius asks the Alexandrians to live with the Jews in mutual kindness: “If both sides will abstain from these things and live with mildness and philanthropy toward each other” (*ean toutōn apostantes amphoteroi meta praotētos kai philanthrōpeias tēs pros allēlous zēn ethelēsēte*, *P.Lond.* 1912, 101).

Since *praotēs* is opposed to roughness and severity, corrects violence and the excesses of tyranny, and moves judges and the powerful to clemency, it became a constant epithet for the emperor, kings, and high officials. Agrippa considered it to be a trait of royalty more than a virtue (Josephus, *Ant.* 19.334). Plato attributed it to the kings of Atlantis (*Critias* 120 e); Agesilaus was indulgent toward private offenses and very mild toward his friends (Xenophon, *Ages.* 11.6.10; cf. 2). At Syracuse, Hiero II “settled the situation with such moderation (*praos*) and generosity that the Syracusans ... made him their general” (Polybius 1.8.4). Ptolemy VI Philometor, more than anyone else, was mild and good (Polybius 39.7.3; with Philip V, this meekness was a mere facade, 10.26.1). Demetrius had “a certain *praotēs* that drew all hearts toward him” (Diodorus Siculus 19.81.4; cf. 11.67.3). According to Philodemus of Gadara, the *praotēs* of the good king, who does not take vengeance for plots, wins sympathy.

With Plato and Aristotle the contours of *praotēs* come into focus. The former sees it as a quality of the good person (*Leg.* 5.731 d); the latter makes it a virtue, contrasting it with wrath and vengeance; the *praos* is inclined to forgive (*Eth. Nic.* 4.11.1125.; *Rh.* 2.3.1380; Ps.-Aristotle, *Mag. Mor.* 2.7.1108). *Praotēs* is without hatred and spitefulness (Plato, *Resp.* 6.500 a) and moderates the punishment of offenses (*Leg.* 9.863 d). But – and this is a notable innovation – the *praos* keeps his serenity in all the misfortunes that come his way, bearing them calmly and patiently: the wise man, if he happens to lose a son, a brother, wealth, “bears it as mildly as possible.” In a privileged fashion, the teacher learns *praotēs* by remaining patient in the face of the errors and objections of his interlocutors: “Only put more mildness into your teaching so as not to force me to abandon it.”

Menander shows how Cnemon, who is awkward and surly (*chalepos*, *dyskolos*), became accommodating; his *praotēs* is the victory of goodwill. But in Plutarch “*praotēs* has the place of honor” to an exceptional degree, as J. de Romilly puts it. He praises it in almost all his heroes and states that “deliberateness and mildness are the essential qualities of the statesman and are

passed on to him by reason and education” (*Cor.* 15.4). Nicocles had said, “Temperament alone does not make sovereigns severe or mild.... Have less confidence in my mildness than in your virtue” (Isocrates, *Nic.* 3.55), and Epictetus 3.20.9 emphasizes that the trainer exercises the athlete’s patience, calmness, and mildness (*to anektikon, to aorgēton, to praon*). Likewise animals are taught to remain calm and docile, barbarians are “tamed” when they are made milder (*exeprayne*, Plutarch, *De Alex. fort.* 330 a), and honest people learn to maintain their serenity: “the person who is accustomed to apply himself to affairs with flexibility and moderation is very mild and agreeable in his dealings with other people” (*eukolōtatos ... kai praotatos, De tranq. anim.* 7.468 e; cf. *De frat. amor.* 17.488 b). This implies submission to reason (*De cohib. ira* 1.453b–c), moderation of the passions (*praotēs pathōn, De prof. in virt.* 83 e; cf. 78 b; 80 b–c), and self-mastery (*Fab.* 17.7). But then this balance between insensitivity and cruelty (*De virt. mor.* 445 a) is a virtue that is put between courage and justice (*ibid.* 2.441 b), and even a divine virtue, superior to purely intellectual qualities.

The *praos* has a mild look (Plutarch, *De cohib. ira* 6.456 a), a smiling countenance (4.455 a–b), a soft voice (Xenophon, *Symp.* 1.10), a tranquil demeanor (*praotēs poreias, Per.* 5.1; *Fab.* 17.7); is accommodating and affable (*Aristides* 23.1), courteous (*Alex.* 58.8), charming and gracious (*Ages.* 20.7; *Aem.* 3.6), but also quiet and reserved (*De frat. amor.* 16.487 c), and at the same time easygoing and welcoming toward all (*Praec. ger. rei publ.* 32.823 f). His character is conciliatory. He does not like quarrels (*Lyc.* 25.4) and remains patient as Socrates was toward a shrewish wife and stupid children (*Cat. Mai.* 20.3). In the event of a misunderstanding, he is not slow to be reconciled (*De frat. amor.* 18.489 c). His simple and affable ways (*Conv. sept. sap.* 3.148 d) may captivate opponents (*De frat. amor.* 16.487 c; cf. *Luc.* 29.6; *Pomp.* 33.2); this is the triumph of *praotēs*, because “the characteristic of mildness, pardon, and reconciliation, is to lift up, save, spare, fortify” (*De cohib. ira* 10.458 c).

Philo had already emphasized most of these traits, but meekness was not really part of his theological vocabulary (he preferred *hēmerotēs*). The virtue of *praotēs* is put in action with peace and calmness (Philo, *Moses* 1.328, 2.279; *hēsychē te kai praōs, Creation* 81) and moderation that come easier with age, when the passions are more tamed (103, *epieikeia kai praotēs*; cf. Dio Cassius 55.12). Thus it presupposes self-mastery (*Sacr. Abel and Cain* 27) and translates into a friendly look and a soft voice (*Moses* 1.331; *Abraham* 153). Philo emphasizes tranquility, affability, and a sort of mellowness; the virtue is not to be impassible to or thrown into convulsions by misfortune, but to moderate one’s feelings, to “lighten the weight of events in quietness and calm” (*hēsychē kai praōs, Abraham* 257). The fat from the breast of the sacrificial

victims, which is reserved for the priests, symbolizes “gentle mildness” (*Spec. Laws* 1.145). Masters are gentle with servants (*Decalogue* 167). Prudence “takes care to remain in kindness, mildness, and affability” (*tēn eumenē kai praeian kai hileōn*, *Alleg. Interp.* 1.66). This discretion was that shown by Macro in reprimanding Gaius quietly and mildly (*hēsychē kai praōs*), bending over to speak in his ear so that no one else would hear (*Philo, To Gaius* 43). We might also say that this is God’s discretion.

In light of the secular parallels, it is not surprising that the OT attributed *praytēs* to Moses (Num 12:3; Sir 45:4; cf. Josephus, *Ant.* 3.97, 316) to David (Ps 132:1), to Artaxerxes (Esth 5:1 *e*), to the high priest Onias (2 Macc 15:12), and to the Messiah. It is surprising, however, to see the LXX uses *prays* and *praytēs* exclusively to translate the Hebrew words *ʾānāw*, *ʾānī*, *nāwāh*, *ʾānāh*, always expressing humility and abasement; *prays* is even synonymous with *tapeinos* (Isa 26:6; cf. Sir 10:14) to the point that unlike *chrēstotēs*, *praytēs* is never attributed to God. This new meaning appears in the first occurrence of the term, regarding Moses, who was “very *prays* (Hebrew *ʾānāw*), the most *prays* man on earth” (Num 12:3). This can hardly have to do with “non-violence” – since the mediator of the covenant, in resisting Pharaoh’s oppression, had killed an Egyptian (Exod 2:12) – rather, it means a religious quality involving radical submission to God and modesty in dealings with other people. As it happens, Moses shows “clemency” by praying for his sister Miriam when she is stricken with leprosy after plotting against him. It is worth noting that apart from Dan 4:19 (a soft voice), the OT never uses *prays* with a secular meaning. The *praeis* are the “humble of the earth” (Job 24:4), the abased, the poor, exploited by the wicked, to whom they have to give in. Therefore they are blessed by God (Zeph 3:12), who teaches them (Ps 25:9; cf. Matt 11:25), saves them (Ps 76:9; 147:6; 149:4), relieves them on the day of misfortune (Ps 94:13, *praynō*), and finally “toppling the thrones of princes makes the *praeis* sit in their stead” (Sir 10:14; cf. Luke 1:51–53). These “humble possess the land” (Ps 37:11) and rejoice to hear Yahweh’s praise (Ps 34:2). These, then, are religious people, whose outstanding model will be the Messiah-King, who appears not proudly on a noble war-horse but “humble, mounted on an ass,” to enter his capital (Zech 9:9; cf. Matt 21:5).

OT *praytēs* is perfect submission to the divine will (Ps 132:1), and the Lord loves the combination of faithfulness and meekness (Sir 1:27; 45:4) that characterizes his people. In contrast to prideful exaltation, these folk always remain modest (Sir 10:28); if a poor person accosts them, they reply gently (Sir 4:8); if a woman expresses herself with modesty, her husband is no common mortal (Sir 36:23)! This absence of any immoderation characterized Onias, “of modest bearing and gentle manner (*praon de ton tropon*), distinguished in his

speech and gifted from childhood with all the practices of virtue” (2 Macc 15:12). A person who conducts himself in that manner is loved by all people who are accepted by God (Sir 3:17). This is no longer a matter of self-mastery or of reining in one’s anger, but of a heart disposition and comportment characterized by restraint and modesty. It is the distinctive mark of souls that belong to God and “fear” him, have a sense of his transcendence and of their own poverty. Having been tested, they have acquired an approachable manner, measured speech, reserved attitudes. Their *praytēs* is not so much mildness as indulgence (French *mansuétude*). The Latin word *mansuetudo* derives from *mansuesco*, literally, “accustom to the hand,” hence “tame”; so *mansuetudo*, “taming,” came to mean serene receptiveness, as opposed to impetuosity or insolence, hostility or gruffness. It is in a way the docile and respectful attitude of a servant toward his master, always ready to submit.

If the NT heightens and focuses these essential meanings, it does not change them by making *praytēs* a major Christian virtue. It is notable that this noun is unknown in the Gospels and the adjective *prays* is found only in Matt (and at 1 Pet 3:4), but with remarkable significance: “Blessed are the *praeis*, because they shall inherit the earth.” This is a resumption of Ps 37:11, where *praeis* translates the Hebrew *‘nāwīm*. So it means the poor, the small, the persecuted, and better – as the Syrians understood – the “humble” in the moral sense. It is not the sociological condition that is exalted, but religious submission and confidence in God, which translates into patience and mildness. The stable happiness of peace and security that is promised them is “possession of the land,” not occupation of the land (of promise), the land of Israel in the political sense; still less “all the land,” the whole world, but entrance into the kingdom of God here below and ultimately in heaven. The “inheritance” here is blessedness for the destitute who have looked to God for everything.

Totally submissive toward God and meek toward people, Jesus presented himself as “meek and lowly of heart” (*prays kai tapeinos tē kardia*) and on these grounds invites people to receive his teaching (Matt 11:29). Thus he reveals his innermost soul, but he also takes up a tradition that is constant from Pindar and Isocrates and that attributes *praytēs* to teachers. Far from being despotic, the Master must be patient and discreet toward his students lest he discourage or offend them; in his condescension he puts himself on their level and answers their problems, being at their service. At the entrance of the Messiah-King into his capital on Palm Sunday, Matt 21:5 quotes Zech 9:9 – “Your king comes to you, humble (*prays*, Hebrew *‘ānî*), mounted on the foal of an ass,” the mount of the poor, and not on a horse, the warrior’s noble mount.

Using a bold metaphor, 1 Pet 3:4, addressing Christians, appeals to “the secret person, the one of the heart, in the incorruptibility of a meek and calm

spirit.” These women are to accept the dependency they are in vis-à-vis their husbands, whom they hope to convert to the faith (cf. the beatitude of the meek, Matt 5:4), with the help of the meekness that disarms opponents (2 Tim 2:25), according to Israel’s experience (Ps 149:4–5). Aware of their weakness, docile, and submissive, these Christian women are “poor” folk who know no bitter zeal. They are often mistreated, even insulted, but they remain peaceful (Titus 3:2) and disposed to forgive (2 Cor 10:1; Gal 6:1). Like the Messiah, they neither dispute nor cry out (Matt 11:29; 12:19). Thus they imitate the Suffering Servant and obtain the victory of good over evil.

As for *praytēs* (eleven times in the epistles), it is first of all the characteristic of the apostle. “What do you want? Shall I come to you with a rod, or with love and in a spirit of meekness?” (*ē en agapē pneumati te praytētos*) is almost a quotation of Job 37:13, where God’s will is realized either by the rod (Hebrew *šēheṭ*) or by lovingkindness (*hesed*) linked with justice; but St. Paul links *praytēs* and *agapē*. If the *rhabdos* (rod), used for punishment, symbolizes Israelite and Greek education, the apostle’s love is that of a father, without violence, all gentleness and serenity; it persuades rather than rails. Moreover, it is not the man who commands; St. Paul exhorts “by the meekness and gentleness of Christ” (*dia tēs praytētos kai epieikeias tou Christou*), setting these opposite submission, because *praytēs* disarms opponents.

This meekness is poured out into the hearts of all Christians by the Holy Spirit, and it is what maintains unity and harmony between all members of the community: “I urge you ... to lead a life worthy of the calling that you have received, in all humility, meekness, and patience; bear with one another with love” without grumbling. “You, God’s chosen ones, put on compassion, kindness, humility, meekness, patience; bear with one another and forgive one another, if anyone has a complaint against another.” So if one member of the community “is taken in a fault, you who are spiritual must restore him in a spirit of meekness, taking care for yourselves, for you yourselves are also capable of being tempted.”

The *praytēs* of believers cannot be confined to relations with other Christians; it has to extend to all people. “Remind the faithful not to slander anyone, not to be quarrelsome, but conciliatory (*epieikeis*), showing constant humility toward all people.” This receptiveness toward one’s neighbor, this affability, this kindness in relations, which are manifestations of love (*agapē*), must be plain for all to see: “Who among you is wise and understanding? Let him show it by good conduct, by acts marked with the humility that belongs to wisdom” (*en praytēti sophias*, Jas 3:13). This then is a characteristic of



Christian comportment, a touchstone of a person who possesses *agapē*; such a person cannot be other than *prays*.

This virtue, which is required in teachers (Matt 11:29) and educators (2 Cor 10:1; Gal 6:1) because it is persuasive (Matt 5:4), is especially necessary in dealings with the undisciplined or refractory: “A servant of the Lord must be not combative but affable (*ēpios*) toward all ... instructing opponents with humility” (2 Tim 2:25). After all, such people may be acting in good faith, so their objections must be accepted with patience, without annoyance. Through meekness, which unites humility and clemency (cf. Dio Cassius 48.3; 55.12, 17), one can remain calm and bring back the errant and the guilty. The aim is to save souls, not to triumph over a conquest. This is the same attitude that 1 Pet 3:15 commands for all believers: “always ready to give an answer to anyone who asks the reason for the hope that is in you, always with humility and respect.”

*Praypathia* (a biblical hapax), which seems to be synonymous with *praytēs*, is commended by St. Paul to Timothy: “Man of God ... pursue righteousness, piety, faith, love, constancy, meekness” (1 Tim 6:11), all indispensable virtues for the pastor who will be serene, accessible to all, not given to violent reaction, fomenting peace.

## πρεσβεία, πρεσβεύω

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*presbeia*, **embassy, delegation**; *presbeuō*, **to act as ambassador**

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*presbeia*, S 4242; *EDNT* 3.147–148; *NIDNTT* 1.192–193, 197; MM 534; L&N 37.87; BAGD 699 | *presbeuo*, S 4243; *TDNT* 6.681–683; *EDNT* 3.147–148; *NIDNTT* 1.192–194, 197; MM 534; L&N 37.87; BAGD 699

A *presbeutēs* can be an emissary, a messenger, an envoy (2 Chr 32:31; 1 Macc 13:21; 14:21, 22, 40; 15:17), like a *presbys*, hence a mere spokesman; but normally, in the Hellenistic period, this was an ambassador in the full sense of the word, sent by the Greek cities to each other and to the kings.

The role of these emissaries could vary – according to *P.Cair.Zen.* 60, 5, there was a “treaty on embassies.” Sometimes they were tools in political intrigue, as when some fellow citizens of a claimant to the throne “sent an embassy after him (*apestēilan presbeian*) to say, ‘We do not want this man to reign over us’ ”; sometimes they defended financial interests, as at Samos in the third century BC, where “the citizens called for an embassy to be sent to Antiochus to recover their property and Boulagoras was designated ambassador ... and performed with absolute zeal and devotion” (*SEG* I, 366, 9). Usually

they establish or strengthen good relations between cities and above all negotiated treaties of alliance and friendship (1 Macc 4:11; cf. 8:17; 15:17). It is in this sense that, finding himself in an inferior position, a king under attack “sends an embassy (*presbeian aposteilas*) to sue for peace.” Examples are common. Deut 20:10–12 prescribes: “When you draw near to a city to do battle with it, you shall invite it to come to terms ... if it does not make peace with you, if it goes to war against you, you shall besiege it,” which Josephus paraphrases, “When you are about to go to war, send an embassy and heralds to those who are willingly hostile” (*mellontas de polemein presbeian kai kērykas pempein para tous hekousiōs polemious*, *Ant.* 4.296). “Trypho knew that Simon was on the verge of joining battle with him; he sent him messengers (*presbeis*)” to ask for the money that he claimed Jonathan owed (1 Macc 13:14). Around 200 BC, “when the Thracian, commanded by Zoltes, appeared with an army of consequence in Scythia, marching against the Greek cities that had submitted to Rhemaxos, Agathocles was elected ambassador. He crossed enemy territory, passing through a good number of tribes, not shrinking from danger, and he persuaded the barbarians not only to do our city no harm but also to track down and return all the livestock that had previously been carried off by the pirates.”

As for the verb *presbeuō*, it is used only twice in the Bible, by St. Paul, who uses it for an ambassador of Christ: “On Christ’s behalf, then, we are ambassadors (*hyper Christou oun presbeuomen*), given that God is urging through us (*di’ hēmōn*). We ask on behalf of Christ, be reconciled to God” (2 Cor 5:20); “Pray for me that I will be given an open mouth to announce boldly the mystery of the gospel, of which I am ambassador in chains” (*presbeuō en halysei*, Eph 6:20). The apostle gives himself a title of nobility, for a legate is a noteworthy personage, at the top of the military hierarchy, and *presbeuōn* and *presbeutēs* are technical terms for imperial legates in the Greek Orient. For example, in the second century AD, when Emperor Claudius acknowledges receipt of the “gold crown” that a gymnastic club sent him on the occasion of his victorious campaign in Britain, his letter ends thus: “The ambassadors were (*hoi presbeuontes ēsan*) Tib. Cl. Hermas, Tib. Cl. Cyrus, Dion son of Miccalos, an Antiochene” (*P.Lond.* 1178, 14; vol. 3, p. 216). A decree at Thespieae for young volunteer soldiers mentions the names of two delegates to the imperial authorities: “Envoys from the city (*hoi presbeuontes*): Eirenaios, Bentios. Eirenaios fulfilled this mission for the third time as a volunteer.”

That the apostle indeed means *presbeuō* in the full sense of the word is proven by the very way in which he describes his mission: (a) *hyper Christou*, on behalf of Christ (cf. *I.Priene* 108, 164: “he served as ambassador on behalf of the township” – *epresbeusen hyper tou dēmou*, 129 BC; Dittenberger, *Syl.* 591, 5; 656, 15; 805, 7: “having often served as ambassador on behalf of his

country” – *presbeusanta pollakis hyper tēs patrídos*); hence, not in the Lord’s place, but in his service; (b) the justification of this mission: “seeing that God exhorts through us.” The sovereign speaks through his ambassador (*di’ hēmōn*; cf. 1 Macc 10:51; Eph 6:19, *en anoixei tou stomatos mou*); the credit given the ambassador’s words corresponds with the authority of the sovereign. Paul is not the one who matters – he does not act in his own name, and his message does not originate with himself – he represents Christ, and when he speaks, his words are to be taken as coming from God; (c) the goal of the apostolic embassy is to offer reconciliation with God, and Paul begs his hearers to accept this offer. Ambassadors (*hoi presbeuontes*) inform (1 Macc 14:21; *I.Delos* 175, 2) in the same terms with which they have been instructed (1 Macc 10:51).

προβάλλω

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*proballō*, to bring or put forward, present; to bud

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*proballo*, S 4261; *EDNT* 3.152; MM 537; L&N 23.195; BAGD 702

At Ephesus, the Jews in the midst of the mob “pushed Alexander to the fore” (*proballontōn auton*, Acts 19:33). This meaning – “bring forth, present” – recurs constantly in the papyri and the inscriptions. “I had the misfortune of being nominated by the citizens as grain commissioner, although I was not of age to take on this *leitourgia* ... I was put forward by certain persons who were acting out of jealousy” (*P.Mich.* 23, 3; third century BC); “You were wrong to nominate us for the office of *ktēnarchos*” (*SB* 10202); “Having been officially presented by the inhabitants of the town for the above-mentioned jobs.”

In the LXX, the physical meaning “bring out, cast forward” is seen when the third Maccabee brother “stuck out his tongue as soon as they asked” (to cut it off, 2 Macc 7:10); when twenty youths throw themselves against the wall, when Razis “tore out his own entrails, took them with both hands, and threw them at the mob.” But in Judg 14:12, 13, 16, Samson sets forth a riddle.

None of these texts is analogous to the use of *proballō* in the parable of the Fig Tree, Luke 21:30. Where Mark 13:28 and Matt 24:32 have “when the leaves have come out” (*ekphyē*), Luke reads “when they have put forth.” Clearly this verb has a very wide range of meaning, and only the context can provide specificity. Here we must translate “when they are already budding.” The agricultural parallels from the first century have been cited. With respect to plants that flower and give off fragrances, Dioscorides, *Mat. Med.* 2.205: “in the summer it produces a milky-white flower” (*therous de galaktinon anthos proballei*); 4.50: “in the autumn the leaves produce a smell” (*proballei de kata*

to *phthinopōron ta phylla tragou osmēn*); Josephus, *Ant.* 4.226: “if the plants produce fruit before the fourth year” (*an karpon probalē ta phyta*); Epictetus 1.15.7: “Nothing great is produced suddenly, since it is not so even with the grape and the fig. If you said to me now, ‘I want a fig,’ I would answer that it takes time. Let the flowers appear first, then the fruit (*eita probalē ton karpon*), and finally let it ripen.” Since this meaning is not attested in the papyri, we must conclude that it belongs to literary Greek, where its usage attests to a traditional rhetorical topos.

## προβιβάζω

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*probibazō*, to instigate

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***probibazo***, S 4264; *EDNT* 3.153; MM 538; L&N 33.299; BAGD 703

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It is difficult to pin down the meaning of this NT hapax. When Herodias asks for the head of John the Baptist, Matt 14:8 specifies *probibastheisa hypo tēs mētros autēs*. This is usually taken to mean “urged on by her mother”; but the two occurrences in the LXX mean inculcate, instill in the mind (Exod 35:4, *hiphil* of the Hebrew *yārāh*; Deut 6:7, *piel* of the Hebrew *šānan*), and this is the meaning retained by F. Field. Even though it is attested by only a single Byzantine papyrus (*P.Lond.* 1708, 262), it will do here, with the idea being “upon her mother’s instigation.” Support comes from Musonius, replying to the objection “Is it not unreasonable for a man who is capable of influencing the young to study philosophy (*probibazein neous eis philosophian*) to work the earth or busy himself with manual labor?” (ed. C. E. Lutz, frag. 11, p. 82, 23).

These terms present no difficulty for interpreters. With some exceptions, they indicate a positive disposition, goodwill; the Koine usually uses them in the heightened sense of eagerness and ardor. This is the nuance when Eleazar declares: “I will prove worthy of my age, leaving to the young a noble example by dying well, willingly and generously, for the venerable and holy laws.”

Rather frequently one of these terms is used for the eager welcome in store for certain persons (Tob 7:8; Josephus, *Life* 142: foreigners welcomed at Tarichaea; *T. Job* 11.1), for a teaching, for events (Philo, *Abraham* 246), for petitions: “Whereas King Attalus ... gave an eager welcome to our requests (*epakousas prothymōs ta axioumena*) and sent the city 18,000 silver drachmas for the teaching of the children.” In various contexts, the nuance ranges from simple goodwill to cordiality to devotion to zeal; but almost always there is an

element of fervor, even enthusiasm (Diodorus Siculus 19.91.5), and in any event generosity – at least in biblical Greek.

In Sir 45:23, Phineas “by the goodness of his generous soul (*en agathotēti prothymias psychēs autou*) obtained pardon for Israel,” and in 2 Chr 29:31: “All those who were generous of heart (*pas prothymos tē kardia*) brought whole burnt offerings.” It is in this sense that the Lord contrasts the weak flesh with the *pneuma prothymon* (Mark 14:38; Matt 26:41); this ardor or eagerness of spirit is that of the apostles, who were resolved to remain faithful to Christ through whatever dangers might come; but in the presence of these dangers, the fragility of their “flesh” (*sarx*) became evident.

The four occurrences of *prothymia* in 2 Cor 8:11, 12, 19; 9:2 all have to do with the spontaneity, quickness, and generosity of heart evidenced in the Corinthians’ willingness to contribute to the collection for the saints at Jerusalem, a benevolent deed, but he urges them to translate this basic good intention (*hē prothymia tou thelein*) into action. In fact, all the texts insist that *prothymia* is active, puts intentions into effect (cf. *P.Oxy.* 2190, 6: “I did something worthy of the good intention” – *axion ti tēs prothymias epraxā*; first century AD); it must be deployed, demonstrated. In the fifth century AD, an Athenian decree honors the Samians “for their good conduct and their eagerness to do as much good as possible”; “carrying out the appointment with all eagerness” (*meta pasas prothymias tan apodexim poioumena*, Dittenberger, *Syl.* 532, 6; third century BC; *I.Bulg.* 659, 21; 2264, 7); a decree from the same period honors three ambassadors sent to Zalmodegikos, king of the Getae, because they “demonstrated limitless zeal (*pasan prothymian paraschomenoi*) and brought back more than sixty hostages” (*SEG XVIII*, 288, 9). It is not so much a matter of spontaneity (*Ep. Arist.* 226), or even ardor and zeal (*ibid.* 20; Josephus, *Ant.* 4.42), but of practical submission, loyal obedience to orders. Lysimachos acknowledges: “the people obeyed willingly”; likewise Attalus at Amlada, granting freedom to the hostages: “Since I have seen that you were sorry for your former offenses and that you submitted willingly to the orders of our government”; a *dioikētēs* writes to a subordinate: “It does not seem impossible if you devote yourselves wholeheartedly to the matters.” In AD 68, the prefect Tiberius Julius Alexander prescribes: “I want the people to be zealous in farming.”

If we keep in mind that most of these occurrences are found in honorific decrees, and that a certain number of them have religious meanings, we must conclude that Hellenistic *prothymia* is not only a widely used term, but a noble word that honors its possessor and is especially well-suited for functionaries, for public officials. We should place 1 Pet 5:2 in this context: “Shepherd the flock of God that is among you not out of compulsion (*anankastōs*) but

willingly (*hekousiōs*), not for shameful gain but out of devotion (*prothymōs*).” *Prothymia* here is spontaneous, disinterested, not “calculating,” as with Athenodoros of Rhodes, who “gave very devoted help to the grain commissioners, advancing money to them interest-free,” or people who “lend willingly and eagerly, with no intention of receiving anything back other than the capital” (Philo, *Virtues* 83). *Prothymia* describes not only the way one acts, but the spirit that inspires the action. It is the quality of a prince (*Spec. Laws* 4.170) and a benefactor.

## προκοπή, προκόπτω

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*prokopē*, **progress**; *prokoptō*, **to progress, advance**

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***prokope***, S 4297; TDNT 6.703–719; EDNT 3.157–158; NIDNTT 2.128, 130–131; MM 542; L&N 13.57; BAGD 707 | ***prokopto***, S 4298; TDNT 6.703–719; EDNT 3.157–158; NIDNTT 2.128, 130; MM 542; L&N 13.57, 42.18, 59.64, 67.118; BDF §308; BAGD 707–708; ND 2.95, 4.36

The substantive is unknown in classical Greek and the verb in the LXX. Both mean literally a move forward, an extension, and are used most often in the figurative sense of progress, growth, advancement.

The meaning is often neutral (“Night has advanced; day is near”), sometimes pejorative (heretics will constantly get worse – *prokopsousin epi to cheiron* – in the direction of impiety, 2 Tim 2:16); but usually it has to do with improvement and success. Philip, prefect of Jerusalem, learns that Judas Maccabeus was progressing little by little (*kata mikron eis prokopēn erchomenon*) and that his successes were becoming more and more frequent. This is the most common meaning of *prokoptō* in the epistolary papyri, where the writer expresses the hope that his correspondent will be well and will prosper: *errōsthai se euchomai kai prokoptein*; and it is in this sense of continual and effective advancement in knowledge and in morals that we read Gal 1:14 – “Progressing in Judaism more than most of those of my age in my nation, surpassing them in zeal for the traditions of my ancestors.”

Such progress becomes generally known and draws more and more esteem from those who know about it. Likewise, the arrest and trial of Paul turned out “rather for the advancement of the gospel, for throughout the praetorium and everywhere else, my chains have become well-known in Christ, and most of the brethren, encouraged in the Lord ... are proclaiming the word with increased boldness.” In Phil 1:25, the apostle’s presence should contribute to Christians’ progress and joy in the faith. This moral and religious meaning is ever clearer in

1 Tim 4:15 – “Let your progress be manifest to all.” Thanks to his training (verses 7–8), Timothy will no longer be seen as an inexperienced novice; he will progress continually.

Scholars traditionally mention that *prokopē* is a technical term in Stoic philosophy, and it is indeed true that this term is used for a person’s moral and spiritual evolution. According to Chrysippus, the sage is a person who is progressing (*prokoptōn*) from folly to wisdom, from vice to virtue. But if the Stoa contributed greatly to the spread of this term in the first century and used it for moral values (*hē prokopē pros aretēn*, Epictetus 1.4.3 ff.), this usage cannot be said to have influenced the NT writers, at least not directly, because the idea of *prokopē* was so generally current without reference to origin or technical signification. Thus Philo – who was knowledgeable about contemporary philosophy – defines moral progress as “that which is incomplete and strives for completion,” and distinguishes two or three classes of people: the perfect person (*ton teleion*) and the one who is progressing morally (*ton prokoptonta*) have a strong and ardent desire for the good and already share in the divine fixity and stability (*Dreams* 2.234–237); “for the wicked (*tōn phaulōn*), God is Lord and Master; for those who are progressing and improving (*tōn en prokopais kai beltiōsesi*) he is God; but for the best and most perfect (*tōn d’ aristōn kai teleiotatōn*), he is Lord and God” (*Change of Names* 19). If the capability for improvement and perfection (*Post. Cain* 78) never disappears (*Husbandry* 166; cf. Cleanthes, in Stobaeus, vol. 2, p. 65, 10), “all progress depends on God” (*Alleg. Interp.* 2.93; cf. *P.Lund* II, 1, 4 = *SB* 8088).

Epictetus sensibly observes: “It is ridiculous to imagine that one can progress in things that one knows nothing about” (2.17.4). Moreover, it is commonplace to keep track of progress in scientific knowledge, in moral education, and in the assimilation of wisdom. Ben Sirach says, “Progress came to me through wisdom.” Philo repeats that study and instruction make for progress toward perfection, and Josephus notes that wisdom produced progress in Daniel, Mishaël, and Abednego (*sophias en prokopē genomenous*, *Ant.* 10.189). It is in this sense that “Jesus grew in wisdom and in stature with God and with men.” We may cite this eulogy for a young citizen of Istropolis: “he laid a foundation for himself, progressing in stature and advancing toward godliness” (*hypestēsato tē te hēlikia prokoptōn kai proagomenos eis to theosebein*, Dittenberger, *Syl.* 708, 18; first century BC). And we might add this epitaph from Aphrodisia: “children who departed in the midst of progress.”

προπετής

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*propetēs*, recklessly hasty, impulsive (with overtones of injustice)

Certainty is impossible in translating the two NT occurrences of this adjective. At the riot at Ephesus, the clerk asks his fellow citizens to do nothing *propetes* (*mēden propetes prassein*, Acts 19:36), and according to 2 Tim 3:4, people in the last days will be *prodotai*, *propeteis*. Literally, the term means “fallen forward,” hence “inclined toward.” Figuratively, it expresses lack of control or quickness, in either a favorable or a pejorative sense; in the latter case, it means reckless precipitousness.

The adjective, unknown in the papyri, is used in the LXX only by the Wisdom writers for prattlers who talk without thinking, but the fact that they are abominated and promised ruin indicates that this is one of the gravest sins of speech; moreover, *propetēs* does not exactly match the original Hebrew.

With respect to action, the *proteteis* are those who are impulsive, who get carried away – like a bolting horse (cf. *proalēs*, Sir 30:8) – who cannot reason soundly and who make themselves known by their violence, people who wreck everything, who take wild chances. The Greeks grouped them with the reckless and the bold: *hoi thraseis propeteis* (Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 3.10.1116); “giving free rein to your recklessness and boldness” (*tē sautou propeteia kai thrasytēti*, Demosthenes, *C. Andr.* 22.63); “the Romans showed more boldness and daring” (*tharraleōteron kai propetesteron*, Polybius 3.102.11; contrasted with the prudence and circumspection of their adversaries); “quick to rush at everyone” (Xenophon, *Cyr.* 1.4.4, contrasted with *aidous*); “Cleitos, a bold and reckless young man” (*thrasys te kai propetēs neanias*, Josephus, *Life* 170); “Herod had enough self-control not to do something rash (*tou mē propetes ti poiēsai*) under the influence of passion.” At the beginning of the third century, a tax collector complains that his methods are criticized as unjust and violent (*prepetōs epi tauta*, *P.Oxy.* 3028, 7).

In light of these usages, we should understand the *propeteis* in 2 Tim 3:4 to be frenzied and unjust; and the Ephesian rioters are warned against not “reckless precipitousness” but uncontrolled or ill-considered aggression.

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### προσκαρτερέω, προσκαρτέρησις

*proskartereō*, **to be firm, endure, persevere, remain faithful to a person or a task; *proskarterēsis*, constancy, diligence, perseverance, persistence**

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*proskartereo*, S 4342; TDNT 3.618–619; EDNT 3.172; NIDNTT 2.767–768; MM 548; L&N 34.2, 35.28, 68.68; BDF §202; BAGD 715 | *proskarteresis*, S



4343; TDNT 3.619–620; EDNT 3.172; NIDNTT 2.767–768; MM 548; L&N 68.68; BAGD 715

Given the Koine's love for compound forms and its tendency to reinforce the expressivity of words, we might think that *proskartereō* would hardly differ from plain *kartereō* – “be firm and courageous, endure,” even “persevere” (2 Macc 7:17), which is the meaning of *proskartereō* in Tob 5:8 (in 8). When Moses commands the explorers of Canaan, “Be courageous” (Num 13:20), the LXX uses *proskarterēsantes* to translate the hiphil of the Hebrew *hāzaq*.

Nevertheless, the usage of *proskartereō* (usually with the dative) shows new connotations, whether of remaining faithfully attached to a person or of applying oneself exclusively to a certain thing, devoting oneself to it tirelessly. In the first case, Simon the sorcerer, after being baptized, stuck close to Philip (*ēn proskarterōn tō Philippō*, Acts 8:13); the centurion Cornelius calls one of the soldiers who is in his service. We may compare Mark 3:9, where Jesus asks his disciples “that a boat be kept ready for him” (*hina ploiarion proskarterē autō*), i.e., at his disposal, so that he may use it when he wants.

According to Rom 13:6, the tax officials constantly apply themselves to their task (*eis auto touto proskarterountes*). This diligence is already clear in Daniel, where the two elders frequent the house of Joakim (*houtoi prosekarteroun en tē oikia Iōakim*, Sus 6, Theodotion) and is not rare in the papyri: “The little one greets you; she is diligent in her studies” (*aspazetai se hē meikra kai proskarterei tois mathēmasi*, P.Brem. 63, 24). It is always a matter of persevering, not letting up, as is seen in the technical use of the verb in the legal vocabulary: the defendant and the complainant are at the disposition of the court until the final settlement of the suit, as in this summons from 104/5: “Let them keep themselves at the disposition of the court of the same governor until my claim against them is satisfied.” Thus *proskarterēsis* has a connotation of waiting without lapse, but with a nuance of stubbornness, like that of the tribe of Ephraim besieging Bethel (Josephus, *Ant.* 5.130), and finally the verb refers to the exertion of great efforts, especially in military language: “Epaminondas bade his soldiers hold fast” (Xenophon, *Hell.* 7.5.14); “the soldiers, by persevering (or “with great effort,” *proskarterēsantes*) dislodged four stone blocks” (Josephus, *War* 6.27); “the others pursued the operations with all their might” (Polybius 1.55.4; cf. Achilles Tatius 1.10.7: “if she remains obstinate, do not use force,” *kan men proskarterē, episches tēn bian*).

These components should be kept in mind when we look at the five NT texts that remark on or call for perseverance in prayer. The idea is constant diligence, effort that never lets up, confident waiting for results; and several times these

characteristics are emphasized by the periphrastic construction of the participle with the imperfect of the verb to be, showing continuity and suggesting perseverance that does not falter or fail: “these were all persevering with one accord in prayer” (*houtoi pantes ēsan proskarterountes homothymadon tē proseuchē*). When the apostles refuse to wait on tables so that they may devote themselves to prayer and the ministry of the word (Acts 6:4), their dedication has connotations of exclusivity. The application of the verb *proskartereō* to prayer, a usage without parallel in secular Greek and in the LXX, is original to the NT authors; its frequency points as much to an actual state of affairs in the primitive church as to an apostolic demand. It is regrettable that the theological treatises on prayer did not explore the richness of the meaning of this expression, because it is the apostolic translation of the Master’s precept “that they ought always to pray ... and never lose heart” (*to dein pantote proseuchesthai ... kai mē enkakein*, Luke 18:1; cf. 1 Thess 5:17).

The substantive *proskarterēsis*, “constancy, diligence, persistence” (Philodemus of Gadara, *Rh.* 1.11), unknown in the papyri, is a biblical hapax describing Christian prayer; it should be understood as having the same richness of meaning as the corresponding verb: “Live a life of prayer and supplication; pray always, in the Spirit. Keep at it with tireless perseverance (*eis auto agrypountes en pasē proskarterēsei*), with intercessions for all the saints” (Eph 6:18). The word is found again in Jewish acts of emancipation at Panticapaeum in AD 80 in a rather enigmatic formula: *chōris is tēn proseuchēn thōpeias te kai proskarterēseōs*; also *chōris tou proskarterein tē proseuchē epitropeuousēs tēs synagōgēs tōn Ioudaiōn kai theon sebōn*. We translate: the slave shall be free “except [for his obligation] to attend the prayer service regularly”; the Jewish synagogue is the best example of a place for prayer to God.

## προσλαμβάνομαι

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*proslambanomai*, **to take in addition, seize, conquer, take with oneself, aid, assist, take in, add, receive**

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*proslambanomai*, S 4355; TDNT 4.15; EDNT 3.175; NIDNTT 3.747–748, 750; MM 549–550; L&N 15.127, 15.167, 15.180, 18.2, 34.53; BDF §169(2); BAGD 717

This compound of *lambanō*, “take, receive, possess,” can keep the same meaning; for example, Heracles says to his son, “Take me here to lift me up” (Sophocles, *Trach.* 1024; cf. Aristophanes, *Lys.* 202). But at *Ach.* 1215 (“Take

[*labesthe*] my leg, take it again [*proslabesth'*], my friends”), Aristophanes retains the significance of *pros-* (“additionally”; Polybius 3.70.2; cf. Euripides, *Med.* 885; *Hipp.* 1011) added to the simple verb: “take in addition.” Thus one takes a food with one’s bread (Xenophon, *Mem.* 3.14.4; cf. *Symp.* 4.8) or “adds” dishonor to misfortune (Thucydides 5.111.3; *Tht.* 207 c; *Phdr.* 272 a). Hence the meanings “add, adjoin, bring along”: “Cyrus took with him a large number of horsemen and peltasts” (bearers of light shields, Xenophon, *Cyr.* 1.4.16); “If I had joined him to you as an ally” (*An.* 7.6.27; Sophocles, *OC* 378); then “come to the aid of”: Dio undertook a campaign against Dionysius and “with the help of the people (*proslabōn ton dēmon*) expelled him” (Aristotle, *Pol.* 5.10.32); and finally “take, conquer” cities or lands (Xenophon, *Hell.* 4.4.1). – In the middle voice, *proslambanomai* retains this latter meaning (Polybius 1.37.5), and likewise “take with oneself” (volunteers, Chariton, *Chaer.* 8.2.14); but above all it means “take part in an enterprise, come to the aid of, assist”: “It was right that you should lend me your help” (Plato, *Leg.* 10.897 d); “Clearchus put his own hand to the work ... men who had passed the age of thirty also took part.”

In the LXX, two occurrences have the meaning “add, adjoin,” one means “receive, accept” (those banished from Jerusalem, 2 Macc 10:15), and the other five have theological meanings. God is the subject of the verb, but in each case the underlying Hebrew is different: God decides to take Isr as his people (1 Sam 12:22; *’āsāh* with the double nuance of acquiring and instituting); “From on high he stretched forth his hand, he grasped me, he drew me out of the great waters” (Ps 18:16, Hebrew *māšāh*); “If my father and mother were to abandon me, Yahweh would take me in” (Ps 27:10, Hebrew *’āsap*); “Happy is the one whom you choose and take for yourself to abide with you in your court” (Ps 65:4, Hebrew *qārah*, bring near, present); “You will guide me with your counsel, and then afterward you will receive me in your glory” (Ps 73:24, Hebrew *lāqah*, “seize, take, conquer, carry off”). This usage in the Psalms shows that *proslambanō* is an element in Isr’s religious language and could not fail to have an influence on NT usage.

With Philo, the meaning “add” is predominant. An illness of the soul is added to bodily illness (*Unchang. God* 66; *Migr. Abr.* 55), sorrow to sorrow (*Moses* 2.225), new joys to past happiness (*Virtues* 67); if there are too few people in the household, one takes a neighbor in addition to eat the lamb (*Heir* 193); tax collectors add to their brutality the immunity that is assured by their masters’ directives. The nuances “to take for oneself” (Philo, *Sacr. Abel and Cain* 119), “acquire” (*Decalogue* 136; *Good Man Free* 12, 159) and “take to oneself” (*Plant.* 64) are well attested; but we may emphasize “to master” (*Conf. Tongues* 110, the passions) and “seize” (*To Gaius* 347). In Josephus, “add” is

less frequent, but “adjoin” (in the sense of taking on associates) and “receive help” recur endlessly; which attests the common social nuance of this verb in the first century. The meaning “take by force” is not absent: “the rebels sought to take the upper city in addition to the places that they already occupied” (War 2.424).

In the papyri, it is often a question of “receiving” what is due, but also of “adjoining” persons as witnesses (*P.Mert.* V, 32: “bringing with me the same Panas,” *proslabonta syn emoi ton auton Panan*), associates (*P.Dura* 13 a 10, *metochous proslabesai*), partners (*P.Oxy.* 3092, 4: *proslambanesthai autous koinōnous*; *P.Amh.* 100, 4: *proselabeto ton Kornēlion koinōnon*), or collaborators (*P.Fay.* 12, 10: *proslabomenos synergon Ammōnion*), who provide their services (*UPZ* 19, 25, *diakonein hēmin*) and their help (*P.Oxy.* 71, col. II, 9: *eis boētheian*). In 157 BC a new meaning appeared, “to enlist” in an army. A *prostagma* of Ptolemy VI Philometor and Cleopatra II says, “To Demetrius. Enlist (*proslabesthai*) Apollonius the Macedonian in the company of Dexilaos” (*P.Lond.* 23, 21; vol. 1, p. 38 = *UPZ* 14, 14; cf. 208, 3; 214, 1). Similarly, in the same period, an honorific decree for Orthagoras of Araxa: “Our people were quite zealous toward them (the people of Orloanda) to obtain their liberty and their integration (*proslēphthōsin*) into the confederation of the Lycian people.... By his action he contributed to their integration (*eis to proslēphthēnai autous*) into the community of Lycians.” This reception into a community is not merely official but also implies emotional ties (*UPZ* 144, 11: *proseilēpsai philon*), as in the marriage contract in *P.Mur.* 115, 5, from the second century AD: the husband “has agreed and concluded to reconcile anew and take back the same Salome ... as his legitimate wife.”

In the NT, the verb *proslambanō* is used only in the middle voice. The first text is difficult. When Jesus has announced his passion, Peter *proslabomenos auton* “began to rebuke him, saying, ‘God forbid, Master, it shall not be’ ” (Matt 16:22; Mark 8:32). How should this be translated? A. Schlatter cites Josephus, *Ant.* 18.4 as a parallel: Judas the Gaulanite “assured himself of the help of Saddok, a Pharisee” (*Saddōkon Pharisaion proslabomenos*). St. Matthew, however, comments on *proslabomenos* with “began to rebuke him,” and it is difficult to see how the aorist participle here could mean “come to the aid of, help” Jesus. Other moderns see here a synonym of *paralambanō*, “take along with oneself,” so that Peter “drew him aside” or “apart”; but this meaning is not attested. Why not refer instead to the numerous occurrences of this verb in the sense of “take by force, seize, master” and see here an illusion to the impetuosity of the apostle, who adds and opposes a claim against Christ’s affirmation, wanting to cause him to change his mind. This would account for the quite brusque character of Christ’s response: “Get behind me, adversary;

you are setting up a stumbling-block” (*skandalon*, Matt 16:23), an obstacle on the way of the cross.

On the other hand, the five occurrences in Acts are completely traditional. At Thessalonica, “jealous Jews took as allies (*proslabomenoi*) some wicked men” (Acts 17:5); at Ephesus, Priscilla and Aquila, after hearing Apollos, “took him with them (*proselabonta auton*) and explained the way of God to him more precisely” (18:26). At the end of the storm, St. Paul says to his companions, “Today is the fortieth day that you have been in suspense and fasting and have taken nothing *more* to eat” (*mēthen proslabomenoi*). When the apostle himself started to eat, “all were encouraged and also took food” (*autoi proselabonto trophēs*, 27:36). At Malta, “the barbarians showed us uncommon humaneness (*ou tēn tychousan philanthrōpian*) ... receiving (*proselabonto*) us all, because of the rain and cold that had come on” (28:2). Note well this link between kind and beneficent humaneness and reception. Nothing has less of a juridical flavor than help given to shipwreck victims. Here, the heart receives and helps the neighbor. In this same way *proslambanomai* became with Paul a Christian virtue.

In four occurrences, the apostle Paul uses the present or aorist middle imperative (*proslambanesthe*, *proslabou*) three times. “Receive the one who is weak in the faith.” This is not about taking aside a brother whose conduct is not in harmony with ours. The verb indicates that we must take him with us and introduce him warmly into our fellowship. This is more than a manifestation of brotherly love; it is a primitive requirement of the Christian religion, formulated thus: “The one who eats must not scorn the one who does not eat, and the one who does not eat must not judge the one who eats, because God has received him” (*ho theos gar auton proselabeto*, Rom 14:3). He has chosen him as his own, taking him from the world to make him a believer and bring him into his church. How can this divinely established brotherhood be refused? The new exhortation is “Receive then one another, just as Christ has received you, for the glory of God” (Rom 15:7). The two propositions correspond precisely: *dio proslambanesthe allēlous* on the one hand and *kathōs kai ho Christos proselabeto hymas* on the other. Christ’s welcome of all of his own without distinction with a view to the perfect unity of the community is the model for each Christian’s welcoming of all his fellow-Christians, and at the same time is an individual precept. This is an evocation of the hospitality which was the first manifestation of brotherly *agapē* in the primitive church and which must of course be present at the outset in every community.

In a concrete case, St. Paul tells Philemon to observe this principle towards Onesimus, a runaway slave who would normally have been punished. “If you have any regard for the bonds that unite us, receive him as if he were myself”

(*proslabou auton hōs eme*, Phlm 17). According to the previously cited texts, he is not only being asked to receive this guilty person into his house, nor simply to pardon him, but even to treat him with complete respect, generosity, and attentiveness. As a parallel we may cite *BGU* 1141, 37, from 34 BC: “Twice I received him into my house” (*dis proselabomēn auton eis oikon par’ eme*). We may add a Latin letter of recommendation addressed to a military tribune in the second century, in which Aurelius Archelaus commends to him his friend Theon: “I ask you, my lord, to look upon him as if he were myself, for he is such a man as should be loved by you.”

### προτρέπομαι

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*protrepomai*, to urge forward, stir up, exhort

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*protrepomai*, S 4389; *EDNT* 3.182; MM 554; L&N 33.300; BAGD 722

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*Protrepō*, “urge forward,” is used above all in the transitive and with a figurative meaning, “stir up, exhort.” Nevertheless, the aorist middle participle, which is a NT hapax at Acts 18:27, is not without difficulty: from Ephesus, since Apollos “wanted to pass over to Achaëa, the brethren exhorted (him) and wrote to the disciples to receive him.” This translation follows Chrysostom in supposing that *auton* should be understood between *protrepsamenoi* and *hoi adelphoi*, which is contrary to the usage in the papyri and the inscriptions. And why exhort Apollos, since he himself has the desire to go to Corinth (*boulomenou de autou dielthein*)? We could translate, “the brethren encouraged him,” but that is not exactly what the verb means. According to Codex Bezae and the Harclean Syriac, it was Corinthians at Ephesus who, having heard Apollos, asked him to come to their country (*parekaloun dielthein ... eis tēn patriδα autōn*); Apollos did not take the initiative for this apostolic mission. We can remove the difficulty by referring *protrepsamenoi* not to Apollos but to the Corinthians, who were urged to write a letter of recommendation (cf. Rom 16:1; 2 Cor 3:1 ff.; Col 4:10): having exhorted, the brothers wrote, or they wrote exhorting, or the brothers exhorted by means of a letter.

The papyri offer numerous parallels to this invitation to make a voyage: “Theon, my brother, salutes you and urges you (*protrepetai se*) to come to see us at Bacchias” (*P.Mich.* 496, 19); “urge brother Castor, if he is going to come” (*protrepsai Kastora, ean mellē elthein, embalesthai tous hēmeterous*, *SB* 7349, 6); “we urged him to come with us to survey the flood plains” (*proetrepsamen exelthein ham’ hēmeīn epi ton horismon tōn nēsōn*, *ibid.* 10649, 5); “I urged the father of one of them to come with us to you” (*proetrepsa men oun ton patera*

*tou henos autōn katelthein met' autōn pros se*, ibid. 9415, col. XVIII, 12); “when the envoy encouraged him and urged him to go to Egypt” (*tou presbeutou protrepsamenou kai parormēsantos eis Aigypton elthein*, Josephus, *Ant.* 12.166). The urging is a function of affection or admiration, as with *Pap.Lugd.Bat.* XVII, 16, *b* 15 – “for my friend urged me strongly” – and *SB* 7517, 6, where the subject of the verb is “benevolence”: “Your benevolence impels those who have been wronged to come to you fearlessly” (*hē sē eumeneia protrepetai tous adikēthentas aphobōs soi proseinai*).

The invitation is often very pressing, like the strong urging to serve in a *leitourgia*, to make payments or pay taxes (*P.Ryl.* 617, 12; *P.Ross.Georg.* III, 9, 10), to meet one’s obligations, to carry out tasks (*SB* 9102, 17), and especially to take on a responsibility. The verb occurs commonly in honorific decrees mentioning that an athlete was “stirred up” to take part in a competition or an official was urged to accept his office. It is possible that this noble sense of the word motivated the selection of this verb in Acts 18:27 to make the arrival of Apollos at Corinth somewhat official.

## πρόφασις

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*prophasis*, **a reason proffered, pretext, excuse**

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***prophasis***, S 4392; *EDNT* 3.182; MM 555; L&N 33.437, 88.230; BAGD 722

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Derived from *prophainō*, unknown in the OT (cf. 2 Macc 3:26), *prophasis* is used five times in the NT, always in a pejorative sense; four of the occurrences are datives of manner and circumstance, used adverbially. Its first meaning is “a reason that is proffered” without any psychological or moral connotation, but it is most commonly used to mean “pretext,” a motive set forth deceitfully, as with the sailors who “let down the boat to the sea on the pretext (*prophasei*) that they had to distance the anchors from the bow” (Acts 27:30); the sailors wanted to flee, and they used a false pretext, but St. Paul saw their true intent.

*Prophasis* often takes on this nuance of lying and pretense: one acts on a hidden motive under the cover of one that is perceptible or respectable. This fallacious character appears in Mark 12:40; Luke 20:47, denouncing the scribes who make a show of praying at length. This hypocrisy, rejected by St. Paul, is that of certain preachers denounced in Phil 1:18 whose intentions are not pure; they preach the gospel out of “envy and strife” (*dia phthonon kai erin*), then “out of selfish ambition” (*ex eritheias*), and finally “not from pure motives” (*ouch hagnōs*) and on a pretext (*prophasei*). This ministry is incited by jealousy, the purpose being to make the apostle’s chains heavier, that is, to

supplant him and undermine his authority. Other Christians “preach Christ out of goodwill, acting in love” (verses 15–16). The apostle concludes, “What does it matter? In one way or another, under pretext or in truth (*eite prophasei eite alētheia*), Christ is preached, and in that I rejoice.” This dichotomy between true and false motives is classical: *prophaseis anti tōn alēthōn pseudeis*.

*Prophasis* finally has the sense of excuse – valid or not – notably that of ignorance: *agnoias prophasin hypoteimēsamenos* (*P.Oxy.* 1119, 11). In this meaning, John 15:22 – “If I had not come and spoken to them, they would have no sin, but now they have not excuse for their sin” of willful blindness.

### προχειρίζομαι

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*procheirizomai*, **to choose ahead of time, establish, designate, appoint, destine**

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*procheirizomai*, S 4400; TDNT 6.862–864; EDNT 3.186; NIDNTT 1.475–476; MM 556; L&N 30.89; BAGD 724

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In secular Greek, this verb in the middle voice and with a personal object in the accusative means “choose ahead of time, establish, designate, destine.” In the LXX, it is used especially for people chosen beforehand for a certain mission; and, with the exception of Dan 3:22, it is a noble term, because those entrusted with a mission have been elected or appointed on account of their competence and integrity. They are trustworthy envoys, qualified representatives of God, or the king, or of some other high authority.

It is in this quasi-technical sense that Acts uses this verb – unknown in Philo and Josephus – regarding either Christ (“that God may send to you Jesus, the one predestined to be Messiah”) or Paul (“the God of our fathers chose you in advance [*procheirisato se*] to know his will,” Acts 22:14; “I have appeared to you to establish you as a minister and witness of the things that you have seen [*procheirisasthai se*] ...; the Gentiles to whom I am sending you [*apostellō*],” 26:16). An official appointing or delegating is always referred to. In the inscriptions and the papyri, the verb figures in the vocabulary of administration, referring to functionaries or persons officially chosen to carry out a certain function: Boulagoras, in the third century BC, was “chosen by the people several times (*procheiristheis te pleionakis hypo tou dēmou*) as their representative in public litigation” (*SEG* I, 366, 20); in the second century, the chief of police of a town makes his report regarding “one of the guards of Tebtunis who was appointed by Ptolemaeus, the district *archiphylaktēs*” (*tōn ek Tebtyneōs phylakitōn procheiristhentōn hypo Ptolemaiou*, *P.Tebt.* 731, 3); in



the first century, in a rental contract, it means that Demetrius must make payments to the broker or to the treasurer of the association, who will be appointed.

The perfect passive participle *prokecheirismenon* (Acts 3:20) is a stylistic element in formulas for registration. In AD 48, a contract was “recorded by [ ... ], adjunct to Theon, the delegate of the association of *agoranomoi*.” In 53, in a sworn agreement, six elders, farmers of the province of Oxyrhynchus, “swear to the officially constituted inspectors of sowing for the nome.” From the same year we have the identical declaration of five elders, farmers from the village of Ares (*P.Fouad* 19, 6). Sometimes it is the inspectors of sowing that are designated (*P.Oxy.* 2185, 5; in 92); sometimes tax collectors (*hoi prokechirismenoi praktores*, *P.Fay.* 14, 1; from 124 BC); sometimes the geometer who draws up a certificate of measurement; sometimes a friend who designates his delegate: “For Castor ... I Trypho, his fellow ephebe, whom he has appointed.”

## πρωτότοκος

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*prōtotokos*, **firstborn**

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*prototokos*, S 4416; TDNT 6.871–881; EDNT 3.189–191; NIDNTT 1.667–669; MM 557; L&N 10.43, 13.79, 87.47; BDF §120(1); BAGD 726–727

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Only five occurrences of this term can be cited from the papyri, and all of them are from the fourth century. One is in a certificate of adoption (*huion gnēsion kai prōtotokon*, *P.Lips.* 28, 15); the others are in magical papyri, with respect to animals (*P.Oslo* 1, 312: “taking the umbilical cord of a firstborn ram”; *Pap.Graec.Mag.* 4, 1092, 1101, 3150). It is rare in the inscriptions, and the literary texts that attest it are Jewish-or Christian-inspired.

So this is in effect a biblical term, used 130 times in the LXX, usually in the proper literal of the word, firstfruits of a (human or animal) mother’s womb. There are religious connotations, because the firstborn is consecrated to Yahweh; a qualitative connotation, because it is the “firstborn of the father’s vigor” (Gen 49:3; Num 1:20; Ps 78:51), it is the best or the most excellent (Ezek 44:30; cf. Philo, *Prelim. Stud.* 98); an affective connotation, because it is the best-loved; an honorific connotation, since the firstborn, through the birthright, shares in the the father’s authority and is given much property.

All of these nuances appear in figurative uses of the term, for example, when God says to Moses, “Israel is my firstborn” (Exod 4:22), and Luke probably had them in mind when he wrote concerning Mary, “She gave birth to

her firstborn” (*eteken ton huion autēs ton prōtotokon*, Luke 2:7). He chose this word because of these connotations, and perhaps also to signal that this Davidic firstborn might be a claimant to messiahship. There is some surface ambiguity, because “firstborn” can be a reference to later offspring; but on the one hand, the title *prōtotokos* was given immediately after birth (Exod 13:2; 34:19; Philo, *Cherub.* 54); and on the other hand, the literature and the inscriptions attest that a “firstborn” can be an only child. At Leontopolis in Lower Egypt, the epitaph of a Jewish woman of Arsinoe in 5 BC mentions that she died bringing her firstborn into the world; obviously this child could have had no younger brothers: “Fate, through my labor pains with my firstborn child, brought me to the end of my life.”

Apart from Heb 11:28 (cf. Ps 78:51), the other occurrences of *prōtotokos* in the NT are figurative, all expressive of honor, dignity, or preeminence, especially with respect to Christ, the “firstborn of all creation” (*prōtotokos pasēs ktiseōs*, Col 1:15), who has a primacy of excellence in the order of creation that could be described as cosmic. He is also the firstborn with respect to the dead (*prōtotokos ek tōn nekrōn*, Col 1:18) and thus has primacy in the order of resurrection, not simply because he was the first to come forth from the grave, but because he came forth as the all-powerful sovereign, the prince of a new humanity (Rev 1:5, *ho archōn*); finally, Christ is honored with a primacy in the eschatological order, because in glory he will be “firstborn among many brethren” (*prōtotokos en pollois adelphois*, Rom 8:29); as the first one resurrected, he will be the source of all other glorifications, and “his brothers” will worship him in love.

A single NT text refers to creatures as firstborn in a figurative sense: Heb 12:23, “the assembly of the firstborn” (*ekklēsia prōtotokōn*), which exegetes take to mean either the patriarchs, or Christians who have already died, or the first converts and martyrs, or all the members of the church militant, or the angels in heaven. In all cases, *prōtotokos* is a title of honor, suggesting the privileges discussed above.

πύργος

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*pyrgos*, **tower, watchtower, fortress, palace, house, apartment**

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*purgos*, S 4444; TDNT 6.953–956; EDNT 3.300; MM 560; L&N 7.23; BAGD 730

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This term refers to quite diverse structures, from a simple house in a town or a roof apartment to a palace, like that at Malatha in Idumea, to which Agrippa

retired (Josephus, *Ant.* 18.147), or the luxurious dwelling of Aseneth (*Jos. Asen.* 2.1–2; 14.5), a watchtower, a defensive tower jutting out over the walls, especially one that dominates a city gate. There are also “towers set up before a port to break the threatening waves and guarantee a safe refuge for those who enter” (4 Macc 13:6), not to mention the “wooden towers” that were strapped onto elephants (1 Macc 6:37; cf. the *pyrgomachountes* who do battle in these towers, Polybius 5.84.2) or the towers with ladders that attackers threw against fortifications in order to be on the same level as the defenders (Philo, *Spec. Laws* 4.229; Josephus, *War* 5.292; Polybius 5.99.5: towers spaced at intervals of one hundred feet and provided with guard-doors). Metaphorically, a tower, because of its height and strength, can suggest the elaboration of a coherent and bold intellectual system (“the tower of atheism”) or, because of its very elaborate perfection, aesthetic splendor.

The most famous tower in the Bible and in all of human history is the tower of Babel, “whose top is in the heavens” (Gen 11:4, 5, 8), a ziggurat, amply commented on by Philo, who saw it as the “sign of an extraordinary madness.” But the tower most often referred to in the OT is the walled fortress; these massive towers make it possible to get at attackers from the side and catch them in crossfire. They are usually for the defense of a port or a city. Sometimes *pyrgos* refers to a donjon (Isa 30:25; *T. Jud.* 5.5), sometimes the whole fortified city (Judg 8:9; Philo, *Conf. Tongues* 128, 130), sometimes to small forts scattered through the countryside (1 Macc 16:10; 2 Macc 10:36). The towers of the wall around Jerusalem were especially numerous and famous, and they had names. Thus according to Luke 13:4, the “Tower of Siloam” fell on eighteen people, killing them. It can perhaps be identified with the first foundations found of a tower built along the canal of Siloam. In any event, we may compare Josephus, *War* 5.292: Titus ordered the building of three towers fifty feet tall to be erected on each embankment, so that the defenders of the ramparts might thus be put to flight. In the middle of the night, one of these accidentally fell. Josephus relates the melee that followed and the panic that spread, even though no one died.

Another sort of *pyrgos* is the watchtower in the countryside (2 Chr 26:10, 15; 27:4; cf. Judg 7:5), where a sentinel was posted (2 Kgs 9:17; 17:9; 18:8) to watch for marauders, jackals, and the occasional fox that attacked fruits, crops, or flocks (watchmen are remunerated, cf. *P.Oxy.* 2024, 8 and 22: “for the tower guards, seven *artabai*,” *tōn phyllattōn tōn pyrgōn art.* ζ'; 2197, 131). Such a tower is often conical and stands about three meters high. They could be used for storing provisions (1 Chr 27:25). In Isa 5:2, the tower is presented as the complement of a fence or hedge around a vineyard; this wording is taken up in the parable of the Vineyard and the Tenants (Matt 21:33; Mark 12:1).

But there is also the man who wants to build a tower and must first sit down and “count the cost” (Luke 14:28). This is not an inexpensive vineyard tower built with dry stone, but a grandiose palace. One recalls that Herod was above all a great builder of towers. Notably, he built Hippicus, a square tower thirty cubits high; “above, a reservoir held rainwater, and above this was a two-story dwelling, twenty-five cubits high ... the total height was eighty cubits” (Josephus, *War* 5.163–166). The height of the tower called Phasael was ninety cubits (ibid. 5.169). The tower called Mariamme was only fifty-five cubits high, but its apartments were more luxurious and ornate than those of the other towers.

These texts show that *pyrgos* is a quite variable form in ancient architecture, not only because it may be square or cylindrical, but because it may be a defensive tower, a watchtower, or a dwelling (either a simple house or one part of an important residence) – in the papyri, usually the main building of a farm. In the papyri, *pyrgos* appears in contracts for rentals, sales, mortgages, and marriage, in cadastres, even in complaints to the *stratēgos* or a police chief. But while in the Bible *tower* often has religious value, referring to the strength and certainty of divine protection, it has only a secular meaning in the papyri.

In the inscriptions – which often mention or commemorate the building of a tower, whether as a military edifice, a rural estate, or an urban monument – we note that the Olythian *proxenos* Heracleodoros dedicated “the tower and the hall and the statue to all the gods” (*theois pasin ton pyrgon kai tēn exedran kai ton andrianta*, *I.Thas.* 376, 2). But the Christian inscriptions follow the biblical tradition of using *tower* not only as a safe refuge but as a sign of his protection and a pledge of his watchful care: “Lord, keep this tower and those who dwell in it” (*IGLS* 328); God through his providence has righted “a tower bent by time and the shaking of the earth” (ibid. 785, 4); “the construction of the tower (of the wall) is, with the help of God, the work of the Macedonian quarter” (ibid. 2828, at Baalbeck; cf. 478, 1). Hence the name “Tower of the Lord” and its religious meaning: “Christ Jesus, be for us a Protector-God, a house of refuge, and a mighty tower in the presence of the enemy” (ibid. 1811; cf. 1814); “In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, by the intercession of St. Mary, Mother of God and Virgin forever, and of the glorious archangels and chief apostles, this tower was built” (ibid. 1913).

## ῥαδιουργία

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*rhadiourgia*, **ability, unconcern, unscrupulousness, scheming**


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*radiourgia*, S 4468; TDNT 6.972–973; EDNT 3.207; MM 562; L&N 88.301; BAGD 733
 

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At Cyprus, St. Paul denounces the *magus* Elymas as being “full of all guile and all *rhadiourgia*.” This term, which appears only in the Koine (literary and popular), is a biblical hapax and could be translated “scheming.” But its meaning is very broad. First, it means facility at doing something: “We did not speak to those who were too young concerning the things of love, lest with facility added to the violence of their passions they should give themselves over to it without hesitation” (Xenophon, *Cyr.* 1.6.34); thence easiness, unconcern, indolence, then lack of conscience, unscrupulousness: “There are two ways of being struck. One corresponds to the case of the slave whose misdeeds have deserved the blows of the free man – who, having acted unconscionably (*dia rhadiourgian*), is stretched out on the wheel; the other is that of any inanimate object whatsoever.”

The most common meaning is “deception, trickery.” In a case of fraud, Cato files suit. This dishonesty appears most often in financial matters: “The association of criminals and thieves (*rhadiourgoi kai kleptai*) usually founders in this fashion: through the lack of reciprocal justice and in a general way mutual breach of trust” (Polybius 4.29.4). This meaning, “swindling,” is almost the only meaning attested in the papyri. In 216 BC, a woman complains that her coat has been stolen and asks the *stratēgos* for punishment of the theft (*peri de tēs rhadiourgias*, *P.Magd.* 35, 11; republished *P.Enteux.* 30). In 114, Marres, priest of Soknebtunis, is angry at the falsification of a figure in his contract. The *synallagmatographos* had written down a rent of thirty-six *artabai* instead of thirty. This was a swindle (*to para touto rhadiourgēmenas*); “I have been treated in a flagrantly unjust manner” (*ēdikēmenos kath’ hyperbolēn*, *P.Tebt.* 42, 16). A defenseless (*aboēthēton*) woman asks the *oikonomos* that she not be defrauded of the guarantee of her dowry “because of the *rhadiourgia* of the accused” (*dia tou enkaloumenou rhadiourgian*, *P.Tebt.* 776, 31; cf. *BGU* 226, 14). In the second century AD, the prefect of Egypt stipulates that in order to contest a debt a person will have to declare that the contract is a fake or that fraudulent or deceptive means were used.

In Acts 13:10, it is not a question of money or even of some particular action, but a character trait, a dominant vice. Elymas is called a “son of the devil,” who is the father of lies (John 8:44). The association with *dolos*, “ruse, trick, fraud,” invites us to translate, “full of all trickery and mischief.”

ρίπτω

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*rhiptō*, to throw, throw away, get rid of, lay out, scatter

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*ripto*, S 4496; TDNT 6.991–993; EDNT 3.212–213; MM 564; L&N 15.217, 16.10, 85.37; BDF §§ 13, 68, 101, 308; BAGD 736

This verb is used in the NT with the same meanings as in classical Greek and the LXX (Hebrew *šālāk*).

(a) “To throw.” For example, throwing a ship’s rigging and anchors into the sea. It is better to be thrown into the sea – i.e., to die a cruel death – than to be a cause of stumbling.

(b) “To throw away, rid oneself of.” The object may be things like money (Ezek 7:19), as when Judas, before going to hang himself, throws the pieces of silver in the temple (Matt 27:5); or persons, as with the demon who “having thrown the possessed person down in their midst came out of him, doing him no harm.” The nuance of abandonment and rejection is 14:9 – “You have cast me behind your back”; Neh 9:26 – “They have cast your law behind themselves”; Joel 1:7; Philo, *Flacc.* 37: cast off.

(c) “Unload, unburden oneself.” When this is done at the feet of someone of high station, there are connotations of veneration and confidence: the crowds cast their sick at Jesus’ feet (Matt 15:30), as Judah threw himself at Joseph’s feet to appease his anger (Josephus, *Ant.* 2.159), or as an old man threw himself to the ground and knelt before Dionysius (*P.Oxy.* 1089, 31; cf. *T. Job* 39.9). With respect to things, *rhiptō* means “to leave” (on the spot, *P.Ryl.* 125, 25: “they left the box in my house empty” – *eripsan en tē oikia mou tēn pyxida kenēn*) or “to replace,” for example, the lead weight on the opening of the ephah (Zech 5:8; cf. Judg 8:25).

(d) The LXX often uses the verb for throwing corpses into a field or into a tomb, especially the perfect passive participle *errimmenos* (Hebrew *nāpal*), which would be the equivalent of our “recumbent” or “laid out” (French *gisant*), as in Josephus, *Ant.* 6.362: “laid out on the ground” (*epi gēs errimmenos*). The participle can also refer to beggars sleeping on the hard ground (Epictetus 3.26.6) and more generally to objects placed, arranged, or even scattered here and there (*Enoch* 21.3–4; *BGU* 1857, 9). This pejorative

connotation is present in Matt 9:36 – Jesus “took pity on them because they were weary and lying on the ground (*hoti ēsan eskylmenoi kai errimmenoi*), like sheep without a shepherd.” They were not only exhausted but also abandoned, without resources, scattered and dispersed; only a pastor could gather them together and assure their survival.

(e) It is more difficult to interpret Acts 22:23 – in the temple court, the Jews, exasperated at Paul, “cried out, cast (their) cloaks (*kai rhiptountōn ta himatia*) and threw dust in the air.” This is reminiscent of Job’s three friends, who “raised their voices and wept; each tore his cloak (*rhēxantes hekastos tēn heautou stolēn*) and poured dust on his head.” But *rhiptō* does not mean “to rend, tear” (*diarhēssō*); it would be better to translate “tear off, pull off” (Isa 33:12) remembering that the motive is anger or indignation, as when Moses threw down the tables of the law and broke them (Exod 32:19; Deut 9:17). As Plato says, “What a statement you have just made! In setting it forth, you should expect to see a great number of people, and people not to be taken lightly, hurriedly cast off their garments (*hoion rhipsantas ta himatia*) and strip, take up whatever weapons are ready to hand, and rush at you with all their might.”

This is a theatrical gesture, one customarily used by lawyers; it has with good reason been compared to the Roman *jactatio togarum*. But we do not know exactly what the gesture was. In any event, *rhiptō* should mean “agitate” rather than “throw,” which is confirmed by the medical vocabulary, in which *rhiptō* is used for convulsions and by the examples cited by F. Field, following Wettstein.

ῥυπαρία, ῥυπαρός, ῥύπος

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*rhyparia*, **dirtiness, filth**; *rhyparos*, **dirty, filthy**; *rhypos*, **dirtiness, filth**

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***ruparia***, S 4507; *EDNT* 3.215; *NIDNTT* 1.479; MM 565; L&N 88.256; BAGD 738 | ***ruparos***, S 4508; *EDNT* 3.215; *NIDNTT* 1.479; MM 565; L&N 79.52, 88.257; BAGD 738 | ***rupos***, S 4509; *EDNT* 3.215; *NIDNTT* 1.479; MM 565; L&N 79.55; BDF §51(2); BAGD 738

The nouns mean “dirtiness, filth” (Plutarch, *De vit. pud.* 2: nurses scrub the dirt from small children; *Phoc.* 18.4: “a poor old man, dressed in a dirty cloak”; Plutarch, *De sera* 26) and the adjective “dirty.” They are used for impure metals (Dioscorides 5.74; cf. 1.56), for base and trivial remarks: “In describing the sublime, one must not stoop to dirty and disgusting details” (*eis ta rhypara kai exybrismena*, Ps.-Longinus, *Subl.* 43.5; *T. Jud.* 14.3, *en dialogismois*

*rhyparois*). In the papyri, *rhyparos* refers to grain that has not been winnowed or purified, and especially to debased coinage.

In the Bible, the term “dirty clothes” (as opposed to festal clothes) appears in Zech 3:3–4 and again in Jas 2:2, contrasting the man with luxurious clothing and the poor man in a worn and dirty garment, just as when Pharaoh orders “that the prisoner be given splendid clothing instead of the filthy garment that he has.” Stains or dirt are washed away; 1 Pet 3:21 points out that the purpose of baptism is not to get rid of bodily dirt.

In classical Greek, moral stains are filth, and it is not surprising that Jas 1:21 gives *rhyparia* this figurative meaning of a stain that one washes away in order to be clean (*katharos*, John 13:10); similarly Teles and Plutarch use this term for sordid greed. The transition from the literal to the moral meaning of *rhypos* was clear in the LXX (“Who will draw the pure from the unclean? No one”) and common in literary texts: “Making your soul pure (*katharēn psychēn*) and washing away that which soils it”; “These meditations (on the stars) purify stains here below” (Marcus Aurelius 7.47).



## σ S

σανίς

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*sanis*, **plank, board**

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*sanis*, S 4548; *EDNT* 3.228; MM 568; L&N 7.79; BAGD 742

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From its first occurrences, *sanis*, “plank, board,” was used for a leaf of a wooden door. Thus the epitaph of Lysandros, dead at Karanis at age twenty, says, “During the night, my companions did not make the cedar doors resound”; and thus the brothers who want to preserve their sister’s virginity propose barricading or blockading her: “If she is a door, we will set up planks of cedar against her.” This wood can be of all sorts, from that which is carried by camels, the lid of a trunk (*kibōton*) in which the priest Jehoiada bored a hole (2 Kgs 12:9), and writing tablets, to the cedar floors in the rooms for eating and resting in the royal palace (Josephus, *Ant.* 8.134; *SEG* XXII, 114, 17, *en sanidi leleukōmenē* – 1 st century AD).

*Sanis* is especially used for ships, whether for the sides (Ezek 27:5; *Anth. Pal.* 9.415.6), the gangway (Euripides, *Hel.* 1556; Polybius 1.22.5), the planks, like those that saved the shipwreck victims in Acts 27:44, or the “floor” of a floating bridge burned by pirates (Philo, *To Gaius* 129).

σαργάνη, σπυρίς

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*sarganē*, *spyris*, **basket**

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*sargane*, S 4553; *EDNT* 3.229; MM 569; L&N 6.148; BAGD 742 | *spuris*, S 4711; *EDNT* 3.267; MM 586, 618; L&N 6.149; BDF §34(5); BAGD 764

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These two substantives, unknown in the LXX, seem almost synonymous, since St. Paul, in his escape from Damascus, was let down the wall *en sarganē* according to 2 Cor 11:33 (omitted by F, G) and *en spyridi* in Acts 9:25.

Some have wanted to see *sarganē* as a fish basket, while it is actually a woven wicker basket with varied uses: “*Peltai* (small shields) are hidden in large straw and wool baskets (*en angesin*), ... smaller weapons in baskets full of raisins and figs (*en sarganaïs*), and daggers in amphoras of grain, dried figs, and olives” (Aeneas Tacticus 29.6). In the papyri, it is a container for grain or

wine, or more precisely, a unit of measure, the weight of a shipment, valued at 150 pounds in *P.Cair.Isid.* 10, 4 ff.; 13, 50; 16, 22; 17, 2 ff.; *SB* 9176; 9384, 54, 62; *P.Mil.Vogl.* 152, col. II, 52, 59: *eis episkeuēn sarganōn*. There are smaller units, however: *sarganition hena* (*BGU* 236, 11; from AD 57); *sarganion* (*P.Lips.* 21, 18).

A *spyris* is also a woven basket, but more commonly used, although it is unknown in Josephus, and of smaller capacity. The word is used at Matt 15:37 and Mark 8:8, and also at Matt 16:10 and Mark 8:20, in each case referring to the baskets in which the pieces of bread and fish left over from the multiplying of the loaves were placed; the two latter texts place *spyris* parallel with *kophinos*. Some have concluded that a *spyris* is a basket for bread or fish. But, apart from the fact that the *spyris* may be of different sizes (*spyridion*, *Pap.Lugd.Bat.* II, 8, 13; *P.Tebt.* 414, 19; *P.Oxy.* 1293, 30), it is used for the picnic basket in which each one brings his own food, not only for a basket of good dates (*P.Oxy.* 116, 19), nuts (741, 2), or delicacies (1070, 31) but also dry pitch (*pissēs xēras sphyridas*, *SB* 1, 9). So the word means a portable container and can be translated “bag” or “parcel.” The price of a parcel is figured, as with the baskets of nails in *P.Cair.Zen.* 94, 7 (cf. *P.Fay.* 102, 3 ff., in AD 105; *timē spyridōn*, *UPZ* 112, col. V, 18; from 170 BC), and receipt of the parcel is acknowledged in a business letter (*SB* 7572, 3; 9025, 19). There is no specifying the size or shape, since the word refers to an instrument of torture in Philo, who describes a tax agent torturing taxpayers: “He tied a cord with a sliding knot (*brochos*) to a basket full of sand (*ammou spyrida plērē*) which he hung from their necks, a crushing burden” (*Spec. Laws* 3.160).

## σάρξ, σαρκικός, σάρκινος

*sarx*, **flesh**; *sarkikos*, **of the flesh, carnal**; *sarkinos*, **fleshy, of the flesh, carnal**

*sarx*, S 4561; *TDNT* 7.98–151; *EDNT* 3.230–233; *NIDNTT* 1.671–672, 674–682; MM 569; L&N 8.4, 8.63, 9.11, 9.12, 9.14, 9.15, 10.1, 22.20, 23.90, 25.29, 26.7, 58.10, 88.279; BDF §§160, 266(2), 258(2), 272, 275(4); BAGD 743–744 | *sarkikos*, S 4559; *TDNT* 7.98–151; *EDNT* 3.229–230; *NIDNTT* 1.671, 674, 677, 682; MM 569; L&N 26.8, 41.42, 79.1, 79.4; BDF §113(2); BAGD 742 | *sarkinos*, S 4560; *TDNT* 7.98–151; *EDNT* 3.229–230; *NIDNTT* 1.671, 674, 682; MM 569; L&N 9.13, 26.8, 41.42, 79.4; BDF §113(2); BAGD 743

E. Schweizer noted that in Homer the word “flesh” was used especially in the plural, a usage that remained common in literary Greek (cf. Hippocrates, *Peri sarkōn*; Quintus of Smyrna, Dio Chrysostom, etc.). It refers to the flesh of the

human body (Herondas, *Mimes* 4.6: “flesh that seems to palpitate, hot”) but more often, it seems, animal flesh. It is associated with bones, muscles, sinews, veins, viscera, and blood.

*Sarx* can be pale (Sophocles, *Phil.* 1157) or white (Euripides, *Med.* 1189), old (Aeschylus, *Ag.* 72), vigorous (*Sept.* 622) or torn (Euripides, *Hipp.* 1239, 1343). Being material, flesh finally meets death: “his old flesh was torn from his bones” (Euripides, *Med.* 1217); “the daughter and the father lie dead” (1119); the vital force departs. *Sarx* is contrasted with *nous*, or the immortal *psychē*, or *logos* (Epictetus 1.3.5), or *pneuma* (Euripides, frag. 971: “He who, swelled with flesh, is extinguished like a star fallen from heaven, freeing the spirit for the aether”). It is notably the “miserable flesh” (Epictetus 1.3.5) that distinguishes humans from the gods. What is more, if sensations are detected by means of the sensitivity of the flesh (*paraisthēsis sarkinē*), thinkers from Epicurus on (Epictetus, *Against Epicurus* 2, frag. 6, col. 2) reflect on “pleasure according to the flesh” (*hē kata sarka hēdonē*) as compared to pleasures of the *psychē* (Plutarch, *Quaest. conv.* 5.1) and conclude around the turn of the millennium not only that the latter are greater, but that the *pathē tēs sarkos* (bodily sensations) are a crude sensual pleasure, usually an appeasement of sexual instincts.

The LXX translates the Hebrew *bāśār* especially with *sarx*, referring to the whole living creature, human or animal, the very person (Lev 13:18; Eccl 4:5; 5:5; cf. my *sarx* = me, Ps 119:120), the whole being (Gen 2:23; Ezek 37:6, 8; Job 2:5; Ps 68:2; Eccl 5:5), and especially the body. But since the body’s vitality (Hebrew *nepeš*) is in the blood (Gen 9:4–5; Lev 17:1; Deut 12:23), the composite human is referred to by the expression “flesh and blood,” the locution *kol bāśār*; “all flesh,” means all human beings; and kinship is defined as the same biological origin, by blood as well as flesh. God formed the body in the mother’s womb (Job 12:10; 34:15 – the God of all flesh), beginning with inert earthy matter, which he animated with his breath (Gen 2:7, cf. 6:3, 13); one lives only insofar as one breathes, which means that the body is capable of dying (Ps 104:23; Zech 14:12). Being a creature (Isa 31:3; Jer 17:5; Joel 3:1), it is characterized by weakness and fragility; this is one of the most obvious contrasts with the deity. The Wisdom writers emphasize the devaluation of the flesh. A “body of flesh” is pejorative, as is “eyes of flesh” (Job 10:4), which see poorly: since they discern only appearances, they are deceived. We cannot speak of a dualism of flesh and spirit that would correspond to the opposition between good and evil, but fleshly being, which belongs to the earth, is not only separated from the world of the *pneuma*, which belongs to heaven (4 Ezra 3:1), but is inferior to it.

The Synoptic Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles mention flesh only rarely, and always with its OT meanings. Likewise the Fourth Gospel, in which this word always occurs in Jesus' speech. Used six times regarding the Eucharist (John 6:51–56), and made more specific as “the flesh of the Son of Man” or “my flesh and my blood,” it refers to the body and soul of Jesus, his person given to communicate eternal life. Twice *sarx* is opposed to *pneuma*. John 8:15 is pejorative: “You judge according to the flesh,” that is, according to appearances; this is a superficial, incomplete, and false judgment. These nuances are traditional in Israel, and there is not the slightest theological elaboration.

In the Pauline writings, on the other hand, the “flesh” is constantly mentioned, and with meanings so different that one could almost say that they vary from verse to verse. First, there are a large number of occurrences with the neutral biological meaning, “flesh” as a synonym of “body”: “No one ever hated his own flesh” (Eph 5:29); “I am absent in the flesh (physically) but in spirit I am among you.” Then there is “human nature” in the noblest sense, since the incarnate Son of God was “born of the race of David, according to the flesh.” The “body of his flesh” (Col 1:22) is his humanity. “Flesh” can also mean human existence (1 Pet 4:6) here below (Eph 6:5) and its conditioning: Onesimus is a brother beloved “both according to the flesh and according to the Lord” (Phlm 16), which means humanly and divinely.

There is already a pejorative nuance in 1 Cor 1:26, which observes that at Corinth there were “not many wise according to the flesh,” that is, humanly gifted; and in 1 Cor 7:28, where spouses experience “affliction in the flesh”; and also in 2 Cor 5:16 – “We no longer know anyone according to the flesh; even if we knew Christ according to the flesh, yet now we no longer know him.” This pejorative value of *sarx* is described as a “weakness”; the flesh is ephemeral as the grass (1 Pet 1:24; Isa 40:6) and mortal (2 Cor 4:11); it is the seat of sensations and the emotions; it is passible. Its infirmity and poverty are such that “no flesh (creature) may boast before God.”

It gets worse. St. Paul, probably inheriting something from the Qumran sect, or in any event depending on contemporary Jewish conceptions, sees the flesh as a source of evil, of dissolute actions, always ready to break free (Gal 5:13), like an insolent slave (cf. Col 2:23, *plēsmonē tēs sarkos*), rebelling and wishing to become an autonomous authority: “When we were in the flesh (under its orders, in a state of sinfulness), the passions ... acted in our members” (Rom 7:5); “no good dwells in me, that is, in my flesh” (7:18); “sin dwells in me” (7:21). This is not to say that what we today call the body is corrupt. *Sarx* is almost personified; more precisely, it retains here its basic meaning of “human nature,” but human nature as vitiated. It is the “whole person” that is corrupt, a

perverse mind and will. Just as the arm and the hand are considered as autonomous and responsible for actions in which they are really just instruments, Paul treats the flesh – the inferior part of a person – as the locus of the passions and covetousness. He attributes to it *epithymia*, which is constantly opposing the *pneuma*: “the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; these are (principles that are) opposed to each other (*tauta gar allēlois antikeitai*).... The works of the flesh are manifest; they are sexual immorality, impurity, debauchery, idolatry, magic, hatred ...” (Gal 5:17–19). There is a radical opposition between on the one hand *sarx* and *epithymia kakē* (Col 3:5; 1 Cor 10:6) and on the other hand reason, spirit, God’s will.

The Pauline parenesis is based on this experience: “With my reason I serve the law of God, but with my flesh the law of sin.” The Christian life is essentially defined as a liberation from *sarx* and a submission to *pneuma*: “We walk not according to the flesh, but according to the spirit. Those who live according to the flesh have their minds set on the things of the flesh; those who live according to the spirit have their minds set on the things of the spirit.” Indeed, “the inclinations (*to phronēma*) of the flesh lead to death, but the inclinations of the spirit lead to life and peace (with God). This is why the inclinations of the flesh are enmity toward God, because they are not in submission to the law of God, nor can they be. Now those who are in the flesh cannot please God. But you are not in the flesh, but in the spirit, if it is true that the Spirit of God dwells in you.” “Take no thought for the flesh, (to satisfy) its lusts” (Rom 13:14; Gal 5:15); “Let us purify ourselves from every stain in flesh and in spirit, making ourselves perfectly holy, in the fear of God” (2 Cor 7:1; cf. 1 Cor 7:34). The conflict is such that “those who belong to Christ Jesus have crucified the flesh with its passions and lusts” (Gal 5:24). The last denunciation is that given by 1 John 2:16 – “All that is in the world – the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, the pride of life – is not of the Father, but of the world.”

*Sarkikos*. – This rare adjective is used by St. Paul with the same nuances as the substantive *sarx*, first of all in the neutral, slightly depreciatory sense of “material goods” (*ta sarkika*), as opposed to spiritual goods (*ta pneumatika*, Rom 15:27, 1 Cor 9:11), then in a pejorative moral sense: “carnal wisdom” (duplicity, hypocrisy, etc.) as opposed to the grace of God (2 Cor 1:12); or “carnal weapons” (*ta hopla ... sarkika*), which are weak rather than *dynata* (10:4). Finally, there is the most pronounced Pauline theological meaning, describing the human and earthly order: “When there is jealousy and strife among you, are you not carnal (*ouchi sarkikoi este*) and walking according to man (*kata anthrōpon*)?” (1 Cor 3:3). 1 Pet 2:11 emphasizes sinful tones that are discordant with the divine: “I urge you ... to abstain from these carnal lusts which make war against the soul.”

*Sarkinos*. – Used much more than the preceding verb, this adjective takes on varied meanings in the secular literature; it denotes the carnal nature of the body, sometimes with the nuance “corpulent” or “fleshy”: “Look for the fleshy fish (*ton sarkinon ichthyn*) lest you starve to death”; sometimes “real.” The LXX uses *sarkinos* for weakness and powerlessness, and St. Paul gives it the same pejorative meaning as *sarx*: “the law is spiritual (*pneumatikos*) but I am carnal (*sarkinos*), sold to sin”; “I was not able to speak to you as to spiritual people (*pneumatikois*), but as to carnal people (*sarkinois*), as to nursing infants in Christ” (1 Cor 3:1); babies are only flesh; they are not anti-spiritual, but they are still non-spiritual.

σβέννυμι

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*sbennymi*, **extinguish, quench**

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*sbennumi*, S 4570; TDNT 7.165–168; EDNT 3.235; NIDNTT 3.109–111; MM 570; L&N 14.70, 68.52; BDF §92; BAGD 745

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The literal meaning of *sbennymi* is “put out a fire”; the fire of Gehenna is not quenched; the OT heroes of the faith “quenched the raging of the fire”; but lamps are quenched for want of oil (Matt 25:8; *T. Job* 43.5); the Messiah does not quench the smouldering wick (*linon*); and the shield of faith can put out the flaming darts of the Evil One.

The metaphorical usages are constant, both in the LXX and in the secular literature, meaning “annihilate, cause to disappear.” The object can be offspring (2 Sam 14:7; Prov 10:7), prosperity (Job 18:5; Prov 13:9; *Anth. Pal.* 9.178), thought and sound reason (Wis 2:3; Philo, *Dreams* 1.31; *Alleg. Interp.* 1.46), beauty (*Anth. Pal.* 5.62), love (Cant 8:7), wrath, pride (Job 40:12; *Anth. Pal.* 5.300), the power of the passions, tyranny (Plutarch, *Lyc.* 11.13; Josephus, *War* 2.296, the fire of war), the root of lawsuits, etc. But none of these usages clarifies 1 Thess 5:19, “Do not quench the Spirit.” The context has to do with spiritual gifts, and the present imperative with *mē* would mean to stop prohibiting those inspired by the Holy Spirit from communicating what they have received (cf. 1 Cor 14:39, *mē kōlyete*). But the singular *to pneuma* points not to the charismatics but to the person of the Holy Spirit, or better the Holy Spirit’s inspiration, which is like a shining and burning flame. Just as 2 Tim 1:6 says to revive, rekindle God’s gift, 1 Tim 5:19 urges each believer not to suppress or restrain it, according to the principle of 1 Cor 14:32 – “the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets” – and its application in Rom 12:6–8. A divine communication must not be kept to oneself, since by definition it is

intended for the edification of all; and it is even worse to cut oneself off from the source and refuse to hear “what the Spirit says to the churches” (Rev 2:11, 17, 29, etc.).

## σεμνός, σεμνότης

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*semnos*, **serious, grave, dignified, majestic, respectable**; *semnotēs*, **seriousness, gravity, dignity, majesty**

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*semnos*, S 4586; TDNT 7.191–196; EDNT 3.238; NIDNTT 2.91–93; MM 572; L&N 88.47; BAGD 746–747 | *semnotes*, S 4587; TDNT 7.191–196; EDNT 3.238; NIDNTT 2.91–93; MM 572; L&N 88.46; BAGD 747

These terms, which express seriousness, gravity, dignity, and majesty, and which describe the venerable and august qualities of persons, occur often in classical Greek. They are used seven times by St. Paul; six of these occurrences are in the Pastoral Epistles. Their meaning in no way derives from Stoicism; it corresponds to common Hellenistic usage, as copiously attested in literary texts, honorific inscriptions, and funerary epigrams.

*Semnos* is a common modifier for divinities and things pertaining to them: the temple (2 Macc 3:12; Philo, *To Gaius* 198), the high priest, the law (2 Macc 6:28; *Ep. Arist.* 5, 171, 313), the Sabbath (2 Macc 6:11), the sacred psalms (Philo, *Contemp. Life* 29), and religious clothing (ibid. 66). Applied to people and things, *semnotēs* suggests grandeur, magnificence, solemnity, a quality that inspires respect, fear, or reverence. It refers especially to honorable conduct, a dignified and level-headed existence, and a high standard of morality: *ho semnos bios* = the religious life. It is in this sense that 1 Tim 2:2 expresses the hope “that we may lead a calm and tranquil life in all godliness and religious dignity” (*en pasē eusebeia kai semnotēti*). The church is the household or family of God (3:5), and its members are a priestly congregation; the *semnotēs* of each one is the dignity of a liturgy, a mode of existence defined by piety and worship, marked by the seriousness, gravity, decency that are fitting in God’s presence. The papyri, like the honorific decrees, emphasize the nobility or excellence of *semnotēs*: “for a dignified life” (*epi tē semnotēti tou biou*); a decree of Delphi for an *enkōmiographos*: “exhibited worthiness of character” (*ēthōn epedeixato semnotēta*); at Magnesia, a son boasts of his father’s dignity: “because of the dignity of his character and the nobility he inherited from his forbears”; at Philadelphia in Lydia: “praised for character and for a dignified and stable life” (*epi te ēthei kai biou semnotēti kai eustatheia epainethenta*, *Ath. Mitt.*, 1900, p. 122, n. 1); at Thyatira, “praised for dignified character and

reasonable ways” (*epi te tou ēthous semnotēti kai tropou epieikeia epainoumenon*, *Hermes*, 1930, p. 109).

*Semnotēs* has to do not only with bearing and attitude (Philo, *Flacc.* 4), one’s comportment in general (*en pasi semnotēti*, Dittenberger, *Syl.* 807, 14; *Or.* 567, 200), or even collective behavior (*to semnon tēs philadelphias hymōn*, *BGU*, 1024, col. VIII, 7; cf. *1 Clem.* 47.5; 48.1), but with a religious and moral posture that bears the mark of excellence: “Whatsoever things are true, noble (*hosa semna*), just, pure, lovely, honorable ... think on these things” (Phil 4:8; cf. Dio Chrysostom 31.6). The *episkopos* will raise his children in submission, *meta pasēs semnotētos* (1 Tim 3:4), meaning that the dignity of those in authority inspires fear and respect, or better that the educator imparts flawless moral rectitude to his students. Titus in his teaching is to maintain “purity, dignity (*semnotēta*), speech that is wholesome and unassailable.” Deacons must be *semnoi* (1 Tim 3:8), i.e., serious and honorable, because they carry out a public function that requires respectability in the minister and inspires respect and even praise in those who witness his life, like the high priest Ananus, “a venerable and just man who, despite his noble birth, his dignity, and his honors, loved to treat the humblest as his equals” (Josephus, *War* 4.319), or Caristanus, who is praised in the year 98 for having carried out his command over all Greece “with brilliance and in a praiseworthy manner” (*semnōs kai axiologōs*, *Fouilles de Delphes*, III, 4; n. 47, 7). There is nothing off-putting about this gravity; seriousness does not rule out kindness.

“Likewise, the women [must be] dignified” (1 Tim 3:11), after the fashion of Aphrodisia, a steady woman, involved in her husband’s business: *Aphrodeisia semnotatē kai pistotatē ... gynaiki*. *Semnotēs* is one of the virtues that is praised in women: Hannah led a calm and austere life; Esther was the same when she appeared before Ahasuerus (Josephus, *Ant.* 11.234); the mother of the Maccabees shared the same virtue (4 Macc 17:5). A woman is adorned not with gold and silver, but *hosa semnotētos*, *eutaxias*, *aidous* (Plutarch, *Con. praec.* 26). In the papyri, and especially in the inscriptions, *semnotēs* is sometimes purely honorific, but usually it is an outstanding quality suggestive of reserve and restraint, discretion, self-mastery under all circumstances: *gynaika semnēn*, whether with respect to young women, or especially married women (“the noble and most dignified wife,” *hē kalē kai semnotatē symbios*, *P.Ross.Georg.* V, 6, 27), as at Sinope (“to his wife, Prokope, most reverent, known for her restraint and dignity” – *Prokopē gynaiki heautou eusebestatē kai semnotēti sōphrosynēs memartyrēmenē*, *BCH*, 1920, p. 359), or Aurelia Philotera, who “lived with dignity and distinction” (*semnōs kai epiphanōs zēsasan*, *IG X*, 2, n. 176, 11–13; cf. 194, 6–9: “the dignified and affectionate Pontia Kallistiane,” *tēn semnotatēn kai philostorgon Pontian Kallistianēn*).



*Semnotēs*, frequently in the superlative, is associated with *philandria* (MAMA VIII, 476, 514), *philoteknia* (SEG VI, 452), and *sophrosynē* (MAMA VIII, 470, 4). An epitaph from the third century AD: “The dignified Berous, daughter of Chrysippus, was a Penelope in deed and not in fiction, chaste in her marriage, prudent despite her youth, a good mistress of her house and her life” (IGLS 721, 2–3). Some Jewish women are named Semnous.

Titus 2:2 requires old men to be sober, dignified (*semnous*), level-headed (*sōphronas*); here we could translate *semnos* as “venerable” or “very respectable”; seriousness, which excludes eccentricity and peculiarity, is a characteristic of old age, as this epitaph from the high imperial period says: “You were so dignified, while still a child, that you seemed to have the intelligence of an old man.”

A Christian cannot have less virtue than the honest pagan whose epitaph reads “in everything you were dignified” (*en panti d’ ēstha semnos*, SEG VIII, 372, 11; second century; cf. TAM II, 422 a 17; b 15); his name is “revered, admired, worthy to be loved by all.”

## σημεῖον

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*sēmeion*, **sign**

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*semeion*, S 4592; TDNT 7.200–261; NIDNTT 2.626–627, 629; MM 572–573; L&N 33.477; BAGD 747–748

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In secular and biblical Greek, the basic meaning “sign” is applied to very different things: the notice that bears a court’s verdict (Plato, *Resp.* 10.614, c), a seal or signature, the engraving on a shield, a ship’s decoration (Thucydides 6.31.3), a landmark or milestone (Herodian 2.13.18), a flag (Xenophon, *Cyr.* 8.5.13), the ensign of a flagship.

One of the most widespread meanings in the papyri is distinctive “mark” or identifying “sign,” whether with respect to things, animals, or people: “this marks the burial place” (*estin de sēmeion tēs taphēs*, *P.Paris* 18 bis, 10; cf. *SB* 9420, 8); “I sold the female camel whose distinguishing feature is described.” Gemellus complains to the *epistratēgos* that he was appointed to a *leitourgia* under a false name and without regard to his characteristics. Just as a phylactery is a sign worn around the arm (*Ep. Arist.* 159), circumcision is a mark on the flesh signifying the covenant. These personal “marks” are not necessarily physical; virtues can also be “distinctives”: “I considered such things to be the signs of good men” (*hēgoumēn sēmeia agathōn andrōn ta toiauta einai*, Dittenberger, *Syl.* 831, 14; from AD 117). Such are the “signs” or “character

traits” (Plutarch, *Cat. Min.* 24.1: *ta tōn ēthōn sēmeia*) by which an apostle may be recognized, according to 2 Cor 12:12 (cf. *b. Sanh.* 98a–b; 1 QS 3.14).

So a *sēmeion* is noetic; developed from *sēma*, it is very close to “signal,” “writing,” and “message”; literary and papyrological texts often treat “sign” as the equivalent of “proof.” This is the authenticating or identifying sign which the Fourth Gospel uses in a theological way and which St. Paul exploits in 2 Thess 3:17 – “This greeting is in my hand, Paul’s hand, which is the mark (or proof) in every letter; this is how I write.” The autographed greeting authenticates the letter. Already in 255 BC, a certain Plato, requesting a service from Zeno, sends him as proof of his goodwill two *artabai* of chick-peas purchased at five drachmas apiece (*sēmeion de hoti soi apesteila para Sōsou erebinthou kriou artabas β' ēgorasmenas*, *P.Cair.Zen.* 59192, 8). A century later, Stratonicus, to prove to his wife that it is indeed her husband who is writing to her, mentions as a sign something that he had said to her in private: “Stratonikos to Senchnoubis his wife, greetings. Recognize as a sign: when I said to you to buy the new tunic with the money” (*Stratonikos Senchnoubei tē gynaiki chairein. Sēmeion hote eipa soi lytrōsai ton kainon chitōna apo tōn chalkōn ginōske*, *SB* 7574, 2: a letter on an ostrakon). In the second century AD, the sign to the recipient of a letter that the author is well-informed is that he knows that his wife went out to buy four obols worth of spices (*allo sēmion soi graphō peri autou, hote hē gynē sou exelthousa ēgorake obolōn tessarōn artymata tō nautikō*, *P.Petaus* 28, 8 and 17). In the same period, Anthestianus, having sent Sarapammon to the potter Psois, who refuses to pay his debts, informs his debtor that he cannot cheat him, because he knows what Psois has said and done. In the fourth century, Probus asks his sister Manatine to pay one and a half talents to his confidential aide Petronius, and as proof that it is he who is writing (*sēmeiou de charin*) says “When I met you at the Caesareion, I said to you, ‘Give me a little of the money that you have from me, so that I may buy a cauldron,’ and you said to me ...”

Thus *sēmeion* is the sign whereby the recipient may recognize the identity of the sender; the sender mentions circumstances that only the two of them could know about. This meaning is also found in the epigrams: Bacchon sends his slave to borrow money from the perfumer Aischra and tells him that as a sign of his identity he should refer to his amorous exploits. Likewise, Pytias’s lover wants to summon her: “As proof that it is I, tell her that he came drunk, passing through thieves, guided by Eros the bold.”

In the religious sphere, *sēmeion* has always meant a prodigy that is recognizable and provides proof for everyone. In the NT, it is a category of miracle, together with mighty works (*dynameis*) and wonders (*terata*, Acts 2:22; 2 Thess 2:9; 2 Cor 12:12; Heb 2:4); but it retains its value as a sign or

demonstration. With the prophets, a “sign” is proof that a message is truly from God (Exod 3:12; 4:19; Judg 6:17; 1 Sam 10:1, 7; Isa 38:7–8). For Philo, God performs *sēmeia* to indicate his will, to teach people, and to introduce them to the knowledge of heavenly things. More clearly, according to Josephus, “God uses miracles to convince people” (*Ant.* 2.274, 280); they are designed to inspire faith (2.276). Hence the persistent demand of Jesus’ contemporaries: “We want to see a sign from you” (Matt 12:38; 16:1; Mark 8:11; Luke 11:16; John 2:18; 6:30). “The Jews seek signs” (1 Cor 1:22).

This is how St. John sees miracles: they authenticate Jesus as the Messiah announced by the prophets. Since they are wonders and manifestations of power (Matt 9:28–29) as well as of mercy (11:5), they legitimate adherence to his teaching (11:20) and give him personal credibility. They show who he is: “He manifested his glory and his disciples believed in him” (John 2:11; 11:4). They are above all a sign of the Father’s favor: “No one can do the signs that you do unless God is with him.” By referring to the *mirabilia* done by Jesus as “signs,” St. John shows that he understands them as data that allow the discovery of the glory (*doxa*) of the incarnate Word, the revelation that Jesus is with God or comes from God, and finally the recognition of the testimony of the Father on behalf of his Son.

This theology enriches and adds subtlety to the concept of *sēmeion*. Should we translate “sign,” “indication,” or “proof”? What is certain is that the sign itself needs to be verified. If it is a guarantee of the authenticity of the Sent One and of the truth of the teaching, it has demonstrative power only for souls that are well-disposed or believing. It can provoke astonishment or emotion, even admiration (John 2:23; 6:26; Acts 8:9, 13) without adherence: “Even though he had done so many signs in their presence, still they did not believe in him” (John 12:37). It is even possible to slip into superstition at the sight of wonders, like Alexander, according to Plutarch (*Alex.* 75.1 ff.). The *semeia* of false prophets appear to confirm error (Deut 13:2–5), and according to 1 Cor 14:22, speaking in tongues is a sign for believers, but not for unbelievers. In other words, the “sign” is intelligible only to the religious intelligence; it is a veiled manifestation that only the eyes of the heart can discover, a propaedeutic to faith, attracting attention and prompting to an initiative, as with Nicodemus (John 3:2). Thus it is necessary to transcend the materiality of the deed in order to get to its meaning, or better, to the signified reality.

σηρικός (σιρικός)

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*sērikos* (*sirikos*), **silk**

Inspired by the lamentation of Ezek 27:9–25 over the ruin of Tyre, the dirge in Rev 18:12 describes the lamentation of the “merchants of the earth” over the ruin of Babylon, the loss of the cargoes from their ships: “cargo of gold and silver, of precious stones and pearls, of fine linen and purple, of silk (*sirikou*) and scarlet cloth.” The text is interesting both because it evokes the importation of luxury items from Africa and the Orient and also because of the use of the biblical hapax *sērikon*, which does not appear before the time of Augustus. It derives from *Sēr* (plural *Sēres*), referring to a people of the Far East, probably the Chinese, and also products originating in China: silk. At Vespasian’s triumph, where he was accompanied by Titus, “the emperors were unarmed, clothed in silk (*esthēsīn sērikais*) and crowned with laurels” (Josephus, *War* 7.126).

It is a curious fact that the ancients thought that silk came from a plant. According to Strabo 15.1.20, “Nearchus said that (the wool that grew on certain trees) was used to weave fine materials used by the Macedonians for cushions and saddle pads; the serica also are of this kind, Byssus being dried out of certain barks.” Pausanias, writing in the time of Marcus Aurelius, is the one who corrects this error: “As for the threads from which the Seres make their clothing, they do not come from a husk but from a different origin, as follows. There exists in their land a small animal, called by the Greeks a *sēr*. ... Its size is double that of the largest beetle; for the rest, it resembles a spider.... The work of these animals is a fine web that is found rolled about their feet.”

These silk fabrics, given their quality, enjoyed prodigious success in the first century, especially in the higher classes of society: “The empress’s silk robes, brought out from the palace armories” (Martial, *Epigr.* 11.8.5). A slave of Marcella, named Thymeles, was her *siricaria*, responsible for the wardrobe of *sericae vestes* (*CIL* VI, 9892). Caligula was not afraid to appear in public dressed in silk (*processit aliquando sericatus*), but he was criticized by Suetonius (“dress unworthy of a Roman and even of a human being,” *Calig.* 52). In AD 16, a *senatus consultum* forbade men to wear silk (Tacitus, *Ann.* 2.33; Dio Cassius 57.15). It was only in the sixth century that sericulture was introduced in the West, at least according to Procopius of Gaza: monks from India, knowing how zealously Emperor Justinian tried to keep the Romans from buying silk from their enemies the Persians, explained to the emperor that it was possible to make silk in Roman territory, “because they said that silk was produced by a worm that nature taught the art and compelled to work.... These men brought some eggs to Byzantium; they succeeded in transforming them

into worms, which they fed mulberry leaves; and so the Romans began to make silk” (*Goth.* 4.17).

σκληροκαρδία, σκληρός, σκληρότης, σκληροτράχηλος, σκληρύνω  
*sklērokardia*, **hard-heartedness**; *sklēros*, **hard, dry, stiff, inflexible, rigid**;  
*sklērotēs*, **hardness**; *sklērotrachēlos*, **stiff-necked**; *sklērynō*, **to harden**

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*sklerokardia*, S 4641; *TDNT* 3.613–614; *EDNT* 3.254; *NIDNTT* 2.152, 156, 180, 184; L&N 88.224; BDF §120(4); BAGD 756 | *skleros*, S 4642; *TDNT* 5.1022–1024, 1028; *EDNT* 3.254; *NIDNTT* 2.153–156; MM 578; L&N 20.3, 76.15, 88.135, 88.136; BAGD 756 | *sklerotes*, S 4643; *TDNT* 5.1022–1024, 1028–1029; *EDNT* 3.254; *NIDNTT* 2.153, 155; MM 578; L&N 88.223; BAGD 756 | *sklerotrachelos*, S 4644; *TDNT* 5.1022–1024, 1029; *EDNT* 3.254; *NIDNTT* 2.153, 155; MM 578; L&N 88.224; BAGD 756 | *skleruno*, S 4645; *TDNT* 5.1022–1024, 1030–1031; *EDNT* 3.254–255; *NIDNTT* 2.153, 155; MM 578; L&N 88.226; BAGD 756

The substantive *skelos* (cf. *skellō*, in the active, “to parch, dry up”; passive, “to be parched, dry”) does not exist, but there is *sklēros*, “hard, dry, stiff,” often contrasted with *malakos*, “soft, supple.” In its literal sense, it is used for stone, for metals and vegetables, for wood, for wind, air, or climate – as in Jas 3:4, where boats of whatever size are driven by strong winds (*hypo anemōn sklērōn*) – or for crisp and loud claps of thunder (Hesiod, *Th.* 839; Herodotus 8.12). In Hippocrates and Aristotle, the adjective is often used for bones, skin, and various other parts of the body.

In a figurative sense, the word is used to describe style (“forced” metaphors, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Pomp.* 1.2.6), difficult circumstances or a cruel fate, but especially for divine cruelty or inflexibility (Sophocles, *OT* 36), for “kings who are kings’ sons, who are harsh and inhumane toward their subjects” (*Ep. Arist.* 289; cf. Matt 25:24 – “I knew that you were a hard man”), and for people of rigid, forbidding, uncultured character (Plato, *Tht.* 155 e; Plutarch, *Cim.* 1.2), where hardness is rusticity.

The first occurrences in the LXX describe speech: that which is not pleasing to an interlocutor and not acceptable, or which is expressed roughly; Joseph spoke harshly to his brothers. The word is also used for hard work (Exod 1:14; 6:9; Deut 26:6; Isa 14:3; Philo, *Moses* 2.183), for hard battle (2 Sam 2:17), and for heavy servitude; but *sklēros* takes on many more varied meanings in classical Greek, being used especially for persons, sometimes in a positive sense, but more often pejoratively. Finally, “hardening” becomes a religious

idea, expressing rebellion, disobedience, or rejection of God's will, to be sure, but with the emphasis especially on obstinacy, inflexibility (Cant 8:6). Sir 3:26–27: “The obstinate heart will fall into misfortune”; Isa 48:4 – “I knew that you were obstinate, because your neck is made of iron sinews and your forehead is bronze”; Bar 2:33 – “They will repent of their stiff neck ... because they will remember the way of their fathers”; Deut 31:27.

The metaphor of the neck (Hebrew *ʾōrep*), the part of the animal body that connects the head to the backbone, is taken from the draft animal, whose efforts to resist are localized in the neck. When the ass or horse refuses to go on, it tightens and stiffens its neck. So to be “hard-or stiff-necked” means stubborn disobedience, hardening or obstinacy in rebellion. To specify this condition, the Bible uses the compounds *sklērotrachēlos*, six occurrences (out of nine) of which describe Israel, and *sklērokardia* (Hebrew *ʾārlaṭ lēhāh*). A stiff or hard heart resists divine impulses, refuses to follow that path that God wants it to follow. It is not only closed and insensitive, but disobedient. This substantive is used only twice in the NT, and only by Jesus: “It is because of your hardness of heart that Moses allowed you to put away your wives”; “Jesus showed himself to the Eleven.... He rebuked their unbelief (*apistia*) and hardness of heart, because they had not believed those who saw him raised (from the dead)” (Mark 16:14). *Sklērokardia* adds to simple unbelief in the resurrection the idea of *refusal* to believe in it.

The verb *sklērynō*, unknown in Philo and rather rare in secular Greek, is common in the LXX, where most of the occurrences have a moral and religious meaning: the Israelites stiffen their neck or their heart rather than return to Yahweh and submit to his will. But it is also said that God himself hardens the heart of the Egyptians (Exod 14:17), that of Sihon, king of Heshbon (Deut 2:30), and even that of Israel when they strayed from God's ways (Isa 63:17). The most typical case is that of Pharaoh, whose heart God hardened (Exod 4:21; 7:3; 9:12; 10:1, 20, 27; 11:10; 14:4, 8); but it is likewise said that “Pharaoh's heart was hardened” (Exod 7:22; 8:15; 9:35; 13:15). This simultaneity poses a theological problem, that of the union of divine action and human freedom, which St. Paul did not clarify by stating that “God shows mercy to whom he will and hardens whom he will”; but he suggests the solution in Rom 2:5, where he denounces the hardness of the impenitent heart that scorns the infinite treasures of divine goodness. “By your hardening, by your impenitent heart, you are storing up for yourself a treasury of wrath for the day of wrath.” God is free in his justice to penalize one who obstinately refuses his light and his mercy. Pharaoh's *sklērotēs* is voluntary; it has blinded him, keeping him from giving in to the prodigious divine signs wrought by Moses. God uses this obstinacy to free his people, because it is his usual course of

action to bring good from evil; just as by giving up his Son to crucifixion he gained the salvation of the world. This salvation, like the crucifixion, was decided from eternity.

## σκύβαλον

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*skybalon*, **scrap, debris, refuse, dung, excrement**

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*skubalon*, S 4657; TDNT 7.445–447; EDNT 3.256; NIDNTT 1.480; MM 579–580; L&N 6.225; BAGD 758

It is not easy to translate this NT hapax at Phil 3:8, where St. Paul, renouncing confidence in the flesh, meaning his privileges as a Jew, says they are worthless, to be discarded (*hēgoumai skybala [einai]*), in order to know Christ, gain him, be in him, share in the power of his resurrection.

I. – *Skybalon* often means “scrap, debris, refuse” (*P.Cair.Zen.* 59494, 16; *CPR* I, 175, 16; *PSI* 184, 7: *en skybalois chortou*), gleanings (*P.Ryl.* 149, 22: “grazed them on the gleavings of my vegetable-seed crop” – *katemenēsan aph’ hou eichon lachanospermou skybalou*; in AD 39/40), that which remains (*SB* 9386, 49: *synlegontes skybala ergatai β’ ... oboloi ιβ’*) and is given to the dogs, leftovers (*P.Mich.Zen.* 31, 15). This is the meaning intended by Philo in *Sacr. Abel and Cain* 109: “all the rest should be left as refuse (*hōsper skybala*) to the mortal nature”; by Leonidas of Tarentum: “You shall not taste even the leftovers from my dinner” (*Anth. Pal.* 6.202.6); by Ariston: “the crumbs that fall from the table” (*ibid.* 6.303.4); by Philip of Thessalonica: the remains of a deceased person (*ibid.* 7.383.2); by Hegesippus: “the wreckage of a ship” (7.276.2; cf. an anonymous writer: “a half-eaten scrap” – *hēmidaes skybalon*, 9.375); Achilles Tatius: “he reviled the catch and threw it out as refuse of the sea” (*eloidorei tēn agran kai erripsen hōs thalassēs skybalon*, 2.11.5); *Sib. Or.* 7.58: “you will be the miserable refuse of war.”

II. – *Skybalon* also has the sense “dung, filth” through popular association with *skōr*, according to Moulton-Milligan, who cite *P.Fay.* 119, 7, where Gemellus informs his son that the donkey-driver has purchased “a little bundle and rotten hay, the whole of it decayed – no better than dung” (*mikran dysmēn kai chorton sapron kai holon lelymenon hōs skybalon*, around AD 100). We may compare CD 4.19 (“the builders attached themselves to filth,” Hebrew *šō’*, in place of *šāw*; cf. the LXX, and the Vulgate of Hos 5:11 – *sordes*) and find a correspondence with the Hebrew *tō ‘ēhâh*, ordinarily translated *bdelygma* (“abomination”), but also *akatharsia* (“uncleanness”), *ponēriai* (“wickedness”), *makrymmata* (something that is sent away because it is repulsive), and *molynsis*

(“defilement, pollution”). In any event, “Debris and filth accumulate in the nooks and crannies of houses” (*sesōrentai phorytos kai skybalōn plēthos*, Philo, *Prov.* 2.105), and in ethics the term suggests scorn or disgust: “As when the sieve is shaken the scraps (or impurities, *kopria*) remain, so does a person’s filth (or uncleanness, *skybala*) remain in his thoughts” (Sir 27:4; OT hapax). Sir 26:28 uses the verb *skybalizō* with respect to intelligent men who are scornfully rejected.

III. – Again, *skybalon* means “excrement,” for example in Artemidorus Daldianus (*Onir.* 2.25) and the medical writers (Aelian, *NA* 5.9; other references in Wettstein). This is how the Vulgate (*stercora*) and Symmachus understood the word in Ezek 4:12, 15. The ritual law of whole burnt offerings, as Philo understood it, was that “nothing should remain of the creature except the excrement and the skin” (*skybalōn kai dermatos*). During the siege of Jerusalem, “many dug through the sewers and old cow dung in order to feed on this ordure; what they would have been unable to look at before became food for them.”

IV. – In any event, the word means what must be eliminated. J. Huby’s comment is exactly right, in spite of the anachronism: “All of that is worth no more than the contents of a garbage can.” To convey the crudity of the Greek, however: “It’s all crap.”

## σκωληκόβρωτος

*skōlēkobrōtos*, **worm-eaten**

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*skolekobrotos*, S 4662; *TDNT* 7.456–457; *EDNT* 3.256; MM 580; L&N 23.166; BAGD 758

This compound, which means literally “worm food,” i.e., “eaten by worms,” belongs to the agricultural vocabulary and is used for plants, trees, fruits, especially grains (Theophrastus, *Hist. Pl.* 3.12.6; 4.11.1; *Caus. Pl.* 5.9.1). It is attested in five or six papyri, all from before Christ. Eudemos asks Zeno to decrease the rent because the harvest has been eaten by worms (*eisig gar hēmin skōlēkobrōtou kai kakou sitou [arourai] ιε'*, *P.Cair.Zen.* 59433, 14; cf. *Berichtigungsliste* IV, p. 16); *ibid.* 59728, 5: “worm-eaten corpses” (*tēn skōlēkobrōton sōmata*); *P.Mich.Zen.* 96, 4: “that has become worm-eaten” (*tēs gegenēmenēs skōlēkobrōtou*, referring to sesame seed); *PSI* 490, 4: *tēn genomenēn skōlēkobrōton apokechōrēkasin enkataleipontes tous geōrgountas tēn gēn* (a letter concerning a crop guardian); *P.Grad.* VII, 11: “seed that is not worm-eaten” (*spermatos askōlēkobrōtou*); *P.Tebt.* 701, 74 and 81: “for the



worm-eaten ground” (*eis tēn skōlēkobrōton gēn*; cf. the possible restoration in 1008, 18). In 5/4 BC, *P.Oslo* 26, 14 attests the neologism *holoskōlēkobrōtos*.

Since in the Bible “the punishment of the ungodly is the fire and the worm” (Sir 7:17; cf. Isa 66:24 = Mark 9:48), especially worms (Isa 14:11; Sir 19:3; 1 Macc 2:62), which symbolize human emptiness (Job 7:5; 25:6) and the decay and decomposition of corpses (Job 17:14; 21:26; Sir 10:11), Acts 12:23 uses *skōlēkobrōtos* for Herod Agrippa: “he was eaten by worms and died.” For all that, this is not a medical term; but in the secular and religious literature it is used for the death of villains, like Judas (according to Papias) and an uncle (also named Julian) of Julian the Apostate, false prophets like Alexander (Lucian, *Alex.* 59), cruel rulers like Pheretima, queen of the Cyrenians (“still alive, she was crawling with worms,” Herodotus 4.205); Sulla, who had a purulent intestinal abscess and an infection that caused his flesh to swarm with vermin (Plutarch, *Sull.* 36.3–4); Pherecydes (Aelian, *VH* 4.28); Herod the Great (Josephus, *Ant.* 17.169); and especially persecutors, from Antiochus IV Epiphanes (“the ungodly man’s eyes were crawling with worms,” 2 Macc 9:9) and L. Hermianus, the governor of Cappadocia (Tertullian, *Scap.* 3) to Emperor Galerius (“his intestines were crawling with countless worms”).

## σπερμολόγος

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*spermologos*, **seed-gatherer, gleaner, prattler, buffoon**

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*spermologos*, S 4691; *EDNT* 3.264; *NIDNTT* 3.525; MM 583; L&N 27.19, 33.381; BDF §119(1); BAGD 762

At Athens, Paul dialogued (*dialogomai*, Acts 17:17) with the idlers that he met at the agora (cf. *agoraios*, 17:5; 19:38), who asked, using Athenian slang, “What does this *spermologos* mean?” (17:18). It is impossible to give the exact connotations of this biblical hapax, a word unknown in the papyri and, it seems, in the inscriptions as well. It is often translated “prattler, speechifier, driver.” But the etymology is clear: *sperma legein* means to gather seeds or grains. So as a noun, it refers to sparrows and other birds that peck at seeds scattered on the ground and is in no way pejorative. Used figuratively, however, the word takes on more diverse meanings: the good-for-nothing who wanders about the market and collects the scraps and debris scattered here and there; cf. Demosthenes: “The accuser ... a miserable gleaner (*spermologos*), an outcast from the marketplace” (*Corona* 18.127); or the prattler, chatterer who is always hunting for news and spreading it everywhere, running his mouth carelessly, who pretends to be in the know but actually spouts his gossip without

understanding it: an ignoramus. This highly derogatory meaning is the most commonly attested sense of the word in the first-second century. Philo: “Helicon, a slave of high lineage, a seed-pecker and outcast from society” (*To Gaius* 203); Plutarch: Alcibiades is accused of abandoning the command of the fleet to “men who owe their influence to their drunkenness and buffoonery (*spermologias*),” (*Alc.* 36.2; cf. Plutarch, *Demetr.* 28.5); “When the soul founders, anger casts aside a jumble of violent, unrestrained words.”

Given this definition, which makes the word almost an insult, it is difficult to understand how the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers could immediately afterward lead Paul to the middle of Mars Hill and ask him to expound his teaching before the assembly. M. A. Robinson suggests that Paul must have used the parable of the sower and that this accounts for the use of the word. Hence the play on words, which does not ridicule the preacher but takes aim at his teaching in a humorous way. It is best to translate *spermologos* as “this character.”

## σπίλας

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*spilas*, **gust, squall, (under-sea) rock, boulder**

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*spilas*, S 4694; EDNT 3.265; MM 583–584; L&N 79.57; BAGD 762

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Jude 12: *houtoi eisin hoi en tais agapais hymōn spilades*. This can be translated “These people are stumbling blocks in your love feasts” or “These people are stains on your love feasts.” The biblical hapax *spilas*, unknown in the papyri, can mean “gust, squall,” but the predominant classical meaning is “rock, boulder”; cf. Sophocles, *Trach.* 678: “it dissolved on a rock on the ground”; Theocritus: “an inexhaustible, voiceless stream from the rocks”; “Here, beneath this sepulchral rock, O stranger, lies Demas.” Usually, *splidades* are rocks that are covered by water and thus dangerous: “the waves smashed their ships on the reefs” (Homer, *Od.* 3.298); “the narrow strait ... hemmed in by narrow reefs” (Apollonius Rhodius, *Argon.* 2.550; cf. 558); “the vessels, smashed by the waves against the reefs and promontories” (Polybius 1.37.2). In the area around the port of Jaffa, “there is a series of steep cliffs and reefs jutting far out into the water.” This meaning is reported by all the lexicographers: “*splidades* are rocks under the sea ... rocks hidden by the sea” (*splidades hai hyphalos petrai ... hai hypo thalassan kekrymmenai petrai*, *Etymol. Mag.*); “Apion says that *splidades* are rocks that form a hollow in the sea, but Heliodoros says they are rocks beside the sea that the waters wash over.” J. Pollux sums up precisely: “*spilas*, a reef, a hidden boulder, a stone, a jutting rock, a promontory, a prominence

exposed to the wind, a knoll” (*Onom.* 1.9.115). In Jude 12, where a moral portrait of godless folk who slander the way of righteousness is being sketched, the metaphor is excellent; it suggests the pernicious influence of false teachers in promiscuity at banquets. They present a danger of shipwreck, scandal, or ensnarement for believers.

The use of the masculine article *hoi* [*spiloi*?] with the feminine *spilades* suggests that there might have been a popular confusion of this word with *spilos* (“stain on the skin,” and by extension any physical or moral stain). This is how the Vulgate interprets this text (“maculae”). The Orphic text *Lithica* 614 is cited: the good woman is “speckled with stains” (*katastiktos spiladessi*). This meaning would make the text less forceful. In any event, the meal of brotherly love in the Christian community requires greater holiness than the *nomos eranistōn* from the imperial period: “Let no one enter into the most venerable meeting of the dinner club before he has been examined for purity, piousness, and goodness.”

### σπλάγχνα, σπλαγχνίζομαι

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*splanchna*, **entrails, viscera, compassion**; *splanchnizomai*, **to have compassion, take pity**

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*splagchna*, S 4698; TDNT 7.548–559; EDNT 3.265–266; NIDNTT 2.593, 599–600; MM 584; L&N 8.58, 25.49, 25.50, 25.54, 25.55, 26.11; BAGD 763 | *splagchnizomai*, S 4697; TDNT 7.548–559; EDNT 3.265; NIDNTT 2.599–600; MM 584; L&N 25.49; BDF §§108(3), 176(1), 229(2), 233(2), 235(2); BAGD 762

In the fifth-fourth century, *splanchna* meant the internal parts of a sacrificial victim, mentioned in cultic regulations as part of the compensation of priests and priestesses, so that the verb *splanchnizō* meant “consume the entrails.” This means the honorable parts, of course, since the word is also applied to humans, in whom seven viscera are enumerated (Philo, *Alleg. Interp.* 1.12; *Drunkenness* 106; cf. *Spec. Laws* 1.62): “the internal parts are called viscera, these being the stomach, the heart, the lungs, the spleen, the liver, and the two kidneys” (*Creation* 118). The word is also used for the intestines (*Abraham* 241) or the stomach area in general without any anatomical precision.

The emotions are located in the entrails – since they are what is most intimate and hidden (*Post. Cain* 118; cf. Josephus, *War* 4.263) – which are therefore synonymous with what we today call the “heart”: “I suffer in my stomach and in my entrails” (*tēn koilian mou kai ta splanchna mou ponō*, *Pss.*

*Sol.* 2.15); “Abraham, moved to the depths of his entrails, began to weep” (*T. Abr.* A 3, 5); “The consumption reaches to the entrails, causing through its oppression despair and distress.” When Aseneth falls in love at the first sight of Joseph, her entrails are smitten (*Jos. Asen.* 6.1), just as the entrails of the father are disturbed with each cry from his son (*Sir* 30:7), for children are said to be their father’s entrails (*hoi paides splanchna legontai*, Artemidorus Daldianus, *Onir.* 1.44; Philo, *Joseph* 25; 4 Macc 14:13). But the entrails of the foolish are also said to be unstable (*Sir* 33:5), and blows to the entrails cause suffering (Philo, *To Gaius* 368). The nuance of pity is attested in 5 BC (*hyper splanchnou* = through pity, *BGU* 1139, 17).

This last meaning, unusual in secular Greek, is the predominant one in the Bible (cf. *Prov* 12:10; *Wis* 10:5), especially in the NT, where the entrails (corresponding to the Hebrew *rahmîm*) are the seat of compassion (*Gen* 43:30; 1 Kgs 3:26; *Jer* 31:20). The feminine singular *rehem*, moreover, refers to the uterus, the mother’s womb; so that the entrails are the locus of the mother’s pity for her children (*Isa* 49:15) and are said to shudder (*Isa* 16:11; *Cant* 5:4), to resound and make noise (*Isa* 43:15), to bubble or seethe (*Lam* 1:20), or to be in turmoil. It follows that in the Synoptics, where this compassion is twice attributed to God (*Matt* 18:27; *Luke* 15:20), once to the Good Samaritan, and nine times to Christ – almost always to account for a miracle – the word means first of all a physical emotion, true compassion in the face of a neighbor’s misery, literally a movement of the entrails at the sight. So translating the passive *esplanchnisthē* as “he took pity” is almost opposite the true sense; “he was taken by (or moved with) pity” would be better. The exact sense is “he had a visceral feeling of compassion.”

The affective quality of the entrails is much emphasized by Paul: whereas the entrails of the Corinthians are constricted, those of Titus are open and go out to the believers (2 *Cor* 6:12; 7:15); Philemon has calmed the entrails of Christians under trial (*Phlm* 7; cf. verse 20. The apostle loves Onesimus as his own entrails (*tout’ estin ta ema splanchna*, verse 12), hence as his own child; and he loves the believers in the entrails of Christ (*epithō pantas hymas en splanchnois Christou Iēsou*, *Phil* 1:8). This tender compassion is almost hypostasized; every Christian must be clothed in it, for it is the expression of brotherly love, with strong connotations of mercy.

The compound *eusplanchnos* (*Eph* 4:32; 1 *Pet* 3:8) should not be translated “benevolent, good-hearted”; it is intensive. But whereas in secular Greek having good or strong entrails means being courageous, in Christian terms it means to be tenderly merciful, compassionate: “so display your innate love and compassion and tenderness.” *Jas* 5:11 coins a new word for this: having long or

abundant entrails (*polysplanchnos estin ho Kyrios kai oiktirmōn*), the equivalent of *polyeleos* (Ps 102:8; SB 8726, 9).

σπουδάζω, σπουδαῖος, σπουδαίως, σπουδή

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*spoudazō*, to hasten, apply oneself, devote oneself; *spoudaios*, hasty, diligent, virtuous; *spoudaiōs*, hastily, diligently; *spoudē*, haste, urgency, zeal, diligence, gravity, seriousness

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*spoudazo*, S 4704; TDNT 7.559–568; EDNT 3.266; NIDNTT 3.1168–1169; MM 585; L&N 25.74, 68.63, 68.79; BDF §§77, 392(1a); BAGD 763 | *spoudaios*, S 4705; TDNT 7.559–568; EDNT 3.267; NIDNTT 3.1168–1169; MM 585; L&N 25.75, 25.75, 68.65; BDF §§102(1), 244(2); BAGD 763 | *spoudaios*, S 4709; EDNT 3.267; MM 585; L&N 68.79; BAGD 763 | *spoude*, S 4710; TDNT 7.559–568; EDNT 3.267; NIDNTT 3.1168–1169; MM 585–586; L&N 25.74, 68.63, 68.79; BAGD 763–764

It is not easy to specify the exact meaning of these terms, which were common in classical and Hellenistic Greek and which translators of the NT almost always take to mean “zeal, urgency.” They are absent from Matthew and John.

I. – The idea of “haste, rapidity, alacrity” is in the forefront, with no psychological or moral connotation. “When the sun rose, the angels urged Lot to leave” (Gen 19:15; hiphil of the Hebrew *’ûṣ*); “The servants hurried to leave”; the shepherds hastened to Bethlehem (Luke 2:16); “Hasten to come to me, quickly” (*spoudason elthein pros me, techeōs*, 2 Tim 4:9; cf. BGU 2349, 5). A meaning well-attested in the papyri: “That has to be sped up” (*P.Panop.Beatty* 2, 78; cf. 218); “Please, sister, hurry to make my tunic” (*P.Fuad I Univ.* VI, 15); “Hurry to go and find my uncle’s wife.” This is sometimes the meaning of the adjective *spoudaios* (*P.Brem.* 48, 28) and almost always that of the substantive *spoudē* in the LXX: “You shall eat the lamb in haste.” The usage of the Koine is similar, whether in literary texts or (more rarely) in the papyri: “I sailed hastily for Alexandria” (*P.Mich.* 503, 2); “Please carry out the brickyard work as quickly as possible” (*P.Sorb.* 63, 2); “I wrote you quickly.” The only NT use of the word in this sense is perhaps Mark 6:45, where Salome, after asking her mother’s advice, returned “at once, in haste”; but here there seems to be a psychological nuance, just as the Virgin Mary’s departing “with alacrity” (Luke 1:39) means not only “hastily” but “with fervor.”

II. – In effect, *spoudazō* with an impersonal object means above all “apply oneself to, actively involve oneself with” and with a personal object “devote

oneself to, take the part of.” In the papyri, the meaning “deal with, take care of” is predominant, often with connotations of going to some trouble and doing one’s best. It is in this sense of “trying, applying oneself diligently to” and not “hastening” that the NT occurrences of this verb should be understood.

The adverb *spoudaiōs* has the same meaning in Titus 3:13, where the apostle’s disciple must take care and do his best to provide for the trip of Zenas and Apollos; and in 2 Tim 1:17, where Onesiphorus sought Paul in the Roman prisons with extreme care and without sparing himself any trouble – and succeeded in finding him. Likewise, the substantive *spoudē*, with this nuance of costly effort, is contrasted with indolence and inertia in Rom 12:11 (*tē spoudē mē oknēroi*) and 2 Pet 1:5 (*spoudēn pasan pareisenegkantes*); it is not so much a matter of goodwill or zeal, but of making an effort; the formula is classical. Finally, *spoudē* also means “gravity, seriousness.” This seems to be the right characteristic for a leader of a Christian community, who must preside *en spoudē* (Rom 12:8) – not with urgency or zeal, but with seriousness, dignity, or solicitude (*Ep. Arist.* 39); or even in such a manner as to win esteem, i.e., honorably (cf. Josephus, *Ant.* 14.186; cf. 2.197; 9.182; Philostratus, *Gym.* 13). It would seem that it was this quality of seriousness that produced in the Corinthians “sorrow according to God,” i.e., repentance (2 Cor 7:11).

III. – Whatever the nuance of each particular text, the diligence, care, or effort manifested come from an initial goodwill, the pursuit of something one cares about, a desire to succeed; and *spoudazō*, in the first century AD, expresses the marks of an attentive benevolence, as thoughtful as it is efficient. In 41, Emperor Claudius takes pleasure in the tokens of attachment he has received from the Alexandrians (*P.Lond.* 1912, 25: *spoudasantes kai spoudasthentos*; cf. Severus and Caracalla, in *I.Bulg.* 659, 23), who are for their part impatient to receive tokens of his favor: *ha par’ emou labein espoudakate* (line 52; cf. *P.Oxy.* 2558, 3: *Kaisarōn spoudēn*; Dittenberger, *Or.* 723, 1). With regard to the Thasians, he receives “all the tokens of [their] diligence and piety” (*tēs hymeteras spoudēs kai eusebeias apodechomai pantas*, *I.Thas.* 179, 4), as Octavian wrote to the inhabitants of Rhosos: “Seleucus, my admiral, ... has shown many tokens of his diligence and eagerness” (*pasan eispheromenos spoudēn kai prothymian*, *IGLS* 718, 84). This goodwill includes ardor, care, and devotion: “we obtained this thanks to the careful effort of our friends” (*tēs de tōn philōn spoudēs tychontos epetychamen*, *P.Tebt.* 314, 9); a woman in the second-third century thanks her mother for sending a chair (*charin de soi oida, mētēr, epi tē spoudē tou kathedrariou*, *P.Oxy.* 963). Someone who is asking a ruler to intervene calls upon the goodwill of the prospective benefactor: “I urge you, sir, to take the initiative in showing your concern for them.”

Finally, *spoudē* expresses fervor, zeal, and eagerness, as in 2 Cor 7:12 – “the zeal that you showed for us”; 8:7 – “you excel in all diligence”; 8:8 – “to prove by the zeal of others that your own love is sincere”; 8:16–17 – Titus is fervent in his care for the Corinthians; Heb 6:11 – the Hebrews must be ardent in their efforts to grow the good fruit of their hope. This is exactly the wording of the papyri: “with full eagerness and joy, of one accord” (*meta tēs pleistēs spoudēs kai charas homothymadon*, BGU 1768, 7); “as far as possible, I will show my eagerness”; especially the adverb *spoudaiōs*: “Let us use creation with ardor while we are young” (Wis 2:6); the Jewish elders begged Jesus with fervor or insistently. Telling of the effectiveness of a recommendation, the beneficiary writes, “He introduced me to Aemilianus without delay and eagerly” (*anoknōs kai spoudaiōs synestake me*, P.Mich. 498, 14). Philoi shows that he is eager to serve (*hina pempōmen Philōi spoudaiōs hēmin prosenechthēti*). As for Jude 3, *pasan spoudēn poioumenos graphein hymin*, we could just as easily translate either “I was in a hurry” or “I greatly desired to write to you concerning our common salvation.” All the commentators, following Wettstein, emphasize that the formula *pasan spoudēn poioumenos* has classical antecedents going back to Herodotus.

IV. – When St. Paul points out to the Corinthians that Titus has shown himself very eager (*spoudaioteros*) to go to them, of his own accord (2 Cor 8:17), he wants to impress his recipients with the fact that this promptitude comes from the very heart of his envoy; but, nevertheless, he is using the epistolary formula “I know your devotion,” which became a cliché: “Knowing your devotion to everyone” (*eidōs sou to spoudeon to pros pantas*, P.Oxy. 929, 3; cf. 1064, 6); “for I know your devotion and fairness.” We have every right to think that in choosing the adjective *spoudaios*, he also gave it the connotations “good, excellent, virtuous” that are implied in other NT usages and which were so common in the Koine, that a Roman epitaph uses this word to sum up all the virtues of “Crispina, wife of Procopius, *spoudaia*, loving the law” (CII 132). This moral meaning of *spoudaios* comes especially from Aristotle, who probably borrowed it from Antisthenes (Diogenes Laertius 6.104–105). On the one hand, *spoudaios* means “serious, conscientious”; on the other hand, “meticulous, done well, virtuous.” There are games that are serious (*tas espoudasmenas paidias*, Aristotle, *Rh.* 1.11.1371–4) in that they require effort, and similarly the work or function (*ergon*) of moral virtue is the virtuous life (*zōē spoudaia*), which requires sustained diligence. Xenophon contrasts honest folk, who deserve respect (*hoi spoudaioi*) against rogues (*hoi phauloi*, in *Cyr.* 2.24) and the wicked (*ponēroi*). This vocabulary and doctrine were picked up by the Stoics. According to Zeno, there are two classes of humans (*to men ton spoudaiōn, to de tōn phaulōn*), the former practicing virtue, the others doing

evil (Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 2.7.11; vol. 2, p. 99; cf. *SVF*, vol. 1, 216). Chrysippus says that the *spoudaios anēr* is a rare person (Plutarch, *De Stoic. rep.* 31), is perfect and happy and does not fall into error. Philo inherits this tradition and contrasts the good and the wicked (*to phaulon tō spoudaiō*, *Giants* 56); “The life of the virtuous person consists in deeds (*ho spoudaiou bios en ergois*), that of the wicked (*ho tou phaulou*) in words.” As opposed to the slave, the *spoudaios* is not subject to compulsion (*Good Man Free* 60); “He is perfectly virtuous (*pantōs spoudaios*), this man to whom it is said, ‘I am your God’ ” (*Change of Names* 31; cf. Philo, *Sacr. Abel and Cain* 124), “incapable of taking on the burden of any evil whatsoever” (*Creation* 73). As God is the author of all that is worthwhile (*spoudaia*, Philo, *Change of Names* 256), it is possible to specify that “God made all virtuous beings for the sake of their affinity with him” (*Creation* 74).

In everyday Greek, *spoudaios* refers to good quality: “I am sending you some good melon seeds” (*P.Oxy.* 117, 2); “we have no other that is good” (*P.Flor.* 338, 8); the adjective is also used for athletes, good people (*P.Mich.* 213, 11), and true friends, precisely because they are zealous and eager.

V. – We cannot fail to note the connotations of excellence and honor in this term, especially when it is linked with *philotimia*, as is the case in most of the honorific decrees. For example, a decree at Samos in honor of Boulagoras, “showing eagerness and absolute devotion” (*tēm pasan epoiēsato spoudēn kai philotimian antikatastas*, *SEG* I, 366, 11; second century BC); a decree conferring *proxenia* upon Nicias, who spared no zeal, expense, or devotion; a decree at a city in Cappadocia in behalf of Apollonius; a decree of Apollonia honoring Pamphilos: “With all eagerness and devotion, he set each of these matters in order” (*I.Car.* 167, 8); decree of Smyrna in honor of some Thasian judges: “for the zeal and devotion with which they acted.” Heracleans of the Pontus send an embassy to Hadrian to intercede on behalf of their colony “using all zeal and all genuine affection.”

This link with *philostorgia* (“affection”) exploits the affective connotations of the word *spoudē* during this period and reveals not only the elements of affection, spontaneity, and unselfishness in Titus’s eagerness to go to Corinth and the cordial aspects of brotherly assistance in the primitive church but also how the believers put their whole heart into bearing fruit.

## στασιαστής, στάσις

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*stasiastēs*, **agitator, troublemaker, fomentor of rebellion**; *stasis*, **standing, controversy, rebellion, uprising**



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*stasiastes*, EDNT 3.267; MM 586; L&N 39.37; BAGD 764 | *stasis*, S 4714; TDNT 7.568–571; EDNT 3.267; MM 586; L&N 13.72, 33.448, 39.34; BAGD 764

The biblical hapax *stasiastēs*, used concerning Barabbas, who was in prison “with the seditious” (Mark 15:7), unknown in classical Greek, is attested from the third century BC by two papyri. Païs, a rug-maker, has already brought accusations against Nechtembes to Zeno; today he gives several proofs of his escapades. He has even corrupted other weavers; he is an agitator (*hos estin stasiastes*, PSI 442; republished as *P.Cair.Zen.* 59484, 4). A similar accusation brought by Petosiris against another Païs: “memorandum to Zeno from Petosiris: Païs, the agitator, the farmer” (*hypomnēma Zēnōni para Petosirios: Paeis ho stasiastes ho geōrgos*, *P.Cair.Zen.* 59499, 87). Josephus, *Ant.* 14.8 presents “a friend of Hyrcanus the Idumean, called Antipater ...; he was by nature a troublemaker and seditious.” The noun is derived from *stasiazō*, “be in dissension, plot an uprising” (Xenophon, *An.* 2.5.28), form parties (Thucydides 4.84.2), revolt.

With the exception of Prov 17:14 (Hebrew *rîḥ*, a private quarrel), all the occurrences of *stasis* in the LXX fit the first meaning of the term: transitively, the act of standing something up; intransitively, the act of standing still, as the moon stood still (Josh 10:13); hence the connotations of repose, stability, fixity so emphasized by Philo with moral or religious significance. But the NT uses this meaning – “stand, remain in place” – only once, with respect to the way to the heavenly sanctuary, which was not yet open “so long as the first tent (the tabernacle of the old covenant) remained” (Heb 9:8) or was functional (*echousēs stasin*). This agrees with the usage in 2 Chr 30:16; 35:10, 15; Neh 9:3; 13:11, because holding a place or a position is often synonymous with carrying out a function. Valerius Pius, for example, gives thanks and accepts the position of *secutor* and the assurance that he has been given (*eucharistōn autō kai epidechomenos tēn genētheisan pros auton stasin kai dexian*, *P.Mich.* 485, 7; cf. Marcus Aurelius 6.41.2).

Standing up can mean standing up in opposition to or disagreement with someone. This sense of *stasis* is attested five times in Acts, with the same connotations as in contemporary Greek. It can be a matter of conflicting ideas, a source of controversy and polemics; these discussions bring out disagreements and stir up commotion and trouble that are hard to smooth over, between either individuals or social groups, like the violent dispute in Acts 23:10. Usually, *stasis* refers to social disorders, whether civil war (Dittenberger, *Syl.* 528, 4; third century BC, at Gortyn; Josephus, *Ant.* 14.22), revolution (Thucydides 7.33.5), revolt (Josephus, *Ant.* 20.117), an insurrection, an uprising (*P.Brem.*

11, 30 = *C.Pap.Jud.* 444, 30), a riot. Thus emperor Claudius refers to the *tarachē kai stasis* of the Alexandrians against the Jews, and in a dream Martyrius sees the riots and madness at Lycopolis, followed by attacks and pillage (*P.Oxy.* 1873, 2). All these texts show the gravity and violence implied by Hellenistic *stasis* and help explain the connection between insurrection and murder in Luke 23:19, 25.

στέγω

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*stegō*, to hide, contain, bear up, endure

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*stego*, S 4722; *TDNT* 7.585–587; *EDNT* 3.272; MM 587; L&N 25.176; BAGD 765–766

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This verb, which is relatively rare in literary Greek, as well as in the papyri and inscriptions, derives from the Indo-European (*s*)*teg*, “cover, hide” (cf. Kasch, on this word, in *TDNT*, vol. 7, p. 585). It has diverse meanings, as summarized by Hesychius: “*stegei*: hide, contain, bear up, endure” (*kryptei*, *synechei*, *bastazei*, *hypomenei*). The word is used for covering a house with a roof, as in a dedication by a *thiasos* at Olbia (“They covered the synagogue”) or for covering a container to keep a liquid from spilling. Hence the connotations of protecting and defending, of enduring and resisting, either literally (“They bore up against the onslaught of the barbarians”) or in a moral sense: “Being able to endure the deprivations no longer” (Philo, *Flacc.* 64, *mēketi stegein*); Moses was “unable to contain (*mē stegōn*) a feeling of reciprocal love and affection for his people” (*Virtues* 69); “For my father did me much evil, and I bore up until your arrival” (*ho gar patēr mou polla moi kaka epoiēsen, kai estexa heōs elthēs*, *P.Oxy.* 1775, 10); “it is necessary to be zealous, to bear up, to speak out” (*zēlotypein gar dei stegein karterein*, *P.Grenf.* 1.18; second century BC); Palladas: “I cannot hold back this rage” (*Anth. Pal.* 11.340). It is in this sense that St. Paul, not taking advantage of his right to live off of the gospel, endures all his privations (1 Cor 9:12; *panta stegomen*) or is unable to endure the impatience or distress caused him by lack of news from the Thessalonians: “no longer being able to bear it” (*mēketi stegontes*, 1 Thess 3:1, 5).

We may understand 1 Cor 13:7 in the same way: “love bears all things” (*hē agapē ... panta stegei*). It seems preferable, however, to give *stegō* its classical sense, “keep secret, hidden,” which is its meaning in Sir 8:17 – “Do not seek advice from a fool; he will not keep the matter confidential” (OT hapax); “remain silent.” From Philo: “Not being able to keep quiet the secret of the greatness and beauty of virtue” (Philo, *Abraham* 261); from Josephus: “Once he

was drunk, he could no longer keep secrets” (*Life* 225; cf. *Ant.* 19.48); a petition to the king, third century BC: “let him no longer hold out in the district on account of the preceding complaints” (*ouketi stēgē en tō nomō dia tas prokeimenas aitias*, *P.Tebt.* 769, 74); or the edict of the prefect Cn. Vergilius Capito, December 7, AD 48: *kai toutous de stegē monon dechesthai tous dierchomenous*. Thus, in all circumstances, love is characterized by discretion; in particular, it keeps quiet about evils and does not record them on a balance sheet; it covers evil with silence and does not try to exploit it, as mothers excuse their children’s faults and as Christ begged pardon for his executioners (Luke 23:34). So St. Paul says, “Persecuted, we show tolerance” (1 Cor 4:12; cf. 1 Pet 4:8 = *T. Jos.* 17.2). Far from complaining about all of the dishonest and base deeds that may do him harm, the long-suffering charitable person conceals them, in a way, and thus overcomes evil with good (1 Thess 5:15; Rom 12:17, 21; 1 Pet 3:9).

## στηρίζω

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*stērizō*, **to support, sustain, strengthen, fix firmly in place**,

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*sterizo*, S 4741; *TDNT* 7.653–657; *EDNT* 3.276; MM 589; L&N 30.80, 74.19, 85.38; BDF §§71, 74(1), 400(7); BAGD 768

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The basic meaning of this verb is “support, sustain, strengthen,” and in the passive voice “lean, settle, be confirmed,” but its nuances vary considerably in various usages. These are first of all cosmic: the “rainbows that the son of Kronos fixed on a cloud”; “a wave appeared to us, touching the sky.” More common, however, is the meaning “set up, plant, fix.” “I did not have the means either to plant my feet or to climb the trunk”; the camel’s hump “is set on the rest of its body” (perfect passive of *estēriktai*, Aristotle, *HA* 2.1.499). Finally, in medical language, the illness or the pain settles in a certain part of the body. In a number of its late occurrences, *stērizō* has the nuance of steadfast determination, but apparently it never had a moral significance in classical Greek.

It was the LXX that gave it a religious and moral meaning. It preserves the secular meanings, as with Jacob’s ladder “leaning on the earth (*estērigmenē*, Hebrew *nāṣah*) and reaching to the heavens” (Gen 28:12; cf. Philo, *Dreams* 1.3.; 1.133; 2.19), but it emphasizes the meaning “sustain” and “lean” (“If anyone leans on this broken reed that is Egypt, his hand will be pierced”). In so doing it gives *stērizō* a nuance of stability, of lasting fixedness, of solidity, so that the verb has to be translated “strengthen, make firm.” According to Exod

17:12, “Aaron and Hur held Moses’ hands (Hebrew *tāmak*), so that his hands were firm (*estērigmenai*, Hebrew *’mûnâh*) until sunset” (cf. Philo, *Alleg. Interp.* 3.45). On the rare occasion this strengthening is pejorative, but almost always God is the one who does the establishing (Sir 6:37; 1 Macc 14:14; *Pss. Sol.* 16.12), or the heart is what stands firm, that is, what is strong, convinced, persevering. This is a virtue that goes with faithfulness.

Philo inherits this vocabulary: “the plaster must harden and acquire solidity” (*Husbandry* 160); “The feet are the support and the stable base of a man.” Not only is the meaning “stability” emphasized, but it becomes a spiritual quality that the hesitant and the divided lack; they are “unable to find a permanent seat” (*Migr. Abr.* 148), “unstable beings, scattered, carried here and there, always moving away without ever establishing (*stērichthēnai*) themselves anywhere” (*Prelim. Stud.* 58). It is precisely in the midst of the worst difficulties that changeless fixedness must be shown: “Do not let yourself be submerged or engulfed, but fix yourself firmly (*stērichtheis*) and energetically turn back the stream of difficulties that are pouring out on you with extreme violence from above to below, from here and there, from all sides at once.” This precept is taken up by Christian parenesis. This intensive sense of *stērizō* (“stand firm”) is owed to Philo, whose affinities with the vocabulary of the NT are never sufficiently noted.

There is nevertheless a Hebraism that Philo did not exploit, which consists in placing or fixing one’s eye or face toward or against someone. In the latter case, hostility is entailed, but “to set one’s face” to do something expresses an absolutely firm resolve, an unshakable decision or attitude, a definitive intention. This is exactly the meaning in Luke 9:51 – at the beginning of the great journey to Jerusalem, during which Jesus crosses Samaria, Judea, the Jordan and even turns his back on the capital, the evangelist notes that “he set his face to go to Jerusalem” (*autos to prosōpon estērisen tou poreuesthai eis Iērousalēm*). Perhaps Luke is thinking of Isa 50:7, “I set my face like a flint”; in any event, he wants to point out Christ’s absolutely firm resolve – almost obstinacy – to get to the Holy City, whatever may be the dangers, the suffering, and the diverse circumstances of the pilgrimage.

We must understand the same sense of absoluteness with “the great gulf solidly fixed (perfect passive, *estēriktai*)” that separates poor Lazarus from the wicked rich man (Luke 16:26). It is absolutely uncrossable, cutting off any communication. More important is Jesus’ order to Peter: “When you have returned, strengthen your brothers” (*stērison tous adelphous sou*, Luke 22:32). Not only does this verb here find its original technical parenetic meaning, taking on a moral sense, but it envisions a faith thenceforth indefectible: make your brothers unyielding. In his first epistles, St. Paul sees the goal of his

apostolic ministry as being “to strengthen and encourage” the faith of the disciples, to establish them solidly, without oscillation, to make them capable of standing fast without discouragement or doubt, notably in the midst of the physical, moral, and doctrinal calamities of the end times. Just as Jesus had entrusted to Peter the responsibility of firmly establishing the apostles, who had been scandalized and disoriented by their Master’s passion (Matt 26:31), these in turn strengthen the faithful in the wait for the Parousia. Their resolution must be strong and sustained: “Have patience ... strengthen your hearts, for the Lord’s coming is near” (Jas 5:8); “The God of all grace ... when you suffer a little (while), he himself will equip you, strengthen you, fortify you, ground you” (*autos katartisei, stērixēi, stēnōsei, themeliōsei*, 1 Pet 5:10; the reading with the verb *stērizō* must be kept). Peter addresses persecuted Christians who must remain unshakable in their faith, because their hearts – full of a vigor infused by God – have a sort of immovability in the midst of all the disasters (cf. 5:8, the devil like a roaring lion). The accumulation of the four verbs of stability points out well the importance of “firmness” among the Christian virtues. Once the baptized have committed themselves to the Christian *credo*, they will remain unchangeably fixed in it (*estērigmenous en tē parousē alētheia*, 2 Pet 1:12). No deficiency is to be allowed. The last occurrence of *stērizō* (in the imperative) in the NT is addressed to the church at Sardis: “Be watchful, and strengthen the rest that was close to perishing.”

## στόμαχος

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*stomachos*, **orifice, throat, esophagus, stomach**

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*stomachos*, S 4751; EDNT 3.279; MM 592; L&N 8.66; BAGD 770

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Derived from *stoma*, the biblical hapax *stomachos* is almost unknown in the papyri and inscriptions. Its primitive meaning is “opening, orifice.” In Homer it refers to the throat, the gullet; in Aristotle, the esophagus; in Hippocrates and the medical writers in general it means the stomach proper: “Suffocation results from the pressing of the liver and the belly against the diaphragm, and from the tightening of the orifice of the stomach.” Rufus of Ephesus defines this organ thus: “the stomach or esophagus is the conduit through which food and drink descend to the intestines” (*Onom.* 157); “it goes down between the pharynx and the neck vertebrae” (*Anat.* 24; cf. 38). But the *stomachos* is not only the stomach cavity; it is also the neck of the bladder or the cervix.

When 1 Tim 5:23 prescribes, “Stop drinking only water; take a little wine on account of your stomach and your frequent illnesses” (*mēketi hydropotei*,

*alla oinō oligō chrō dia ton stomachon kai tas pyknas sou astheneias*), all exegetes agree that *stomachos* means the stomach proper, even though the Hebrews, alone of all the peoples of antiquity, had practically no knowledge of this organ. It is impossible to diagnose Timothy's trouble, because the lack of vigor (*a-stheneia*) is a very general reference to illness. Babylonian, Egyptian, Greek, and Roman physicians are unanimous in pointing out overwhelming fatigue, torpor, general tiredness, chronic bouts of weakness (*BGU* 2065, 10; *Pap.Lugd.Bat.* XVI, 3, 29) as symptoms experienced by *kakostomachoi*, so this could just as well be a case of gastroenteritis as of varices of the esophagus, a gastric ulcer, etc. In any event, without resorting to magic, amulets, or phylacteries, ancient medicine was not without resources to combat stomach illnesses.

In prescribing wine, St. Paul was in agreement with the unanimous opinion of ancient physicians. They prescribed wine as a tonic, a prophylactic, and a remedy to facilitate digestion, combat anorexia, and suppress stomach-rumblings, especially wine sweetened with honey: wine is a stimulant for the stomach. The wisdom of this treatment was recognized by secular writers: "For persons who have been weakened by stomach ailments and need a tonic remedy ... physicians strengthen them with wine."

## στρατολογέω

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*stratologeō*, **to marshall or recruit an army**

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*stratologeō*, S 4753; *TDNT* 7.701–713; *EDNT* 3.280; *NIDNTT* 3.958, 964; *MM* 592; *L&N* 55.19, 55.20; *BAGD* 770

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"No one who is serving as a soldier lets himself become entangled or involved in the affairs of this life; he seeks only to please the one who enlisted him (*hina tō stratologēsanti aresē*).” The biblical hapax *stratologeō*, “marshall or recruit an army,” is unknown in the papyri but attested in several literary texts. When Pharaoh took Sarah, Abraham “enlisted the invincible Ally”; “Brasidas had a thousand Helots, and with the allied soldiers who had been enlisted (*ek te symmachōn stratologēthentōn*), a considerable army was put together” (*Diodorus Siculus* 12.67.5; cf. 14.54). H. J. Mason gives this definition: *stratologeō*: *dilectum facere, epimelētēs hodōn kai en allois topoīs s ...* (*IGRom.* III, 763; *Phaselis Lyciae*, 144–7 p.; vide *St R.* II, 1090 adn.). – *stratologia*: *dilectus, pemphtheis epi s [ – ] apo Rhōmaiōn* (*IGRom.* III, 824; *Thracia*, II).”

## συγγένεια, συγγενής, συγγενίς

*syngeneia*, **family, kin**; *syngenēs*, **male relative**; *syngenis*, **female relative**

→see also συγγενής

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*suggeneia*, S 4772; TDNT 7.736–742; EDNT 3.282; MM 595; L&N 10.5; BDF §110(2); BAGD 772 | *suggenes*, S 4773; TDNT 7.736–742; EDNT 3.282; MM 595; L&N 10.6, 11.57; BDF §§47(4), 48, 194(2); BAGD 772 | *suggenis*, EDNT 3.282; MM 595; L&N 10.7; BDF §59(3); BAGD 772

These noun forms, which do not appear before Pindar, correspond to the idea of “birth, race” and are formed around *gignomai*, “be born,” then “become, occur.” So *syngeneia* means “family,” “kinship”; *syngenēs* means “belonging to the same *genos*, kin, related”; *syngenis* is a relative; but there are many nuances.

I. – The first meaning, which remains the commonest, is that of blood ties, the racial meaning, which relies on the concept of the family: “the paternal family” (*syngeneia patros*, Euripides, *Tro.* 754); “my father’s kinsman” (*Or.* 1233; *Phoen.* 291), “a relative’s blood.” Aristotle notes, “The same person is called son by one, brother by another, by someone else cousin or kinsman by blood, marriage, or affinity.” These degrees of kinship are specified as brother (Aeschylus, *Cho.* 199, *adelphos*, from *a*, “one,” and *delphys*, “womb”; cf. *Ep. Arist.* 7; *P.Grenf.* II, 78, 13), sister (Aeschylus, *Eum.* 691), cousin (*PV* 855); and relatives and friends are linked with them. Furthermore, *syngeneia* refers to the kinship of the human race with divinity, that is to say, the origin of humanity with and its likeness to divinity. Zeus is “father of gods and men” (Homer, *Il.* 1.544; Hesiod, *Th.* 546, 643; *Op.* 59, 169), “the common author of our two races” (Aeschylus, *Suppl.* 402). From this paternity there derives a resemblance: “Since man shares in the divine lot (*theias metesche moiras*), he attains this state of kinship (*syngeneia*) with the gods.” The Stoics Cleanthes and Aratus (quoted by St. Paul, *tou gar kai genos esmen*, Acts 17:28) affirm this divine filiation.

II. – From the physical sense we move on to the metaphorical meaning, “affinity, likeness.” Thus Plato, *Phd.* 79 b–c, which links likeness and kinship (*homoios* and *xyngenēs*); 84 b, kinship and similarity (*xyngenēs* and *toioutos*); 86 b: “of the same nature and family” (*homophyē te kai xyngenē*); *Resp.* 8.559 d. One learns “to know some things by other things if they have some relationship”; the lover “does not cease to attach himself to that which is related to him.” “Of all human activities, the one that is the most closely related to God’s activity (contemplation) is the most blessed” (Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 10.9.1178; cf. 1179). Hence the meanings “of the same type, analogous, having the same properties.” From the meaning “natural” we move to

“connatural.” “Avarice is more natural (innate, *symphyes*) to man than prodigality” (ibid. 4.3.1121; cf. 3.15.1119); “Connaturality (*syngeneia*) disposes children to obey their father.”

III. – In usage, and according to their etymology, the terms *syngeneia* and *syngenēs* take on nuances of solidarity, affection, and pride. “His native city, his comrades, his parents – that is what a man cherishes, that is what is sufficient for him” (Pindar, *Paean*. 4.33); “blood ties (*to syngenes*) are terribly strong when friendship is added” (Aeschylus, *PV* 39; cf. 289); “family conversations (*hai syngeneis homiliai*) are a strong potion for hearts”; “real kinship produces solid friendship” (Plato, *Menex.* 244 a; cf. *Leg.* 5.729 c; 11.929 a). Aristotle insists on this more than anyone else: “Since whatever is conformable to nature is agreeable, and since things that are akin (*syngenē*) have natural links between them, all things that are akin and all like things are mutually pleasant to each other most of the time” (*Rh.* 1.11.1371–13). “The species of friendship (*philia*) are comradeship (*hetaireia*), membership in the same household (*oikeiotēs*), membership in the same family (*syngeneia*), and so on” (*Rh.* 2.4.1381); apart from the friendship of association (*en koinōnia*), there is “friendship of kindred (*syngenikē*) and friendship of comrades (*hetairikē*)” (*Eth. Nic.* 8.12.1161, 16), friendship based on kinship (9.2.1165 and 30).

IV. – Finally, *syngeneia* has a social and political meaning. Plato had already used this term for the “great alliances” of the state (*Resp.* 6.491 c), but it becomes common in this meaning from the third century BC in the vocabulary of the inscriptions: cities unite in bonds of friendship and kinship. Thus Alabanda is “kin to the Greeks”; “whereas the Rhodians are a people related to the people of Argos.” The formula “kinsmen and friends” (*syngeneis kai philoi*) recurs endlessly: the Acarnanians “celebrate the cult of the gods with piety and conduct toward peoples that are kinsmen and friends a politics that is noble and worthy of their ancestors.” The most notable case is that of a subdivision of the tribe (*phylē*) of Sinuri. This *syngeneia* administers the sanctuary; its members (*syngeneis*) “are pious toward the deity” (n. 9, 7–8) and can be the objects of honorific decrees; thus Nesaïos “conducted himself well toward the *syngeneia*” and becomes the brother of the *syngeneis* (n. 73). So this community was a fraternity.

V. – In the inscriptions, and especially in the papyri, *syngenēs*, “king’s friend,” is a courtly title that usually precedes the person’s function (*stratēgos*, *epistratēgos*). The Alexandrian Chrysermos is “kinsman of king Ptolemy” (*ton syngenē basileōs Ptolemaïou*). King Attalus III calls Athenaeus his kinsman (*hēmōn esti syngenēs*, *I.Perg.* 248, 28). The papyri notably associate the “kinsman” with the legal guardian: “having as his legal guardian his kinsman Petearmouthos.”



VI. – The OT and the NT conform to current usage without adding any new nuance. The LXX uses *syngeneia* to translate the Hebrew *mišpāḥâh*, “family,” in the larger sense of a clan or a tribe; the NT always uses this word for kinship (Luke 1:61; Acts 7:3, 14). *Syngenēs* in the words of Jesus is absolutely conformable to OT usage: “A prophet is not scorned except in his country and among his kinsmen (*en tois syngeneusin autou*) and in his household.” St. Luke links it with neighbors (Luke 1:58, *hoi perioikoi*), with acquaintances (2:44, *tois gnōstois*), with brothers (that is, the closest relatives), and with wealthy neighbors (Luke 14:12, *geitonas plousious*), with friends (21:16), and with intimate friends (Acts 10:24, *tous anankaious philous*). For St. Paul, the Israelites are his brothers, his kinsmen according to the flesh (Rom 9:3), that it, they are of the same *genos*, the same race, sharing with the apostle the same Jewish descent, blood relatives; but in the greeting in Rom 16:7, 11, 21, it is not clear why St. Paul would describe Christians in terms of their Jewish origins by calling them his compatriots (*syngeneis*); he must mean instead that they are related by birth in a way that is “oriental-style” (i.e., very broad), but that they are nevertheless related by common origin in the same family.

The biblical hapax *syngenis*, the feminine of *syngenēs*, does not appear in the papyri before the second century AD (“having married my kinswoman”) and does not specify any particular degree of relationship. In Luke 1:36, it means that Mary and Elizabeth were both of the Israelite race, but not that they necessarily belonged to the same tribe.

## συγγενής

*syngenēs*, **related; a relative**

→see also συγγένεια, συγγενής, συγγενίς

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*suggenes*, S 4773; TDNT 7.736–742; EDNT 3.282; MM 595; L&N 10.6, 11.57; BDF §§47(4), 48, 194(2); BAGD 772

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A compound of *syn* and *genos*, *syngenēs* – attested for the first time in Pindar – means literally a “congener,” but in practice it means “related,” either closely or distantly, in either the literal or the figurative sense of the word.

I. – A *syngenēs*, in the Hellenistic period, is first of all a member of a family, a blood relation (*Ep. Arist.* 7), a nephew (Josephus, *Ant.* 1.179, 1.316; cf. 1.252, 1.296), an aunt (Lev 18:14; 20:20), a legitimate wife (Sir 41:22), all those who are part of a household (Sus 30, 63; *T. Abr.* B 2; *Jos. Asen.* 5.3, 10; 7.2; 10.1; 22.2; 24.9), linked with children, brothers and sisters (Mark 6:4; Luke 14:12; 21:16; 2 Macc 15:18; Philo, *Contemp. Life* 13; *P.Oxy.* 3014, 2; *TAM*, 2,

1, 259: *teknois kai engonois kai syngeneisi*; *C.P.Herm.* 31, 17), with neighbors (Luke 1:58, *hoi perioikoi*; 14:12, *geitōn*), and with “acquaintances” (Luke 2:44, *tois gnōstois*), so that it is not possible to specify how closely related “relations” are. Quite often “relatives” and “friends” are associated, and sometimes the affection that binds *syngeneis* is mentioned.

II. – The papyri constantly mention the “relative-guardian”: *meta kyriou tou syngenous* (*P.Alex.* 10, 5; first century AD); “having as legal guardian his relative Petearmouthos” (*P.Phil.* 6, 5; 7, 5; 8, 5). There is also “relative and foster parent” (or “relative and nurse,” *syngenēs kai tropheus*), but the latter designation is not for a function but is a title of honor.

III. – In the language of the inscriptions, the ties of friendship and alliance between two cities are often described as establishing relatedness: “Whereas the inhabitants of Magnesia-on-the-Maeander enjoy links of friendship with the inhabitants of Gonnoi and are their relatives”; a decree at Pitana: “Whereas the inhabitants of Pergamum, who are relatives and friends and have been well-disposed to our city from the beginning”; a decree at Lebedos around 200 BC, “to the Samians, who are friends and relatives of the city”; a decree of the Thessalian confederation: “Whereas the Teans are relatives and friends and are well-disposed toward the Thessalians.”

Moreover, there are groupings called *syngeneia* that are subdivisions of a tribe (*phylē*) or of a city (*polis*); their members are *syngeneis*, united as “brothers” (*I.Sinur.* 73, 1, 7). These usages show that *syngenēs* can be understood in a very broad sense, meaning anything from “fellow citizen, compatriot” (2 Macc 5:6, parallel to *homoethnēs*; 8:1; Luke 2:4; Josephus, *War* 7.262), and “relative” through international friendship to relatedness with some other member of a certain group (*MAMA* VI, 116 = *I.Car.* 84). We understand that St. Paul refers to the Israelites as brothers and *syngeneis* “according to the flesh” (*kata sarka*, Rom 9:23); they are not only his compatriots, they share the same blood (cf. Philo, *Spec. Laws* 2.80, 82; *P.Fay.* 115, 4: two pigeons with the same range, *syngenē chyridia*). It may also be this sort of affinity that unites him with Herodian (Rom 16:11; cf. *P.Grenf.* II, 78, 13: *syngeneis adelphoi*); so also with Lucius, Jason, and Sosipater (Rom 16:21); and even with Andronicus and Junia (16:7), though the additional phrase “my companions in captivity” would be a way of hinting at the strong bonds that are formed between those who endure trials together (cf. Philo, *Spec. Laws* 3.126, 155: “There is a kinship more intimate than blood relationship, namely, a shared attitude toward justice and virtue”; *Abraham* 31; *Moses* 2.171: “There is no other kinship or friendship than that with good people”). It has been suggested that he is referring to their belonging to the same tribe, Benjamin; or even to “the very broad oriental kinship that can take in hundreds of persons who are dispersed without losing

their memory of their common origin, a sort of clan” (M. J. Lagrange, on this text). Or he could mean that they are also from Tarsus (cf. *P.Tebt.* 61 b, 79; 62, 58: *syngeneis katoikoi*; second century BC). This mention of *syngeneia* has an affective connotation; it is even a testimony of honor.

IV. – In 1 Macc 10:89; 11:31, kings reward those whom they wish to honor by giving them the title “king’s relative,” the highest court distinction. Mostly *stratēgoi* and *epistratēgoi* seem to be so honored, but so is a *nauarchos* (*SB* 9970, 1), a *dioikētēs* (*C.Ord.Ptol.* 61, 8; 64, 2), even an *epistolographos* (secretary, *ibid.* 62, 17; 63, 12). It would be better to use the English translation “king’s kinsman.”

V. – In a religious sense, there is a kinship of humans with God, which was strongly emphasized by the Stoics.

## συλλάω

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*sylaō*, to pillage, plunder; to exercise a right of seizure, recover

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*sulao*, S 4813; *EDNT* 3.285; *NIDNTT* 3.379; MM 596; L&N 57.234; BAGD 776

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This verb is a hapax in the LXX, and also in the NT (2 Cor 11:8, *allas ekklēsias esylēsa labōn opsōnion pros tēn hymōn diakonian*), which is ordinarily translated, “I despoiled other churches, taking pay from them for serving you” – which is not particularly clear, due especially to the fact that *sylaō* has a rich variety of meanings.

The first meaning is that of “drawing” a bow from its case (Homer, *Il.* 4.105) or “removing” the cover from a quiver (4.116); and very often in Homer it means to remove an enemy’s weapons, despoil him of his weapons, snatch them away from him, or despoil a corpse (*nekron sylaō*, 10.343, 387; 6.71; Plato, *Resp.* 5.469 d). Thence the common classical meaning, “remove, steal, pillage,” notably sacred treasures; hence “snatch away, carry off,” notably with violence. But the meaning “plunder, despoil,” well attested in the classical period, is confirmed in the Koine: “In time of war and in time of peace, they pillage (*sylōsin*), they despoil, enslave, ravage, sack, insult, mistreat, destroy, dishonor, assassinate.” In the papyri, the word means especially theft with breaking and entering (*P.Stras.* 296, verso 10) and violence (“they robbed me and carried me off,” *esylēsan me bastazontes*, *P.Erl.* 27, 9) or objects stolen, for example, tools in a tower (*P.Ryl.* 138, 19; from AD 34; etc; cf. *SB* 9534, 10), and most often a house that has been plundered. There is a softened expression in a letter of Serapias to his son Herminis asking him to bring his daughter to

him as a favor: “Do not deprive me for the cost of renting a donkey, so that I may show you affection” (*mē syla mou peri tou naulou tou ōnou, hina philiazō sou*, *P.Oxf.* 19, 7; third century AD). None of these meanings shed any light on the Pauline text.

To the contrary, if we refer to the technical legal meaning of *sylaō* (“retaliate by seizing”), the right of seizure being at the root of the exercise of retaliation. This was an official institution, cited by Demosthenes, *C. Lacr.* 35.26: “Without our having done them any wrong, without having any judgment against us, they carried out a seizure of our property (*sesylēmetha*) – they, Phaselites, as if a right of seizure (*sylōn*), had been granted the Phaselites against the Athenians. What are we to call the refusal to give back what one has received? Is this not the removal by force of another’s property?” Likewise Ps.-Aristotle, *Oec.* 2.2.10: since the Chalcedonians could not pay the foreign mercenaries, they “proclaimed that if anyone, citizen or resident alien, held right of reprisal (*sylon echei*) against a city or a private person, and if he wanted to exercise it, he had only to sign up. When a great number had signed up, the Chalcedonians – on the pretext of their legal right – seized (*esylōn*) the ships that were leaving for the Pontus.... Thus they gathered a great deal of money ... and they set up a tribunal to decide the claims” (*hyper de tōn sylon diedikasanto*).

In Ep Jer 17, this verb means “pillage, plunder,” which is its meaning in the papyri, where these pillagings are attributed to robbers who also commit assault and battery on persons, if the occasion arises. The nuance of violence, common in classical Greek (Demosthenes, *Cor. Trier.* 51.13; Polybius 2.8.1–2, piracy; Plutarch, *Cim.* 8.3–4), is often absent in the Hellenistic period. A mother writes to her son: “Do not take the ass from me for the voyage, so that I may continue in my affection for you” (*mē syla mou peri tou naulou tou onou, hina philiazō sou*, *P.Oxf.* 19, 7). In an act of emancipation at Delphi, it is provided that those present will be able to exercise the right of seizure on the freed slave as upon a free person, without incurring penalties or becoming subject to any lawsuit or penalty of any sort.

This latter legal text illuminates the hyperbole in 2 Cor 11:8 – “I despoiled other churches, taking pay from them in order to be of service to you.” St. Paul exercised a right of seizure (*sylon*) – a reply to a refusal to pay off a debt, the taking of security equivalent to the damage suffered, to the justice denied – hence a reprisal. “A private individual who considers himself the victim of a tort by a foreigner (assault, theft, unpaid debt) ... will take justice into his own hands ...; he will seize the person or property of a fellow citizen of his adversary ...; hence the action of *sylan* represents a material compensation” (P. Gauthier, *Symbola*, p. 212). In this pseudo-judicial act, the one who is the

object of the seizure has committed no wrong (Demosthenes, *C. Lacr.* 35.26), so the apostolic allusion to “other churches” suggests to the Corinthians the seriousness of the consequences of their own failure. Furthermore, *ekklēsia* here refers to religion more than to community, since *sylaō* is often used with the sacred wealth of a sanctuary (Herodotus 6.101); “Socrates never pillaged a temple” (*oude tōn hierōn esylēsen ouden*, Josephus, *Ag. Apion* 2.263). An amnesty decree in 163 BC excludes “those who have committed murders and those who have robbed temples and sacred warehouses.” In any event, the founder and apostle of the churches had a prior right, established and recognized, to live off of subsidies from these churches. The use of the verb *sylaō* calls this “right of seizure” to mind, but in a milder form, so that we might translate “we authorized ourselves to recover....” The metaphor should be interpreted in light of the changed circumstances; the idea of seizure has receded, but the idea of collective responsibility is emphasized: each one is held accountable for the actions of all, because each one shares in the property of the community as a whole (cf. P. Ducrey, *Le Traitement des prisonniers de guerre dans la Grèce antique*, pp. 42–44).

So the hyperbolic and ironic metaphor of 2 Cor 11:8 is clarified. The apostle means the just compensation, somehow legal, for subsidies that were not paid him by the Corinthians. By using and abusing the Macedonians’ accommodating attitude toward him, he exercised right of seizure/reprisal (*sylai*) against the compatriots of his debtors. That is why he states that he has plundered or despoiled other churches that he has conquered in his missionary campaign in Greece. He himself, having been deprived of everything, has taken from elsewhere the minimum salary (*opsōnion*) that was due him from the Corinthians as an apostle. The final “for serving you” (*pros tēn hymōn diakonian*) emphasizes that the point is not personal profit, but in a way an official salary. It was the Corinthians’ default that was responsible for this legal action.

συλλογίζομαι

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*syllogizomai*, to calculate, reckon, take into account, summarize, conclude, reflect, meditate, reason

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*sullogizomai*, S 4817; EDNT 3.285; MM 597; L&N 33.157; BAGD 777

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The first occurrence of this word in Herodotus gives it the meaning “calculate, reckon,” which remains its predominant sense, notably in the LXX; and it is the

only meaning attested in the papyri, even though the nuance “enroll in a list of accounts, be posted” is noted.

From this financial usage we move into the intellectual realm: “calculate, take into account,” notably in Plato and Polybius, then “summarize, conclude.” But from Demosthenes on, the most common meaning is “reflect, meditate, reason.” Thus Isa 43:18, “Do not reckon on the past” (*ta archaia mē syllogizesthe*, Hebrew *bîn*, in parallel with “do not remember,” *mē mnēmoneuete*); Josephus, *War* 1.560: “Antipater, considering (*synelogizeto*) the hatred of the people for himself, their pity for the orphans, the zeal that the Jews had shown to his brothers while they were living ... He then resolved to break these [forced] betrothals at any price”; Plutarch, *Brut.* 36.6: “While he was reflecting, absorbed in his thoughts, Brutus thought he noticed someone come in”; *Sert.* 17.8: “Sertorius reflected on it and consulted the people of the country”; *Pomp.* 60.3: “Having arrived at the banks of the Rubicon, ... Caesar remained some time thinking (*pros heauton syllogizomenos*) about the magnitude of his audacious act.”

So we are in a position to translate Luke 20:5, *hoi de synelogisanto pros heautous legontes*. Jesus had asked whether John’s baptism was from heaven or from men. His interlocutors, the chief priests, the scribes, and the elders, “reflected together and answered that they did not know.”

## συμπαθής, συμπαθέω

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*sympathēs*, **sharing the same suffering or emotion, compassionate**;  
*sympatheō*, **to share the same suffering or emotion, be compassionate**

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*sumpathes*, S 4835; *TDNT* 5.935–936; *EDNT* 3.288; MM 598; L&N 25.58; BAGD 779 | *sumpatheo*, S 4834; *TDNT* 5.935–936; *EDNT* 3.288; *NIDNTT* 3.719, 722, 724; L&N 24.80, 25.57; BAGD 778–779

A compound of *syn* and *pathos*, *sympathēs* refers to a person who is affected by the same suffering, the same impressions, the same emotions as another, or who undergoes identical trials, and finally “sympathizes” with this other person who is in some sort of trouble, has pity.

The first prerequisite for sympathy then is being “receptive” and easily influenced; the second is being united to the other by a shared nature, society, condition (*P.Oxy.* 2190, 19), or ailment. Thus God, the Creator and Father, sympathizes with humans (4 Macc 5:25); rulers with their subjects; above all, mothers with their children. In this tender sense of the word, 1 Pet 3:8 prescribes, “Be like-minded, compassionate, brotherly, with motherly

tenderness.” If compassion means participating in another’s pain, it is tinged with pity and includes a tendency to help the unfortunate. In battle, the victorious part of the army should come to the aid of the part that is struggling (*en tō ponounti sympathein*, Josephus, *War* 2.579). In a letter of recommendation, the writer asks the prospective benefactor to intervene (*hin’ autō synpathēte*, *P.Stras.* 174, 5; cf. *P.Lond.* 1345, 20; 1369, 12). This active meaning of the verb *sympatheō* is seen in Heb 10:34, which says that the compassionate recipients have effectively helped the prisoners. This nuance must be retained in Heb 4:15 with respect to the high priest of the new covenant, full of sure mercy, but also powerful and able to give effective help for the weaknesses of his human brethren. This ability is already indicated by the construction with the double negative “we do not have ... not able,” which reinforces the affirmation that we are certain that Christ, through his compassion, will make up for our lack of strength.

## σύμφυτος, συμφύω

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*symphytos*, **innate, natural**; *symphyō*, **to be born with, grow with; to be attached or united to or combined with**

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*sumputos*, S 4854; TDNT 7.766–797; EDNT 3.290; MM 598; L&N 89.117; BAGD 780 | *sumpuo*, S 4855; EDNT 3.290; BAGD 780

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The verbal adjective *symphytos*, “born with,” hence “innate, natural,” means not only “of the same nature” (Euripides, *Andr.* 954) but also “growing together.” It is used in the LXX only with respect to agricultural matters, in accord with the usage of the papyri, which, beginning with the third century BC, use this term for cultivated land, no matter what sort of crop it is sown with. This is the meaning of the verb *symphyō* with respect to the seed that fell among thorns and grew up together with them (*kai symphueisai hai akanthai*, Luke 8:7).

In a broader sense, this verb means “to be attached or united to or combined with.” Aristotle: “Any body does not combine with any other body” (Aristotle, *Sens.* 438); “lovers want to combine their beings and make one being from two” (*Pol.* 2.4.6.1262); Philo: “together with each soul there dwells (*synoikōn*) an appointed witness that is attached to it at birth.” In optics, *symphyomai* (Latin *cohaerescō*) is used from Plato on to express the idea that the visual flow merges with exterior light in a homogeneous body. In medicine, it refers to the healing of fractured bones and means specifically “to grow back in such a way as to connect the two fragments, to mend.” Hence *symphytos* also has this meaning of cohesion and interpenetration. Lysurgus, for example, trained the

citizens “always to form one body with the community (*tō koinō symphyeis ontas aiei*) like bees, clustered around their leader.” It is in this sense that we should understand Rom 6:5 – “for if we have been conformed to the likeness of his death.” Moderns rightly translate “if we have been joined to him” (*NBJ*), “if we have been united with him” (F. J. Leenhardt, *Romans*, p. 159); but the idea of growth must not be left out, because the very use of the word *symphytos* suggests the image of a “single plant” (Leenhardt, p. 160) that is getting bigger, and in which the life of the trunk conveys life and fruit-bearing strength to the branches. Through baptism, Christians share in the “virtue” of the crucified Christ. The members and the head make up a unity; the two organisms are in a vital union, suggesting the “incorporating personality” of the Lord, “una persona mystica” (St. Thomas Aquinas, on this verse).

συμφωνέω, συμφώνησις, συμφωνία, σύμφωνος

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*symphōneō*, **to agree, consent, be of the same feeling**; *symphōnēsis*, **accord, agreement**; *symphōnia*, **the sound of musical or instruments or instruments and voices together; agreement**; *symphōnos*, **agreeing, harmonious**

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*sumphoneo*, S 4856; *TDNT* 9.304–309; *EDNT* 3.290; MM 598–599; L&N 31.15, 64.10; BDF §§179(1), 202, 227(2), 409(3); BAGD 780–781 | *sumphonesis*, S 4857; *TDNT* 9.304–309; *EDNT* 3.290; MM 599; L&N 31.15; BAGD 781 | *sumphonia*, S 4858; *TDNT* 9.304–309; *EDNT* 3.290; MM 599; L&N 14.83; BAGD 781 | *sumphonos*, S 4859; *TDNT* 9.304–309; *EDNT* 3.290; MM 599; L&N 31.15; BAGD 781

When the older son returns from the field, he hears “music and choirs” in his father’s house (Luke 15:25). *Symphōnia* can mean the sound produced by a certain musical instrument or of voices and instruments “in concert,” more specifically what we call a band or an orchestra. This is the meaning here, given the subsequent detail “of choirs.” From Plato on (Plato, *Leg.* 3.689 d), the word is used for agreement or harmony of feelings and the union that results therefrom among humans, and the Stoics define *symphōnia* as “agreement in teaching concerning things related to life” (*symphōnian de homodogmatian peri tōn kata ton bion*, Stobaeus, vol. 2, p. 74, 4). In the papyri, the preponderant meaning is “agreement, covenant.” In receipts from AD 67 and 102: “We have received the things from the agreement” (*eschomen ta apo tēs symphōnias*, *O.Bodl.* 1075, 4; cf. 1056, 4); “I have paid the costs pursuant to the agreement (*apo tēs symphōnias*) that you made the four workers on the basis of twelve drachmas per arour’ (*P.Lond.* 1173, vol. 3, p. 207 = *P.Sarap.* 103); “He made



the purchases in the name of his son Dionysius, after the time of the agreement entered into by him and Isadora-Tatrephes on the one side.”

The biblical hapax *symphōnēsis*, unknown in the papyri, would normally mean the accord between two voices singing together. In 2 Cor 6:15, which forbids all syncretism between Christian and pagan cults (“What *symphōnēsis* is there between Christ and Belial?”), the nuance of agreement, accommodation, emerges from the parallel terms: *metochē* (verse 14, participation, affinity), *koinōnia* (verse 14, association, community), *synkatathesis* (verse 16, assent, accommodation).

The verb *symphōneō*, much used in the papyri, especially in a legal sense, can mean simple agreement (“The words of the prophets are in agreement with this”) and homogeneity (the piece of cloth taken from a new garment “will not match the old garment”). Hence, on a moral level: “to be of the same feeling, to agree together, to consent.” Such is the *symphōnia* of disciples who agree concerning the object of their prayer (Matt 18:19) or of Ananias and Sapphira, who “agreed together to put the Spirit of the Lord to the test.” This is analogous to the *symphōnia* of Ammonius and Antiphanes son of Heraclas, and to all those contracts in which the parties state that they have come to an agreement: “They made an agreement”; “It was agreed between them.” The most common formula is as follows: “I am in agreement with all that is written above” or “The clauses hereunder are agreeable to us.” Often a simple *symphōnō* (“I agree”) is followed immediately by a signature.

In the parable about the workers sent into the vineyard, when the master of the house “agreed with the workers for one denarius per day” (Matt 20:2, 13), the Vulgate (“conventionem facta”) rightly took this as an authentic work contract. The papyri constantly have *symphōneō* followed by a price. In AD 78, Maron received from Hermas the whole agreed price: one hundred drachmas paid from hand to hand; for the sale of a part of a house (*BGU* 1643, 20, eighty drachmas; *P.Thead.* 1, 11, ten talents of silver; 2, 8, nine talents; *P.Corn.* 12, 23; 13, 14; *P.Mich.* 428, 6; *P.Stras.* 370, 20), of a field, of a pasture (*Pap.Lugd.Bat.* II, 8, 10; 9 a 10; XIII, 2, 5; 15, 10), of an ass (*P.Thead.* 3, 7; *SB* 6001, 7), of a mare (*P.Thead.* 4, 6: 130 talents of silver), of a camel (*P.Stras.* 201, 22; *P.Vindob.Worp* 9, 8), of an acacia (*P.Oslo* 45, 3; cf. 134, 15), of a slave (*Pap.Lugd.Bat.* II, 7, 24: 2,200 drachmas; *P.Stras.* 264, 13), for a job: “I have received from you the 276 drachmas that was agreed on for the hay-making season.”

*Symphōnos*, has the same connotations of conformity, correspondence, and coincidence. But in the formula *ek symphōnou*, used with respect to an interruption in conjugal relations “by mutual consent” or “common accord” (1 Cor 7:5), we must not simply refer to the papyrological parallels (*P.Bon.* 24 a

10; *P.Oxy.* 1673, 28; *P.Ness.* 21, 26) – which usually write *kathōs exymphōnou* – with the legal severity of *ex conducto*. There is an aesthetic touch and something of moral delicacy and consonance, perceptible in 4 Macc 7:7 – Eleazar “echoes the law and philosophy of the divine life”; 14:7 – “O holy seven, brothers united in harmony!” The will, desires, and aspirations of Christian spouses coincide in harmonious tonality; two freedoms that agree spontaneously, or better, two hearts that are joined in one precise euphony.

### συναίρω λόγον

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*synairō logon*, **to settle an account**

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*sunairo logon*, S 4868 + 3056; MM 601; L&N 57.229; BDF §310(1); BAGD 783

In the parables of the Unforgiving Servant and of the Talents (Matt 25:19), the king and the master demand an accounting from their servants. The expression is unknown in classical and Hellenistic literary Greek; but it is not a biblicism, for it is found often in the papyri. In the first century AD, *P.Fay.* 109, 6: “I have drawn up the accounts with the father” (*synērmāi logon tō patri*); in 78–79, on the vineyards of Epimachus in the nome of Hermopolis, it is mentioned that on the fourth of Phaopi “Phibis does not work, because he settles accounts with Epimachus.” In the second century, *P.Oxy.* 113, 27: “Let me know what you have given him, so that I may settle my accounts with him” (*hina synarōmāi autō logon*); *PSI* 801, 3: “the whole account having been settled” (*pantos logou synērmenou*); 921, 8; 974, 29; 1038, 9; *BGU* 775, 19. In the third century, the account of Heroninus: “The whole account having been settled up to Thoth, I owe ...” (*heōs Thōth pantos logou synērmenou ophilō*, *P.Flor.* 372, 14); cf. an ostrakon from Nubia: “until the settling of the account.” In the fourth-fifth century, “to settle the account of their land-owning business” (*synarasthai logon tōn autōn geouchikōn pragmatōn*, *SB* 9527, 11).

### συναποθνήσκω

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*synapothnēskō*, **to die with**

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*sunapothnesko*, S 4880; *TDNT* 3.7–21, 7.766–797; *EDNT* 3.298; *NIDNTT* 1.430–431, 435; MM 603; L&N 23.118; BAGD 784–785

This verb, which is common in Greek and Hellenistic literature, but totally unknown in the papyri, means simply “die with, disappear at the same time” (Sir 19:10; Diodorus Siculus 17.13.4: the wounded Thebans once more attacked their enemies and “took them along with themselves in death”). It is used especially to express to vow of a fervent heart to live and die with a beloved: “you are in our hearts, united for death and life” (*eis to synapothanein kai syzēn*, 2 Cor 7:3). According to the Aristotelian tradition, through *philostorgia*, “there are even parents who, if their children die, die with them” (*tois teknois synapothnēskēin*, Stobaeus 2.7.13; vol. 2, p. 120, 8). Charicleia says concerning her fiancé, “I must live with this man and die with him” (Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 10.19.2).

But beginning with Herodotus (7.222), it is used also for soldiers who sacrifice themselves with their leader and follow him in death (Strabo 17.2.3). According to Nicolaus of Damascus, the Aquitanian officer Adiatuanus had a guard of six hundred men who were bound to him by a vow: “to accompany kings in life and in death (*syzōntas kai synapothnēskontas*), they have these men who have made vows to them. In exchange, they share his power, have the same clothing and the same lifestyle, and they by strict necessity die with him (*synapothnēskousi*), whether the king dies through sickness, war, or some other manner.” St. Paul wrote, “If we die with Christ ... we shall also live with him” (Rom 6:8). This was not only an expression of faithfulness, but a true *devotio*, that of the apostle Thomas: “Let us go also, that we may die with him” (*agōmen kai hēmeis hina apothanōmen met’ autou*, John 11:16); and of Peter, joined by the other disciples: “If I had to die with you, I would never deny you (*ean deē me synapothanein soi, ou mē se aparnēsomai*) – and all the others said the same” (Mark 14:31). Thus the primitive church composed a baptismal hymn: “If we have begun by dying with (him), with (him) also shall we live” (*ei gar synapethanomen, kai syzēsomen*, 2 Tim 2:11; cf. 2 Cor 4:10; 1 Cor 15:31) – after the fashion of the repentant thief (Luke 23:41–43). These actions, these customs, and this use of language inspired the wording of the hymn in a more or less conscious manner; but in the new covenant, it is not possible to live from Christ and with Christ without having made the oath to die with him.

## συνείδησις

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*syneidēsis*, **conscience**

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*suneidesis*, S 4893; TDNT 7.898–919; EDNT 3.301–303; NIDNTT 1.348–351, 353; MM 604–605; L&N 26.13, 27.54, 28.4; BAGD 786; ND 3.85

This word, attested three times in the OT (Sir 42:8, the variant in Sinaiticus; Eccl 10:20, Hebrew *madā*; Wis 17:10) makes its first appearance in Democritus and Chrysippus (Diogenes Laertius 7.85; cf. *SVF*, III, 43, 2–5: “proper to every living creature is his constitution and his knowledge of it” – *kai tēn tautēs syneidēsīn*), then practically disappears from the literature only to reappear in the neuter participle *to syneidos* in the first century in Philo, Josephus, Plutarch, etc. Absent from the Synoptics, the substantive is used quite frequently by St. Paul as a central element of his educative moral theology of liberty, as much in the major epistles as in the Pastorals; it then appears in Heb and 1 Pet, where it is part of the common Christian vocabulary. Where does it come from and what does it mean?

The first known papyrological occurrence is from AD 59. A former soldier, Lucius Pamiseus, having met a convoy of donkeys loaded with stones, led by a slave, received a violent kick from one of the donkeys. The terrified slave took flight: “the slave, aware of his crime, fled” (*tou de doulou phygontos kata syneidēsīn hēs pepoētai eperias*, *P.Fouad* 28, 15). He acted not out of remorse but out of the fear of the punishment that he might receive. In 117, Ammonius and Hermocles write to Apollonius to handle a matter according to his conscience and his point of view, i.e., according to his personal intuition and judgment (*estin epi tēn syneidēsīn sou dran*, *P.Brem.* 11, 27 = *C.Pap.Jud.* II, 444). Between 180 and 192, in a petition to the *stratēgos*, the claimant pleads his perfect conscience concerning his right (*dia tēn perisson synidēsīn axiō*, *P.Corn.* 14, 11). In the third century, Horion asks his correspondent to act conscientiously (*oida gar hoti syneidēsi spoudazeis emoī*, *P.Flor.* 338, 17), which implies an ethical nuance. This nuance is apparent in the form of remorse on the part of the guilty: “I wanted to show friendship to you, but you did not wait for me, since you must have been troubled by a bad conscience” (*hypo kakou syneidotos katechomenos*, *P.Oxy.* 532, 23; second century; cf. 218, col. II, 19, around the beginning of the Christian era, concerning a trial by ordeal: “if the subject has some offense on his conscience” – *ean de enklēmatos tinos echē syneidēsīn*); “troubled by conscience concerning the things that she stole from the household supplies and stores” (*thleibomenē tē syneidēsei peri hōn enosphisato en tē endomeneia kai apothetois*, *P.Ryl.* 116, 9; second century). In the third-fourth century, Alypius writes to his steward: “You have neglected to do it (give an accounting for the production and shipping of the grain), perhaps because you do not have a clear conscience” (*ou kalō syneidotī chrōmenoi*, *P.Rein.* 52, 5). These descriptions of the conscience are materially analogous to those given earlier in the NT. They tend to identify the *syneidēsis* with the moral personality, whose integrity remains despite the subject’s offenses.

Philo also had a concept of the pure conscience (*Spec. Laws* 1.203, *ek katharou tou syneidos*), that of the person who has committed no offense (*Heir* 6) and who is incorruptible (*Post. Cain* 59), fully in the light before God (*Joseph* 68); but the conscience is constantly linked with *elenchos* (*Creation* 128; *Good Man Free* 149; *Virtues* 206; *Conf. Tongues* 121; *Drunkenness* 125; *Post. Cain* 59; *Worse Attacks Better* 23; cf. the addition of several manuscripts to John 8:9 – *hypo tēs syneidēseōs elenchomenoi*), is the source of remorse (*Spec. Laws* 2.49: “in the grip of conscience concerning unjust actions” – *syneidēsei tōn adikēmatōn anchomenos*; *Unchang. God* 100), an internal witness linked with God (*Joseph* 285; *Decalogue* 91), which convicts the sinner of his guilt (*Joseph* 47), condemns him (*Flacc.* 7), holds him back on the slide into evil (*Joseph* 47), but which also holds the “reins” on his conduct (*Worse Attacks Better* 23) and directs it freely: “The victim of a transformation states that he cannot eat of the expiatory sacrifice, because his conscience does not allow him to take nourishment and repent” (*Flight* 159); the wife of Macron, “because of the state of her conscience (*heneken tou syneidos*), becomes still more of a wheedler,” (*To Gaius* 39); the servant of God, “purified from every offense, considers that he loves his Master from his conscience” (*ho philodespoton ek tou syneidos krinē*, *Heir* 7). Compare Heb 13:18 – “having a good conscience, wishing to conduct ourselves well in everything.”

Philo uses *syneidēsis* and *to syneidos* rather often, but it cannot be said that he developed the idea, because he uses it above all for the function of blaming for sins, conformably to the Jewish and Stoic traditions. Josephus also knows bad conscience (*Ant.* 16.102, 212) but accentuates its ethical character: through conscience, Joseph knows that adultery deserves death (*Ant.* 2.51), and each person is convinced that good deeds are rewarded (*Ag. Apion* 2.218). Conscience always arises from knowledge, it is a knowing that the subject shares (*syn-eidenai*) either with himself or with someone else, sometimes purely on a psychological level, sometimes on an ethical level: “Alexander, in addition to the purity of his conscience (*meta katharou tou syneidos*), was assisted by his powerful eloquence” (in getting himself acquitted, *War* 1.453).

None of these texts, even those of Seneca, approach St. Paul’s in density and precision; Paul made *syneidēsis* into the interior faculty for the personal discernment of good and evil, the practical rule of conduct and motive for action: “for conscience’s sake” (*dia tēn syneidēsin*, Rom 13:5; 1 Cor 8:7; 10:25–29; cf. 1 Pet 2:19; 3:21). Having abolished the law, and thus morality based on the observance of an external rule, he substituted an individual norm, a spirit for a letter: the Christian is “autonomous.” He took a *word* that was in the popular vocabulary and whose usage is attested by the papyri, and he distinctively enriched the *concept*, which was elaborated by popular moralizing

preaching, and which was directed – above all in Seneca – toward the conscience that we today call “antecedent” (*conscientia antecedens*).

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*sunecho*, S 4912; TDNT 7.877–885; EDNT 3.306; MM 606–607; L&N 25.241, 30.18, 68.19, 90.65; BAGD 789

Of the twelve occurrences of this verb in the NT, only one has a theological meaning: “For the love of Christ compels (*synechei*) us.” This rather odd figurative meaning needs to be illuminated by the usage of the Koine.

I. – “Hold together, maintain,” is said of fabric that is held together and stitched and quite early becomes a technical term for the holding together of the universe in unity; with the Stoics, it refers to the divine link that holds the world together. Philo calls God “the One who created all, who unites and sustains earth and heaven, sea and air,” in accord with Wis 1:7 (“The Spirit of the Lord fills the universe and contains all things”) or Job 3:23 (God hedges man in on all sides). A Roman inscription from 370 describes Attis thus: “To you, Attis, the Most High, holding all things together.” This cosmic meaning is unknown in the NT, as is the following meaning.

II. – From the meaning “to assemble” derives that of being an associate or co-participant in a matter: “Nikon, with whom Penenteris is associated” (*hō synechetai ho Penentēris*, *P.Magd.* 26, 7; cf. *P.Gen* 38, 8; *P.Mich.* 370, 26–28); and the meaning “administrate together,” the object being some property or other (*P.Paris* II, 31, 8; from the third century BC). In a marriage contract from AD 127 between Sarapion and Taïs, the services and profits of the slave Callityche will be shared together (*tēn douleian kai apophoras autēs synexei*, *P.Oxy.* 496, 6).

III. – Probably from this usage comes the sense “devote oneself to, take care of,” as in this epitaph from Thermion in the imperial period: “I shall take care of her as of one of my own children”; and Acts 18:5, where Paul at Corinth devotes himself entirely to preaching: *syneicheto tō logō* – he is absorbed, completely wrapped up in this ministry.

IV. – The passive *synechomai* means “be taken, held,” as on the horns of a dilemma (*synechomai de ek tōn duo*, Phil 1:23) or under a compulsion that cannot be avoided. Hence the medical meaning: “be taken” by a fever, an illness, a pain, as was Peter’s mother-in-law (Luke 4:38) or the father of Publius (Acts 28:8; cf. Matt 4:24). Two fourth-century physicians, delivering a medical certificate, state that they have seen the patient in bed, taken by a light fever. Similarly, on the psychological level, a person can be taken by great fear, as were the Gerasenes (*phobō megalō syneichonto*, Luke 8:37), or as was Christ,

who was oppressed or constrained (*pōs synechomai*) until his baptism was completed.

V. – When surrounded by a dense crowd or by encircling enemies, one is both “pressed” and “detained.” This nuance of constraint is the most emphasized connotation in the papyri. In 20–50, a woman who was beaten, robbed, and abandoned by her husband asks the *archidikastēs* to make him appear before him and compel him to return her dowry (*hopōs epanankasthē synechomenos apodounai moi tēn phernēn syn hēmiolia*, *P.Oxy.* 281, 25). In 103 BC, Diocles, an associate of shady characters, is convicted and forced to pay damages to Theotimus, whom he has insulted and attacked (*synechomenous tēs adikou agōgēs*, *P.Fay.* 12, 31). *Synechō* is the ordinary term for the power behind the execution of a judicial verdict: the accused are compelled to pay a certain sum to their victims (*synechomenous apodounai autois*, *P.Ryl.* 65, 11; from 67 BC). Sometimes this verb is used for the “seizure” of a commodity, an impounding. In 236 BC, an imprisoned debtor asks the tax farmer to place an embargo on the produce of his vineyards. Much more commonly it is a matter of physical constraint used against a recalcitrant debtor. *Dioikētai*, *toparchoi*, *komarchoi*, *epistratēgoi*, *basilogrammateis*, *archidikastai*, and police chiefs order the “seizure” of the guilty party. *Synechō* is even used for impounding by private citizens themselves. In the second century BC, however, a series of amnesty orders (by Ptolemy IV Philometor or Ptolemy V Epiphanes) forbids “confining free men in their houses or anywhere else” (*P.Kroll* col. II, 18 = *C.Ord.Ptol.* 34; cf. 53, 260; 53 bis 6; 53 ter 5, 18; 55, 13; *PSI* 1401, 13). These usages shed light on Luke 22:63, *hoi andres hoi synechontes*, which is usually translated “the men who were guarding him (Jesus)”; they were “holding him prisoner.”

VI. – The violence implied by the idea of constraint is not essential to *synechō*, which also means “grip, squeeze.” In Acts 7:57, where we say that the members of the Sanhedrin “stopped their ears,” the Greek says that they pressed or bound up his ears in order not to hear (*syneschon to ōta autōn*). The same word is also used for shutting the mouth (Isa 52:15; Ps 69:16), for the way the crocodile’s scales are fastened together (Job 41:9, Theodotion), for pinching the fingers together (Aristophanes, *Vesp.* 95).

VII. – All of the meanings discussed above have a part in the love of Christ that constrains us. This love suggests the Lord’s seizing us to hold us and maintain us in his sovereign and exclusive possession. It takes possession of us so forcefully that it compels us to love in return (cf. the persistence in Mic 7:18; Ps 77:9) and wraps up our whole being. More than pressure, it is an compulsion (Vulgate “urget nos”) that orients our whole life and all our conduct. The fervor of this *agapē*, which is suggestive of a fire (Matt 24:12), can be compared to a



burning fever (cf. Heb 10:24 – *paroxysmos agapēs*) and thus implies intense emotion, the giving of one’s heart. Finally, since according to St. Paul the *agapē* of Christ is essentially linked to the cross, this love in a way oppresses the disciple, just as Christ was in anguish at the prospect of his passion; it judges him and convinces (*krinō*) him to die with his Savior. He is forced to it, as it were.

## ΣΥΣΤΑΤΙΚΌΣ

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*systatikos*, **setting in relation, appointing, guaranteeing, commending**

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*sustatikos*, S 4956; EDNT 3.313; MM 617; L&N 33.345; BAGD 795

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This adjective, derived from *synistēmi*, literally “giving consistency” or “setting in relation,” is used in the neuter for the appointing of a representative, the giving of a guarantee (*P.Oxy.* 1634, 20; *P.Grenf.* II, 70, 4) or of orders (*P.Tebt.* 315, 29). With *epistolē* or *grammata*, it refers to a “letter of recommendation” (*P.Oxy.* 1587, 20; Diogenes Laertius 8.87), which usually meant a letter given to a traveler so that he might find a good welcome with the writer’s relatives or friends abroad (*P.Oxy.* 1064; *P.Flor.* 173). Diogenes was skeptical of the value of these *systatika grammata* (Epictetus 2.3.1). St. Paul deemed them superfluous in his case: “Do we need letters of introduction to you or from you?”

These letters were so commonly used that from the time of Demetrius of Phalerum formularies were available for use as models. The oldest ones that have come down to us are from the third century BC. Recommendations were written for a close friend (*anankaïos philos*, *C.P.Herm.* 1; first century) or a regular visitor to a high official or to any acquaintance at all (*SB* 7662, 13). Even the emperor or the consuls intervene to recommend their freedmen when they are awarded a certain position or function; they “bear witness” to their qualities or abilities. For example, “The recommendation of your superior moves me to promote you to the distinguished service of the *voluptates*; I give you the post of ...” Christians continued this custom. There are numerous letters between them or from priests recommending their “brother” in the faith to this or that community.

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σώζω, σωτήρ, σωτηρία, σωτήριος

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*sōzō*, to save, deliver; *sōtēr*, savior, deliverer; *sōtēria*, salvation, deliverance; *sōtērios*, saving, preserving, salutary, helpful

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*sozo*, S 4982; *TDNT* 7.965–1003; *EDNT* 3.319–321; *NIDNTT* 3.204–206, 209–219; MM 620; L&N 21.18, 21.27, 23.136; BDF §§26, 180; BAGD 789–799 | *soter*, S 4990; *TDNT* 7.1003–1021; *EDNT* 3.325–327; *NIDNTT* 3.216–223; MM 621–622; L&N 21.22, 21.31; BAGD 800–801 | *soteria*, S 4991; *TDNT* 7.965–1003; *EDNT* 3.327–3.329; *NIDNTT* 3.205–207, 209–216, 218–219; MM 622; L&N 21.18, 21.25, 21.26; BDF §258(1); BAGD 801 | *soterios*, S 4992; *TDNT* 7.1021–1024; *EDNT* 3.329; *NIDNTT* 3.216–217, 221; MM 622; L&N 21.28; BDF §§59(2), 113(1), 187(8); BAGD 801–802

“From the adjective \*σαφής, *saos* (safe), contracted to *sōs* (Homeric, Attic), *sōos* (Ionian and Koine), is derived the factitive verb *saoō*, *saōsō*, *esaōsa* (make safe, healthy), that is to say, (1) save from an immediate threat; (2) procure safety by bringing out of a dangerous situation safe and sound.” In Christian language, “salvation, Savior, save” became such specific technical terms that we hardly grasp their meaning for the hearers of the apostolic kerygma. Certainly it is still a matter of being saved from misfortune, but only the *usage* – literary and popular – of these words allows us to grasp their extension and meaning in the first century: From what dangers is one saved? What is the nature of salvation? Above all, who is the one who saves?

I. *Sōzō* and *sōtēria* in secular Greek. – To save means to deliver when there is a particularly perilous situation, a mortal danger (*megalōn kindynōn*, Dittenberger, *Syl.* 1130, 1; *Or.* 69, 4; 70, 4; 71, 3; *SEG* VII, 731; *SB* 8334, 7; 8862, 4; *IGUR*, n. 193, 6–8): first of all war or deliverance from enemies or opponents, then the perils of navigation: “I saved this shipwrecked man when his crew had died”; “a young woman was saved from the sea by a dolphin” (Plutarch, *Conv. sept. sap.* 19; *De sol. an.* 36); a dedication to Pan: “You saved us when we were astray on the Red Sea ... now save the city of Alexandria”; saved by the god from the sea (*sōtheis ek pelagous*, Dittenberger, *Or.* 74 = *SB* 8383, 7); Balbillus, “saved from the waters” (*ex hydatōn sōtheis*). This deliverance, this salvation, is spoken of with respect to all the dangers of an earthly pilgrimage, notably desert crossings: Besarion was saved from danger thanks to the special protection of the god (E. Bernand, *Inscriptions métriques*, n. 106, 5 = *SB* 7905); Isidoros was saved when he was thrown from his carriage by his horses (E. Bernand, *Inscriptions métriques*, 109, 2; *SB* 10161); a *proskynēma* of the Cretan Cheidon: “Travelers ... follow your route safe and sound” (*sōzomenoi*; E. Bernand, *Inscriptions métriques*, 157, 2; cf. 159, 1 = *SB* 8382, 4050). But the most common usage of *sōtēria*, *sōzō*, is medical: to save

means to heal a disease; remedies are saviors (Plutarch, *De adul. et am.* 11; Philo, *Alleg. Interp.* 3.129; *Rewards* 145, 170; *Worse Attacks Better* 110; *Joseph* 110), physicians are saviors. In the second century BC, a decree of Samos honors the physician Diodorus, who cared for and restored many patients and “was the cause of their salvation.... He placed the common salvation above all fatigue and all expense.” In letters, news is sought from correspondents, the writer is anxious because none has been received and rejoices if the news is good: “You will do well to send me a message regarding your health, which is my greatest preoccupation” (*P.Phil.* 35, 17); “Do not neglect, my brother, to write me regarding your health” (*P.Mert.* 85, 5; cf. 28, 11); “Write me first, I beg you, regarding your health, and then regarding your desires” (*P.Sarap.* 91, 7; cf. 92, 21; 95, 6; 100, 13). The physician Eudaemon writes his mother and brothers seeking news from them and assurance regarding their safety (*P.Fouad* 80, 7). “I rejoiced to receive your letter and to learn that you have been cured of your illness.” Frequently *sōtēria* is associated with *hygieia*, which suggests that salvation is not merely deliverance but also protection or preservation: “May I not see my prayer rejected for the salvation of your children as God keeps them” (*P.Apoll.* 49, 7; cf. *P.Fouad* 89, 9; *P.Lond.* 1919, 21); it is in this sense that Soteria is a tutelary household deity (*P.Oslo* 148, 12).

This weakened meaning is common; to save is to leave alive, protect and pardon, preserve from misery, remain safe and sound, subsist, with a nuance of security (*P.Panop.Beatty* 2, 16 and 151; *P.Mich.* 490, 7), so that a way to say “keep a spark from dying” is “save the seed of fire” (Homer, *Od.* 5.490); pine is good for preserving wine (Plutarch, *Quaest. conv.* 5.3.1). One keeps (*sōzō*) one’s beard (Epictetus 1.16.14); Apollonius, an Alexandrian architect, dedicates an altar to Zeus the Sun “for the preservation of all his labors” (*hyper tēs sōtērias autou pantōn ergōn*, *SB* 8323); one saves or preserves official documents (*P.Fam.Tebt.* XV, 49 and 91; *SB* 9066, col. II, 15), as well as principles (Philo, *Spec. Laws* 1.59; Epictetus 4.1.120) or a game (Epictetus 4.7.30), marks of kinship (Philo, *Creation* 145), traditional acts (*Spec. Laws* 4.102), and a memory (Plutarch, *Dem.* 2).

In a number of the texts cited, especially in medical usage, *sōzō* and *sōtēria* have a positive meaning, referring to a good, namely, good health: being well. This is clearly the case with regard to vows *hyper sōtērias*: a statue is set up, a column is erected, an altar is prepared for the prosperity or happiness of loved ones, and especially for the happiness of the emperor; thus authorities or private individuals “save” a city, that is, contribute to its welfare, safeguard its happiness; so *sōtēria* is synonymous with *eudaimonia* (cf. *P.Oxy.* 2559, 7; *Dittenberger, Or.* II, 40).

The *sōtēria* of the universe is attributed to the gods, because Zeus “has arranged everything for the preservation and perfection of the whole” (Plato, *Leg.* 10.903 *b*), he protects and nourishes; if we leave aside the philosophers (Plato, *Phd.* *c–d*; *Resp.* 6.492 *e*; *Tabula of Cebes* 3.2; 4.3; 14.1) and the mystery religions, salvation has no moral connotations.

II. *Sōzō* and *sōtēria* in the LXX. – In the Bible, “salvation” has the same meanings as in secular Greek: deliverance, protection, healing, health, happiness, and prosperity; but the Hebrew verb *yāša* ‘, which is most commonly used, would originally have the nuance “be spacious, have plenty of room, be comfortable.” It would be the opposite of *šārar*, “be pressed, constrained, oppressed.” Salvation is usually Israel’s independence and security, brought about sometimes by heroes like Manoah (Judg 13:5; cf. Jer 14:9; cf. Philo, *Unchang. God* 17; *Joseph* 63; *Moses* 1.317), sometimes and in fact almost always by God himself in response to the cry of his people. Philo constantly emphasizes that the God of Israel is the only Savior, helper, and protector of the soul (*Drunkennes* 111), benefactor (*Sobr.* 55), providing refuge and complete security (*Dreams* 1.86; *Drunkennes* 72); but this OT salvation is also moral and spiritual and applies only to people who have been purified of sin: “Cleanse your heart of evil, O Jerusalem, so that you may be saved.”

III. *Sōzō* and *sōtēria* in the NT. – The secular meanings occur often, but the specifically religious meaning is dominant, in contrast to perdition, and consists first of all of deliverance from sins (Matt 1:21; Luke 1:68, 69, 71, 77) and “the wrath to come” (Rom 5:9; cf. 1 Cor 3:15; 5:5; 1 Thess 5:9), and hence “reconciliation” (Rom 5:10–11). It has to do with the salvation of the soul (Mark 8:35; 1 Pet 1:9), which is already actual (*sēmeron*, Luke 19:8; *kath’ hēmeran*, Acts 2:47; *nyn hēmera sōtērias*, 2 Cor 6:2; *esōthēmen*, Rom 8:24; *sesōmenoi*, Eph 2:5, 8; *esōsen*, Titus 3:5) and continues to become effective (*sōzomenoi*, 1 Cor 1:18; 2 Cor 2:15), but will not be complete and definitive until entrance into heaven: eternal life (1 Tim 1:16; 6:12), which is still an object of hope (Rom 8:24; Titus 3:7; Heb 6:18; 1 Pet 1:3). Two major conditions are required: faith and perseverance, because the undertaking is difficult in the midst of tribulations (Mark 13:20) and its success can be compromised; so much so that one may wonder whether in the end “there will be few saved.” Jesus answers, “That which is impossible for humans is possible for God” (Luke 18:27). Salvation is a gracious gift from him (Eph 2:5, 8; 2 Tim 1:9), his accomplishment of victory through his might (Rev 7:10; 12:10; 19:1) and the action of his Son (John 3:17; 10:9; Acts 5:31; Heb 2:10; 7:25); so that to be called to set out on the way of salvation is joyous news (Eph 1:13), because success is divinely guaranteed: “The gospel is God’s power for salvation.”

IV. *Sōtēr* in secular Greek. – It is first and foremost the gods who have superhuman powers and are *sōtēres* in that they deliver people from dangers or protect them (Xenophon, *Hell.* 3.3, 4; *PSI* 1241, 7; *SB* 7530, 4, *theōn sōzontōn*; 9820; *P.Oxy.* 3069, 20; *P.Köln* 56, 8; *IGLS* 1184, B 5; *I.Did.* 424, 14–15; Firmicus Maternus, *Err. prof. rel.* 22: *tharrite, mystai, tou theou sesōsmenou, estai gar hymōn ek ponōn sōtēria*). Zeus is invoked by a suppliant at Philadelphia in these terms in the first century: “May Zeus Savior receive this account favorably and grant in return the benefits of health, safety, peace, and security on land and on sea”; Athena (*I.Lind.*, n. 392, 394; *I.Rhamn.* 23, 3; *I.Bulg.* 326, 8); Poseidon, “savior of ships” (Ps.-Homer, *H. Pos.* 22.5); Leda, gives birth to the Dioscuri “for the salvation of the people of earth and of ships” (Ps.-Homer, *H. Cast.* 33.6); Asclepius; Isis and Sarapis, the former being as a healer the object of the most widespread worship.

With the help or the protection of the gods, humans also can be saviors, especially by delivering their country or perfecting their institutions, so that the title *sōtēr* is used in the fifth century BC for men of politics, for Gelon (Diodorus Siculus 11.26.6), for Brasidas (Thucydides 5.11.1), for Philip of Macedonia (Demosthenes 18.43), for Dionysius of Syracuse (Diodorus Siculus 16.20.6; Plutarch, *Dio* 46), Camillus (Plutarch, *Cam.* 10), Lysandridas. These tributes are understandable, as is the description of philosophers as “savior” – or alternatively as *boēthos* – but adulation and flattery abuse them: an acclamation directed to a prefect, “save the city” (*sōson polin*, *P.Oxy.* 41, 23); “Save us, *prytanēs*, your government is excellent” (1414, 22); “Prosper, O prefect, protector of honest people.” For having announced the freedom of Greece, Titus Quinctius Flamininus is proclaimed by the crowd “the savior and defender of Greece” (Plutarch, *Flam.* 10; cf. 16); Theophanes, Pompey’s freedman, is “savior, benefactor, second founder of the country” (Dittenberger, *Syl.* 753; cf. 751, 754), Marius is “savior of Italy” (Plutarch, *Mar.* 39); the father of Herodes Atticus (*CIG* 2.3596; *I.Olymp.* 622) and various illustrious unknowns, such as Demetrios Kindaburios (*TAM* II, 3, n. 768) or the officer who denounced Plautianus to Septimus Severus and for this became *sōtēr* and *euergetēs* (Herodian 3.12.2; cf. 8.3.4), or wealthy donors (*MAMA* 6.103, 165; *I.Car.* 11).

All the same, “savior” in the official and functional titles of sovereigns is not unimportant for understanding the language of the NT, especially when the Roman emperor is described as “savior and benefactor,” which are divine attributes. In the Hellenistic period, after the decay of the *polis*, the prince is conceived as representing the divinity and procuring the welfare of his subjects, who look to him for everything – security and happiness. Especially illuminating is the letter of the proconsul Paulus Fabius Maximus: “Providence,

which governs the course of our lives, has shown attention and goodness and has provided for the most perfect good for life by producing the emperor (Augustus), whom it has filled with virtue in order to make him a benefactor of humanity (*eis euergesian anthrōpōn*). So it has sent to us and to others a savior (*sōtēra*) who has put an end to war and will restore order everywhere: Caesar, by his appearing, has realized the hopes of our ancestors; not only has he surpassed earlier benefactors of humanity, but he leaves no hope to those of the future that they might surpass him. The god's birthday was for the world the beginning of the good news that he brought (*ērxen de tō kosmō tōn di' auton euangeliōn hē genethlios*)."

V. *Sōtēr* in the NT. – It is no exaggeration to say that the whole new covenant is summed up in the announcement of the angel to the Virgin Mary: "You shall give birth to a child and you shall *call his name Jesus*," that is, "Yahweh saves." This is commented on by Matt 1:21, "because he will save his people from their sins." His mission, his *raison d'être*, his work are expressed in his name: Savior by antonomasia, the center of history, *Die Mitte der Zeit*. Pilate presents him as "Jesus, called the Christ" (Matt 27:17), and the crowds acclaim him as a king coming in the name of the Lord (Luke 19:38; cf. 1 Tim 1:17; 6:15); but faith confesses that "God has sovereignly exalted him and given him a Name that is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow in the heavens, on the earth, and under the earth."

In the Magnificat, the Virgin Mary sets her motherhood in relation with OT *sōtēria*. She "rejoices in God [her] Savior." Jesus, forgiving the sins of the guilty (Luke 7:48; cf. 5:24) and proclaiming deliverance to the captives (Luke 4:18), lays down that he has come "to seek and to save that which was lost" (Luke 19:10; cf. 5:32; 15:7, 10, 24, 32), which St. John takes to mean the whole world and the gift of eternal life (John 3:17; 4:42; 10:9; cf. 5:34). St. Peter specifies: "Salvation is in no other" (Acts 4:12), because he is the head (*archēgos*) of the whole economy of salvation (Acts 5:31; 13:23; Heb 2:10; 5:9). As he is the head of the church, he is thereby also "Savior of the body" (Eph 5:24); even Israel will be saved (Rom 11:26).

The Pastoral Epistles insist: "God wishes all people to be saved" (1 Tim 2:4) without distinction of race, group, or qualities, because he is all goodness and beneficence (Titus 3:4); "the living God is the Savior of all people, especially those who believe" (1 Tim 4:10); "Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners" (1:15). It is "our great God and Savior" that was manifested (2 Tim 1:10), bringing grace and peace (Titus 1:4) in superabundance (Titus 3:6).

VI. *Sōtērios*. – This adjective, very common in the LXX (nearly 140 occurrences), means "saving, preserving, salutary, helpful"; often used as a noun, it refers to things, animals, and people. The five NT occurrences all have a

religious meaning. The first two are quotations of Isa 40:5 by Simeon: “My eyes have seen your salvation” (Luke 2:30; 3:6); in this context, this instrument of *sōtēria* (*T. Sim.* 7.1; Dan 5:10) is “almost a personification of the Savior” (M. J. Lagrange, on this text). The “salvation of God” sent to the pagans, according to Acts 28:28, is the preaching of the gospel, the means of access to the kingdom of God. The grace of God that saves all people (*charis tou theou sōtērios*) that has appeared in a way personifies *charis*, because it evokes the manifestation of the Son of God, the Savior, from his incarnation and his death to his resurrection; a gift of the Father.

## σωματικῶς

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*sōmatikōs*, **bodily, personally**

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*somatikos*, S 4985; *EDNT* 3.325; MM 621; L&N 8.2; BAGD 800; ND 3.86

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In Christ the fullness of the godhead dwelled (Col 1:19) “bodily” (2:9). This is how *sōmatikōs* is ordinarily translated, with the understanding that the reference is to the resurrected body of Christ (Phil 3:21) or to the church, which is his body on earth. If the adverb is taken to mean “in a bodily fashion,” then we can compare Philo: “The priest ‘shall not be a man,’ according to Moses, when he enters the holy of holies.... This has to do not with the body, but with the movements of his soul.” But how could the divinity be circumscribed or concentrated in Jesus? It would probably be better to translate “personally,” the meaning of the word in the only three papyri in which it is attested: the priests of Bacchias in 178 want to be freed of the *leitourgia* for the work on the dikes, which is in danger of becoming a personal chore for them (*mē agesthai sōmatikōs epī tēn tōn chōmatōn apergasian*, *P.Lund* III, 8, 15, republished in *SB* 8748); “that we may be freed from personally completing the work on the dikes”; finally, there is *P.Fouad* 13, 8, which A. Bataille restores to read *sōmatikōs apergazesthai hiereis*.

σωφρονέω, σωφρονίζω, σωφρονισμός, σωφρόνως, σωφροσύνη, σώφρων

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*sōphroneō*, **to be moderate, sober-minded, sensible, sane**; *sōphronizō*, **to instill a sense of moderation, restore someone to his senses, instruct, train**; *sōphronismos*, **having good judgment, of sound mind**; *sōphronōs*, **with good sense, with self-control**; *sōphrosynē*, **prudence, moderation, sound**

**judgment, decency, self-control, mastery of the passions; *sōphrōn*, moderate, sensible**

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*sophroneo*, S 4993; *TDNT* 7.1097–1104; *EDNT* 3.329–330; *NIDNTT* 1.501–502; MM 622; L&N 30.22, 32.34; BAGD 802 | *sophronizo*, S 4994; *TDNT* 7.1104; *EDNT* 3.329–330; MM 622; L&N 33.229; BAGD 802 | *sophronismos*, S 4995; *TDNTM* 7.1104; *EDNT* 3.329–330; MM 622; L&N 32.34, 88.93; BAGD 802 | *sophronos*, S 4996; *EDNT* 3.329–330; *NIDNTT* 1.501–502; L&N 88.94; BAGD 802 | *sophrosune*, S 4997; *TDNT* 7.1097–1104; *EDNT* 3.329–330; *NIDNTT* 1.494; MM 622; L&N 32.34, 88.93; BAGD 802 | *sophron*, S 4998; *TDNTD* 7.1097–1104; *EDNT* 3.329–330; *NIDNTT* 1.501–502; MM 622–623; L&N 88.94; BAGD 802; ND 4.151

These compounds of the verb *phroneō* – rare in the papyri, used abundantly in classical Greek and very common in the Hellenistic period, especially in the inscriptions – are, strictly speaking, untranslatable. Deriving from *sōs-phrēn*, they express first of all the idea of spiritual health, a correct or appropriate way of reasoning, but also a sense of moderation, a moderation or reserve that is expressed in inner equilibrium. Hence *sōphroneō*, “be moderate, sober-minded” (unknown in the LXX); with respect to an exorcised demoniac, “in his right mind” (Mark 5:15; Luke 8:35). It is used of Christians, who should be measured and reserved in their self-concept (Rom 12:3); of Paul, beside himself or euphoric in his relationship with God (*exestēmen*) but reasonable and prudent (*sōphronoumen*) in his relations with the Corinthians (2 Cor 5:13); of the Cretans, who must be staid (*sōphronein peri panta*, Titus 2:6); and of believers who are overly excited about the prospect of an immediate Parousia and are called to be calm (1 Pet 4:7). Accused by Festus of being mad, the apostle replies, “I am speaking words of truth and good sense” (*alētheias kai sōphrosynēs rhēmata apophthengomai*, Acts 26:25).

The Stoics treat *sōphrosynē* as one of the four cardinal virtues, but it is especially identified with prudence (Esth 3:13 c; Wis 9:11, *sōphronōs*; Philo, *Unchang. God* 164), which is given to the apostles along with the spirit of power and of love, because it is a virtue of rulers. Sometimes it is contrasted with debauchery (*akolasia*), and it is confused with *enkrateia* (Philo, *Good Man Free* 67, 70, 159, 250–251; Plutarch, *Alex.* 21.11; 30.10–11; 47.8); it is the virtue of temperance that overcomes the passions. This nuance is that of the *sōphrōn nous*, the temperate mind, and its account for the association of *sōphrōn* with sobriety (1 Tim 3:2; Titus 2:2; 1 Pet 4:7) and chastity.

Finally, *sōphrosynē* – while connoting moderation and just measure – has to do with character and life conduct (*sōphrosynē tropōn*) and so becomes a



general virtue, the knowledge of what to do and what to avoid. Not only is it of unparalleled nobility, but it expresses the purest Greek ideal (Plato, *Cra.* 411 e; *Chrm.* 159 bff.), and the honorific decrees always mention it as a characteristic of a good life, for example at Mylasa: “having lived with *sōphrosynē* and in his youth having shown forth a perfect example of merit.” This explains the association of *sōphrōn* and *kosmios*: the *sōphrōn* has a feel for the proprieties (*sōphrosynē kekosmēmenou*, TAM, II, 288).

*Sōphrosynē* is taught to children “as the virtue that is most appropriate for young people and the first of all virtues, an element of harmony, and productive of good.” Thus is it that educative (*paideuoussa*) grace teaches us to live “temperately, justly, and piously,” and that older Christian women must instruct the younger women in wisdom, teaching them to love their husbands and their children.

The Pastoral Epistles require *sōphrosynē* of the *episkopos* (1 Tim 3:2; Titus 1:8) and of the older men, but they treat it primarily as a feminine virtue, whether with regard to dress, chaste and reserved conduct, or even of the condition of salvation, which here seems to be the discretion and reserve that become women. *Sōphrosynē* had been attributed to women from the time of Semonides of Amorgos and Pythagoras: “The best virtue for woman is *sōphrosynē*” (*gynaikos de malista areta sōphrosyna*, in Stobaeus, *Flor.* 74; vol. 4, p. 589; cf. *Flor.* 44, 24, vol. 4, p. 154: *gynaika de sōphronein chrē*); “Honor *sōphrosynē*, which is the distinctive virtue of women,” especially young women; certainly it includes modesty (Philo, *Spec. Laws* 1.138). Aristotle states that it is not the same virtue in women as in men. After Musonius Rufus, Plutarch was the leading advocate of this feminine advancement in the first century AD (*Mulier. virt.* 20; *Sol.* 20.5; *Cleom.* 22.2), constantly attested in tomb inscriptions and in honorific decrees: Theophile, “a paragon of *sōphrosynē*”; the most illustrious Jullia Bassia, praised by the *boulē* and *dēmos* of the Tauromenites; or Tata, the high priestess of emperors, “adorned with all virtue and *sōphrosynē*” (*kekosmēmenēn pasē aretē kai sōphrosynē*, TAM II, 15, col. II, 9); Claudia, who was “pure in her love for her husband, unsurpassed in her love for her children, ... indescribable in her *sōphrosynē*” (*philandria asynkritos, philoteknia anyperblētos, ... sōphrosynē adiēgētos*, ibid. 443; cf. 285); “adorned with nobility and *sōphrosynē* and showing forth all womanly virtue” (*eugeneia kai sōphrosynē kekosmēmenē kai pasan gynaikeian aretēn apodeiknymenē*, ibid. III, 4). In the first century AD, the Roman people and merchants of Assos pay homage to the *sōphrosynē* of Lollia Arlegilla (*I.Assos*, n. XIV, 2). Likewise the honorific decree paying homage to Stratonike, the wife of Attalos (ibid., pp. 33–34). A woman’s funerary epigram praises her as “chief of *sōphrosynē*” (*sōphrosynēs prytanis*, W. Peek, in *ZPE*, vol. 24, 1977, p. 33).

As in Titus 2:4–5, the components of *sōphrosynē* are enumerated: *philandria*, *philostorgia*, *eutaxia*, *eutechnia*, *eunoia*. The term always refers to a “well-ordered life,” a life above all suspicion and criticism, an “honest woman,” the opposite of dissoluteness (Aristotle, *Rh.* 1.9.1366; Plutarch, *Luc.* 1.1). The mores of such a woman are above reproach. Such was “the worthy Berous, daughter of Chrysippus, who was a Penelope in deed and not in fiction, chaste in her marriage (*sōphrōn en gamotēti*), prudent despite her youth, a good mistress of her house and her life” (*IGLS* 721, 5; cf. 2371).

ταλαιπωρέω, ταλαιπωρία, ταλαίπωρος

*talaipōreō*, to bewail one's misery; *talaipōria*, misery, devastation;  
*talaipōros*, miserable, wretched

*talaiporeo*, S 5003; *EDNT* 3.331–332; *NIDNTT* 3.858–859; L&N 25.136; BAGD 803 | *talaiporia*, S 5004; *EDNT* 3.332; *NIDNTT* 3.858–859; MM 624; L&N 22.11; BAGD 803 | *talaiporos*, S 5005; *EDNT* 3.332; *NIDNTT* 3.858–859; MM 624; L&N 22.12; BAGD 803

In the LXX, the verb *talaipōreō* almost always translates the Hebrew *šādaq*, almost always in the pual, referring to ravaged lands, devastated countries (Mic 2:4; Joel 1:10; Jer 4:20; Zech 11:2–3), ruined pillars (Hos 10:2) – the aftermath of violence. Philo uses it for the thousand snubs that Flaccus received (*Flacc.* 155) and the severity of a night spent in the open air (*Etern. World* 4; *Spec. Laws* 3.17); Manetho uses it for men toiling in quarries (in Josephus, *Ag. Apion* 1.237; cf. Xenophon, *Mem.* 2.1.18); Josephus uses it for the fatigue of long marches (*Ant.* 2.334; 3.3) or costly efforts (4.167; cf. *P.Mil.Vogl.* 24, 15: *emou talaipōrountos is to pelagos*, AD 117), Thucydides for various sufferings and difficulties resulting from war (3.78.1; 5.74.3), for the rainy season (2.101.5), for the plague, for the constraints of existence (1.99.1). It is with this general meaning that it is used in Jas 4:9 – “Bewail your misery (*talaipōrēsate*), mourn and weep” (NT hapax).

The substantive *talaipōria*, very common in the OT, has the same meaning and signifies devastation (Job 30:3; Hos 9:6; Isa 16:4; Mic 2:4), pillaging (Amos 3:10), ravaging (Joel 1:15; Hab 2:17), calamity (2 Macc 6:9). This is the meaning in Isa 59:7, quoted at Rom 3:16, and of Jas 5:1, where the rich are told to weep over the evils that are going to befall them.

The adjective *talaipōros* retains the meaning “miserable” when referring to the precariousness of life, to suffering and privation that must be endured, as in Rev 3:17 (“You do not realize that you are wretched, pitiful, poor, blind, and naked”); but more often it refers to psychological and religious wretchedness, as with those who place no value on wisdom and instruction (Wis 3:11), “pin their hopes on dead things” (13:10), or are condemned to death when “if they had pleaded their case even before Scythians, they would have been acquitted” (2 Macc 4:47). Even more so people who “keep bad company and are perverted and miserable their whole life long” (*Ep. Arist.* 130). Two funerary steles of

Rhenaë, from the second-first century BC, call for God to avenge the murderers of two young Jewish women, Heraclea and Marthina: “I invoke and call upon God Most High ... upon those who treacherously assassinated and poisoned the wretched Heraclea.” In October of AD 64, Thaubas announces to his father, “Your unhappy daughter Herennia (*tēn talaipōron thygatera sou Herennian*) died ... the ninth of Phaophi in premature labor.” So when St. Paul cries out “Wretched man that I am” (*talaipōros egō anthrōpos*, Rom 7:24), we must interpret this as both *infelix* and *miser*: “Unhappy and miserable man that I am! Who will deliver me from this mortal body?” As an exact parallel, these exclamations from Epictetus 1.3.5, attributed to those who live only for the body, forgetful of their divine paternity, have been cited: “What am I then? A poor wretched human, or miserable flesh!” (*ti gar eimi? talaipōron anthrōparion, kai ta dystēna mou sarkidia*). The connotations are the same with respect to the person who is afraid to take the necessary food: “Poor wretch! Can you be so blind?” (*talaipōre*; 3.26.3; cf. 4.6.18). The exclamation is a common one (Plutarch, *Aem.* 26.10), whether after a mistake or a sin (“How unhappy and miserable I am!” *Jos. Asen.* 6.5, 7) to express the condition of the guilty person (“O miserable soul – *ō talaipōre psychē* – how can you say that you have committed no offense?” *T. Abr.* B 10), or on the occasion of the loss of a loved one. It is the cry of a broken heart.

### ταπεινός, ταπεινόω, ταπεινώσις

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*tapeinos*, **base, ignoble, of low birth; modest, moderate, humble**; *tapeinoō*, **to humble, humiliate**; *tapeinōsis*, **modesty, humility**

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*tapeinos*, S 5011; TDNT 8.1–26; EDNT 3.333; NIDNTT 2.259–264; MM 625; L&N 25.295, 87.61, 88.52, 88.64; BAGD 804 | *tapeinoo*, S 5013; TDNT 8.1–26; EDNT 3.334–335; MM 625; L&N 25.198, 79.87, 81.7, 87.62, 88.56; BAGD 804 | *tapeinosis*, S 5014; TDNT 8.1–26; EDNT 3.334–335; NIDNTT 2.259–264; MM 625; L&N 87.60, 88.51; BAGD 805

In secular Greek, the *tapeinos* is usually a person who is base, ignoble, of low birth (*P.Oxy.* 79, verso 2: “nothing humble or ignoble or despised,” *mēden tapinon mēde agenes mēde adoxon*; Plutarch, *Cic.* 10.5; Lucian, *Cal.* 24), servile (Plato, *Leg.* 6.774 c, *aneleutheros*), working at a humble occupation (Demosthenes, *C. Eub.* 57.5), held in low esteem; it can even refer to lowliness of heart. This nuance of depreciation remained in polite monastic and ecclesiastical formulas in the sixth century. But despite the preponderance of baseness and pettiness, *tapeinōsis* was also considered a virtue even by pagans,

namely, the virtue of modesty or moderation, associated with *praütēs*, *hēsychia*, *metriotēs*, *kosmiotēs*, and even *sōphrosynē*; the opposite of *hybris*, *authadeia*, and *hyperēphania*. S. Rehr has provided abundant evidence of this.

Nevertheless, the Christian idea of humility derives primarily from the OT and the example of Christ. It combines the ideas of poverty, modesty, and mildness. The humble are contrasted with potentates, the great (Matt 18:4; 23:12; Rom. 12:16), the arrogant (Jas 4:6), the rich (Jas 1:9; cf. Phil 4:12), with all that is lofty (Luke 3:5; 2 Cor 11:7; Jas 4:10; 1 Pet 5:6) and glorious (Phil 3:21; cf. Prov 29:23). Here is a profile of the humble:

(a) They are “little people,” of modest circumstances, who are regarded with favor by the Lord.

(b) They are unfortunate sufferers (2 Cor 7:6; 12:21), whom God comforts (Phil 2:8; Heb 6:6; 10:29).

(c) They are discreet and self-effacing (*Ep. Arist.* 257; Rom 12:16; Gal 6:1–3; Eph 4:2; 1 Tim 3:6; 1 Pet 3:8).

(d) They are humble before the Lord and reserved with respect to their brethren, persuaded of “the misery and emptiness of the whole creation.”

## ταράσσω, τάραχος

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*tarassō*, to agitate, move, disturb; *tarachos*, agitation, disturbance, confusion, panic, uprising

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*tarasso*, S 5015; *EDNT* 3.335–336; *NIDNTT* 3.709–710; MM 625; L&N 16.3, 25.244, 39.44; BAGD 805 | *tarachos*, S 5017; *EDNT* 3.336; *NIDNTT* 3.709–710; MM 626; L&N 25.243, 39.5; BAGD 805

“Agitate, move, disturb” is used for things like water (John 5:4, 7; Ezek 22:2, 13; 34:18–19; Hippocrates, *Aff.* 55.3), for the stomach or intestines, and for mental uncertainty and confusion, as with Peter’s guards, worried about the escape of their prisoner (*ēn tarachos ouk oligos*, Acts 12:18). The same word can be used for a panic, as in 1 Sam 5:9; Plutarch, *De garr.* 13. *Tarassō* and *tarachos* are used especially for disorders, social disturbances, political agitation, and riots. It is in this sense (Latin *tumultus*) that they are used in Acts 16:8, 13; 19:23: At Thessalonica, Paul and Silas are accused of instigating a disturbance; at Berea, it is the Jews who agitate and upset the crowds; at Ephesus, it is the riot of the silversmiths. It is a technical term for insurrections, like the Jewish revolt at Cyrene (*SEG* IX, 168, 8; 252, 6; *BGU* 889, 23 = *C.Pap.Jud.* 449); thus *tarachos* is synonymous with *stasis* (“uprising,” *P.Brem.* XI, 30 = *C.Pap.Jud.* 441; Dittenberger, *Syl.* 684, 13; 3 Macc 3:24; *stasiastēs* =

factionous person, *P.Cair.Zen.* 59484, 4), *ephodos*, “clash, attack, irruption” (*P.Giss.* 41, col. II, 4–5), *kinēsis*, “movement” (Diodorus Siculus 31, frag. 17 b; ed. Dindorf), *thorybos*, “tumult, confusion” (*P.Brem.* XI, 25–26), and *polemos*, “battle, combat.” Hence the choice of words of Emperor Claudius, writing to the Alexandrians in 41: “the disturbance and uprising against the Jews, or better, to speak frankly, the war” (*tēs de pros Ioudaious tarachēs kai staseōs, mallon d’ ei chrē to alēthes eipein tou polemou*, *P.Lond.* 1912, 73–74). Just as in France “in the time of the Revolution” or “before the Revolution” is a chronological reference, “in the times of the troubles” referred to some particular insurrection.

With respect to individuals, *tarassō* usually expresses simple uneasiness mixed with fear: Zechariah (Luke 1:12), Herod (Matt 2:3), the apostles frightened at the sight of Jesus walking on the water (Matt 14:26; Mark 6:50) or resurrected (Luke 24:38), or disturbed at the prospect of the Master’s departure; the faithful are upset by heterodox teachings (Acts 15:24; 1 Pet 3:14 = Isa 8:12). These connotations of disquiet, fear, dismay, and confusion match those of secular Greek, and of biblical Greek when the frame of mind resulting from a dream is being described. The person’s mind is always troubled (*etarachthē hē psychē autou*, Gen 41:8; Dan 2:1; 7:15; *Pss. Sol.* 6.4).

But this meaning – agitation, care, preoccupations – does not take account of three Johannine texts referring to intense emotion or confusion in Christ’s heart, first of all at the tomb of Lazarus; then at the Last Supper, when “having said these things, Jesus was troubled in his spirit” (John 13:21); and also when the Lord clearly states his anguish at the prospect of his imminent passion. In all three instances, trembling and dread are envisioned: Jesus was upset. This meaning comes from the LXX, where *tarassō* translates quite diverse Hebrew verbs to the effect that the earth is quaking (2 Sam 22:8, Hebrew *gā‘aš*) or is broken up (Isa 24:19, Hebrew *rā‘a*), that the mountains are shaking (Psa 46:2, Hebrew *mûr*) or shuddering (hithpapel of *rāgaz*, Ps 18:8; 77:16; cf. Amos 8:8), also the hills (Jer 4:24, hithpapel of *qālal*). God disturbs the sea (Isa 51:15, Hebrew *rāga*), the isles are dismayed (Ezek 26:18, *bāhal*), “Syene is shaken in all directions” (Ezek 30:16, Hebrew *hûl*; cf. Esth 4:4), “the spirit of Egypt will melt in her heart” (Isa 19:3, niphal of *bāqaq*), the nations tremble (Isa 64:2, Hebrew *rāgaz*; cf. Deut 2:25), the city of Susa is dismayed (Esth 3:15, niphal of *bûk*). With respect to people, the emphasis is always on fear, terror. This tumultuous agitation, this upsetting internal trouble (2 Sam 18:33, Hebrew *rāgaz*; Jdt 4:2; 7:4; 14:19; 16:10) batters and weakens the soul’s strength (Judg 11:35, hiphil of *kāra*), crushes it (Ps 42:8, hithpoel of *šāḥaḥ*), so that the person faints (Ps 143:4; hithpoel of *šāmam*), stricken with dizziness and reeling like a drunkard (Ps 107:27, Hebrew *ḥāgag*), unable to speak (Ps 77:4, niphal of

*pā'am*), worn out (Gen 40:6, *zā'ap*), and muddled (Isa 3:12, piel of *bāla* ), routed (Isa 22:5, Hebrew *mhûmâh*), after the fashion of mental disturbance (*Ep. Arist.* 314; cf. *T. Job* 26.6 – “troubling your discourse,” *tarassonta tous dialogismous sou*). When the entrails shudder and shake, it means that they are moved with compassion (Gen 43:30, piel of *māhar*); 1 Kgs 3:26 (niph'al of *kāmar*; Sir 30:7; 51:21); if it is the spirit, sadness or gloom is indicated (1 Kgs 20:4–5, Hebrew *sar*).

The meaning “grief” cannot be excluded as a component of the emotion that troubled Jesus at the tomb of Lazarus (cf. *T. Job* 19.1, when Job learns of the death of his children; cf. 20:7; 33:1; 34:5), but “dread” is clearly meant in the other two Johannine texts, with a nuance of upset and physical trembling (Ps 55:5; cf. *Pss. Sol.* 8.5 – “my bones shook like reeds”), even bruises (Ps 109:22), which emphasizes the real humanity of the innocent Christ, for whom being subjected to death was a real cruelty. This explains why he collapsed in the Olivet garden (Mark 14:33–35; Matt 26:37–39; Luke 22:44).

## τετραπλοῦν

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*tetraploun*, **fourfold, quadruple**

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***tetraploun***, S 5074; *EDNT* 3.353; MM 632; L&N 60.76; BAGD 813

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The first attestation of this biblical hapax is in Xenophon, and it hardly appears in the papyri before the third century AD: “Do not fail to write me a letter, keeping in mind that if you do something, you will receive it back quadruple.” It has a quasi-legal meaning on the lips of Zacchaeus: “If I have wronged anyone, I shall pay it back fourfold” (*apodidōmi tetraploun*, Luke 19:8; cf. M. J. Lagrange, on this text). We may recall Plato’s gradation of fines: the judge sets the penalty at double, triple, or quadruple, according to whether the wound is curable or the victim is disfigured and will no longer be able to defend his country. If the wound is not curable, “the aggressor shall pay quadruple” (*tēn tetraplasian*, Plato, *Leg.* 9.878 c).

All ancient legal systems had quadruple penalties. In Israel, it was prescribed for the theft of sheep. For sins against other people or infidelity to Yahweh, a fifth is added (Lev 5:24; Num 5:7). In a mutilated fragment of the laws of Gortyn, this penalty apparently applies to a sheep thief: “he shall pay quadruple.” At Rome, for *furtum manifestum*, “for slave and free alike, the reparation shall be quadruple” (Gaius, *Inst.* 3.189); likewise, “for property taken by violence, the reparation shall be quadruple” (*ibid.* 3.209); and for

reparation for damage caused by a gathering of people, “the one who gathered them by fraud shall pay a quadruple penalty for each one of them.”

The *poena quadrupli* for an illegal seizure may have originated in the jurisdiction of the prefects of Egypt, who would have served as a model for imperial legislation. In any event, the transcript of a trial before the prefect of Egypt Valerius Eudaimon in AD 143 records the conviction of the *kōmogrammateus* who presented for a *leitourgia* someone from his jurisdiction who was *aporos*, without resources. Here is the sentence: “You have committed an injustice (*adikia*). You designated a man without resources for a *leitourgia*. By causing this injustice, you were the cause for the sale of his property. You are liable for a fine. You shall pay the fine to the treasury; but in addition, you shall pay to this man quadruple the price for which his property was sold.”

τίλλω

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*tillō*, to pick, pluck; to remove something from a shell, husk, or pod

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*tillo*, S 5089; EDNT 3.357; MM 634; L&N 18.9; BAGD 817

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In the incident of the ears of grain picked by the disciples on the Sabbath, the usual translation of *ērxanto tillein tous stachyas* is “they began to pick ears of grain” (Matt 12:1; Mark 2:23). The verb *tillō*, “pick one by one” (hair by hair, leaf by leaf), hence “pluck” (Cratinus, frag. 256), is often used in the middle voice for plucking out the hair or beard as an expression of mourning, but also for plucking feathers (Dan 7:4; Aristophanes, *Av.* 285, 352, 365) or leaves. In the Koine, it is used for the removal of the fleece from sheep (*tois tillousin ta hypodiphthera*, *P.Cair.Zen.* 59430, 3), for a tanner’s plucking the hairs from a hide (*P.Petr.* II, 32; *SB* 6990, 3; cf. Aristophanes, *Eq.* 373: “I will pluck out your eyelashes”), and especially in an agricultural setting for the extraction of a fiber, for boys who prune palm trees and sweep up the leaves (*P.Lond.* 131, 384–385), or for a plant that has grains or seeds to be picked out: the chick pea (*P.Cair.Zen.* 59719, 11), vetch or lentils (*SB* 9409, col. V, 24 and 31; 9711, col. IV, 2–3; 9715, verso, col. II, 3), sesame (*ibid.* 6797, 3; cf. 9408, 55). These are shelled. Thus the inhabitants of Great Britain, after storing their cut grain in underground granaries, shell it for their daily food, removing the grains from their hulls (*tous palaious stachys tillein*, Diodorus Siculus 5.21.5).

E. Delebecque compares this action to that of Jesus’ disciples. They did not pluck the stalks of grain (*kalamos*) or the ear (*stachys*) separated from the stalk, but as only Luke makes clear, they rubbed the ears in their hands to get the grains out. So we must follow Delebecque’s translation: “It happened that one



day he had to pass through a grain field, and his disciples were shelling and eating the grain, rubbing it between their hands.”

τρέφω, ἀνατρέφω

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*trephō, anatrephō, to nourish, raise*

→see also ἀνατρέφω

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***trepho***, S 5142; *EDNT* 3.369; MM 641; L&N 23.6, 35.45, 35.51; BAGD 825 | ***anatrepho***, S 397; *EDNT* 1.94; L&N 33.232, 35.51; BAGD 62

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The first meaning of *trephō* is “nourish, raise” (Hippocrates, *Alim.* 8: “food, that which nourishes,” *trophē de to trephon*; 21: “food is not food if it does not nourish”; *Vict.* 1.3.1–2: “water can always nourish”). It also means “thicken, make dense.” The basic meaning is “to facilitate [through appropriate care] the development of that which is subject to growth.” It is used most often for “raising” children – as Jesus was raised at Nazareth – but also for providing subsistence for adults, for fattening animals, for tending plants so that they grow.

From Hesiod and Pindar on (cf. Moussy, *Recherches sur τρέφω*, pp. 52ff.), *trephō* is also used to mean “instruct, train, educate,” and it is in this sense that parents are to use corrections and reprimands inspired by the Lord.

The compound *ana-trephō* has exactly the same meaning as the simple form, as is attested by usage and the variation in the manuscripts, where the two are easily interchanged. It also means “care for children” (Acts 7:20; Philo, *Moses* 1.11; Josephus, *Ant.* 2.238) and “raise” them. In the inscriptions, it refers to education by a foster father, as at Aphrodisias, where the epitaph on Zeno’s tomb mentions that also buried there is “Marcus Aurelius Eutychus, who raised him.” At Jerusalem, St. Paul introduces himself thus: “I am a Jew, born at Tarsus in Cilicia (*gegennēmenos*), but I was raised (*anatethrammenos*) in this city, taught (*pepaideumenos*) at the feet of Gamaliel” (Acts 22:3). The contemporary parallels are numerous: “Moses, of Chaldean race, was born and raised in Egypt” (Philo, *Moses* 1.5; cf. 1.8, 20); “Our parents brought us forth (*egennēsan hēmas*), raised us (*ethrepsan*), taught us (*epaideusan*)” (*Alleg. Interp.* 1.99); “I, Flaccus, who was born (*gennētheis*), raised (*kai trapheis*), and educated (*kai paideutheis*) in imperial Rome” (*Flacc.* 158; cf. 46); “There are people who have passed from childhood to old age without experiencing the least trouble, either because of a fortunate nature or because of the care that went into their upbringing and education” (*dia tēn tōn trephontōn kai paideuontōn epimeleian*, *Dreams* 2.147); “a young man of Jewish birth but

raised in Sidon” (*trapheis d’ en Sidōni*, Josephus, *War* 2.101); Plutarch, *Conv. disp.* 8.7; Plutarch, *De adul. et am.* 25; *Num.* 5.6. The epitaph of a mercenary: “The land that gave me birth is Apamea, but Egypt is the land that raised me.”

## τύπος

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*typos*, **mold, stamp, statue, idol, any mark left by a blow, model, outline, sketch, decree, verdict**

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*tupos*, S 5179; *TDNT* 8.246–256; *EDNT* 3.372–376; *NIDNTT* 3.903–907; *MM* 645; *L&N* 6.96, 8.56, 58.25, 58.58, 58.59, 58.63, 90.28; *BAGD* 829–830; *ND* 1.77–78

Derived from *typoō*, “mark with an imprint, stamp a form,” the substantive *typos* properly refers to a mold for producing a shape, or a wooden stamp for making an imprint in clay, the stroke of a numismatic die, the engraving of seals, a figure that juts out; hence its use for statues and works of sculpture, and in particular for idols. In a general way, *typos* is used for any mark left by a blow, hence, “If I do not see the nail-print in your hand (*ton typon tōn hēlōn*) and place my finger where the nails were (*ton topon tōn hēlōn*) ...”

This term is used for the model (Hebrew *taḥnîṭ*) of the heavenly temple that Moses is told to make (Exod 25:39, quoted at Acts 7:44; Heb 8:5). A *typos*, then, is an architectural or representational plan, as appears from a contract made with Theophilus, a painter from Alexandria, whereby the artist undertakes to decorate the vault of the house of Diotimus at Philadelphia “according to the model that the owner has seen.” In the literary arena, Lysias writes a letter to the tribune “in these terms” (*echousan ton typon touton*, Acts 23:15), literally, “under this form” (cf. 1 Macc 15:2), or better, “of which this is the text.” This is as when *Ep. Arist.* 34 reproduces the letter of King Ptolemy to the high priest Eleazar: “the king’s letter was as follows” (*ēn de hē tou basileōs epistolē ton typon echousa touton*). This meaning is often attested in private correspondence and in official documents.

A *typos* can be an outline, a sketch (Strabo 4.1.1), or a representation of any sort; in this sense Adam was the figure or type of the One who was to come, i.e., of the second Proto-Human; and the events of the old covenant are figurative and instructive concerning that which can happen to us (1 Cor 10:6). The *typos* contains a teaching. Hence Rom 6:17 – “You obeyed with all your heart the *typos didachēs* that was passed on to you.” We could translate, “the type, form, model of teaching” that constitutes Christian doctrine; but it is preferable to interpret “the rule of doctrine” that constitutes the gospel, since

this is a matter of a normative tradition, and in the papyri *typos* often means “decree, order, rescript,” or “judgment, verdict, decision.” It is not surprising that the word should have this legal meaning in the Epistle to the Romans. The nuance would be that of a sort of yardstick according to which the authenticity of the faith could be verified; the opposite of individual conceptions, fantasies, even customs (*synētheia*, *SB* 7622, 6). We may cite Plato: “What are the models (*hoi typoi*) that must be followed in speaking of the gods?” (*Resp.* 3.379 *a*).

In ethics, a *typos* is a model, hardly different from an example; and it is a technical term in the “pastoral” writings of the NT: the Thessalonians are models for all believers (1 Thess 1:7); Timothy and Titus are models through their good works (1 Tim 4:12; Titus 2:7); presbyters are models for their flock (1 Pet 5:3); and above all the apostle is a model for imitation. Thus being a model for the flock became the golden rule for leaders of Christian communities; the usage of the papyri shows that it is obligatory.

τυφόομαι

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*typhomai*, to be enveloped in smoke, deluded, dazed, puffed up

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*tuphomai*, S 5187; *EDNT* 3.378; *MM* 646; *L&N* 14.64; *BAGD* 831

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Apparently unknown in the papyri, *typhoō* – formed from the noun *typhos*, “smoke,” then “vapor that goes to the head” – means “envelop in smoke” and is almost synonymous with *typhloō*, “to make blind.” It is used exclusively in a metaphorical sense in its three biblical occurrences – 1 Tim 3:6; 6:4; 2 Tim 3:4 – as in secular Greek. From Zeno on, *typhos*, “delusion,” is associated with vanity, vainglory, and ambition. It is an intellectual vice, the vice of the rhetor who is at the same time unable to see the intellectual light (Philo, *Prov.* 2.18; *Decalogue* 4–6) and “unteachable and rebellious” (*Drunkenness* 95; 2 Pet 1:9); hence the insult *typhos*, “deluded old man.”

The passive *typhomai* in 1-2 Tim refers to a permanent condition: a dazed mind, a blindness (*Flight* 90; *Spec. Laws* 1.79; 3.125); to be “puffed up, full of the smoke of vanity, decked out in excessive pretension.” The pairing “foolish and deluded” speaks for itself.

ὑπερηφανία, ὑπερήφανος

*hyperēphania*, **exaltation, pride, haughtiness**; *hyperēphanos*, **lifted up, exalted, proud, haughty**

*uperephania*, S 5243; TDNT 8.525–529; EDNT 3.398; NIDNTT 3.28–30; MM 653; L&N 88.213; BAGD 841 | *uperephanos*, S 5244; TDNT 8.525–529; EDNT 3.399; NIDNTT 3.27–32; MM 653; L&N 88.214; BAGD 841

The commonly accepted etymology (*hyper* + *phainomai*: someone who shows himself to be above his fellows, elevated) no longer seems acceptable, even if it is taken to mean “visible above others,” all the more so since the seat of *hyperēphania* is within us. The proud person has a heart that is puffed up, compares himself to others and reckons that he is above them, scorns them (Ps 30:19, *exoudenōsis*); the opposite is the *tapeinos*. Moreover, the *hyperēphanos* is constantly associated with the *hybristēs* and the *alazōn*. These data suggest that we should examine the semantics of these terms circumspectly.

The first known usage of the verb *hyperēphaneō* is pejorative. Hesiod presents the three sons of Sky and Earth as “children full of pride” (*hyperēphanta tekna*) that one hardly dares to name. Andocides denounces the “lust and pride” of Alcibiades (Andocides, *C. Alcib.* 4.13), as Demosthenes denounces those who build private dwellings that are more magnificent than the public buildings and that “eclipse the greater part” of these. The excess that characterizes the proud translates into insolence and misdeeds (Pindar, *Pyth.* 2.28; Plato, *Menex.* 240 d). It is a vice of the rich, of kings, and of the successful (Homer, *Il.* 11.694), whose arrogance “disdains” or “scorns” others. So there is praise for a person who shows himself sensitive to the lessons and protests of his fellows, who acts with wisdom and moderation, succeeds in his undertakings, but without for that reason becoming prideful.

This exaltation ends up scorning the divine sovereignty: “It is not thinkable that Achilles had a proud scorn for gods and men” (*au hyperēphanian theōn kai anthrōpōn*, Plato, *Resp.* 3.391 c). Salmoneus, “the most impious and prideful of men ... thought by his grand deeds to excel Jupiter himself” (Diodorus Siculus 6.7.1–4); “in times of prosperity, men scorn the gods.” Thus the pagans, and especially the Stoics, who included pride in their catalogs of vices, denounced this sacrilegious excess, which the gods would not leave unpunished.

Nevertheless, *hyperēphanos* could have a favorable meaning, for example, as a personal epithet: “Greet the distinguished Leontas and his family” (*P.Oxy.* 530, 28; cf. Ibycus, *ibid.* 1790, frag. 1, 17). It is used for not paying an excessive price for merchandise (*PSI* 1413, 2, republished in *SB* 9450), for a proud empire (Aeschylus, *PV* 405), for odiously luxurious ships (Plutarch, *Pomp.* 24.4; gilded masts, silver-plated oars), but also for research into causes, a quest of marvelous splendor (Plato, *Phd.* 96 a); “the art of navigation does not put on grand airs, as if it were working wonders” (*Grg.* 511 d, *hōs hyperēphanon*); “to cast a shadow on an incomparably splendid action” (*Symp.* 217 e, *ergon hyperēphanon*); at Rome are announced Scipio’s “actions of extraordinary greatness and nobility” (Plutarch, *Fab.* 26.3, *praxeis hyperēphanoi*); “monuments of an extraordinary greatness” (Plutarch, *Per.* 13.1, *ergōn hyp.*); “Archidamus fought magnificently” (*agōnizomenon hyperēphanōs*, *Ages.* 34.7).

Thus in secular Greek, *hyperēphania*, -os, is used sometimes in a positive sense, sometimes pejoratively. It is essentially an excess with regard to the ordinary and the normal; but usually it is a vice, a person’s exaggerated opinion of himself, which entails disdain for others, even scorn for the divinity. It was the LXX that gave pride – with exceptional insistency – its exclusively moral and religious definition, first of all in sketching the psychological and sociological portrait of the proud person, then and especially in emphasizing the monstrous nature of this vice. And first of all *hyperēphania* is a vice of the heart (Obad 3; 1 Sam 17:28; Ps 101:5) that is manifested in insolent, scornful, and lying speech, through attitude and comportment, and especially through actions (*poiēsē en hyperēphania*, Deut 17:12; cf. Num 15:30; Ps 31:23; Tob 4:13). The proud, insolent person (Jdt 6:19; 9:9; 1 Macc 2:47, 49; 2 Macc 1:28), presumptuous and haughty (Isa 16:6; Jer 48:29), arrogant (Ps 119:21, 78, 122; 1 Macc 1:21; 2 Macc 9:7), scorning the neighbor (Ps 123:4; Tob 4:13) and not hesitating to hurt him (Sir 11:30; Ps 36:11; 140:5), even with violence (Prov 8:13; Ps 10:2) to the point of shedding blood (Sir 27:15; 31:26). But this wicked person, who perverts even his companions (Sir 13:1), will be the victim of his own excess (Ps 59:12), abandoned by his friends (Sir 22:22) and will be without support (Sir 51:10; cf. 3:28; Wis 5:8); his “house will be desolate” (Sir 21:4), because “detested by the Lord and by men is pride” (Sir 10:7; 16:8; 25:2). The whole of OT ethics is summed up in Prov 3:34 – “God opposes the proud but gives his favor to the humble.”

The sentence apparently agrees with the many assertions of pagan authors; but the inspired writers denounce in *hyperēphania* a spiritual perversion and a kind of generalized vice (cf. Ps 73:6) whereby one stiffens the neck and refuses to take the divine commandment into account (Neh 9:16). It is rebellion against

the Creator and Lord of all beings. According to Num 15:30, “The one who acts with hand [raised] in pride” outrages Yahweh and dares to rebel against his sovereignty. Hence the scandal: “How will one who is dirt and dust be proud?” (Sir 10:9). If it is already a serious thing humanly speaking to attribute to oneself something that one does not possess or that one has not acquired by one’s own means (Isa 10:13; 14:13–14; 1 Cor 4:6–7; Gal 6:3), it is the supreme impiety not to accept one’s creaturely condition: “It is just to submit to God, and as a mere mortal not to pretend to be equal to the divinity” (*onta isothea phronein*, 2 Macc 9:12).

It is remarkable that the NT speaks so sparingly of pride. The substantive *hyperēphania* is found only once, in the words of the Master (Mark 7:22), in a catalog of twelve vices between slander (*blasphēmia*) and moral stupor (*aphrosynē*), while it is absent from the parallel passage in Matt 15:19. But what is important is to specify the source of these vices: “from within, from the heart of the person, come ... slander, pride ...” The adjective *hyperēphanos* is used five times, first of all by the Virgin Mary, precisely in the OT meaning (especially Ps 88:11): “He has scattered those who are proud in the thoughts of their heart” (*dieskorpisen hyperēphanous dianoia kardias autōn*, Luke 1:51), that is, the rich and the powerful (as opposed to the *tapeinoi* in verse 52). Their understanding and their will are oriented against God; they usurp the divine prerogatives. Inevitably, they will be punished and brought low, while the humble will be raised up.

Rom 1:30 and 2 Tim 3:2 similarly mention the *hyperēphanoi* in vice lists. In the former case, it is a matter of the past, when philosophers refused to submit their own thought to God’s thought; the latter text has to do with the future, when people will reject the very foundations of morality. In both cases the *hyperēphanoi* are linked with the *alazones*; immoderation and excess go together. Finally, Jas 4:6 and 1 Pet 5:5 both cite Prov 3:34 – “God resists the proud [Hebrew *lallēšîm*], but gives grace [or kindness, liberality] to the humble”; his favors go to the lowly. In Peter, the quotation of Prov supports the exhortation, “Clothe yourselves with humility.” All of these texts are to be understood in light of the ethics already revealed in the OT.

ὑπεροράω

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*hyperoraō*, to look down on, scorn, disdain, ignore, abandon

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*uperorao*, EDNT 3.399; L&N 30.49; BAGD 841

Etymologically, this verb means “look over, see from above,” and in a pejorative sense “look down on, scorn, disdain.” In the LXX and in the papyri, only this second meaning is attested: “You will be scorned” (*esē hypereōramenē*, Nah 3:11; niphal of the Hebrew *‘ālam*, “hide, avert the eyes”); “their money will be scorned” (Ezek 7:19); “the jealous person scorns people” (Sir 14:8); *P.Hamb.* 23, 36: *hōs an ei nomōn boētheias hypereidomenois* (sixth century); “the Roman general, disdainful because of his anger and not trusting them, delayed so long ...” (Josephus, *War* 2.534). Hence the meaning “to abandon,” for example the ass that has fallen on the road and must be helped up (Deut 22:4); “I will not leave you or abandon you” (Josh 1:5; cf. Ps 9:22); “to leave off, desist” (Isa 58:7); Saul could not leave the country to be ravaged by the Philistines (*hyperidein tēn gēn kakōtheisan*, Josephus, *Ant.* 6.281); a noble person cannot extricate himself from danger and remain indifferent to one who threatens his friends (ibid. 14.357).

Finally, where we say “scorn, disdain,” we must understand the meaning “make no allowance for”; cf. 2 Macc 7:11 – “I got these from heaven, but because of his laws I do not take them into account” (*hyperorō tauta*). Hence the preponderant use of this verb with respect to the possibility that a prayer will not be answered. It is used often, and only in this sense, in the papyri of the second century BC: “Being a defenseless woman, I beg and pray you not to leave me bereft of what is rightly mine”; “I beg you then, O king, not to neglect me, who has been wronged (*mē hyperidein me adikoumenon*), and to order, to the contrary ...” (*P.Magd.* 8, 12).

In all these cases, the one in the superior position is not supposed to scorn the suppliant, is asked not to be indifferent but to intervene; a contrast is drawn between a possible lack of action and the assuming of a positive stance. This is precisely the case in Acts 17:30 – “God, having averted his eyes from these times of ignorance (*hyperidōn*), now makes known....” Obviously this is not “to scorn” but something more like “to ignore.” God decides not to remember, not to see any longer: “closing his eyes” (*Bible de Jérusalem*; cf. *NJB*, “overlooking”). Literally, he no longer takes the guilty past into account but takes another approach: he calls to repentance.

## ὑπηρέτης

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*hypēretēs*, **rower, crew member, subordinate, servant, police officer, bailiff**

→see also δοῦλος, οἰκέτης, οἰκέϊος, μίσθιος, μισθωτός

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*uperetes*, S 5257; TDNT 8.530–544; EDNT 3.400; NIDNTT 3.544, 546; MM 655; L&N 35.20; BDF §187(2); BAGD 842

It seems that the word originally meant a rower (*erassō*, to row), one who was on a lower deck of a trireme and hence in an inferior position; then a member of the crew, a sailor under the orders of a skipper; finally, a subordinate, a subaltern, often associated with *doulos* (John 18:18; Philo, *Worse Attacks Better* 56) and *diakonos*. Anyone who is in service to another person is a *hypēretēs*: *hypēretēs tō kyriō* (P.Ryl. 234, 1–2; Philo, *Post. Cain* 50; *Sacr. Abel and Cain* 44); but there is a great variety of functions, from the valet who accompanies the hoplite on campaigns (Thucydides 3.17.3), the steward of the emperor's property (IGLS 1631, 2), a tyrant's bodyguards (Plutarch, *Praec. ger. rei publ.* 28.822 e; *Cleom.* 37.9), and military administrative officers (P.Rein. 1, 14; UPZ II, 214, 1–2) or other administrators (BGU 2247, 21), to a general's aide-de-camp (Xenophon, *Cyr.* 2.4.4), a prefect's servant (SB 1126, 11–13), a king's servant – which is clearly the meaning in John 18:36, “If my kingdom was of this world, my subordinates (*hoi hypēretai hoi emoi*, angels, disciples, my militia?) would have fought” – and “temple servants” (Philo, *Spec. Laws* 1.152).

In the papyri, *hypēretai* appear in the third century BC as people in the service of Zeno, meaning domestic servants but also “workers” (*ergatai*, P.Cair.Zen. 52, 4), or employees of the master, among whom there is a hierarchy. We may compare the servants of the high priest in Matt 26:58; Mark 14:54, 65.

In the NT, *hypēretai* are usually “police officers,” as in the Greek tradition. Thus the judge hands a person over to the apparitor or bailiff; these are the *hypēretai* who came to arrest Jesus and made their report once their mission was accomplished (John 7:32, 45, 46; 18:3, 12, 18, 22; 19:6), like those who discovered that the apostles were missing from the prison (Acts 5:22, 26). They are always portrayed as servants of the high priests, the Pharisees, the Sanhedrin, or the *stratēgos* of the temple; in other words, they are always subordinates.

This usage conforms to the papyri, which use *hypēretēs* for subordinate functionaries in the civil and judicial administration. They take part in expert evaluations (PSI 448, 13; P.Lond. 214, vol. 2, p. 161), autopsies, promises made under oath, court hearings. They deliver summonses and verdicts to parties in litigation, give an accounting to their overseers (BGU 1775) and by their signature certify that they have in fact passed on a petition to the party concerned: *ho deina hypēretēs metadedōka* (P.Tebt. 434; P.Petaus 17, 34; 23, 1; 24, 30; SB 7870, 22–23; 7744, 11) or *metedothē dia tou deina hypēretou* (BGU 226, 24–25; P.Ross.Georg. II, 27; *Archives de Kronion*, ed. D. Foraboschi, n. 29, 12; 42, 22). Working under the office of the *stratēgos* (P.Oxy. 294; 475; P.Fouad 22, col. II, 27; P.Mil.Vogl. 129 and 156; P.Meyer



3), these officials had special responsibility for publicizing enactments. They posted them to bring them to the attention of the public and by so doing conferred an official and sure character upon them.

The fact that *hypēretai* were “official witnesses” and “guarantors of the public trust” helps explain the use of this term for ministers of the new covenant, especially since the Greeks used the expression “servant of the gods” and had *hypēretai* in their cultic assemblies. Christ appeared to Saul to make him a “minister and witness” of the things that he had seen (Acts 16:16), and the apostle asks “that we be considered servants of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God.” At Salamis, John Mark is the *hypēretēs* of Paul and Barnabas, not with respect to material services but as an aide, a co-worker, helping in the ministry, just as a physician’s assistant cooperates with the physician in treating a sick person. The word has this same religious meaning in Luke 1:2 – “What has been handed on to us by the servants of the word” (*hypēretai tou logou*). All the agents of the spread of the gospel play on their own level the role of the secular *hypēretai*: they promptly obey orders received from a superior and they officially pass along a message, carrying it to parties who have an interest in it.

The *hypēretēs* in Luke 4:20, to whom Jesus gives the scroll after rolling it up, is the verger-sacristan and synagogue warder, the *hazzān*, an official subordinate to the *archisynagōgos*.

## ὕπόδειγμα

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*hypodeigma*, **sign, sample, example, model for imitation**

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***upodeigma***, S 5262; TDNT 2.32–33; EDNT 3.402; NIDNTT 2.290, 293; MM 656; L&N 58.59; BAGD 844

The Atticists rejected this word in favor of *paradeigma*, which is unknown in the NT but used as its synonym in the LXX. Its first meaning is “sign, mark, indicator”; for example, on a sarcophagus in Cilicia: “As a sign of (witness to) her devotion, merit, and sobriety, Titus set up this altar to his wife Juliana.”

By extension, *hypodeigma* means “specimen, sample,” just as one cites an “example” in grammar, that is, a “case” or an “illustration.” Philo, *Conf. Tongues* 64: “As for the worse kind of ‘dawning,’ we find an example in what they tell us ...”; Josephus, *War* 1.374: “Fortune is often seen to change its countenance; you may learn as much from your own case.” This is the meaning of 2 Pet 2:6 – “God gave the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah as an example of what is going to happen to the ungodly”; their case is a sample of what awaits

sinner who refuse to be converted. In washing his disciples' feet, Jesus gave them an example (without the article: an illustration of the servant theology), so that they might act as he acted toward them. In Heb 4:11; 8:5; 9:23, whether with regard to disobedience or with regard to the earthly sanctuary as a copy of the heavenly temple, a *hypodeigma* is always a reproduction. Thus in medicine graphic representations or drawings make a teacher's lesson easier to grasp.

Already in John 13:15 and 2 Pet 2:6, the exemplary act has the value of a lesson. Indeed, a *hypodeigma* is a model for imitation, an instructive example, a deed intended to be reproduced; hence its use in ethics to refer to a virtuous act that should serve as a model: "Take as an example the endurance and patience of the prophets who spoke in the Lord's name." The epigraphical attestations are very abundant. At Aphrodisias, Eudamos is praised for his exemplary conduct ("having lived in an orderly and sober fashion and as an example of virtue"); likewise Appia, "having lived a sober and orderly life, an example of all virtue" (*sōphrona kai kosmian pros hypodeigma pasēs ezēkuian aretēs*, *MAMA* VIII, 469, 5); Hermia (*ibid.* 471, 14); Dionysius (*ibid.* 480, 8); Adrastus (484, 24); and Theodote, "having lived an orderly and modest life, an example of virtue" (*zēsanta kosmiōs kai aidēmonōs kai pros hypodeigma aretēs*, 190, 10). At Olbia: "imitating the life of those who conducted their public life the most nobly, he became an example to the young of the likeness of noble qualities." At Nimrud Dagħ, Antiochus I of Commagene promotes the cult of his ancestors: "I decree that they shall imitate a good example" (*nomizō te autous kalon hypodeigma mimēsasthai*, *Dittenberger, Or.* 383, 218). In Trachonitis: "most revered bedfellow, a model of nobility and benevolence, Flavia" (*semnotatē synomeune, kalōn hypodeigma philandrōn*, *Phlaouia*, *GVI*, n. 1404). At Delos: "setting forth a godly and generous example also for the others who are living as foreigners" (*eusebes hama kai megalopsychon hypodeigma kai tois allois tois ep' allodēmias kataballomenos*, *I.Delos* 1521, 6–9).

ὑποκρίνομαι, ὑπόκρισις, ὑποκριτής, ἀνυπόκριτος

*hypokrinomai*, to answer, interpret (a dream or oracle), recite or declaim, play a role, pretend, dissemble; *hypokrisis*, answer, declamation, play-acting, deception; *hypokritēs*, interpreter, actor, dissembler, perverse person; *anyrokritos*, authentic, having integrity

→see also ἀνυπόκριτος, γνήσιος; γνήσιος

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*upokrinomai*, S 5271; TDNT 8.559–571; EDNT 3.403; NIDNTT 2.468, 474; MM 657; L&N 88.227; BDF §§78, 157(2), 397(2), 406(1); BAGD 845 |

*upokrisis*, S 5272; TDNT 8.559–570; EDNT 3.403; NIDNTT 2.468–469; MM 657; L&N 88.227; BAGD 845 | *upokrites*, S 5273; TDNT 8.559–570; EDNT 3.403–404; NIDNTT 2.468–470; MM 657; L&N 88.228; BAGD 845 | *anurokritos*, S 505; TDNT 8.570–571; EDNT 3.403–404; MM 50; L&N 73.8; BAGD 76

Curious indeed is the semantic evolution of these terms from Homer and Herodotus to the NT! It would in fact seem that the original meaning of *hypokrinomai* was “answer.” Homer, *Od.* 2.111: “Hear an answer from the suitors”; Ps.-Homer, *H. Apol.* 171: “Tell him in response”; Herodotus 1.2, to the herald of the Colchidians, “the Greeks answered”; 1.116: the answer (*hypokrisis*) of the child Cyrus to Astyages. But to answer is to pronounce on a question by expressing one’s own thought, so it means not only to declare (Polybius 2.49.7) but to approve (Homer, *Il.* 7.407) or “answer in complaining” (Josephus, *Ant.* 12.216); which presupposes reflection and explanation. P. Chantraine is right to define the significance of the compound *hypokrinomai* in Homer, “To explain by bringing forth a response from within oneself.” Xerxes, for example, said to Mardonius that after taking counsel that he would let him know in reply (*hypokrineesthai*) which of the alternatives he would adopt.

From this meaning, “manifest one’s own opinion,” *hypokrinomai* came to mean “interpret a dream or an oracle”: “See how an interpreter of the gods would answer” (Homer, *Il.* 12.228); “Listen to a dream of mine and interpret it” (*Od.* 19.535); “I do not see how anyone can give any other answer (interpretation) to your dream” (ibid. 555); “the Pythia answered” (Herodotus 7.169); “you who interpret dreams so easily” (Aristophanes, *Vesp.* 53). *Hypokritai* are interpreters: “Prophets are *hypokritai* of mysterious words and deeds” (Plato, *Tim.* 72 b); a *hypokrisis* is an oracle’s response (Herodotus 1.90).

The predominant use of *hypokrinomai* is to recite or declaim a text, give a reply in a theatrical dialogue, play a role (Demosthenes, *Corona* 15); “neither Theodorus nor Aristodemus represented (*hypekrinato*) this drama ... but every other actor (*hypokritōn*) of former days played it” (*Embassy* 246); “the poets themselves acted in their tragedies” (Aristotle, *Rh.* 3.1.1408), like Thespis, who “acted (*hypokrinomenon*) his plays himself.” The *hypokrisis* is the play of the actors (*Ep. Arist.* 219; Philo, *Dreams* 1.205; Marcus Aurelius 11.1), their declaiming as well as their bearing and gestures (Plutarch, *Dem.* 11.3), when they interpret the speeches of others (Aristotle, *Rh.* 3.1403; Polybius 10.47.10; Lucian, *Pseudol.* 25; *Pisc.* 32). The *hypokritēs* is the actor himself, either in tragedy or in comedy (Dittenberger, *Syl.* 1078, 27; 1089); “Some actors put on a tragedy and recited lines from Euripides” (Philo, *Good Man Free* 141); but it was not the same *hypokritai* that played both; “the figures have the appearance,

the dress, and the masks of actors, but they are not actors” (*hypokritou echousin, ouk eisi de hypokritai*, Hippocrates, *Lex*; ed. Littré, vol. 4, p. 638); “actors and deceivers (*hypokritai kai exapatai*) say certain things before informed people and have other things in mind” (Hippocrates, *Vict.* 1.24, ed. Littré 6.496.14). “In the competitions, the actors count more for success than the poets” (Aristotle, *Rh.* 3.1.1403).

Because both the orator and the actor practice an art of illusion, our terms came to be pejorative. The actor who plays the role of Agamemnon is not really Agamemnon but pretends to be. So he counterfeits himself and covers his tracks by hiding his own identity: “when tragic actors put on their costumes, they also change their gait, their voice, their bearing, and their language” (Plutarch, *Demetr.* 18.5). So *hypokrinomai* comes to mean “pretend,” “practice deception,” “dissemble” (Marcus Aurelius 2.17; 9.2). It is a lie acted out, as with Laban, who “lived his life under the sign of hypocrisy and false appearances, pretending to be angry when he felt no real distress” (Philo, *Heir* 43). *Hypokrisis* is *apatē*: putting on the show of tears (Demosthenes, *Corona* 287; cf. 15); “However much you pretend to have paid the dowry, it is plain to see that you paid nothing at all” (Demosthenes, *C. Onet.* 31.8); “the oligarchs take this oath – ‘against the people I will be malevolent, and I will devise against them all the evil that I can’ – although they ought to think and pretend the contrary.”

In the LXX, *hypokrinomai* (Hebrew *ʾānāh*) becomes a sin. This is first of all the sin of duplicity, of dissimulation towards others: “hypocrites of the heart” nurse their anger without manifesting it (Job 36:13); “do not be a hypocrite (*mē hypokritēs*) in the lips of men (= before men)” (Sir 40:2). Then it is the sin against sincerity of heart; it is a perversity and an impiety not to act according to what one thinks. Moreover, the LXX and Aquila used *hypokritēs* to translate the Hebrew *ḥānēp*, and P. Dhorme has shown that *ḥānap* designates the profane (Isa 24:5; Jer 3:1–2, 9; Ps 106:38), the apostate (Isa 10:6), the wicked (Isa 33:14; Job 20:5; Sir 16:6), the infidel (Job 34:30), so that the OT “hypocrite” is a perverse or depraved person. Only this meaning allows us to understand why hypocrisy is linked with *ponēria* (Matt 22:18), with *anomia* (Matt 23:28), and with *kakia* (1 Pet 2:1) and deserves Gehenna (Matt 24:51; cf. 23:33).

In Philo, *hypokrisis* often retains its literal sense of deception, associated with cheating, deception, subterfuge, illusion. It is a falsehood that is the opposite of *alētheia*, but it is stigmatized with an exceptional violence unparalleled except in Matt and *Pss. Sol.* (4:6 – “May God remove those who live in hypocrisy among the saints”; 4:20 – “May crows peck out the eyes of hypocrites”); “hateful hypocrisy” (*echthras hypokriseōs*, *Joseph* 67); “in my eyes, hypocrisy is an evil worse than death” (*Joseph* 68); “it is the work of a

base and altogether servile soul to hypocritically disguise one's wicked character" (*Spec. Laws* 4.183); "there is nothing more servile than adulation, flattery, hypocrisy, in which words radically contradict thought."

The verb *hypokrinomai* is used only once in the NT, with regard to those sent by the scribes and high priests: without revealing their identity, they "play the role of righteous people" to spy on Jesus (Luke 20:20). On the other hand, this deceptive conduct is called *hypokrisis* with regard to the Pharisees and the Herodians (Mark 12:15), the "leaven of the Pharisees, which is hypocrisy," and in the apostrophe, "Scribes and Pharisees, your outside gives you the appearance of just people in men's eyes, but inside you are full of hypocrisy and iniquity" (Matt 23:28). Jesus contrasts corruption of heart to the precise material fulfillment of the law's commands, legal formalism; this gives an appearance and assures a good reputation. "In the last days, some will fall away from the faith ... [misled] by the hypocrisy of impostors" (*en hypokrisei pseudologōn*). After the fashion of actors, these teachers will put on masks to hide their true identity (cf. Matt 7:15), but they are only "false speakers, falsifiers of words" who would succeed at their scandalous fraud except that they can be judged by their fruits. 1 Pet 2:1 explains why hypocrisy is so odious to the Christian conscience; it is because the baptized person is a sincere person who has explicitly renounced perversity in all its forms (1 Cor 5:8) and will thus be marked by a fundamental rectitude (2 Cor 6:6): "having put off all wickedness and all guile and hypocrisy" (*pasan kakian kai panta dolon kai hypokriseis*).

As for *hypokritai* (unknown to St. John), Jesus denounces them in the Sermon on the Mount, stigmatizing them both for the ostentation of their almsgiving and their praying "to be praised by people" (Matt 6:2, 5) and also for claiming to be zealous for their neighbor's virtue while not correcting themselves; they are hypocrites because they do not have a true hatred for evil. According to Matt 23:13, 15, 23, 25, 27, 29, Jesus pronounces seven curses against the "scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites," which he concludes with the apostrophe, "Serpents, brood of vipers, how will you escape from the condemnation of Gehenna?" (Matt 23:33). The Lord never showed so much anger. Why?

First of all, because the hypocrisy in view here is a vice of teachers, who bear the heaviest responsibility: not only do they not enter the kingdom themselves but they also hinder those who would like to enter (Matt 23:13), substituting their own authority for God's authority and so making them into children of Gehenna (23:15). Moreover, "they say and do not do" (23:3); in not observing the things they impose on others, they are impostors. What is more, they are full of malice; despite their fine appearance, inside they are as befouled

as tombs filled with “the bones of the dead and all sorts of uncleanness” (23:27; cf. 23:25). Finally, and above all, these hypocrites are in fact impious; they observe the rites and practice the legal observances, but Isaiah (29:19) had prophesied well, “This people honors me with their lips, but their heart is far from me.” It is all there! The Pharisees represent the sclerosis of revealed religion, a cult of the law that is contradictory to the new covenant, which is a religion of the heart indwelt by the Holy Spirit. Jesus constantly denounces the dichotomy that hypocrisy makes between exterior and interior. This is a serious thing in relations between humans; it is monstrous in relations with God, who “jealously yearns for the spirit that he has placed in us” (Jas 4:5).

It would be tempting to translate the adjective *anyrokritos*, unknown in the papyri, either according to etymology (“without hypocrisy”) or according to usage (“not competent to perform on the stage”); but in its six NT occurrences, we must understand it to mean “authentic,” especially with regard to *agapē*, a very original mode of love that has to be distinguished from goodness, from natural devotion, from various counterfeits and false appearances (almsgiving and martyrdom, 1 Cor 13:3). To say that authentic love “has a horror of evil and clings to the good” (Rom 12:9) is to distinguish it from guilty kindnesses and consequently to define it as a divine love, very pure and spiritual. On the other hand, when St. Paul recommends himself on the grounds of love that is *anyrokritos*, “by the word of truth,” he means that the manifestations of his attachment match the sincerity of his devotion. 1 Pet 1:22 is decisive: “Having sanctified your souls perfectly, by obedience to the truth (the primitive baptismal formula) in order to have authentic brotherly love” (*eis philadelphian angrokriton*). Thanks to the sacrament, the new Christian already has a divine love in his heart (Rom 5:5) that lets him love his neighbor with the same love with which God loves him; more precisely, this is a *philadelphia*, a familial affection whereby brothers (Matt 23:8) love each other in the household of the same Father, who has begotten them all (1 Tim 3:15; 1 Pet 2:5; cf. 1 John 4:7; 5:1), or whereby one lives in brotherhood (1 Pet 2:17; 5:9). Only true *agapē* allows this sort of love.

In 1 Tim 1:5 and 2 Tim 1:5, it is faith that is described as *anyrokritos*, which can be translated “having integrity”; this is not a faith that is “unfeigned, without hypocrisy,” but authentic faith that entails intellectual orthodoxy and religious behavior, loyalty and faithfulness to one’s commitments; its external profession (confession and Christian bearing; cf. Rom 10:10) translates adherence of heart and conviction of spirit. Only the righteous live by this faith (Gal 2:20). Finally, in Jas 3:17, the wisdom that is from above is described as *adiakritos* (without partiality), *anyrokritos* (in the sense of Wis 5:18).

ὑπομένω, ὑπομονή

*hypomenō*, to endure; to wait expectantly; *hypomonē*, endurance

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*upomēno*, S 5278; TDNT 4.581–588; EDNT 3.404–405; NIDNTT 2.764, 772–774, 776; MM 658; L&N 25.175, 39.20, 68.17, 85.57; BDF §§148(1), 414(2); BAGD 845–846 | *upomone*, S 5281; TDNT 4.581–588; EDNT 3.405–406; NIDNTT 2.772–776; MM 659; L&N 25.174; BDF §163; BAGD 846

Plato and Aristotle analyzed *hypomonē* and established the conception of it that would hold for the entire Greek tradition. Plato asked, “In what does courage (*andreia*) consist?” and answered that it is “a certain endurance of soul (*karteria tēs psychēs*) ... one of the noblest things.... It is endurance (*karteria*) accompanied by wisdom that is noble” (*Lach.* 192 *b–d*). Regarding this, Socrates observes, “In war, a man endures (*karterounta andra*) and is ready to fight because he calculates reasonably that others will help him, that the enemy is less numerous ... that he has a positional advantage. Would you say that this man, whose endurance of soul relies so much on reason and preparation, is more courageous than the man on the other side who sustains his attack and endures (*hypomenein te kai karterein*)?” – to which Laches replies that the latter is braver. To be courageous, then, is to be manly, to face difficulties without expecting help or putting one’s confidence in others; one endures alone, as Aristotle notes. He makes *hypomonē* a virtue, because it is a noble thing to keep to the mean in difficult circumstances: “one endures (*hypomenōn*) despite the fear that one feels ... for the beauty of the deed.”

Stoicism emphasizes this will to resist all evils, disease, death: “Constancy is the bearing of pain and distress on account of the good” (*karteria: hypomonē lypēs, ponōn heneka tou kalou*, Ps.-Plato, *Def.* 412 *c*); “one must bear, resist, hold fast, fortify one’s resolution and barricade it with firmness and endurance (*karteria kai hypomonē*) drawn from within, the most potent of virtues” (Philo, *Cherub.* 78); in the pancratium, the athlete “by the constancy and vigor of his endurance (*tō karterikō kai pagiō tēs hypomonēs*) breaks the strength of his adversary until the victory is complete” (*Good Man Free* 26); between prudence and temperance on the one hand and justice and piety on the other, Philo locates “*andreia*, which permits endurance (*hypomonēs axion*),” (*Change of Names* 197; cf. Zeno: *andreia peri tas hypomonas*, in Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 2.7.5; vol. 2, p. 60, 14; Josephus, *Ant.* 3.16); “the courageous man (*ho andreios*) has learned to endure (*ha dei hypomenein*)” (*Change of Names* 153); constancy or perseverance is an athletic virtue (*Sacr. Abel and Cain* 46; *Good Man Free* 26) personified in Rebekah. For Plutarch, “to flee death is not blameworthy if one

wishes to live for noble reasons, and to meet it head-on is not praiseworthy (*outh' hypomonē kalon*) if one does so through being tired of life" (*Pel.* 1.8).

The book of 4 Macc illustrates the extreme of this virtue, since its "philosophy demands of us courage (*andreian*) that will cause us to endure (*hypomenein*) willingly all sorts of woes" (4 Macc 5:23), whether these be the most diverse tortures or the pains of childbirth (16:8). The seven martyred brothers "by their courage and their endurance (*tē andreia kai hypomonē*) won the admiration of the whole world and of their own executioners." Already in Philo we find this endurance of death, of a surgical operation (*Unchang. God* 66), of torture (*Dreams* 2.84), of the punishment of Tantalus (*Heir* 269), of captivity (*Unchang. God* 115), of slavery, of exile (*Cherub.* 2), of mistreatment. It is always a matter of bearing up with courage (*andreiōs hypomenōn, Moses* 2.184), of enduring what is hard to bear; this *hypomonē* guides the ascetic (*Flight* 38) who is moving toward beatitude; but it also has to do with enduring privations or minor nuisances, fatigue (*Migr. Abr.* 144), an affront (*Flacc.* 104; *To Gaius* 369), unmerited poverty (*Flacc.* 132), the vicissitudes of fortune (Menander, *Dysk.* 768), harm (*P.Oxy.* 904, 5), familial woes (*P.Hamb.* 22, 2; *P.Oxy.* 1186, 4).

So if *hypomenō* means "suffer" (*Joseph* 94), even in its most softened sense, it implies self-mastery: one contains oneself, bears, endures, and perseveres, sometimes with a nuance of expectant waiting or of patience motivated by hope. The verb even has the weakened meanings "to consent" and "to accept" and is frequently used for a responsibility, a *leitourgia*, expenses that one takes on.

But in reading the LXX, one enters a different semantic world altogether. For one thing, all the occurrences of the substantive *hypomonē* translate the Hebrew verb *qāwâh* (in the piel) or one of its derivatives *tiqwâh*, *miqweh*, Hebrew terms that signify expectant waiting, intense desire; for another, this hope usually has God as its object: "My hope is in you (Yahweh)" (Ps 39:7; 71:5; Jer 14:8; 17:13). Not only is this the first time that *hypomonē* has a religious meaning; it also contradicts the refusal of the *Laches* and the *Eudemian Ethics* to credit this virtue to one who is counting on help from someone else. For the believer, hope comes from God (Ps 62:5; Sir 17:24), "the expectation of the pious will not be disappointed" (Sir 16:13; Ps 9:18). This is not what we today call theological hope, but a constancy in desire that overcomes the trial of waiting, a soul attitude that must struggle to persevere, a waiting that is determined and victorious because it trusts in God. As for the verb *hypomenō*, seven occurrences are conformable to secular usage, but thirty-four others express waiting, translating the Hebrew *qāwâh* (in the piel or hiphil) and rarely *hākâh*. One waits on God for everything. This is a permanent disposition of the soul:



“Our souls wait upon Yahweh” (Ps 33:20); “in you do I hope all day long” (Ps 25:5). Strength is required (Ps 27:14; Job 6:11), but there is certainty of never being let down (Ps 25:3; Isa 49:23; Jer 14:22); hence the beatitude of perseverance: “Blessed is the one who abides (*makarios ho hypomenōn*) and reaches the 1,335 days” (Dan 12:12).

This blessedness of those who endure is taken up by Jas 1:12; 5:11. The NT takes its inspiration both from the secular Greek tradition and from the theology of the LXX, especially the synonymous relation between hope and constancy. From his first letter to the last ones, St. Paul links *hypomonē* with *elpis* (hope) in the triad of theological virtues: “Remembering the efficiency of your faith, the labor of your love, and the constancy of your hope (*tēs hypomonēs tēs elpidos*) in our Lord Jesus Christ.” The nuance is that of perseverance despite difficulties, assuring salvation: “The one who endures to the end will be saved” (*ho de hypomeinas eis telos houtos sōthēsetai*, Matt 10:22; 24:13; Mark 13:13); “save your souls by your endurance” (*en tē hypomonē*, Luke 21:19); “God will give eternal life to those who give themselves over to good works with endurance” (Rom 2:7). Enduring trials with constancy is what makes it possible to bear fruit; this is the last word in the explanation of the parable of the Sower. 1 Cor 13:7 attributes to love this indefatigable capacity to endure despite the ingratitude, vileness, bad conduct, and problems that all communal living involves: “*agapē* endures everything” without complaining or becoming discouraged. God is the source of this constancy (Rom 15:5), which is the possession of all disciples and the authenticating mark of an apostle (2 Cor 6:4; 12:12).

Christ gave the example – “He endured the cross” (*hypemeinen stauron*, Heb 12:2) – and each disciple must “consider what he endured from sinners.” This is why Paul and Revelation set Christian *hypomonē* in relation with the most serious trials (*thlipsis*). One endures them and bears them, as the Lord commanded cross-bearing, but the very word *hypomonē* implies that a happy outcome is expected: the resurrection. The Christian theology of patience will retain these data of revelation. Moulton-Milligan gives no papyrological reference for the substantive *hypomonē*; no attestation has since been found.

ὑπόστασις

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*hypostasis*, **substance, firmness, confidence, collection of documents establishing ownership, guarantee, proof**

→see also πίστις

The usual Latin equivalent of *hypo-stasis* is *sub-stantia*, which in philosophical terms means the essence of an entity, that which is hidden beneath the appearances. This meaning, however, is not attested in the NT, apart from Heb 1:3, where the Son is the imprint or effigy of the substance of the Father.

In an ethical sense, *hypostasis* refers to what is deep in the heart – firmness, calm, confidence, courage; hence the meaning “hope” or psychological and moral support in Ruth 1:12; Ezek 19:5; Ps 39:7 (Hebrew *tôhelet*) and “assurance” – probably the meaning in 2 Cor 9:4; 11:17, and certainly in Heb 3:14 – “if we hold our initial confidence (literally, the beginning of assurance) till the end.” It is more difficult to translate Heb 11:1, *estin de pistis elpizomenōn hypostasis*, where the Vulgate simply transcribes the word in question (“Fides est substantia sperandarum rerum”) and most moderns translate it “assurance or solid confidence.” But in the papyri our noun is usually used for property, for a right of possession: “without risk for myself and my property” (*P.Oxy.* 138, 26; 1981, 27; 2478, 28; *P.Berl.Zill.* 6, 4; *SB* 8986, 22; 9463, 6; 9566, 10); “the scribe attributed more land to me than I actually own” (*P.Oxy.* 488, 17; cf. *P.Wisc.* 61, 15); in an account from the fourth century, “produce from a property of twenty-four *arourai*.” *Hypostasis* is also used for the contents of a house. The commentaries of the church fathers and the medievals followed this line of interpretation: faith contains the substance of eternal life, which is the *prima inchoatio* (first beginning) of the object of hope. It already possesses that hope, perhaps only faintly, but nevertheless in its true essence.

This nuance of anticipation can be narrowed down further. *Hypostasis* means point of departure, beginning (Diodorus Siculus 1.66), provision for the future (*P.Panop.Beatty* 1, 269; *P.Tebt.* 336; 7; *P.Stras.* 309, verso 2; *P.Fay.* 343; *SB* 7360, 12), offer (*P.Panop.Beatty* 2, 144, 158), commitment or guarantee. According to the edict of Mettius Rufus, all owners of building and land have to have deeds on record establishing their property rights. Thus a *hypostasis* is a collection of documents establishing ownership, deposited in the archives and proving the owner’s rights; hence it is a guarantee for the future. Moulton-Milligan are right to translate Heb 11:1 “Faith is the *title-deed* of things hoped for.” This was also the interpretation of the Peshitta: *pyso*, “guarantee, proof.” Faith is a title of ownership on property that is in the future.

*upotasso*, S 5293; TDNT 8.39–46; EDNT 3.408; MM 660; L&N 37.31; BDF §202; BAGD 847–848

It may be said that this verb is peculiar to the language of the NT, and that “submission,” which should not be confused with obedience, is a major virtue in the Christian pastoral writings, expressing the relations of subordination in the cosmic and religious order.

God has placed everything in submission to Christ, to whom the angels are subordinate (Heb 2:5; 1 Pet 3:22); the church is in submission to the Lord (Eph 5:24); Christians submit to God, to his law and his training, but also to one another to cooperate (1 Cor 16:16) in the fear of God (Eph 5:21; cf. Rom 13:8). Woman is subordinate to man, the wife to the husband, the children to the parents (1 Tim 3:4; cf. Marcus Aurelius 1.17.3), the young to the old, slaves and servants to their master (Eph 6:5, Titus 2:9; 1 Pet 2:18), subjects (cf. *Ep. Arist.* 205, 207, 265; Josephus, *War* 2.140; Polybius 21.43, *hoi hypotattomenoi*) to their sovereign; and finally the Christian must submit to every human creature. We may conclude that the baptized person is a “son of obedience” (1 Pet 1:2, 22) in all the larger or smaller human communities in which he is placed (1 Pet 2:13–3:12), contributing to the maintenance of the order fixed by the plan of providence whereby all creatures are ordered in a hierarchy (Wis 11:21).

It is clear that *hypotassō* does not have the same range in these differing communal relationships; but it is always reverent submission, seen as a self-offering (cf. Titus 3:1–2). It means first of all accepting the exact place God has assigned, keeping to one’s rank in this or that society, accepting a dependent status, especially toward God (Jas 4:7), like children who are submissive to a father’s discipline (Heb 12:9), after the fashion of the child Jesus. This religious subjection is made up of an obedient spirit, humaneness of heart (*Ep. Arist.* 257), respect, and willingness to serve. To submit is to accept directives that are given, to honor conditions that are imposed, to please one’s superior (Titus 2:9) or honor him by the homage that is obedience (cf. Eph 6:1), to repudiate egotism and aloofness. It is to spontaneously position oneself as a servant toward one’s neighbor in the hierarchy of love.

All of this is absolutely new and has no secular parallel. The papyri only use *hypotassō* with respect to copies or postscripts added to a letter, or an “adjunct” document. For example: “Attached is a copy of the petition that was addressed to us”; *P.Mert.* 59, 9: “what follows is a copy” (*estin antigraphon to*

*hypotetagmenon*, second century BC; cf. *Dittenberger, Or.* 629, 6); “I have added a note to the attached request”; *P.Yale* 56, 6: “the attached ordinance, translated from the Greek” (*to hypotetagmenon prostagma*). This became a formula: *hypotetachamen soi to antigraphon*, “We submit to you a copy of the letter written to us by the members of the gymnasium of Omboi” (*C.Ord.Ptol.* 49, 7; cf. 45, 5; 51, 8, 52, 15; 58, 7; 60, 15, 17).

ὕστερέω, ὕστέρημα, ὕστέρησις, ὕστερον, ὕστερος

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*hystereō*, **to be late, be left behind, lack, fail, run out**; *hysterēma*, *hysterēsis*, **lack, poverty**; *hysteron*, **after, next, later, finally**; *hysteros*, **coming behind, coming after, late, future**

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*ustereo*, S 5302; *TDNT* 8.592–601; *EDNT* 3.409; *NIDNTT* 3.952–954; MM 661–662; L&N 13.21, 57.37, 65.51, 87.65; BDF §§101, 180(5), 189(3); BAGD 849 | *usterema*, S 5303; *TDNT* 8.592–601; *EDNT* 3.409; *NIDNTT* 3.952–953, 955; L&N 57.38, 85.29; BAGD 849 | *usteresis*, S 5304; *TDNT* 8.592–601; *EDNT* 3.409; *NIDNTT* 3.952–953, 955; L&N 57.37; BAGD 849 | *usteron*, S 5305; *TDNT* 8.592–601; *NIDNTT* 3.952–953; MM 662; BAGD 849 | *usteros*, S 5306; *TDNT* 8.592–601; *EDNT* 3.409; *NIDNTT* 3.952–953; MM 662; L&N 61.16, 67.50; BDF §§62, 164(4); BAGD 849

In this family of words, the evolution was from a local sense to the commoner temporal sense, then to a general idea of inferiority. The adjective *hysteros*, “coming behind, after” in space, then in time, is used for “the following day” as well as for “later, next” and for posterity, a distant future; but it may refer to something that is merely second, subsequent. It takes on a pejorative nuance in the expression “arrive too late” (Homer, *Il.* 18.320), “late, tardy” (Aristophanes, *Vesp.* 691), and especially with the sense of being “inferior.” This latter meaning is well attested in Philo, who especially loves this adjective and gives it the same meanings as classical Greek.

The denominative verb *hystereō* has especially the meaning “be late, arrive late, too late,” but also “let oneself be outrun, left behind,” hence a nuance of inferiority and even – in the Hellenistic period – insufficiency and inefficacy: the manna was given “without insufficiency or excess.” This is the predominant meaning in the LXX (especially for the Hebrew *hāsēr*): “lack, fail, run out.” It is also found in Philo (*Husbandry* 85: lack opportunity), Josephus (*Ant.* 1.98; cf. 15.70), Dioscorides (5.86), and especially in the papyri. “Such a person works and tires himself out and presses on and is only more lacking” (Sir 11:11; cf. 11:12); “If you are useful to the rich man he will use you, but if you have

nothing he will abandon you” (13:15); a sad spectacle is that of the “failing” warrior (26:28); “you have been weighed in the balance and found wanting” (*kai heurethē hysterosa*, literally, lacking weight, Dan 5:27 [Theodotion]). The adverb *hysteron*, the opposite of *nyn* (“now”), retains in the LXX the commonplace meanings of the adjective: next, after, finally. It is particularly common in the papyri.

The NT completes this semantic evolution; almost all of the fifteen occurrences of the verb *hystereō* (John 2:3 is a bad manuscript reading) have the sense “to lack,” whether on a human or a spiritual level. The rich young man, having observed all the commandments, asks, “What do I still lack” to be perfect (Matt 19:20; cf. Mark 10:21)? While Jesus was with his apostles, did they lack anything (Luke 22:35)? When Paul arrived at Corinth, he lacked everything (2 Cor 11:9), but he knew how to live with abundance as well as how to go wanting. He thinks that he is in no way beneath (behind, inferior to) those most eminent apostles who wish to surpass him (2 Cor 11:5; 12:11). The Corinthians lack no spiritual gift.

The meaning of the eight occurrences of *hysterēma* poses no problem (“poverty, lack”), although it does not appear in the secular language before the third century BC, and then only twice. In a petition to the *stratēgos*, the farmers of Oxyrhynchus attest that they have worked their hardest, sown, and even borrowed large sums of money, in order to avoid any tardiness or deficiency (*eis to mēthen hysterēma genesthai*); but the six occurrences in the LXX suggest that this substantive was current in Alexandrian Koine: “This place where nothing is lacking of all the things that are on the earth” (Judg 18:10; 19:19, 20; Hebrew *maḥsôr*); “if the things necessary for whole burnt offerings are lacking, they will be given to them” (2 Esdr 6:9); “what is lacking cannot be numbered” (Eccl 1:15); “for those who fear him, there is no privation (lack)” (Ps 34:9). The Lord comments on the alms given by the poor widow: “This woman, out of her poverty (*ek tou hysterēmatos autēs*), gave all she had to live on.” The Macedonian Christians supplied Paul’s poverty (*to hysterēma mou*, 2 Cor 9:9), and Epaphroditus risked his life to help the apostle, given the absence of the “lacking” Philippians (*hina anaplērōsē to hymōn hysterēma*). On the level of emotions, when the apostle was – if we may put it so – “in a state of lack,” Stephanas, Fortunatus, and Achaicus “filled my privation” (1 Cor 16:17). Faith always needs to be supplemented, filled from an abundance, whether of knowledge, or of faithfulness, or of fervor; so St. Paul prays night and day that God will fill what is lacking (*ta hysterēmata*) in the faith of the Thessalonians, whatever is concretely insufficient; this would be needs rather than deficiencies.

After this, the two biblical occurrences of *hysterēsis* are clear, since this noun and *hysterēma* are synonymous. According to Mark 12:44, the poor

widow gave “out of her poverty” (*ek tēs hysterēseōs autēs*, cf. Luke 21:4); and St. Paul protests, “It is not poverty (*ouch hoti kath’ hysterēsīn*) that inspires my words” (Phil 4:11), before going on to say, “I know how to lack (*hysterein*) and I know how to live with abundance” (4:12).

The adjective *hysteros* is used but once: *en hysterois kairois* (1 Tim 4:1), which means not “the last days” (cf. 1 Pet 1:5, 20 – *en kairō eschatō*), but in days to follow, later times, the future. As for the adverb *hysteron*, it retains its classical meanings: “after, next, later” (Matt 21:30, 32; 25:11; John 13:36; Heb 12:11) and “finally.”

# φ ph

## φαιλόνης

*phailonēs*, **cloak**

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***phailones***, *EDNT* 3.411; *MM* 663, 665–666; *L&N* 6.172; *BDF* §§5(1), 25, 32(2); *BAGD* 851

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St. Paul, a prisoner at Rome, asks Timothy to bring him the cloak (*ton philonēn*) that he left with Carpus at Troas. This refers to a short, heavy coat of thick and coarse material (Plautus, *Mostell.* 991), usually with a hood (Pliny, *HN* 24.138), that effectively protected the torso and arms from rain and cold but hindered movement (Tacitus, *Dial.* 39.3).

The word *phailonē-phainolē* was borrowed by late Greek from the Latin *paenula*, which in turn originally came from Greek and according to its etymology – and the etymological meaning was not entirely lost – would have referred to a very striking, easily visible color. The spelling is quite variable: *phelōnēs*, *phailonēs*, *phelōnis*, *phailonin*, *phelonin*, *phelōnin*, and the transposition of the *l* and the *n* has been retained in modern Greek: *phainolēs* (*P.Oxy.* 3057, 4: “I received your letter, the trunk, and the capes”; 3201, 4: *phenolou idochromou*; line 7: *phenolēs melas*). In addition there are the diminutive forms, so popular in the Koine: *phailonion*, *phelonion*.

This cloak is frequently mentioned in the papyri. Usually made of wool, the cape is categorized as a winter garment (Julius Pollux, *Onom.* 7.13, 60–61); more precisely, there is a *cheimonikon phelōnin* which is more expensive than the summer cape. Along with these notes on purchases and gifts, the *paenula* appears most often in requests for remittal, which is exactly what 2 Tim 3:13 is; cf. *P.Oxy.* 1583, 6; 1584, 7, 18; *P.Mich.* 496, 10, 13: “You say that I will receive the *phainolas* and the pig. The pig I have not received, but I have received the *phainolas*.”

## φθόνος

*phthonos*, **malevolent envy**

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→see also βασκαίνω

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***phthonos***, *S* 5355; *EDNT* 3.423; *MM* 667–668; *L&N* 88.160

Derived from *phthiō*, “perish, waste away,” *phthonos* would literally mean “depreciation, diminution, denigration.” The customary translation is “envy” or “jealousy,” and often there is an association with *zēlos*; but unlike this latter term, *phthonos* is always pejorative. It is hardly possible to imagine what is meant by the “devil’s jealousy,” through which death is said to have come into the world. We must translate “malevolent envy.”

This vice is denounced in the NT sin lists, where it is associated with malice (*kakia*, Titus 3:3; 1 Pet 2:1; cf. *T. Benj.* 8.1) and strife (*eris*, Rom 1:29; Gal 5:21; 1 Tim 6:4); and it is a commonplace in Hellenistic *diatribē*. Stobaeus collected fifty-nine sayings on envy (*Peri phthonou*, *Ecl.* 3.38; vol. 3, pp. 708ff.). Plutarch wrote a treatise on envy and hatred (*Peri phthonou kai misous*; cf. *De prof. in virt.* 14). This malevolence is stigmatized as the worst of evils, it is defined as sadness occasioned by the thought of another’s good, and its harmful effects on social and political life are denounced.

In effect, this malevolence is aggressive and seeks to do harm, at least through slander (Plutarch, *Per.* 13.15: “Hence jealousy against one person, slander against another”) and quite often through lawsuits: “What is more, he has the face to file malicious charges (*phthonous aitias*) against me with no basis” (*P.Ryl.* 144, 21, AD 38); “Nothing was taken; they are accusing us out of jealousy.” It is in this sense that Jesus was handed over to Pilate out of envy and that Paul’s opponents, in a spirit of rivalry, began to preach *dia phthonon kai erin*. The best parallel is from Nicolaus of Damascus: “Some, in order to please Caesar, heaped honors upon him, while others, in their perfidy, approved and proclaimed these extravagant honors only in order that envy (*phthonos*) and suspicion might make Caesar hateful to the Romans.”

φιλάγαθος

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*philagathos*, loving the good, loving good people

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*philagathos*, S 5358; *TDNT* 1.18; *EDNT* 3.424; *NIDNTT* 2.549; MM 668; L&N 25.105; BAGD 858

The etymological meaning of this adjective, which is rare in the literature, is “loving the good” or “loving good people.” It deserves consideration, given the importance of its use in two biblical texts. It is clear that since *agathos*, “good,” is the opposite of *kakos*, “bad,” the *philagathos*, corresponding to the *misoponeros* (Philo, *Moses* 2.9; *Ep. Arist.* 292) would have to be one who treats those around him as friends, thus inspiring attachment and confidence in them; hence, it would mean kind and generous toward others. The term seems not to



be used except with regard to important and influential persons, for example, Pascentius, who is addressed by the priest Theon as *philagathe Paskentie* (*P.Oxy.* 2193, 5; 2194, 5), and the emperor Marcus Aurelius. The *Letter of Aristee* makes it a royal quality: the king who is *philagathos*, in his love of the good, is anxious to attach himself to men of culture and of a superior spirit” (*Ep. Arist.* 124); the sovereign (*hēgoumenos*), “enemy of evil and friend of the good, attaches importance to saving a human life” (292). Philo, setting out to determine what a lawgiver (*nomothetēs*) should be, says, “He should possess all the virtues to perfection and completely” (*Moses* 2.8); but some virtues are better suited than others to particular activities. For the legislative faculty, there are four especially appropriate virtues: “love of humanity, love of justice, love of good, and hatred of vice” (*to philanthrōpon, to philodikaion, to philagathon, to misoponēron*, 2.9). Philo further defines *philagathos*: “the love of the good requires accepting things that are good by nature and procuring them without charge for those who deserve them so that they may use them freely” (*ibid.*). That being *philagathos* means having a taste for the good and the fine – that is, that it is a moral disposition, a virtue – is confirmed by its attribution to the well-intentioned husband who keeps his wife wise and honest.

*Philagathos* belongs first and foremost to the vocabulary of the inscriptions. It is used constantly to describe honest folk: “he conducted himself well and with a love for the good” (*anestraphē kalōs kai philagathōs*); sometimes “pious” is added. In their official praises, a *thiasos*, a *synagōgos*, and a *synodos* mention a member’s propriety, his probity in the exercise of his office, his good relations, and also his respect for the gods in liturgical ceremonies (*aretēs heneka kai philagathias tēs eis tēn patrída*); above all, effectively demonstrated beneficence is mentioned (*eis heautous*, *SB* 1106, 5). After stating that Athenopolis is a noble and good man (*anēr kalos kai agathos*), since he has shown himself to be a lover of the good (*philagathon heauton parechomenos*, line 10), *I.Priene* 107, 16 praises him for his generosity (*philagathia*) as a benefactor of the people (second century BC). Moreover, the *philagathos* is assisted in his devotion by a *paraphilagathos*.

The word’s value is prodigiously enhanced by the fact that it is one of the twenty-one descriptions of the divine Wisdom: “there is in it a spirit ... that loves the good” (*esti en autē pneuma ... philagathon*, *Wis* 7:22; *Alexandrinus* omits *en* and reads “it is a spirit ... that is *philagathos*”); wisdom, which is most holy, loves to share its riches and is always ready to pass them along. It is in this same sense that *philagathos* is listed among the seven positive qualities required of candidates to the episcopate: as an overseer over the household of God, the *episkopos* must have a love for guests in his heart; but as *philagathos*, according to the foregoing references, we must understand that he is profoundly

good, loving to act well and to do what is good; this is not a mere inclination, like *eunoia*, but an effective and generous devotion: the Christian *philagathos* works to realize the good and takes pleasure in it.

φιλανθρωπία, φιλανθρώπως

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*philanthrōpia*, **kindness toward people, generosity**; *philanthrōpōs*, **kindly**

→see also ἐπιείκεια, ἐπιεικής

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***philanthropia***, S 5363; TDNT 9.107–112; EDNT 3.424–425; NIDNTT 2.547, 549, 551; MM 668–669; L&N 25.36, 88.71; BAGD 858 | ***philanthropos***, S 5364; TDNT 9.107–112; EDNT 3.424–425; NIDNTT 2.550; MM 669; L&N 88.72; BAGD 858; ND 1.87, 88

Philanthropy – “that noble virtue” (Philo, *Spec. Laws* 1.221) – is a key word in the Hellenistic period, in literature as well as in the papyri and the inscriptions. The Stoics defined it as “a kindly disposition in human interaction.” In this sense of the word, “Wisdom is a kindly spirit” (Wis 1:6; 7:23) and “the just person must be kind” (12:19), emphasizing niceness, affability, cordiality. Such a person was the centurion Julius, who “treated Paul humanely at Sidon, allowing him to visit the Christians and receive their attentions” (Acts 27:3; cf. Plutarch, *Them.* 31.7; *Aem.* 37.2: granting the prisoner Perseus more humane treatment). So also were the barbarians on Malta, who showed the shipwreck victims “uncommon kindness” (Acts 28:2), and the Alexandrians, who were to be mild and friendly toward the Jews.

This goodness is expressed especially as solicitude, in a willingness to serve, and in effective liberalities; it is a form of generosity. In the Hellenistic period, it is the virtue of benefactors, especially divinities whose protection and providence have been shown toward people or toward a certain city. This is not only the belief of Musonius (frag. 17, ed. Lutz, p. 108, line 14), but of the lowly peasants of the Fayum in AD 6–7: “the philanthropic god knows” (*oiden ho philanthropos theos*, SB 9286, 1); “and I heard, because the philanthropic god took care” (*kai ēkousa, hoti ho philanthrōpos theos epeskepsato*). It is above all the conviction of Philo, who sees in the divine attributes of *epieikeia* and *philanthrōpia* a manifestation of God’s mercy (*Moses* 1.198) and who – having drafted a *Peri philanthrōpias* (*Virtues* 51–186) – worked out a theology of the philanthropy of the true God, who loves humankind (*Virtues* 77, 188; Philo, *Abraham* 79; 137, 203), is giving (*Creation* 81), shows remarkable solicitude (*Spec. Laws* 3.36; 1.120; Josephus, *Ant.* 1.24). Philo compares the kind of reception reserved for kings: “For the king of kings, for God who is Lord of all

things, who through his mildness and philanthropy has deigned to visit his creation, who descends from highest heaven to the ends of the earth for the good of our race – what sort of dwelling should be provided for him? ... A soul in conformity with his will” (*Cherub.* 99). Better yet, God is like a father, providing for the welfare of his family and patient toward the rebellious (Prov 2:6). This is the context in which Titus 3:4 occurs: “when the goodness (*chrēstotēs*) and *philanthrōpia* of God our Savior appeared.” This linking of goodness-benignity and philanthropy is constant. *Philanthrōpia* is used to extend divine mercy to all of humanity, but it implies a gracious and broad generosity that gives and forgives better than do *kyrioi* here below.

Given that Hellenistic sovereigns were seen as the image and representation of God on earth, they were all supposed to possess the *philanthrōpia* of the *euergetēs*, a kindly beneficence that is quick to show clemency, that showers benefits (referred to as *philanthrōpa*) upon subjects, and that finally establishes harmony and peace (cf. the letter of Claudius to the Alexandrians: *meta praotētos kai philanthrōpeias*, *P.Lond.* 1912, 102). On the one hand, the king sees to it that he is “philanthropic” toward his subjects (*Ep. Arist.* 208); on the other, he wants to gain in return some loyalty from them: “the philanthropy and affection of the governed” (*tōn hypotetagmenōn philanthrōpia kai agapēsis*, *ibid.* 265). After the fashion of Ptolemy, he bears witness concerning himself that he has “given his best efforts to being humane” (*tais te heautou dynamesin pephilanthrōpēke pasais*, Rosetta Stone; *Dittenberger, Or.* 90, 12; cf. *SB* 10648, 11; *SEG* XXV, 445, 2, 4, 34). Furthermore, petitions to the king, the prefect, and the *stratēgos* address specifically their philanthropy in order to persuade them to intervene favorably and allow the petitioner to “share in the common privilege” (*pros to kame dynasthai tēs koinēs philanthrōpias metaschein*, *P.Oxy.* 2919, 10; 2918, 16). Precedents are cited: “Since you have always acted with extreme benevolence, now do so again ...” (*P.Sorb.* 53, 6); the hoped-for benefits are celebrated: “thus shall we benefit from your benevolence”; and thanks are given for this philanthropy.

## φιλαργυρία, φιλάργυρος

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*philargyria*, **love of money**; *philargyros*, **loving money**

→see also αἰσχροκερδής, ἀφιλάργυρος; ἀφιλάργυρος

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*philarguria*, S 5365; *EDNT* 3.425; *NIDNTT* 1.138, 2.550; MM 669; L&N 25.107; BAGD 859 | *philarguros*, S 5366; *EDNT* 3.425; *NIDNTT* 2.550; MM 669; L&N 25.108; BAGD 859

The substantive, unknown in the LXX and the papyri, occurs in the NT only in 1 Tim 6:10 – “For *philargyria* is a root of all evils” (*rhiza gar pantōn tōn kakōn estin hē philargyria*). This saying can be traced back to Plato and is a commonplace in *diatribē*. Stobaeus attributes to Democritus the saying, “Wealth arising from evil dealings purchases notorious shame” (*ploutos apo kakēs ergasiēs periginomenos epiphanesteron to oneidos kektētai*) and of Bion he says, “He said that the love of money is the metropolis of all evil” (*tēn philargyrian mētopolin elege pasēs kakias einai*, *Ecl.* 10.36–37; vol. 3, p. 417). Apollodorus of Gela: “It is the head of all evils, for they are all present in the love of money” (*to kephalaion tōn kakōn, en philargyria gar pant’ eni*, *ibid.* 16.12; p. 482); *T. Jud.* 19.1 – “*Philargyria* leads to idolatry”; *Sib. Or.* 2.115: “Gold, prince of evils, life-destroying, crushing all things” (*chryse, kakōn archēge, biophthore, panta chaleptōn*); 3.235: “Those who care only for justice and virtue know nothing of cupidity (*philochrēmosynē*), which for mortals gives rise to myriads of evils, perpetual famine and war.” In a listing of evils (*ponēra*), *Tabula of Cebes* 19.5 includes “pain, wailing, arrogance, love of money (*philargyrian*), incontinence, and all other wickedness”; likewise Epictetus 2.16.45; cf. 2.9.12 and Plutarch: “The desire to acquire wealth causes all the wars.”

As for the lovers of money (*philargyroi*) in the last days, they are victims of an innate passion (4 Macc 2:8), like the Pharisees (Luke 16:14), and above all the sophists, “word-merchants” (*logopōloi*, Philo, *Prelim. Stud.* 53, 127; *Post. Cain* 116), and the philosophers who hawk wisdom in a dishonorable way (*Giants* 37, 39).

φίλοι

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*philoi*, **friends, confidants, dear ones**

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***philoi***, S 5384; *TDNT* 9.146–171; *EDNT* 3.427–428; *NIDNTT* 2.547–551; *MM* 671; *L&N* 34.11; *BDF* §§190(1), 227(2); *BAGD* 861

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When the Lord calls his apostles “friends,” he bases this choice of words on the fact that “I have made known to you all that I heard from my Father.” We can refer to the *disciplina arcani*, so important in the rabbis and at Qumran, but we should also recall a specific meaning of *philos*, namely, “confidant, one to whom a secret is entrusted,” not only because “all things are common to friends,” and not only because the master-disciple relationship is assimilated to a friendship relationship, but because people entrust their most intimate and precious secrets only to those whom they love and in whom they have

confidence. Cf. Philo, *Dreams* 1.191: “The word of God addresses some as a king authoritatively telling them what to do.... For others, it is a friend who with persuasive gentleness reveals numerous secrets that no profane ear may hear.” It is in this sense that “the prophet is called the friend of God” (*Moses* 1.156), especially Moses, to whom God spoke with the confidence and intimacy that people use with friends (*hōs pros ton heautou philon*, Exod 33:11). “The wise are friends of God, especially the most holy lawgiver. For freedom in speech is akin to friendship: with whom does a person speak freely, if not with a friend? Thus it is altogether fitting that Moses should be celebrated in the Scriptures as the friend; thus all that he risks saying in his boldness can be chalked up to friendship.”

St. Paul bids Titus, “Greet those who love us in the faith” (*aspasai tous philountas hēmas en pistei*, Titus 3:15; cf. *P.Yale* 80, 11; 83, 24; *P.Mich.* 477, 3), and St. John says to the elder Gaius, “The friends greet you. Greet the friends by name” (*aspazontai se hoi philoi, aspazou tous philous kat’ onoma*, 3 John 15).

Both expressions recur often in the epistolary papyri: *aspazou tous philountas hymas* (*P.Lund* 3, 17; cf. *P.Ryl.* 235, 5); *aspasai tous philountas se pantas* (*P.Oxy.* 1676, 38–39; cf. *BGU* 332, 7); *aspazou tous philountes pantes pros alētheian*. Greetings are sent to a father, mother, sister, all those in the household, and friends: *aspazome Ammōnan ton patera mou kai tēn mēteran mou ka tēn adelphēn kai tous en oikō pantas kai tous philous* (*P.Mert.* 28, 17); “Greet my mother, my sisters, the children, and all who love me” (*tēn mēteran, tas adelphas, ta paideia, pantas tous philountas me aspazou*, *Pap.Lugd. Bat.* XVII, 16 b 19; cf. *P.Oxy.* 2594, 15). These “friends” could be friends in the strict sense or it could mean mere acquaintances: “Greet Theon and Zoilus and Harpokras and Dionysus and all of our people.” Similarly the “friend and benefactor” of a city (*TAM* III, 139), or “friend and ally” (1 Macc 10:16; 12:14; 15:17, and the inscriptions – *I.Magn.* 38, 52; *SEG* XIX, 468, 32; XXIII, 547, 2, etc.); even the passerby (addressed by an epitaph, *TAM* III, 548).

So it is often necessary, and a sign of profound affection, to greet each one “by name”: “I greet my very sweet daughter Makkaria ... and all of our people by name” (*aspazomai tēn glykytatēn mou thygatera Makkarian ... kai holous tous hēmōn kat’ onoma*, *P.Oxy.* 123, 21–23; cf. 930, 22–26); “Greet all of your people warmly by name”; “Greet all those who love us by name” (*aspazou pantas tous philountas hēmas kat’ onoma*, *P.Athen.* 62, 30, first-second century; cf. *P.Oslo* 151, 20; *P.Warr.* 18, 30); “Greet Tasokmenis my esteemed sister and Samba and Soueris and her children and Sambous and all the relatives and friends by name” (*aspazou Tasokmēnin tēn kyrian mou adelphēn kai Samban kai Souērīn kai ta tekna autēs kai Samboun kai pantes tous syngeneis kai*

*philous kat' onoma*, *P.Mich.* 203, 34); “I greet my daughter warmly and your mother and those who love us by name.” These parallels to 3 John 15 are quite numerous, but the best of them all is this, from a second-century ostrakon: Annius, writing to his “very sweet friend” (*glykytatō*), concludes, “The friends greet you. Greet ... the guardian and Niger ... and all by name.”

In the epitaphs, the adjective *philos* is used especially with father, mother, child, parents; in the papyri, it is especially the superlative *philtatos* that is used, notably in greetings. In AD 1: “Dionysius to Theon, *tō philtatō pleista chairein*” (*P.Oslo* 47, 1; cf. 49, 1; 56, 1; 82, 6; 85, 8); in 58, the same expression, from Chairas to Dionysius (*P.Mert.* 12, 1; cf. 23, 1; *P.Mich.* 210, 2; 503, 1); in 68, Heracleides greets his very dear Satabous. Christians take up the apostolic formulas and can be very expressive of their affection: “It is the same toward you, dearest one, for as in a mirror you see my engrafted affection and love for you, which is always fresh” (*to auto de estin kai pros se, ō philtate, kai gar hōs di esoptrou katides tēn pros se mou emphyton storgēn kai agapēn tēn aei nean*, *P.Oxy.* 2603, 17).

## Φιλόλογος

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*Philologos*, **Philologus**

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***Philologos***, S 5378; *EDNT* 3.427; *NIDNTT* 2.550; MM 670; L&N 93.380; BAGD 860

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As a common noun, this word does not occur in the Bible. It can have a positive or a pejorative sense: “one who loves to talk, a babbler” or “one who loves literature, a scholar” (Epictetus 2.4.1; 3.10.10; 4.22.107; *TAM* 2.919: *ton agathon philologon*). It is applied especially to the Athenians. It is used in official praise (*MAMA* VIII, 263), for example, for physicians (*TAM* II, 147, 5; *CIL* III, 614; cf. V. Nutton, “Menecrates of Sosandra, Doctor or Vet?” in *ZPE*, vol. 22, 1976, p. 96), and epitaphs and letters apply it to students, even to a young girl: *Tetria, philologe, chaire* (*SEG*, XXII, 335, 1–2).

The proper name *Philologus*, mentioned in Rom 16:15, is fairly common at Rome in the *familia* of Caesar’s household (*CIL* VI, 4116), in Egypt, and in Asia Minor. It seems to be particularly common for slaves and freed slaves; as in this inscription: “*Philologus*, chief huntsman, for faithfulness and hard work.” The absence of a patronymic, the tasks that are entrusted to him, and the qualities that he has demonstrated indicate an inferior social standing.

φιλοξενία, φιλόξενο

*philoxenia*, **hospitality**; *philoxenos*, **hospitable**

→see also ξενία, ξενίζω, ξενοδοχέω, ξένος

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*philoxenia*, S 5381; TDNT 5.1–36; EDNT 3.427; NIDNTT 1.686, 690, 2.547, 550; MM 671; L&N 34.57; BAGD 860 | *philoxenos*, S 5382; TDNT 5.1–36; EDNT 3.427; NIDNTT 1.686, 690, 2.550; MM 671; L&N 34.58; BAGD 860

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Christ mentioned hospitality as a distinguishing characteristic of his true disciples, and in the primitive church it was the most obvious and most common work of love, shown either to journeying brethren (cf. Jas 4:13) or especially to preachers of the gospel.

Among the works of brotherly love, Rom 12:13 commends eagerness to welcome traveling Christians: “pursuing hospitality” (*tēn philoxenian diōkontes*). We may compare *b. Šabb.* 104a (“Such is the custom of the merciful [Hebrew *ḥasidîm*] of pursuing the poor”) or Gallias, a citizen of Agrigentum in the fourth century BC, who received numerous *xenōnes* in his house. He was so *philanthrōpos* and *philoxenos* that he posted his slaves at the city gates to welcome strangers when they presented themselves and ask them to his house.

In the Hellenistic period, *philoxenia* is an act of *philanthrōpia*; the stranger, received as a guest, is addressed and treated as a friend (*xenos kai philos*), and the Greeks honor those who practice broad hospitality. At Chersonesus, a benefactor of the city is praised because in time of famine he personally showed hospitality to citizens of the city (*idioxenoi*, B. Latyshev, *Inscriptiones Antiquae*, IV, n. 68, 15). Sotis and Theodosius receive praise “for the good offices toward travelers going from Athens to the Bosphorus” (Dittenberger, *Syl.* 206, 50–51); likewise Aglaos of Cos, “who always honors and gives a noble welcome to those who come to him from our various cities either as envoys or for some other reason ... working to do good to each of those who ask him.” In AD 43, Junia Theodora, a Roman living at Corinth, is honored by a decree by the Lycian confederation and the deme of Telmessos because she “tirelessly showed zeal and generosity toward the Lycian nation and was kind to all travelers, private individuals as well as ambassadors, sent by the nation or the various cities.”

Spanish hospitality was imbued with a religious spirit. Semitic hospitality was particularly generous, as is suggested by *T. Job* 10: “I also had thirty tables put in my house, which were at all times kept ready only for strangers.... And if a stranger asked for alms, he had to take a meal at table before receiving what he needed. I did not allow anyone to leave my home with an empty stomach.”

This hospitality of Job is referred to in *Abot R. Nat.* 7.1–3 (cf. Str-B, vol. 4, 1, pp. 566–567).

In the Christian church, it was the bishop, acting as host on behalf of the local community, who was *philoxenos* and offered a bed and shelter to traveling brothers (1 Tim 3:2; Titus 1:8). But for all Christians, hospitality was to be the first evidence of their *philadelphia*, according to Heb 13:2 – “Do not neglect hospitality (*tēs philoxenias mē epilanthanesthe*), for through hospitality some have without knowing it entertained angels.” The stranger who is welcomed is a messenger of God. This religious motivation refers first of all to Abraham, but also to Lot (Gen 19), Manoah (Judg 13:3–22), and Tobias (Tob 12:1–20).

These examples make an impression, as does the promised reward, which was important, because hospitality was onerous. Everything that the travelers needed had to be supplied, and certain people abused their host’s goodness (*Did.* 11.3–6; *Herm. Man.* 2.5). Consequently, many people tried to keep their doors closed. Hence the added detail in 1 Pet 4:9 – “Practice hospitality to one another without grumbling” (*aneu gongysmou*).

*Philoxenos* is unknown in the papyri, and the noun is attested only in a Christian letter from the fourth century: “I write this letter on this papyrus so that you may read it with joy ... and with a welcoming attitude borne of patience, filled with the Holy Spirit.”

## φίλος τοῦ Καίσαρος

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*philos tou Kaisaros*, **king’s friend**

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*philos tou Kaisaros*, S 5384 + 2541; EDNT 2.235; BAGD 395–396

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The title of honor “king’s friend,” used at the Persian, Egyptian, Lagid, and Seleucid courts, then at Rome, ordinarily refers to high dignitaries who dress in purple, have free access to the king, serve as councillors, and are entrusted with civil and military functions (1 Macc 11:26; 2 Macc 1:14; 10:13; 14:11). The seventeenth book of Diodorus Siculus supplies a great deal of data on the “friends” or “companions” of Alexander and of Darius (cf. F. Carrata Thomes, “Il problema degli eteri nella monarchia di Alessandra Magno,” in *Università di Torino, Pubbl. della Fac. di Lett. e Fil.*, vol. 7, 1955, pp. 14–15, 27ff.). The king assembled his “friends” in council (17.16.1; 16.30.1) and asked for their honest opinions (17.39.2; 17.54.3). Some shared his own opinion (17.45.7); others said the opposite (17.30.4). They gave the king information (17.112.3; 17.115.6) and inquired concerning his intentions (17.117.4). There was a hierarchy among these principal collaborators (17.107.6; 17.117.4), who were



chosen from among the most capable men (17.31.1), esteemed by the king (17.37.5), beloved (17.114.1), and enjoying his confidence (17.32.1). He feasted with them (17.16.4; 17.72.1; 17.73.7; 17.100.1; 17.110.7; 17.117.1) because they went with him when he moved from place to place (17.96.1; 17.97.1; 17.104.1; 17.116.5); and he entrusted delicate assignments to them (17.37.3; 17.52.7; 17.55.1; 17.104.3; 17.112.4). He distributed honors and wealth to them (1.35.2; 17.77.5; cf. Athenaeus 12.539 f). These friends sought the king's good and were ready to stand with him in danger (17.56.2; 17.97.2; 17.117.2), but sometimes they were obsequious (17.115.1; cf. 17.118.1) and jealous of each other (17.101.3), and sometimes they went so far as to plot together against the king (17.79.1; 17.80.1). According to Polybius, King Philip of Macedonia took counsel with his friends (5.2.1; 5.4.13; 5.22.8). He gathered them for deliberations (5.58.2; 5.102.2). They shared the same convictions (5.9.6) and were similarly influenced (5.36.8), but they could be circumvented by intriguers (5.50.9). The friends voted unanimously (5.16.7) and the king's decision followed their opinion (5.63.3). They accompanied the king (5.56.8–9; 5.87.6; 5.101.5), surrounded and assisted him (5.12.5), and shared in his responsibilities (5.16.5), especially the command of his troops (5.21.1; 5.83.1).

Among the “friends of the king” three or four levels of hierarchy can be distinguished: mere friends, honored friends, first friends, and finally the *syngenēs* or “king's kinsman”; but this title was also granted to vassals, and was no more than an honor, a distinction (1 Macc 2:18; 11:57; 15:32; *SEG* VIII, 573; Philo, *Flacc.* 40; *P.Oxy.* 3022, 12), and “first friends” could be on the same level as the chiliarchs and *machairophoroi* of the royal guard.

When the Jews cry out to Pilate, regarding Jesus, “if you release him, you are not a friend of Caesar (*ouk ei philos tou Kaisaros*), for whoever makes himself a king is against Caesar,” there are three possible interpretations: (1) a commonplace appeal to loyalty, a litotes meaning, “You would be an enemy of Caesar not to condemn this royal pretender”; (2) the technical meaning *amicus Augusti*; (3) but Pilate is not a dignitary or important and influential person at the imperial court. The final option is that this distinction is conferred upon him as an equestrian and governor of Judea, but with the fluidity of meaning that marked this official “friendship” in this period.

The thought of incurring the emperor's disfavor won out over Pilate's belief in Jesus' innocence (*ouden heuriskō aition*, Luke 23:4, 14). Losing the emperor's favor would mean the end of his career, or at least a compromised future, the ruin of his ambitions, perhaps the confiscation of his wealth, loss of liberty, perhaps even exile or death. Pilate gave in to the blackmail.

*philostorgos*, S 5387; *EDNT* 3.428; *NIDNTT* 2.538–539, 542, 550; *MM* 671–672; *L&N* 25.41; *BAGD* 861; *ND* 2.101–103, 3.41–42

The first characteristic of “authentic love” (Rom 12:9) is that it fills Christians with tender devotion to each other (verse 10; cf. F. Cumont, *Studia Pontica* III, 20, 14). Thus may we translate *philostorgoi*, which in the Koine often replaces the simple form *storgē*, which expresses familial affection, an attachment sealed by nature and blood ties, uniting spouses, parents and children, brothers and sisters. Because this instinct or feeling is shared by animals and humans, Philo considers it a virtue only to the extent that it remains under the rule of reason; but in common usage, usage *philostorgia* has the more positive sense of the mother’s innate love, benevolence, and devotion toward her children; then that of a husband for his wife or a wife for her husband; of a father for his sons and of sons for a father. But *philostorgia* is also used for all links of kinship, even one’s attachment to guest-friends (*SEG* XVIII, 143, 69), or the attachment of slaves to their master.

Quite often, *philostorgia* is identified with gratitude. Not only do writers of wills leave their property to those who have shown affection for them, but on August 29, 58, Phairas writes to his physician: “I hope that if I cannot return in equal measure the affection you have shown me, I may at least show some token of gratitude.” This extension of *philostorgia* to strangers shows that this sentiment is not limited to mere benevolence but also includes active beneficence, devotion, and generosity; thus Hippolytus appeals to the *dioikētēs* Acusilaus: “I beseech you, in your *philostorgia*, concerning my sons who are with Soterichon ...”

In the language of the inscriptions from the second century BC, *philostorgos* is synonymous with “benefactor.” A decree of Athens confers praise and a gold crown to King Attalus I as the benefactor of the city “with all goodwill and *philostorgia*.” Attalus II honors his brother Eumenes II “for virtue and goodwill and his *philostorgia* toward him” (*aretēs heneken kai eunoias kai philostorgias tēs pros heauton*, *I.Ilium*, n. 41). Attalus III writes “so that you may know how much *philostorgia* we have for him.” The merchants of Laodicea erect a statue in honor of Heliodorus “because of his goodwill and *philostorgia* toward the king and good deeds toward themselves” (*eunoias heneken kai philostorgias tēs eis ton basilea kai euergesias tēs eis hautous*, *Dittenberger*, *Or.* 247, 6). The city of Gythion honors the public physician Damiadas “who has in everything abundantly demonstrated his goodwill and *philostorgia* toward our city.” The

word is also used for devotion to country and with a religious meaning as an epithet for the savior goddess Isis of Carene; but with the abuse of the expression, especially in the honorific inscriptions, it came to be purely a polite term and an expression of official “sympathy” (2 Macc 9:21; cf. *Dittenberger, Or.* 257, 4; *TAM* II, 283, 360, 443, 484, 662, 716, etc.) or of some undifferentiated form of attachment.

φλυαρέω, φλύαρος

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*phlyareō*, **to babble**; *phlyaros*, **babbler**

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***phluareo***, S 5396; *EDNT* 3.429; MM 673; L&N 33.374; BAGD 862 | ***phluaros***, S 5397; *EDNT* 3.429; L&N 33.375; BAGD 862

A *phlyaros* is a babbler who talks at random; *phlyareō* means “spout nonsense.” Thus St. Paul is making a humorous attack on the sin of speech committed by certain idle women who make endless visits “just to chat” and make empty talk (1 Tim 5:13). *Phlyaros* can mean childish babbling, speech that makes no sense (*P.Cair.Zen.* 59300, 7; *PSI* 434, 7, 9), foolishness, silliness.

These terms seem to have been used in polemic to denounce the inane of an argument or an accusation, and it is in this highly pejorative sense that Diotrephes “is spreading silly and malicious talk about us.”

φροντίζω

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*phrontizō*, **to think or meditate about, worry about, attend to, take care of**

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***phrontizo***, S 5431; *EDNT* 3.440; MM 676; L&N 30.20; BDF §155(7); BAGD 866–867

Those who have placed their trust in God must apply themselves to excelling in good works (*hina phrontizōsin kalōn ergōn proïstasthai*). It is difficult to translate this present subjunctive. The verb *phrontizō*, which in the Koine sometimes takes an accusative complement, takes in both the intention and the execution. It means first of all to think on something, to meditate on it, dream about it (*PSI* 1265, 3: *phrontizontes kai pronoian poioumenoi*), with connotations of concern and even of fear or anxiety; then “worry about, attend to, take care of,” notably with regard to public affairs. The word is used for taking things to heart (*Ep. Arist.* 124) and actively looking after them (*Sir* 35:1;

41:12) out of an awareness of one's responsibility to carry through; this is clearly the sense in Titus 3:8.

This is why this verb is used so often in the papyri in official and private letters, especially the aorist imperative *phrontison*. In AD 68, the prefect Tiberius Julius Alexander tells those under his jurisdiction, "I have sought means to help you"; the publication of the edict vouches for the governor's concern for those under his jurisdiction. The private individuals among them are as urgent as the high officials: "Do not fail to see to it." Quick action is required: *phrontison eutheōs* (*P.Ryl.* 78, 26). The recipient's attention is required (*P.Mert.* 63, 14; in AD 5), he is urged to show solicitude and diligence or be reproached for negligence ("I am amazed that you did not take care ..." – *thaumazō pōs ouk ephrontisas tēs mēchanēs tēs Talei*, *P.Mil.Vogl.* 256, 3). It is often a matter of supplying what is lacking, finishing what remains to be done, hence seeing that something is completely carried out. No trouble is spared (*ephrontisa ou metriōs*, *SB* 4323, 2), especially when "the law of nature teaches us to take care" of a good father (*P.Ryl.* 624, 16), to watch over one's children's health (*P.Rein.* 109, 3; *PSI* 973, 4, 11), to be of service to family and friends (*PSI* 1246, 1–3; *SB* 9106, 5; 9395, 12: "take care ... as dear brothers," *phrontisatai ... hōs adelphoi gnēsioi*), and to fulfill religious obligations: "taking care that all that was customarily done for the gods should be carried out properly" (Rosetta Stone, *SB* 8299, 18); "taking much more care than his predecessors with respect to the sacred animals" (*ibid.*, line 31); and in AD 98: "He took care of the temple and the well and the rest of the works" (*ephrontise tou hierou kai tou phrētos kai tōn loipōn ergōn*, *SB* 8331, 21). It is in this context that the exhortation to effective mutual concern in Titus 3:8 occurs.

φῶς, φωστήρ, φωσφόρος, φωτεινός, φωτίζω, φωτισμός

*phōs*, **light**; *phōstēr*, **light-giver, luminary**; *phōsphoros*, **morning star, dawn**; *phōteinos*, **luminous**; *phōtizō*, **to shine, give light, illuminate, enlighten, baptize**; *phōtismos*, **lighting, illumination, baptism**

→see also φωσφόρος

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*phos*, S 5457; *TDNT* 9.310–358; *EDNT* 3.447–448; *NIDNTT* 2.490, 493, 496; MM 680; L&N 2.5, 6.102, 11.14, 14.36, 28.64; BDF §126(1b); BAGD 871–872 | *phoster*, S 5458; *TDNT* 9.310–358; *EDNT* 3.448–449; *NIDNTT* 2.490, 493; MM 680; L&N 1.27, 14.49; BAGD 872 | *phosphoros*, S 5459; *TDNT* 9.310–358; *EDNT* 3.449; *NIDNTT* 2.490, 493, 495; MM 680; L&N 1.32; BAGD 872 | *photeinos*, S 5460; *TDNT* 9.310–358; *EDNT* 3.449; *NIDNTT* 2.490, 493; MM 680; L&N 14.50, 14.51; BAGD 872 | *photizo*, S 5461; *TDNT*

9.310–358; *EDNT* 3.449–450; *NIDNTT* 2.490, 493–495; MM 680–681; L&N 14.39, 28.36; BDF §74(1); BAGD 872–873 | *photismos*, S 5462; *TDNT* 9.310–358; *EDNT* 3.450; *NIDNTT* 2.490, 493; MM 681; L&N 28.36, 72.3; BAGD 873; ND 1.98–99

The first attestations of “light” (*phaos*, which contracts to *phōs*) – and this remains constant – place it in relation with its source, the sun: “When the brilliant light (*lampron phaos*) of the sun had set” (Homer, *Il.* 1.605); “the sun, whose light is the most penetrating to see” (*oxytaton phaos*); “Hail, fatherland; hail, light of the sun” (Aeschylus, *Ag.* 508); “the night will always hide the light of the sun under its cloak of stars” (Aeschylus, *PV* 23). Associated with the sun are the heavenly bodies that are luminous: “the light of the heavenly bodies enables us to see as clearly as possible and provides that visible objects are seen.” The light of the moon is always a disputed topic. According to Plato, the heir of Thales, “the moon receives its light from the sun.” For Epicurus, “it can be supposed that the moon derives its light from itself, but it can also be supposed that it gets it from the sun” (Epicurus, *Epist.* 2.94). Cleomedes (2.101, 104) thinks that the two causes may operate simultaneously. In any event, “no object is visible without light, but every color that is in each object is visible in the light.”

*Phaos* is used especially for daylight. To express a being’s entry into life, the Greeks say that he has been brought to day, that he appears in the light. “To see the light” (*horan phaos*) is synonymous with “to live”; “to leave the light” (*leipein phaos*) is to die: “I will not much longer see the brilliant light of the sun”; “Never will you be able to harm either me or anyone who sees the light” (Sophocles, *OT* 374; cf. 1229); “Ajax no longer sees the light” = he is dead (*Phil.* 415); the wife of Admetus “consented to die for him and to see the light no longer.”

Of course, light can have earthly sources: people, lamps, torches, especially fire. We must emphasize – because knowing this is indispensable for the understanding of Matt 6:23; Luke 11:34–35 – that beginning with Euclid, treatises on optical geometry do not represent vision as involving the reflection of light from the things we see onto our retinas but rather attribute an active role to the eye. Vision is a movement of the eye toward things; the eye emits rays that are propagated along a straight line, a sort of invisible fire. This is why Homer could call the eyes “beautiful lights” (*phaea kala*, *Od.* 16.15; cf. *Il.* 16.645), Plato could state that “the eye is the most sunlike of all the sense organs” (*Resp.* 6.508 *b*), and Empedocles could compare the eyes to lanterns with linen linings (frag. 84, 3; Diels 7). To speak of disturbed vision, Philostratus writes of “the light in the eyes” (*to en ophthalmois phōs*, *Gym.* 14),

and for the blinding of the Cyclops, Euripides writes, “Say who must be first to take the fiery stake and burn out the light of the Cyclops.”

We might say that, for a Greek, light is the most excellent of all realities; the attributes given it are suggestive: holy (*phaos hieron*, Hesiod, *Op.* 339; *P. Warr.* 21, 30 and 34; *Pap. Graec. Mag.* I, 4, 978), pure (*hagnon*, Sophocles, *El.* 86; *katharon*, Pindar, *Pyth.* 9.90; Aratus, *Phaen.* 1013), sweet, joyous, most beloved (*philtaton*; Sophocles, *El.* 1224, 1354; *BGU* 597), heavenly or divine. Its benefits are evoked by figurative meanings. Light is a symbol of strength, protection, happiness, glory, salvation in the common sense of that term: Ajax bests a Trojan battalion and “made salvation shine on his friends” (*phōs ethēken*, *Il.* 6.6); “continue to strike so, and you shall become a light (of salvation) for the Danaans and for your father.” The victors’ procession at the Olympic games is “the most enduring light of honor that the exploits of the mighty receive” (Pindar, *Ol.* 4.10); “victory, light of life and reward for exploits” (10.23); “the light of glory has shined for you.”

Given that light shines and makes perceptible what was unknown or indiscernible in the darkness, it is understood metaphorically for knowledge. “He must explain in plain light what he means” (Sophocles, *Phil.* 581); “to bring to light” (Plato, *Phdr.* 261 e; *Leg.* 4.724 a; 7.788 c; *phōs* opposed to *skotos*). Aristotle: “What sight is to the body, mind is to the soul” (*hōs gar en sōmati opsīs, en psychē nous*, *Eth. Nic.* 1.4.1096.). Knowledge is an illumination of the mind, a progression from darkness to light (Plutarch, *De audiendo* 17; *Cons. ux.* 8); hence the introduction of *phōs* into the philosophical vocabulary.

But since in Homer light characterizes the world of the gods, *phōs* comes to mean a divine manifestation and to take a dominant place in worship. Thus the sun is adored, notably at dawn; Isis, for example, is associated with the rising sun, which spreads light. Because light chases demons away, it plays a role in the cult of the dead and also in the mysteries, like those of Eleusis, because healing is attributed to a flood of light, a divine epiphany. Here again, *phōs* and *zōē* (life) are inseparable.

In the OT, *phōs* (Hebrew *’ôr*) is used with the same subjects and meanings, but this is no longer poetry. Light becomes a fundamental religious reality; by virtue of its symbolism, it will direct human moral life; with the prophets and psalmists, it plays a dominant role in the religion of Israel. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the first page of revelation, which opens with the creation of light: “There was darkness upon the face of the Abyss.... Elohim said, ‘Let there be light,’ and there was light. Elohim saw that the light was good, and Elohim separated the light from the darkness. Elohim called the light day and he called the darkness night.” Thus, from the beginning, the true

God presents himself as *creator of the light* that dominates (Hebrew *memšelet*) and pierces the darkness (2 Cor 4:6), so that one speaks not only of the “light of heaven” but of the “light of God.” With the plagues of Egypt, we know that God retains his mastery and disposes light and darkness as he sees fit.

Furthermore, the light belongs to God: “light dwells with him” (Dan 2:22), and the expression “the light of his face” occurs (Ps 4:6; 89:15), probably to express his helpful kindness. But if God is “clothed with honor and majesty, cloaked with light as with a garment” (Ps 104:2; Hab 3:4), his transcendence and holiness are in view; light evokes the impalpable and the spiritual. This is suggested by the immaterial wisdom that is “a reflection of the eternal light (*phōtos aīdiou*), spotless mirror of God’s activity” (Wis 7:26ff.). God who is light is still asked to send and give his light. It is through light that humans and God communicate and are united; they become like him to the extent that they are luminous. Jesus will use the expression “son of light” (Luke 16:8; John 12:36; cf. 4:23–24).

In addition, Isaiah multiplies promises of light, exhorts Israel to “walk in the light of Yahweh” (2:5; cf. Bar 4:2), and prophesies that the Messiah will be the light that will save the world: “I have destined you to be the covenant of the people, to be the light of the nations, to open the blind eyes....” In the view of the faithful person, security is walking to God’s light, that is, in conformity with his will: “Your word is a lamp to my feet, a light upon my path” (Ps 119:105); “the light of the Lord is the path that the wise person follows.” So this light is a religious and moral knowledge (Hos 10:12 – *phōs gnōseōs*; Hebrew *nîr*). “Wisdom makes instruction shine forth like light” (Sir 24:27). These meanings are expressed also by the relatively rare verb *phōtizō*, which is sometimes transitive, indicating that a source of light illuminates an object, sometimes intransitive, “to shine,” that is, to emit light. Thus, in the LXX, “a person’s wisdom makes his face shine”; but in Judg 13:8, 23, this verb means to illuminate intellectually, to instruct, that is, to make to known the truth, to bring to light what is hidden. It is repeated that “God lightens our eyes” (2 Esdr 9:8; Ps 13:3; 19:9; Sir 34:17; Bar 1:12); “the Lord is a light to me” (Mic 7:8); “you light my lamp, O Yahweh; my God illumines my darkness” (Ps 18:28); “the unfolding of your words gives light, giving understanding to the simple.”

Philo, fed on Scripture, is a lover of the light. He is the one who created the definition, “God is light” (*ho theos phōs esti*). He understands the creation of light – on “day one” (Gen 1:3–5), before the sun – to mean incorporeal and intelligible light, the model of all the luminous stars, surpassing visible light in luminosity and brilliance (*Creation* 29–31). Since God is the spiritual sun who lightens the soul (*Virtues* 164), the Therapeutai ask at daybreak “that the heavenly light fill their souls” (*Contemp. Life* 27). No one insisted more than

Philo on this “incorporeal light” (*Conf. Tongues* 61; *Dreams* 1.113), “sacred light” (*Spec. Laws* 1.288), “divine light” (*Migr. Abr.* 39; *Heir* 264; *Dreams* 2.74), designated also as “light of the soul” (*Alleg. Interp.* 3.167; *Worse Attacks Better* 117) or “light of thought” (*Unchang. God* 3), “light of the spirit” (*Spec. Laws* 1.288), which is nothing other than “the light of truth” (*Unchang. God* 96; *Alleg. Interp.* 3.45; *Decalogue* 138; *Joseph* 68: *phōs hē alētheia*) or wisdom. As much as ignorance destroys the faculties of seeing and hearing, keeping the light from penetrating it to show it what is (*Drunkenness* 157), so much does “the heavy reason of the divine lights” (*ton metarsion kai enkymona theiōn phōtōn logon*, *Alleg. Interp.* 3.104; *Abraham* 119) send its own light and perceive everything (*Post. Cain* 57; *Worse Attacks Better* 128). St. Paul specifies, “the spiritual person judges all things.”

In the Gospels, the word “light,” used almost always in a religious sense, cannot be understood except in terms of the OT; but it is applied to Christ and his disciples in such a way that Christianity may be defined as a religion of the light. In the first place, Jesus realizes the promises of light. When Simeon identifies Jesus with the “light to lighten the nations” (*phōs eis apokalypsin ethnōn*, Luke 2:32), he is referring to Isa 49:6; it is his understanding that the son of Mary brings truth, goodness, happiness. Since he comes as illuminator, he will publish, manifest, make known God and God’s will. This publishing and this brightness were perceived by the Galileans: “The people who were sitting in darkness have seen a great light (*phōs mega*), and upon those who were sitting in the region of the shadow of death a light has arisen” (Matt 4:16) – a quotation of the messianic prophecy of Isa 9:1, which identifies the light with the person of Jesus: *phōs aneteilen autois*. Still more decisive is the transfiguration, when the face of Jesus shone like the sun and his garments “became white (resplendent, brilliant) like the light” (*leuka hōs to phōs*, Matt 17:2). It is the divinity of Jesus, his glory, that reflects on his body and attests his divine sonship (2 Pet 1:17).

St. John is even more insistent, especially in the prologue to his Gospel, and will have it understood that *phōs* applied to Christ is to be taken in its literal sense, not with a metaphorical meaning: “the life was the light of men” (John 1:4). Ps 35:10 and Bar 3:14 had already linked life and light. In effect, with regard to spiritual beings, life is light. This has to do with the pre-incarnate Logos, but at a stage later than the creation, since there are human beings. Divine help is indispensable for knowledge. John 1:5 specifies, “The light (of the Logos) shone in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it.” Shining in obscurity, the light illuminates the path and guides humans, who may advance; but the darkness did not “seize” it, did not appropriate it and did not understand it intellectually. There is an allusion to the creation of the light,



which dissipated the darkness of the primeval chaos, but this illumination is continuously renewed in the spiritual world. This can mean – but does not necessarily mean – the illumination by the gospel (the verb *phainei* is a durative present, cf. 1 John 2:8). In opposition is evoked the historic attitude of humans when the light of Christ shone among the Jews: darkness, an abstract term, almost synonymous with hostility (John 12:35, 46), as pejorative as at Qumran, posing a radical antithesis to the divine world. John 1:9 resumes more clearly: “The true light, which lightens every human being, was coming into the world.” The present participle *erchomenon*, predicate to the verb *ēn*, is determinative with regard to time: the incarnate Logos was arriving, coming, advancing, on his way. This is an absolute and perfect spiritual light (as opposed to sensible light), intended for every human (Isa 42:6), and thus destined to light the whole universe. To put it clearly, this is the Revealer of God par excellence, as the conclusion of the prologue (John 1:18) expressly says. These are not gratuitous words of the evangelist, but the *ipsissima verba* of the Lord. No human being could have claimed such a prerogative.

To be light is to illuminate, to radiate, and there are degrees of illumination. There are lights that are lighted before they in turn begin to give light. This is the case with Jesus’ disciples: “You are the light of the world (for the world, *hymeis este to phōs tou kosmou*). Let your light so shine before men that they may see your good works and glorify the Father who is in heaven.” As lamps, the disciples, following their master, must shed light, that is, they must reveal God to people; this is what they will do as disciples by manifesting through their lives and their works the will of God, to whom they subject themselves, thus glorifying God.

All human attitudes toward Jesus are defined as an encounter between two lights. Christ and his revelation are like a brilliant sun that illuminates, but the eye of the soul – which emits rays (cf. above) – must be in good condition to receive the light. So the whole problem is to guarantee the quality of the organ of sight, to have good eyes for discerning God in Jesus: “The light of your body is the eye. When your eye is simple, your whole body is lighted; but if it is bad, your body also is dark. See then that the light that is in you (*to phōs to en soi*) is not darkness. If then your whole body is lighted ... how much will it be wholly lighted when the lamp, by its brightness, illuminates you.” The precondition for receiving the divine light is thus a heart that is well disposed, purified, and rightly oriented; it is ready to meet what it is looking for and with which it will couple. Is knowledge not an assimilation of something new from outside?

In addition, in his last appeal to the chosen people, the Lord exhorts them to flee their darkness: “The Light is with you a little longer. Walk while you have the light, lest the darkness overtake you; for the one who walks in darkness

does not know where he is going. While you have the light, believe in the light, so as to be sons of light (*huiōi phōtos*).” The process of judgment for each one is this: “The light came into the world, and people preferred darkness to the light, because their works were evil. For whoever does evil hates the light and does not come to the light, lest his works be known for what they are. But the one who does the truth comes to the light, so that his works are manifested as done in God” (John 3:19–21). The root of clear unbelief in Jesus is a refusal of his light, a preference for darkness, by virtue of a moral inclination (wealth, luxury, ambition, vainglory). After the fashion of criminals, who choose the night for carrying out their misdeeds so as to remain unknown, those who do evil dread the light, which will unveil their guilt and condemn them. They deliberately choose darkness. On the other hand, the one who practices the truth, that is, who remains faithful (Gen 47:29; Neh 9:33; Isa 26:10) and does what is good, comes to the light that he loves, hence to Christ, who is light: “whoever proceeds from the truth hears my voice” (John 18:37). Thus the love of moral good predisposes one to faith, especially since good works cannot be accomplished without God’s help (Isa 26:12; Phil 2:13). We may conclude: salvation is realized through faithfulness to the light; perdition results from the refusal to love the truth (2 Thess 2:10).

The other writings of the NT attest that the theme of light was not only commonly evoked in catechesis but was also a major chapter in the first Christian theology. This theology is based especially on the OT and constantly contrasts light and darkness, after the fashion of the Qumran sect, but it also wishes to make clear over against paganism that God is pure spirit. Furthermore, St. John, who warns, “Keep yourselves from idols” (1 John 5:21), is the same one who states, “This is the message that we have heard from him (Jesus Christ) and that we announce to you, namely, that *God is light* and in him there is no darkness at all.” St. James had already designated God as “Father of lights,” knowing that the concept was current among his readers; but it was St. Paul who in the twilight of his life would give the most fully worked out idea, for the benefit of the converted pagans of Ephesus: God, “the only possessor of immortality, dwelling in inaccessible light which no human has ever seen or can see. To him be honor and eternal power. Amen.” It is a fundamental article of the faith of Israel that no mortal can see God, who is inaccessible because he belongs to another world (Ps 104:2; Job 37:21–24; Ezek 1:28; Dan 2:22). An eternal being whom death cannot touch, he is located in light in order to express first of all his spirituality (God is spirit, John 4:24); then his transcendence, or better, his divinity; and finally his glory, blessedness, power – and immortality.

Like Simeon (Luke 2:32), who cites Isa 49:6, St. Paul recalls that Christ was to “announce the light to the people” (Acts 26:23). But it is as “first in the resurrection of the dead” that he is the author of this illumination, which is not limited to Israel but extends to the Gentiles. In order to do this, he raises up his apostle, Paul, who conceives his ministry as the spreading of the light, as victory over darkness. The salvation of each soul lies in accepting him by faith. In an admirable but difficult text, Paul refers this spiritual re-creation to the first creation of light. The gospel is light to the highest degree, the lightning-flash of God’s glory: “The God who said, ‘Let light shine in the midst of darkness,’ is the one who has shined in our hearts to shed light by the knowledge of the glory of God [shining] on the face of Christ.” It is not the preacher, his person or ideas, that sheds light, but God. The same God who at the beginning brought forth light out of darkness and whose reflection shone in an external way on the face of Moses is also the one who has shone in a spiritual way in the soul, or better, “in the heart” of Paul – that is, in the most intimate and invisible way (cf. Gal 1:16 – he revealed his Son *in me*). Hence this illumination is for the purpose of shining out, so that the apostle may be able to radiate around himself: *pros phōtismōn*. The interior light is so fulsome that it diffuses a knowledge, that of “the glory of God” which shines on the face of Christ. This is the gospel. The Pauline apostolate is the diffusion of this light.

In his first epistle, after the fashion of Jesus (Luke 16:8), St. Paul characterizes believers as “sons of the light and of the day.” According to what precedes, we should read literally, “begotten by God, who is light,” but also thus: You are henceforth luminous, and this is the basis for a whole spirituality, because *operatio sequitur esse*, doing follows being; since the baptized participate in the nature of God and are illuminated by the gospel, they must conduct themselves as beings who are victorious over the darkness; that is, they must produce the fruits of all the virtues; their divine nature must be manifest in the eyes of all, so that all will be drawn in and pulled along by this dazzling wake; this is their constant theme of thankfulness to God: “Formerly you were darkness (ignorant and sinful), but now you are light in the Lord. Conduct yourselves, then, as children of light (as luminous creatures), because the fruit of this light consists in all goodness, righteousness, and truth.” Given the realism and the holiness of this begetting by the light, we can see that it is forbidden for Christians to make compacts with paganism and its mores; on the religious level, no syncretism is possible. There is a radical incompatibility between *phōs* and *skotos* (darkness): “Do not be unequally yoked with unbelievers! What participation (*metochē*) is there between righteousness and iniquity, or what is there in common (*koinōnia*) between light and darkness? What accord (*sumphōnēsis*) is there between Christ and Belial?” St. Peter and

St. John remind the disciples that they were “called from darkness to the admirable (or marvelous, *thaumastos*) light of God” (1 Pet 2:9), and that in living according to this light, according to revealed truth and holiness, they are in communion with one another (1 John 1:7). To be baptized is to be in the light; to abide in the light is to be faithful to the precept of brotherly love, which sums up the whole of gospel ethics. Hence: “The true light is already shining. The one who says that he is in the light (*en tō phōti einai*) and hates his brother is still in darkness. The one who loves his brother abides in the light (*en tō phōti menei*) and there is no scandal in him”; he shows himself to be an authentic child of God, who is light and love; nothing will make him stumble, because “whoever abides in him does not sin” (1 John 3:6), does not make a compact with the darkness.

The last book of the Bible evokes the conquests of the gospel, the universality of the redeemed, who are illuminated by revelation and are on a pilgrimage to the celestial city. Finally – this is the last prophecy – the servants of God will see his face: “There will be no more night, and they will not need the light of a torch or the light of the sun, because the Lord God will shed his light on them, and they will reign forever and ever.” No philosophy or theology of light has achieved such richness, such homogeneity, or such splendor. It is Christianity that has given *phōs* its eternal title of nobility.

*Phōtizein*. – All the NT occurrences of this word are religious. The subject is always God, Christ, an angel (Rev 18:1), or St. Paul: “It has been given to me to bring to light the dispensation of the mystery” (Eph 3:9). Two texts have considerable importance. The first concerns the realization of salvation that “has been manifested (*phanerōtheisan*) now by the appearing (*dia tēs epiphaneias*) of our Savior Christ Jesus ... bringing to light (*phōtisantos*) life and incorruptibility through the gospel” (2 Tim 1:10). Resurrected and luminous, Christ rising from the tomb makes life and incorruptibility shine forth from his person before communicating them to others. This luminescence is precisely that of religious epiphanies; an *epiphaneia* is the glittering apparition of a divinity who showers favors. The second text is Heb 6:4, “those who have once been illumined and tasted the heavenly gift”; the aorist passive participle (*tous phōtisthentas*) designates the baptized, as the Peshitta understood in substituting “those who have gone down for baptism.” Faith and baptism are, in effect, an introduction of light into the world; believers are illumined by God and concerning God; having received the knowledge of the truth, they were snatched from the satanic realm of darkness. In Rev 21:23, “the glory of God” illumines the heavenly Jerusalem and its inhabitants (22:5).

*Phōstēr*. – Literally, this noun designates “what gives light,” hence a light-bearer, a luminary, “what illumines.” In the LXX (representing the Hebrew

*māôr*) it applies exclusively to the sun and the moon, the luminaries of heaven (Gen 1:14, 16; Wis 13:2; Sir 43:7). So when St. Paul declares to the Philippians, “You appear as luminaries in the world” (*phainesthe hōs phōstēres en kosmō*, Phil 2:15), we may understand him to mean, “You shine like torches in the world,” after the fashion of the stars that light the night, or, without reference to the heavenly world, “You shine like hearths of light” as witnesses to the gospel, whose light shines in the darkness of an evil world. This meaning would be preferable, since the “children of God” named here are not themselves light but are bearers of the divine light. In any event, their calling is to illuminate the ignorant and the errant. But the apostle would seem to be inspired by Dan 12:3 – “Those who are wise will shine like the splendor of the firmament (*phanousin hōs phōstēres tou ouranou*), and those who have turned many to righteousness, like the stars (*hōsei ta astra tou ouranou*) forever and ever.” If this is the case, *phōstēr* (Hebrew *zōhar*) means luminous brilliance. This is the certain meaning in Rev 21:11, where the heavenly Jerusalem has in itself the glory of God: “Its brilliance (*ho phōstēr autēs*) is like a very precious stone, like a stone of crystalline jasper.” This luminosity, which is an effect of the divine presence, would be “his testimony, his teaching, his sacraments, the virtues of his saints” (E. B. Allo).

*Phōsphoros*. – 2 Pet 1:19 commands Christians to cling to the “prophetic word,” which is “like a shining lamp (*hōs lychnō phainonti*) in a dark place until day breaks and dawn arises in your hearts.” The Messiah was expected as a light (Isa 60:1–3; cf. 1 John 2:8); his first coming could then be considered like a dawn whose brightness only increases until his glorious return. Already this *parousia* radiates in hearts and makes them live in hope, thanks to the prophets who provide certitude concerning it.

The use of the biblical hapax *phōsphoros* can be justified in two ways. If the term usually designates the morning star, here it is used metaphorically, a usage well attested in the papyri and especially in Philo: “The intelligible rays come from God the light-bearer” (*tou phōsphorou theou*, *Drunkenness* 44); “those who show themselves obedient to the oracles will live continuously in a light without shadow, bearing these laws in their souls, like so many stars that illumine it” (*asteras phōsphorountas*). Moreover, *phōsphoros* was an epithet of numerous divinities. In a hymn from the first-second century, a greeting to all the gods: *phōsphore chaire megiste*. It is especially the goddesses Artemis and Hecate that are honored with this title; so also the planet Venus, which precedes the sun: “the Torch of the day, the dawn ... chasing the stars” (Euripides, *Ion* 1157; cf. *IA* 20; *Hel.* 569); “rise ... the luminous star has come” (*phōsphoros astēr*). 2 Pet thus uses *phōsphoros* to specify the heavenly and divine nature of the light that illuminates the whole Christian life.

*Phōtismos*. – This abstract noun, derived from *phōtizō*, means “lighting, illumination” and is an astronomical technical term for the radiance of the moon, the reflection of the sun’s light by the moon. Astronomy asks about the waxing and waning of the light of the moon (*peri phōtismōn selēnēs*) and seeks its origin. This privileged meaning appears in the LXX, where out of six occurrences of *phōtismos* three have to do with the night (Job 3:9; Ps 78:14; 139:11; cf. Aratus, *Phaen.* 470ff., 775ff., 791). The other three apply to God: “The Lord is my light and my Savior” (*Kyrios phōtismos mou kai sōtēr mou*, Ps 27:1; 44:3; 90:8); but it is still a question of a luminosity that is received, refracted. Thus do we understand the splendor of the preaching of the gospel in 2 Cor 4:4, 6: *ton phōtismōn tou euangelion ... pros phōtismōn tēs gnōseōs*. The apostle is a light-bearer, because the content of the gospel is Christ glorified, and the preacher causes this *doxa* (glory) to radiate, or propagates the “knowledge of the glory of God [which] shines out on the face of Christ.” Here again, this brightness is a reflection: just as the light of the sun is reflected by the moon, and the glory of God by the face of Moses, so also does the divine *doxa* shine out upon the glorified Christ, and the apostle makes it shine in the ears of his hearers (cf. 2 Pet 1:16).

Since the baptized are *phōtisthentes* (Heb 6:4; 10:32; cf. the variant readings *ebaptisen/ephōtisen* in the *Acts Thom.* 25), St. Justin calls baptism *phōtismos* (*1 Apol.* 61.12; 65.1; *Dial.* 122.5), and Clement of Alexandria calls it *phōtisma*.

## φωσφόρος

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*phōsphoros*, **giving light; morning star**

→see also φῶς, φωστήρ, φωσφόρος, φωτεινός, φωτίζω, φωτισμός

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***phosphoros***, S 5459; TDNT 9.310–358; EDNT 3.449; NIDNTT 2.490, 493, 495; MM 680; L&N 1.32; BAGD 872

2 Pet 1:19 compares the prophetic word to a lamp shining in a dark place, in the light of which Christians must walk “until the morning star rises in your hearts.” The adjective, derived from *phōs-pherō*, refers to sources of light, that which gives or brings light, especially the stars, but also torches and lamps. Hence its application to the “light-bringing priestess of Queen Cleopatra” and especially to light-bearing divinities, namely Hecate, the moon-goddess, and Artemis. Philo uses this epithet for the true God (“the intelligible rays emanate from God the light-bearer”) and for the shining constellations (*Creation* 29, 53; *Flacc.* 184; *Dreams* 1.214; *Moses* 1.120; 2.102).

The substantive *phōsphoros* ordinarily refers to the morning star (cf. Rev 2:28; 22:16 – *astēr prōinos*), since this star brings or heralds the light of day and is synonymous with dawn, Eos. Some have seen in 2 Pet 1:19 an allusion to Cant 2:17. Origen finds there a figurative reference to the Messiah. But given the eschatological connotations at 2 Pet 1:19, we must take into account the symbolism of *phōsphoros* in figurative representations, where sculptors represent it before the chariot of the sun. It shows the charioteer the way to go; it guides westward the funeral wagon or the eagle that bears away the soul. Phosphorus guides the deceased on the heavenward way. Thus the Messiah was awaited as a light (Isa 40:1–3; 1 John 2:8), and his first coming could be considered a dawning; but his brightness can only grow until his glorious return. His Parousia – made certain by the prophecies – already shines out in hearts and makes them live in hope: “He has a great day for us.... Let our faces shine with his light” (*Odes Sol.* 41.4, 6).

# χ ch

## χαλεπός

*chalepos*, **dangerous, formidable, injurious, harsh, difficult, hard, regrettable**

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*chalepos*, S 5467; *EDNT* 3.452–453; *NIDNTT* 1.419–420; MM 682; L&N 20.2, 22.29; BAGD 874

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The Gadarene demoniacs were “so dangerous (*chalepoi lian*) that no one could pass by on the road” (Matt 8:28). In classical Greek, this adjective is applied much more often to things than to persons, whereas in the Koine it is used indifferently of both. Here it has the same meaning as in Isa 18:2, “a formidable nation” (Hebrew niphal of *yārē*); *Ep. Arist.* 289: certain men who obtained authority “ended up becoming more injurious than the godless tyrants”; in 6 BC, Augustus writes to the Cnidians: “It seemed to me that you were very harsh toward the accused persons and that to the contrary you hated the crime” (*autois edoxate chalepoi gegonenai kai pros ta enantia misoponēroi*, Dittenberger, *Syl.* 780, 30); “you shall serve fearsome mistresses” (Philo, *Cherub.* 71); King Alcetas was too hard on the people (Diodorus Siculus 19.89.3); Ochos had a disagreeable character (17.5.3); Alexander showed irritation (17.40.3); the king was greatly troubled (17.101.6; 17.110.8); Cleopatra was dangerous for everyone (*chalepēn eis hapantas*, Josephus, *Ant.* 15.98); “people of a very difficult and jealous disposition” (Plutarch, *T. Sim.* 12); “Terentia, having a difficult disposition” (*Cic.* 29.4; cf. *oude chalepainōn* = without rancor); the king is hard on his friends (*Dem.* 25.1); Demetrius “was rude and disagreeable to those who came to him” seeking an audience (*Demetr.* 42.1; cf. *Ant.* 89.[2] 1); “terrible enemies” (*Ant.* 40.4); “fierce dogs” (*De tranq. anim.* 1); the father and mother of the young wild boar were formidable (Xenophon, *Cyn.* 10.23). Cf. a litigant who becomes indignant (*P.Phil.* 2, 7, *chalepēnas*).

When applied to things, *chalepos* can mean simply “difficult, hard,” but sometimes it also takes on the nuance of “regrettable” (2 Macc 4:4), “grievous” (Wis 3:19), “severe” (Plutarch, *De sera* 4), and “cruel” (Wis 19:13; 4 Macc 7:2–4). It is used fairly often for dangerous circumstances, which is precisely the case in 2 Tim 3:1, which announces the onset of the last days: there will be *kairoi chalepoi*, dangerous or perilous times for the faith and the existence of



the church, harmful for Christians, with a nuance of violence and aggressiveness that befits calamities.

## χαλκεύς

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*chalkeus*, **smith, artisan in copper, bronze, or iron; silversmith**

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***chalkeus***, S 5471; *EDNT* 3.453; *NIDNTT* 2.96; MM 683; L&N 2.55; BAGD 874

2 Tim 4:14 – *Alexandros ho chalkeus*. This substantive, common in Mycenaean and attested in the oldest Greek texts, is used in all periods. Originally, a *chalkeus* was one who worked copper, bronze, or iron, hence an artisan in metal, a metallurgist, like the smith at Istrus who offered this dedication to Athena: “I Tatarion the *chalkeus* offered this gift to Athena.” In the Hellenistic period, specific names were used: *chalkeotechnēs* (Quintus of Smyrna, *Posthomerica* 2.440), *sidērochalkeus* (*P.Oxy.* 84, 3), *orichalkeus* = a worker in brass (*P.Paris* 20, 33), etc. Since jewelry was made from copper, and *chalkos* (copper) is frequently associated with *chrysos* (silver), the *chalkeus* can also be a silversmith; but in the imperial period, a silversmith was called a *chrysochōn* or *argyropoios* (*Anth. Pal.* 14.50), and the smith proper was a *chalkeus* or a *chalkotypos* (Plutarch, *Per.* 12.6; *PSI* 871, 3; *SB* 8620 g 3; 8635, 2; *I.Bulg.* 1922, 1) or a *chalkourgōs*.

The smith’s trade was widespread in the countryside, judging from the attestations in the papyri, and we can imagine that the *chalkeus* was indispensable for shoeing horses and repairing harnesses, but little information is available on smiths and their lives. They worked in a tool room (*P.Cair.Zen.* 90, 1), in a temple (*P.Hib.* 213, 6), in stables (*P.Oxy.* 2480, 28), on a boat (*ibid.*, line 24), on irrigating machines (1913, 19: *chalkei ergazomenō eis tas mēchanas*). They could own a house (*P.Mich.* 257, 4; AD 30), pay taxes (*P.Tebt.* 103, 33; first century BC), owe four thousand drachmas for a copper purchase (*P.Tebt.* 890, 27, 223; second century BC), build a *proskynēma* (*SB* 4391, 8604, 2; cf. 8634, 1). In the third century, Aurelius Epimachus, a smith from the town of Caminoi, aged and infirm, but still having apprentices, offers his services and asks to complete projects with the iron that has been supplied to him (*P.Rein.* 113, 4). But in AD 44, a complainant accuses Hippocraton, smith at a place called Pammenus, of not having paid back two doors and forty drachmas of silver (*P.Fouad* 27, 5).

χαρά

*chara*, **joy**

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*chara*, S 5479; TDNT 9.359–372; EDNT 3.454–455; NIDNTT 2.356–359; MM 683; L&N 25.123, 25.124; BAGD 875–876

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The distinguishing characteristic of the Judeo-Christian religion is joy. The proclamation of salvation is one of great joy (*charan megalēn*, Luke 2:10–11), which contrasts with the pessimism and despair of first-century paganism. This explains why a large proportion of the occurrences of *chara* in the papyri are of Christian origin, why pagan occurrences of the word are so rare, and especially why pagan joy is never that of the soul. Rather, it is the pleasure felt by a traveler returning to his homeland, fervor in spreading false news, rejoicing at a welcome (*P.Iand.* 13, 18), especially at the good Nile floods, or popular jubilation (*P.Fay.* 20, 1; *BGU* 1141, 3; 1768, 7; *P.Ant.* 202 a 14); hence there is no religious parallel to the NT.

χάρις

*charis*, **grace, beauty, charm, favor, goodwill, free benevolence, gift, benefit, gratitude**

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*charis*, S 5485; TDNT 9.372–402; EDNT 3.457–460; NIDNTT 2.115–124; MM 684–685; L&N 25.89, 33.350, 57.103, 88.66; BDF §§47(3), 128(5), 128(6), 160, 216(1), 258(2), 456(4), 473(1); BAGD 877–878

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The religious meaning of NT “grace” is original, but the secular word *charis* was suited for taking on a theological meaning, and its nuances made sense to new converts.

I. – *Grace in the sense of beauty.* *Charis* is the quality of that which is attractive and gives joy. It is the charm of language (Plutarch, *Aem.* 2.2), of a masterpiece (*Tim.* 35.4), of a conversation, of a garden (*Anth. Pal.* 9.666), of a bath (*ibid.* 9.609 *bis*, 621, 623, 624, 814); and especially personal charm, beauty and friendliness; the charm of a child (Luke 2:52; Josephus, *Ant.* 2.231); and the charm of an attractive woman. Gracious (Plutarch, *Cim.* 2.3) is the opposite of ugly (*aischran*, 2.4); *meta charitos* means “of good grace.”

II. – *Grace in the sense of favor or love.* In classical Greek, grace usually refers to a subjective disposition: goodwill or good grace, benevolence that finds expression in generosity, love that commands action, but which is

absolutely free. In the inscriptions and papyri of the Hellenistic period, grace is still synonymous with favor and friendship, but it means especially the “favor” of a friend, a prince, or the gods. Those who are under obligation strive to find favor with the powerful, who in turn give notice that they have granted the favor that was asked. It is in this sense that God shows mercy and benevolence toward his favored ones; his “grace,” then, is suggestive of loving care and condescension (Josephus, *Ant.* 5.107; cf. 2.153), a nuance retained in the gratuitousness and generosity of the salvation granted in the NT.

III. – *Grace in the sense of benefit.* It is often impossible to distinguish between benevolent feelings and a favor granted. Any gift, present, pardon, or concession that is granted freely, out of one’s goodness, is called a *charis*. Thus it is that the collection for the saints at Jerusalem is a very effective act of generosity (1 Cor 16:3; 2 Cor 8:6, 19), and a benefit, like the visit that St. Paul offers to make to the Corinthians (2 Cor 1:15). How much more does the extreme generosity of God’s love result in gifts that become the indwelling possession of believers (cf. the link between *dōrea* and *charis*, Rom 5:15, 17; Eph 4:7); they receive grace upon grace (John 1:16; cf. Rom 12:6; 15:15; 1 Cor 1:4; 2 Cor 8:1).

IV. – *Grace in the sense of gratitude.* A benefit arising purely from the goodness of the benefactor necessarily inspires gratitude on the part of the one who receives it. Hence the final meaning of *charis*, apparently predominant in the documents of the Hellenistic period: thanksgiving, gratitude felt or expressed. A person does not stop at merely feeling gratitude toward a benefactor but makes an effort to pay him back, as if paying off a debt by returning benefit for benefit. This principle is seen in a decree by the Athenian cleruchs in honor of Euboulos of Marathon, “so that the people may demonstrate that they give worthy citizens the recognition that is their due.”

Since God is the universal and constant benefactor, and all that humans have depends on his grace, thanksgiving to God is the homage due from all his creatures: “I thank you first, my friends, and even more those who sent you, and most of all God, whose oracles these are” (*Ep. Arist.* 177); “I thank God for placing in my mind ... the knowledge of the good” (*Corp. Herm.* 6.4). Pagans observe this just obligation, but Christians are the most thankful people in the world (Col 3:15) because the Holy Spirit is given them precisely “so that we may know well what God has freely given us”; their worship, centered on the “Eucharist,” is grateful praise to God for all that he has given them. Of all the biblical authors, St. Paul is the one whose thanksgivings are the most frequent and the most fervent.

χειραγωγέω, χειραγωγός

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*cheiragōgeō*, to lead, guide (by the hand); *cheiragōgos*, one who leads another by the hand

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*cheiragōgeo*, S 5496; TDNT 9.435; EDNT 3.463; MM 687; L&N 15.184; BAGD 880 | *cheiragōgos*, S 5497; TDNT 9.435; EDNT 3.463–464; MM 687; L&N 15.185; BAGD 880

These terms, which are not extant before the Hellenistic era, are often used in the Bible of a blind person who is led by the hand: Samson (Judg 16:26; Josephus, *Ant.* 5.315), Tobias (Tob 11:16, Sinaiticus), the magician Elymas (Acts 13:11), St. Paul arriving at Damascus (Acts 9:8; 22:11). The best parallel (others are in J. J. Wettstein) is in Artemidorus Daldianus: “He blinded them so that they would use guides” (*typhlous epoiēsen hina cheiragōgois chrēsōntai*, *Onir.* 1.48).

The verb *cheiragōgeō* is attested especially in the broad sense “to guide, to help.” In *Gos. Pet.* 40, two angels sustained (*hyporthountas*) and led the resurrected Christ (*cheiragōgoumenon hyp’ autōn*); UPZ 110, 55: inexperienced persons are guided by the facts themselves (*hyp’ autōn tōn pragmatōn cheiragōgoumenos*, second century BC); “help him with whatever need he has.”

The substantive *cheiragōgos* means “guiding line” in the stele of Moschion: “in the middle of the checkerboard, take the main thread at its beginning and follow the track” (*tēn cheiragōgon archēn labōn*). The comedian Philemon: “For the old man has wealth as his guide.”

χειρόγραφον

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*cheirographon*, handwriting, written declaration, signature, acknowledgment of debt, IOU

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*cheirographon*, S 5498; TDNT 9.435–436; EDNT 3.464; MM 687; L&N 33.40; BAGD 880

According to Col 2:14, Christ has erased the official record of our debt (*exaleipsas to kath’ hēmōn cheirographon*). Etymologically, *cheirographon* (“handwriting”), a word little used in classical Greek (cf. Exod 31:18 – “stone tablets written on by the finger of God,” *plakas lithinas gegrammenas tō daktulō tou theou*; Deut 9:10), means an autograph, or a written declaration, a

signature, as in the world of business and commerce (*P.NYU* 5, 55, 63; 11, 201, 207; *P.Corn.* 8, 9; *P.Ryl.* 585, 45); for example, a letter of credit. The writing and the signature validate the commitment and guarantee its authenticity.

In the papyri, where it is much used, *cheirographon* is a technical term meaning “acknowledgment of debt,” i.e., the receipt signed by a debtor, who acknowledges that he owes a certain sum and undertakes to repay it: “the right of execution belonging to you and to anyone else who may validly present this note on your behalf or in your stead, against me and all my property and all that I may acquire.” In AD 1, a wine buyer signs the invoice and acknowledges the sum under this heading: “merchandise for which you have signed a receipt” (*hyper hōn kai ethou cheirographon*, *P.Oxy.* 745, 2; cf. 269, col. II, 7; AD 57; *PSI* 1250 A 17). Not only were invoices established without deletion or addition (*cheirographon chōris aliphatos kai epigraphēs*, *BGU* 717, 24), but they were drawn up in duplicate (sometimes triplicate, *SB* 6822, 13), with both parties pledging, “This invoice, established by me in duplicate, shall be valid.” This draft is acknowledged to be valid in all its provisions; nevertheless disputes could arise in some cases (*P.Mich.* 480, 8; 621, 15–16). Normally, however, possession of the written acknowledgment of the debt gave the right to recover it: “the entire sum granted to you by me, according to the note” (*P.Oxy.* 1132, 6). Once the invoice was paid or the note was honored, it was canceled with two crosswise strokes: “he ordered a cross to be marked on the invoice” (*ekeleuse to cheirographon chiassthēnai*, *P.Flor.* 61, 65; in AD 86–88; cf. *P.Oxy.* 266, 15).

According to St. Paul, humans are in debt to God because of their sins (*ta paraptōmata*) and are insolvent. Christ came to lift this mortgage, and through his blood he paid for them, annulling their debt. A Christian of the fourth century took his inspiration from Col 2:14 – “so that God [may invalidate?] the *cheirographon* of my sins through your steadfast and most holy prayers.”

χρηστεύομαι, χρηστός, χρηστότης

*chrēsteuomai*, **to be good, kind, benevolent**; *chrēstos*, **useful, serviceable, good, benevolent, favorable**; *chrēstotēs*, **usefulness, good quality, goodness**  
→see also ἐπιείκεια, ἐπιεικής

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*chresteuomai*, S 5541; *TDNT* 9.491–492; *EDNT* 3.474; *NIDNTT* 2.105; MM 692; L&N 88.67; BAGD 886 | *chrestos*, S 5543; *TDNT* 9.483–489; *EDNT* 3.474–475; *NIDNTT* 2.105–106; MM 693; L&N 22.40, 65.25, 88.9, 88.68; BAGD 886 | *chrestotes*, S 5544; *TDNT* 9.489–491; *EDNT* 3.475; *NIDNTT* 2.105–107; MM 693; L&N 88.10, 88.67; BAGD 886

The meaning of these terms varied greatly between the classical and Hellenistic periods. The connection with oracles is unknown in the NT, as is the etymological meaning of *chrēstos*, “useful, serviceable,” referring to either persons or things.

I. – “*Good quality*” of things: precious stones (Ezek 27:22; 28:3); fine gold (Dan 2:32); fine linen (*P.Tebt.* 703, 98); wood (*P.Hib.* 82, 28); a well-conditioned yoke, one that is not rough and does not hurt or chafe the neck (Matt 11:30); especially foods that are wholesome or taste good; oil (*P.Oxy.* 937, 28; 1455, 6, 10; 1753, 2; *P.Ryl.* 627, 186; 629, 116; 630, 155; *P.Gen* 63, col. III, 5; *P.Lund* IV, 11, 7; *Pap.Lugd.Bat.* I, 21, 1 and 39; *Stud.Pal.* XXII, 56, 15; *P.Stras.* 173, 5; 299 verso 10; *PSI* 890, 45, 47); brine (*P.Oxy.* 1759, 9); fine wheat flour (2148, 4); wheat (*P.Cair.Zen.* 59177, 3; *BGU* 1532, 6); especially wine that is mild and sweet. *Chrēstēria* are “furnishings” in a court or a dwelling (*P.Oxy.* 496, 7; *P.Yale* 71, 10; 72, 3, 9; *P.Mich.* 612, 13).

II. – *Chrēstotēs* is a divine attribute. *Theoi chrēstoi* are favorable divinities. The major acclamation of Israelite worship is of the Lord who is *chrēstos*, benevolent, favorable, and merciful; Jewish writers draw on this inheritance, which is confirmed by new revelation (Rom 2:4; 9:22; Eph 2:7; Titus 3:4; 1 Pet 2:3).

III. – *Chrēstotēs* is an attribute of princes and rulers, whose nobility and goodness find expression in generous acts; they have the opportunity and the means to be magnanimous; their *chrēstotēs* is often associated with their philanthropy, their justice (Josephus, *Ant.* 9.133), their *megalopsychia* (ibid. 12.21; Dittenberger, *Syl.* 761, 11; from the first century BC), their *eumeneia*.

IV. – *A virtue of honest folk.* Anyone who shows goodness and concern toward others can be described as *chrēstos*, especially when receiving guests (2 Macc 9:21; 12:30–31). The term then takes on an ethical meaning: the person who is *chrēstos* (man, woman, or child) behaves properly, conforms to the rule of honesty, what is called “good morals” (*ēthos chrēston*) or simply “the good.” Thus Phocion, a good and profoundly honest man (*anēr agathos*; Plutarch, *Phoc.* 5.10), famous *epi chrēstotēti* (19.1), was called *ho chrēstos* (10.4; cf. Chabrias, ibid. 6.4; 10.8; 14.1).

St. Paul borrows from this vocabulary, making *chrēstotēs* a fruit of the Holy Spirit (Gal 5:22), a virtue of apostles (2 Cor 6:6) and of all Christians (Eph 4:32; Col 3:12). Thus in a way he ennobles all disciples of Jesus Christ, for *chrēstos* in that period is a title of honor conferred upon a mother, a grandmother (*SB* 9673 c 3), parents (Philo, *Virtues* 131: *hoi chrēstoi goneis*), Moses (*Virtues* 160), Noah (Josephus, *Ant.* 1.96), Abraham (1.200), Jacob (1.149), Samuel (6.92), David (7.43, 184, 270), Rehoboam (8.213), Gedaliah (10.164), the high priest (9.166; 11.139), a revered friend (*P.Oxy.* 122, 1; cf.

1664, 15), an excellent husband (Plutarch, *Cat. Mai.* 20.1: *peri gynaika chrēstos anēr*), even a very good child (*SB* 9996 [862], 1; *T. Benj.* 3.7), and generous and devoted nurses. If Pauline *chrēstotēs* emphasizes goodness, mildness, and generosity above all else, it retains the nobility given the word by his contemporaries, which distinguishes it from *prytēs*. This seems to be the quality that is most frequently mentioned in funerary inscriptions.

V. – *An expression of love.* These occurrences are so common and so diverse that it is impossible to discern the specific nuance in each instance: goodness, kindness, willingness to be of service, honesty, nobility, loyalty, probity. In addition, the verb *chrēsteuomai* (unknown in secular Greek; cf. *Pss. Sol.* 9.11; *1 Clem.* 13.2) is translated differently in 1 Cor 13:4, *hē agapē chrēsteuetai*, “love is good, kind, considerate, willing to help, benevolent.” The Vulgate is correct: “benigna est.” The point is brotherly love, a loving attitude that includes a willingness to serve one’s neighbor. This virtue is possessed only by magnanimous and unselfish souls who are characterized by kindness, friendliness, and liberality: the Christian is both delicate and generous in brotherly relations, seeking to be useful, considerate, helpful, beneficent, always in an agreeable way, even with a smile. Ambrosiaster translated “*jucunda est*,” for that is the expression of a “good heart,” of a person who is happy to meet his neighbor and to be able to offer him his help.

In the second century, the spectacle of Christian *agapē* was so stunning for pagans – “*Vides, inquiunt, ut invicem se diligant*” (“Behold, how they love one another!”) – that according to Tertullian, they called Christians not *christiani* but *chrestiani*, “made up of mildness or kindness.”

ψ ps

ψευδολόγος

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*pseudologos*, **liar, impostor**

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*pseudologos*, S 5573; EDNT 3.496; MM 697; L&N 33.255; BAGD 8

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1 Tim 4:2 describes certain latter-day apostates as hypocritical liars or impostors. The substantive *pseudologos* belongs to cultivated Greek and is not used in the papyri. Its pejorative meaning is clear in Aristophanes – “Remember to keep this schemer, this impostor, this buffoon (*ho panourgos anēr kai pseudologos kai bōmolochos*) from sitting on my throne” (*Ran.* 1521; cf. Polybius 31.22.9) – and in Strabo – “All the historians of India have been shown up as being for the most part bald-faced liars” (*pseudologoi*, 2.1.9). The verb *pseudologeō* was used especially by lawyers and rhetors: “to make false reports, speak falsehoods.” The substantive *pseudologia* has this meaning in *P.Princ.* 119, 1: “false accusation”; *CPR* I, 19, 15: “answers full of falsehoods” (*antepistalmata ... meta pseudologias*). These two papyri are from the fourth century.