


The background of the book cover is a complex stained glass design. It features a central figure, possibly a philosopher or saint, with a beard and a halo, rendered in shades of blue and white. This figure is surrounded by large, irregular sections of red and blue glass. The entire composition is held together by a network of dark, lead-like lines. The overall effect is one of historical depth and intellectual tradition.

ROUTLEDGE



Philosophy of Mind in the Early and High Middle Ages

EDITED BY MARGARET CAMERON

THE HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND VOLUME 2

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND IN THE EARLY AND HIGH MIDDLE AGES

Philosophy of Mind in the Early and High Middle Ages provides an outstanding overview of a tumultuous 900-year period of discovery, innovation, and intellectual controversy that began with the Roman senator Boethius (ca. 480–524) and concluded with the Franciscan theologian and philosopher John Duns Scotus (ca. 1266–1308). Relatively neglected in philosophy of mind, this volume highlights the importance of philosophers such as Abelard, Duns Scotus, and the Persian philosopher and polymath Avicenna to the history of philosophy of mind.

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- mental perception,
- Avicenna and the intellectual abstraction of intelligibles,
- Duns Scotus and the will,
- soul, will, and choice in Islamic and Jewish contexts,
- perceptual experience,
- the systematization of the passions,
- the complexity of the soul and the problem of unity,
- the phenomenology of immortality,
- morality, and
- the self.

Essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of mind, medieval philosophy, and the history of philosophy, *Philosophy of Mind in the Early and High Middle Ages* is also a valuable resource for those in related disciplines such as religious studies and history.

Margaret Cameron is Canada Research Council Chair in the Aristotelian Tradition (Tier II) and an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Victoria, Canada. She works in the Aristotelian tradition of logic and philosophy of language, as well as the history of the philosophy of language more broadly, and has published articles in *The Cambridge Companion to Boethius*, *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy*, *Vivarium*, *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, and the *Archives d'histoire doctrinale du moyen âge grec et latin*, as well as in a number of other book publications.

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General Editors: Rebecca Copenhaver and Christopher Shields

The History of the Philosophy of Mind is a major six-volume reference collection, covering the key topics, thinkers and debates within philosophy of mind, from Antiquity to the present day. Each volume is edited by a leading scholar in the field and comprises chapters written by an international team of specially commissioned contributors.

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Edited by Margaret Cameron

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Rebecca Copenhaver and Christopher Shields

How far back does the history of philosophy of mind extend? In one sense, the entire history of the discipline extends no further than living memory. Construed as a recognized sub-discipline of philosophy, philosophy of mind seems to have entered the academy in a regular way only in the latter half of the twentieth century. At any rate, as an institutional matter, courses listed under the name ‘Philosophy of Mind’ or ‘The Mind-Body Problem’ were rare before then and seem not to have become fixtures of the curriculum in Anglo-American universities until the 1960s.¹ More broadly, construed as the systematic self-conscious reflection on the question of how mental states and processes should be conceived in relation to physical states and processes, one might put the date to the late nineteenth or early twentieth century.

One might infer on this basis that a six-volume work on *The History of Philosophy of Mind* extending back to antiquity is bound to be anachronistic: we cannot, after all, assume that our questions were the questions of, say, Democritus, working in Thrace in the fifth century BC, or of Avicenna (Ibn-Sînâ), active in Persia in the twelfth century, or of John Blund, the Oxford- and Paris-trained Chancellor of the see of York from 1234–1248, or, for that matter, of the great German philosopher and mathematician Leibniz (1646–1716). One might on the contrary think it *prima facie* unlikely that thinkers as diverse as these in their disparate times and places would share very many preoccupations either with each other or with us.

Any such immediate inference would be unduly hasty and also potentially misleading. It would be misleading not least because it relies on an unrealistically unified conception of what *we* find engaging in this area: philosophy of mind comprises today a wide range of interests, orientations, and methodologies, some almost purely *a priori* and others almost exclusively empirical. It is potentially misleading in another way as well, heading in the opposite direction. If we presume that the only thinkers who have something useful to say to us are those engaging the questions of mind we find salient, using idioms we find congenial, then we will likely overlook some surprising continuities as well as instructive discontinuities across these figures and periods.

Some issues pertinent to mental activity may prove perennial. Of equal importance, however, are the differences and discontinuities we find when we investigate

questions of mind assayed in earlier periods of thought. In some cases, it is true, we find it difficult to determine without careful investigation whether difference in idiom suffices for difference in interest or orientation. For instance, it was once commonplace to frame questions about mental activity as questions about the soul, where today questions posed about the nature of the soul and its relation to the body are apt to sound to many to be outmoded or at best quaintly archaic. Yet when we read what, for instance, medieval philosophers investigated under that rubric, we are as likely as not to find them reflecting on such core contemporary concerns as the nature of perception, the character of consciousness, the relation of mental faculties to the body, and the problem of intentionality – and to be doing so in a manner immediately continuous with some of our own preoccupations.

That said, even where upon examination we find little or no continuity between present-day and earlier concerns, this very difference can be illuminating. Why, for instance, is the will discussed so little in antiquity? Hannah Arendt suggests an answer: the will was not discussed in antiquity because it was not discovered before St. Augustine managed to do so in the third century.² Is she right? Or is the will in fact discussed obliquely in antiquity, enmeshed in a vocabulary at least initially alien to our own? On the supposition that Arendt is right, and the will is not even a topic of inquiry before Augustine, why should this be so? Should this make us less confident that we have a faculty rightly called ‘the will’? Perhaps Augustine not so much discovered the will as *invented* it, to give it pride of place in his conception of human nature. A millennium later Thomas Aquinas contended that the will is but one power or faculty of the soul, as an intellectual appetite for the good (*ST* I 82, resp.). Is he right? Is the will as examined by Augustine and Aquinas the same will of which we ask, when we do, whether our will is free or determined?

A study of the history of philosophy of mind turns up, in sum, some surprising continuities, some instructive partial overlaps, and some illuminating discontinuities across the ages. When we reflect on the history of the discipline, we bring into sharper relief some of the questions we find most pressing, and we inevitably come to ask new and different questions, even as we retire questions which we earlier took to be of moment. Let us reflect first then on some surprising continuities. Three illustrations will suffice, but they could easily be multiplied.

First, consider some questions about minds and machines: whether machines can be conscious or otherwise minded, whether human intelligence is felicitously explicated in terms of computer software, hardware, or functional processes more generally. Surely such questions belong to our era uniquely? Yet we find upon reading some early modern philosophy that this is not so. In Leibniz, for instance, we find this striking passage, known as ‘Leibniz’s mill’:

Imagine there were a machine whose structure produced thought, feeling, and perception; we can conceive of its being enlarged while maintaining the same relative proportions, so that we could walk into it as we can walk into a mill. Suppose we do walk into it; all we would find there

are cogs and levers and so on pushing one another, and never anything to account for a perception. So perception must be sought in simple substances, not in composite things like machines. And that is all that can be found in a simple substance – perceptions and changes in perceptions; and those changes are all that the internal actions of simple substances can consist in.

(*Monadology* §17)

Leibniz offers an argument against mechanistic conceptions of mental activity in this passage, one with a recognizably contemporary counterpart. His view may be defensible or it may be indefensible; but it is certainly relevant to questions currently being debated.

Similarly, nearly every course in philosophy of mind these days begins with some formulation of the ‘mind-body problem’, usually presented as a descendant of the sort of argument Descartes advanced most famously in his *Meditations*, and defended most famously in his correspondence with Elisabeth of Bohemia. Centuries before Descartes, however, we encounter the Islamic polymath Avicenna (Ibn-Sînâ) wondering in detail about the question of whether the soul has or lacks quantitative extension, deploying a striking thought experiment in three separate passages, one of which runs:

One of us must suppose that he was just created at a stroke, fully developed and perfectly formed but with his vision shrouded from perceiving all external objects – created floating in the air or in space, not buffeted by any perceptible current of the air that supports him, his limbs separated and kept out of contact with one another, so that they do not feel each other. Then let the subject consider whether he would affirm the existence of his self. There is no doubt that he would affirm his own existence, although not affirming the reality of any of his limbs or inner organs, his bowels, or heart or brain or any external thing. Indeed he would affirm the existence of this self of his while not affirming that it had any length, breadth or depth. And if it were possible for him in such a state to imagine a hand or any other organ, he would not imagine it to be a part of himself or a condition of his existence.

(Avicenna, ‘*The Book of Healing*’)

Avicenna’s ‘Floating Man’ or ‘Flying Man’, reflects his Neoplatonist orientation and prefigures in obvious ways Descartes’ more celebrated arguments of *Meditations* II. Scholars dispute just how close this parallel is,³ but it seems plain that these arguments and parables bear a strong family resemblance to one another, and then each in turn to a yet earlier argument by Augustine,⁴ more prosaically put, but engaging many of the same themes.

The point is not to determine who won the race to this particular argument, nor to insist that these authors arrive at precisely the same finish line. Rather, when

we study each expression in its own context, we find illuminating samenesses and differences, which in turn assist us in framing our own questions about the character of the quantitative and qualitative features of mind, about the tenability of solipsism, and about the nature of the human self. One would like to know, for instance, whether such a narrow focus on the internal states of human consciousness provides a productive method for the science of mind. Or have our philosophical forebears, as some today think, created impediments by conceiving of the very project in a way that neglects the embodied characteristics of cognition? From another angle, one may wonder whether these approaches, seen throughout the history of the discipline, lead inexorably to Sartre's conclusion that 'consciousness is a wind blowing from nowhere towards objects'?⁵ One way to find out is to study each of these approaches in the context of its own deployment.

For a final example, we return to the birthplace of Western philosophy to reflect upon a striking argument of Democritus in the philosophy of perception. After joining Leucippus in arguing that the physical world comprises countless small atoms swirling in the void, Democritus observes that *only* atoms and the void are, so to speak, really real. All else exists by convention: 'by convention sweet and by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention colour; but in reality atoms and void' (DK 68B9). This remark evidently denies the reality of sensible qualities, such as sweetness and bitterness, and even colour. What might Democritus be thinking? By judging this remark alongside his remaining fragments, we see that he is appealing to the variability of perception to argue that if one perceiver tastes a glass of wine and finds it sweet, while another perceiver tastes the same glass and finds it bitter, then we must conclude – on the assumption that perceptual qualities are real – that either one or the other perceiver is wrong. After all, they cannot both be right, and there seems little point in treating them as both wrong. The correct conclusion, Democritus urges, is that sensible qualities, in contrast to atoms and the void, are not real. The wine is neither sweet nor bitter; sweetness and bitterness are wholly subjective states of perceivers.

Readers of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century British philosophy will recognize this argument in Locke and Berkeley. Locke presents the argument to support his distinction between primary and secondary qualities: primary qualities being those features of objects that are (putatively) *in* objects, independently of perception, such as number, shape, size, and motion; secondary qualities being those features of objects subject to the variability of perception recognized by Democritus. Locke struggles with the reality of secondary qualities, sometimes treating them as ideas in our minds and other times as dispositions of the primary qualities of objects that exist independently of us. Democritus, by contrast, aligning the real with the objective, simply banishes them to the realm of convention. And Berkeley appeals to the same phenomenon on which Locke founds his famous distinction – the variability of perception – to argue that the distinction is unsustainable and thus embraces the anti-Democritean option: the real is the ideal.

We may ask which if any of these philosophers deserves to be followed. As an anecdotal matter, when beginning philosophy students grasp the point of arguments

from the variability of perception, they become flummoxed, because before having their attention focussed on the phenomenon of variability, most tend to think of sensible qualities as intrinsic monadic properties of the external objects of perception. This issue in the philosophy of perception, straddling as it does different periods and idioms, remains a live one, proving as vivid for us as it was for Democritus and Locke.

When we find similar philosophical arguments and tropes recurring in radically different periods and contexts throughout the history of philosophy, that is usually at least a strong *prima facie* indication that we are in an area demanding careful scrutiny. Unsurprisingly, arguments concerning the nature of perception and perceptible qualities offer one telling illustration. Still, we should resist the temptation to find continuities where none exist, especially where none exist beyond the verbal or superficial. We should moreover resist, perhaps more strongly still, the tendency to minimize or overlook differences where they appear. One of the intellectual joys of studying the history of philosophy resides precisely in uncovering and appreciating the deep discontinuities between disparate times and contexts.

On this score, examples abound, but one suffices to illustrate our point. The title of a widely read article written in the 1960s posed a provocative question: ‘Why Isn’t the Mind-Body Problem Ancient?’.⁶ This question, of course, has a presupposition, namely that the mind-body problem is in fact *not* ancient. It also seems to betray a second presupposition, namely that there is *a* mind-body problem: a single problem that that engages philosophers of the modern era but that escaped the ancients. This presupposition raises the question: what *is* the single, unified, mind-body problem that the ancients failed to recognize? In fact, when we turn to the range of questions posed in this domain, we find a family of recognizably distinct concerns: the hard problem, the explanatory gap, mental causation, and so on. Not all these questions have a common orientation, even if they arise from a common anxiety that the mind and the body are at once so dissimilar that inquiring into their relationship may already be an error, and yet so similar in their occupation and operation as to obliterate any meaningful difference.

We might call this anxiety *categorical*. That is, it has seemed to various philosophers in various eras that there is some basic categorical distinction to be observed in the domain of the mental, to the effect that mental states belong to one category and physical states to another. That by itself might be true without, however, there being any attendant problem. After all, we might agree that there is a categorical distinction between, say, biological properties and mathematical properties, and even that these families of properties are never co-instantiable. After all, no number can undergo descent with modification, and no animal can be a cosine. That is hardly a problem: no one expects numbers to be biological subjects, and no one would ever mistake an organism for a mathematical function. The problem in the domain of the mental and physical seems to arise only when we assume that some objects – namely ourselves – exhibit both mentality and physicality, and do so in a way that is systematic and unified. Bringing these thoughts together we arrive at a mind-body problem: if mental and physical properties are categorially exclusive

while we ourselves are mental and physical at once, we must be what we cannot be, namely subjects of properties that cannot coincide.

In this sense, Cartesian dualism might be regarded as a solution to the mind-body problem, at least *this* mind-body problem, one which simply concedes its conclusion by affirming that minds and bodies are irredeemably different sorts of substances displaying different sorts of properties. Needless to say, this 'solution' invites a series of still more intractable problems concerning the interaction of these postulated disparate substances, about the location of the mental, and so forth. Even so, when the Cartesian expedient is rejected on these or other grounds, the old problem re-emerges, in one guise yielding an equally desperate seeming sort of solution, namely the total elimination of the mental as ultimately not amenable to a purely physicalistic characterization.⁷ Eliminativism, no less than Cartesianism, solves the mind-body problem by effectively by concession.

One should accordingly look afresh at the problem as formulated. In fact, when one asks *what* these purportedly mutually excluding properties may be, several candidates come to the fore. Some think properties such as *being conscious* are mental and cannot possibly be physical, perhaps because conscious states are ineliminably subjective, whereas all physical properties are objective, or because mental properties are essentially qualitative, whereas physical properties are only quantitative. Descartes' own reasons, though disputed, seem to have been largely epistemic: possibly one can doubt the existence of one's body, whereas it is impossible, because self-defeating, to doubt the existence of one's own mind or mental states (*Meditation II*). If these property-differences obtain in these domains and are in fact such as to be mutually exclusive, then we do now have the makings of a mind-body problem.

Returning, then, to the question pertinent to our study of the ancient period, we may ask: do the ancients draw these sorts of categorial distinctions? If so, why do they fail to appreciate the problems we find so familiar and obvious? Or do they in fact fail to draw these categorial distinctions in the first place? If they do not, then one would like to know why not. One can imagine a number of different options here: one could fault the ancients for failing to pick up on such starkly categorial differences; one could credit them for astutely avoiding the conceptual muddles of Cartesianism. Some argue, for instance, that Aristotelian hylomorphism embraces a framework of explanation within which Cartesian questions simply cannot arise, thereby obviating an array of otherwise intractable problems.⁸ Although we do not attempt to litigate these issues here, one can appreciate how an investigation into ancient approaches to philosophy of mind yields palpable benefits for some modern questions, even if and perhaps precisely because such questions were not ancient.

Needless to say, we never know in advance of our investigations whether the benefits of such study are forthcoming. To make such discoveries as can be made in this area, then, we need ask a set of questions similar to those we asked regarding the mind-body problem, *mutatis mutandis*, for other philosophical problems in the mental domain, broadly construed, as they arise in other periods of philosophy beyond ancient philosophy as well.

If we proceed in this way, we find that the study of the history of philosophy of mind offers the contemporary philosopher perspectives on the discipline which, however far below the surface, may yet guide our own inquiries into the mental and physical, and into the character of mental and physical states and processes. This is, of course, but one reason to engage the studies these six volumes contain. Other researchers with a more purely historical orientation will find a wealth of material in these pages as well, ranging across all periods of western philosophy, from antiquity to that part of the discipline that resides in living memory. Our historical and philosophical interests here may, of course, be fully complementary: the history of philosophy of mind takes one down some odd by-ways off some familiar boulevards, into some dead-ends and cul-de-sacs, but also along some well-travelled highways that are well worth traversing over and again.

Notes

- 1 A perusal of the course offerings of leading universities in the US tends to confirm this. To take but one example, which may be multiplied, a search of the archives of the University of Notre Dame lists one course in 'Philosophy of Mind' offered as an advanced elective in 1918 and 1928, 1929, but then no further course until 1967, when 'The Mind-Body Problem,' began to be offered yearly off and on for two decades. In the 1970s, various electives such as 'Mind and Machines' were offered intermittently, and a regular offering in 'Philosophy of Mind' began only in 1982. This offering continues down to the present. While we have not done a comprehensive study, these results cohere with archive searches of several other North American universities.
- 2 Arendt sees prefigurations in St. Paul and others, but regards Augustine as 'the first philosopher of the will and the only philosopher the Romans ever had' (1978, vol. ii, 84).
- 3 For an overview of these issues, see Marmura (1986).
- 4 On the relation between Descartes and Augustine, see the instructive treatment in Matthews (1992).
- 5 Sartre (1943: 32–33).
- 6 Matson (1966). Citing Matson's question, King (2007) went on to pose a continuing question of his own: 'Why Isn't the Mind-Body Problem Medieval?'. In so doing, King meant to oppose Matson, who had claimed that the one should not assume that medieval philosophers, although writing in a recognizably Aristotelian idiom, similarly failed to engage any mind-body problem. After all, he noted, in addition to their Aristotelianism, they accepted a full range of theistic commitments alien to Aristotle.
- 7 Eliminativism about the mental has a long a chequered history, extending at least as far back as Broad (1925) (who rejects it), but has its most forceful and accessible formulation in Churchland (1988).
- 8 Charles (2008) has advanced this sort of argument on behalf of hylomorphism.

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INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME 2

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1 Introduction

The historical period covered in this volume begins with the Neoplatonic translator and commentator and Roman senator Boethius (*ca.* 480–524) and concludes with the Franciscan theologian and philosopher John Duns Scotus (*ca.* 1266–1308). What we find during the nine hundred intervening years is an exciting, tumultuous, and philosophically robust period of discovery, rediscovery, innovation, and intellectual controversy taking place in multiple languages over large territories, stretching from ancient Rome, through England and France, into Alexandria, Baghdad, Spain, and eventually throughout Europe. Philosophy of mind during this period is in fact much broader and often stranger than it is taken to be in contemporary philosophical circles. Discussions took place within a wider context of investigation into and debate over what is better termed “philosophical anthropology”, or the study of the human soul and its relation to other living things, to God, and to the material world, including human bodies. No introduction to the historical context of the period could do justice to the sheer volume, let alone complexity, of these topics; many excellent studies of various portions of this extensive historical period have been done (and will be noted throughout). Instead, this introduction is intended for those who are more or less unfamiliar with what happened in the history of the philosophy of mind from the end of the ancient period to the start of the fourteenth century. For those already familiar with this period and this material, jump ahead and read the chapters themselves.

This period in the history of philosophy has its roots the ancient world, to Plato, to Aristotle, to the medical writer Galen (129–*ca.* 200), to the Neoplatonist Plotinus (*ca.* 204–270) and other Neoplatonic commentators, and to Augustine (354–430) and other Christian writers. It also branches forward, past the end of the thirteenth century, by means of the theoretical authority acquired by many of its figures, such as Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), his teacher Albert the Great (*ca.* 1200–1280), and John Duns Scotus (1265/66–1308), as well as the Arabic philosophers Ibn Sina (*ca.* 970–1037), known in the Latin West as “Avicenna”, Ibn Rushd (1126–1198), known as “Averroes”, and Jewish thinker Moses

Maimonides (*ca.* 1135–1204), just to mention some of the most influential names. It would be a great mistake to think that the years covered by this volume mark off any natural period in intellectual history. Rather, by being set in this series of volumes on the history of philosophy of mind, it should be thought of as part of a continuous history, impossible fully to appreciate and understand without recognizing the relationship of its major achievements to the work that came before and after.

Even so, some periodization within this 900 year stretch can be helpfully marked off. In what follows, we will examine four overlapping periods. We start with Boethius and his intellectual context and examine some of the major achievements that followed in what is called the “Latin West” (roughly, at this time, northern Europe and parts of England) up until the eleventh century theologian Anselm of Canterbury (*ca.* 1033–1109). Second, we will turn to the development of philosophy, particularly the philosophy of mind in Arabic-speaking centres of learning, turning our focus to two towering figures: Avicenna and Averroes. Third, we mark off the twelfth century in the Latin west as a major turning point in intellectual history, as a period of intense recovery and translation of parts of ancient as well as Arabic philosophy. Within this century, running alongside the new developments prompted by the availability of new material, we find an avid fascination – little explored in the history of philosophy – with topics in the philosophy of mind. Fourth, and finally, we turn to the study of the philosophy of mind taking place in the new intellectual world of the university, both in Paris and Oxford, and then beyond. Since no one list of topics could be generated to characterize the study of philosophy of mind during this long, multifaceted period, we will instead highlight some of the most pressing topics along the way.

2 Between Boethius and Anselm in the Latin West

Boethius served as the first conduit for the transmission of ancient Greek philosophy into the Latin language, which remained the language of academia in the West throughout this period (and beyond). Boethius set out to translate and comment on all the works of Plato and Aristotle, the two philosophers who, in his day, were regarded as authoritative and – rather surprising from a present-day perspective – doctrinally compatible along most philosophical dimensions.¹ His early death made this ambitious plan impossible, although he managed to translate the majority of Aristotle’s logical writings, two of which were transmitted into the medieval period, namely the *Categories* and *On Interpretation*. Boethius’ commentaries on these works, as well as on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* (usually taken as an introduction to logic), link more than just Aristotle to the future: in his lengthy commentaries on these works, Boethius reports the views of a host of ancient commentators, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias (*fl.* late second and early third centuries) and Plotinus’ student Porphyry (*ca.* 234–*ca.* 305), among others. Boethius’ reliance on and interest in the ancient commentators not only gave medieval readers insight into this rich ancient tradition but primed them to be open to, indeed eager for, the

assistance those commentators would provide once their works were translated into Latin in the thirteenth century and beyond.

In addition to this achievement, Boethius also provided a work on logical division, *On Division*, in which of the three main ways of dividing parts and wholes provided a mereological framework for later thinkers, who tackled (for example) the question of the division of the soul into its parts (see Chapter 9). But it was Boethius' best-selling *Consolation of Philosophy*, a philosophical reflection about the true nature of being human and about the question of whether, in a universe providentially governed by an omnipotent God, humans can have free will, that provided a major resource for thinking about philosophy of mind. Read continuously throughout this period in the Latin West and included on the prescribed curriculae of study in the universities, the *Consolation* provided a basic psychological vocabulary and a description of the relationship between various mental processes/acts, for example, sensing, imagining, estimating, reasoning, and understanding, as well as the differences between animal, human, and divine cognition. Like Augustine, Boethius was a Christian and a Neoplatonist: this spiritual and intellectual orientation was enormously attractive to many Western thinkers, and Boethius' authority remained secure throughout this period (see Chapter 2).

What happened after the death of Boethius in the Latin West? As D. Gutas dramatically explained, "Philosophy died a lingering death before Islam appeared" (Gutas 2010, 11). Chronologically, this is mostly correct: after the pagan philosophical schools were closed by edict of the Emperor Justinian in 529, it was only in Baghdad in the ninth century that we find any major philosophical activity taking place (see section 3, Introduction). In the Latin West, a period of philosophical silence also ensued, to be picked up again only in the late eighth century's court of Charlemagne. Intellectuals and politicians were stimulated by theological controversies (such as the production of religious images, the nature of the Trinity, predestination, and so on) to turn to logical works, specifically those inherited from Boethius, to solve problems. Immediately, however, philosophically minded intellectuals turned to questions in the philosophy of mind: Alcuin (active ca. 780), the leading political thinker, wrote *On the rational soul* (*De animae ratione*), and the leading philosopher John Scottus Eriugena (ca. 800–ca. 877) penned the masterful five-part *On nature* (*Periphyseon*), the fourth and fifth parts of which put forward his views on human nature within the perspective of a mystically oriented theophany (see Chapter 12). A speculative idealist, Eriugena held the bold position that human nature, which uniquely mediates between worldly and other-worldly realms, transcends this material reality and exists as a concept made eternally in the divine mind.² The activity of this period set into motion a period of theologically motivated philosophical inquiry, inspired in part by mystical theology of the Greek Pseudo-Dionysius (the sixth century Neoplatonist trying pass himself off as Dionysius the Areopagite,³ thereby cashing in on Christian credentials), but in the main by the thought of St. Augustine.⁴

Among the early medieval Latin thinkers that followed, Anselm of Canterbury towers in importance both for his philosophical ingenuity and legacy. To

contemporary readers, Anselm is best known for his ontological proof for the existence of God presented in the *Proslogion*, that is, of “that than which nothing greater can be thought”. For the history of philosophy of mind, Anselm’s *On Truth* and *On Free Will*, two books in a three book collection which also includes *On the Fall of the Devil*, are more important. By his own description:

One of the three is *On Truth*, what it is and in what things it is customarily said to be found; and what is justice. The second is *On Free Will*, what it is, and whether a man always has it, and how many different ways there are of having and not having rectitude of will, the preserving of which is the task of the rational creature. In it I showed how great the natural strength of the will is for preserving rectitude once acquired, not how necessary grace may be for it.

(Anselm 1998, 151)

It helps to situate Anselm in his own environment, noting that while some philosophical texts (e.g., Aristotle’s *Categories* and *On Interpretation*, as well as the Pseudo-Augustinian *Ten Categories*) were in use, the logical schools organized around the teaching of a master were only just getting started in Paris. Anselm was not untouched by this work, but he was mainly motivated by another type of school – the secular theological schools, especially that of Laon, in which controversies were rapidly boiling over and motivating a new generation of intellectuals to inquire after human nature. We will pick up on this development in section 4.

3 Development of the Arabic tradition in the history of the philosophy of mind

Arguably, the most influential philosopher in the Arabic tradition is Avicenna, whose philosophical output would not have been possible without the momentous translation of Greek intellectual writings into Arabic beginning in the eight century. Not only were Aristotle’s writings made available through this initiative, which was broadly supported in Baghdad by the political and religious elite (see Gutas 1998), but so too were the writings of Plato, the ancient Greek Neoplatonic commentators, and medical works by Galen and others. Philosophical interest in philosophical psychology meshed with interest in biology and other natural sciences and must be reviewed as being continuous with physiological inquiry (Gutas 1998; Harvey 2006). This meant that, for example, in the process of identifying and determining the functions of various activities of the soul, such as nutrition, perception, and memory (to name just a few), philosophers in this tradition were also keen to associate these activities with locations and operations of the physical body. In addition, many philosophical arguments and theories of the Arabic-speaking philosophers were advanced against the background of, and oftentimes in direct debate with, Muslim theologians, the *Mutakallimūn*.

What we are calling “philosophy of mind” here was known as the science of the soul in the Arabic tradition. There was a religious motivation for engaging in this study; according to philosopher and theologian al-Ghazali (1058/9–1111), there are “only two starting points for attaining knowledge of God: knowledge of the human soul and knowledge of the visible world”. Coming to know the human soul was a teleologically driven rational inquiry, with the goal of attaining human perfection. Aristotle’s *On the soul* provided the starting point of inquiry, lending a philosophical vocabulary and psychic schema to this project. Consequently, philosophers in the Arabic tradition operated within a more or less hylomorphic metaphysical framework in which Aristotle’s definition of the soul was “the first actuality of a natural body that has life potentially” (*On the soul* 412a27).

While accepting a broadly Aristotelian perspective, Avicenna was also strongly influenced by Plato as well as Neoplatonic currents. In brief, Avicenna did not accept Aristotle’s theory of the soul. Instead, he held a substance-dualist view, an approach more congenial to Plato, according to which body and soul are discrete substances that nonetheless operate closely together. His view is supported by an ingenious and famous thought experiment known as the “flying man”:

We say, therefore, that one of us must imagine himself as created all at once and perfect but with his sight veiled from seeing external things, and created as moving in the air or in the void so that the density of the air, which he could perceive, would not touch him, and with his limbs separate in such a way that they neither meet nor touch each other. He must then see if he affirms the existence of his essence. For, he would not hesitate to affirm that he exists, but he would not affirm anything external about his members, anything hidden about what is inside him, neither his mind nor his brain, or anything external whatsoever. But he would affirm that he exists without affirming his length, width, or density. If he were able at that time to imagine a hand or some other member, he would not imagine it to be a part of him or necessary to his existence. Now, you know that what is affirmed is different from what is not affirmed and what is granted is different from what is not granted. And because the essence that he affirms to exist is proper to him in that it is himself and in addition to the body, he who is attentive has the means to be awakened to knowing that the being of the soul is different from the being of the body; indeed, he does not need the body in order to know and perceive the soul.

(Avicenna *On the soul* 1.1, 36–7)⁵

Consequently, Avicenna was able to argue for the soul’s continued existence after bodily death.⁶

Avicenna’s interest in the soul and psychological phenomena is remarkably wide ranging. Of particular importance are his theories of the five internal and five external senses. The internal senses are common sense, imagery, imagination, estimation, and memory; the external are vision, hearing, smell, touch, and taste.

Avicenna was particularly interested in sense perception in order to explain how individual objects of perception are able to be intellectuated by the soul. Avicenna posited that there are in fact two objects of sense perception: in addition to the images of the sensible objects, which are their sensible forms, Avicenna added that the faculty of estimation is capable of grasping intentions (*ma'naa*), which he took to be meanings. The intention thus grasped enables the sensible to be intelligible, having ultimately emanated from the Active Intellect, which is the source of all understanding (see Chapters 3 and 8).

Avicenna's influence carried on continuously in the subsequent Arabic tradition⁷ and was a major factor in thirteenth-century theories of the soul in the European West. So, too, was the philosophy of Averroes, whose many commentaries on Aristotle's *On the soul* demonstrate his ongoing efforts to interpret Aristotle's views correctly. His views evolved throughout his lifetime, and with regard to cognition Averroes moved away from an early commitment to an emanationist theory to the view that the Agent Intellect illuminates by means of efficient causation both the potential subject and object of cognition. Averroes' focus was on the role and operation of the material intellect, which is the principle of potential intellection for human beings. The question is: how can this potential for thought become actualized? In his *Middle Commentary on On the Soul*, Averroes thought the material intellect had an incidental connection to a human soul but was effectively "on loan" from the Agent Intellect, which is wholly separate from human beings:

It has thus been explained that the hylic [i.e., material] intellect is something composed of the disposition found in us and of an intellect conjoined to this disposition. As conjoined to the disposition, it is a disposed intellect, not an intellect in act; though, as not conjoined to this disposition, it is an intellect in act; while, in itself, this intellect is the Agent Intellect, the existence of which will be shown later.

(Averroes 2002, 284)⁸

In his *Longer Commentary on On the Soul*, however, Averroes famously sheds this view, along with the view that each individual human being has his or her own material intellect. If this were the case, then among the many unwanted implications would be that each received intelligible would be unique to its thinker, and consequently there could be no common or shared understanding of what is understood. Instead, there is one material intellect shared by the entire human species:

For just as light is the actuality of the transparent [medium], so the agent intellect is the actuality of the material [intellect]. Just as the transparent [medium] is not moved by color and does not receive it except when there is light, so too that intellect does not receive the intelligibles which are here except insofar as it is actualized through that [agent] intellect

and illuminated by it. Just as light makes color in potency to be in act in such a way that it can move the transparent [medium], so the agent intellect makes the intentions in potency to be intelligible in act in such a way that the material intellect receives them. This, then, is how the material intellect and the agent [intellect] should be understood.

(Averroes 2009, 3.5, 411)

This theory, which raised a great deal of controversy in the Latin West, became known as the doctrine of the unicity of the intellect (although Averroes' own views were often misunderstood). Among the controversies pursuant to this view were its implications for personal immortality.

There were many other exciting developments in Averroes' thinking about the soul and its operations, including his views on estimation, imagination, memory, and many other topics.⁹ We will return to Avicenna and Averroes in section 5.

4 Twelfth century in the Latin West

Most histories of philosophy demarcate the "early medieval period" from "late" or "high medieval period" with the advent of the rise of the universities in the early thirteenth century. This periodization, however, obscures the considerable developments of the twelfth century in the Latin West. Moreover, even those historians who have turned their sights on the twelfth century have overwhelmingly focused on the developments in logic, as well as the influence of logic on theology. There may be an explanation of sorts for this negligence: philosophers in the twelfth century were without the benefit of access to Aristotle's *On the Soul*, and so were left to recover theoretical bits from the writings of the Church Fathers, from Boethius' commentaries on logic, and other resources. The history of philosophical anthropology at this time, however, with its strong inclination toward Platonic philosophy, demands greater attention, given the intense attention given to all sorts of questions about the human soul. The turn to serious investigation of the nature of the soul and its place in the cosmos (and, ultimately, its relationship to God) can perhaps be explained by the cultural and political tumult of the period. According to medieval historian G. Constable (1996, 4), "The eleventh and twelfth centuries, and especially the years between about 1040 and 1160, were a period of intense, rapid, and to a high degree self-conscious change in almost all aspects of human thought and activity." At the same time, stability afforded by growing social cohesion and the communities of monastic scholarship enabled the production of significant pieces of scholarship. The pulse and productivity of this period is made all the more thrilling given what is taking place in the background: the recovery and translation into Latin of the bulk of Aristotle's philosophical corpus, along with the first translations of commentaries and studies by Arabic philosophers.

If anything, the twelfth century is known to non-specialists because of the life and work of Peter Abelard (1079–1142), justly famed as a great logician and made

popular because of his scandalous life, as he himself presented it in his autobiographical *History of my calamities*. At this time students were moving *en masse* to Paris, attracted by the presence of paid masters specializing in the study of Aristotelian logic.¹⁰ None of the available philosophical treatises being taught at this time in Paris directly addressed topics in the philosophy of mind; indirectly, however, the philosophy of mind demanded attention, given the nature of the logical topics most hotly debated. For instance, their logic concerned itself with the theory of signification, according to which “to signify” is “to generate an understanding” of something in someone. How spoken words connect with the things about which we speak and how they generate understandings in the mind were topics of serious concern. It is not surprise, then, that such concerns prompted Abelard to investigate the psychology behind the activity of signifying. In a similar way, logic deals with concepts and properties and so equally gives way to a second free-standing interest in the problem of universals: are universals to be found in reality or only in our words and understanding? Again, it is the connection to the role of understanding in explaining one’s position on this philosophical question that generated new theories of cognition. But as for other anthropological questions – about the nature of the soul, its connection to the body, and so on – these remained mostly untouched by the logical communities. If anything, a basic commitment to Augustine’s substance dualism (in which the body is one substance and the immaterial soul another), which hewed much closer to Plato’s conception of the relationship between body and soul than to Aristotle’s, along with religious faith seemed to render these questions unimportant to these young philosophers.

Outside the logic classrooms, however, there was intense interest in all sorts of anthropological issues, motivating the production of a number of treatises on the soul. The ancient texts around which many of their discussions were framed paint a clear picture of the importance of Platonism to these thinkers: for example, *The Marriage of Mercury and Philology* by the fourth century Martianus Capella, Boethius’ *Consolation of Philosophy*, not to mention all of the available works by Augustine. These authors were self-consciously both Christians and Platonists, and explicit efforts to work out a synthesis between Christian and Platonic doctrines can be found throughout their writings. Three broad traditions of Platonic anthropology (which could equally be called “Platonic cosmology”, since human beings were often depicted as microcosms of the universe) will be briefly noted, although these are research areas to which historians of philosophy today have not paid much attention.¹¹ Nonetheless, to display the breadth of philosophical interest in these issues, they deserve brief mention.

The first, centred around the monastery of St. Victor, developed an Augustinian-inspired substance dualism to account for the nature of human beings. According to Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173) in his treatise *On the Trinity*:

What is man if not a “rational mortal animal”? This formula carries a primary and a secondary [consignified] meaning. “Animal” means, in effect, substance. Not substance absolutely, but substance blessed with

sensibility. “Man” does not signify sensitive substance absolutely, but sensitive substance blessed with rationality.

(Richard of St. Victor 1958 IV.6)

The second is centred around the city of Chartres¹² and is represented by the figures of William of Conches (*ca.* 1090–*ca.* 1154), Gilbert of Poitiers (*ca.* 1085–1154), and John of Salisbury (*ca.* 1120–1180). A good example of the effort to identify both differences and common ground between Christian Scripture, the Church Fathers, and Platonism can be found in William of Conches’ dialogue between a Duke and a Philosopher on the topic of natural philosophy called *Dragmaticon*. In a discussion about the human soul, William investigates the location of the soul in the body:

DUKE: If the soul as a whole is in one’s hand, then when one’s hand is cut off the soul will be separated from the body.

PHILOSOPHER: If the soul as a whole were in the hand in such a way that it was not as a whole in another organ as well, your objection would hold. Although the hand, therefore, in which the soul resides entirely, is cut off, it remains, however, in the other organs in which it also was entirely before.

DUKE: Whose opinion do you support? That which holds that all souls were created at the same time or that which claims that new souls are created daily?

PHILOSOPHER: I am a Christian, not an Academic [i.e., not a member of Plato’s school]. With Augustine, therefore, I believe and hold that new souls are created daily, that they are created not by transmission, not from some other material, but from nothing, by the sole command of the Creator. . . . Many, however, conjecture that the soul is joined on as soon as the body has become ready to receive it, because the Creator *blew the breath of life upon the face of Adam* [Genesis 2.7] after he had formed his body. Plato seems to agree with this opinion when he says, “Therefore, they [that is, the gods] bound the circuits of the soul to the ready material, [namely,] the wet and fluid body. [*Timaeus* 43A, in Calcidius’ translation].”

(William of Conches 1997, 170)

The third is centred around the monastic order of the Cistercians and is represented by the figures of William of St. Thierry and Isaac of Stella. According to B. McGinn, their “technical questions of psychology were . . . directly related to a wider anthropological and spiritual program designed to provide a theoretical basis for man’s return to God” (McGinn 1977, 20–21). Concerned primarily to systematize the operations of the soul, these thinkers also explored the soul’s connections to physiology and medicine. William of St. Thierry (*ca.* 1075–1148) began his work *The Nature of Body and Soul* with facts he had gathered from available literature on subject such as the four bodily humours and the processes of digestion and concludes his treatise on the dynamism of the soul’s ascent and descent.

Another point of interest for this albeit brief and patchy history is the all-important set of writings called the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard (ca. 1105–ca. 1160). This four-volume work contains an organized compendium of themes emerging from biblical texts and quotations from Church Fathers. First assembled by Peter Abelard in his *Yes and No* (*Sic et Non*), these types of compendia were fashionable, and several were produced in the twelfth century. Lombard's *Sentences* gained the strongest foothold, however, and became the authoritative source for theologically motivated questions and topics. Many topics, from angelic cognition to the nature of the Eucharist, elicited philosophical speculation. Every university-educated person would have been familiar with the material, since in the Christian tradition, the *Sentences*, it has been claimed, is second only to the Bible in the numbers of commentaries written on it (Grabmann 1911, 392, repeated in Rosemann 2004, 3).

5 The heyday of thirteenth-century philosophy of mind

The thirteenth century in the European West was vibrant, eclectic, and transformative. Universities in Paris, Bologna, and England had become firmly established by the start of that century, complete with discipline-specific curriculae grounded – not always uncontroversially¹³ – in the works of Aristotle, which had only recently become widely available to the Latin-speaking scholars of this period. As was the case for Avicenna and Averroes, the study of the science of the soul was situated in the context of natural philosophy, i.e., physics, as one of its branches. Focus on the soul, considered in Aristotle's sense as the principle of living things, entailed that it encompassed not just human but also animal and plant souls. But the science of the soul was also a subject for metaphysical speculation: questions about its essence, parts, unity, relation to the body, to God, and to eternity were answered in nearly countless commentaries on *On the Soul* and other treatises. What follows will be a mere sketch of some of the highlights, and the reader can be guided by footnote references to more comprehensive studies on this complicated and rich period.

After Aristotle's *On the Soul* was first translated into Latin, it did not enjoy immediate attention. When it was first translated in the mid-twelfth century by James of Venice, philosophically minded theologians were occupied writing their own treatises on the soul envisioning human beings as microcosms of the universe, as we saw earlier. The first person to incorporate some Aristotelian elements into his treatise on the soul was Dominicus Gundissalinus (ca. 1115–ca. 1190), who was also the first to translate Avicenna's work on the soul from *The Healing*; in fact, much of Gundissalinus' treatise consists of long passages copied from Avicenna's text.¹⁴ Commentaries on Aristotle's *On the Soul* did not begin to appear until nearly one hundred years after James' translation,¹⁵ and by this time in the late mid-thirteenth century, the Avicennian influence had worn off in favour of that of Averroes. This was partly a consequence of the availability of Averroes' *Long Commentary on the De Anima* in Latin translation by the 1220s, as well as

an accompanying Latin translation of the Arabic translation of *On the Soul*.¹⁶ It was also a consequence of changing intellectual tastes for topics that were not covered by Avicenna.

In order to appreciate the development of thinking about the soul during this period, it is important to note the double appearance of Aristotle's *On the Soul* on the university curriculum: it was first read and studied by students in the first cycle of a bachelor's degree alongside the study of logical and grammatical works. It was then studied again in a course containing Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics*:

the book *On the Soul*, if it is read with the works on natural philosophy [should be read] at the feast of the Ascension Day, but if it is read with the books on logic [it should be read] at the feast of the Annunciation of the holy Virgin.¹⁷

This double placement is evidence of the dual character of Aristotle's treatise as a work of both epistemology and natural science. In addition, many of the topics covered in Aristotle's *On the Soul* were explored in the context of metaphysics, thereby lending it a tri-disciplinary character. It is epistemic in the sense that thirteenth-century philosophers inquired whether we can know the soul with certainty, and how such knowledge is possible. (It was also epistemic in the sense that the soul was something so obviously felt by every thinker.) It was a subject for natural science since its relation to other parts of the body and their operations were treated as topics of biology and physiology. Additionally, it is treated in metaphysical writings in the sense that they investigated the soul's definition, its nature or essence, its parts, the way in which it hylomorphically exists, the nature of its matter, whether its matter contains any actuality of its own, and so on. Study of the soul was complex and expansive and, following the first lines of Aristotle's treatise, was regarded to be difficult.¹⁸

Just as Avicenna marked a major turning point in the tradition of Arabic philosophy, so too did Thomas Aquinas for the period considered here. We have already mentioned that, prior to the mid-century, study of the soul was largely Avicennian-inspired. This entailed that the soul was defined, following Avicenna, as the *perfection* of the body. It was also more deeply infused with religious aims, which raised questions about what the proper discipline for a metaphysical study of the soul should be, as this passage from John Blund (*ca.* 1175–1249) demonstrates:

The theologian has to inquire how the soul may earn merit and demerit and what leads to salvation and what to damnation. But it is not his task to inquire what the soul is, to what category it belongs, and how it is infused into the body. Consequently, knowledge of these things pertains to someone of another faculty [i.e., the Arts Faculty]. Therefore, since the theologian only has to teach how to earn merit and demerit, it is not his proper task to teach what the soul is and what its essence is.

(*Tractatus de anima* 2, 7.14)¹⁹

Long quotations and paraphrases taken from Avicenna's *On the Soul* all but disappear in the first commentaries on Aristotle's treatise. Averroes' *Long Commentary* became the model for a new approach to Aristotle, which provided not only "a hermeneutical framework, a model of interpretation based on the search for logical consistency between the propositions of a given text using principles of the whole philosophical system of which that text is a part" (Bazán 2005, 596), but also answers to new questions about the unicity of the soul, the plurality of forms, and other metaphysical matters.²⁰ With regard to the unicity of the soul, Aquinas took the line that every substance can have but one substantial form (see Chapter 9). Consequently, the intellective soul was no longer defined as the perfection of the body but rather as its substantial form.²¹ Aquinas' thesis was amplified by the work of the so-called "Radical Aristotelians", such as Siger of Brabant (*ca.* 1240–1284), John of Jandun (*ca.* 1295–1323), and Boethius of Dacia (*fl.* thirteenth century). These philosophers adopted some version of Averroes' thesis of the unicity of the material intellect for the human species.²² While this may appear to some today to be a reasonable Aristotelian position to take, the thesis generated enormous controversy in its day, and Aquinas was faced with opposition from multiple sides. Franciscans such as John Peckham (*ca.* 1230–1292) even publically argued with Aquinas. The Franciscan preference for the plurality of substantial forms thesis became known as the "*Correctoria*" debates, after the *Correctorium fratris Thomae* written by William de la Mare in about 1277. By this stage, there was already a widespread theological rejection of Aquinas' unicity of form argument, primarily due to its undesirable theological implications for core Christian beliefs about Christ's numerical identity (before and after Christ is in the tomb), the Eucharist, the doctrine of original sin, and others.²³ But the most striking blow against the unicity of substantial form thesis came from Robert Kilwardby (*ca.* 1215–1279),²⁴ who was responsible for generating a list of 217 condemned theses that could not be taught in the universities. This was the well-known collection of "Condemnations of 1277", although the impact they really had on changing the course of intellectual history is a subject of much debate;²⁵ certainly the topic of the soul's unicity or plurality continued to be discussed and debated.

While debates about the soul and its parts continued through the end of the thirteenth century and into the start of the fourteenth (which marks the end of the period covered in this volume), the influence of Aristotle's *On the Soul* began to wane to a certain degree. According to Bazán (2005, 596), some arts masters continued to teach and comment on Aristotle's treatise, but

not without feeling oppressed, though, and censored. . . . And perhaps not without also feeling perplexed, may we add, because if there was so much error in Aristotle's texts, why should they be kept in the curriculum? . . . The focus of their attention shifted, then, from the mere exegesis of Aristotle's texts to the analysis of Averroes' interpretation and its philosophical difficulties.

While the many debates and theories about the soul's unicity or plurality are probably the best known part of the thirteenth century's interest in the science of the soul amongst historians of philosophy, it is by far only a fraction of what held the philosophical and theological interests of the many masters working in Paris and Oxford. Some of the many topics are covered in the following chapters: intellectual cognition (Chapter 2), intellectual abstraction (Chapter 3), the will (Chapters 4 and 5), perceptual experience (Chapter 6), emotions (Chapter 7), the relation between the soul and agent intellect (Chapter 8), the soul and its parts (Chapter 9), immortality (Chapter 10), morality (Chapter 11) and the self (Chapter 12).

Notes

- 1 On Boethius' writings, see Marenbon and Magee 2009. On the agreement between Plato and Aristotle, see Karamanolis 2006, Chiaradonna 2013, and Griffin 2015.
- 2 *Periphyseon* 770B. For this position Eriugena was very attractive to later mystical thinkers such as Meister Eckhart (*ca.* 1260–*ca.* 1328), as well as idealists such as Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), not without having been accused on occasion of being pantheistic (and thus heretical).
- 3 See Gersh 1978 and Perl 2008; on Pseudo-Dionysius' ongoing influence, Rourke 1992.
- 4 See especially Marenbon 1981 and Marenbon 1983. Marenbon's history of the period from *ca.* 780 to 1100 remains the single best study, although his focus is mainly (though not exclusively) on the impact of logic on theological developments (see also Marenbon 2008). A study that focuses on the history of philosophical anthropology from this period remains to be written, but see Erismann 2011.
- 5 Translation from Toivanen 2015, 67, from the Latin translation by Dominicus Gundisalpinus and Avendauth. On this experiment see Black 2008, Marmura 1986, and Toivanen 2015.
- 6 Avicenna's arguments for this position are translated in Khalidi 2005, 48–52.
- 7 According to Adamson and Taylor 2005, 3–4: "Like Kant in the German tradition or Plato and Aristotle in the Greek tradition, Avicenna significantly influenced everything that came after him in the Arabic tradition." See Janssens 1991, Langermann 2010, and Hasse and Bertolacci 2012 for recent scholarship on Avicenna's legacy.
- 8 There is considerable secondary literature on Averroes' changing theories of the material intellect. See Ivry 2002, Taylor 2000, Taylor 2009, and Cory 2015.
- 9 For example, on memory see Black 1996; on imagination see Druart 2007.
- 10 Some scholars prefer to think of this as a period of the study of Boethian logic, since the study of Aristotle's and Porphyry's ideas was mediated by Boethius' commentaries on their works.
- 11 This was not the case in the earlier half of the twentieth century when interest in these Neoplatonic thinkers was much greater amongst historians of philosophy.
- 12 To what extent it is correct to speak of a "School of Chartres" has been a matter of debate: see Jeaneau 2009.
- 13 See Piché 1999 and the bibliography he provides.
- 14 See Callus 1939, Dales 1995, and Hasse 2000, 13–18.
- 15 It is generally thought that the first commentary on Aristotle's *On the Soul* was written by Peter of Spain (a different author than the better-known Peter of Spain who wrote the *Summulae logicales* and later became Pope), but see Wood 2001 for the claim that the Franciscan Richard Rufus (d. *ca.* 1260) was the earliest, since he was "the earliest Western teacher of the new Aristotle we know". A chronological list of thirteenth-century commentaries by known and anonymous authors can be found in Bazán 2005, 626.

- 16 See Minio-Paluello 1972.
- 17 Denifle and Châtelain 1889–1897, 1, 124. This is the notice in the 1252 Statutes of the English nation at the University of Paris.
- 18 Aristotle 402a1–11 first calls the study of the soul “more honourable and precious than any other”, and then says that “To attain any knowledge about the soul is one of the most difficult things in the world”.
- 19 Quoted in Hasse 2000, 19.
- 20 For an excellent overview of the commentary tradition on *De Anima* in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, see De Boer 2013.
- 21 Aquinas’ views are set out in his *Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima*, *Summa theologiae* I, qq. 75–79 and *De unitate intellectus* and have been widely studied. On Averroes’ influence on Aquinas, see Taylor 2013, which also provides a translation of Aquinas’ *Commentary on Book II of the Sentences, Distinction 17, Question 2, Article 1* containing Aquinas’ first encounter with Averroes’ thought: “Whether there is one soul or intellect for all human beings”.
- 22 The interpretation of Radical Aristotelianism is still controversial, although recent studies present the position in much less radical terms than in the past, when the position on the soul’s unicity as well as on the eternity of the world were thought to be part of a “doctrine of double truth”. See Bazán 2005 and the bibliography he provides there.
- 23 Glorieux 1974.
- 24 On Kilwardby’s science of the soul, see Silva 2012.
- 25 For a recent study of the condemnations that chronicles the lengthy debates over their correct interpretation and intellectual effects, see Piché 1999. According to Silva 2012, 261–262, the idea that many of these condemnations were directed against Aquinas stems from what he calls a “pro-Thomist historiographical bias”. Silva follows Wilshire 1964, who presents Kilwardby as “an old man caught off guard without enough knowledge of the newer philosophical discussions of which Aquinas is the leading figure”.

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